5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Kim Phillips kim.phillips@amd.com
commit fd470a8beed88440b160d690344fbae05a0b9b1b upstream.
Unlike Intel's Enhanced IBRS feature, AMD's Automatic IBRS does not provide protection to processes running at CPL3/user mode, see section "Extended Feature Enable Register (EFER)" in the APM v2 at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304652
Explicitly enable STIBP to protect against cross-thread CPL3 branch target injections on systems with Automatic IBRS enabled.
Also update the relevant documentation.
Fixes: e7862eda309e ("x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS") Reported-by: Tom Lendacky thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) bp@alien8.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720194727.67022-1-kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 11 +++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 +++++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -484,11 +484,14 @@ Spectre variant 2
Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against - Spectre v2 variant attacks, including cross-thread branch target injections - on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, eIBRS enables STIBP too. + Spectre v2 variant attacks.
- Legacy IBRS systems clear the IBRS bit on exit to userspace and - therefore explicitly enable STIBP for that + On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target + injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables + STIBP, too. + + AMD Automatic IBRS does not protect userspace, and Legacy IBRS systems clear + the IBRS bit on exit to userspace, therefore both explicitly enable STIBP.
The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1317,19 +1317,21 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) }
/* - * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP + * If no STIBP, Intel enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP * is not required. * - * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target + * Intel's Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return - * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection, - * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case. + * to userspace. AMD Automatic IBRS also does not protect userspace. + * These modes therefore disable the implicit cross-thread protection, + * so allow for STIBP to be selected in those cases. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))) return;
/* @@ -2596,7 +2598,8 @@ static ssize_t rfds_show_state(char *buf
static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {