Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
This series also adds some TEE features like:
Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE.
Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents.
Rest of the patches from #4 to #6 adds support for TEE based trusted keys.
This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be found here [1].
Also, this patch-set is dependent on generic Trusted Keys framework patch-set [2].
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/18/284
Changes in v2: 1. Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2. 2. Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3. 3. Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
Sumit Garg (6): tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm tee: enable support to register kernel memory tee: add private login method for kernel clients KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
Documentation/security/keys/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 9 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 + include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 +++++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 + security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 3 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c | 282 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c | 3 + 14 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c
Kernel pages are marked as normal type memory only so allow kernel pages to be registered as shared memory with OP-TEE.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index aa94270..bce45b1 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -553,6 +553,13 @@ static int check_mem_type(unsigned long start, size_t num_pages) struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int rc;
+ /* + * Allow kernel address to register with OP-TEE as kernel + * pages are configured as normal memory only. + */ + if (virt_addr_valid(start)) + return 0; + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); rc = __check_mem_type(find_vma(mm, start), start + num_pages * PAGE_SIZE);
Enable support to register kernel memory reference with TEE. This change will allow TEE bus drivers to register memory references.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org --- drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c index 2da026f..5c69b89 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tee_drv.h> +#include <linux/uio.h> #include "tee_private.h"
static void tee_shm_release(struct tee_shm *shm) @@ -224,13 +225,14 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, { struct tee_device *teedev = ctx->teedev; const u32 req_flags = TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED; + const u32 req_ker_flags = TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED; struct tee_shm *shm; void *ret; int rc; int num_pages; unsigned long start;
- if (flags != req_flags) + if (flags != req_flags && flags != req_ker_flags) return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
if (!tee_device_get(teedev)) @@ -264,7 +266,17 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, goto err; }
- rc = get_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, shm->pages); + if (flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) { + rc = get_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, + shm->pages); + } else { + const struct kvec kiov = { + .iov_base = (void *)start, + .iov_len = PAGE_SIZE + }; + + rc = get_kernel_pages(&kiov, num_pages, 0, shm->pages); + } if (rc > 0) shm->num_pages = rc; if (rc != num_pages) { diff --git a/include/linux/tee_drv.h b/include/linux/tee_drv.h index 7a03f68..dedf8fa 100644 --- a/include/linux/tee_drv.h +++ b/include/linux/tee_drv.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #define TEE_SHM_REGISTER BIT(3) /* Memory registered in secure world */ #define TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED BIT(4) /* Memory mapped in user space */ #define TEE_SHM_POOL BIT(5) /* Memory allocated from pool */ +#define TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED BIT(6) /* Memory mapped in kernel space */
struct device; struct tee_device;
On 7/30/19 7:23 AM, Sumit Garg wrote:
@@ -264,7 +266,17 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, goto err; }
- rc = get_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, shm->pages);
- if (flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) {
rc = get_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE,shm->pages);- } else {
const struct kvec kiov = {.iov_base = (void *)start,.iov_len = PAGE_SIZE};rc = get_kernel_pages(&kiov, num_pages, 0, shm->pages);
Passing a single kvec struct is temporary I assume? Because as currently written this will only work with num_pages==1.
Stuart
On Fri, 9 Aug 2019 at 03:57, Stuart Yoder stuart.yoder@arm.com wrote:
On 7/30/19 7:23 AM, Sumit Garg wrote:
@@ -264,7 +266,17 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, goto err; }
rc = get_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, shm->pages);
if (flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) {rc = get_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE,shm->pages);} else {const struct kvec kiov = {.iov_base = (void *)start,.iov_len = PAGE_SIZE};rc = get_kernel_pages(&kiov, num_pages, 0, shm->pages);Passing a single kvec struct is temporary I assume? Because as currently written this will only work with num_pages==1.
Ah, thanks Stuart for pointing this out. It should rather be an array of kvec struct. Will fix it in next version.
-Sumit
Stuart
There are use-cases where user-space shouldn't be allowed to communicate directly with a TEE device which is dedicated to provide a specific service for a kernel client. So add a private login method for kernel clients and disallow user-space to open-session using GP implementation defined login method range: (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF).
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 ++++++ include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index 0f16d9f..2c2f646 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, goto out; }
+ if (arg.clnt_login & TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK) { + pr_debug("login method not allowed for user-space client\n"); + rc = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + rc = ctx->teedev->desc->ops->open_session(ctx, &arg, params); if (rc) goto out; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h index 4b9eb06..a0a3d52 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h @@ -172,6 +172,14 @@ struct tee_ioctl_buf_data { #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_APPLICATION 4 #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION 5 #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION 6 +/* + * Disallow user-space to use GP implementation specific login + * method range (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF). This range is rather + * being reserved for REE kernel clients or TEE implementation. + */ +#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK 0x80000000 +/* Private login method for REE kernel clients */ +#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL 0x80000000
/** * struct tee_ioctl_param - parameter
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key.
Refer to Documentation/tee.txt for detailed information about TEE.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 + include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 ++++++++ security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 3 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c | 282 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c | 3 + 6 files changed, 359 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 5559010..e0df5df 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) extern struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops; #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) +extern struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops; +#endif
#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tee.h b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab58ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tee.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org + */ + +#ifndef __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H +#define __TEE_TRUSTED_KEY_H + +#include <linux/tee_drv.h> + +#define DRIVER_NAME "tee-trusted-key" + +/* + * Get random data for symmetric key + * + * [out] memref[0] Random data + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM 0x0 + +/* + * Seal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Plain key + * [out] memref[1] Sealed key datablob + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_SEAL 0x1 + +/* + * Unseal trusted key using hardware unique key + * + * [in] memref[0] Sealed key datablob + * [out] memref[1] Plain key + * + * Result: + * TEE_SUCCESS - Invoke command success + * TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS - Incorrect input param + */ +#define TA_CMD_UNSEAL 0x2 + +/** + * struct trusted_key_private - TEE Trusted key private data + * @dev: TEE based Trusted key device. + * @ctx: TEE context handler. + * @session_id: Trusted key TA session identifier. + * @shm_pool: Memory pool shared with TEE device. + */ +struct trusted_key_private { + struct device *dev; + struct tee_context *ctx; + u32 session_id; + u32 data_rate; + struct tee_shm *shm_pool; +}; + +#endif diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index dd31343..0d5e37c 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS if the boot PCRs and other criteria match. Userspace will only ever see encrypted blobs.
+ It also provides support for alternative TEE based Trusted keys + generation and sealing in case TPM isn't present. + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
config ENCRYPTED_KEYS diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 6ecadfb..5fcf2ae 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ #
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o \ - trusted-tpm.o + trusted-tpm.o \ + trusted-tee.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..724a73c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 Linaro Ltd. + * + * Author: + * Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org + */ + +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/uuid.h> + +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted_tee.h> + +static struct trusted_key_private pvt_data; + +/* + * Have the TEE seal(encrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int tee_key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + p->key_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + sizeof(p->blob), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_SEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE unseal(decrypt) the symmetric key + */ +static int tee_key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->blob, + p->blob_len, TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in); + } + + reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)p->key, + sizeof(p->key), TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | + TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out); + goto out; + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_UNSEAL; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in; + param[0].u.memref.size = p->blob_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out; + param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->key); + param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_UNSEAL invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; + } + +out: + if (reg_shm_out) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out); + if (reg_shm_in) + tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Have the TEE generate random symmetric key + */ +static int tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; + struct tee_param param[4]; + struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL; + + memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); + memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param)); + + reg_shm = tee_shm_register(pvt_data.ctx, (unsigned long)key, key_len, + TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED); + if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "random key shm register failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(reg_shm); + } + + inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM; + inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; + inv_arg.num_params = 4; + + param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT; + param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm; + param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; + param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; + + ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); + if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM invoke err: %x\n", + inv_arg.ret); + ret = -EFAULT; + } else { + ret = param[0].u.memref.size; + } + + tee_shm_free(reg_shm); + + return ret; +} + +static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) +{ + if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +static int trusted_key_probe(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tee_client_device *rng_device = to_tee_client_device(dev); + int ret = 0, err = -ENODEV; + struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg sess_arg; + + memset(&sess_arg, 0, sizeof(sess_arg)); + + /* Open context with TEE driver */ + pvt_data.ctx = tee_client_open_context(NULL, optee_ctx_match, NULL, + NULL); + if (IS_ERR(pvt_data.ctx)) + return -ENODEV; + + /* Open session with hwrng Trusted App */ + memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, rng_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); + sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL; + sess_arg.num_params = 0; + + ret = tee_client_open_session(pvt_data.ctx, &sess_arg, NULL); + if ((ret < 0) || (sess_arg.ret != 0)) { + dev_err(dev, "tee_client_open_session failed, err: %x\n", + sess_arg.ret); + err = -EINVAL; + goto out_ctx; + } + pvt_data.session_id = sess_arg.session; + + ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_sess; + + pvt_data.dev = dev; + + return 0; + +out_sess: + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); +out_ctx: + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return err; +} + +static int trusted_key_remove(struct device *dev) +{ + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted); + tee_client_close_session(pvt_data.ctx, pvt_data.session_id); + tee_client_close_context(pvt_data.ctx); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct tee_client_device_id trusted_key_id_table[] = { + {UUID_INIT(0xf04a0fe7, 0x1f5d, 0x4b9b, + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x61, 0x9b, 0x85, 0xb4, 0xce, 0x8c)}, + {} +}; + +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, trusted_key_id_table); + +static struct tee_client_driver trusted_key_driver = { + .id_table = trusted_key_id_table, + .driver = { + .name = DRIVER_NAME, + .bus = &tee_bus_type, + .probe = trusted_key_probe, + .remove = trusted_key_remove, + }, +}; + +static int __init init_tee_trusted(void) +{ + return driver_register(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +static void __exit cleanup_tee_trusted(void) +{ + driver_unregister(&trusted_key_driver.driver); +} + +struct trusted_key_ops tee_trusted_key_ops = { + .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ + .init = init_tee_trusted, + .seal = tee_key_seal, + .unseal = tee_key_unseal, + .get_random = tee_get_random, + .cleanup = cleanup_tee_trusted, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_trusted_key_ops); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c index 8f00fde..a0a171f 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ static struct trusted_key_ops *available_tk_ops[] = { #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) &tpm_trusted_key_ops, #endif +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE) + &tee_trusted_key_ops, +#endif }; static struct trusted_key_ops *tk_ops;
Provide documentation for usage of TEE based Trusted Keys via existing user-space "keyctl" utility. Also, document various use-cases.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- Documentation/security/keys/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 94 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/index.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/index.rst index 647d58f..f9ef557 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/index.rst @@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ Kernel Keys ecryptfs request-key trusted-encrypted + tee-trusted diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef03745 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +====================== +TEE based Trusted Keys +====================== + +TEE based Trusted Keys provides an alternative approach for providing Trusted +Keys in case TPM chip isn't present. + +Trusted Keys use a TEE service/device both to generate and to seal the keys. +Keys are sealed under a hardware unique key in the TEE, and only unsealed by +the TEE. + +For more information about TEE, refer to ``Documentation/tee.txt``. + +Usage:: + + keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring + keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring + keyctl print keyid + +"keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format +specific to TEE device implementation. The key length for new keys are always +in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits). + +Examples of trusted key and its usage as 'master' key for encrypted key usage: + +More details about encrypted keys can be found here: +``Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst`` + +Create and save a trusted key named "kmk" of length 32 bytes:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32" @u + 754414669 + + $ keyctl show + Session Keyring + 827385718 --alswrv 0 65534 keyring: _uid_ses.0 + 274124851 --alswrv 0 65534 _ keyring: _uid.0 + 754414669 --als-rv 0 0 _ trusted: kmk + + $ keyctl print 754414669 + 15676790697861b422175596ae001c2f505cea2c6f3ebbc5fb08eeb1f343a07e + + $ keyctl pipe 754414669 > kmk.blob + +Load a trusted key from the saved blob:: + + $ keyctl add trusted kmk "load `cat kmk.blob`" @u + 491638700 + + $ keyctl print 491638700 + 15676790697861b422175596ae001c2f505cea2c6f3ebbc5fb08eeb1f343a07e + +The initial consumer of trusted keys is EVM, which at boot time needs a high +quality symmetric key for HMAC protection of file metadata. The use of a +TEE based trusted key provides security that the EVM key has not been +compromised by a user level problem and tied to particular hardware. + +Create and save an encrypted key "evm" using the above trusted key "kmk": + +option 1: omitting 'format':: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new trusted:kmk 32" @u + 608915065 + +option 2: explicitly defining 'format' as 'default':: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default trusted:kmk 32" @u + 608915065 + + $ keyctl print 608915065 + default trusted:kmk 32 f380ac588a925f488d5be007cf23e4c900b8b652ab62241c8 + ed54906189b6659d139d619d4b51752a2645537b11fd44673f13154a65b3f595d5fb2131 + 2fe45529ea0407c644ea4026f2a1a75661f2c9b66 + + $ keyctl pipe 608915065 > evm.blob + +Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:: + + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "load `cat evm.blob`" @u + 831684262 + + $ keyctl print 831684262 + default trusted:kmk 32 f380ac588a925f488d5be007cf23e4c900b8b652ab62241c8 + ed54906189b6659d139d619d4b51752a2645537b11fd44673f13154a65b3f595d5fb2131 + 2fe45529ea0407c644ea4026f2a1a75661f2c9b66 + +Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption +are anticipated. In particular the 'ecryptfs' encrypted keys format can be used +to mount an eCryptfs filesystem. More details about the usage can be found in +the file ``Documentation/security/keys/ecryptfs.rst``. + +Another format 'enc32' can be used to support encrypted keys with payload size +of 32 bytes.
Add MAINTAINERS entry for TEE based Trusted Keys framework.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- MAINTAINERS | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index ce06877..0b61ecf 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -8930,6 +8930,15 @@ F: include/keys/trusted-type.h F: security/keys/trusted.c F: security/keys/trusted.h
+KEYS-TEE-TRUSTED +M: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org +L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org +L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +F: Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst +F: include/keys/trusted_tee.h +F: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c + KEYS/KEYRINGS: M: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com L: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Hi,
Interesting, I wrote something similar and posted it to the lists a while back: https://github.com/jkrh/linux/commit/d77ea03afedcb5fd42234cd834da8f8a0809f6a...
Since there are no generic 'TEEs' available, I implemented the same thing as a generic protocol translator. The shared memory binding for instance already assumes fair amount about the TEE and how that is physically present in the system. Besides, the help from usage of shm is pretty limited due to the size of the keydata.
-- Janne
On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 3:26 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
This series also adds some TEE features like:
Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE.
Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents.
Rest of the patches from #4 to #6 adds support for TEE based trusted keys.
This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be found here [1].
Also, this patch-set is dependent on generic Trusted Keys framework patch-set [2].
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/18/284
Changes in v2:
- Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2.
- Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3.
- Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
Sumit Garg (6): tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm tee: enable support to register kernel memory tee: add private login method for kernel clients KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
Documentation/security/keys/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 9 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 + include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 +++++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 + security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 3 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c | 282 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c | 3 + 14 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c
-- 2.7.4
Hi,
To clarify a bit further - my thought was to support any type of trust source. Remote, local or both. Just having one particular type of locally bound 'TEE' sounded very limited, especially when nothing from the TEE execution side is really needed for supporting the kernel crypto. What you really need is the seal/unseal transaction going somewhere and where that somewhere is does not matter much. With the user mode helper in between anyone can easily add their own thing in there.
-- Janne
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 10:11 AM Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
Hi,
Interesting, I wrote something similar and posted it to the lists a while back: https://github.com/jkrh/linux/commit/d77ea03afedcb5fd42234cd834da8f8a0809f6a...
Since there are no generic 'TEEs' available, I implemented the same thing as a generic protocol translator. The shared memory binding for instance already assumes fair amount about the TEE and how that is physically present in the system. Besides, the help from usage of shm is pretty limited due to the size of the keydata.
-- Janne
On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 3:26 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
This series also adds some TEE features like:
Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE.
Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents.
Rest of the patches from #4 to #6 adds support for TEE based trusted keys.
This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be found here [1].
Also, this patch-set is dependent on generic Trusted Keys framework patch-set [2].
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/18/284
Changes in v2:
- Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2.
- Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3.
- Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
Sumit Garg (6): tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm tee: enable support to register kernel memory tee: add private login method for kernel clients KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
Documentation/security/keys/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 9 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 + include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 +++++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 + security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 3 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c | 282 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c | 3 + 14 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c
-- 2.7.4
On Wed, 31 Jul 2019 at 15:51, Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
Hi,
To clarify a bit further - my thought was to support any type of trust source.
That could be very well accomplished via Trusted Keys abstraction framework [1]. A trust source just need to implement following APIs:
struct trusted_key_ops ts_trusted_key_ops = { .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ .init = init_ts_trusted, .seal = ts_key_seal, .unseal = ts_key_unseal, .get_random = ts_get_random, .cleanup = cleanup_ts_trusted, };
Remote, local or both. Just having one particular type of locally bound 'TEE' sounded very limited,
TEE is just one of trust source like TPM, we can have other trust source as mentioned above.
especially when nothing from the TEE execution side is really needed for supporting the kernel crypto. What you really need is the seal/unseal transaction going somewhere and where that somewhere is does not matter much.
Its only the seal/unseal operations that are provided by TEE driver that hooks up under trusted keys abstraction layer.
With the user mode helper in between anyone can easily add their own thing in there.
Isn't actual purpose to have trusted keys is to protect user-space from access to kernel keys in plain format? Doesn't user mode helper defeat that purpose in one way or another?
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/18/284
-Sumit
-- Janne
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 10:11 AM Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
Hi,
Interesting, I wrote something similar and posted it to the lists a while back: https://github.com/jkrh/linux/commit/d77ea03afedcb5fd42234cd834da8f8a0809f6a...
Since there are no generic 'TEEs' available, I implemented the same thing as a generic protocol translator. The shared memory binding for instance already assumes fair amount about the TEE and how that is physically present in the system. Besides, the help from usage of shm is pretty limited due to the size of the keydata.
-- Janne
On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 3:26 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
This series also adds some TEE features like:
Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE.
Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents.
Rest of the patches from #4 to #6 adds support for TEE based trusted keys.
This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be found here [1].
Also, this patch-set is dependent on generic Trusted Keys framework patch-set [2].
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/18/284
Changes in v2:
- Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2.
- Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3.
- Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
Sumit Garg (6): tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm tee: enable support to register kernel memory tee: add private login method for kernel clients KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
Documentation/security/keys/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 9 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 + include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 +++++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 + security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 3 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c | 282 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c | 3 + 14 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c
-- 2.7.4
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 4:58 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
To clarify a bit further - my thought was to support any type of trust source.
That could be very well accomplished via Trusted Keys abstraction framework [1]. A trust source just need to implement following APIs:
struct trusted_key_ops ts_trusted_key_ops = { .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ .init = init_ts_trusted, .seal = ts_key_seal, .unseal = ts_key_unseal, .get_random = ts_get_random, .cleanup = cleanup_ts_trusted, };
Which is basically the same as implementing a new keytype in the kernel; abstraction is not raised in any considerable manner this way?
I chose the userspace plugin due to this, you can use userspace aids to provide any type of service. Use the crypto library you desire to do the magic you want.
With the user mode helper in between anyone can easily add their own thing in there.
Isn't actual purpose to have trusted keys is to protect user-space from access to kernel keys in plain format? Doesn't user mode helper defeat that purpose in one way or another?
Not really. CPU is in the user mode while running the code, but the code or the secure keydata being is not available to the 'normal' userspace. It's like microkernel service/driver this way. The usermode driver is part of the kernel image and it runs on top of a invisible rootfs.
-- Janne
On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 11:51, Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 4:58 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
To clarify a bit further - my thought was to support any type of trust source.
That could be very well accomplished via Trusted Keys abstraction framework [1]. A trust source just need to implement following APIs:
struct trusted_key_ops ts_trusted_key_ops = { .migratable = 0, /* non-migratable */ .init = init_ts_trusted, .seal = ts_key_seal, .unseal = ts_key_unseal, .get_random = ts_get_random, .cleanup = cleanup_ts_trusted, };
Which is basically the same as implementing a new keytype in the kernel; abstraction is not raised in any considerable manner this way?
It doesn't create a new keytype. There is only single keytype: "trusted" which could be implemented via one of the trust source available in the system like TPM, TEE etc.
I chose the userspace plugin due to this, you can use userspace aids to provide any type of service. Use the crypto library you desire to do the magic you want.
Here TEE isn't similar to a user-space crypto library. In our case TEE is based on ARM TrustZone which only allows TEE communications to be initiated from privileged mode. So why would you like to route communications via user-mode (which is less secure) when we have standardised TEE interface available in kernel?
With the user mode helper in between anyone can easily add their own thing in there.
Isn't actual purpose to have trusted keys is to protect user-space from access to kernel keys in plain format? Doesn't user mode helper defeat that purpose in one way or another?
Not really. CPU is in the user mode while running the code, but the code or the secure keydata being is not available to the 'normal' userspace. It's like microkernel service/driver this way. The usermode driver is part of the kernel image and it runs on top of a invisible rootfs.
Can you elaborate here with an example regarding how this user-mode helper will securely communicate with a hardware based trust source with other user-space processes denied access to that trust source?
-Sumit
-- Janne
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 10:40 AM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
I chose the userspace plugin due to this, you can use userspace aids to provide any type of service. Use the crypto library you desire to do the magic you want.
Here TEE isn't similar to a user-space crypto library. In our case TEE is based on ARM TrustZone which only allows TEE communications to be initiated from privileged mode. So why would you like to route communications via user-mode (which is less secure) when we have standardised TEE interface available in kernel?
The physical access guards for reading/writing the involved critical memory are identical as far as I know? Layered security is generally a good thing, and the userspace pass actually adds a layer, so not sure which is really safer?
In my case the rerouting was to done generalize it. Any type of trust source, anywhere.
Isn't actual purpose to have trusted keys is to protect user-space from access to kernel keys in plain format? Doesn't user mode helper defeat that purpose in one way or another?
Not really. CPU is in the user mode while running the code, but the code or the secure keydata being is not available to the 'normal' userspace. It's like microkernel service/driver this way. The usermode driver is part of the kernel image and it runs on top of a invisible rootfs.
Can you elaborate here with an example regarding how this user-mode helper will securely communicate with a hardware based trust source with other user-space processes denied access to that trust source?
The other user mode processes will never see the device node to open. There is none in existence for them; it only exists in the ramfs based root for the user mode helper.
-- Janne
On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 13:30, Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 10:40 AM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
I chose the userspace plugin due to this, you can use userspace aids to provide any type of service. Use the crypto library you desire to do the magic you want.
Here TEE isn't similar to a user-space crypto library. In our case TEE is based on ARM TrustZone which only allows TEE communications to be initiated from privileged mode. So why would you like to route communications via user-mode (which is less secure) when we have standardised TEE interface available in kernel?
The physical access guards for reading/writing the involved critical memory are identical as far as I know? Layered security is generally a good thing, and the userspace pass actually adds a layer, so not sure which is really safer?
AFAIK, layered security is better in case we move from lower privilege level to higher privilege level rather than in reverse order.
-Sumit
In my case the rerouting was to done generalize it. Any type of trust source, anywhere.
Isn't actual purpose to have trusted keys is to protect user-space from access to kernel keys in plain format? Doesn't user mode helper defeat that purpose in one way or another?
Not really. CPU is in the user mode while running the code, but the code or the secure keydata being is not available to the 'normal' userspace. It's like microkernel service/driver this way. The usermode driver is part of the kernel image and it runs on top of a invisible rootfs.
Can you elaborate here with an example regarding how this user-mode helper will securely communicate with a hardware based trust source with other user-space processes denied access to that trust source?
The other user mode processes will never see the device node to open. There is none in existence for them; it only exists in the ramfs based root for the user mode helper.
-- Janne
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 1:00 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Here TEE isn't similar to a user-space crypto library. In our case TEE is based on ARM TrustZone which only allows TEE communications to be initiated from privileged mode. So why would you like to route communications via user-mode (which is less secure) when we have standardised TEE interface available in kernel?
The physical access guards for reading/writing the involved critical memory are identical as far as I know? Layered security is generally a good thing, and the userspace pass actually adds a layer, so not sure which is really safer?
AFAIK, layered security is better in case we move from lower privilege level to higher privilege level rather than in reverse order.
You can look at this in many ways. Another way to look at it is that the services should be provided with the least amount of permissions required for the task. Further you can containerize something, the better.
As for your PLATFORMS support: it is all nice, but there is no way to convince op-tee or any other tee to be adopted by many real users. Every serious user can and will do their own thing, or at very best, buy it from someone who did their own thing and is trusted. There is zero chance that samsung, huawei, apple, nsa, google, rambus, payment system vendors, .. would actually share the tee (or probably even the interfaces). It is just too vital and people do not trust each other anymore :(
Anyway, enough about the topic from my side. I guess people will tell what they want, I'm fine with any, and it is all progress from the current state :)
-- Janne
Hi Janne,
On Wed, 31 Jul 2019 at 12:41, Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
Hi,
Interesting, I wrote something similar and posted it to the lists a while back: https://github.com/jkrh/linux/commit/d77ea03afedcb5fd42234cd834da8f8a0809f6a...
Since there are no generic 'TEEs' available,
There is already a generic TEE interface driver available in kernel. Have a look here: "Documentation/tee.txt".
I implemented the same thing as a generic protocol translator. The shared memory binding for instance already assumes fair amount about the TEE and how that is physically present in the system. Besides, the help from usage of shm is pretty limited due to the size of the keydata.
If you look at patch #1 and #2, they add support to register kernel memory buffer (keydata buffer in this case) with TEE to operate on. So there isn't any limitation due to the size of the keydata.
-Sumit
-- Janne
On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 3:26 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
This series also adds some TEE features like:
Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE.
Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents.
Rest of the patches from #4 to #6 adds support for TEE based trusted keys.
This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be found here [1].
Also, this patch-set is dependent on generic Trusted Keys framework patch-set [2].
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082 [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/7/18/284
Changes in v2:
- Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2.
- Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3.
- Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
Sumit Garg (6): tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm tee: enable support to register kernel memory tee: add private login method for kernel clients KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
Documentation/security/keys/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst | 93 +++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 9 + drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 + drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 16 +- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 3 + include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 +++++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 + security/keys/Kconfig | 3 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 3 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c | 282 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted.c | 3 + 14 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tee.c
-- 2.7.4
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 1:26 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Interesting, I wrote something similar and posted it to the lists a while back: https://github.com/jkrh/linux/commit/d77ea03afedcb5fd42234cd834da8f8a0809f6a...
Since there are no generic 'TEEs' available,
There is already a generic TEE interface driver available in kernel. Have a look here: "Documentation/tee.txt".
I guess my wording was wrong, tried to say that physical TEEs in the wild vary massively hardware wise. Generalizing these things is rough.
I implemented the same thing as a generic protocol translator. The shared memory binding for instance already assumes fair amount about the TEE and how that is physically present in the system. Besides, the help from usage of shm is pretty limited due to the size of the keydata.
If you look at patch #1 and #2, they add support to register kernel memory buffer (keydata buffer in this case) with TEE to operate on. So there isn't any limitation due to the size of the keydata.
Ah, didn't mean that. Meant that the keydata is typically pretty small in size, so there is limited benefit from passing that in via shm if that complicates anything.
On Wed, 31 Jul 2019 at 16:33, Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 1:26 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Interesting, I wrote something similar and posted it to the lists a while back: https://github.com/jkrh/linux/commit/d77ea03afedcb5fd42234cd834da8f8a0809f6a...
Since there are no generic 'TEEs' available,
There is already a generic TEE interface driver available in kernel. Have a look here: "Documentation/tee.txt".
I guess my wording was wrong, tried to say that physical TEEs in the wild vary massively hardware wise. Generalizing these things is rough.
There are already well defined GlobalPlatform Standards to generalize the TEE interface. One of them is GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [1] which provides the basis for this TEE interface.
I implemented the same thing as a generic protocol translator. The shared memory binding for instance already assumes fair amount about the TEE and how that is physically present in the system. Besides, the help from usage of shm is pretty limited due to the size of the keydata.
If you look at patch #1 and #2, they add support to register kernel memory buffer (keydata buffer in this case) with TEE to operate on. So there isn't any limitation due to the size of the keydata.
Ah, didn't mean that. Meant that the keydata is typically pretty small in size, so there is limited benefit from passing that in via shm if that complicates anything.
Ah, ok. Do you think of any better approach rather than to use SHM?
[1] https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/tee-client-api-specification/
-Sumit
-- Janne
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 5:23 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
I guess my wording was wrong, tried to say that physical TEEs in the wild vary massively hardware wise. Generalizing these things is rough.
There are already well defined GlobalPlatform Standards to generalize the TEE interface. One of them is GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [1] which provides the basis for this TEE interface.
I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
Normally the TEE implementations are well-guarded secrets and the state of the implementation is quite random. In many cases keeping things secret is fine from my point of view, given that it is a RoT after all. The secrecy is the core business here. So, this is why I opted the userspace 'secret' route - no secrets in the kernel, but it's fine for the userspace. Umh was a logical fit to implement it.
-- Janne
On Thu, 2019-08-01 at 09:36 +0300, Janne Karhunen wrote:
On Wed, Jul 31, 2019 at 5:23 PM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
I guess my wording was wrong, tried to say that physical TEEs in the wild vary massively hardware wise. Generalizing these things is rough.
There are already well defined GlobalPlatform Standards to generalize the TEE interface. One of them is GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [1] which provides the basis for this TEE interface.
I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
AFAIK Sumit is working with the OP-TEE implementation, which can be found on github: https://github.com/op-tee/optee_os
Regards, Rouven
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 9:50 AM Rouven Czerwinski r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de wrote:
I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
AFAIK Sumit is working with the OP-TEE implementation, which can be found on github: https://github.com/op-tee/optee_os
Thanks, I will take a look. The fundamental problem with these things is that there are infinite amount of ways how TEEs and ROTs can be done in terms of the hardware and software. I really doubt there are 2 implementations in existence that are even remotely compatible in real life. As such, all things TEE/ROT would logically really belong in the userland and thanks to the bpfilter folks now the umh logic really makes that possible ... I think. The key implementation I did was just an RFC on the concept, what if we start to move the stuff that really belongs in the userspace to this pseudo-userland. It's not kernel, but it's not commonly accessible userland either. The shared memory would also work without any modifications between the umh based TEE/ROT driver and the userland if needed.
Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever people think is the best.
-- Janne
On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 13:00, Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 9:50 AM Rouven Czerwinski r.czerwinski@pengutronix.de wrote:
I'm aware of it - I have implemented a large part of the GP TEE APIs earlier (primarily the crypto functions). Does the TEE you work with actually support GP properly? Can I take a look at the code?
AFAIK Sumit is working with the OP-TEE implementation, which can be found on github: https://github.com/op-tee/optee_os
Thanks, I will take a look.
For documentation, refer to: https://optee.readthedocs.io/
The fundamental problem with these things is that there are infinite amount of ways how TEEs and ROTs can be done in terms of the hardware and software. I really doubt there are 2 implementations in existence that are even remotely compatible in real life.
I agree with you regarding implementation specific nature of TEE but having a standardized client interface does solves the problem.
As such, all things TEE/ROT would logically really belong in the userland and thanks to the bpfilter folks now the umh logic really makes that possible ... I think. The key implementation I did was just an RFC on the concept, what if we start to move the stuff that really belongs in the userspace to this pseudo-userland. It's not kernel, but it's not commonly accessible userland either. The shared memory would also work without any modifications between the umh based TEE/ROT driver and the userland if needed.
Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever people think is the best.
Yes your implementation can very well fit under trusted keys abstraction framework without creating a new keytype: "ext-trusted".
-Sumit
-- Janne
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 10:58 AM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever people think is the best.
Yes your implementation can very well fit under trusted keys abstraction framework without creating a new keytype: "ext-trusted".
The fundamental problem with the 'standardized kernel tee' still exists - it will never be generic in real life. Getting all this in the kernel will solve your problem and sell this particular product, but it is quite unlikely to help that many users. If the security is truly important to you, would you really trust any of this code to someone else? In this day and age, I really doubt many do. Everyone does their own thing, so this is why I really see all that as a userspace problem.
-- Janne
On Thu, 1 Aug 2019 at 14:00, Janne Karhunen janne.karhunen@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Aug 1, 2019 at 10:58 AM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Anyway, just my .02c. I guess having any new support in the kernel for new trust sources is good and improvement from the current state. I can certainly make my stuff work with your setup as well, what ever people think is the best.
Yes your implementation can very well fit under trusted keys abstraction framework without creating a new keytype: "ext-trusted".
The fundamental problem with the 'standardized kernel tee' still exists - it will never be generic in real life. Getting all this in the kernel will solve your problem and sell this particular product, but it is quite unlikely to help that many users. If the security is truly important to you, would you really trust any of this code to someone else? In this day and age, I really doubt many do.
There are already multiple platforms supported by OP-TEE [1] which could benefit from this trusted keys interface.
Everyone does their own thing, so this is why I really see all that as a userspace problem.
IMO, we should try to use standardized interfaces which are well thought off rather than implementing your own.
[1] https://optee.readthedocs.io/general/platforms.html
-Sumit
-- Janne
On Tue, Jul 30, 2019 at 05:53:34PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm tee: enable support to register kernel memory tee: add private login method for kernel clients KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
Skimmed through the patches. I think it is better to sort out the current LKM dependency issue with trusted.ko and get TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 trusted keys code consolidated before it makes sense to really go detail on this.
/Jarkko
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Janne Karhunen -
Jarkko Sakkinen -
Rouven Czerwinski -
Stuart Yoder -
Sumit Garg