From: Davide Caratti dcaratti@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 44d4775ca51805b376a8db5b34f650434a08e556 ]

syzkaller shows that packets can still be dequeued while taprio_destroy() is running. Let sch_taprio use the reset() function to cancel the advance timer and drop all skbs from the child qdiscs.

Fixes: 5a781ccbd19e ("tc: Add support for configuring the taprio scheduler") Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f362872379bf8f0017fb667c1ab158f2d1e764a... Reported-by: syzbot+8971da381fb5a31f542d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti dcaratti@redhat.com Acked-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes vinicius.gomes@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63b6d79b0e830ebb0283e020db4df3cdfdfb2b94.160814284... Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/sched/sch_taprio.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sched/sch_taprio.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_taprio.c @@ -1597,6 +1597,21 @@ free_sched: return err; }

+static void taprio_reset(struct Qdisc *sch) +{ + struct taprio_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch); + struct net_device *dev = qdisc_dev(sch); + int i; + + hrtimer_cancel(&q->advance_timer); + if (q->qdiscs) { + for (i = 0; i < dev->num_tx_queues && q->qdiscs[i]; i++) + qdisc_reset(q->qdiscs[i]); + } + sch->qstats.backlog = 0; + sch->q.qlen = 0; +} + static void taprio_destroy(struct Qdisc *sch) { struct taprio_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch); @@ -1607,7 +1622,6 @@ static void taprio_destroy(struct Qdisc list_del(&q->taprio_list); spin_unlock(&taprio_list_lock);

- hrtimer_cancel(&q->advance_timer);

taprio_disable_offload(dev, q, NULL);

@@ -1954,6 +1968,7 @@ static struct Qdisc_ops taprio_qdisc_ops .init = taprio_init, .change = taprio_change, .destroy = taprio_destroy, + .reset = taprio_reset, .peek = taprio_peek, .dequeue = taprio_dequeue, .enqueue = taprio_enqueue,

From: Zhuguangqing zhuguangqing@xiaomi.com

commit 236761f19a4f373354f1dcf399b57753f1f4b871 upstream.

If state has not changed successfully and we updated cpufreq_state, next time when the new state is equal to cpufreq_state (not changed successfully last time), we will return directly and miss a freq_qos_update_request() that should have been.

Fixes: 5130802ddbb1 ("thermal: cpu_cooling: Switch to QoS requests for freq limits") Cc: v5.4+ stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+ Signed-off-by: Zhuguangqing zhuguangqing@xiaomi.com Acked-by: Viresh Kumar viresh.kumar@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano daniel.lezcano@linaro.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106092243.15574-1-zhuguangqing83@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/thermal/cpu_cooling.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/thermal/cpu_cooling.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/cpu_cooling.c @@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ static int cpufreq_set_cur_state(struct unsigned long state) { struct cpufreq_cooling_device *cpufreq_cdev = cdev->devdata; + int ret;

/* Request state should be less than max_level */ if (WARN_ON(state > cpufreq_cdev->max_level)) @@ -329,10 +330,12 @@ static int cpufreq_set_cur_state(struct if (cpufreq_cdev->cpufreq_state == state) return 0;

- cpufreq_cdev->cpufreq_state = state; + ret = freq_qos_update_request(&cpufreq_cdev->qos_req, + cpufreq_cdev->freq_table[state].frequency); + if (ret > 0) + cpufreq_cdev->cpufreq_state = state;

- return freq_qos_update_request(&cpufreq_cdev->qos_req, - cpufreq_cdev->freq_table[state].frequency); + return ret; }

/**

From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com

commit 76786a0f083473de31678bdb259a3d4167cf756d upstream.

As described in "fscrypt: add fscrypt_is_nokey_name()", it's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file concurrently with adding the directory's encryption key.

Fix this bug on ubifs by rejecting no-key dentries in ubifs_create(), ubifs_mkdir(), ubifs_mknod(), and ubifs_symlink().

Note that ubifs doesn't actually report the duplicate filenames from readdir, but rather it seems to replace the original dentry with a new one (which is still wrong, just a different effect from ext4).

On ubifs, this fixes xfstest generic/595 as well as the new xfstest I wrote specifically for this bug.

Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-5-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ubifs/dir.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c @@ -278,6 +278,15 @@ done: return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry); }

+static int ubifs_prepare_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + struct fscrypt_name *nm) +{ + if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) + return -ENOKEY; + + return fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 0, nm); +} + static int ubifs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, bool excl) { @@ -301,7 +310,7 @@ static int ubifs_create(struct inode *di if (err) return err;

- err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 0, &nm); + err = ubifs_prepare_create(dir, dentry, &nm); if (err) goto out_budg;

@@ -961,7 +970,7 @@ static int ubifs_mkdir(struct inode *dir if (err) return err;

- err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 0, &nm); + err = ubifs_prepare_create(dir, dentry, &nm); if (err) goto out_budg;

@@ -1046,7 +1055,7 @@ static int ubifs_mknod(struct inode *dir return err; }

- err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 0, &nm); + err = ubifs_prepare_create(dir, dentry, &nm); if (err) { kfree(dev); goto out_budg; @@ -1130,7 +1139,7 @@ static int ubifs_symlink(struct inode *d if (err) return err;

- err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 0, &nm); + err = ubifs_prepare_create(dir, dentry, &nm); if (err) goto out_budg;

From: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com

commit 159e1de201b6fca10bfec50405a3b53a561096a8 upstream.

It's possible to create a duplicate filename in an encrypted directory by creating a file concurrently with adding the encryption key.

Specifically, sys_open(O_CREAT) (or sys_mkdir(), sys_mknod(), or sys_symlink()) can lookup the target filename while the directory's encryption key hasn't been added yet, resulting in a negative no-key dentry. The VFS then calls ->create() (or ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), or ->symlink()) because the dentry is negative. Normally, ->create() would return -ENOKEY due to the directory's key being unavailable. However, if the key was added between the dentry lookup and ->create(), then the filesystem will go ahead and try to create the file.

If the target filename happens to already exist as a normal name (not a no-key name), a duplicate filename may be added to the directory.

In order to fix this, we need to fix the filesystems to prevent ->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), and ->symlink() on no-key names. (->rename() and ->link() need it too, but those are already handled correctly by fscrypt_prepare_rename() and fscrypt_prepare_link().)

In preparation for this, add a helper function fscrypt_is_nokey_name() that filesystems can use to do this check. Use this helper function for the existing checks that fs/crypto/ does for rename and link.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201118075609.120337-2-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/crypto/hooks.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c +++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode if (err) return err;

- /* ... in case we looked up ciphertext name before key was added */ - if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME) + /* ... in case we looked up no-key name before key was added */ + if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) return -ENOKEY;

if (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(dir, inode)) @@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inod if (err) return err;

- /* ... in case we looked up ciphertext name(s) before key was added */ - if ((old_dentry->d_flags | new_dentry->d_flags) & - DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME) + /* ... in case we looked up no-key name(s) before key was added */ + if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(old_dentry) || + fscrypt_is_nokey_name(new_dentry)) return -ENOKEY;

if (old_dir != new_dir) { --- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h @@ -100,6 +100,35 @@ static inline void fscrypt_handle_d_move dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME; }

+/** + * fscrypt_is_nokey_name() - test whether a dentry is a no-key name + * @dentry: the dentry to check + * + * This returns true if the dentry is a no-key dentry. A no-key dentry is a + * dentry that was created in an encrypted directory that hasn't had its + * encryption key added yet. Such dentries may be either positive or negative. + * + * When a filesystem is asked to create a new filename in an encrypted directory + * and the new filename's dentry is a no-key dentry, it must fail the operation + * with ENOKEY. This includes ->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), ->symlink(), + * ->rename(), and ->link(). (However, ->rename() and ->link() are already + * handled by fscrypt_prepare_rename() and fscrypt_prepare_link().) + * + * This is necessary because creating a filename requires the directory's + * encryption key, but just checking for the key on the directory inode during + * the final filesystem operation doesn't guarantee that the key was available + * during the preceding dentry lookup. And the key must have already been + * available during the dentry lookup in order for it to have been checked + * whether the filename already exists in the directory and for the new file's + * dentry not to be invalidated due to it incorrectly having the no-key flag. + * + * Return: %true if the dentry is a no-key name + */ +static inline bool fscrypt_is_nokey_name(const struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_NAME; +} + /* crypto.c */ extern void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(struct work_struct *); extern struct fscrypt_ctx *fscrypt_get_ctx(gfp_t); @@ -290,6 +319,11 @@ static inline void fscrypt_handle_d_move { }

+static inline bool fscrypt_is_nokey_name(const struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return false; +} + /* crypto.c */ static inline void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(struct work_struct *work) {

From: Eric Auger eric.auger@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 16b8fe4caf499ae8e12d2ab1b1324497e36a7b83 ]

In case an error occurs in vfio_pci_enable() before the call to vfio_pci_probe_mmaps(), vfio_pci_disable() will try to iterate on an uninitialized list and cause a kernel panic.

Lets move to the initialization to vfio_pci_probe() to fix the issue.

Signed-off-by: Eric Auger eric.auger@redhat.com Fixes: 05f0c03fbac1 ("vfio-pci: Allow to mmap sub-page MMIO BARs if the mmio page is exclusive") CC: Stable stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+ Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson alex.williamson@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c index 632653cd70e3b..2372e161cd5e8 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c @@ -114,8 +114,6 @@ static void vfio_pci_probe_mmaps(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev) int bar; struct vfio_pci_dummy_resource *dummy_res;

- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vdev->dummy_resources_list); - for (bar = PCI_STD_RESOURCES; bar <= PCI_STD_RESOURCE_END; bar++) { res = vdev->pdev->resource + bar;

@@ -1606,6 +1604,7 @@ static int vfio_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) mutex_init(&vdev->igate); spin_lock_init(&vdev->irqlock); mutex_init(&vdev->ioeventfds_lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vdev->dummy_resources_list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vdev->ioeventfds_list); mutex_init(&vdev->vma_lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vdev->vma_list);

From: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz

[ Upstream commit b08070eca9e247f60ab39d79b2c25d274750441f ]

ext4_handle_error() with errors=continue mount option can accidentally remount the filesystem read-only when the system is rebooting. Fix that.

Fixes: 1dc1097ff60e ("ext4: avoid panic during forced reboot") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger adilger@dilger.ca Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127113405.26867-2-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/super.c | 14 ++++++-------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 920658ca8777d..06568467b0c27 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -455,19 +455,17 @@ static bool system_going_down(void)

static void ext4_handle_error(struct super_block *sb) { + journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal; + if (test_opt(sb, WARN_ON_ERROR)) WARN_ON_ONCE(1);

- if (sb_rdonly(sb)) + if (sb_rdonly(sb) || test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT)) return;

- if (!test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT)) { - journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal; - - EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_flags |= EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED; - if (journal) - jbd2_journal_abort(journal, -EIO); - } + EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_flags |= EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED; + if (journal) + jbd2_journal_abort(journal, -EIO); /* * We force ERRORS_RO behavior when system is rebooting. Otherwise we * could panic during 'reboot -f' as the underlying device got already

From: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit df7e8818926eb4712b67421442acf7d568fe2645 ]

Userspace that does not know about the AMD_IBRS bit might still allow the guest to protect itself with MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL using the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit. However, svm.c disallows this and will cause a #GP in the guest when writing to the MSR. Fix this by loosening the test and allowing the Intel CPUID bit, and in fact allow the AMD_STIBP bit as well since it allows writing to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL too.

Reported-by: Zhiyi Guo zhguo@redhat.com Analyzed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert dgilbert@redhat.com Analyzed-by: Laszlo Ersek lersek@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 72bf1d8175ac2..ca746006ac040 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -4233,6 +4233,8 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) break; case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP) && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) return 1; @@ -4318,6 +4320,8 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) break; case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL: if (!msr->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) && + !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP) && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS) && !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) return 1;

From: Christophe Leroy christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu

[ Upstream commit 1891ef21d92c4801ea082ee8ed478e304ddc6749 ]

fls() and fls64() are using __builtin_ctz() and _builtin_ctzll(). On powerpc, those builtins trivially use ctlzw and ctlzd power instructions.

Allthough those instructions provide the expected result with input argument 0, __builtin_ctz() and __builtin_ctzll() are documented as undefined for value 0.

The easiest fix would be to use fls() and fls64() functions defined in include/asm-generic/bitops/builtin-fls.h and include/asm-generic/bitops/fls64.h, but GCC output is not optimal:

00000388 <testfls>: 388: 2c 03 00 00 cmpwi r3,0 38c: 41 82 00 10 beq 39c <testfls+0x14> 390: 7c 63 00 34 cntlzw r3,r3 394: 20 63 00 20 subfic r3,r3,32 398: 4e 80 00 20 blr 39c: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0 3a0: 4e 80 00 20 blr

000003b0 <testfls64>: 3b0: 2c 03 00 00 cmpwi r3,0 3b4: 40 82 00 1c bne 3d0 <testfls64+0x20> 3b8: 2f 84 00 00 cmpwi cr7,r4,0 3bc: 38 60 00 00 li r3,0 3c0: 4d 9e 00 20 beqlr cr7 3c4: 7c 83 00 34 cntlzw r3,r4 3c8: 20 63 00 20 subfic r3,r3,32 3cc: 4e 80 00 20 blr 3d0: 7c 63 00 34 cntlzw r3,r3 3d4: 20 63 00 40 subfic r3,r3,64 3d8: 4e 80 00 20 blr

When the input of fls(x) is a constant, just check x for nullity and return either 0 or __builtin_clz(x). Otherwise, use cntlzw instruction directly.

For fls64() on PPC64, do the same but with __builtin_clzll() and cntlzd instruction. On PPC32, lets take the generic fls64() which will use our fls(). The result is as expected:

00000388 <testfls>: 388: 7c 63 00 34 cntlzw r3,r3 38c: 20 63 00 20 subfic r3,r3,32 390: 4e 80 00 20 blr

000003a0 <testfls64>: 3a0: 2c 03 00 00 cmpwi r3,0 3a4: 40 82 00 10 bne 3b4 <testfls64+0x14> 3a8: 7c 83 00 34 cntlzw r3,r4 3ac: 20 63 00 20 subfic r3,r3,32 3b0: 4e 80 00 20 blr 3b4: 7c 63 00 34 cntlzw r3,r3 3b8: 20 63 00 40 subfic r3,r3,64 3bc: 4e 80 00 20 blr

Fixes: 2fcff790dcb4 ("powerpc: Use builtin functions for fls()/__fls()/fls64()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool segher@kernel.crashing.org Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/348c2d3f19ffcff8abe50d52513f989c4581d000.160337552... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h index 603aed229af78..46338f2360046 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h @@ -217,15 +217,34 @@ static __inline__ void __clear_bit_unlock(int nr, volatile unsigned long *addr) */ static __inline__ int fls(unsigned int x) { - return 32 - __builtin_clz(x); + int lz; + + if (__builtin_constant_p(x)) + return x ? 32 - __builtin_clz(x) : 0; + asm("cntlzw %0,%1" : "=r" (lz) : "r" (x)); + return 32 - lz; }

#include <asm-generic/bitops/builtin-__fls.h>

+/* + * 64-bit can do this using one cntlzd (count leading zeroes doubleword) + * instruction; for 32-bit we use the generic version, which does two + * 32-bit fls calls. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 static __inline__ int fls64(__u64 x) { - return 64 - __builtin_clzll(x); + int lz; + + if (__builtin_constant_p(x)) + return x ? 64 - __builtin_clzll(x) : 0; + asm("cntlzd %0,%1" : "=r" (lz) : "r" (x)); + return 64 - lz; } +#else +#include <asm-generic/bitops/fls64.h> +#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 unsigned int __arch_hweight8(unsigned int w);

From: Jamie Iles jamie@nuviainc.com

[ Upstream commit a61df3c413e49b0042f9caf774c58512d1cc71b7 ]

syzkaller found the following JFFS2 splat:

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffa00000000001 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x96000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 CM = 0, WnR = 0 [dfffa00000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 12745 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G S 5.9.0-rc8+ #98 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--) pc : jffs2_parse_param+0x138/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:206 lr : jffs2_parse_param+0x108/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:205 sp : ffff000022a57910 x29: ffff000022a57910 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff000057634008 x26: 000000000000d800 x25: 000000000000d800 x24: ffff0000271a9000 x23: ffffa0001adb5dc0 x22: ffff000023fdcf00 x21: 1fffe0000454af2c x20: ffff000024cc9400 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa000102dbdd0 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: ffffa000109e44bc x13: ffffa00010a3a26c x12: ffff80000476e0b3 x11: 1fffe0000476e0b2 x10: ffff80000476e0b2 x9 : ffffa00010a3ad60 x8 : ffff000023b70593 x7 : 0000000000000003 x6 : 00000000f1f1f1f1 x5 : ffff000023fdcf00 x4 : 0000000000000002 x3 : ffffa00010000000 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : dfffa00000000000 x0 : 0000000000000008 Call trace: jffs2_parse_param+0x138/0x308 fs/jffs2/super.c:206 vfs_parse_fs_param+0x234/0x4e8 fs/fs_context.c:117 vfs_parse_fs_string+0xe8/0x148 fs/fs_context.c:161 generic_parse_monolithic+0x17c/0x208 fs/fs_context.c:201 parse_monolithic_mount_data+0x7c/0xa8 fs/fs_context.c:649 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2871 [inline] path_mount+0x548/0x1da8 fs/namespace.c:3192 do_mount+0x124/0x138 fs/namespace.c:3205 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3413 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3390 [inline] __arm64_sys_mount+0x164/0x238 fs/namespace.c:3390 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:36 [inline] invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 [inline] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x15c/0x598 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:149 do_el0_svc+0x60/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:195 el0_svc+0x34/0xb0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:226 el0_sync_handler+0xc8/0x5b4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:236 el0_sync+0x15c/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:663 Code: d2d40001 f2fbffe1 91002260 d343fc02 (38e16841) ---[ end trace 4edf690313deda44 ]---

This is because since ec10a24f10c8, the option parsing happens before fill_super and so the MTD device isn't associated with the filesystem. Defer the size check until there is a valid association.

Fixes: ec10a24f10c8 ("vfs: Convert jffs2 to use the new mount API") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles jamie@nuviainc.com Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/jffs2/super.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/jffs2/super.c b/fs/jffs2/super.c index 68ce77cbeed3b..6839a61e8ff1e 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/super.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/super.c @@ -208,12 +208,8 @@ static int jffs2_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) case Opt_rp_size: if (result.uint_32 > UINT_MAX / 1024) return invalf(fc, "jffs2: rp_size unrepresentable"); - opt = result.uint_32 * 1024; - if (opt > c->mtd->size) - return invalf(fc, "jffs2: Too large reserve pool specified, max is %llu KB", - c->mtd->size / 1024); + c->mount_opts.rp_size = result.uint_32 * 1024; c->mount_opts.set_rp_size = true; - c->mount_opts.rp_size = opt; break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -275,6 +271,10 @@ static int jffs2_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) c->mtd = sb->s_mtd; c->os_priv = sb;

+ if (c->mount_opts.rp_size > c->mtd->size) + return invalf(fc, "jffs2: Too large reserve pool specified, max is %llu KB", + c->mtd->size / 1024); + /* Initialize JFFS2 superblock locks, the further initialization will * be done later */ mutex_init(&c->alloc_sem);

From: Petr Vorel petr.vorel@gmail.com

commit a85cbe6159ffc973e5702f70a3bd5185f8f3c38d upstream.

and include <linux/const.h> in UAPI headers instead of <linux/kernel.h>.

The reason is to avoid indirect <linux/sysinfo.h> include when using some network headers: <linux/netlink.h> or others -> <linux/kernel.h> -> <linux/sysinfo.h>.

This indirect include causes on MUSL redefinition of struct sysinfo when included both <sys/sysinfo.h> and some of UAPI headers:

In file included from x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/kernel.h:5, from x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/netlink.h:5, from ../include/tst_netlink.h:14, from tst_crypto.c:13: x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/linux/sysinfo.h:8:8: error: redefinition of `struct sysinfo' struct sysinfo { ^~~~~~~ In file included from ../include/tst_safe_macros.h:15, from ../include/tst_test.h:93, from tst_crypto.c:11: x86_64-buildroot-linux-musl/sysroot/usr/include/sys/sysinfo.h:10:8: note: originally defined here

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201015190013.8901-1-petr.vorel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel petr.vorel@gmail.com Suggested-by: Rich Felker dalias@aerifal.cx Acked-by: Rich Felker dalias@libc.org Cc: Peter Korsgaard peter@korsgaard.com Cc: Baruch Siach baruch@tkos.co.il Cc: Florian Weimer fweimer@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- include/uapi/linux/const.h | 5 +++++ include/uapi/linux/ethtool.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/kernel.h | 9 +-------- include/uapi/linux/lightnvm.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/mroute6.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/netlink.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/sysctl.h | 2 +- 8 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/include/uapi/linux/const.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/const.h @@ -28,4 +28,9 @@ #define _BITUL(x) (_UL(1) << (x)) #define _BITULL(x) (_ULL(1) << (x))

+#define __ALIGN_KERNEL(x, a) __ALIGN_KERNEL_MASK(x, (typeof(x))(a) - 1) +#define __ALIGN_KERNEL_MASK(x, mask) (((x) + (mask)) & ~(mask)) + +#define __KERNEL_DIV_ROUND_UP(n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d)) + #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_CONST_H */ --- a/include/uapi/linux/ethtool.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ethtool.h @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_ETHTOOL_H #define _UAPI_LINUX_ETHTOOL_H

-#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/const.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/if_ether.h>

--- a/include/uapi/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kernel.h @@ -3,13 +3,6 @@ #define _UAPI_LINUX_KERNEL_H

#include <linux/sysinfo.h> - -/* - * 'kernel.h' contains some often-used function prototypes etc - */ -#define __ALIGN_KERNEL(x, a) __ALIGN_KERNEL_MASK(x, (typeof(x))(a) - 1) -#define __ALIGN_KERNEL_MASK(x, mask) (((x) + (mask)) & ~(mask)) - -#define __KERNEL_DIV_ROUND_UP(n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) / (d)) +#include <linux/const.h>

#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_KERNEL_H */ --- a/include/uapi/linux/lightnvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/lightnvm.h @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ #define _UAPI_LINUX_LIGHTNVM_H

#ifdef __KERNEL__ -#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/const.h> #include <linux/ioctl.h> #else /* __KERNEL__ */ #include <stdio.h> --- a/include/uapi/linux/mroute6.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/mroute6.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _UAPI__LINUX_MROUTE6_H #define _UAPI__LINUX_MROUTE6_H

-#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/const.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/sockios.h> #include <linux/in6.h> /* For struct sockaddr_in6. */ --- a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ #ifndef _UAPI_X_TABLES_H #define _UAPI_X_TABLES_H -#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/const.h> #include <linux/types.h>

#define XT_FUNCTION_MAXNAMELEN 30 --- a/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netlink.h @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _UAPI__LINUX_NETLINK_H #define _UAPI__LINUX_NETLINK_H

-#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/const.h> #include <linux/socket.h> /* for __kernel_sa_family_t */ #include <linux/types.h>

--- a/include/uapi/linux/sysctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sysctl.h @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SYSCTL_H #define _UAPI_LINUX_SYSCTL_H

-#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/const.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/compiler.h>

From: Damien Le Moal damien.lemoal@wdc.com

commit 0ebcdd702f49aeb0ad2e2d894f8c124a0acc6e23 upstream.

For a null_blk device with zoned mode enabled is currently initialized with a number of zones equal to the device capacity divided by the zone size, without considering if the device capacity is a multiple of the zone size. If the zone size is not a divisor of the capacity, the zones end up not covering the entire capacity, potentially resulting is out of bounds accesses to the zone array.

Fix this by adding one last smaller zone with a size equal to the remainder of the disk capacity divided by the zone size if the capacity is not a multiple of the zone size. For such smaller last zone, the zone capacity is also checked so that it does not exceed the smaller zone size.

Reported-by: Naohiro Aota naohiro.aota@wdc.com Fixes: ca4b2a011948 ("null_blk: add zone support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal damien.lemoal@wdc.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/block/null_blk_zoned.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/block/null_blk_zoned.c +++ b/drivers/block/null_blk_zoned.c @@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include "null_blk.h"

-/* zone_size in MBs to sectors. */ -#define ZONE_SIZE_SHIFT 11 +#define MB_TO_SECTS(mb) (((sector_t)mb * SZ_1M) >> SECTOR_SHIFT)

static inline unsigned int null_zone_no(struct nullb_device *dev, sector_t sect) { @@ -12,7 +11,7 @@ static inline unsigned int null_zone_no(

int null_zone_init(struct nullb_device *dev) { - sector_t dev_size = (sector_t)dev->size * 1024 * 1024; + sector_t dev_capacity_sects; sector_t sector = 0; unsigned int i;

@@ -25,9 +24,12 @@ int null_zone_init(struct nullb_device * return -EINVAL; }

- dev->zone_size_sects = dev->zone_size << ZONE_SIZE_SHIFT; - dev->nr_zones = dev_size >> - (SECTOR_SHIFT + ilog2(dev->zone_size_sects)); + dev_capacity_sects = MB_TO_SECTS(dev->size); + dev->zone_size_sects = MB_TO_SECTS(dev->zone_size); + dev->nr_zones = dev_capacity_sects >> ilog2(dev->zone_size_sects); + if (dev_capacity_sects & (dev->zone_size_sects - 1)) + dev->nr_zones++; + dev->zones = kvmalloc_array(dev->nr_zones, sizeof(struct blk_zone), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); if (!dev->zones) @@ -55,7 +57,10 @@ int null_zone_init(struct nullb_device * struct blk_zone *zone = &dev->zones[i];

zone->start = zone->wp = sector; - zone->len = dev->zone_size_sects; + if (zone->start + dev->zone_size_sects > dev_capacity_sects) + zone->len = dev_capacity_sects - zone->start; + else + zone->len = dev->zone_size_sects; zone->type = BLK_ZONE_TYPE_SEQWRITE_REQ; zone->cond = BLK_ZONE_COND_EMPTY;

From: Qinglang Miao miaoqinglang@huawei.com

commit 2d18e54dd8662442ef5898c6bdadeaf90b3cebbc upstream.

A memory leak is found in cgroup1_parse_param() when multiple source parameters overwrite fc->source in the fs_context struct without free.

unreferenced object 0xffff888100d930e0 (size 16): comm "mount", pid 520, jiffies 4303326831 (age 152.783s) hex dump (first 16 bytes): 74 65 73 74 6c 65 61 6b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 testleak........ backtrace: [<000000003e5023ec>] kmemdup_nul+0x2d/0xa0 [<00000000377dbdaa>] vfs_parse_fs_string+0xc0/0x150 [<00000000cb2b4882>] generic_parse_monolithic+0x15a/0x1d0 [<000000000f750198>] path_mount+0xee1/0x1820 [<0000000004756de2>] do_mount+0xea/0x100 [<0000000094cafb0a>] __x64_sys_mount+0x14b/0x1f0

Fix this bug by permitting a single source parameter and rejecting with an error all subsequent ones.

Fixes: 8d2451f4994f ("cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing") Reported-by: Hulk Robot hulkci@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Qinglang Miao miaoqinglang@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Zefan Li lizefan@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c @@ -914,6 +914,8 @@ int cgroup1_parse_param(struct fs_contex opt = fs_parse(fc, &cgroup1_fs_parameters, param, &result); if (opt == -ENOPARAM) { if (strcmp(param->key, "source") == 0) { + if (fc->source) + return invalf(fc, "Multiple sources not supported"); fc->source = param->string; param->string = NULL; return 0;

From: Anant Thazhemadam anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com

commit 70f259a3f4276b71db365b1d6ff1eab805ea6ec3 upstream.

When h5_close() gets called, the memory allocated for the hu gets freed only if hu->serdev doesn't exist. This leads to a memory leak. So when h5_close() is requested, close the serdev device instance and free the memory allocated to the hu entirely instead.

Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6ce141c55b2f7aafd1c4 Reported-by: syzbot+6ce141c55b2f7aafd1c4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+6ce141c55b2f7aafd1c4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/bluetooth/hci_h5.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_h5.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_h5.c @@ -250,8 +250,12 @@ static int h5_close(struct hci_uart *hu) if (h5->vnd && h5->vnd->close) h5->vnd->close(h5);

- if (!hu->serdev) - kfree(h5); + if (hu->serdev) + serdev_device_close(hu->serdev); + + kfree_skb(h5->rx_skb); + kfree(h5); + h5 = NULL;

return 0; }

From: Anant Thazhemadam anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com

commit 31dcb6c30a26d32650ce134820f27de3c675a45a upstream.

A kernel-infoleak was reported by syzbot, which was caused because dbells was left uninitialized. Using kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() fixes this issue.

Reported-by: syzbot+a79e17c39564bedf0930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+a79e17c39564bedf0930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201122224534.333471-1-anant.thazhemadam@gmail.co... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c @@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ static int vmci_ctx_get_chkpt_doorbells( return VMCI_ERROR_MORE_DATA; }

- dbells = kmalloc(data_size, GFP_ATOMIC); + dbells = kzalloc(data_size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!dbells) return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM;

From: Chao Yu yuchao0@huawei.com

commit e584bbe821229a3e7cc409eecd51df66f9268c21 upstream.

syzbot reported a bug which could cause shift-out-of-bounds issue, fix it.

Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:395 sanity_check_raw_super fs/f2fs/super.c:2812 [inline] read_raw_super_block fs/f2fs/super.c:3267 [inline] f2fs_fill_super.cold+0x16c9/0x16f6 fs/f2fs/super.c:3519 mount_bdev+0x34d/0x410 fs/super.c:1366 legacy_get_tree+0x105/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592 vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1496 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2896 [inline] path_mount+0x12ae/0x1e70 fs/namespace.c:3227 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3240 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3448 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3425 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3425 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reported-by: syzbot+ca9a785f8ac472085994@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Anant Thazhemadam anant.thazhemadam@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Chao Yu yuchao0@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim jaegeuk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/f2fs/super.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -2523,7 +2523,6 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct block_t total_sections, blocks_per_seg; struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = (struct f2fs_super_block *) (bh->b_data + F2FS_SUPER_OFFSET); - unsigned int blocksize; size_t crc_offset = 0; __u32 crc = 0;

@@ -2557,10 +2556,10 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct }

/* Currently, support only 4KB block size */ - blocksize = 1 << le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize); - if (blocksize != F2FS_BLKSIZE) { - f2fs_info(sbi, "Invalid blocksize (%u), supports only 4KB", - blocksize); + if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize) != F2FS_BLKSIZE_BITS) { + f2fs_info(sbi, "Invalid log_blocksize (%u), supports only %u", + le32_to_cpu(raw_super->log_blocksize), + F2FS_BLKSIZE_BITS); return -EFSCORRUPTED; }

From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de

commit 88a06d6fd6b369d88cec46c62db3e2604a2f50d5 upstream.

The runtime->avail field may be accessed concurrently while some places refer to it without taking the runtime->lock spinlock, as detected by KCSAN. Usually this isn't a big problem, but for consistency and safety, we should take the spinlock at each place referencing this field.

Reported-by: syzbot+a23a6f1215c84756577c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+3d367d1df1d2b67f5c19@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201206083527.21163-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- sound/core/rawmidi.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/sound/core/rawmidi.c +++ b/sound/core/rawmidi.c @@ -72,11 +72,21 @@ static inline unsigned short snd_rawmidi } }

-static inline int snd_rawmidi_ready(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream) +static inline bool __snd_rawmidi_ready(struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime) +{ + return runtime->avail >= runtime->avail_min; +} + +static bool snd_rawmidi_ready(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream) { struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime; + unsigned long flags; + bool ready;

- return runtime->avail >= runtime->avail_min; + spin_lock_irqsave(&runtime->lock, flags); + ready = __snd_rawmidi_ready(runtime); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags); + return ready; }

static inline int snd_rawmidi_ready_append(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, @@ -945,7 +955,7 @@ int snd_rawmidi_receive(struct snd_rawmi if (result > 0) { if (runtime->event) schedule_work(&runtime->event_work); - else if (snd_rawmidi_ready(substream)) + else if (__snd_rawmidi_ready(runtime)) wake_up(&runtime->sleep); } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&runtime->lock, flags); @@ -1024,7 +1034,7 @@ static ssize_t snd_rawmidi_read(struct f result = 0; while (count > 0) { spin_lock_irq(&runtime->lock); - while (!snd_rawmidi_ready(substream)) { + while (!__snd_rawmidi_ready(runtime)) { wait_queue_entry_t wait;

if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) { @@ -1041,9 +1051,11 @@ static ssize_t snd_rawmidi_read(struct f return -ENODEV; if (signal_pending(current)) return result > 0 ? result : -ERESTARTSYS; - if (!runtime->avail) - return result > 0 ? result : -EIO; spin_lock_irq(&runtime->lock); + if (!runtime->avail) { + spin_unlock_irq(&runtime->lock); + return result > 0 ? result : -EIO; + } } spin_unlock_irq(&runtime->lock); count1 = snd_rawmidi_kernel_read1(substream, @@ -1181,7 +1193,7 @@ int __snd_rawmidi_transmit_ack(struct sn runtime->avail += count; substream->bytes += count; if (count > 0) { - if (runtime->drain || snd_rawmidi_ready(substream)) + if (runtime->drain || __snd_rawmidi_ready(runtime)) wake_up(&runtime->sleep); } return count; @@ -1370,9 +1382,11 @@ static ssize_t snd_rawmidi_write(struct return -ENODEV; if (signal_pending(current)) return result > 0 ? result : -ERESTARTSYS; - if (!runtime->avail && !timeout) - return result > 0 ? result : -EIO; spin_lock_irq(&runtime->lock); + if (!runtime->avail && !timeout) { + spin_unlock_irq(&runtime->lock); + return result > 0 ? result : -EIO; + } } spin_unlock_irq(&runtime->lock); count1 = snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(substream, buf, NULL, count); @@ -1452,6 +1466,7 @@ static void snd_rawmidi_proc_info_read(s struct snd_rawmidi *rmidi; struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream; struct snd_rawmidi_runtime *runtime; + unsigned long buffer_size, avail, xruns;

rmidi = entry->private_data; snd_iprintf(buffer, "%s\n\n", rmidi->name); @@ -1470,13 +1485,16 @@ static void snd_rawmidi_proc_info_read(s " Owner PID : %d\n", pid_vnr(substream->pid)); runtime = substream->runtime; + spin_lock_irq(&runtime->lock); + buffer_size = runtime->buffer_size; + avail = runtime->avail; + spin_unlock_irq(&runtime->lock); snd_iprintf(buffer, " Mode : %s\n" " Buffer size : %lu\n" " Avail : %lu\n", runtime->oss ? "OSS compatible" : "native", - (unsigned long) runtime->buffer_size, - (unsigned long) runtime->avail); + buffer_size, avail); } } } @@ -1494,13 +1512,16 @@ static void snd_rawmidi_proc_info_read(s " Owner PID : %d\n", pid_vnr(substream->pid)); runtime = substream->runtime; + spin_lock_irq(&runtime->lock); + buffer_size = runtime->buffer_size; + avail = runtime->avail; + xruns = runtime->xruns; + spin_unlock_irq(&runtime->lock); snd_iprintf(buffer, " Buffer size : %lu\n" " Avail : %lu\n" " Overruns : %lu\n", - (unsigned long) runtime->buffer_size, - (unsigned long) runtime->avail, - (unsigned long) runtime->xruns); + buffer_size, avail, xruns); } } }

From: Boqun Feng boqun.feng@gmail.com

commit 8d1ddb5e79374fb277985a6b3faa2ed8631c5b4c upstream.

Syzbot reports a potential deadlock found by the newly added recursive read deadlock detection in lockdep:

[...] ======================================================== [...] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected [...] 5.9.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Not tainted [...] -------------------------------------------------------- [...] syz-executor.1/10214 just changed the state of lock: [...] ffff88811f506338 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: send_sigurg+0x1d/0x200 [...] but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past: [...] (&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2} [...] [...] [...] and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. [...] [...] [...] other info that might help us debug this: [...] Chain exists of: [...] &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock [...] [...] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [...] [...] CPU0 CPU1 [...] ---- ---- [...] lock(&f->f_owner.lock); [...] local_irq_disable(); [...] lock(&dev->event_lock); [...] lock(&new->fa_lock); [...] <Interrupt> [...] lock(&dev->event_lock); [...] [...] *** DEADLOCK ***

The corresponding deadlock case is as followed:

CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2 read_lock(&fown->lock); spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, ...) write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock); // wait for the lock read_lock(&fown-lock); // have to wait until the writer release // due to the fairness <interrupted> spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock); // wait for the lock

The lock dependency on CPU 1 happens if there exists a call sequence:

input_inject_event(): spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...); input_handle_event(): input_pass_values(): input_to_handler(): handler->event(): // evdev_event() evdev_pass_values(): spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock); __pass_event(): kill_fasync(): kill_fasync_rcu(): read_lock(&fa->fa_lock); send_sigio(): read_lock(&fown->lock);

To fix this, make the reader in send_sigurg() and send_sigio() use read_lock_irqsave() and read_lock_irqrestore().

Reported-by: syzbot+22e87cdf94021b984aa6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c5e32344981ad9f33750@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng boqun.feng@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton jlayton@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

--- fs/fcntl.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/fcntl.c +++ b/fs/fcntl.c @@ -779,9 +779,10 @@ void send_sigio(struct fown_struct *fown { struct task_struct *p; enum pid_type type; + unsigned long flags; struct pid *pid; - read_lock(&fown->lock); + read_lock_irqsave(&fown->lock, flags);

type = fown->pid_type; pid = fown->pid; @@ -802,7 +803,7 @@ void send_sigio(struct fown_struct *fown read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } out_unlock_fown: - read_unlock(&fown->lock); + read_unlock_irqrestore(&fown->lock, flags); }

static void send_sigurg_to_task(struct task_struct *p, @@ -817,9 +818,10 @@ int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown struct task_struct *p; enum pid_type type; struct pid *pid; + unsigned long flags; int ret = 0; - read_lock(&fown->lock); + read_lock_irqsave(&fown->lock, flags);

type = fown->pid_type; pid = fown->pid; @@ -842,7 +844,7 @@ int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } out_unlock_fown: - read_unlock(&fown->lock); + read_unlock_irqrestore(&fown->lock, flags); return ret; }

From: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz

[ Upstream commit 10f04d40a9fa29785206c619f80d8beedb778837 ]

The on-disk quota format supports quota files with upto 2^32 blocks. Be careful when computing quota file offsets in the quota files from block numbers as they can overflow 32-bit types. Since quota files larger than 4GB would require ~26 millions of quota users, this is mostly a theoretical concern now but better be careful, fuzzers would find the problem sooner or later anyway...

Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger adilger@dilger.ca Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/quota/quota_tree.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/quota/quota_tree.c b/fs/quota/quota_tree.c index a6f856f341dc7..c5562c871c8be 100644 --- a/fs/quota/quota_tree.c +++ b/fs/quota/quota_tree.c @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static ssize_t read_blk(struct qtree_mem_dqinfo *info, uint blk, char *buf)

memset(buf, 0, info->dqi_usable_bs); return sb->s_op->quota_read(sb, info->dqi_type, buf, - info->dqi_usable_bs, blk << info->dqi_blocksize_bits); + info->dqi_usable_bs, (loff_t)blk << info->dqi_blocksize_bits); }

static ssize_t write_blk(struct qtree_mem_dqinfo *info, uint blk, char *buf) @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static ssize_t write_blk(struct qtree_mem_dqinfo *info, uint blk, char *buf) ssize_t ret;

ret = sb->s_op->quota_write(sb, info->dqi_type, buf, - info->dqi_usable_bs, blk << info->dqi_blocksize_bits); + info->dqi_usable_bs, (loff_t)blk << info->dqi_blocksize_bits); if (ret != info->dqi_usable_bs) { quota_error(sb, "dquota write failed"); if (ret >= 0) @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static uint find_free_dqentry(struct qtree_mem_dqinfo *info, blk); goto out_buf; } - dquot->dq_off = (blk << info->dqi_blocksize_bits) + + dquot->dq_off = ((loff_t)blk << info->dqi_blocksize_bits) + sizeof(struct qt_disk_dqdbheader) + i * info->dqi_entry_size; kfree(buf); @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static loff_t find_block_dqentry(struct qtree_mem_dqinfo *info, ret = -EIO; goto out_buf; } else { - ret = (blk << info->dqi_blocksize_bits) + sizeof(struct + ret = ((loff_t)blk << info->dqi_blocksize_bits) + sizeof(struct qt_disk_dqdbheader) + i * info->dqi_entry_size; } out_buf:

From: Qinglang Miao miaoqinglang@huawei.com

[ Upstream commit ffa1797040c5da391859a9556be7b735acbe1242 ]

I noticed that iounmap() of msgr_block_addr before return from mpic_msgr_probe() in the error handling case is missing. So use devm_ioremap() instead of just ioremap() when remapping the message register block, so the mapping will be automatically released on probe failure.

Signed-off-by: Qinglang Miao miaoqinglang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028091551.136400-1-miaoqinglang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic_msgr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic_msgr.c b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic_msgr.c index f6b253e2be409..36ec0bdd8b63c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic_msgr.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic_msgr.c @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int mpic_msgr_probe(struct platform_device *dev)

/* IO map the message register block. */ of_address_to_resource(np, 0, &rsrc); - msgr_block_addr = ioremap(rsrc.start, resource_size(&rsrc)); + msgr_block_addr = devm_ioremap(&dev->dev, rsrc.start, resource_size(&rsrc)); if (!msgr_block_addr) { dev_err(&dev->dev, "Failed to iomap MPIC message registers"); return -EFAULT;

From: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com

[ Upstream commit b6d49ecd1081740b6e632366428b960461f8158b ]

When returning the layout in nfs4_evict_inode(), we need to ensure that the layout is actually done being freed before we can proceed to free the inode itself.

Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/nfs/nfs4super.c | 2 +- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/nfs/pnfs.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4super.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4super.c index 04c57066a11af..b90642b022eb9 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4super.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4super.c @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void nfs4_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) nfs_inode_return_delegation_noreclaim(inode); /* Note that above delegreturn would trigger pnfs return-on-close */ pnfs_return_layout(inode); - pnfs_destroy_layout(NFS_I(inode)); + pnfs_destroy_layout_final(NFS_I(inode)); /* First call standard NFS clear_inode() code */ nfs_clear_inode(inode); } diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index 9c2b07ce57b27..9fd115c4d0a2f 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ void pnfs_put_layout_hdr(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo) { struct inode *inode; + unsigned long i_state;

if (!lo) return; @@ -304,8 +305,12 @@ pnfs_put_layout_hdr(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo) if (!list_empty(&lo->plh_segs)) WARN_ONCE(1, "NFS: BUG unfreed layout segments.\n"); pnfs_detach_layout_hdr(lo); + i_state = inode->i_state; spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); pnfs_free_layout_hdr(lo); + /* Notify pnfs_destroy_layout_final() that we're done */ + if (i_state & (I_FREEING | I_CLEAR)) + wake_up_var(lo); } }

@@ -723,8 +728,7 @@ pnfs_free_lseg_list(struct list_head *free_me) } }

-void -pnfs_destroy_layout(struct nfs_inode *nfsi) +static struct pnfs_layout_hdr *__pnfs_destroy_layout(struct nfs_inode *nfsi) { struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo; LIST_HEAD(tmp_list); @@ -742,9 +746,34 @@ pnfs_destroy_layout(struct nfs_inode *nfsi) pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo); } else spin_unlock(&nfsi->vfs_inode.i_lock); + return lo; +} + +void pnfs_destroy_layout(struct nfs_inode *nfsi) +{ + __pnfs_destroy_layout(nfsi); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pnfs_destroy_layout);

+static bool pnfs_layout_removed(struct nfs_inode *nfsi, + struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo) +{ + bool ret; + + spin_lock(&nfsi->vfs_inode.i_lock); + ret = nfsi->layout != lo; + spin_unlock(&nfsi->vfs_inode.i_lock); + return ret; +} + +void pnfs_destroy_layout_final(struct nfs_inode *nfsi) +{ + struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lo = __pnfs_destroy_layout(nfsi); + + if (lo) + wait_var_event(lo, pnfs_layout_removed(nfsi, lo)); +} + static bool pnfs_layout_add_bulk_destroy_list(struct inode *inode, struct list_head *layout_list) diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.h b/fs/nfs/pnfs.h index f8a38065c7e47..63da33a92d831 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.h +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.h @@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ struct pnfs_layout_segment *pnfs_layout_process(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp); void pnfs_layoutget_free(struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp); void pnfs_free_lseg_list(struct list_head *tmp_list); void pnfs_destroy_layout(struct nfs_inode *); +void pnfs_destroy_layout_final(struct nfs_inode *); void pnfs_destroy_all_layouts(struct nfs_client *); int pnfs_destroy_layouts_byfsid(struct nfs_client *clp, struct nfs_fsid *fsid, @@ -651,6 +652,10 @@ static inline void pnfs_destroy_layout(struct nfs_inode *nfsi) { }

+static inline void pnfs_destroy_layout_final(struct nfs_inode *nfsi) +{ +} + static inline struct pnfs_layout_segment * pnfs_get_lseg(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg) {

From: Jessica Yu jeyu@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 38dc717e97153e46375ee21797aa54777e5498f3 ]

Apparently there has been a longstanding race between udev/systemd and the module loader. Currently, the module loader sends a uevent right after sysfs initialization, but before the module calls its init function. However, some udev rules expect that the module has initialized already upon receiving the uevent.

This race has been triggered recently (see link in references) in some systemd mount unit files. For instance, the configfs module creates the /sys/kernel/config mount point in its init function, however the module loader issues the uevent before this happens. sys-kernel-config.mount expects to be able to mount /sys/kernel/config upon receipt of the module loading uevent, but if the configfs module has not called its init function yet, then this directory will not exist and the mount unit fails. A similar situation exists for sys-fs-fuse-connections.mount, as the fuse sysfs mount point is created during the fuse module's init function. If udev is faster than module initialization then the mount unit would fail in a similar fashion.

To fix this race, delay the module KOBJ_ADD uevent until after the module has finished calling its init routine.

Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Tested-By: Nicolas Morey-Chaisemartin nmoreychaisemartin@suse.com Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu jeyu@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/module.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 806a7196754a7..9e9af40698ffe 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -1863,7 +1863,6 @@ static int mod_sysfs_init(struct module *mod) if (err) mod_kobject_put(mod);

- /* delay uevent until full sysfs population */ out: return err; } @@ -1900,7 +1899,6 @@ static int mod_sysfs_setup(struct module *mod, add_sect_attrs(mod, info); add_notes_attrs(mod, info);

- kobject_uevent(&mod->mkobj.kobj, KOBJ_ADD); return 0;

out_unreg_modinfo_attrs: @@ -3608,6 +3606,9 @@ static noinline int do_init_module(struct module *mod) blocking_notifier_call_chain(&module_notify_list, MODULE_STATE_LIVE, mod);

+ /* Delay uevent until module has finished its init routine */ + kobject_uevent(&mod->mkobj.kobj, KOBJ_ADD); + /* * We need to finish all async code before the module init sequence * is done. This has potential to deadlock. For example, a newly

From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi krisman@collabora.com

[ Upstream commit fc6b6a872dcd48c6f39c7975836d75113db67d37 ]

Internally, UBD treats each physical IO segment as a separate command to be submitted in the execution pipe. If the pipe returns a transient error after a few segments have already been written, UBD will tell the block layer to requeue the request, but there is no way to reclaim the segments already submitted. When a new attempt to dispatch the request is done, those segments already submitted will get duplicated, causing the WARN_ON below in the best case, and potentially data corruption.

In my system, running a UML instance with 2GB of RAM and a 50M UBD disk, I can reproduce the WARN_ON by simply running mkfs.fvat against the disk on a freshly booted system.

There are a few ways to around this, like reducing the pressure on the pipe by reducing the queue depth, which almost eliminates the occurrence of the problem, increasing the pipe buffer size on the host system, or by limiting the request to one physical segment, which causes the block layer to submit way more requests to resolve a single operation.

Instead, this patch modifies the format of a UBD command, such that all segments are sent through a single element in the communication pipe, turning the command submission atomic from the point of view of the block layer. The new format has a variable size, depending on the number of elements, and looks like this:

+------------+-----------+-----------+------------ | cmd_header | segment 0 | segment 1 | segment ... +------------+-----------+-----------+------------

With this format, we push a pointer to cmd_header in the submission pipe.

This has the advantage of reducing the memory footprint of executing a single request, since it allow us to merge some fields in the header. It is possible to reduce even further each segment memory footprint, by merging bitmap_words and cow_offset, for instance, but this is not the focus of this patch and is left as future work. One issue with the patch is that for a big number of segments, we now perform one big memory allocation instead of multiple small ones, but I wasn't able to trigger any real issues or -ENOMEM because of this change, that wouldn't be reproduced otherwise.

This was tested using fio with the verify-crc32 option, and by running an ext4 filesystem over this UBD device.

The original WARN_ON was:

------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x13f/0x141 refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00002-g2a5bb2cf75c8 #346 Stack: 6084eed0 6063dc77 00000009 6084ef60 00000000 604b8d9f 6084eee0 6063dcbc 6084ef40 6006ab8d e013d780 1c00000000 Call Trace: [<600a0c1c>] ? printk+0x0/0x94 [<6004a888>] show_stack+0x13b/0x155 [<6063dc77>] ? dump_stack_print_info+0xdf/0xe8 [<604b8d9f>] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0x13f/0x141 [<6063dcbc>] dump_stack+0x2a/0x2c [<6006ab8d>] __warn+0x107/0x134 [<6008da6c>] ? wake_up_process+0x17/0x19 [<60487628>] ? blk_queue_max_discard_sectors+0x0/0xd [<6006b05f>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0xd1/0xdf [<6006af8e>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x0/0xdf [<600acc14>] ? raw_read_seqcount_begin.constprop.0+0x0/0x15 [<600619ae>] ? os_nsecs+0x1d/0x2b [<604b8d9f>] refcount_warn_saturate+0x13f/0x141 [<6048bc8f>] refcount_sub_and_test.constprop.0+0x2f/0x37 [<6048c8de>] blk_mq_free_request+0xf1/0x10d [<6048ca06>] __blk_mq_end_request+0x10c/0x114 [<6005ac0f>] ubd_intr+0xb5/0x169 [<600a1a37>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x6b/0x17e [<600a1b70>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x26/0x69 [<600a1bd9>] handle_irq_event+0x26/0x34 [<600a1bb3>] ? handle_irq_event+0x0/0x34 [<600a5186>] ? unmask_irq+0x0/0x37 [<600a57e6>] handle_edge_irq+0xbc/0xd6 [<600a131a>] generic_handle_irq+0x21/0x29 [<60048f6e>] do_IRQ+0x39/0x54 [...] ---[ end trace c6e7444e55386c0f ]---

Cc: Christopher Obbard chris.obbard@collabora.com Reported-by: Martyn Welch martyn@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi krisman@collabora.com Tested-by: Christopher Obbard chris.obbard@collabora.com Acked-by: Anton Ivanov anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c | 191 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 115 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c b/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c index 0f5d0a699a49b..4e59ab817d3e7 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c @@ -47,18 +47,25 @@ /* Max request size is determined by sector mask - 32K */ #define UBD_MAX_REQUEST (8 * sizeof(long))

+struct io_desc { + char *buffer; + unsigned long length; + unsigned long sector_mask; + unsigned long long cow_offset; + unsigned long bitmap_words[2]; +}; + struct io_thread_req { struct request *req; int fds[2]; unsigned long offsets[2]; unsigned long long offset; - unsigned long length; - char *buffer; int sectorsize; - unsigned long sector_mask; - unsigned long long cow_offset; - unsigned long bitmap_words[2]; int error; + + int desc_cnt; + /* io_desc has to be the last element of the struct */ + struct io_desc io_desc[]; };

@@ -524,12 +531,7 @@ static void ubd_handler(void) blk_queue_max_write_zeroes_sectors(io_req->req->q, 0); blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_DISCARD, io_req->req->q); } - if ((io_req->error) || (io_req->buffer == NULL)) - blk_mq_end_request(io_req->req, io_req->error); - else { - if (!blk_update_request(io_req->req, io_req->error, io_req->length)) - __blk_mq_end_request(io_req->req, io_req->error); - } + blk_mq_end_request(io_req->req, io_req->error); kfree(io_req); } } @@ -945,6 +947,7 @@ static int ubd_add(int n, char **error_out) blk_queue_write_cache(ubd_dev->queue, true, false);

blk_queue_max_segments(ubd_dev->queue, MAX_SG); + blk_queue_segment_boundary(ubd_dev->queue, PAGE_SIZE - 1); err = ubd_disk_register(UBD_MAJOR, ubd_dev->size, n, &ubd_gendisk[n]); if(err){ *error_out = "Failed to register device"; @@ -1288,37 +1291,74 @@ static void cowify_bitmap(__u64 io_offset, int length, unsigned long *cow_mask, *cow_offset += bitmap_offset; }

-static void cowify_req(struct io_thread_req *req, unsigned long *bitmap, +static void cowify_req(struct io_thread_req *req, struct io_desc *segment, + unsigned long offset, unsigned long *bitmap, __u64 bitmap_offset, __u64 bitmap_len) { - __u64 sector = req->offset >> SECTOR_SHIFT; + __u64 sector = offset >> SECTOR_SHIFT; int i;

- if (req->length > (sizeof(req->sector_mask) * 8) << SECTOR_SHIFT) + if (segment->length > (sizeof(segment->sector_mask) * 8) << SECTOR_SHIFT) panic("Operation too long");

if (req_op(req->req) == REQ_OP_READ) { - for (i = 0; i < req->length >> SECTOR_SHIFT; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < segment->length >> SECTOR_SHIFT; i++) { if(ubd_test_bit(sector + i, (unsigned char *) bitmap)) ubd_set_bit(i, (unsigned char *) - &req->sector_mask); + &segment->sector_mask); + } + } else { + cowify_bitmap(offset, segment->length, &segment->sector_mask, + &segment->cow_offset, bitmap, bitmap_offset, + segment->bitmap_words, bitmap_len); + } +} + +static void ubd_map_req(struct ubd *dev, struct io_thread_req *io_req, + struct request *req) +{ + struct bio_vec bvec; + struct req_iterator iter; + int i = 0; + unsigned long byte_offset = io_req->offset; + int op = req_op(req); + + if (op == REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES || op == REQ_OP_DISCARD) { + io_req->io_desc[0].buffer = NULL; + io_req->io_desc[0].length = blk_rq_bytes(req); + } else { + rq_for_each_segment(bvec, req, iter) { + BUG_ON(i >= io_req->desc_cnt); + + io_req->io_desc[i].buffer = + page_address(bvec.bv_page) + bvec.bv_offset; + io_req->io_desc[i].length = bvec.bv_len; + i++; + } + } + + if (dev->cow.file) { + for (i = 0; i < io_req->desc_cnt; i++) { + cowify_req(io_req, &io_req->io_desc[i], byte_offset, + dev->cow.bitmap, dev->cow.bitmap_offset, + dev->cow.bitmap_len); + byte_offset += io_req->io_desc[i].length; } + } - else cowify_bitmap(req->offset, req->length, &req->sector_mask, - &req->cow_offset, bitmap, bitmap_offset, - req->bitmap_words, bitmap_len); }

-static int ubd_queue_one_vec(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct request *req, - u64 off, struct bio_vec *bvec) +static struct io_thread_req *ubd_alloc_req(struct ubd *dev, struct request *req, + int desc_cnt) { - struct ubd *dev = hctx->queue->queuedata; struct io_thread_req *io_req; - int ret; + int i;

- io_req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct io_thread_req), GFP_ATOMIC); + io_req = kmalloc(sizeof(*io_req) + + (desc_cnt * sizeof(struct io_desc)), + GFP_ATOMIC); if (!io_req) - return -ENOMEM; + return NULL;

io_req->req = req; if (dev->cow.file) @@ -1326,26 +1366,41 @@ static int ubd_queue_one_vec(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct request *req, else io_req->fds[0] = dev->fd; io_req->error = 0; - - if (bvec != NULL) { - io_req->buffer = page_address(bvec->bv_page) + bvec->bv_offset; - io_req->length = bvec->bv_len; - } else { - io_req->buffer = NULL; - io_req->length = blk_rq_bytes(req); - } - io_req->sectorsize = SECTOR_SIZE; io_req->fds[1] = dev->fd; - io_req->cow_offset = -1; - io_req->offset = off; - io_req->sector_mask = 0; + io_req->offset = (u64) blk_rq_pos(req) << SECTOR_SHIFT; io_req->offsets[0] = 0; io_req->offsets[1] = dev->cow.data_offset;

- if (dev->cow.file) - cowify_req(io_req, dev->cow.bitmap, - dev->cow.bitmap_offset, dev->cow.bitmap_len); + for (i = 0 ; i < desc_cnt; i++) { + io_req->io_desc[i].sector_mask = 0; + io_req->io_desc[i].cow_offset = -1; + } + + return io_req; +} + +static int ubd_submit_request(struct ubd *dev, struct request *req) +{ + int segs = 0; + struct io_thread_req *io_req; + int ret; + int op = req_op(req); + + if (op == REQ_OP_FLUSH) + segs = 0; + else if (op == REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES || op == REQ_OP_DISCARD) + segs = 1; + else + segs = blk_rq_nr_phys_segments(req); + + io_req = ubd_alloc_req(dev, req, segs); + if (!io_req) + return -ENOMEM; + + io_req->desc_cnt = segs; + if (segs) + ubd_map_req(dev, io_req, req);

ret = os_write_file(thread_fd, &io_req, sizeof(io_req)); if (ret != sizeof(io_req)) { @@ -1356,22 +1411,6 @@ static int ubd_queue_one_vec(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct request *req, return ret; }

-static int queue_rw_req(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct request *req) -{ - struct req_iterator iter; - struct bio_vec bvec; - int ret; - u64 off = (u64)blk_rq_pos(req) << SECTOR_SHIFT; - - rq_for_each_segment(bvec, req, iter) { - ret = ubd_queue_one_vec(hctx, req, off, &bvec); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - off += bvec.bv_len; - } - return 0; -} - static blk_status_t ubd_queue_rq(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, const struct blk_mq_queue_data *bd) { @@ -1384,17 +1423,12 @@ static blk_status_t ubd_queue_rq(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, spin_lock_irq(&ubd_dev->lock);

switch (req_op(req)) { - /* operations with no lentgth/offset arguments */ case REQ_OP_FLUSH: - ret = ubd_queue_one_vec(hctx, req, 0, NULL); - break; case REQ_OP_READ: case REQ_OP_WRITE: - ret = queue_rw_req(hctx, req); - break; case REQ_OP_DISCARD: case REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES: - ret = ubd_queue_one_vec(hctx, req, (u64)blk_rq_pos(req) << 9, NULL); + ret = ubd_submit_request(ubd_dev, req); break; default: WARN_ON_ONCE(1); @@ -1482,22 +1516,22 @@ static int map_error(int error_code) * will result in unpredictable behaviour and/or crashes. */

-static int update_bitmap(struct io_thread_req *req) +static int update_bitmap(struct io_thread_req *req, struct io_desc *segment) { int n;

- if(req->cow_offset == -1) + if (segment->cow_offset == -1) return map_error(0);

- n = os_pwrite_file(req->fds[1], &req->bitmap_words, - sizeof(req->bitmap_words), req->cow_offset); - if (n != sizeof(req->bitmap_words)) + n = os_pwrite_file(req->fds[1], &segment->bitmap_words, + sizeof(segment->bitmap_words), segment->cow_offset); + if (n != sizeof(segment->bitmap_words)) return map_error(-n);

return map_error(0); }

-static void do_io(struct io_thread_req *req) +static void do_io(struct io_thread_req *req, struct io_desc *desc) { char *buf = NULL; unsigned long len; @@ -1512,21 +1546,20 @@ static void do_io(struct io_thread_req *req) return; }

- nsectors = req->length / req->sectorsize; + nsectors = desc->length / req->sectorsize; start = 0; do { - bit = ubd_test_bit(start, (unsigned char *) &req->sector_mask); + bit = ubd_test_bit(start, (unsigned char *) &desc->sector_mask); end = start; while((end < nsectors) && - (ubd_test_bit(end, (unsigned char *) - &req->sector_mask) == bit)) + (ubd_test_bit(end, (unsigned char *) &desc->sector_mask) == bit)) end++;

off = req->offset + req->offsets[bit] + start * req->sectorsize; len = (end - start) * req->sectorsize; - if (req->buffer != NULL) - buf = &req->buffer[start * req->sectorsize]; + if (desc->buffer != NULL) + buf = &desc->buffer[start * req->sectorsize];

switch (req_op(req->req)) { case REQ_OP_READ: @@ -1566,7 +1599,8 @@ static void do_io(struct io_thread_req *req) start = end; } while(start < nsectors);

- req->error = update_bitmap(req); + req->offset += len; + req->error = update_bitmap(req, desc); }

/* Changed in start_io_thread, which is serialized by being called only @@ -1599,8 +1633,13 @@ int io_thread(void *arg) }

for (count = 0; count < n/sizeof(struct io_thread_req *); count++) { + struct io_thread_req *req = (*io_req_buffer)[count]; + int i; + io_count++; - do_io((*io_req_buffer)[count]); + for (i = 0; !req->error && i < req->desc_cnt; i++) + do_io(req, &(req->io_desc[i])); + }

written = 0;

From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de

[ Upstream commit 618de0f4ef11acd8cf26902e65493d46cc20cc89 ]

The PCM hw_params core function tries to clear up the PCM buffer before actually using for avoiding the information leak from the previous usages or the usage before a new allocation. It performs the memset() with runtime->dma_bytes, but this might still leave some remaining bytes untouched; namely, the PCM buffer size is aligned in page size for mmap, hence runtime->dma_bytes doesn't necessarily cover all PCM buffer pages, and the remaining bytes are exposed via mmap.

This patch changes the memory clearance to cover the all buffer pages if the stream is supposed to be mmap-ready (that guarantees that the buffer size is aligned in page size).

Reviewed-by: Lars-Peter Clausen lars@metafoo.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201218145625.2045-3-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- sound/core/pcm_native.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_native.c b/sound/core/pcm_native.c index ec501fbaabe49..0c5b7a54ca81c 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c @@ -717,8 +717,13 @@ static int snd_pcm_hw_params(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, runtime->boundary *= 2;

/* clear the buffer for avoiding possible kernel info leaks */ - if (runtime->dma_area && !substream->ops->copy_user) - memset(runtime->dma_area, 0, runtime->dma_bytes); + if (runtime->dma_area && !substream->ops->copy_user) { + size_t size = runtime->dma_bytes; + + if (runtime->info & SNDRV_PCM_INFO_MMAP) + size = PAGE_ALIGN(size); + memset(runtime->dma_area, 0, size); + }

snd_pcm_timer_resolution_change(substream); snd_pcm_set_state(substream, SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP);