- Linux-stable-mirror - lists.linaro.org

[PATCH V2 net] net: mana: Fix the extra HZ in mana_hwc_send_request

by Souradeep Chakrabarti

Commit 62c1bff593b7 added an extra HZ along with msecs_to_jiffies. This patch fixes that. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 62c1bff593b7 ("net: mana: Configure hwc timeout from hardware") Signed-off-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <schakrabarti(a)linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui(a)microsoft.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c index 2729a2c5acf9..ca814fe8a775 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/hw_channel.c @@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ int mana_hwc_send_request(struct hw_channel_context *hwc, u32 req_len, } if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&ctx->comp_event, - (msecs_to_jiffies(hwc->hwc_timeout) * HZ))) { + (msecs_to_jiffies(hwc->hwc_timeout)))) { dev_err(hwc->dev, "HWC: Request timed out!\n"); err = -ETIMEDOUT; goto out; -- 2.34.1

1 hour, 13 minutes

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 2/2] selftests/mm: compaction_test: Fix trivial test success and reduce probability of OOM-killer invocation

by Dev Jain

Reset nr_hugepages to zero before the start of the test. If a non-zero number of hugepages is already set before the start of the test, the following problems arise: - The probability of the test getting OOM-killed increases. Proof: The test wants to run on 80% of available memory to prevent OOM-killing (see original code comments). Let the value of mem_free at the start of the test, when nr_hugepages = 0, be x. In the other case, when nr_hugepages > 0, let the memory consumed by hugepages be y. In the former case, the test operates on 0.8 * x of memory. In the latter, the test operates on 0.8 * (x - y) of memory, with y already filled, hence, memory consumed is y + 0.8 * (x - y) = 0.8 * x + 0.2 * y > 0.8 * x. Q.E.D - The probability of a bogus test success increases. Proof: Let the memory consumed by hugepages be greater than 25% of x, with x and y defined as above. The definition of compaction_index is c_index = (x - y)/z where z is the memory consumed by hugepages after trying to increase them again. In check_compaction(), we set the number of hugepages to zero, and then increase them back; the probability that they will be set back to consume at least y amount of memory again is very high (since there is not much delay between the two attempts of changing nr_hugepages). Hence, z >= y > (x/4) (by the 25% assumption). Therefore, c_index = (x - y)/z <= (x - y)/y = x/y - 1 < 4 - 1 = 3 hence, c_index can always be forced to be less than 3, thereby the test succeeding always. Q.E.D NOTE: This patch depends on the previous one. Fixes: bd67d5c15cc1 ("Test compaction of mlocked memory") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain(a)arm.com> --- tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c | 72 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c index c5be395f8363..2ae059989771 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c @@ -82,12 +82,15 @@ int prereq(void) return -1; } -int check_compaction(unsigned long mem_free, unsigned int hugepage_size) +int check_compaction(unsigned long mem_free, unsigned int hugepage_size, + int initial_nr_hugepages) { int fd, ret = -1; int compaction_index = 0; - char initial_nr_hugepages[10] = {0}; char nr_hugepages[10] = {0}; + char init_nr_hugepages[10] = {0}; + + sprintf(init_nr_hugepages, "%d", initial_nr_hugepages); /* We want to test with 80% of available memory. Else, OOM killer comes in to play */ @@ -101,23 +104,6 @@ int check_compaction(unsigned long mem_free, unsigned int hugepage_size) goto out; } - if (read(fd, initial_nr_hugepages, sizeof(initial_nr_hugepages)) <= 0) { - ksft_print_msg("Failed to read from /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages: %s\n", - strerror(errno)); - goto close_fd; - } - - lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET); - - /* Start with the initial condition of 0 huge pages*/ - if (write(fd, "0", sizeof(char)) != sizeof(char)) { - ksft_print_msg("Failed to write 0 to /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages: %s\n", - strerror(errno)); - goto close_fd; - } - - lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET); - /* Request a large number of huge pages. The Kernel will allocate as much as it can */ if (write(fd, "100000", (6*sizeof(char))) != (6*sizeof(char))) { @@ -140,8 +126,8 @@ int check_compaction(unsigned long mem_free, unsigned int hugepage_size) lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET); - if (write(fd, initial_nr_hugepages, strlen(initial_nr_hugepages)) - != strlen(initial_nr_hugepages)) { + if (write(fd, init_nr_hugepages, strlen(init_nr_hugepages)) + != strlen(init_nr_hugepages)) { ksft_print_msg("Failed to write value to /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages: %s\n", strerror(errno)); goto close_fd; @@ -165,6 +151,42 @@ int check_compaction(unsigned long mem_free, unsigned int hugepage_size) return ret; } +int set_zero_hugepages(int *initial_nr_hugepages) +{ + int fd, ret = -1; + char nr_hugepages[10] = {0}; + + fd = open("/proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages", O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK); + if (fd < 0) { + ksft_print_msg("Failed to open /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + if (read(fd, nr_hugepages, sizeof(nr_hugepages)) <= 0) { + ksft_print_msg("Failed to read from /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + goto close_fd; + } + + lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET); + + /* Start with the initial condition of 0 huge pages */ + if (write(fd, "0", sizeof(char)) != sizeof(char)) { + ksft_print_msg("Failed to write 0 to /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages: %s\n", + strerror(errno)); + goto close_fd; + } + + *initial_nr_hugepages = atoi(nr_hugepages); + ret = 0; + + close_fd: + close(fd); + + out: + return ret; +} int main(int argc, char **argv) { @@ -175,6 +197,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) unsigned long mem_free = 0; unsigned long hugepage_size = 0; long mem_fragmentable_MB = 0; + int initial_nr_hugepages; ksft_print_header(); @@ -183,6 +206,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) ksft_set_plan(1); + /* start the test without hugepages reducing mem_free */ + if (set_zero_hugepages(&initial_nr_hugepages)) + return ksft_exit_fail(); + lim.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; lim.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &lim)) @@ -226,7 +253,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) entry = entry->next; } - if (check_compaction(mem_free, hugepage_size) == 0) + if (check_compaction(mem_free, hugepage_size, + initial_nr_hugepages) == 0) return ksft_exit_pass(); return ksft_exit_fail(); -- 2.30.2

1 hour, 45 minutes

2
2
0 0

[PATCH 1/2] selftests/mm: compaction_test: Fix incorrect write of zero to nr_hugepages

by Dev Jain

nr_hugepages is not set to zero because the file offset has not been reset after read(). Fix that using lseek(). Fixes: bd67d5c15cc1 ("Test compaction of mlocked memory") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dev Jain <dev.jain(a)arm.com> --- Merge dependency: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240513082842.4117782-1-dev.jain@arm.com/ Andrew, does it sound reasonable to have the fixes tag in the above patch too, along with this series? tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c index 533999b6c284..c5be395f8363 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/compaction_test.c @@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ int check_compaction(unsigned long mem_free, unsigned int hugepage_size) goto close_fd; } + lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET); + /* Start with the initial condition of 0 huge pages*/ if (write(fd, "0", sizeof(char)) != sizeof(char)) { ksft_print_msg("Failed to write 0 to /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages: %s\n", -- 2.30.2

1 hour, 50 minutes

2
2
0 0

[PATCH 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Do not use WARN when encode fails

by Jarkko Sakkinen

When asn1_encode_sequence() fails, WARN is not the correct solution. 1. asn1_encode_sequence() is not an internal function (located in lib/asn1_encode.c). 2. Location is known, which makes the stack trace useless. 3. Results a crash if panic_on_warn is set. It is also noteworthy that the use of WARN is undocumented, and it should be avoided unless there is a carefully considered rationale to use it. Replace WARN with pr_err, and print the return value instead, which is only useful piece of information. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.13+ Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index c6882f5d094f..8b7dd73d94c1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -84,8 +84,9 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, work1 = payload->blob; work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), scratch, work - scratch); - if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) { + if (IS_ERR(work1)) { ret = PTR_ERR(work1); + pr_err("BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed with %d\n", ret); goto err; } -- 2.45.1

7 hours, 27 minutes

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak in tpm2_key_encode()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

'scratch' is never freed. Fix this by calling kfree() in the success, and in the error case. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # +v5.13 Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index dfeec06301ce..c6882f5d094f 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, u8 *end_work = scratch + SCRATCH_SIZE; u8 *priv, *pub; u16 priv_len, pub_len; + int ret; priv_len = get_unaligned_be16(src) + 2; priv = src; @@ -57,8 +58,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); - if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) - return PTR_ERR(w); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(w), "BUG: Boolean failed to encode")) { + ret = PTR_ERR(w); + goto err; + } work = asn1_encode_tag(work, end_work, 0, bool, w - bool); } @@ -69,8 +72,10 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, * trigger, so if it does there's something nefarious going on */ if (WARN(work - scratch + pub_len + priv_len + 14 > SCRATCH_SIZE, - "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) - return -EINVAL; + "BUG: scratch buffer is too small")) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); @@ -79,10 +84,17 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, work1 = payload->blob; work1 = asn1_encode_sequence(work1, work1 + sizeof(payload->blob), scratch, work - scratch); - if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) - return PTR_ERR(work1); + if (WARN(IS_ERR(work1), "BUG: ASN.1 encoder failed")) { + ret = PTR_ERR(work1); + goto err; + } + kfree(scratch); return work1 - payload->blob; + +err: + kfree(scratch); + return ret; } struct tpm2_key_context { -- 2.45.1

7 hours, 27 minutes

1
0
0 0

+ mm-huge_memory-dont-unpoison-huge_zero_folio.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm/huge_memory: don't unpoison huge_zero_folio has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-huge_memory-dont-unpoison-huge_zero_folio.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Subject: mm/huge_memory: don't unpoison huge_zero_folio Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 20:26:08 +0800 When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1135! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 9 PID: 137 Comm: kswapd1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00491-gd5ce28f156fe-dirty #14 RIP: 0010:shrink_huge_zero_page_scan+0x168/0x1a0 RSP: 0018:ffff9933c6c57bd0 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88f61fc5c9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff88f61fc5c9c0 RBP: ffffcd7c446b0000 R08: ffffffff9a9405f0 R09: 0000000000005492 R10: 00000000000030ea R11: ffffffff9a9405f0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88e703c4ac00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88f61fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f4da6e9878 CR3: 0000000c71048000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> do_shrink_slab+0x14f/0x6a0 shrink_slab+0xca/0x8c0 shrink_node+0x2d0/0x7d0 balance_pgdat+0x33a/0x720 kswapd+0x1f3/0x410 kthread+0xd5/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:shrink_huge_zero_page_scan+0x168/0x1a0 RSP: 0018:ffff9933c6c57bd0 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88f61fc5c9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff88f61fc5c9c0 RBP: ffffcd7c446b0000 R08: ffffffff9a9405f0 R09: 0000000000005492 R10: 00000000000030ea R11: ffffffff9a9405f0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88e703c4ac00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88f61fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f4da6e9878 CR3: 0000000c71048000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 The root cause is that HWPoison flag will be set for huge_zero_folio without increasing the folio refcnt. But then unpoison_memory() will decrease the folio refcnt unexpectedly as it appears like a successfully hwpoisoned folio leading to VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0) when releasing huge_zero_folio. Skip unpoisoning huge_zero_folio in unpoison_memory() to fix this issue. We're not prepared to unpoison huge_zero_folio yet. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240516122608.22610-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: 478d134e9506 ("mm/huge_memory: do not overkill when splitting huge_zero_page") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual(a)arm.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com> Cc: Xu Yu <xuyu(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/memory-failure.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) --- a/mm/memory-failure.c~mm-huge_memory-dont-unpoison-huge_zero_folio +++ a/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -2546,6 +2546,13 @@ int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) goto unlock_mutex; } + if (is_huge_zero_folio(folio)) { + unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: huge zero page is not supported %#lx\n", + pfn, &unpoison_rs); + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto unlock_mutex; + } + if (!PageHWPoison(p)) { unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Page was already unpoisoned %#lx\n", pfn, &unpoison_rs); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from linmiaohe(a)huawei.com are mm-huge_memory-dont-unpoison-huge_zero_folio.patch

7 hours, 40 minutes

1
0
0 0

Re: [BUG] Linux 6.8.10 NPE

by Paul Grandperrin

> I am using vanilla Linux 6.8.10, and I've just noticed this BUG in my dmesg log. I have no idea what triggered it, and especially since I have not even mounted any NFS filesystems?! Hi all, I have the exact same bug. I'm using the NixOS kernel but as soon as it was updated to 6.8.10 my server has gone in a crash-reboot-loop. The server is hosting an NFS deamon and it crashes about 10 seconds after the tty login prompt is displayed. Dowgrading to 6.8.9 fixes the issue. Regards, Paul Grandperrin

19 hours, 49 minutes

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 1/2] drm/rockchip: vop: clear DMA stop bit on flush on RK3066

by Val Packett

On the RK3066, there is a bit that must be cleared on flush, otherwise we do not get display output (at least for RGB). Signed-off-by: Val Packett <val(a)packett.cool> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- Hi! This was required to get display working on an old RK3066 tablet, along with the next tiny patch in the series enabling the RGB output. I have spent quite a lot of time banging my head against the wall debugging that display (especially since at the same time a scaler chip is used for LVDS encoding), but finally adding debug prints showed that RK3066_SYS_CTRL0 ended up being reset to all-zero after being written correctly upon init. Looking at the register definitions in the vendor driver revealed that the reason was pretty self-explanatory: "dma_stop". --- drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c | 3 +++ drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.h | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_vop_reg.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c index a13473b2d..d4daeba74 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c @@ -1578,6 +1578,9 @@ static void vop_crtc_atomic_flush(struct drm_crtc *crtc, spin_lock(&vop->reg_lock); + /* If the chip has a DMA stop bit (RK3066), it must be cleared. */ + VOP_REG_SET(vop, common, dma_stop, 0); + /* Enable AFBC if there is some AFBC window, disable otherwise. */ s = to_rockchip_crtc_state(crtc->state); VOP_AFBC_SET(vop, enable, s->enable_afbc); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.h index b33e5bdc2..0cf512cc1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.h @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct vop_common { struct vop_reg lut_buffer_index; struct vop_reg gate_en; struct vop_reg mmu_en; + struct vop_reg dma_stop; struct vop_reg out_mode; struct vop_reg standby; }; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_vop_reg.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_vop_reg.c index b9ee02061..9bcb40a64 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_vop_reg.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_vop_reg.c @@ -466,6 +466,7 @@ static const struct vop_output rk3066_output = { }; static const struct vop_common rk3066_common = { + .dma_stop = VOP_REG(RK3066_SYS_CTRL0, 0x1, 0), .standby = VOP_REG(RK3066_SYS_CTRL0, 0x1, 1), .out_mode = VOP_REG(RK3066_DSP_CTRL0, 0xf, 0), .cfg_done = VOP_REG(RK3066_REG_CFG_DONE, 0x1, 0), -- 2.45.0

22 hours, 24 minutes

2
5
0 0

[PATCH v1] usb: typec: tcpm: fix use-after-free case in tcpm_register_source_caps

by Amit Sunil Dhamne

There could be a potential use-after-free case in tcpm_register_source_caps(). This could happen when: * new (say invalid) source caps are advertised * the existing source caps are unregistered * tcpm_register_source_caps() returns with an error as usb_power_delivery_register_capabilities() fails This causes port->partner_source_caps to hold on to the now freed source caps. Reset port->partner_source_caps value to NULL after unregistering existing source caps. Fixes: 230ecdf71a64 ("usb: typec: tcpm: unregister existing source caps before re-registration") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Amit Sunil Dhamne <amitsd(a)google.com> --- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c index 8a1af08f71b6..be4127ef84e9 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c @@ -3014,8 +3014,10 @@ static int tcpm_register_source_caps(struct tcpm_port *port) memcpy(caps.pdo, port->source_caps, sizeof(u32) * port->nr_source_caps); caps.role = TYPEC_SOURCE; - if (cap) + if (cap) { usb_power_delivery_unregister_capabilities(cap); + port->partner_source_caps = NULL; + } cap = usb_power_delivery_register_capabilities(port->partner_pd, &caps); if (IS_ERR(cap)) base-commit: 51474ab44abf907023a8a875e799b07de461e466 -- 2.45.0.rc1.225.g2a3ae87e7f-goog

23 hours, 18 minutes

3
2
0 0

[PATCH v2] serial: core: only stop transmit when HW fifo is empty

by Jonas Gorski

If the circular buffer is empty, it just means we fit all characters to send into the HW fifo, but not that the hardware finished transmitting them. So if we immediately call stop_tx() after that, this may abort any pending characters in the HW fifo, and cause dropped characters on the console. Fix this by only stopping tx when the tx HW fifo is actually empty. Fixes: 8275b48b2780 ("tty: serial: introduce transmit helpers") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski(a)gmail.com> --- (this is v2 of the bcm63xx-uart fix attempt) v1 -> v2 * replace workaround with fix for core issue * add Cc: for stable I'm somewhat confident this is the core issue causing the broken output with bcm63xx-uart, and there is no actual need for the UART_TX_NOSTOP. I wouldn't be surprised if this also fixes mxs-uart for which UART_TX_NOSTOP was introduced. If it does, there is no need for the flag anymore. include/linux/serial_core.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/serial_core.h b/include/linux/serial_core.h index 55b1f3ba48ac..bb0f2d4ac62f 100644 --- a/include/linux/serial_core.h +++ b/include/linux/serial_core.h @@ -786,7 +786,8 @@ enum UART_TX_FLAGS { if (pending < WAKEUP_CHARS) { \ uart_write_wakeup(__port); \ \ - if (!((flags) & UART_TX_NOSTOP) && pending == 0) \ + if (!((flags) & UART_TX_NOSTOP) && pending == 0 && \ + __port->ops->tx_empty(__port)) \ __port->ops->stop_tx(__port); \ } \ \ -- 2.34.1

1 day, 1 hour

2
2
0 0

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror