June 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH] f2fs: fix to don't dirty inode for readonly filesystem

by Chao Yu

syzbot reports f2fs bug as below: kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:933! RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x1576/0x1590 fs/f2fs/inode.c:933 Call Trace: evict+0x2a4/0x620 fs/inode.c:664 dispose_list fs/inode.c:697 [inline] evict_inodes+0x5f8/0x690 fs/inode.c:747 generic_shutdown_super+0x9d/0x2c0 fs/super.c:675 kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1667 kill_f2fs_super+0x303/0x3b0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4894 deactivate_locked_super+0xc1/0x130 fs/super.c:484 cleanup_mnt+0x426/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1256 task_work_run+0x24a/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:180 ptrace_notify+0x2cd/0x380 kernel/signal.c:2399 ptrace_report_syscall include/linux/ptrace.h:411 [inline] ptrace_report_syscall_exit include/linux/ptrace.h:473 [inline] syscall_exit_work kernel/entry/common.c:251 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare kernel/entry/common.c:278 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x15c/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:88 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b The root cause is: - do_sys_open - f2fs_lookup - __f2fs_find_entry - f2fs_i_depth_write - f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync - f2fs_dirty_inode - set_inode_flag(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE) - umount - kill_f2fs_super - kill_block_super - generic_shutdown_super - sync_filesystem : sb is readonly, skip sync_filesystem() - evict_inodes - iput - f2fs_evict_inode - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_DIRTY_INODE)) : trigger kernel panic When we try to repair i_current_depth in readonly filesystem, let's skip dirty inode to avoid panic in later f2fs_evict_inode(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+31e4659a3fe953aec2f4(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/000000000000e890bc0609a55cff@googl… Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> --- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index 8f2b9f62ef73..64cda1d77fe5 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ void f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync(struct inode *inode, bool sync) if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NEW_INODE)) return; + if (f2fs_readonly(F2FS_I_SB(inode)->sb)) + return; + if (f2fs_inode_dirtied(inode, sync)) return; -- 2.40.1

3 months, 2 weeks

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Re: [PATCH net] net: fix __dst_negative_advice() race

by Lee Jones

On Tue, 28 May 2024, Eric Dumazet wrote: > __dst_negative_advice() does not enforce proper RCU rules when > sk->dst_cache must be cleared, leading to possible UAF. > > RCU rules are that we must first clear sk->sk_dst_cache, > then call dst_release(old_dst). > > Note that sk_dst_reset(sk) is implementing this protocol correctly, > while __dst_negative_advice() uses the wrong order. > > Given that ip6_negative_advice() has special logic > against RTF_CACHE, this means each of the three ->negative_advice() > existing methods must perform the sk_dst_reset() themselves. > > Note the check against NULL dst is centralized in > __dst_negative_advice(), there is no need to duplicate > it in various callbacks. > > Many thanks to Clement Lecigne for tracking this issue. > > This old bug became visible after the blamed commit, using UDP sockets. > > Fixes: a87cb3e48ee8 ("net: Facility to report route quality of connected sockets") > Reported-by: Clement Lecigne <clecigne(a)google.com> > Diagnosed-by: Clement Lecigne <clecigne(a)google.com> > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> > Cc: Tom Herbert <tom(a)herbertland.com> > --- > include/net/dst_ops.h | 2 +- > include/net/sock.h | 13 +++---------- > net/ipv4/route.c | 22 ++++++++-------------- > net/ipv6/route.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- > net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 11 +++-------- > 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) Could we have this patch in all Stable branches please? Upstream commit: Fixes: 92f1655aa2b2 ("net: fix __dst_negative_advice() race") -- Lee Jones [李琼斯]

3 months, 2 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0a960ba49869ebe8ff859d000351504dd6b93b68 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061235-hatchet-upriver-8fa7@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 0a960ba49869 ("proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode .permission operation") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0a960ba49869ebe8ff859d000351504dd6b93b68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tyler Hicks (Microsoft)" <code(a)tyhicks.com> Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 19:56:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode .permission operation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The following commits loosened the permissions of /proc/<PID>/fdinfo/ directory, as well as the files within it, from 0500 to 0555 while also introducing a PTRACE_MODE_READ check between the current task and <PID>'s task: - commit 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") - commit 1927e498aee1 ("procfs: prevent unprivileged processes accessing fdinfo dir") Before those changes, inode based system calls like inotify_add_watch(2) would fail when the current task didn't have sufficient read permissions: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0500, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] This matches the documented behavior in the inotify_add_watch(2) man page: ERRORS EACCES Read access to the given file is not permitted. After those changes, inotify_add_watch(2) started succeeding despite the current task not having PTRACE_MODE_READ privileges on the target task: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = 1757 openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] This change in behavior broke .NET prior to v7. See the github link below for the v7 commit that inadvertently/quietly (?) fixed .NET after the kernel changes mentioned above. Return to the old behavior by moving the PTRACE_MODE_READ check out of the file .open operation and into the inode .permission operation: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] Reported-by: Kevin Parsons (Microsoft) <parsonskev(a)gmail.com> Link: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/commit/89e5469ac591b82d38510fe7de98346cce… Link: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/75379065/start-self-contained-net6-buil… Fixes: 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh(a)google.com> Cc: Hardik Garg <hargar(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Allen Pais <apais(a)linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks (Microsoft) <code(a)tyhicks.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501005646.745089-1-code@tyhicks.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 6e72e5ad42bc..f4b1c8b42a51 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -74,7 +74,18 @@ static int seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) +static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); +} + +/** + * Shared /proc/pid/fdinfo and /proc/pid/fdinfo/fd permission helper to ensure + * that the current task has PTRACE_MODE_READ in addition to the normal + * POSIX-like checks. + */ +static int proc_fdinfo_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, + int mask) { bool allowed = false; struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -88,18 +99,13 @@ static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) if (!allowed) return -EACCES; - return 0; + return generic_permission(idmap, inode, mask); } -static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); -} +static const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_file_inode_operations = { + .permission = proc_fdinfo_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, +}; static const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_file_operations = { .open = seq_fdinfo_open, @@ -388,6 +394,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_fdinfo_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, ei = PROC_I(inode); ei->fd = data->fd; + inode->i_op = &proc_fdinfo_file_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &proc_fdinfo_file_operations; tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, 0); @@ -407,23 +415,13 @@ static int proc_readfdinfo(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) proc_fdinfo_instantiate); } -static int proc_open_fdinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return 0; -} - const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = { .lookup = proc_lookupfdinfo, + .permission = proc_fdinfo_permission, .setattr = proc_setattr, }; const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = { - .open = proc_open_fdinfo, .read = generic_read_dir, .iterate_shared = proc_readfdinfo, .llseek = generic_file_llseek,

3 months, 2 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 0a960ba49869ebe8ff859d000351504dd6b93b68 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061233-cacti-revered-a821@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 0a960ba49869 ("proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode .permission operation") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") 5d5bd24f4155 ("crypto: qat - implement dh fallback for primes > 4K") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0a960ba49869ebe8ff859d000351504dd6b93b68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tyler Hicks (Microsoft)" <code(a)tyhicks.com> Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 19:56:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] proc: Move fdinfo PTRACE_MODE_READ check into the inode .permission operation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The following commits loosened the permissions of /proc/<PID>/fdinfo/ directory, as well as the files within it, from 0500 to 0555 while also introducing a PTRACE_MODE_READ check between the current task and <PID>'s task: - commit 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") - commit 1927e498aee1 ("procfs: prevent unprivileged processes accessing fdinfo dir") Before those changes, inode based system calls like inotify_add_watch(2) would fail when the current task didn't have sufficient read permissions: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0500, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] This matches the documented behavior in the inotify_add_watch(2) man page: ERRORS EACCES Read access to the given file is not permitted. After those changes, inotify_add_watch(2) started succeeding despite the current task not having PTRACE_MODE_READ privileges on the target task: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = 1757 openat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK|O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] This change in behavior broke .NET prior to v7. See the github link below for the v7 commit that inadvertently/quietly (?) fixed .NET after the kernel changes mentioned above. Return to the old behavior by moving the PTRACE_MODE_READ check out of the file .open operation and into the inode .permission operation: [...] lstat("/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0555, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 inotify_add_watch(64, "/proc/1/task/1/fdinfo", IN_MODIFY|IN_ATTRIB|IN_MOVED_FROM|IN_MOVED_TO|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE| IN_ONLYDIR|IN_DONT_FOLLOW|IN_EXCL_UNLINK) = -1 EACCES (Permission denied) [...] Reported-by: Kevin Parsons (Microsoft) <parsonskev(a)gmail.com> Link: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/commit/89e5469ac591b82d38510fe7de98346cce… Link: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/75379065/start-self-contained-net6-buil… Fixes: 7bc3fa0172a4 ("procfs: allow reading fdinfo with PTRACE_MODE_READ") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh(a)google.com> Cc: Hardik Garg <hargar(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Allen Pais <apais(a)linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks (Microsoft) <code(a)tyhicks.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501005646.745089-1-code@tyhicks.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 6e72e5ad42bc..f4b1c8b42a51 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -74,7 +74,18 @@ static int seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) +static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); +} + +/** + * Shared /proc/pid/fdinfo and /proc/pid/fdinfo/fd permission helper to ensure + * that the current task has PTRACE_MODE_READ in addition to the normal + * POSIX-like checks. + */ +static int proc_fdinfo_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, + int mask) { bool allowed = false; struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); @@ -88,18 +99,13 @@ static int proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) if (!allowed) return -EACCES; - return 0; + return generic_permission(idmap, inode, mask); } -static int seq_fdinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return single_open(file, seq_show, inode); -} +static const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_file_inode_operations = { + .permission = proc_fdinfo_permission, + .setattr = proc_setattr, +}; static const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_file_operations = { .open = seq_fdinfo_open, @@ -388,6 +394,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_fdinfo_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, ei = PROC_I(inode); ei->fd = data->fd; + inode->i_op = &proc_fdinfo_file_inode_operations; + inode->i_fop = &proc_fdinfo_file_operations; tid_fd_update_inode(task, inode, 0); @@ -407,23 +415,13 @@ static int proc_readfdinfo(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) proc_fdinfo_instantiate); } -static int proc_open_fdinfo(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - int ret = proc_fdinfo_access_allowed(inode); - - if (ret) - return ret; - - return 0; -} - const struct inode_operations proc_fdinfo_inode_operations = { .lookup = proc_lookupfdinfo, + .permission = proc_fdinfo_permission, .setattr = proc_setattr, }; const struct file_operations proc_fdinfo_operations = { - .open = proc_open_fdinfo, .read = generic_read_dir, .iterate_shared = proc_readfdinfo, .llseek = generic_file_llseek,

3 months, 2 weeks

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[PATCH v2 net] bnx2x: Fix multiple UBSAN array-index-out-of-bounds

by Ghadi Elie Rahme

Fix UBSAN warnings that occur when using a system with 32 physical cpu cores or more, or when the user defines a number of Ethernet queues greater than or equal to FP_SB_MAX_E1x using the num_queues module parameter. The value of the maximum number of Ethernet queues should be limited to FP_SB_MAX_E1x in case FCOE is disabled or to [FP_SB_MAX_E1x-1] if enabled to avoid out of bounds reads and writes. Stack traces: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_stats.c:1529:11 index 20 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]' CPU: 12 PID: 858 Comm: systemd-network Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic #202405052133 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/21/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xcb/0x110 bnx2x_prep_fw_stats_req+0x2e1/0x310 [bnx2x] bnx2x_stats_init+0x156/0x320 [bnx2x] bnx2x_post_irq_nic_init+0x81/0x1a0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_nic_load+0x8e8/0x19e0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_open+0x16b/0x290 [bnx2x] __dev_open+0x10e/0x1d0 RIP: 0033:0x736223927a0a Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc0bb2ada8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000583df50f9c78 RCX: 0000736223927a0a RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000583df50ee510 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000583df50d4940 R08: 00007ffc0bb2adb0 R09: 0000000000000080 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000583df5103ae0 R13: 000000000000035a R14: 0000583df50f9c30 R15: 0000583ddddddf00 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_stats.c:1546:11 index 28 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]' CPU: 12 PID: 858 Comm: systemd-network Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic #202405052133 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/21/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xcb/0x110 bnx2x_prep_fw_stats_req+0x2fd/0x310 [bnx2x] bnx2x_stats_init+0x156/0x320 [bnx2x] bnx2x_post_irq_nic_init+0x81/0x1a0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_nic_load+0x8e8/0x19e0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_open+0x16b/0x290 [bnx2x] __dev_open+0x10e/0x1d0 RIP: 0033:0x736223927a0a Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffc0bb2ada8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000583df50f9c78 RCX: 0000736223927a0a RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000583df50ee510 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000583df50d4940 R08: 00007ffc0bb2adb0 R09: 0000000000000080 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000583df5103ae0 R13: 000000000000035a R14: 0000583df50f9c30 R15: 0000583ddddddf00 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_sriov.c:1895:8 index 29 is out of range for type 'stats_query_entry [19]' CPU: 13 PID: 163 Comm: kworker/u96:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-060900rc7-generic #202405052133 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/21/2019 Workqueue: bnx2x bnx2x_sp_task [bnx2x] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xcb/0x110 bnx2x_iov_adjust_stats_req+0x3c4/0x3d0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_storm_stats_post.part.0+0x4a/0x330 [bnx2x] ? bnx2x_hw_stats_post+0x231/0x250 [bnx2x] bnx2x_stats_start+0x44/0x70 [bnx2x] bnx2x_stats_handle+0x149/0x350 [bnx2x] bnx2x_attn_int_asserted+0x998/0x9b0 [bnx2x] bnx2x_sp_task+0x491/0x5c0 [bnx2x] process_one_work+0x18d/0x3f0 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fixes: 7d0445d66a76 ("bnx2x: clamp num_queues to prevent passing a negative value") Signed-off-by: Ghadi Elie Rahme <ghadi.rahme(a)canonical.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- Changes since v1: * Fix checkpatch complaints: - Wrapped commit message to comply with 75 character limit - Added space before ( in if condition drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c index a8e07e51418f..c895dd680cf8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.c @@ -66,7 +66,12 @@ static int bnx2x_calc_num_queues(struct bnx2x *bp) if (is_kdump_kernel()) nq = 1; - nq = clamp(nq, 1, BNX2X_MAX_QUEUES(bp)); + int max_nq = FP_SB_MAX_E1x - 1; + + if (NO_FCOE(bp)) + max_nq = FP_SB_MAX_E1x; + + nq = clamp(nq, 1, max_nq); return nq; } -- 2.43.0

3 months, 2 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061242-cosmetics-bronco-9d06@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: f592cc579474 ("soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request") 778279f4f5e4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: allow loading as a module") d6815c5c43d4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: Add debugfs dumping file") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:55:44 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte aligned addresses associated with it. These control voltage, enable state, mode, and in legacy targets, voltage headroom. The current in-flight request checking logic looks for exact address matches. Requests for different addresses of the same RPMh resource as thus not detected as in-flight. Add new cmd-db API cmd_db_match_resource_addr() to enhance the in-flight request check for VRM requests by ignoring the address offset. This ensures that only one request is allowed to be in-flight for a given VRM resource. This is needed to avoid scenarios where request commands are carried out by RPMh hardware out-of-order leading to LDO regulator over-current protection triggering. Fixes: 658628e7ef78 ("drivers: qcom: rpmh-rsc: add RPMH controller for QCOM SoCs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Elliot Berman <quic_eberman(a)quicinc.com> # sm8650-qrd Signed-off-by: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215-rpmh-rsc-fixes-v4-1-9cbddfcba05b@quicinc… Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c index c344107bc36c..b4e613c34a5c 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -17,6 +21,8 @@ #define MAX_SLV_ID 8 #define SLAVE_ID_MASK 0x7 #define SLAVE_ID_SHIFT 16 +#define SLAVE_ID(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 16), addr) +#define VRM_ADDR(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 4), addr) /** * struct entry_header: header for each entry in cmddb @@ -220,6 +226,30 @@ const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *id, size_t *len) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_read_aux_data); +/** + * cmd_db_match_resource_addr() - Compare if both Resource addresses are same + * + * @addr1: Resource address to compare + * @addr2: Resource address to compare + * + * Return: true if two addresses refer to the same resource, false otherwise + */ +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ + /* + * Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte + * aligned addresses associated with it. Ignore the offset to check + * for VRM requests. + */ + if (addr1 == addr2) + return true; + else if (SLAVE_ID(addr1) == CMD_DB_HW_VRM && VRM_ADDR(addr1) == VRM_ADDR(addr2)) + return true; + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_match_resource_addr); + /** * cmd_db_read_slave_id - Get the slave ID for a given resource address * diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c index c4c7aad957e6..561d8037b50a 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2023-2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "%s " fmt, KBUILD_MODNAME @@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ static int check_for_req_inflight(struct rsc_drv *drv, struct tcs_group *tcs, for_each_set_bit(j, &curr_enabled, MAX_CMDS_PER_TCS) { addr = read_tcs_cmd(drv, drv->regs[RSC_DRV_CMD_ADDR], i, j); for (k = 0; k < msg->num_cmds; k++) { - if (addr == msg->cmds[k].addr) + if (cmd_db_match_resource_addr(msg->cmds[k].addr, addr)) return -EBUSY; } } diff --git a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h index c8bb56e6852a..47a6cab75e63 100644 --- a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h +++ b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ #ifndef __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ #define __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ @@ -21,6 +24,8 @@ u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id); const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len); +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2); + enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id); int cmd_db_ready(void); @@ -31,6 +36,9 @@ static inline u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id) static inline const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len) { return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); } +static inline bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ return false; } + static inline enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id) { return -ENODEV; }

3 months, 2 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061241-obscurity-phonics-bd3b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: f592cc579474 ("soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request") 778279f4f5e4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: allow loading as a module") d6815c5c43d4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: Add debugfs dumping file") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:55:44 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte aligned addresses associated with it. These control voltage, enable state, mode, and in legacy targets, voltage headroom. The current in-flight request checking logic looks for exact address matches. Requests for different addresses of the same RPMh resource as thus not detected as in-flight. Add new cmd-db API cmd_db_match_resource_addr() to enhance the in-flight request check for VRM requests by ignoring the address offset. This ensures that only one request is allowed to be in-flight for a given VRM resource. This is needed to avoid scenarios where request commands are carried out by RPMh hardware out-of-order leading to LDO regulator over-current protection triggering. Fixes: 658628e7ef78 ("drivers: qcom: rpmh-rsc: add RPMH controller for QCOM SoCs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Elliot Berman <quic_eberman(a)quicinc.com> # sm8650-qrd Signed-off-by: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215-rpmh-rsc-fixes-v4-1-9cbddfcba05b@quicinc… Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c index c344107bc36c..b4e613c34a5c 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -17,6 +21,8 @@ #define MAX_SLV_ID 8 #define SLAVE_ID_MASK 0x7 #define SLAVE_ID_SHIFT 16 +#define SLAVE_ID(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 16), addr) +#define VRM_ADDR(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 4), addr) /** * struct entry_header: header for each entry in cmddb @@ -220,6 +226,30 @@ const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *id, size_t *len) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_read_aux_data); +/** + * cmd_db_match_resource_addr() - Compare if both Resource addresses are same + * + * @addr1: Resource address to compare + * @addr2: Resource address to compare + * + * Return: true if two addresses refer to the same resource, false otherwise + */ +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ + /* + * Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte + * aligned addresses associated with it. Ignore the offset to check + * for VRM requests. + */ + if (addr1 == addr2) + return true; + else if (SLAVE_ID(addr1) == CMD_DB_HW_VRM && VRM_ADDR(addr1) == VRM_ADDR(addr2)) + return true; + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_match_resource_addr); + /** * cmd_db_read_slave_id - Get the slave ID for a given resource address * diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c index c4c7aad957e6..561d8037b50a 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2023-2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "%s " fmt, KBUILD_MODNAME @@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ static int check_for_req_inflight(struct rsc_drv *drv, struct tcs_group *tcs, for_each_set_bit(j, &curr_enabled, MAX_CMDS_PER_TCS) { addr = read_tcs_cmd(drv, drv->regs[RSC_DRV_CMD_ADDR], i, j); for (k = 0; k < msg->num_cmds; k++) { - if (addr == msg->cmds[k].addr) + if (cmd_db_match_resource_addr(msg->cmds[k].addr, addr)) return -EBUSY; } } diff --git a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h index c8bb56e6852a..47a6cab75e63 100644 --- a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h +++ b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ #ifndef __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ #define __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ @@ -21,6 +24,8 @@ u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id); const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len); +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2); + enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id); int cmd_db_ready(void); @@ -31,6 +36,9 @@ static inline u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id) static inline const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len) { return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); } +static inline bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ return false; } + static inline enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id) { return -ENODEV; }

3 months, 2 weeks

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024061240-pointing-endanger-621b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: f592cc579474 ("soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request") 778279f4f5e4 ("soc: qcom: cmd-db: allow loading as a module") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From f592cc5794747b81e53b53dd6e80219ee25f0611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:55:44 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] soc: qcom: rpmh-rsc: Enhance check for VRM in-flight request Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte aligned addresses associated with it. These control voltage, enable state, mode, and in legacy targets, voltage headroom. The current in-flight request checking logic looks for exact address matches. Requests for different addresses of the same RPMh resource as thus not detected as in-flight. Add new cmd-db API cmd_db_match_resource_addr() to enhance the in-flight request check for VRM requests by ignoring the address offset. This ensures that only one request is allowed to be in-flight for a given VRM resource. This is needed to avoid scenarios where request commands are carried out by RPMh hardware out-of-order leading to LDO regulator over-current protection triggering. Fixes: 658628e7ef78 ("drivers: qcom: rpmh-rsc: add RPMH controller for QCOM SoCs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Elliot Berman <quic_eberman(a)quicinc.com> # sm8650-qrd Signed-off-by: Maulik Shah <quic_mkshah(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215-rpmh-rsc-fixes-v4-1-9cbddfcba05b@quicinc… Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c index c344107bc36c..b4e613c34a5c 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/cmd-db.c @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, 2020, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -17,6 +21,8 @@ #define MAX_SLV_ID 8 #define SLAVE_ID_MASK 0x7 #define SLAVE_ID_SHIFT 16 +#define SLAVE_ID(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 16), addr) +#define VRM_ADDR(addr) FIELD_GET(GENMASK(19, 4), addr) /** * struct entry_header: header for each entry in cmddb @@ -220,6 +226,30 @@ const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *id, size_t *len) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_read_aux_data); +/** + * cmd_db_match_resource_addr() - Compare if both Resource addresses are same + * + * @addr1: Resource address to compare + * @addr2: Resource address to compare + * + * Return: true if two addresses refer to the same resource, false otherwise + */ +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ + /* + * Each RPMh VRM accelerator resource has 3 or 4 contiguous 4-byte + * aligned addresses associated with it. Ignore the offset to check + * for VRM requests. + */ + if (addr1 == addr2) + return true; + else if (SLAVE_ID(addr1) == CMD_DB_HW_VRM && VRM_ADDR(addr1) == VRM_ADDR(addr2)) + return true; + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cmd_db_match_resource_addr); + /** * cmd_db_read_slave_id - Get the slave ID for a given resource address * diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c index c4c7aad957e6..561d8037b50a 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/rpmh-rsc.c @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2023-2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "%s " fmt, KBUILD_MODNAME @@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ static int check_for_req_inflight(struct rsc_drv *drv, struct tcs_group *tcs, for_each_set_bit(j, &curr_enabled, MAX_CMDS_PER_TCS) { addr = read_tcs_cmd(drv, drv->regs[RSC_DRV_CMD_ADDR], i, j); for (k = 0; k < msg->num_cmds; k++) { - if (addr == msg->cmds[k].addr) + if (cmd_db_match_resource_addr(msg->cmds[k].addr, addr)) return -EBUSY; } } diff --git a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h index c8bb56e6852a..47a6cab75e63 100644 --- a/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h +++ b/include/soc/qcom/cmd-db.h @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Linux Foundation. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2024, Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ #ifndef __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ #define __QCOM_COMMAND_DB_H__ @@ -21,6 +24,8 @@ u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id); const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len); +bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2); + enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id); int cmd_db_ready(void); @@ -31,6 +36,9 @@ static inline u32 cmd_db_read_addr(const char *resource_id) static inline const void *cmd_db_read_aux_data(const char *resource_id, size_t *len) { return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); } +static inline bool cmd_db_match_resource_addr(u32 addr1, u32 addr2) +{ return false; } + static inline enum cmd_db_hw_type cmd_db_read_slave_id(const char *resource_id) { return -ENODEV; }

3 months, 2 weeks

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Candidates for stable v6.9..v6.10-rc1 Out Of Bounds

by Ronnie Sahlberg

These commits reference out.of.bound between v6.9 and v6.10-rc1 These commits are not, yet, in stable/linux-rolling-stable. Let me know if you would rather me compare to a different repo/branch. The list has been manually pruned to only contain commits that look like actual issues. If they contain a Fixes line it has been verified that at least one of the commits that the Fixes tag(s) reference is in stable/linux-rolling-stable 2ba24864d2f61b52210b Syz Fuzzers, Out of bounds 3ebc46ca8675de6378e3 Syz Fuzzers, Out of bounds 9841991a446c87f90f66 Kernel panic, NULL pointer, Out of bounds 51fafb3cd7fcf4f46826 Out of bounds 45cf976008ddef4a9c9a Out of bounds 8b2faf1a4f3b6c748c0d Out of bounds faa4364bef2ec0060de3 Buffer overflow, Out of bounds 8ee1b439b1540ae54314 Out of bounds 7b4c74cf22d7584d1eb4 Out of bounds 1008368e1c7e36bdec01 Out of bounds -- Ronnie Sahlberg [Principal Software Engineer, Linux] P 775 384 8203 | E [email] | W ciq.com

3 months, 2 weeks

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Candidates for stable v6.9..v6.10-rc1 KASAN

by Ronnie Sahlberg

These commits reference KASAN between v6.9 and v6.10-rc1 These commits are not, yet, in stable/linux-rolling-stable. Let me know if you would rather me compare to a different repo/branch. The list has been manually pruned to only contain commits that look like actual issues. If they contain a Fixes line it has been verified that at least one of the commits that the Fixes tag(s) reference is in stable/linux-rolling-stable 195aba96b854dd664768 KASAN, Out of bounds 2e577732e8d28b9183df Kernel panic, KASAN 20faaf30e55522bba2b5 KASAN, Syz Fuzzers, Out of bounds c1115ddbda9c930fba0f KASAN, NULL pointer -- Ronnie Sahlberg [Principal Software Engineer, Linux] P 775 384 8203 | E [email] | W ciq.com

3 months, 2 weeks

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Linux-stable-mirror June 2024