June 2020 - Linux-stable-mirror

[patch 3/3] x86/vdso: Unbreak paravirt VDSO clocks

by Thomas Gleixner

The conversion of x86 VDSO to the generic clock mode storage broke the paravirt and hyperv clocksource logic. These clock sources have their own internal sequence counter to validate the clocksource at the point of reading it. This is necessary because the hypervisor can invalidate the clocksource asynchronously so a check during the VDSO data update is not sufficient. If the internal check during read invalidates the clocksource the read return U64_MAX. The original code checked this efficiently by testing whether the result (casted to signed) is negative, i.e. bit 63 is set. This was done that way because an extra indicator for the validity had more overhead. The conversion broke this check because the check was replaced by a check for a valid VDSO clock mode. The wreckage manifests itself when the paravirt clock is installed as a valid VDSO clock and during runtime invalidated by the hypervisor, e.g. after a host suspend/resume cycle. After the invalidation the read function returns U64_MAX which is used as cycles and makes the clock jump by ~2200 seconds, and become stale until the 2200 seconds have elapsed where it starts to jump again. The period of this effect depends on the shift/mult pair of the clocksource and the jumps and staleness are an artifact of undefined but reproducible behaviour of math overflow. Implement an x86 version of the new vdso_cycles_ok() inline which adds this check back and a variant of vdso_clocksource_ok() which lets the compiler optimize it out to avoid the extra conditional. That's suboptimal when the system does not have a VDSO capable clocksource, but that's not the case which is optimized for. Reported-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos(a)szeredi.hu> Fixes: 5d51bee725cc ("clocksource: Add common vdso clock mode storage") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h @@ -271,6 +271,24 @@ static __always_inline const struct vdso return __vdso_data; } +static inline bool arch_vdso_clocksource_ok(const struct vdso_data *vd) +{ + return true; +} +#define vdso_clocksource_ok arch_vdso_clocksource_ok + +/* + * Clocksource read value validation to handle PV and HyperV clocksources + * which can be invalidated asynchronously and indicate invalidation by + * returning U64_MAX, which can be effectively tested by checking for a + * negative value after casting it to s64. + */ +static inline bool arch_vdso_cycles_ok(u64 cycles) +{ + return (s64)cycles >= 0; +} +#define vdso_cycles_ok arch_vdso_cycles_ok + /* * x86 specific delta calculation. *

5 years

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 01/72] ath9x: Fix stack-out-of-bounds Write in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb

by Sasha Levin

From: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 19d6c375d671ce9949a864fb9a03e19f5487b4d3 ] Add barrier to accessing the stack array skb_pool. The case reported by syzbot: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/0000000000003d7c1505a2168418@google.com BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:626 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb+0xdf6/0xf70 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:666 Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881db309a28 by task swapper/1/0 Call Trace: ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:626 [inline] ath9k_hif_usb_rx_cb+0xdf6/0xf70 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:666 __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x1f2/0x470 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1648 usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x368/0x420 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1713 dummy_timer+0x1258/0x32ae drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1966 call_timer_fn+0x195/0x6f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1404 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0x5f9/0x1500 kernel/time/timer.c:1786 Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+d403396d4df67ad0bd5f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Qiujun Huang <hqjagain(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200404041838.10426-5-hqjagain@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c index 6f669166c263..4399e1ebac15 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c @@ -610,6 +610,11 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_rx_stream(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev, hif_dev->remain_skb = nskb; spin_unlock(&hif_dev->rx_lock); } else { + if (pool_index == MAX_PKT_NUM_IN_TRANSFER) { + dev_err(&hif_dev->udev->dev, + "ath9k_htc: over RX MAX_PKT_NUM\n"); + goto err; + } nskb = __dev_alloc_skb(pkt_len + 32, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!nskb) { dev_err(&hif_dev->udev->dev, -- 2.25.1

5 years

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[PATCH] scripts/spelling: Recommend blocklist/allowlist instead of blacklist/whitelist

by SeongJae Park

From: SeongJae Park <sjpark(a)amazon.de> This commit recommends the patches to replace 'blacklist' and 'whitelist' with the 'blocklist' and 'allowlist', because the new suggestions are incontrovertible, doesn't make people hurt, and more self-explanatory. Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sjpark(a)amazon.de> cr https://code.amazon.com/reviews/CR-27247203 --- scripts/spelling.txt | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/scripts/spelling.txt b/scripts/spelling.txt index d9cd24cf0d40..ea785568d8b8 100644 --- a/scripts/spelling.txt +++ b/scripts/spelling.txt @@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ beter||better betweeen||between bianries||binaries bitmast||bitmask +blacklist||blocklist boardcast||broadcast borad||board boundry||boundary @@ -1495,6 +1496,7 @@ whcih||which whenver||whenever wheter||whether whe||when +whitelist||allowlist wierd||weird wiil||will wirte||write -- 2.17.1

5 years

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading." failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 18dfb5326370991c81a6d1ed6d1aeee055cb8c05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun, 3 May 2020 11:29:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] iio: vcnl4000: Fix i2c swapped word reading. The bytes returned by the i2c reading need to be swapped unconditionally. Otherwise, on be16 platforms, an incorrect value will be returned. Taking the slow path via next merge window as its been around a while and we have a patch set dependent on this which would be held up. Fixes: 62a1efb9f868 ("iio: add vcnl4000 combined ALS and proximity sensor") Signed-off-by: Mathieu Othacehe <m.othacehe(a)gmail.com> Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c index 985cc39ede8e..979746a7d411 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/vcnl4000.c @@ -220,7 +220,6 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask, u8 rdy_mask, u8 data_reg, int *val) { int tries = 20; - __be16 buf; int ret; mutex_lock(&data->vcnl4000_lock); @@ -247,13 +246,12 @@ static int vcnl4000_measure(struct vcnl4000_data *data, u8 req_mask, goto fail; } - ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(data->client, - data_reg, sizeof(buf), (u8 *) &buf); + ret = i2c_smbus_read_word_swapped(data->client, data_reg); if (ret < 0) goto fail; mutex_unlock(&data->vcnl4000_lock); - *val = be16_to_cpu(buf); + *val = ret; return 0;

5 years

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[PATCH] cdc-acm: Add DISABLE_ECHO quirk for Microchip/SMSC chip

by Joakim Tjernlund

USB_DEVICE(0x0424, 0x274e) can send data before cdc_acm is ready, causing garbage chars on the TTY causing stray input to the shell and/or login prompt. Signed-off-by: Joakim Tjernlund <joakim.tjernlund(a)infinera.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c index ded8d93834ca..d579b05a2c2b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c @@ -1689,6 +1689,8 @@ static int acm_pre_reset(struct usb_interface *intf) static const struct usb_device_id acm_ids[] = { /* quirky and broken devices */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x0424, 0x274e), /* Microchip Technology, Inc. (formerly SMSC) */ + .driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO, }, /* DISABLE ECHO in termios flag */ { USB_DEVICE(0x076d, 0x0006), /* Denso Cradle CU-321 */ .driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, },/* has no union descriptor */ { USB_DEVICE(0x17ef, 0x7000), /* Lenovo USB modem */ -- 2.26.2

5 years

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[PATCH v2] lib: fix bitmap_parse() on 64-bit big endian archs

by Alexander Gordeev

Commit 2d6261583be0 ("lib: rework bitmap_parse()") does not take into account order of halfwords on 64-bit big endian architectures. As result (at least) Receive Packet Steering, IRQ affinity masks and runtime kernel test "test_bitmap" get broken on s390. Fixes: 2d6261583be0 ("lib: rework bitmap_parse()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov(a)gmail.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Amritha Nambiar <amritha.nambiar(a)intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme(a)redhat.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris(a)chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <tobin(a)kernel.org> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vineet.gupta1(a)synopsys.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon(a)arm.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev(a)linux.ibm.com> --- lib/bitmap.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/bitmap.c b/lib/bitmap.c index 89260aa342d6..80d26b183248 100644 --- a/lib/bitmap.c +++ b/lib/bitmap.c @@ -739,6 +739,7 @@ int bitmap_parse(const char *start, unsigned int buflen, const char *end = strnchrnul(start, buflen, '\n') - 1; int chunks = BITS_TO_U32(nmaskbits); u32 *bitmap = (u32 *)maskp; + int chunk = 0; int unset_bit; while (1) { @@ -749,9 +750,14 @@ int bitmap_parse(const char *start, unsigned int buflen, if (!chunks--) return -EOVERFLOW; - end = bitmap_get_x32_reverse(start, end, bitmap++); +#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(__BIG_ENDIAN) + end = bitmap_get_x32_reverse(start, end, &bitmap[chunk ^ 1]); +#else + end = bitmap_get_x32_reverse(start, end, &bitmap[chunk]); +#endif if (IS_ERR(end)) return PTR_ERR(end); + chunk++; } unset_bit = (BITS_TO_U32(nmaskbits) - chunks) * 32; -- 2.23.0

5 years

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[tip: x86/urgent] x86/speculation: Prevent rogue cross-process SSBD shutdown

by tip-bot2 for Anthony Steinhauser

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: dbbe2ad02e9df26e372f38cc3e70dab9222c832e Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/dbbe2ad02e9df26e372f38cc3e70dab9222c832e Author: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser(a)google.com> AuthorDate: Sun, 05 Jan 2020 12:19:43 -08:00 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> CommitterDate: Tue, 09 Jun 2020 10:50:55 +02:00 x86/speculation: Prevent rogue cross-process SSBD shutdown On context switch the change of TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB are evaluated to adjust the mitigations accordingly. This is optimized to avoid the expensive MSR write if not needed. This optimization is buggy and allows an attacker to shutdown the SSBD protection of a victim process. The update logic reads the cached base value for the speculation control MSR which has neither the SSBD nor the STIBP bit set. It then OR's the SSBD bit only when TIF_SSBD is different and requests the MSR update. That means if TIF_SSBD of the previous and next task are the same, then the base value is not updated, even if TIF_SSBD is set. The MSR write is not requested. Subsequently if the TIF_STIBP bit differs then the STIBP bit is updated in the base value and the MSR is written with a wrong SSBD value. This was introduced when the per task/process conditional STIPB switching was added on top of the existing SSBD switching. It is exploitable if the attacker creates a process which enforces SSBD and has the contrary value of STIBP than the victim process (i.e. if the victim process enforces STIBP, the attacker process must not enforce it; if the victim process does not enforce STIBP, the attacker process must enforce it) and schedule it on the same core as the victim process. If the victim runs after the attacker the victim becomes vulnerable to Spectre V4. To fix this, update the MSR value independent of the TIF_SSBD difference and dependent on the SSBD mitigation method available. This ensures that a subsequent STIPB initiated MSR write has the correct state of SSBD. [ tglx: Handle X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD & X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD correctly and massaged changelog ] Fixes: 5bfbe3ad5840 ("x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control") Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 28 ++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 35638f1..8f4533c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -545,28 +545,20 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); - /* - * If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation - * method. Note that if SSBD mitigation is disabled or permanentely - * enabled this branch can't be taken because nothing can set - * TIF_SSBD. - */ - if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD) { - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) { + /* Handle change of TIF_SSBD depending on the mitigation method. */ + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) { + if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD) amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn); - } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) { + } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) { + if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD) amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn); - } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { - msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); - updmsr = true; - } + } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || + static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { + updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD); + msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); } - /* - * Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if conditional STIBP is enabled, - * otherwise avoid the MSR write. - */ + /* Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if conditional STIBP is enabled. */ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) { updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SPEC_IB);

5 years

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[tip: x86/urgent] x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for indirect branches.

by tip-bot2 for Anthony Steinhauser

The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: 4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/4d8df8cbb9156b0a0ab3f802b80cb5db57acc0bf Author: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser(a)google.com> AuthorDate: Sun, 07 Jun 2020 05:44:19 -07:00 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> CommitterDate: Tue, 09 Jun 2020 10:50:55 +02:00 x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for indirect branches. Currently, it is possible to enable indirect branch speculation even after it was force-disabled using the PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE option. Moreover, the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL command gives afterwards an incorrect result (force-disabled when it is in fact enabled). This also is inconsistent vs. STIBP and the documention which cleary states that PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE cannot be undone. Fix this by actually enforcing force-disabled indirect branch speculation. PR_SPEC_ENABLE called after PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE now fails with -EPERM as described in the documentation. Fixes: 9137bb27e60e ("x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation") Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8d57562..56f573a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1175,11 +1175,14 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) return 0; /* * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict - * mode. + * mode. It can neither be enabled if it was force-disabled + * by a previous prctl call. + */ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT || - spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED) + spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED || + task_spec_ib_force_disable(task)) return -EPERM; task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task); task_update_spec_tif(task);

5 years

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[PATCH] x86_64: fix jiffies ODR violation

by Bob Haarman

`jiffies` and `jiffies_64` are meant to alias (two different symbols that share the same address). Most architectures make the symbols alias to the same address via linker script assignment in their arch/<arch>/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S: jiffies = jiffies_64; which is effectively a definition of jiffies. jiffies and jiffies_64 are both forward declared for all arch's in: include/linux/jiffies.h. jiffies_64 is defined in kernel/time/timer.c for all arch's. x86_64 was peculiar in that it wasn't doing the above linker script assignment, but rather was: 1. defining jiffies in arch/x86/kernel/time.c instead via linker script. 2. overriding the symbol jiffies_64 from kernel/time/timer.c in arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.s via `jiffies_64 = jiffies;`. As Fangrui notes: ``` In LLD, symbol assignments in linker scripts override definitions in object files. GNU ld appears to have the same behavior. It would probably make sense for LLD to error "duplicate symbol" but GNU ld is unlikely to adopt for compatibility reasons. ``` So we have an ODR violation (UB), which we seem to have gotten away with thus far. Where it becomes harmful is when we: 1. Use -fno-semantic-interposition. As Fangrui notes: ``` Clang after LLVM commit 5b22bcc2b70d ("[X86][ELF] Prefer to lower MC_GlobalAddress operands to .Lfoo$local") defaults to -fno-semantic-interposition similar semantics which help -fpic/-fPIC code avoid GOT/PLT when the referenced symbol is defined within the same translation unit. Unlike GCC -fno-semantic-interposition, Clang emits such relocations referencing local symbols for non-pic code as well. ``` This causes references to jiffies to refer to `.Ljiffies$local` when jiffies is defined in the same translation unit. Likewise, references to jiffies_64 become references to `.Ljiffies_64$local` in translation units that define jiffies_64. Because these differ from the names used in the linker script, they will not be rewritten to alias one another. Combined with ... 2. Full LTO effectively treats all source files as one translation unit, causing these local references to be produced everywhere. When the linker processes the linker script, there are no longer any references to `jiffies_64` anywhere to replace with `jiffies`. And thus `.Ljiffies$local` and `.Ljiffies_64$local` no longer alias at all. In the process of porting patches enabling Full LTO from arm64 to x86_64, we observe spooky bugs where the kernel appeared to boot, but init doesn't get scheduled. Instead, we can avoid the ODR violation by matching other arch's by defining jiffies only by linker script. For -fno-semantic-interposition + Full LTO, there is no longer a global definition of jiffies for the compiler to produce a local symbol which the linker script won't ensure aliases to jiffies_64. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/852 Fixes: 40747ffa5aa8 ("asmlinkage: Make jiffies visible") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Alistair Delva <adelva(a)google.com> Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray(a)google.com> Debugged-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> Debugged-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Bob Haarman <inglorion(a)google.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/time.c | 4 ---- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/time.c b/arch/x86/kernel/time.c index 371a6b348e44..e42faa792c07 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/time.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/time.c @@ -25,10 +25,6 @@ #include <asm/hpet.h> #include <asm/time.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -__visible volatile unsigned long jiffies __cacheline_aligned_in_smp = INITIAL_JIFFIES; -#endif - unsigned long profile_pc(struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned long pc = instruction_pointer(regs); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 1bf7e312361f..7c35556c7827 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -40,13 +40,13 @@ OUTPUT_FORMAT(CONFIG_OUTPUT_FORMAT) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 OUTPUT_ARCH(i386) ENTRY(phys_startup_32) -jiffies = jiffies_64; #else OUTPUT_ARCH(i386:x86-64) ENTRY(phys_startup_64) -jiffies_64 = jiffies; #endif +jiffies = jiffies_64; + #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) /* * On 64-bit, align RODATA to 2MB so we retain large page mappings for -- 2.26.2.761.g0e0b3e54be-goog

5 years

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[PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm64: Synchronize sysreg state on injecting an AArch32 exception

by Marc Zyngier

On a VHE system, the EL1 state is left in the CPU most of the time, and only syncronized back to memory when vcpu_put() is called (most of the time on preemption). Which means that when injecting an exception, we'd better have a way to either: (1) write directly to the EL1 sysregs (2) synchronize the state back to memory, and do the changes there For an AArch64, we already do (1), so we are safe. Unfortunately, doing the same thing for AArch32 would be pretty invasive. Instead, we can easily implement (2) by calling the put/load architectural backends, and keep preemption disabled. We can then reload the state back into EL1. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: James Morse <james.morse(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/kvm/aarch32.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/aarch32.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/aarch32.c index 0a356aa91aa1..40a62a99fbf8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/aarch32.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/aarch32.c @@ -33,6 +33,26 @@ static const u8 return_offsets[8][2] = { [7] = { 4, 4 }, /* FIQ, unused */ }; +static bool pre_fault_synchronize(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + preempt_disable(); + if (vcpu->arch.sysregs_loaded_on_cpu) { + kvm_arch_vcpu_put(vcpu); + return true; + } + + preempt_enable(); + return false; +} + +static void post_fault_synchronize(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool loaded) +{ + if (loaded) { + kvm_arch_vcpu_load(vcpu, smp_processor_id()); + preempt_enable(); + } +} + /* * When an exception is taken, most CPSR fields are left unchanged in the * handler. However, some are explicitly overridden (e.g. M[4:0]). @@ -155,7 +175,10 @@ static void prepare_fault32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mode, u32 vect_offset) void kvm_inject_undef32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { + bool loaded = pre_fault_synchronize(vcpu); + prepare_fault32(vcpu, PSR_AA32_MODE_UND, 4); + post_fault_synchronize(vcpu, loaded); } /* @@ -168,6 +191,9 @@ static void inject_abt32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_pabt, u32 vect_offset; u32 *far, *fsr; bool is_lpae; + bool loaded; + + loaded = pre_fault_synchronize(vcpu); if (is_pabt) { vect_offset = 12; @@ -191,6 +217,8 @@ static void inject_abt32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_pabt, /* no need to shuffle FS[4] into DFSR[10] as its 0 */ *fsr = DFSR_FSC_EXTABT_nLPAE; } + + post_fault_synchronize(vcpu, loaded); } void kvm_inject_dabt32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long addr) -- 2.26.2

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Linux-stable-mirror June 2020