July 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

Sasha Levin is halucinating, non human entity, has no ethics and no memory

by Pavel Machek

Hi! So... I'm afraid subject is pretty accurate. I assume there's actual human being called "Sasha Levin" somewhere, but I interact with him via email, and while some interactions may be by human, some are written by LLM but not clearly marked as such. And that's not okay -- because LLMs lie, have no ethics, and no memory, so there's no point arguing with them. Its just wasting everyone's time. People are not very thrilled by 'Markus Elfring' on the lists, as he seems to ignore feedback, but at least that's actual human, not a damn LLM that interacts as human but then ignores everything. Do we need bot rules on the list? Oh, and if you find my email offensive, feel free to ask LLM to change the tone. Best regards, Pavel -- I don't work for Nazis and criminals, and neither should you. Boycott Putin, Trump, and Musk!

3 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072855-spongy-yodel-58e6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Lin.Cao" <lincao12(a)amd.com> Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 16:44:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing dependent jobs MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When application A submits jobs and application B submits a job with a dependency on A's fence, the normal flow wakes up the scheduler after processing each job. However, the optimization in drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb() uses a callback that only clears dependencies without waking up the scheduler. When application A is killed before its jobs can run, the callback gets triggered but only clears the dependency without waking up the scheduler, causing the scheduler to enter sleep state and application B to hang. Remove the optimization by deleting drm_sched_entity_clear_dep() and its usage, ensuring the scheduler is always woken up when dependencies are cleared. Fixes: 777dbd458c89 ("drm/amdgpu: drop a dummy wakeup scheduler") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.6+ Signed-off-by: Lin.Cao <lincao12(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717084453.921097-1-lincao12@amd.com diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c index e671aa241720..ac678de7fe5e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c @@ -355,17 +355,6 @@ void drm_sched_entity_destroy(struct drm_sched_entity *entity) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_destroy); -/* drm_sched_entity_clear_dep - callback to clear the entities dependency */ -static void drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(struct dma_fence *f, - struct dma_fence_cb *cb) -{ - struct drm_sched_entity *entity = - container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb); - - entity->dependency = NULL; - dma_fence_put(f); -} - /* * drm_sched_entity_wakeup - callback to clear the entity's dependency and * wake up the scheduler @@ -376,7 +365,8 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup(struct dma_fence *f, struct drm_sched_entity *entity = container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb); - drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(f, cb); + entity->dependency = NULL; + dma_fence_put(f); drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched); } @@ -429,13 +419,6 @@ static bool drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb(struct drm_sched_entity *entity) fence = dma_fence_get(&s_fence->scheduled); dma_fence_put(entity->dependency); entity->dependency = fence; - if (!dma_fence_add_callback(fence, &entity->cb, - drm_sched_entity_clear_dep)) - return true; - - /* Ignore it when it is already scheduled */ - dma_fence_put(fence); - return false; } if (!dma_fence_add_callback(entity->dependency, &entity->cb,

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 6.6.y] spi: cadence-quadspi: fix cleanup of rx_chan on failure paths

by Ronald Wahl

From: Khairul Anuar Romli <khairul.anuar.romli(a)altera.com> commit 04a8ff1bc3514808481ddebd454342ad902a3f60 upstream. Remove incorrect checks on cqspi->rx_chan that cause driver breakage during failure cleanup. Ensure proper resource freeing on the success path when operating in cqspi->use_direct_mode, preventing leaks and improving stability. Signed-off-by: Khairul Anuar Romli <khairul.anuar.romli(a)altera.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/89765a2b94f047ded4f14babaefb7ef92ba07cb2.175127438… Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> [Minor conflict resolved due to code context change.] Signed-off-by: Ronald Wahl <ronald.wahl(a)legrand.com> --- drivers/spi/spi-cadence-quadspi.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-cadence-quadspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-cadence-quadspi.c index 9285a683324f..7c17b8c0425e 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-cadence-quadspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-cadence-quadspi.c @@ -1870,11 +1870,6 @@ static int cqspi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) pm_runtime_enable(dev); - if (cqspi->rx_chan) { - dma_release_channel(cqspi->rx_chan); - goto probe_setup_failed; - } - ret = spi_register_controller(host); if (ret) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to register SPI ctlr %d\n", ret); -- 2.50.1

3 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to()," failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072811-pension-lyrics-6070@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ada Couprie Diaz <ada.coupriediaz(a)arm.com> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 15:28:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(), call_on_irq_stack() `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled. Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely, is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks. In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task, but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0), clobbering it. In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack, calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use ! This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS, or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK or FPAC if enabled. This is possible on a default config, but unlikely. However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU should receive based on priority. Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very* frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading to unpredictable kernel panics. Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning. Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around the branch. Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency of behaviour between all configurations. Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF, as the existing one saves but only masks IF. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ada Couprie Diaz <ada.coupriediaz(a)arm.com> Reported-by: Cristian Prundeanu <cpru(a)amazon.com> Fixes: 59b37fe52f49 ("arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt") Tested-by: Cristian Prundeanu <cpru(a)amazon.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250718142814.133329-1-ada.coupriediaz@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index ad63457a05c5..c56c21bb1eec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ /* * Save/restore interrupts. */ + .macro save_and_disable_daif, flags + mrs \flags, daif + msr daifset, #0xf + .endm + .macro save_and_disable_irq, flags mrs \flags, daif msr daifset, #3 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 5ae2a34b50bd..30dcb719685b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) * */ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to) + save_and_disable_daif x11 mov x10, #THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT add x8, x0, x10 mov x9, sp @@ -848,6 +849,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to) ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 scs_save x0 scs_load_current + restore_irq x11 ret SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to) @@ -874,6 +876,7 @@ NOKPROBE(ret_from_fork) * Calls func(regs) using this CPU's irq stack and shadow irq stack. */ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) + save_and_disable_daif x9 #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK get_current_task x16 scs_save x16 @@ -888,8 +891,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) /* Move to the new stack and call the function there */ add sp, x16, #IRQ_STACK_SIZE + restore_irq x9 blr x1 + save_and_disable_daif x9 /* * Restore the SP from the FP, and restore the FP and LR from the frame * record. @@ -897,6 +902,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) mov sp, x29 ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 scs_load_current + restore_irq x9 ret SYM_FUNC_END(call_on_irq_stack) NOKPROBE(call_on_irq_stack)

3 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to()," failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072817-deeply-galleria-d758@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From d42e6c20de6192f8e4ab4cf10be8c694ef27e8cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ada Couprie Diaz <ada.coupriediaz(a)arm.com> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 15:28:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] arm64/entry: Mask DAIF in cpu_switch_to(), call_on_irq_stack() `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()` manipulate SP to change to different stacks along with the Shadow Call Stack if it is enabled. Those two stack changes cannot be done atomically and both functions can be interrupted by SErrors or Debug Exceptions which, though unlikely, is very much broken : if interrupted, we can end up with mismatched stacks and Shadow Call Stack leading to clobbered stacks. In `cpu_switch_to()`, it can happen when SP_EL0 points to the new task, but x18 stills points to the old task's SCS. When the interrupt handler tries to save the task's SCS pointer, it will save the old task SCS pointer (x18) into the new task struct (pointed to by SP_EL0), clobbering it. In `call_on_irq_stack()`, it can happen when switching from the task stack to the IRQ stack and when switching back. In both cases, we can be interrupted when the SCS pointer points to the IRQ SCS, but SP points to the task stack. The nested interrupt handler pushes its return addresses on the IRQ SCS. It then detects that SP points to the task stack, calls `call_on_irq_stack()` and clobbers the task SCS pointer with the IRQ SCS pointer, which it will also use ! This leads to tasks returning to addresses on the wrong SCS, or even on the IRQ SCS, triggering kernel panics via CONFIG_VMAP_STACK or FPAC if enabled. This is possible on a default config, but unlikely. However, when enabling CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI, DAIF is unmasked and instead the GIC is responsible for filtering what interrupts the CPU should receive based on priority. Given the goal of emulating NMIs, pseudo-NMIs can be received by the CPU even in `cpu_switch_to()` and `call_on_irq_stack()`, possibly *very* frequently depending on the system configuration and workload, leading to unpredictable kernel panics. Completely mask DAIF in `cpu_switch_to()` and restore it when returning. Do the same in `call_on_irq_stack()`, but restore and mask around the branch. Mask DAIF even if CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK is not enabled for consistency of behaviour between all configurations. Introduce and use an assembly macro for saving and masking DAIF, as the existing one saves but only masks IF. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ada Couprie Diaz <ada.coupriediaz(a)arm.com> Reported-by: Cristian Prundeanu <cpru(a)amazon.com> Fixes: 59b37fe52f49 ("arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt") Tested-by: Cristian Prundeanu <cpru(a)amazon.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250718142814.133329-1-ada.coupriediaz@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index ad63457a05c5..c56c21bb1eec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ /* * Save/restore interrupts. */ + .macro save_and_disable_daif, flags + mrs \flags, daif + msr daifset, #0xf + .endm + .macro save_and_disable_irq, flags mrs \flags, daif msr daifset, #3 diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index 5ae2a34b50bd..30dcb719685b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors) * */ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to) + save_and_disable_daif x11 mov x10, #THREAD_CPU_CONTEXT add x8, x0, x10 mov x9, sp @@ -848,6 +849,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to) ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10 scs_save x0 scs_load_current + restore_irq x11 ret SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_switch_to) NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to) @@ -874,6 +876,7 @@ NOKPROBE(ret_from_fork) * Calls func(regs) using this CPU's irq stack and shadow irq stack. */ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) + save_and_disable_daif x9 #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK get_current_task x16 scs_save x16 @@ -888,8 +891,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) /* Move to the new stack and call the function there */ add sp, x16, #IRQ_STACK_SIZE + restore_irq x9 blr x1 + save_and_disable_daif x9 /* * Restore the SP from the FP, and restore the FP and LR from the frame * record. @@ -897,6 +902,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_on_irq_stack) mov sp, x29 ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 scs_load_current + restore_irq x9 ret SYM_FUNC_END(call_on_irq_stack) NOKPROBE(call_on_irq_stack)

3 months, 1 week

3
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[PATCH 3/4] nvme: fix handling of tls alerts

by Olga Kornievskaia

Revert kvec msg iterator before trying to process a TLS alert when possible. In nvmet_tcp_try_recv_data(), it's assumed that no msg control message buffer is set prior to sock_recvmsg(). If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control message, it would return an error. At that point, we setup a kvec backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS alert. Msg can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the tls_alert_recv. Fixes: a1c5dd8355b1 ("nvmet-tcp: control messages for recvmsg()") Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com> --- drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c index 688033b88d38..cf3336ddc9a3 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c @@ -1161,6 +1161,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue) if (unlikely(len < 0)) return len; if (queue->tls_pskid) { + iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len); ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -1218,18 +1219,47 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_data(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue) { struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd = queue->cmd; int len, ret; + union { + struct cmsghdr cmsg; + u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))]; + } u; + u8 alert[2]; + struct kvec alert_kvec = { + .iov_base = alert, + .iov_len = sizeof(alert), + }; + struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_control = &u, + .msg_controllen = sizeof(u), + }; while (msg_data_left(&cmd->recv_msg)) { + /* assumed that cmg->recv_msg's control buffer is not setup + */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(cmd->recv_msg.msg_controllen > 0); + len = sock_recvmsg(cmd->queue->sock, &cmd->recv_msg, cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags); + if (cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) { + cmd->recv_msg.msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOF); + if (len == 0 || len == -EIO) { + iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, + 1, alert_kvec.iov_len); + len = sock_recvmsg(cmd->queue->sock, &msg, + MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (len > 0 && + tls_get_record_type(cmd->queue->sock->sk, + &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) { + iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len); + ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(cmd->queue, + &msg, u.buf); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + } + } if (len <= 0) return len; - if (queue->tls_pskid) { - ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(cmd->queue, - &cmd->recv_msg, cmd->recv_cbuf); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - } cmd->pdu_recv += len; cmd->rbytes_done += len; @@ -1267,6 +1297,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_ddgst(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue) if (unlikely(len < 0)) return len; if (queue->tls_pskid) { + iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len); ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -1453,10 +1484,6 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_alloc_cmd(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue, if (!c->r2t_pdu) goto out_free_data; - if (queue->state == NVMET_TCP_Q_TLS_HANDSHAKE) { - c->recv_msg.msg_control = c->recv_cbuf; - c->recv_msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(c->recv_cbuf); - } c->recv_msg.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL; list_add_tail(&c->entry, &queue->free_list); @@ -1736,6 +1763,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_try_peek_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue) return len; } + iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, len); ret = nvmet_tcp_tls_record_ok(queue, &msg, cbuf); if (ret < 0) return ret; -- 2.47.1

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 2/4] sunrpc: fix client side handling of tls alerts

by Olga Kornievskaia

A security exploit was discovered in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv due to its assumption that there is valid data in the msghdr's iterator's kvec. Instead, this patch proposes the rework how control messages are setup and used by sock_recvmsg(). If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the tls_alert_recv. Fixes: dea034b963c8 ("SUNRPC: Capture CMSG metadata on client-side receive") Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy(a)hammerspace.com> Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com> --- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c index 04ff66758fc3..c5f7bbf5775f 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ xs_alloc_sparse_pages(struct xdr_buf *buf, size_t want, gfp_t gfp) static int xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, - struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret) + unsigned int *msg_flags, struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret) { u8 content_type = tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, cmsg); u8 level, description; @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * record, even though there might be more frames * waiting to be decrypted. */ - msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR; + *msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR; break; case TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT: tls_alert_recv(sock->sk, msg, &level, &description); @@ -386,19 +386,33 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, } static int -xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags) +xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags, int flags) { union { struct cmsghdr cmsg; u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))]; } u; + u8 alert[2]; + struct kvec alert_kvec = { + .iov_base = alert, + .iov_len = sizeof(alert), + }; + struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = *msg_flags, + .msg_control = &u, + .msg_controllen = sizeof(u), + }; int ret; - msg->msg_control = &u; - msg->msg_controllen = sizeof(u); - ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags); - if (msg->msg_controllen != sizeof(u)) - ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret); + iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1, + alert_kvec.iov_len); + ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, flags); + if (ret > 0 && + tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) { + iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret); + ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, msg_flags, &u.cmsg, + -EAGAIN); + } return ret; } @@ -408,7 +422,13 @@ xs_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t seek) ssize_t ret; if (seek != 0) iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, seek); - ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags); + ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags); + /* Handle TLS inband control message lazily */ + if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) { + msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOR); + if (ret == 0 || ret == -EIO) + ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, &msg->msg_flags, flags); + } return ret > 0 ? ret + seek : ret; } @@ -434,7 +454,7 @@ xs_read_discard(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t count) { iov_iter_discard(&msg->msg_iter, ITER_DEST, count); - return xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags); + return xs_sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags, 0); } #if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE -- 2.47.1

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 1/4] sunrpc: fix handling of server side tls alerts

by Olga Kornievskaia

Scott Mayhew discovered a security exploit in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv() due to its assumption it can read data from the msg iterator's kvec.. kTLS implementation splits TLS non-data record payload between the control message buffer (which includes the type such as TLS aler or TLS cipher change) and the rest of the payload (say TLS alert's level/description) which goes into the msg payload buffer. This patch proposes to rework how control messages are setup and used by sock_recvmsg(). If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec backed msg buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the tls_alert_recv. Reported-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 5e052dda121e ("SUNRPC: Recognize control messages in server-side TCP socket code") Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy(a)hammerspace.com> Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com> --- net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c index 46c156b121db..e2c5e0e626f9 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c @@ -257,20 +257,47 @@ svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, } static int -svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(struct svc_sock *svsk, struct msghdr *msg) +svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags) { union { struct cmsghdr cmsg; u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))]; } u; - struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock; + u8 alert[2]; + struct kvec alert_kvec = { + .iov_base = alert, + .iov_len = sizeof(alert), + }; + struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = *msg_flags, + .msg_control = &u, + .msg_controllen = sizeof(u), + }; + int ret; + + iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1, + alert_kvec.iov_len); + ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT); + if (ret > 0 && + tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) { + iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret); + ret = svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, &u.cmsg, -EAGAIN); + } + return ret; +} + +static int +svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(struct svc_sock *svsk, struct msghdr *msg) +{ int ret; + struct socket *sock = svsk->sk_sock; - msg->msg_control = &u; - msg->msg_controllen = sizeof(u); ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, MSG_DONTWAIT); - if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen != sizeof(u))) - ret = svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret); + if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) { + msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOR); + if (ret == 0 || ret == -EIO) + ret = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, &msg->msg_flags); + } return ret; } @@ -321,7 +348,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_msg(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, size_t buflen, iov_iter_advance(&msg.msg_iter, seek); buflen -= seek; } - len = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(svsk, &msg); + len = svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(svsk, &msg); if (len > 0) svc_flush_bvec(bvec, len, seek); @@ -1018,7 +1045,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_marker(struct svc_sock *svsk, iov.iov_base = ((char *)&svsk->sk_marker) + svsk->sk_tcplen; iov.iov_len = want; iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &iov, 1, want); - len = svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(svsk, &msg); + len = svc_tcp_sock_recvmsg(svsk, &msg); if (len < 0) return len; svsk->sk_tcplen += len; -- 2.47.1

3 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072854-humbling-collector-aca6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 15f77764e90a713ee3916ca424757688e4f565b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Lin.Cao" <lincao12(a)amd.com> Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 16:44:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] drm/sched: Remove optimization that causes hang when killing dependent jobs MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit When application A submits jobs and application B submits a job with a dependency on A's fence, the normal flow wakes up the scheduler after processing each job. However, the optimization in drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb() uses a callback that only clears dependencies without waking up the scheduler. When application A is killed before its jobs can run, the callback gets triggered but only clears the dependency without waking up the scheduler, causing the scheduler to enter sleep state and application B to hang. Remove the optimization by deleting drm_sched_entity_clear_dep() and its usage, ensuring the scheduler is always woken up when dependencies are cleared. Fixes: 777dbd458c89 ("drm/amdgpu: drop a dummy wakeup scheduler") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.6+ Signed-off-by: Lin.Cao <lincao12(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250717084453.921097-1-lincao12@amd.com diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c index e671aa241720..ac678de7fe5e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c @@ -355,17 +355,6 @@ void drm_sched_entity_destroy(struct drm_sched_entity *entity) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_destroy); -/* drm_sched_entity_clear_dep - callback to clear the entities dependency */ -static void drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(struct dma_fence *f, - struct dma_fence_cb *cb) -{ - struct drm_sched_entity *entity = - container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb); - - entity->dependency = NULL; - dma_fence_put(f); -} - /* * drm_sched_entity_wakeup - callback to clear the entity's dependency and * wake up the scheduler @@ -376,7 +365,8 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_wakeup(struct dma_fence *f, struct drm_sched_entity *entity = container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_entity, cb); - drm_sched_entity_clear_dep(f, cb); + entity->dependency = NULL; + dma_fence_put(f); drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched); } @@ -429,13 +419,6 @@ static bool drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb(struct drm_sched_entity *entity) fence = dma_fence_get(&s_fence->scheduled); dma_fence_put(entity->dependency); entity->dependency = fence; - if (!dma_fence_add_callback(fence, &entity->cb, - drm_sched_entity_clear_dep)) - return true; - - /* Ignore it when it is already scheduled */ - dma_fence_put(fence); - return false; } if (!dma_fence_add_callback(entity->dependency, &entity->cb,

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 2/4] sunrpc: fix client side handling of tls alerts

by Olga Kornievskaia

A security exploit was discovered in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv due to its assumption that there is valid data in the msghdr's iterator's kvec. Instead, this patch proposes the rework how control messages are setup and used by sock_recvmsg(). If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS alert. Msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator before calling into the tls_alert_recv. Fixes: dea034b963c8 ("SUNRPC: Capture CMSG metadata on client-side receive") Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy(a)hammerspace.com> Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com> --- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c index 04ff66758fc3..c5f7bbf5775f 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ xs_alloc_sparse_pages(struct xdr_buf *buf, size_t want, gfp_t gfp) static int xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, - struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret) + unsigned int *msg_flags, struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret) { u8 content_type = tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, cmsg); u8 level, description; @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * record, even though there might be more frames * waiting to be decrypted. */ - msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR; + *msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR; break; case TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT: tls_alert_recv(sock->sk, msg, &level, &description); @@ -386,19 +386,33 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, } static int -xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags) +xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags, int flags) { union { struct cmsghdr cmsg; u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))]; } u; + u8 alert[2]; + struct kvec alert_kvec = { + .iov_base = alert, + .iov_len = sizeof(alert), + }; + struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = *msg_flags, + .msg_control = &u, + .msg_controllen = sizeof(u), + }; int ret; - msg->msg_control = &u; - msg->msg_controllen = sizeof(u); - ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags); - if (msg->msg_controllen != sizeof(u)) - ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret); + iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1, + alert_kvec.iov_len); + ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, flags); + if (ret > 0 && + tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) { + iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret); + ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, msg_flags, &u.cmsg, + -EAGAIN); + } return ret; } @@ -408,7 +422,13 @@ xs_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t seek) ssize_t ret; if (seek != 0) iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, seek); - ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags); + ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags); + /* Handle TLS inband control message lazily */ + if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) { + msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOR); + if (ret == 0 || ret == -EIO) + ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, &msg->msg_flags, flags); + } return ret > 0 ? ret + seek : ret; } @@ -434,7 +454,7 @@ xs_read_discard(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t count) { iov_iter_discard(&msg->msg_iter, ITER_DEST, count); - return xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags); + return xs_sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags, 0); } #if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE -- 2.47.1

3 months, 1 week

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