June 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 5.15.y] btrfs: don't drop extent_map for free space inode on write error

by Larry Bassel

From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> [ Upstream commit 5571e41ec6e56e35f34ae9f5b3a335ef510e0ade ] While running the CI for an unrelated change I hit the following panic with generic/648 on btrfs_holes_spacecache. assertion failed: block_start != EXTENT_MAP_HOLE, in fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1385 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1385! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 2695096 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.8.0-rc2+ #1 RIP: 0010:__extent_writepage_io.constprop.0+0x4c1/0x5c0 Call Trace: <TASK> extent_write_cache_pages+0x2ac/0x8f0 extent_writepages+0x87/0x110 do_writepages+0xd5/0x1f0 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x63/0x90 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x5c/0x80 btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x1f/0x50 btrfs_write_out_cache+0x507/0x560 btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x32a/0x420 commit_cowonly_roots+0x21b/0x290 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x813/0x1360 btrfs_sync_file+0x51a/0x640 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x52/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x9c/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 This happens because we fail to write out the free space cache in one instance, come back around and attempt to write it again. However on the second pass through we go to call btrfs_get_extent() on the inode to get the extent mapping. Because this is a new block group, and with the free space inode we always search the commit root to avoid deadlocking with the tree, we find nothing and return a EXTENT_MAP_HOLE for the requested range. This happens because the first time we try to write the space cache out we hit an error, and on an error we drop the extent mapping. This is normal for normal files, but the free space cache inode is special. We always expect the extent map to be correct. Thus the second time through we end up with a bogus extent map. Since we're deprecating this feature, the most straightforward way to fix this is to simply skip dropping the extent map range for this failed range. I shortened the test by using error injection to stress the area to make it easier to reproduce. With this patch in place we no longer panic with my error injection test. CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> (cherry picked from commit 5571e41ec6e56e35f34ae9f5b3a335ef510e0ade) [Larry: backport to 5.15.y. Minor conflict resolved due to missing commit 4c0c8cfc8433 btrfs: move btrfs_drop_extent_cache() to extent_map.c] Signed-off-by: Larry Bassel <larry.bassel(a)oracle.com> --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index d6e43c94436d..e3e5bd4fb477 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -3197,8 +3197,23 @@ static int btrfs_finish_ordered_io(struct btrfs_ordered_extent *ordered_extent) unwritten_start += logical_len; clear_extent_uptodate(io_tree, unwritten_start, end, NULL); - /* Drop the cache for the part of the extent we didn't write. */ - btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, unwritten_start, end, 0); + /* + * Drop extent maps for the part of the extent we didn't write. + * + * We have an exception here for the free_space_inode, this is + * because when we do btrfs_get_extent() on the free space inode + * we will search the commit root. If this is a new block group + * we won't find anything, and we will trip over the assert in + * writepage where we do ASSERT(em->block_start != + * EXTENT_MAP_HOLE). + * + * Theoretically we could also skip this for any NOCOW extent as + * we don't mess with the extent map tree in the NOCOW case, but + * for now simply skip this if we are the free space inode. + */ + if (!btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode)) + btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, unwritten_start, + end, 0); /* * If the ordered extent had an IOERR or something else went -- 2.46.0

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 5.15.y] thermal/int340x_thermal: handle data_vault when the value is ZERO_SIZE_PTR

by Larry Bassel

From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 7931e28098a4c1a2a6802510b0cbe57546d2049d ] In some case, the GDDV returns a package with a buffer which has zero length. It causes that kmemdup() returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR (0x10). Then the data_vault_read() got NULL point dereference problem when accessing the 0x10 value in data_vault. [ 71.024560] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 This patch uses ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() for checking ZERO_SIZE_PTR or NULL value in data_vault. Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 7931e28098a4c1a2a6802510b0cbe57546d2049d) [Larry: backport to 5.15.y. Minor conflict resolved due to missing commit 9e5d3d6be664 thermal: int340x: Consolidate freeing of acpi_buffer pointer] Signed-off-by: Larry Bassel <larry.bassel(a)oracle.com> --- drivers/thermal/intel/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/intel/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c b/drivers/thermal/intel/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c index 6aa5fe973613..1c479c72b7d2 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/intel/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/intel/int340x_thermal/int3400_thermal.c @@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void int3400_setup_gddv(struct int3400_thermal_priv *priv) priv->data_vault = kmemdup(obj->package.elements[0].buffer.pointer, obj->package.elements[0].buffer.length, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!priv->data_vault) { + if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(priv->data_vault)) { kfree(buffer.pointer); return; } @@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static int int3400_thermal_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto free_imok; } - if (priv->data_vault) { + if (!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(priv->data_vault)) { result = sysfs_create_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &data_attribute_group); if (result) @@ -558,7 +558,8 @@ static int int3400_thermal_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) free_sysfs: cleanup_odvp(priv); if (priv->data_vault) { - sysfs_remove_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &data_attribute_group); + if (!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(priv->data_vault)) + sysfs_remove_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &data_attribute_group); kfree(priv->data_vault); } free_uuid: @@ -590,7 +591,7 @@ static int int3400_thermal_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!priv->rel_misc_dev_res) acpi_thermal_rel_misc_device_remove(priv->adev->handle); - if (priv->data_vault) + if (!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(priv->data_vault)) sysfs_remove_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &data_attribute_group); sysfs_remove_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &uuid_attribute_group); sysfs_remove_group(&pdev->dev.kobj, &imok_attribute_group); -- 2.46.0

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] Bluetooth: HCI: Fix HCI command order for extended advertising

by Christian Eggers

For extended advertising capable controllers, hci_start_ext_adv_sync() at the moment synchronously calls SET_EXT_ADV_PARAMS [1], SET_ADV_SET_RAND_ADDR [2], SET_EXT_SCAN_RSP_DATA [3](optional) and SET_EXT_ADV_ENABLE [4]. After all synchronous commands are finished, SET_EXT_ADV_DATA is called from the async response handler of SET_EXT_ADV_PARAMS [5] (via hci_update_adv_data). So the current implementation sets the advertising data AFTER enabling the advertising instance. The BT Core specification explicitly allows for this [6]: > If advertising is currently enabled for the specified advertising set, > the Controller shall use the new data in subsequent extended > advertising events for this advertising set. If an extended > advertising event is in progress when this command is issued, the > Controller may use the old or new data for that event. In case of the Realtek RTL8761BU chip (almost all contemporary BT USB dongles are built on it), updating the advertising data after enabling the instance produces (at least one) corrupted advertising message. Under normal conditions, a single corrupted advertising message would probably not attract much attention, but during MESH provisioning (via MGMT I/O / mesh_send(_sync)), up to 3 different messages (BEACON, ACK, CAPS) are sent within a loop which causes corruption of ALL provisioning messages. I have no idea whether this could be fixed in the firmware of the USB dongles (I didn't even find the chip on the Realtek homepage), but generally I would suggest changing the order of the HCI commands as this matches the command order for "non-extended adv capable" controllers and simply is more natural. This patch only considers advertising instances with handle > 0, I don't know whether this should be extended to further cases. [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/net… [2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/net… [3] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/net… [4] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/net… [5] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/net… [6] https://www.bluetooth.com/wp-content/uploads/Files/Specification/HTML/Core-… Signed-off-by: Christian Eggers <ceggers(a)arri.de> Fixes: a0fb3726ba55 ("Bluetooth: Use Set ext adv/scan rsp data if controller supports") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + include/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 9fc8f544e20e..8d37f127ddba 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ struct oob_data { struct adv_info { struct list_head list; + bool enable_after_set_ext_data; bool enabled; bool pending; bool periodic; diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.h index 5224f57f6af2..00eceffeec87 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.h @@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ int hci_schedule_adv_instance_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, int hci_setup_ext_adv_instance_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); int hci_start_ext_adv_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); int hci_enable_ext_advertising_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); +int hci_enable_ext_advertising(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance); int hci_enable_advertising_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev); int hci_enable_advertising(struct hci_dev *hdev); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 66052d6aaa1d..eb018d8a3c4b 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -2184,6 +2184,37 @@ static u8 hci_cc_set_ext_adv_param(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, return rp->status; } +static u8 hci_cc_le_set_ext_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct hci_cp_le_set_ext_adv_data *cp; + struct hci_ev_status *rp = data; + struct adv_info *adv_instance; + + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "status 0x%2.2x", rp->status); + + if (rp->status) + return rp->status; + + cp = hci_sent_cmd_data(hdev, HCI_OP_LE_SET_EXT_ADV_DATA); + if (!cp) + return rp->status; + + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + + if (cp->handle) { + adv_instance = hci_find_adv_instance(hdev, cp->handle); + if (adv_instance) { + if (adv_instance->enable_after_set_ext_data) + hci_enable_ext_advertising(hdev, cp->handle); + } + } + + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + + return rp->status; +} + static u8 hci_cc_read_rssi(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -4166,6 +4197,8 @@ static const struct hci_cc { sizeof(struct hci_rp_le_read_num_supported_adv_sets)), HCI_CC(HCI_OP_LE_SET_EXT_ADV_PARAMS, hci_cc_set_ext_adv_param, sizeof(struct hci_rp_le_set_ext_adv_params)), + HCI_CC_STATUS(HCI_OP_LE_SET_EXT_ADV_DATA, + hci_cc_le_set_ext_adv_data), HCI_CC_STATUS(HCI_OP_LE_SET_EXT_ADV_ENABLE, hci_cc_le_set_ext_adv_enable), HCI_CC_STATUS(HCI_OP_LE_SET_ADV_SET_RAND_ADDR, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index 1f8806dfa556..da0e39cce721 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -1262,6 +1262,7 @@ int hci_setup_ext_adv_instance_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) hci_cpu_to_le24(adv->max_interval, cp.max_interval); cp.tx_power = adv->tx_power; cp.sid = adv->sid; + adv->enable_after_set_ext_data = true; } else { hci_cpu_to_le24(hdev->le_adv_min_interval, cp.min_interval); hci_cpu_to_le24(hdev->le_adv_max_interval, cp.max_interval); @@ -1456,6 +1457,23 @@ int hci_enable_ext_advertising_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) data, HCI_CMD_TIMEOUT); } +static int enable_ext_advertising_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) +{ + u8 instance = PTR_UINT(data); + + return hci_enable_ext_advertising_sync(hdev, instance); +} + +int hci_enable_ext_advertising(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) +{ + if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_ADVERTISING) && + list_empty(&hdev->adv_instances)) + return 0; + + return hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, enable_ext_advertising_sync, + UINT_PTR(instance), NULL); +} + int hci_start_ext_adv_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) { int err; @@ -1464,11 +1482,11 @@ int hci_start_ext_adv_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) if (err) return err; - err = hci_set_ext_scan_rsp_data_sync(hdev, instance); - if (err) - return err; - - return hci_enable_ext_advertising_sync(hdev, instance); + /* SET_EXT_ADV_DATA and SET_EXT_ADV_ENABLE are called in the + * asynchronous response chain of set_ext_adv_params in order to + * set the advertising data first prior enabling it. + */ + return hci_set_ext_scan_rsp_data_sync(hdev, instance); } int hci_disable_per_advertising_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) @@ -1832,8 +1850,14 @@ static int hci_set_ext_adv_data_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) if (instance) { adv = hci_find_adv_instance(hdev, instance); - if (!adv || !adv->adv_data_changed) + if (!adv) return 0; + if (!adv->adv_data_changed) { + if (adv->enable_after_set_ext_data) + hci_enable_ext_advertising_sync(hdev, + adv->handle); + return 0; + } } len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, pdu->data, -- 2.43.0

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 0/4] Devres fixes for v6.15.4

by Danilo Krummrich

As discussed in [1], here's the patch series for the Rust Devres fixes for v6.15.4. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/stable/2025062455-rogue-flagship-54a4@gregkh/ Danilo Krummrich (4): rust: completion: implement initial abstraction rust: revocable: indicate whether `data` has been revoked already rust: devres: fix race in Devres::drop() rust: devres: do not dereference to the internal Revocable rust/bindings/bindings_helper.h | 1 + rust/helpers/completion.c | 8 +++ rust/helpers/helpers.c | 1 + rust/kernel/devres.rs | 53 ++++++++++----- rust/kernel/revocable.rs | 18 +++-- rust/kernel/sync.rs | 2 + rust/kernel/sync/completion.rs | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) create mode 100644 rust/helpers/completion.c create mode 100644 rust/kernel/sync/completion.rs base-commit: a2b47f77e740a21dbdcb12e2f2ca3c840299545a -- 2.49.0

2 months, 1 week

2
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[PATCH] btrfs: check delayed refs when we're checking if a ref exists

by Alex Lyakas

[upstream commit 42fac187b5c746227c92d024f1caf33bc1d337e4] This is a backport of the above upstream commit by Josef Bacik to the stable linux-6.6.y branch. I tested it to the best of my abilities. I was able to test the part where the reference exists in the extent tree, which means the patch doesn't break existing functionality. However, I was not able to test the case where we only have the delayed reference. Josef, I would appreciate if you could review the patch. Original commit message by Josef: In the patch 78c52d9eb6b7 ("btrfs: check for refs on snapshot delete resume") I added some code to handle file systems that had been corrupted by a bug that incorrectly skipped updating the drop progress key while dropping a snapshot. This code would check to see if we had already deleted our reference for a child block, and skip the deletion if we had already. Unfortunately there is a bug, as the check would only check the on-disk references. I made an incorrect assumption that blocks in an already deleted snapshot that was having the deletion resume on mount wouldn't be modified. If we have 2 pending deleted snapshots that share blocks, we can easily modify the rules for a block. Take the following example subvolume a exists, and subvolume b is a snapshot of subvolume a. They share references to block 1. Block 1 will have 2 full references, one for subvolume a and one for subvolume b, and it belongs to subvolume a (btrfs_header_owner(block 1) == subvolume a). When deleting subvolume a, we will drop our full reference for block 1, and because we are the owner we will drop our full reference for all of block 1's children, convert block 1 to FULL BACKREF, and add a shared reference to all of block 1's children. Then we will start the snapshot deletion of subvolume b. We look up the extent info for block 1, which checks delayed refs and tells us that FULL BACKREF is set, so sets parent to the bytenr of block 1. However because this is a resumed snapshot deletion, we call into check_ref_exists(). Because check_ref_exists() only looks at the disk, it doesn't find the shared backref for the child of block 1, and thus returns 0 and we skip deleting the reference for the child of block 1 and continue. This orphans the child of block 1. The fix is to lookup the delayed refs, similar to what we do in btrfs_lookup_extent_info(). However we only care about whether the reference exists or not. If we fail to find our reference on disk, go look up the bytenr in the delayed refs, and if it exists look for an existing ref in the delayed ref head. If that exists then we know we can delete the reference safely and carry on. If it doesn't exist we know we have to skip over this block. This bug has existed since I introduced this fix, however requires having multiple deleted snapshots pending when we unmount. We noticed this in production because our shutdown path stops the container on the system, which deletes a bunch of subvolumes, and then reboots the box. This gives us plenty of opportunities to hit this issue. Looking at the history we've seen this occasionally in production, but we had a big spike recently thanks to faster machines getting jobs with multiple subvolumes in the job. Chris Mason wrote a reproducer which does the following mount /dev/nvme4n1 /btrfs btrfs subvol create /btrfs/s1 simoop -E -f 4k -n 200000 -z /btrfs/s1 while(true) ; do btrfs subvol snap /btrfs/s1 /btrfs/s2 simoop -f 4k -n 200000 -r 10 -z /btrfs/s2 btrfs subvol snap /btrfs/s2 /btrfs/s3 btrfs balance start -dusage=80 /btrfs btrfs subvol del /btrfs/s2 /btrfs/s3 umount /btrfs btrfsck /dev/nvme4n1 || exit 1 mount /dev/nvme4n1 /btrfs done On the second loop this would fail consistently, with my patch it has been running for hours and hasn't failed. I also used dm-log-writes to capture the state of the failure so I could debug the problem. Using the existing failure case to test my patch validated that it fixes the problem. Fixes: 78c52d9eb6b7 ("btrfs: check for refs on snapshot delete resume") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Alex Lyakas <alex(a)zadara.com> --- fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.h | 2 ++ fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c b/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c index 6f2e48d..b143194 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c @@ -1115,6 +1115,77 @@ struct btrfs_delayed_ref_head * return find_ref_head(delayed_refs, bytenr, false); } +static int find_comp(struct btrfs_delayed_ref_node *entry, u64 root, u64 parent) +{ + int type = parent ? BTRFS_SHARED_BLOCK_REF_KEY : BTRFS_TREE_BLOCK_REF_KEY; + struct btrfs_delayed_tree_ref *tree_ref; + + if (type < entry->type) + return -1; + if (type > entry->type) + return 1; + + tree_ref = btrfs_delayed_node_to_tree_ref(entry); + + if (type == BTRFS_TREE_BLOCK_REF_KEY) { + if (root < tree_ref->root) + return -1; + if (root > tree_ref->root) + return 1; + } else { + if (parent < tree_ref->parent) + return -1; + if (parent > tree_ref->parent) + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +/* btrfs: check delayed refs when we're checking if a ref exists */ +/* + * Check to see if a given root/parent reference is attached to the head. This + * only checks for BTRFS_ADD_DELAYED_REF references that match, as that + * indicates the reference exists for the given root or parent. This is for + * tree blocks only. + * + * @head: the head of the bytenr we're searching. + * @root: the root objectid of the reference if it is a normal reference. + * @parent: the parent if this is a shared backref. + */ +bool btrfs_find_delayed_tree_ref(struct btrfs_delayed_ref_head *head, + u64 root, u64 parent) +{ + struct rb_node *node; + bool found = false; + + lockdep_assert_held(&head->mutex); + + spin_lock(&head->lock); + node = head->ref_tree.rb_root.rb_node; + while (node) { + struct btrfs_delayed_ref_node *entry; + int ret; + + entry = rb_entry(node, struct btrfs_delayed_ref_node, ref_node); + ret = find_comp(entry, root, parent); + if (ret < 0) { + node = node->rb_left; + } else if (ret > 0) { + node = node->rb_right; + } else { + /* + * We only want to count ADD actions, as drops mean the + * ref doesn't exist. + */ + if (entry->action == BTRFS_ADD_DELAYED_REF) + found = true; + break; + } + } + spin_unlock(&head->lock); + return found; +} + void __cold btrfs_delayed_ref_exit(void) { kmem_cache_destroy(btrfs_delayed_ref_head_cachep); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.h b/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.h index fd9bf2b..c4f2495 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.h @@ -409,6 +409,8 @@ int btrfs_delayed_refs_rsv_refill(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, void btrfs_migrate_to_delayed_refs_rsv(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 num_bytes); bool btrfs_check_space_for_delayed_refs(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info); +bool btrfs_find_delayed_tree_ref(struct btrfs_delayed_ref_head *head, + u64 root, u64 parent); /* * helper functions to cast a node into its container diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index ef77d42..7e180c8 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -5241,23 +5241,62 @@ static int check_ref_exists(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct btrfs_root *root, u64 bytenr, u64 parent, int level) { + struct btrfs_delayed_ref_root *delayed_refs; + struct btrfs_delayed_ref_head *head; struct btrfs_path *path; struct btrfs_extent_inline_ref *iref; int ret; + bool exists = false; path = btrfs_alloc_path(); if (!path) return -ENOMEM; - +again: ret = lookup_extent_backref(trans, path, &iref, bytenr, root->fs_info->nodesize, parent, - root->root_key.objectid, level, 0); + btrfs_root_id(root), level, 0); + if (ret != -ENOENT) { + /* + * If we get 0 then we found our reference, return 1, else + * return the error if it's not -ENOENT; + */ + btrfs_free_path(path); + return (ret < 0 ) ? ret : 1; + } + + /* + * We could have a delayed ref with this reference, so look it up while + * we're holding the path open to make sure we don't race with the + * delayed ref running. + */ + delayed_refs = &trans->transaction->delayed_refs; + spin_lock(&delayed_refs->lock); + head = btrfs_find_delayed_ref_head(delayed_refs, bytenr); + if (!head) + goto out; + if (!mutex_trylock(&head->mutex)) { + /* + * We're contended, means that the delayed ref is running, get a + * reference and wait for the ref head to be complete and then + * try again. + */ + refcount_inc(&head->refs); + spin_unlock(&delayed_refs->lock); + + btrfs_release_path(path); + + mutex_lock(&head->mutex); + mutex_unlock(&head->mutex); + btrfs_put_delayed_ref_head(head); + goto again; + } + + exists = btrfs_find_delayed_tree_ref(head, root->root_key.objectid, parent); + mutex_unlock(&head->mutex); +out: + spin_unlock(&delayed_refs->lock); btrfs_free_path(path); - if (ret == -ENOENT) - return 0; - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - return 1; + return exists ? 1 : 0; } /* -- 1.9.1

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 5.15.y] s390: Add '-std=gnu11' to decompressor and purgatory CFLAGS

by Heiko Carstens

From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> commit 3b8b80e993766dc96d1a1c01c62f5d15fafc79b9 upstream. GCC changed the default C standard dialect from gnu17 to gnu23, which should not have impacted the kernel because it explicitly requests the gnu11 standard in the main Makefile. However, there are certain places in the s390 code that use their own CFLAGS without a '-std=' value, which break with this dialect change because of the kernel's own definitions of bool, false, and true conflicting with the C23 reserved keywords. include/linux/stddef.h:11:9: error: cannot use keyword 'false' as enumeration constant 11 | false = 0, | ^~~~~ include/linux/stddef.h:11:9: note: 'false' is a keyword with '-std=c23' onwards include/linux/types.h:35:33: error: 'bool' cannot be defined via 'typedef' 35 | typedef _Bool bool; | ^~~~ include/linux/types.h:35:33: note: 'bool' is a keyword with '-std=c23' onwards Add '-std=gnu11' to the decompressor and purgatory CFLAGS to eliminate these errors and make the C standard version of these areas match the rest of the kernel. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122-s390-fix-std-for-gcc-15-v1-1-8b00cadee08… Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> --- arch/s390/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/Makefile b/arch/s390/Makefile index dc840ba0b016..c8071eb82e2e 100644 --- a/arch/s390/Makefile +++ b/arch/s390/Makefile @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ endif aflags_dwarf := -Wa,-gdwarf-2 KBUILD_AFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR := $(CLANG_FLAGS) -m64 -D__ASSEMBLY__ KBUILD_AFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += $(if $(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO),$(aflags_dwarf)) -KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR := $(CLANG_FLAGS) -m64 -O2 +KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR := $(CLANG_FLAGS) -m64 -O2 -std=gnu11 KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -D__NO_FORTIFY KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += -fno-delete-null-pointer-checks -msoft-float -mbackchain KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables diff --git a/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile index d22ec8acb13c..677cbb654024 100644 --- a/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile +++ b/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ UBSAN_SANITIZE := n KASAN_SANITIZE := n KCSAN_SANITIZE := n -KBUILD_CFLAGS := -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes +KBUILD_CFLAGS := -std=gnu11 -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-sign-compare KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss -fno-builtin -ffreestanding KBUILD_CFLAGS += -c -MD -Os -m64 -msoft-float -fno-common -- 2.48.1

2 months, 1 week

2
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[PATCH 5.15.y] s390/entry: Fix last breaking event handling in case of stack corruption

by Heiko Carstens

commit ae952eea6f4a7e2193f8721a5366049946e012e7 upstream. Note: the GET_LC macro and all the infrastructe that comes with this does not exist for this kernel release. Therefore the patch is slightly different to the upstream variant. In case of stack corruption stack_invalid() is called and the expectation is that register r10 contains the last breaking event address. This dependency is quite subtle and broke a couple of years ago without that anybody noticed. Fix this by getting rid of the dependency and read the last breaking event address from lowcore. Fixes: 56e62a737028 ("s390: convert to generic entry") Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> --- arch/s390/kernel/entry.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S index 160290049e8c..14a5eff4d027 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S @@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ ENTRY(stack_overflow) stmg %r0,%r7,__PT_R0(%r11) stmg %r8,%r9,__PT_PSW(%r11) mvc __PT_R8(64,%r11),0(%r14) - stg %r10,__PT_ORIG_GPR2(%r11) # store last break to orig_gpr2 + mvc __PT_ORIG_GPR2(8,%r11),__LC_LAST_BREAK xc __SF_BACKCHAIN(8,%r15),__SF_BACKCHAIN(%r15) lgr %r2,%r11 # pass pointer to pt_regs jg kernel_stack_overflow -- 2.48.1

2 months, 1 week

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Re: [PATCH 2/2] f2fs: sysfs: export linear_lookup in features directory

by Sasha Levin

[ Sasha's backport helper bot ] Hi, Summary of potential issues: ℹ️ This is part 2/2 of a series ⚠️ Found matching upstream commit but patch is missing proper reference to it Found matching upstream commit: 617e0491abe4d8d45c5110ca474c0feb428e6828 Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit: --- 1: 617e0491abe4d ! 1: 4c702e18f9b37 f2fs: sysfs: export linear_lookup in features directory @@ Commit message supported Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> - Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> ## Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs ## @@ Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs: Description: Shows all enabled kernel features. --- NOTE: These results are for this patch alone. Full series testing will be performed when all parts are received. Results of testing on various branches: | Branch | Patch Apply | Build Test | |---------------------------|-------------|------------| | stable/linux-5.4.y | Success | Success |

2 months, 1 week

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[PATCH v2 6.6.y 0/2] Kunit to check the longest symbol length

by Sergio González Collado

Hello, Please consider this series for 6.6.y This patch series backports two patches that implement a test to verify that a symbol with KSYM_NAME_LEN of 512 can be read. The first patch implements the test. This commit also includes a fix for the test x86/insn_decoder_test. In the case a symbol exceeds the symbol length limit, an error will happen: arch/x86/tools/insn_decoder_test: error: malformed line 1152000: tBb_+0xf2> ..which overflowed by 10 characters reading this line: ffffffff81458193: 74 3d je ffffffff814581d2 <_RNvXse_NtNtNtCshGpAVYOtgW1_4core4iter8adapters7flattenINtB5_13FlattenCompatINtNtB7_3map3MapNtNtNtBb_3str4iter5CharsNtB1v_17CharEscapeDefaultENtNtBb_4char13EscapeDefaultENtNtBb_3fmt5Debug3fmtBb_+0xf2> The fix was proposed in [1] and initially mentioned at [2]. The second patch fixes a warning when building with clang because there was a definition of unlikely from compiler.h in tools/include/linux, which conflicted with the one in the instruction decoder selftest. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y9ES4UKl%2F+DtvAVS@gmail.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/320c4dba-9919-404b-8a26-a8af16be1845@app.fastm… Signed-off-by: Sergio González Collado <sergio.collado(a)gmail.com> --- Changes in v2: sign-off patch 2/2 --- Nathan Chancellor (1): x86/tools: Drop duplicate unlikely() definition in insn_decoder_test.c Sergio González Collado (1): Kunit to check the longest symbol length arch/x86/tools/insn_decoder_test.c | 5 +- lib/Kconfig.debug | 9 ++++ lib/Makefile | 2 + lib/longest_symbol_kunit.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/longest_symbol_kunit.c base-commit: 6282921b6825fef6a1243e1c80063421d41e2576 -- 2.39.2

2 months, 1 week

3
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[PATCH 5.10.y] s390: Add '-std=gnu11' to decompressor and purgatory CFLAGS

by Heiko Carstens

From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> commit 3b8b80e993766dc96d1a1c01c62f5d15fafc79b9 upstream. GCC changed the default C standard dialect from gnu17 to gnu23, which should not have impacted the kernel because it explicitly requests the gnu11 standard in the main Makefile. However, there are certain places in the s390 code that use their own CFLAGS without a '-std=' value, which break with this dialect change because of the kernel's own definitions of bool, false, and true conflicting with the C23 reserved keywords. include/linux/stddef.h:11:9: error: cannot use keyword 'false' as enumeration constant 11 | false = 0, | ^~~~~ include/linux/stddef.h:11:9: note: 'false' is a keyword with '-std=c23' onwards include/linux/types.h:35:33: error: 'bool' cannot be defined via 'typedef' 35 | typedef _Bool bool; | ^~~~ include/linux/types.h:35:33: note: 'bool' is a keyword with '-std=c23' onwards Add '-std=gnu11' to the decompressor and purgatory CFLAGS to eliminate these errors and make the C standard version of these areas match the rest of the kernel. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122-s390-fix-std-for-gcc-15-v1-1-8b00cadee08… Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> --- arch/s390/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/Makefile b/arch/s390/Makefile index 39ffcd4389f1..92f2426d8797 100644 --- a/arch/s390/Makefile +++ b/arch/s390/Makefile @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ endif aflags_dwarf := -Wa,-gdwarf-2 KBUILD_AFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR := $(CLANG_FLAGS) -m64 -D__ASSEMBLY__ KBUILD_AFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += $(if $(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO),$(aflags_dwarf)) -KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR := $(CLANG_FLAGS) -m64 -O2 +KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR := $(CLANG_FLAGS) -m64 -O2 -std=gnu11 KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -D__NO_FORTIFY KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += -fno-delete-null-pointer-checks -msoft-float KBUILD_CFLAGS_DECOMPRESSOR += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables diff --git a/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile index a93c9aba834b..955f113cf320 100644 --- a/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile +++ b/arch/s390/purgatory/Makefile @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ GCOV_PROFILE := n UBSAN_SANITIZE := n KASAN_SANITIZE := n -KBUILD_CFLAGS := -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes +KBUILD_CFLAGS := -std=gnu11 -fno-strict-aliasing -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-sign-compare KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss -fno-builtin -ffreestanding KBUILD_CFLAGS += -c -MD -Os -m64 -msoft-float -fno-common -- 2.48.1

2 months, 1 week

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