August 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: fix race condition between destroy_previous_session()" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 76e98a158b207771a6c9a0de0a60522a446a3447 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024082626-succulent-engraver-73cd@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 76e98a158b20 ("ksmbd: fix race condition between destroy_previous_session() and smb2 operations()") d484d621d40f ("ksmbd: add durable scavenger timer") c8efcc786146 ("ksmbd: add support for durable handles v1/v2") fa9415d4024f ("ksmbd: mark SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED to session when destroying previous session") c2a721eead71 ("ksmbd: lazy v2 lease break on smb2_write()") d47d9886aeef ("ksmbd: send v2 lease break notification for directory") eb547407f357 ("ksmbd: downgrade RWH lease caching state to RH for directory") 2e450920d58b ("ksmbd: move oplock handling after unlock parent dir") 4274a9dc6aeb ("ksmbd: separately allocate ci per dentry") 864fb5d37163 ("ksmbd: fix possible deadlock in smb2_open") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 76e98a158b207771a6c9a0de0a60522a446a3447 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2024 14:03:49 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: fix race condition between destroy_previous_session() and smb2 operations() If there is ->PreviousSessionId field in the session setup request, The session of the previous connection should be destroyed. During this, if the smb2 operation requests in the previous session are being processed, a racy issue could happen with ksmbd_destroy_file_table(). This patch sets conn->status to KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT to block incoming operations and waits until on-going operations are complete (i.e. idle) before desctorying the previous session. Fixes: c8efcc786146 ("ksmbd: add support for durable handles v1/v2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.6+ Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-25040 Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> diff --git a/fs/smb/server/connection.c b/fs/smb/server/connection.c index 09e1e7771592..7889df8112b4 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/connection.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/connection.c @@ -165,11 +165,43 @@ void ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(u64 sess_id, u32 status) up_read(&conn_list_lock); } -void ksmbd_conn_wait_idle(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, u64 sess_id) +void ksmbd_conn_wait_idle(struct ksmbd_conn *conn) { wait_event(conn->req_running_q, atomic_read(&conn->req_running) < 2); } +int ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id(struct ksmbd_conn *curr_conn, u64 sess_id) +{ + struct ksmbd_conn *conn; + int rc, retry_count = 0, max_timeout = 120; + int rcount = 1; + +retry_idle: + if (retry_count >= max_timeout) + return -EIO; + + down_read(&conn_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(conn, &conn_list, conns_list) { + if (conn->binding || xa_load(&conn->sessions, sess_id)) { + if (conn == curr_conn) + rcount = 2; + if (atomic_read(&conn->req_running) >= rcount) { + rc = wait_event_timeout(conn->req_running_q, + atomic_read(&conn->req_running) < rcount, + HZ); + if (!rc) { + up_read(&conn_list_lock); + retry_count++; + goto retry_idle; + } + } + } + } + up_read(&conn_list_lock); + + return 0; +} + int ksmbd_conn_write(struct ksmbd_work *work) { struct ksmbd_conn *conn = work->conn; diff --git a/fs/smb/server/connection.h b/fs/smb/server/connection.h index 5c2845e47cf2..5b947175c048 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/connection.h +++ b/fs/smb/server/connection.h @@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ extern struct list_head conn_list; extern struct rw_semaphore conn_list_lock; bool ksmbd_conn_alive(struct ksmbd_conn *conn); -void ksmbd_conn_wait_idle(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, u64 sess_id); +void ksmbd_conn_wait_idle(struct ksmbd_conn *conn); +int ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id(struct ksmbd_conn *curr_conn, u64 sess_id); struct ksmbd_conn *ksmbd_conn_alloc(void); void ksmbd_conn_free(struct ksmbd_conn *conn); bool ksmbd_conn_lookup_dialect(struct ksmbd_conn *c); diff --git a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c index 162a12685d2c..99416ce9f501 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_session.c @@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ void destroy_previous_session(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, { struct ksmbd_session *prev_sess; struct ksmbd_user *prev_user; + int err; down_write(&sessions_table_lock); down_write(&conn->session_lock); @@ -325,8 +326,16 @@ void destroy_previous_session(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, memcmp(user->passkey, prev_user->passkey, user->passkey_sz)) goto out; + ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_RECONNECT); + err = ksmbd_conn_wait_idle_sess_id(conn, id); + if (err) { + ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE); + goto out; + } + ksmbd_destroy_file_table(&prev_sess->file_table); prev_sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED; + ksmbd_all_conn_set_status(id, KSMBD_SESS_NEED_NEGOTIATE); ksmbd_launch_ksmbd_durable_scavenger(); out: up_write(&conn->session_lock); diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 3f4c56a10a86..cb7f487c96af 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@ int smb2_session_logoff(struct ksmbd_work *work) ksmbd_conn_unlock(conn); ksmbd_close_session_fds(work); - ksmbd_conn_wait_idle(conn, sess_id); + ksmbd_conn_wait_idle(conn); /* * Re-lookup session to validate if session is deleted

1 year, 3 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH 6.6 0/2] VCN power saving improvements

by Mario Limonciello

From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com> This is a backport of patches from 6.11-rc1 that improve power savings for VCN when hardware accelerated video playback is active. Boyuan Zhang (2): drm/amdgpu/vcn: identify unified queue in sw init drm/amdgpu/vcn: not pause dpg for unified queue drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vcn.c | 53 ++++++++++++------------- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vcn.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

1 year, 3 months

2
3
0 0

[PATCH 5.10.y] nfsd: Don't call freezable_schedule_timeout() after each successful page allocation in svc_alloc_arg().

by Kuniyuki Iwashima

When commit 390390240145 ("nfsd: don't allow nfsd threads to be signalled.") is backported to 5.10, it was adjusted considering commit 3feac2b55293 ("sunrpc: exclude from freezer when waiting for requests:"). However, 3feac2b55293 is based on commit f6e70aab9dfe ("SUNRPC: refresh rq_pages using a bulk page allocator"), which converted page-by-page allocation to a batch allocation, so schedule_timeout() is placed un-nested. As a result, the backported commit 7229200f6866 ("nfsd: don't allow nfsd threads to be signalled.") placed freezable_schedule_timeout() in the wrong place. Now, freezable_schedule_timeout() is called after every successful page allocation, and we see 30%+ performance regression on 5.10.220 in our test suite. Let's move it to the correct place so that freezable_schedule_timeout() is called only when page allocation fails. Fixes: 7229200f6866 ("nfsd: don't allow nfsd threads to be signalled.") Reported-by: Hughdan Liu <hughliu(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> --- net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c index d1eacf3358b8..60782504ad3e 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c @@ -679,8 +679,8 @@ static int svc_alloc_arg(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); return -EINTR; } + freezable_schedule_timeout(msecs_to_jiffies(500)); } - freezable_schedule_timeout(msecs_to_jiffies(500)); rqstp->rq_pages[i] = p; } rqstp->rq_page_end = &rqstp->rq_pages[i]; -- 2.30.2

1 year, 3 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH 6.1.y 0/7] NFSD updates for LTS 6.1.y

by cel＠kernel.org

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Address an NFSD crasher that was noted here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/65ee9c0d-e89e-b3e5-f542-103a0ee4745c@huaw… To apply the fix cleanly, backport a few NFSD patches into v6.1.y that have been in the other LTS kernels for a while. Reported-by: Li LingFeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: Li LingFeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> Tested-by: Li LingFeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> Jeff Layton (1): nfsd: drop the nfsd_put helper NeilBrown (5): nfsd: Simplify code around svc_exit_thread() call in nfsd() nfsd: separate nfsd_last_thread() from nfsd_put() NFSD: simplify error paths in nfsd_svc() nfsd: call nfsd_last_thread() before final nfsd_put() nfsd: don't call locks_release_private() twice concurrently Trond Myklebust (1): nfsd: Fix a regression in nfsd_setattr() fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 4 ++ fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 2 +- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 32 ++++++++------ fs/nfsd/nfsd.h | 3 +- fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c | 85 ++++++++++---------------------------- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 6 ++- include/linux/sunrpc/svc.h | 13 ------ 7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-) -- 2.45.1

1 year, 3 months

2
8
0 0

[PATCH stable 6.6 1/2] bpf: Fix a kernel verifier crash in stacksafe()

by Shung-Hsi Yu

From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song(a)linux.dev> [ Upstream commit bed2eb964c70b780fb55925892a74f26cb590b25 ] Daniel Hodges reported a kernel verifier crash when playing with sched-ext. Further investigation shows that the crash is due to invalid memory access in stacksafe(). More specifically, it is the following code: if (exact != NOT_EXACT && old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) return false; The 'i' iterates old->allocated_stack. If cur->allocated_stack < old->allocated_stack the out-of-bound access will happen. To fix the issue add 'i >= cur->allocated_stack' check such that if the condition is true, stacksafe() should fail. Otherwise, cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] memory access is legal. Fixes: 2793a8b015f7 ("bpf: exact states comparison for iterator convergence checks") Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Daniel Hodges <hodgesd(a)meta.com> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song(a)linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812214847.213612-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> shung-hsi.yu: "exact" variable is bool instead enum because commit 4f81c16f50ba ("bpf: Recognize that two registers are safe when their ranges match") is not present. Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu(a)suse.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 171045b6956d..3f1a9cd7fc9e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -16124,8 +16124,9 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE; if (exact && - old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != - cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE]) + (i >= cur->allocated_stack || + old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] != + cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])) return false; if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) && !exact) { -- 2.46.0

1 year, 3 months

2
2
0 0

[PATCH stable 5.10] bpf: Allow reads from uninit stack

by Maxim Mikityanskiy

From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 6715df8d5d24655b9fd368e904028112b54c7de1 ] This commits updates the following functions to allow reads from uninitialized stack locations when env->allow_uninit_stack option is enabled: - check_stack_read_fixed_off() - check_stack_range_initialized(), called from: - check_stack_read_var_off() - check_helper_mem_access() Such change allows to relax logic in stacksafe() to treat STACK_MISC and STACK_INVALID in a same way and make the following stack slot configurations equivalent: | Cached state | Current state | | stack slot | stack slot | |------------------+------------------| | STACK_INVALID or | STACK_INVALID or | | STACK_MISC | STACK_SPILL or | | | STACK_MISC or | | | STACK_ZERO or | | | STACK_DYNPTR | This leads to significant verification speed gains (see below). The idea was suggested by Andrii Nakryiko [1] and initial patch was created by Alexei Starovoitov [2]. Currently the env->allow_uninit_stack is allowed for programs loaded by users with CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities. A number of test cases from verifier/*.c were expecting uninitialized stack access to be an error. These test cases were updated to execute in unprivileged mode (thus preserving the tests). The test progs/test_global_func10.c expected "invalid indirect read from stack" error message because of the access to uninitialized memory region. This error is no longer possible in privileged mode. The test is updated to provoke an error "invalid indirect access to stack" because of access to invalid stack address (such error is not verified by progs/test_global_func*.c series of tests). The following tests had to be removed because these can't be made unprivileged: - verifier/sock.c: - "sk_storage_get(map, skb->sk, &stack_value, 1): partially init stack_value" BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS programs are not executed in unprivileged mode. - verifier/var_off.c: - "indirect variable-offset stack access, max_off+size > max_initialized" - "indirect variable-offset stack access, uninitialized" These tests verify that access to uninitialized stack values is detected when stack offset is not a constant. However, variable stack access is prohibited in unprivileged mode, thus these tests are no longer valid. * * * Here is veristat log comparing this patch with current master on a set of selftest binaries listed in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/veristat.cfg and cilium BPF binaries (see [3]): $ ./veristat -e file,prog,states -C -f 'states_pct<-30' master.log current.log File Program States (A) States (B) States (DIFF) -------------------------- -------------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------------- bpf_host.o tail_handle_ipv6_from_host 349 244 -105 (-30.09%) bpf_host.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1320 895 -425 (-32.20%) bpf_lxc.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1320 895 -425 (-32.20%) bpf_sock.o cil_sock4_connect 70 48 -22 (-31.43%) bpf_sock.o cil_sock4_sendmsg 68 46 -22 (-32.35%) bpf_xdp.o tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv4 1554 803 -751 (-48.33%) bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv4 6457 2473 -3984 (-61.70%) bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv6 7249 3908 -3341 (-46.09%) pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 287 145 -142 (-49.48%) strobemeta.bpf.o on_event 15915 4772 -11143 (-70.02%) strobemeta_nounroll2.bpf.o on_event 17087 3820 -13267 (-77.64%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 21271 6635 -14636 (-68.81%) xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 23122 6024 -17098 (-73.95%) -------------------------- -------------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------------- Note: I limited selection by states_pct<-30%. Inspection of differences in pyperf600_bpf_loop behavior shows that the following patch for the test removes almost all differences: - a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf.h + b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/pyperf.h @ -266,8 +266,8 @ int __on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx) } if (event->pthread_match || !pidData->use_tls) { - void* frame_ptr; - FrameData frame; + void* frame_ptr = 0; + FrameData frame = {}; Symbol sym = {}; int cur_cpu = bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); W/o this patch the difference comes from the following pattern (for different variables): static bool get_frame_data(... FrameData *frame ...) { ... bpf_probe_read_user(&frame->f_code, ...); if (!frame->f_code) return false; ... bpf_probe_read_user(&frame->co_name, ...); if (frame->co_name) ...; } int __on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args *ctx) { FrameData frame; ... get_frame_data(... &frame ...) // indirectly via a bpf_loop & callback ... } SEC("raw_tracepoint/kfree_skb") int on_event(struct bpf_raw_tracepoint_args* ctx) { ... ret |= __on_event(ctx); ret |= __on_event(ctx); ... } With regards to value `frame->co_name` the following is important: - Because of the conditional `if (!frame->f_code)` each call to __on_event() produces two states, one with `frame->co_name` marked as STACK_MISC, another with it as is (and marked STACK_INVALID on a first call). - The call to bpf_probe_read_user() does not mark stack slots corresponding to `&frame->co_name` as REG_LIVE_WRITTEN but it marks these slots as BPF_MISC, this happens because of the following loop in the check_helper_call(): for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) { err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1, false); if (err) return err; } Note the size of the write, it is a one byte write for each byte touched by a helper. The BPF_B write does not lead to write marks for the target stack slot. - Which means that w/o this patch when second __on_event() call is verified `if (frame->co_name)` will propagate read marks first to a stack slot with STACK_MISC marks and second to a stack slot with STACK_INVALID marks and these states would be considered different. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzY3e+ZuC6HUa8dCiUovQRg2SzEk7M-dSkqNZyn=xE… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQKs2i1iuZ5SUGuJtxWVfGYR9kDgYKhq3rNV+kBLQC… [3] git@github.com:anakryiko/cilium.git Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230219200427.606541-2-eddyz87@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim(a)isovalent.com> --- Backporting to address the complexity regression introduced by commit 71f656a50176 ("bpf: Fix to preserve reg parent/live fields when copying range info"), that affects Cilium built with LLVM 18. kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 11 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c | 31 +++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 13 +- .../bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c | 104 ++++++--- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c | 9 +- .../selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c | 13 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c | 27 --- .../selftests/bpf/verifier/spill_fill.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c | 52 ----- 9 files changed, 342 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index ad115ccc2fe0..60db311480d0 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2807,6 +2807,8 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, continue; if (type == STACK_MISC) continue; + if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) + continue; verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", off, i, size); return -EACCES; @@ -2844,6 +2846,8 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, continue; if (type == STACK_ZERO) continue; + if (type == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack) + continue; verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n", off, i, size); return -EACCES; @@ -4300,7 +4304,8 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized( stype = &state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE]; if (*stype == STACK_MISC) goto mark; - if (*stype == STACK_ZERO) { + if ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) || + (*stype == STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)) { if (clobber) { /* helper can write anything into the stack */ *stype = STACK_MISC; @@ -9492,6 +9497,10 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, if (old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_INVALID) continue; + if (env->allow_uninit_stack && + old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_MISC) + continue; + /* explored stack has more populated slots than current stack * and these slots were used */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8fba3f3649e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func10.c @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +#include <stddef.h> +#include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include "bpf_misc.h" + +struct Small { + long x; +}; + +struct Big { + long x; + long y; +}; + +__noinline int foo(const struct Big *big) +{ + if (!big) + return 0; + + return bpf_get_prandom_u32() < big->y; +} + +SEC("cgroup_skb/ingress") +__failure __msg("invalid indirect access to stack") +int global_func10(struct __sk_buff *skb) +{ + const struct Small small = {.x = skb->len }; + + return foo((struct Big *)&small) ? 1 : 0; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c index eb888c8479c3..4b0628cd2d03 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c @@ -1948,19 +1948,22 @@ * that fp-8 stack slot was unused in the fall-through * branch and will accept the program incorrectly */ - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_1, 2, 2), + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, 2, 2), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, - .fixup_map_hash_48b = { 6 }, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -8+0 size 8", - .result = REJECT, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, + .fixup_map_hash_48b = { 7 }, + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -8+0 size 8", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ + .result = ACCEPT, }, { "calls: ctx read at start of subprog", diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c index 0ab7f1dfc97a..0e24aa11c457 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/helper_access_var_len.c @@ -29,19 +29,30 @@ { "helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND, zero included", .insns = { - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), - BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 64), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0), - BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel), + /* set max stack size */ + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -128, 0), + /* set r3 to a random value */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0), + /* use bitwise AND to limit r3 range to [0, 64] */ + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 64), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -64), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0), + /* Call bpf_ringbuf_output(), it is one of a few helper functions with + * ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO parameter allowed in unpriv mode. + * For unpriv this should signal an error, because memory at &fp[-64] is + * not initialized. + */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+0 size 64", - .result = REJECT, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, + .fixup_map_ringbuf = { 4 }, + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -64+0 size 64", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ + .result = ACCEPT, }, { "helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND + JMP, wrong max", @@ -183,20 +194,31 @@ { "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, no min check", .insns = { - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), - BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), - BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128), - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128), - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 3), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0), - BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel), + /* set max stack size */ + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -128, 0), + /* set r3 to a random value */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0), + /* use JMP to limit r3 range to [0, 64] */ + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3, 64, 6), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -64), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0), + /* Call bpf_ringbuf_output(), it is one of a few helper functions with + * ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO parameter allowed in unpriv mode. + * For unpriv this should signal an error, because memory at &fp[-64] is + * not initialized. + */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+0 size 64", - .result = REJECT, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, + .fixup_map_ringbuf = { 4 }, + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -64+0 size 64", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ + .result = ACCEPT, }, { "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP (signed), no min check", @@ -564,29 +586,41 @@ { "helper access to variable memory: 8 bytes leak", .insns = { - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 8), - BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64), + /* set max stack size */ + BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -128, 0), + /* set r3 to a random value */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0), + BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -64), BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -64), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -56), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -48), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -40), + /* Note: fp[-32] left uninitialized */ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -24), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -16), BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8), - BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128), - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 63), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 1), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0), - BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel), - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, -16), + /* Limit r3 range to [1, 64] */ + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_3, 63), + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, 1), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0), + /* Call bpf_ringbuf_output(), it is one of a few helper functions with + * ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO parameter allowed in unpriv mode. + * For unpriv this should signal an error, because memory region [1, 64] + * at &fp[-64] is not fully initialized. + */ + BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ringbuf_output), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R1 off -64+32 size 64", - .result = REJECT, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, + .fixup_map_ringbuf = { 3 }, + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 off -64+32 size 64", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ + .result = ACCEPT, }, { "helper access to variable memory: 8 bytes no leak (init memory)", diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c index 070893fb2900..02d9e004260b 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/int_ptr.c @@ -54,12 +54,13 @@ /* bpf_strtoul() */ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_strtoul), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 1), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, - .result = REJECT, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 off -16+4 size 8", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 off -16+4 size 8", + /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ + .result = ACCEPT, }, { "ARG_PTR_TO_LONG misaligned", diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c index 7e36078f8f48..949cbe460248 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c @@ -128,9 +128,10 @@ BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 }, - .errstr = "invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8", - .result = REJECT, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ + .result = ACCEPT, }, { "allocated_stack", @@ -187,6 +188,8 @@ BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, .flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ, - .errstr = "invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8", - .result = REJECT, + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ + .result = ACCEPT, }, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c index 8c224eac93df..59d976d22867 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sock.c @@ -530,33 +530,6 @@ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = ACCEPT, }, -{ - "sk_storage_get(map, skb->sk, &stack_value, 1): partially init stack_value", - .insns = { - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0), - BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -8), - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk)), - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_1, 0, 2), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), - BPF_EXIT_INSN(), - BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_fullsock), - BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), - BPF_EXIT_INSN(), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 1), - BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_10), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_3, -8), - BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_0), - BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), - BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), - BPF_EXIT_INSN(), - }, - .fixup_sk_storage_map = { 14 }, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, - .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack", -}, { "bpf_map_lookup_elem(smap, &key)", .insns = { diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spill_fill.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spill_fill.c index 0b943897aaf6..1e76841b7bfa 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spill_fill.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/spill_fill.c @@ -104,3 +104,214 @@ .result = ACCEPT, .retval = POINTER_VALUE, }, +{ + "Spill and refill a u32 const scalar. Offset to skb->data", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + /* r4 = 20 */ + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 20), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r4 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -8), + /* r4 = *(u32 *)(r10 -8) */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -8), + /* r0 = r2 */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + /* r0 += r4 R0=pkt R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=20 */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_4), + /* if (r0 > r3) R0=pkt,off=20 R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=20 */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1), + /* r0 = *(u32 *)r2 R0=pkt,off=20,r=20 R2=pkt,r=20 R3=pkt_end R4=20 */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, +}, +{ + "Spill a u32 const, refill from another half of the uninit u32 from the stack", + .insns = { + /* r4 = 20 */ + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 20), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r4 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -8), + /* r4 = *(u32 *)(r10 -4) fp-8=????rrrr*/ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -4), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result_unpriv = REJECT, + .errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -4+0 size 4", + /* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */ + .result = ACCEPT, +}, +{ + "Spill a u32 const scalar. Refill as u16. Offset to skb->data", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + /* r4 = 20 */ + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 20), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r4 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -8), + /* r4 = *(u16 *)(r10 -8) */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -8), + /* r0 = r2 */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + /* r0 += r4 R0=pkt R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=umax=65535 */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_4), + /* if (r0 > r3) R0=pkt,umax=65535 R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=umax=65535 */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1), + /* r0 = *(u32 *)r2 R0=pkt,umax=65535 R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=20 */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid access to packet", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, +}, +{ + "Spill u32 const scalars. Refill as u64. Offset to skb->data", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + /* r6 = 0 */ + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 0), + /* r7 = 20 */ + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_7, 20), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r6 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, -4), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r7 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, -8), + /* r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -8), + /* r0 = r2 */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + /* r0 += r4 R0=pkt R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=umax=65535 */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_4), + /* if (r0 > r3) R0=pkt,umax=65535 R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=umax=65535 */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1), + /* r0 = *(u32 *)r2 R0=pkt,umax=65535 R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=20 */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid access to packet", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, +}, +{ + "Spill a u32 const scalar. Refill as u16 from fp-6. Offset to skb->data", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + /* r4 = 20 */ + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 20), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r4 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -8), + /* r4 = *(u16 *)(r10 -6) */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_H, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -6), + /* r0 = r2 */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + /* r0 += r4 R0=pkt R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=umax=65535 */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_4), + /* if (r0 > r3) R0=pkt,umax=65535 R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=umax=65535 */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1), + /* r0 = *(u32 *)r2 R0=pkt,umax=65535 R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=20 */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid access to packet", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, +}, +{ + "Spill and refill a u32 const scalar at non 8byte aligned stack addr. Offset to skb->data", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + /* r4 = 20 */ + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 20), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r4 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -8), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r4 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -4), + /* r4 = *(u32 *)(r10 -4), */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -4), + /* r0 = r2 */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + /* r0 += r4 R0=pkt R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4=umax=U32_MAX */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_4), + /* if (r0 > r3) R0=pkt,umax=U32_MAX R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4= */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_3, 1), + /* r0 = *(u32 *)r2 R0=pkt,umax=U32_MAX R2=pkt R3=pkt_end R4= */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = REJECT, + .errstr = "invalid access to packet", + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, +}, +{ + "Spill and refill a umax=40 bounded scalar. Offset to skb->data", + .insns = { + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end)), + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_1, + offsetof(struct __sk_buff, tstamp)), + BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_4, 40, 2), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r4 R4=umax=40 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -8), + /* r4 = (*u32 *)(r10 - 8) */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -8), + /* r2 += r4 R2=pkt R4=umax=40 */ + BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_4), + /* r0 = r2 R2=pkt,umax=40 R4=umax=40 */ + BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2), + /* r2 += 20 R0=pkt,umax=40 R2=pkt,umax=40 */ + BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 20), + /* if (r2 > r3) R0=pkt,umax=40 R2=pkt,off=20,umax=40 */ + BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, 1), + /* r0 = *(u32 *)r0 R0=pkt,r=20,umax=40 R2=pkt,off=20,r=20,umax=40 */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, +}, +{ + "Spill a u32 scalar at fp-4 and then at fp-8", + .insns = { + /* r4 = 4321 */ + BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 4321), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -4) = r4 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -4), + /* *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r4 */ + BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -8), + /* r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8) */ + BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10, -8), + BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), + BPF_EXIT_INSN(), + }, + .result = ACCEPT, + .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, +}, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c index eab1f7f56e2f..dc92a29f0d74 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c @@ -212,31 +212,6 @@ .result = REJECT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, }, -{ - "indirect variable-offset stack access, max_off+size > max_initialized", - .insns = { - /* Fill only the second from top 8 bytes of the stack. */ - BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0), - /* Get an unknown value. */ - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0), - /* Make it small and 4-byte aligned. */ - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 4), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_2, 16), - /* Add it to fp. We now have either fp-12 or fp-16, but we don't know - * which. fp-12 size 8 is partially uninitialized stack. - */ - BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), - /* Dereference it indirectly. */ - BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), - BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), - BPF_EXIT_INSN(), - }, - .fixup_map_hash_8b = { 5 }, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R2 var_off", - .result = REJECT, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN, -}, { "indirect variable-offset stack access, min_off < min_initialized", .insns = { @@ -289,33 +264,6 @@ .result = ACCEPT, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB, }, -{ - "indirect variable-offset stack access, uninitialized", - .insns = { - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 6), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 28), - /* Fill the top 16 bytes of the stack. */ - BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0), - BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), - /* Get an unknown value. */ - BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_1, 0), - /* Make it small and 4-byte aligned. */ - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_4, 4), - BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_4, 16), - /* Add it to fp. We now have either fp-12 or fp-16, we don't know - * which, but either way it points to initialized stack. - */ - BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_10), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 8), - /* Dereference it indirectly. */ - BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_getsockopt), - BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0), - BPF_EXIT_INSN(), - }, - .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack R4 var_off", - .result = REJECT, - .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS, -}, { "indirect variable-offset stack access, ok", .insns = { -- 2.45.2

1 year, 3 months

5
6
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/numa: no task_numa_fault() call if PTE is changed" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 40b760cfd44566bca791c80e0720d70d75382b84 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024081934-embargo-primer-a23e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 40b760cfd445 ("mm/numa: no task_numa_fault() call if PTE is changed") d2136d749d76 ("mm: support multi-size THP numa balancing") 6b0ed7b3c775 ("mm: factor out the numa mapping rebuilding into a new helper") ec1778807a80 ("mm: mprotect: use a folio in change_pte_range()") 6695cf68b15c ("mm: memory: use a folio in do_numa_page()") 73eab3ca481e ("mm: migrate: convert migrate_misplaced_page() to migrate_misplaced_folio()") 2ac9e99f3b21 ("mm: migrate: convert numamigrate_isolate_page() to numamigrate_isolate_folio()") df57721f9a63 ("Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 40b760cfd44566bca791c80e0720d70d75382b84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2024 10:59:04 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] mm/numa: no task_numa_fault() call if PTE is changed When handling a numa page fault, task_numa_fault() should be called by a process that restores the page table of the faulted folio to avoid duplicated stats counting. Commit b99a342d4f11 ("NUMA balancing: reduce TLB flush via delaying mapping on hint page fault") restructured do_numa_page() and did not avoid task_numa_fault() call in the second page table check after a numa migration failure. Fix it by making all !pte_same() return immediately. This issue can cause task_numa_fault() being called more than necessary and lead to unexpected numa balancing results (It is hard to tell whether the issue will cause positive or negative performance impact due to duplicated numa fault counting). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240809145906.1513458-2-ziy@nvidia.com Fixes: b99a342d4f11 ("NUMA balancing: reduce TLB flush via delaying mapping on hint page fault") Signed-off-by: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Reported-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/87zfqfw0yw.fsf@yhuang6-desk2.ccr.corp.inte… Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)suse.de> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301(a)gmail.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c index 34f8402d2046..3c01d68065be 100644 --- a/mm/memory.c +++ b/mm/memory.c @@ -5295,7 +5295,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (unlikely(!pte_same(old_pte, vmf->orig_pte))) { pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl); - goto out; + return 0; } pte = pte_modify(old_pte, vma->vm_page_prot); @@ -5358,23 +5358,19 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) if (!migrate_misplaced_folio(folio, vma, target_nid)) { nid = target_nid; flags |= TNF_MIGRATED; - } else { - flags |= TNF_MIGRATE_FAIL; - vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, - vmf->address, &vmf->ptl); - if (unlikely(!vmf->pte)) - goto out; - if (unlikely(!pte_same(ptep_get(vmf->pte), vmf->orig_pte))) { - pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl); - goto out; - } - goto out_map; + task_numa_fault(last_cpupid, nid, nr_pages, flags); + return 0; } -out: - if (nid != NUMA_NO_NODE) - task_numa_fault(last_cpupid, nid, nr_pages, flags); - return 0; + flags |= TNF_MIGRATE_FAIL; + vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, + vmf->address, &vmf->ptl); + if (unlikely(!vmf->pte)) + return 0; + if (unlikely(!pte_same(ptep_get(vmf->pte), vmf->orig_pte))) { + pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl); + return 0; + } out_map: /* * Make it present again, depending on how arch implements @@ -5387,7 +5383,10 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) numa_rebuild_single_mapping(vmf, vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, writable); pte_unmap_unlock(vmf->pte, vmf->ptl); - goto out; + + if (nid != NUMA_NO_NODE) + task_numa_fault(last_cpupid, nid, nr_pages, flags); + return 0; } static inline vm_fault_t create_huge_pmd(struct vm_fault *vmf)

1 year, 3 months

3
2
0 0

Re: Patch "drm/amdkfd: Move dma unmapping after TLB flush" has been added to the 6.6-stable tree

by Felix Kuehling

This patch introduced a regression. If you want to backport it, I'd recommend including this fix as well: commit 9c29282ecbeeb1b43fced3055c6a5bb244b9390b Author: Lang Yu <Lang.Yu(a)amd.com> Date: Thu Jan 11 12:27:07 2024 +0800 drm/amdkfd: reserve the BO before validating it Fix a warning. v2: Avoid unmapping attachment repeatedly when ERESTARTSYS. v3: Lock the BO before accessing ttm->sg to avoid race conditions.(Felix) [ 41.708711] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1463 at drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_bo.c:846 ttm_bo_validate+0x146/0x1b0 [ttm] [ 41.708989] Call Trace: [ 41.708992] <TASK> [ 41.708996] ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80 [ 41.709000] ? ttm_bo_validate+0x146/0x1b0 [ttm] [ 41.709008] ? __warn+0x93/0x190 [ 41.709014] ? ttm_bo_validate+0x146/0x1b0 [ttm] [ 41.709024] ? report_bug+0x1f9/0x210 [ 41.709035] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80 [ 41.709041] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80 [ 41.709048] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30 [ 41.709057] ? amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_dmaunmap_mem+0x2c/0x80 [amdgpu] [ 41.709185] ? ttm_bo_validate+0x146/0x1b0 [ttm] [ 41.709197] ? amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_dmaunmap_mem+0x2c/0x80 [amdgpu] [ 41.709337] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 41.709346] kfd_mem_dmaunmap_attachment+0x9e/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 41.709467] amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_dmaunmap_mem+0x56/0x80 [amdgpu] [ 41.709586] kfd_ioctl_unmap_memory_from_gpu+0x1b7/0x300 [amdgpu] [ 41.709710] kfd_ioctl+0x1ec/0x650 [amdgpu] [ 41.709822] ? __pfx_kfd_ioctl_unmap_memory_from_gpu+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu] [ 41.709945] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f [ 41.709949] ? tomoyo_file_ioctl+0x20/0x30 [ 41.709959] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x9c/0xd0 [ 41.709967] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 41.709973] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fixes: 101b8104307e ("drm/amdkfd: Move dma unmapping after TLB flush") Signed-off-by: Lang Yu <Lang.Yu(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Regards, Felix On 2024-08-20 8:00, Sasha Levin wrote: > This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled > > drm/amdkfd: Move dma unmapping after TLB flush > > to the 6.6-stable tree which can be found at: > http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… > > The filename of the patch is: > drm-amdkfd-move-dma-unmapping-after-tlb-flush.patch > and it can be found in the queue-6.6 subdirectory. > > If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, > please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. > > > > commit 23f8ef0f6e5deee5814fda6ec2e2ee4c2f19a384 > Author: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang(a)amd.com> > Date: Mon Sep 11 14:44:22 2023 -0400 > > drm/amdkfd: Move dma unmapping after TLB flush > > [ Upstream commit 101b8104307eac734f2dfa4d3511430b0b631c73 ] > > Otherwise GPU may access the stale mapping and generate IOMMU > IO_PAGE_FAULT. > > Move this to inside p->mutex to prevent multiple threads mapping and > unmapping concurrently race condition. > > After kfd_mem_dmaunmap_attachment is removed from unmap_bo_from_gpuvm, > kfd_mem_dmaunmap_attachment is called if failed to map to GPUs, and > before free the mem attachment in case failed to unmap from GPUs. > > Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang(a)amd.com> > Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling(a)amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> > Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> > > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.h > index 2fe9860725bd9..5e4fb33b97351 100644 > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.h > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.h > @@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu(struct amdgpu_device *adev, > struct kgd_mem *mem, void *drm_priv); > int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_unmap_memory_from_gpu( > struct amdgpu_device *adev, struct kgd_mem *mem, void *drm_priv); > +void amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_dmaunmap_mem(struct kgd_mem *mem, void *drm_priv); > int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_sync_memory( > struct amdgpu_device *adev, struct kgd_mem *mem, bool intr); > int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_gtt_bo_to_kernel(struct kgd_mem *mem, > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c > index 62c1dc9510a41..c2d1d57a6c668 100644 > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c > @@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ kfd_mem_dmaunmap_sg_bo(struct kgd_mem *mem, > enum dma_data_direction dir; > > if (unlikely(!ttm->sg)) { > - pr_err("SG Table of BO is UNEXPECTEDLY NULL"); > + pr_debug("SG Table of BO is NULL"); > return; > } > > @@ -1202,8 +1202,6 @@ static void unmap_bo_from_gpuvm(struct kgd_mem *mem, > amdgpu_vm_clear_freed(adev, vm, &bo_va->last_pt_update); > > amdgpu_sync_fence(sync, bo_va->last_pt_update); > - > - kfd_mem_dmaunmap_attachment(mem, entry); > } > > static int update_gpuvm_pte(struct kgd_mem *mem, > @@ -1258,6 +1256,7 @@ static int map_bo_to_gpuvm(struct kgd_mem *mem, > > update_gpuvm_pte_failed: > unmap_bo_from_gpuvm(mem, entry, sync); > + kfd_mem_dmaunmap_attachment(mem, entry); > return ret; > } > > @@ -1862,8 +1861,10 @@ int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_free_memory_of_gpu( > mem->va + bo_size * (1 + mem->aql_queue)); > > /* Remove from VM internal data structures */ > - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &mem->attachments, list) > + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &mem->attachments, list) { > + kfd_mem_dmaunmap_attachment(mem, entry); > kfd_mem_detach(entry); > + } > > ret = unreserve_bo_and_vms(&ctx, false, false); > > @@ -2037,6 +2038,23 @@ int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_map_memory_to_gpu( > return ret; > } > > +void amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_dmaunmap_mem(struct kgd_mem *mem, void *drm_priv) > +{ > + struct kfd_mem_attachment *entry; > + struct amdgpu_vm *vm; > + > + vm = drm_priv_to_vm(drm_priv); > + > + mutex_lock(&mem->lock); > + > + list_for_each_entry(entry, &mem->attachments, list) { > + if (entry->bo_va->base.vm == vm) > + kfd_mem_dmaunmap_attachment(mem, entry); > + } > + > + mutex_unlock(&mem->lock); > +} > + > int amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_unmap_memory_from_gpu( > struct amdgpu_device *adev, struct kgd_mem *mem, void *drm_priv) > { > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c > index d33ba4fe9ad5b..045280c2b607c 100644 > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c > @@ -1432,17 +1432,21 @@ static int kfd_ioctl_unmap_memory_from_gpu(struct file *filep, > goto sync_memory_failed; > } > } > - mutex_unlock(&p->mutex); > > - if (flush_tlb) { > - /* Flush TLBs after waiting for the page table updates to complete */ > - for (i = 0; i < args->n_devices; i++) { > - peer_pdd = kfd_process_device_data_by_id(p, devices_arr[i]); > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!peer_pdd)) > - continue; > + /* Flush TLBs after waiting for the page table updates to complete */ > + for (i = 0; i < args->n_devices; i++) { > + peer_pdd = kfd_process_device_data_by_id(p, devices_arr[i]); > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!peer_pdd)) > + continue; > + if (flush_tlb) > kfd_flush_tlb(peer_pdd, TLB_FLUSH_HEAVYWEIGHT); > - } > + > + /* Remove dma mapping after tlb flush to avoid IO_PAGE_FAULT */ > + amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_dmaunmap_mem(mem, peer_pdd->drm_priv); > } > + > + mutex_unlock(&p->mutex); > + > kfree(devices_arr); > > return 0;

1 year, 3 months

2
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mm/vmalloc: fix page mapping if vm_area_alloc_pages() with" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 61ebe5a747da649057c37be1c37eb934b4af79ca # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024081918-payday-symphonic-ac65@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 61ebe5a747da ("mm/vmalloc: fix page mapping if vm_area_alloc_pages() with high order fallback to order 0") 88ae5fb755b0 ("mm: vmalloc: enable memory allocation profiling") e9c3cda4d86e ("mm, vmalloc: fix high order __GFP_NOFAIL allocations") 3ba2c3ff98ea ("Merge tag 'modules-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mcgrof/linux") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 61ebe5a747da649057c37be1c37eb934b4af79ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hailong Liu <hailong.liu(a)oppo.com> Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2024 20:19:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm/vmalloc: fix page mapping if vm_area_alloc_pages() with high order fallback to order 0 The __vmap_pages_range_noflush() assumes its argument pages** contains pages with the same page shift. However, since commit e9c3cda4d86e ("mm, vmalloc: fix high order __GFP_NOFAIL allocations"), if gfp_flags includes __GFP_NOFAIL with high order in vm_area_alloc_pages() and page allocation failed for high order, the pages** may contain two different page shifts (high order and order-0). This could lead __vmap_pages_range_noflush() to perform incorrect mappings, potentially resulting in memory corruption. Users might encounter this as follows (vmap_allow_huge = true, 2M is for PMD_SIZE): kvmalloc(2M, __GFP_NOFAIL|GFP_X) __vmalloc_node_range_noprof(vm_flags=VM_ALLOW_HUGE_VMAP) vm_area_alloc_pages(order=9) ---> order-9 allocation failed and fallback to order-0 vmap_pages_range() vmap_pages_range_noflush() __vmap_pages_range_noflush(page_shift = 21) ----> wrong mapping happens We can remove the fallback code because if a high-order allocation fails, __vmalloc_node_range_noprof() will retry with order-0. Therefore, it is unnecessary to fallback to order-0 here. Therefore, fix this by removing the fallback code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240808122019.3361-1-hailong.liu@oppo.com Fixes: e9c3cda4d86e ("mm, vmalloc: fix high order __GFP_NOFAIL allocations") Signed-off-by: Hailong Liu <hailong.liu(a)oppo.com> Reported-by: Tangquan Zheng <zhengtangquan(a)oppo.com> Reviewed-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Barry Song <baohua(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index 6b783baf12a1..af2de36549d6 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -3584,15 +3584,8 @@ vm_area_alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp, int nid, page = alloc_pages_noprof(alloc_gfp, order); else page = alloc_pages_node_noprof(nid, alloc_gfp, order); - if (unlikely(!page)) { - if (!nofail) - break; - - /* fall back to the zero order allocations */ - alloc_gfp |= __GFP_NOFAIL; - order = 0; - continue; - } + if (unlikely(!page)) + break; /* * Higher order allocations must be able to be treated as

1 year, 3 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH v6.6.y] ALSA: timer: Relax start tick time check for slave timer elements

by Takashi Iwai

commit ccbfcac05866ebe6eb3bc6d07b51d4ed4fcde436 upstream. The recent addition of a sanity check for a too low start tick time seems breaking some applications that uses aloop with a certain slave timer setup. They may have the initial resolution 0, hence it's treated as if it were a too low value. Relax and skip the check for the slave timer instance for addressing the regression. Fixes: 4a63bd179fa8 ("ALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Link: https://github.com/raspberrypi/linux/issues/6294 Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240810084833.10939-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> --- Greg, this is a backport for 6.6.y and older stable kernels that failed to cherry-pick the original one. sound/core/timer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/core/timer.c b/sound/core/timer.c index a0b515981ee9..230babace502 100644 --- a/sound/core/timer.c +++ b/sound/core/timer.c @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static int snd_timer_start1(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri, /* check the actual time for the start tick; * bail out as error if it's way too low (< 100us) */ - if (start) { + if (start && !(timer->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE)) { if ((u64)snd_timer_hw_resolution(timer) * ticks < 100000) { result = -EINVAL; goto unlock; -- 2.43.0

1 year, 3 months

2
1
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