This patch-set is an outcome of discussion here [1]. It has evolved very much since v1 to create, consolidate and generalize trusted keys subsystem.
This framework has been tested with trusted keys support provided via TEE but I wasn't able to test it with a TPM device as I don't possess one. It would be really helpful if others could test this patch-set using a TPM device.
[1] https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-doc@vger.kernel.org/msg30591.html
Changes in v4: 1. Separate patch for export of tpm_buf code to include/linux/tpm.h 2. Change TPM1.x trusted keys code to use common tpm_buf 3. Keep module name as trusted.ko only
Changes in v3:
Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem.
Changes in v2:
Split trusted keys abstraction patch for ease of review.
Sumit Garg (5): tpm: move tpm_buf code to include/linux/ KEYS: trusted: use common tpm_buf for TPM1.x code KEYS: trusted: create trusted keys subsystem KEYS: trusted: move tpm2 trusted keys code KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 56 --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 230 ----------- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 308 +-------------- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 45 +++ include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} | 61 +-- include/linux/tpm.h | 270 ++++++++++++- security/keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 9 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c | 343 ++++++++++++++++ .../keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} | 437 +++++---------------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c | 378 ++++++++++++++++++ 13 files changed, 1141 insertions(+), 1001 deletions(-) rename include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} (64%) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c rename security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} (72%) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c
Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc.
Also rename trusted keys TPM 1.x buffer implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 214 ------------------------------------------------ include/keys/trusted.h | 12 +-- include/linux/tpm.h | 214 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted.c | 12 +-- 4 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index e503ffc..0b5498a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #include <linux/platform_device.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> -#include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/tpm_eventlog.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86 @@ -58,123 +57,6 @@ enum tpm_addr { #define TPM_ERR_DISABLED 0x7 #define TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT 38
-#define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10 - -enum tpm2_const { - TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR = 24, - TPM2_PCR_SELECT_MIN = ((TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR + 7) / 8), -}; - -enum tpm2_timeouts { - TPM2_TIMEOUT_A = 750, - TPM2_TIMEOUT_B = 2000, - TPM2_TIMEOUT_C = 200, - TPM2_TIMEOUT_D = 30, - TPM2_DURATION_SHORT = 20, - TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM = 750, - TPM2_DURATION_LONG = 2000, - TPM2_DURATION_LONG_LONG = 300000, - TPM2_DURATION_DEFAULT = 120000, -}; - -enum tpm2_structures { - TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS = 0x8001, - TPM2_ST_SESSIONS = 0x8002, -}; - -/* Indicates from what layer of the software stack the error comes from */ -#define TSS2_RC_LAYER_SHIFT 16 -#define TSS2_RESMGR_TPM_RC_LAYER (11 << TSS2_RC_LAYER_SHIFT) - -enum tpm2_return_codes { - TPM2_RC_SUCCESS = 0x0000, - TPM2_RC_HASH = 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */ - TPM2_RC_HANDLE = 0x008B, - TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */ - TPM2_RC_FAILURE = 0x0101, - TPM2_RC_DISABLED = 0x0120, - TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE = 0x0143, - TPM2_RC_TESTING = 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */ - TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0 = 0x0910, - TPM2_RC_RETRY = 0x0922, -}; - -enum tpm2_command_codes { - TPM2_CC_FIRST = 0x011F, - TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CONTROL = 0x0121, - TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CHANGE_AUTH = 0x0129, - TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY = 0x0131, - TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x013E, - TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, - TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, - TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN = 0x0145, - TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, - TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153, - TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157, - TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_UPDATE = 0x015C, - TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E, - TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161, - TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162, - TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, - TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 0x0177, - TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, - TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, - TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, - TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, - TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, - TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, - TPM2_CC_CREATE_LOADED = 0x0191, - TPM2_CC_LAST = 0x0193, /* Spec 1.36 */ -}; - -enum tpm2_permanent_handles { - TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, -}; - -enum tpm2_capabilities { - TPM2_CAP_HANDLES = 1, - TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS = 2, - TPM2_CAP_PCRS = 5, - TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6, -}; - -enum tpm2_properties { - TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS = 0x0129, -}; - -enum tpm2_startup_types { - TPM2_SU_CLEAR = 0x0000, - TPM2_SU_STATE = 0x0001, -}; - -enum tpm2_cc_attrs { - TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES = 25, - TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE = 28, -}; - -#define TPM_VID_INTEL 0x8086 -#define TPM_VID_WINBOND 0x1050 -#define TPM_VID_STM 0x104A - -enum tpm_chip_flags { - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ = BIT(2), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL = BIT(3), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS = BIT(4), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_ALWAYS_POWERED = BIT(5), -}; - -#define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev) - -struct tpm_header { - __be16 tag; - __be32 length; - union { - __be32 ordinal; - __be32 return_code; - }; -} __packed; - #define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193
struct stclear_flags_t { @@ -274,102 +156,6 @@ enum tpm_sub_capabilities { * compiler warnings about stack frame size. */ #define TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA 128
-/* A string buffer type for constructing TPM commands. This is based on the - * ideas of string buffer code in security/keys/trusted.h but is heap based - * in order to keep the stack usage minimal. - */ - -enum tpm_buf_flags { - TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), -}; - -struct tpm_buf { - struct page *data_page; - unsigned int flags; - u8 *data; -}; - -static inline void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - - head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag); - head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head)); - head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal); -} - -static inline int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) -{ - buf->data_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); - if (!buf->data_page) - return -ENOMEM; - - buf->flags = 0; - buf->data = kmap(buf->data_page); - tpm_buf_reset(buf, tag, ordinal); - return 0; -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - kunmap(buf->data_page); - __free_page(buf->data_page); -} - -static inline u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - - return be32_to_cpu(head->length); -} - -static inline u16 tpm_buf_tag(struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - - return be16_to_cpu(head->tag); -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, - const unsigned char *new_data, - unsigned int new_len) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - u32 len = tpm_buf_length(buf); - - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) - return; - - if ((len + new_len) > PAGE_SIZE) { - WARN(1, "tpm_buf: overflow\n"); - buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; - return; - } - - memcpy(&buf->data[len], new_data, new_len); - head->length = cpu_to_be32(len + new_len); -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value) -{ - tpm_buf_append(buf, &value, 1); -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value) -{ - __be16 value2 = cpu_to_be16(value); - - tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 2); -} - -static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) -{ - __be32 value2 = cpu_to_be32(value); - - tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 4); -} - extern struct class *tpm_class; extern struct class *tpmrm_class; extern dev_t tpm_devt; diff --git a/include/keys/trusted.h b/include/keys/trusted.h index 0071298..841ae11 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) #define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-struct tpm_buf { +struct tpm1_buf { int len; unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE]; }; @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int keylen, ...);
int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen); -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); +int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce);
#define TPM_DEBUG 0
@@ -110,24 +110,24 @@ static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) } #endif
-static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) +static inline void store8(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) { buf->data[buf->len++] = value; }
-static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) +static inline void store16(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) { *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); buf->len += sizeof value; }
-static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) +static inline void store32(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) { *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); buf->len += sizeof value; }
-static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, +static inline void storebytes(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, const int len) { memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 53c0ea9..130c167 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/cdev.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ @@ -161,6 +162,219 @@ struct tpm_chip { int locality; };
+#define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10 + +enum tpm2_const { + TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR = 24, + TPM2_PCR_SELECT_MIN = ((TPM2_PLATFORM_PCR + 7) / 8), +}; + +enum tpm2_timeouts { + TPM2_TIMEOUT_A = 750, + TPM2_TIMEOUT_B = 2000, + TPM2_TIMEOUT_C = 200, + TPM2_TIMEOUT_D = 30, + TPM2_DURATION_SHORT = 20, + TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM = 750, + TPM2_DURATION_LONG = 2000, + TPM2_DURATION_LONG_LONG = 300000, + TPM2_DURATION_DEFAULT = 120000, +}; + +enum tpm2_structures { + TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS = 0x8001, + TPM2_ST_SESSIONS = 0x8002, +}; + +/* Indicates from what layer of the software stack the error comes from */ +#define TSS2_RC_LAYER_SHIFT 16 +#define TSS2_RESMGR_TPM_RC_LAYER (11 << TSS2_RC_LAYER_SHIFT) + +enum tpm2_return_codes { + TPM2_RC_SUCCESS = 0x0000, + TPM2_RC_HASH = 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */ + TPM2_RC_HANDLE = 0x008B, + TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE = 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */ + TPM2_RC_FAILURE = 0x0101, + TPM2_RC_DISABLED = 0x0120, + TPM2_RC_COMMAND_CODE = 0x0143, + TPM2_RC_TESTING = 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */ + TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0 = 0x0910, + TPM2_RC_RETRY = 0x0922, +}; + +enum tpm2_command_codes { + TPM2_CC_FIRST = 0x011F, + TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CONTROL = 0x0121, + TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CHANGE_AUTH = 0x0129, + TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY = 0x0131, + TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x013E, + TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, + TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, + TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN = 0x0145, + TPM2_CC_NV_READ = 0x014E, + TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153, + TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157, + TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_UPDATE = 0x015C, + TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E, + TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161, + TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162, + TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, + TPM2_CC_VERIFY_SIGNATURE = 0x0177, + TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, + TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, + TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, + TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND = 0x0182, + TPM2_CC_EVENT_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE = 0x0185, + TPM2_CC_HASH_SEQUENCE_START = 0x0186, + TPM2_CC_CREATE_LOADED = 0x0191, + TPM2_CC_LAST = 0x0193, /* Spec 1.36 */ +}; + +enum tpm2_permanent_handles { + TPM2_RS_PW = 0x40000009, +}; + +enum tpm2_capabilities { + TPM2_CAP_HANDLES = 1, + TPM2_CAP_COMMANDS = 2, + TPM2_CAP_PCRS = 5, + TPM2_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES = 6, +}; + +enum tpm2_properties { + TPM_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS = 0x0129, +}; + +enum tpm2_startup_types { + TPM2_SU_CLEAR = 0x0000, + TPM2_SU_STATE = 0x0001, +}; + +enum tpm2_cc_attrs { + TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES = 25, + TPM2_CC_ATTR_RHANDLE = 28, +}; + +#define TPM_VID_INTEL 0x8086 +#define TPM_VID_WINBOND 0x1050 +#define TPM_VID_STM 0x104A + +enum tpm_chip_flags { + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ = BIT(2), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL = BIT(3), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_HAVE_TIMEOUTS = BIT(4), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_ALWAYS_POWERED = BIT(5), +}; + +#define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev) + +struct tpm_header { + __be16 tag; + __be32 length; + union { + __be32 ordinal; + __be32 return_code; + }; +} __packed; + +/* A string buffer type for constructing TPM commands. This is based on the + * ideas of string buffer code in security/keys/trusted.h but is heap based + * in order to keep the stack usage minimal. + */ + +enum tpm_buf_flags { + TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), +}; + +struct tpm_buf { + struct page *data_page; + unsigned int flags; + u8 *data; +}; + +static inline void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag); + head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head)); + head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal); +} + +static inline int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + buf->data_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); + if (!buf->data_page) + return -ENOMEM; + + buf->flags = 0; + buf->data = kmap(buf->data_page); + tpm_buf_reset(buf, tag, ordinal); + return 0; +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + kunmap(buf->data_page); + __free_page(buf->data_page); +} + +static inline u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + return be32_to_cpu(head->length); +} + +static inline u16 tpm_buf_tag(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + + return be16_to_cpu(head->tag); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, + const unsigned char *new_data, + unsigned int new_len) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + u32 len = tpm_buf_length(buf); + + /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + return; + + if ((len + new_len) > PAGE_SIZE) { + WARN(1, "tpm_buf: overflow\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + return; + } + + memcpy(&buf->data[len], new_data, new_len); + head->length = cpu_to_be32(len + new_len); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value) +{ + tpm_buf_append(buf, &value, 1); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value) +{ + __be16 value2 = cpu_to_be16(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 2); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) +{ + __be32 value2 = cpu_to_be32(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 4); +} + #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 9a94672..0736671 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) /* * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session */ -static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, +static int osap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle) { unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, /* * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session */ -int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) +int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) { int ret;
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ struct tpm_digests { * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. */ -static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, +static int tpm_seal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen, unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, @@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, /* * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob */ -static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, +static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen, const unsigned char *blobauth, @@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct tpm_buf *tb; + struct tpm1_buf *tb; int ret;
tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct tpm_buf *tb; + struct tpm1_buf *tb; int ret;
tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL);
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:00PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc.
Also rename trusted keys TPM 1.x buffer implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
A question: did you try to do this as mechanically as you ever could or did you do any other code changes? I did go through it but it is possible that I missed something.
In this type of changes it is mandatory be extra strict on not doing anything extra (the rename you would was not of course extra because it was necessary to do).
/Jarkko
On Mon, 19 Aug 2019 at 22:26, Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com wrote:
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:00PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc.
Also rename trusted keys TPM 1.x buffer implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
A question: did you try to do this as mechanically as you ever could or did you do any other code changes? I did go through it but it is possible that I missed something.
There aren't any other code changes apart from "tpm1_buf" rename.
-Sumit
In this type of changes it is mandatory be extra strict on not doing anything extra (the rename you would was not of course extra because it was necessary to do).
/Jarkko
On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 11:22:05AM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
On Mon, 19 Aug 2019 at 22:26, Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com wrote:
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:00PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc.
Also rename trusted keys TPM 1.x buffer implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
A question: did you try to do this as mechanically as you ever could or did you do any other code changes? I did go through it but it is possible that I missed something.
There aren't any other code changes apart from "tpm1_buf" rename.
Thanks. I had to ask because it would be hard to check it manually.
/Jarkko
Utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM1.x trusted keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also, remove tpm1_buf code.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- include/keys/trusted.h | 37 +------------------ security/keys/trusted.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted.h b/include/keys/trusted.h index 841ae11..29e3e9b 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted.h @@ -5,10 +5,6 @@ /* implementation specific TPM constants */ #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 -#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 -#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10 -#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87 -#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104 #define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 #define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 #define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 @@ -17,13 +13,6 @@ #define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) #define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-struct tpm1_buf { - int len; - unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE]; -}; - -#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0) - struct osapsess { uint32_t handle; unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; @@ -46,7 +35,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int keylen, ...);
int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen); -int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce); +int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce);
#define TPM_DEBUG 0
@@ -109,28 +98,4 @@ static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) { } #endif - -static inline void store8(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char value) -{ - buf->data[buf->len++] = value; -} - -static inline void store16(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint16_t value) -{ - *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value); - buf->len += sizeof value; -} - -static inline void store32(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const uint32_t value) -{ - *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value); - buf->len += sizeof value; -} - -static inline void storebytes(struct tpm1_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in, - const int len) -{ - memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len); - buf->len += len; -} #endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 0736671..f7134d6 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) /* * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session */ -static int osap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, +static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle) { unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; @@ -406,13 +406,10 @@ static int osap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) return ret;
- INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_OSAP_SIZE); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OSAP); - store16(tb, type); - store32(tb, handle); - storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP); + tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) @@ -430,17 +427,14 @@ static int osap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, /* * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session */ -int oiap(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) +int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) { int ret;
if (!chip) return -ENODEV;
- INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OIAP); ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -464,7 +458,7 @@ struct tpm_digests { * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. */ -static int tpm_seal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, +static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen, unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, @@ -535,20 +529,17 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, goto out;
/* build and send the TPM request packet */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_SEAL_SIZE + pcrinfosize + datalen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_SEAL); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - storebytes(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - store32(tb, pcrinfosize); - storebytes(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); - store32(tb, datalen); - storebytes(tb, data, datalen); - store32(tb, sess.handle); - storebytes(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_SEAL); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, td->encauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, pcrinfosize); + tpm_buf_append(tb, pcrinfo, pcrinfosize); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, datalen); + tpm_buf_append(tb, data, datalen); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, sess.handle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) @@ -579,7 +570,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, /* * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob */ -static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, +static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen, const unsigned char *blobauth, @@ -628,20 +619,17 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, return ret;
/* build and send TPM request packet */ - INIT_BUF(tb); - store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND); - store32(tb, TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE + bloblen); - store32(tb, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); - store32(tb, keyhandle); - storebytes(tb, blob, bloblen); - store32(tb, authhandle1); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - store32(tb, authhandle2); - storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - store8(tb, cont); - storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH2_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, keyhandle); + tpm_buf_append(tb, blob, bloblen); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle1); + tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, authhandle2); + tpm_buf_append(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(tb, cont); + tpm_buf_append(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { @@ -670,23 +658,23 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm1_buf *tb, static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct tpm1_buf *tb; + struct tpm_buf tb; int ret;
- tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) - return -ENOMEM; + ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0); + if (ret) + return ret;
/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
- ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- kzfree(tb); + tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); return ret; }
@@ -696,14 +684,14 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { - struct tpm1_buf *tb; + struct tpm_buf tb; int ret;
- tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tb) - return -ENOMEM; + ret = tpm_buf_init(&tb, 0, 0); + if (ret) + return ret;
- ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, + ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); @@ -711,7 +699,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
- kzfree(tb); + tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); return ret; }
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:01PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM1.x trusted keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also, remove tpm1_buf code.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com
/Jarkko
Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with "tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +- include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} | 4 ++-- security/keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 7 +++++++ security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} | 2 +- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) rename include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} (98%) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile rename security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} (99%)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index 76d2ce3..ec3f309 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include <crypto/sha.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> -#include <keys/trusted.h> +#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> #include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h>
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h similarity index 98% rename from include/keys/trusted.h rename to include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 29e3e9b..9bdf5f4 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H -#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H +#ifndef __TRUSTED_TPM_H +#define __TRUSTED_TPM_H
/* implementation specific TPM constants */ #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 9cef540..074f275 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += keyctl_pkey.o # Key types # obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o -obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted-keys/ obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/ diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e8963a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Makefile for trusted keys +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o +trusted-y += trusted-tpm.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c similarity index 99% rename from security/keys/trusted.c rename to security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c index f7134d6..66687e7 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
-#include <keys/trusted.h> +#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h>
static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:02PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with "tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +- include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} | 4 ++-- security/keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 7 +++++++ security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} | 2 +- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) rename include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} (98%) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile rename security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} (99%)
Would prefer trusted_tpm.c.
/Jarkko
On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 08:04:58PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:02PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with "tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +- include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} | 4 ++-- security/keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 7 +++++++ security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} | 2 +- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) rename include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} (98%) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile rename security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} (99%)
Would prefer trusted_tpm.c.
Actually, trusted_tpm1.c.
/Jarkko
On Mon, 19 Aug 2019 at 22:36, Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com wrote:
On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 08:04:58PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:02PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with "tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +- include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} | 4 ++-- security/keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 7 +++++++ security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} | 2 +- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) rename include/keys/{trusted.h => trusted_tpm.h} (98%) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile rename security/keys/{trusted.c => trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c} (99%)
Would prefer trusted_tpm.c.
Actually, trusted_tpm1.c.
Okay.
-Sumit
/Jarkko
Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem. The reason being it's better to consolidate all the trusted keys code to a single location so that it can be maintained sanely.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 56 ----- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 16 -- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 308 +----------------------- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 7 + include/linux/tpm.h | 56 +++-- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c | 378 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 429 insertions(+), 394 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index d47ad10..49450c1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) return NULL; return chip; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_find_get_ops);
/** * tpm_dev_release() - free chip memory and the device number diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index 1b4f95c..208e5ba 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -454,62 +454,6 @@ int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random);
-/** - * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key payload - * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * - * Note: only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation is located in - * the keyring subsystem. - * - * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() - */ -int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - int rc; - - chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); - if (!chip || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) - return -ENODEV; - - rc = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - - tpm_put_ops(chip); - return rc; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_seal_trusted); - -/** - * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key - * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * - * Note: only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation is located in - * the keyring subsystem. - * - * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() - */ -int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - int rc; - - chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); - if (!chip || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) - return -ENODEV; - - rc = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - - tpm_put_ops(chip); - - return rc; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_unseal_trusted); - static int __init tpm_init(void) { int rc; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 0b5498a..1c07ce6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -164,8 +164,6 @@ extern const struct file_operations tpmrm_fops; extern struct idr dev_nums_idr;
ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz); -ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *); int tpm_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
@@ -192,9 +190,7 @@ static inline void tpm_msleep(unsigned int delay_msec)
int tpm_chip_start(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_chip_stop(struct tpm_chip *chip); -struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); __must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev, const struct tpm_class_ops *ops); @@ -214,24 +210,12 @@ static inline void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) } #endif
-static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) -{ - return (rc & BIT(7)) ? rc & 0xff : rc; -} - int tpm2_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip); int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digest, u16 *digest_size_ptr); int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digests); int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max); -void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); -int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options); -int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options); ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value, const char *desc);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index d103545..8bb34890 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -13,20 +13,6 @@
#include "tpm.h" #include <crypto/hash_info.h> -#include <keys/trusted-type.h> - -enum tpm2_object_attributes { - TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), -}; - -enum tpm2_session_attributes { - TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION = BIT(0), -}; - -struct tpm2_hash { - unsigned int crypto_id; - unsigned int tpm_id; -};
static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, @@ -376,299 +362,7 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle) tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "flushing context"); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); } - -/** - * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. - * - * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance - * @session_handle: session handle - * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used - * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used - * @attributes: the session attributes - * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used - * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used - */ -static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, - const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len, - u8 attributes, - const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len) -{ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle); - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len); - - if (nonce && nonce_len) - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len); - - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes); - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len); - - if (hmac && hmac_len) - tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); -} - -/** - * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * - * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success. - */ -int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - unsigned int blob_len; - struct tpm_buf buf; - u32 hash; - int i; - int rc; - - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { - if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { - hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; - break; - } - } - - if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) - return -EINVAL; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, - NULL /* nonce */, 0, - 0 /* session_attributes */, - options->keyauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - - /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1); - - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); - tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); - - /* public */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); - - /* policy */ - if (options->policydigest_len) { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); - tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, - options->policydigest_len); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - } - - /* public parameters */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - - /* outside info */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); - - /* creation PCR */ - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); - - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { - rc = -E2BIG; - goto out; - } - - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); - if (rc) - goto out; - - blob_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); - if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) { - rc = -E2BIG; - goto out; - } - if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) { - rc = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); - payload->blob_len = blob_len; - -out: - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - if (rc > 0) { - if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH) - rc = -EINVAL; - else - rc = -EPERM; - } - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @blob_handle: returned blob handle - * - * Return: 0 on success. - * -E2BIG on wrong payload size. - * -EPERM on tpm error status. - * < 0 error from tpm_transmit_cmd. - */ -static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options, - u32 *blob_handle) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - unsigned int private_len; - unsigned int public_len; - unsigned int blob_len; - int rc; - - private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); - if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) - return -E2BIG; - - public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); - blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; - if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) - return -E2BIG; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, - NULL /* nonce */, 0, - 0 /* session_attributes */, - options->keyauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - - tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); - - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { - rc = -E2BIG; - goto out; - } - - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); - if (!rc) - *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( - (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); - -out: - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - if (rc > 0) - rc = -EPERM; - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @blob_handle: blob handle - * - * Return: 0 on success - * -EPERM on tpm error status - * < 0 error from tpm_transmit_cmd - */ -static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options, - u32 blob_handle) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - u16 data_len; - u8 *data; - int rc; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle); - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, - options->policyhandle ? - options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, - NULL /* nonce */, 0, - TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, - options->blobauth /* hmac */, - TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); - - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); - if (rc > 0) - rc = -EPERM; - - if (!rc) { - data_len = be16_to_cpup( - (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); - if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { - rc = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) { - rc = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; - - memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); - payload->key_len = data_len - 1; - payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; - } - -out: - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * - * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd. - */ -int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) -{ - u32 blob_handle; - int rc; - - rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle); - if (rc) - return rc; - - rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle); - tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle); - return rc; -} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_flush_context);
struct tpm2_get_cap_out { u8 more_data; diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 9bdf5f4..0d72106 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen); int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce);
+int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options); +int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options); + #define TPM_DEBUG 0
#if TPM_DEBUG diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 130c167..895179f 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -294,6 +294,19 @@ struct tpm_buf { u8 *data; };
+enum tpm2_object_attributes { + TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), +}; + +enum tpm2_session_attributes { + TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION = BIT(0), +}; + +struct tpm2_hash { + unsigned int crypto_id; + unsigned int tpm_id; +}; + static inline void tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) { struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; @@ -375,6 +388,11 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 4); }
+static inline u32 tpm2_rc_value(u32 rc) +{ + return (rc & BIT(7)) ? rc & 0xff : rc; +} + #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE)
extern int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip); @@ -384,13 +402,12 @@ extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, struct tpm_digest *digests); extern int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen); extern int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max); -extern int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options); -extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options); extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void); +extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc); +extern void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle); #else static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(struct tpm_chip *chip) { @@ -418,21 +435,30 @@ static inline int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, size_t max) return -ENODEV; }
-static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) +static inline struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void) { - return -ENODEV; + return NULL; } -static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct trusted_key_payload *payload, - struct trusted_key_options *options) + +static inline struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + return NULL; +} + +static inline void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ +} + +static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm_buf *buf, + size_t min_rsp_body_length, + const char *desc) { return -ENODEV; } -static inline struct tpm_chip *tpm_default_chip(void) + +static inline void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle) { - return NULL; } #endif #endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 4e8963a..fb42e94 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -5,3 +5,4 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o trusted-y += trusted-tpm.o +trusted-y += trusted-tpm2.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..98892ed7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c @@ -0,0 +1,378 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation + * + * Authors: + * Leendert van Doorn leendert@watson.ibm.com + * Dave Safford safford@watson.ibm.com + * Reiner Sailer sailer@watson.ibm.com + * Kylene Hall kjhall@us.ibm.com + * + * Maintained by: tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net + * + * Trusted Keys code for TCG/TCPA TPM2 (trusted platform module). + */ + +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/tpm.h> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h> + +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> + +static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = { + {HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM_ALG_SHA1}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM_ALG_SHA256}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM_ALG_SHA384}, + {HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM_ALG_SHA512}, + {HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM_ALG_SM3_256}, +}; + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. + * + * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance + * @session_handle: session handle + * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used + * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used + * @attributes: the session attributes + * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used + * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used + */ +static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, + const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len, + u8 attributes, + const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len) +{ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len); + + if (nonce && nonce_len) + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len); + + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len); + + if (hmac && hmac_len) + tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); +} + +/** + * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key + * + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * @options: authentication values and other options + * + * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success. + */ +int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + unsigned int blob_len; + struct tpm_buf buf; + u32 hash; + int i; + int rc; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) { + if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) { + hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id; + break; + } + } + + if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map)) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + 0 /* session_attributes */, + options->keyauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + /* sensitive */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len + 1); + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable); + + /* public */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); + + /* policy */ + if (options->policydigest_len) { + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, + options->policydigest_len); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + } + + /* public parameters */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* outside info */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* creation PCR */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); + if (rc) + goto out; + + blob_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); + payload->blob_len = blob_len; + +out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + if (rc > 0) { + if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH) + rc = -EINVAL; + else + rc = -EPERM; + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key payload + * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * + * Note: only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation is located in + * the keyring subsystem. + * + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() + */ +int tpm_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int rc; + + chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); + if (!chip || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) + return -ENODEV; + + rc = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + + tpm_put_ops(chip); + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command + * + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @blob_handle: returned blob handle + * + * Return: 0 on success. + * -E2BIG on wrong payload size. + * -EPERM on tpm error status. + * < 0 error from tpm_transmit_cmd. + */ +static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u32 *blob_handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + unsigned int private_len; + unsigned int public_len; + unsigned int blob_len; + int rc; + + private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); + if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) + return -E2BIG; + + public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); + blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; + if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) + return -E2BIG; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + 0 /* session_attributes */, + options->keyauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); + + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); + if (!rc) + *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( + (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + +out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + if (rc > 0) + rc = -EPERM; + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command + * + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @blob_handle: blob handle + * + * Return: 0 on success + * -EPERM on tpm error status + * < 0 error from tpm_transmit_cmd + */ +static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u32 blob_handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + u16 data_len; + u8 *data; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, + options->policyhandle ? + options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, + options->blobauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); + if (rc > 0) + rc = -EPERM; + + if (!rc) { + data_len = be16_to_cpup( + (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); + if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6 + data_len) { + rc = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; + + memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); + payload->key_len = data_len - 1; + payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; + } + +out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key + * + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * @options: authentication values and other options + * + * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd. + */ +int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + u32 blob_handle; + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle); + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key + * @chip: a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * + * Note: only TPM 2.0 chip are supported. TPM 1.x implementation is located in + * the keyring subsystem. + * + * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd() + */ +int tpm_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + int rc; + + chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip); + if (!chip || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) + return -ENODEV; + + rc = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + + tpm_put_ops(chip); + + return rc; +}
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:03PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem. The reason being it's better to consolidate all the trusted keys code to a single location so that it can be maintained sanely.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 56 ----- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 16 -- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 308 +----------------------- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 7 + include/linux/tpm.h | 56 +++-- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c | 378 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Would prefer trusted_tpm2.c.
/Jarkko
On Mon, 19 Aug 2019 at 22:37, Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com wrote:
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:23:03PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem. The reason being it's better to consolidate all the trusted keys code to a single location so that it can be maintained sanely.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 56 ----- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 16 -- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 308 +----------------------- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 7 + include/linux/tpm.h | 56 +++-- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm2.c | 378 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Would prefer trusted_tpm2.c.
Okay.
-Sumit
/Jarkko
Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusked keys support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying implemtations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 45 ++++ include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 15 -- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c | 343 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c | 345 +++++----------------------- 5 files changed, 447 insertions(+), 302 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index a94c03a..5559010 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -40,6 +40,51 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint32_t policyhandle; };
+struct trusted_key_ops { + /* + * flag to indicate if trusted key implementation supports migration + * or not. + */ + unsigned char migratable; + + /* trusted key init */ + int (*init)(void); + + /* seal a trusted key */ + int (*seal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); + + /* unseal a trusted key */ + int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); + + /* get random trusted key */ + int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); + + /* trusted key cleanup */ + void (*cleanup)(void); +}; + extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) +extern struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops; +#endif + +#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 + +#if TRUSTED_DEBUG +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ + pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); + pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); + pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable); +} +#else +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ +} +#endif
#endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 0d72106..7b59344 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -57,17 +57,6 @@ static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); }
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) -{ - pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); - pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); - pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable); -} - static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, @@ -93,10 +82,6 @@ static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { }
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) -{ -} - static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index fb42e94..9a4f721 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -4,5 +4,6 @@ #
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o +trusted-y += trusted-common.o trusted-y += trusted-tpm.o trusted-y += trusted-tpm2.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f00fde --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited + * + * Author: + * David Safford safford@us.ibm.com + * Added generic trusted key framework: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org + * + * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst + */ + +#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> + +static struct trusted_key_ops *available_tk_ops[] = { +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) + &tpm_trusted_key_ops, +#endif +}; +static struct trusted_key_ops *tk_ops; + +enum { + Opt_err, + Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, +}; + +static const match_table_t key_tokens = { + {Opt_new, "new"}, + {Opt_load, "load"}, + {Opt_update, "update"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +/* + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the + * payload structure + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + long keylen; + int ret = -EINVAL; + int key_cmd; + char *c; + + /* main command */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_new: + /* first argument is key size */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen); + if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + p->key_len = keylen; + ret = Opt_new; + break; + case Opt_load: + /* first argument is sealed blob */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; + if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); + if (ret < 0) + return -EINVAL; + ret = Opt_load; + break; + case Opt_update: + ret = Opt_update; + break; + case Opt_err: + return -EINVAL; + } + return ret; +} + +static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; + int ret; + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p)); + if (ret < 0) + return p; + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); + + p->migratable = tk_ops->migratable; + + return p; +} + +/* + * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key + * + * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a + * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, + * adding it to the specified keyring. + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + int key_cmd; + size_t key_len; + + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + + payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!payload) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload); + if (key_cmd < 0) { + ret = key_cmd; + goto out; + } + + dump_payload(payload); + + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_load: + ret = tk_ops->unseal(payload, datablob); + dump_payload(payload); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + case Opt_new: + key_len = payload->key_len; + ret = tk_ops->get_random(payload->key, key_len); + if (ret != key_len) { + pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + ret = tk_ops->seal(payload, datablob); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + } +out: + kzfree(datablob); + if (!ret) + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); + else + kzfree(payload); + return ret; +} + +static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + + p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); + kzfree(p); +} + +/* + * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values + */ +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + + if (key_is_negative(key)) + return -ENOKEY; + p = key->payload.data[0]; + if (!p->migratable) + return -EPERM; + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!new_p) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p); + if (ret != Opt_update) { + ret = -EINVAL; + kzfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + + /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ + new_p->migratable = p->migratable; + new_p->key_len = p->key_len; + memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); + dump_payload(p); + dump_payload(new_p); + + ret = tk_ops->seal(new_p, datablob); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + kzfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); + call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); +out: + kzfree(datablob); + return ret; +} + +/* + * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. + * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. + */ +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, + size_t buflen) +{ + const struct trusted_key_payload *p; + char *ascii_buf; + char *bufp; + int i; + + p = dereference_key_locked(key); + if (!p) + return -EINVAL; + + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } + kzfree(ascii_buf); + } + return 2 * p->blob_len; +} + +/* + * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload + */ +static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +{ + kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); +} + +struct key_type key_type_trusted = { + .name = "trusted", + .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, + .update = trusted_update, + .destroy = trusted_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .read = trusted_read, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); + +static int __init init_trusted(void) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(available_tk_ops); i++) { + tk_ops = available_tk_ops[i]; + + if (!(tk_ops && tk_ops->init && tk_ops->seal && + tk_ops->unseal && tk_ops->get_random)) + continue; + + ret = tk_ops->init(); + if (ret) { + if (tk_ops->cleanup) + tk_ops->cleanup(); + } else { + break; + } + } + + /* + * encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if + * trusted key implementation is not found. + */ + if (ret == -ENODEV) + return 0; + + return ret; +} + +static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +{ + if (tk_ops->cleanup) + tk_ops->cleanup(); +} + +late_initcall(init_trusted); +module_exit(cleanup_trusted); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c index 66687e7..dab7c32 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c @@ -1,29 +1,26 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited * * Author: * David Safford safford@us.ibm.com + * Switch to generic trusted key framework: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org * * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst */
#include <crypto/hash_info.h> -#include <linux/uaccess.h> -#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/err.h> -#include <keys/user-type.h> #include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> -#include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/sha.h> -#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
@@ -705,7 +702,6 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
enum { Opt_err, - Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, Opt_hash, @@ -714,9 +710,6 @@ enum { };
static const match_table_t key_tokens = { - {Opt_new, "new"}, - {Opt_load, "load"}, - {Opt_update, "update"}, {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"}, {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"}, {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"}, @@ -843,71 +836,6 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return 0; }
-/* - * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the - * payload and options structures - * - * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. - */ -static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, - struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ - substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; - long keylen; - int ret = -EINVAL; - int key_cmd; - char *c; - - /* main command */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); - switch (key_cmd) { - case Opt_new: - /* first argument is key size */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen); - if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - p->key_len = keylen; - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_new; - break; - case Opt_load: - /* first argument is sealed blob */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; - if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_load; - break; - case Opt_update: - /* all arguments are options */ - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_update; - break; - case Opt_err: - return -EINVAL; - break; - } - return ret; -} - static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) { struct trusted_key_options *options; @@ -928,258 +856,99 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) return options; }
-static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +static int tpm_tk_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; - int ret; - - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p); - if (ret < 0) - return p; - p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL); - if (p) - p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */ - return p; -} - -/* - * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key - * - * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a - * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, - * adding it to the specified keyring. - * - * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. - */ -static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, - struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; - size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - char *datablob; int ret = 0; - int key_cmd; - size_t key_len; int tpm2;
tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2;
- if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!datablob) - return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - datablob[datalen] = '\0'; - options = trusted_options_alloc(); - if (!options) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); - if (!payload) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } + if (!options) + return -ENOMEM;
- key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options); - if (key_cmd < 0) { - ret = key_cmd; + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); + if (ret < 0) goto out; - } + dump_options(options);
if (!options->keyhandle) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; }
- dump_payload(payload); - dump_options(options); + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, p, options); + else + ret = key_seal(p, options); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + }
- switch (key_cmd) { - case Opt_load: - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); - dump_payload(payload); - dump_options(options); - if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - break; - case Opt_new: - key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); - if (ret != key_len) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + if (options->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_seal(payload, options); - if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - break; - default: - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; } - if (!ret && options->pcrlock) - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); out: - kzfree(datablob); kzfree(options); - if (!ret) - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); - else - kzfree(payload); return ret; }
-static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *p; - - p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); - kzfree(p); -} - -/* - * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values - */ -static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +static int tpm_tk_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p; - struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; - struct trusted_key_options *new_o; - size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - char *datablob; + struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; int ret = 0; + int tpm2;
- if (key_is_negative(key)) - return -ENOKEY; - p = key->payload.data[0]; - if (!p->migratable) - return -EPERM; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2;
- datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!datablob) + options = trusted_options_alloc(); + if (!options) return -ENOMEM; - new_o = trusted_options_alloc(); - if (!new_o) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); - if (!new_p) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - }
- memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - datablob[datalen] = '\0'; - ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); - if (ret != Opt_update) { - ret = -EINVAL; - kzfree(new_p); + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); + if (ret < 0) goto out; - } + dump_options(options);
- if (!new_o->keyhandle) { + if (!options->keyhandle) { ret = -EINVAL; - kzfree(new_p); goto out; }
- /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ - new_p->migratable = p->migratable; - new_p->key_len = p->key_len; - memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); - dump_payload(p); - dump_payload(new_p); + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options); + else + ret = key_unseal(p, options); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kzfree(new_p); - goto out; - } - if (new_o->pcrlock) { - ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); + if (options->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); - kzfree(new_p); + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } } - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); - call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); out: - kzfree(datablob); - kzfree(new_o); + kzfree(options); return ret; }
-/* - * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. - * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. - */ -static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, - size_t buflen) -{ - const struct trusted_key_payload *p; - char *ascii_buf; - char *bufp; - int i; - - p = dereference_key_locked(key); - if (!p) - return -EINVAL; - - if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { - ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { - kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; - } - kzfree(ascii_buf); - } - return 2 * p->blob_len; -} - -/* - * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload - */ -static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +int tpm_tk_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) { - kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); + return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len); }
-struct key_type key_type_trusted = { - .name = "trusted", - .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, - .update = trusted_update, - .destroy = trusted_destroy, - .describe = user_describe, - .read = trusted_read, -}; - -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); - static void trusted_shash_release(void) { if (hashalg) @@ -1194,14 +963,14 @@ static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", hmac_alg); return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); }
hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", hash_alg); ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); goto hashalg_fail; @@ -1237,16 +1006,13 @@ static int __init init_digests(void) return 0; }
-static int __init init_trusted(void) +static int __init init_tpm_trusted(void) { int ret;
- /* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if - * TPM is not used. - */ chip = tpm_default_chip(); if (!chip) - return 0; + return -ENODEV;
ret = init_digests(); if (ret < 0) @@ -1267,7 +1033,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) return ret; }
-static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +static void __exit cleanup_tpm_trusted(void) { if (chip) { put_device(&chip->dev); @@ -1277,7 +1043,12 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) } }
-late_initcall(init_trusted); -module_exit(cleanup_trusted); - -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops = { + .migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */ + .init = init_tpm_trusted, + .seal = tpm_tk_seal, + .unseal = tpm_tk_unseal, + .get_random = tpm_tk_get_random, + .cleanup = cleanup_tpm_trusted, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_trusted_key_ops);
On Tue, 13 Aug 2019 at 13:24, Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusked keys support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
So this patch tries to add generic trusted keys framework where underlying implemtations like TPM, TEE etc. could be easily plugged-in.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 45 ++++ include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 15 -- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 1 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c | 343 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c | 345 +++++----------------------- 5 files changed, 447 insertions(+), 302 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c
Any comments/feedback on this patch before I send next version of TEE patch-set with this patch included?
-Sumit
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index a94c03a..5559010 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -40,6 +40,51 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint32_t policyhandle; };
+struct trusted_key_ops {
/** flag to indicate if trusted key implementation supports migration* or not.*/unsigned char migratable;/* trusted key init */int (*init)(void);/* seal a trusted key */int (*seal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);/* unseal a trusted key */int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob);/* get random trusted key */int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);/* trusted key cleanup */void (*cleanup)(void);+};
extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) +extern struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops; +#endif
+#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0
+#if TRUSTED_DEBUG +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{
pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);+} +#else +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ +} +#endif
#endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 0d72106..7b59344 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -57,17 +57,6 @@ static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); }
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) -{
pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);-}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, @@ -93,10 +82,6 @@ static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { }
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) -{ -}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index fb42e94..9a4f721 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -4,5 +4,6 @@ #
obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o +trusted-y += trusted-common.o trusted-y += trusted-tpm.o trusted-y += trusted-tpm2.o diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f00fde --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-common.c @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/*
- Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
- Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited
- Author:
- David Safford safford@us.ibm.com
- Added generic trusted key framework: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
- See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
- */
+#include <keys/user-type.h> +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/parser.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+static struct trusted_key_ops *available_tk_ops[] = { +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM)
&tpm_trusted_key_ops,+#endif +}; +static struct trusted_key_ops *tk_ops;
+enum {
Opt_err,Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,+};
+static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{Opt_new, "new"},{Opt_load, "load"},{Opt_update, "update"},{Opt_err, NULL}+};
+/*
- datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
payload structure
- On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
- */
+static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];long keylen;int ret = -EINVAL;int key_cmd;char *c;/* main command */c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");if (!c)return -EINVAL;key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);switch (key_cmd) {case Opt_new:/* first argument is key size */c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");if (!c)return -EINVAL;ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)return -EINVAL;p->key_len = keylen;ret = Opt_new;break;case Opt_load:/* first argument is sealed blob */c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");if (!c)return -EINVAL;p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)return -EINVAL;ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);if (ret < 0)return -EINVAL;ret = Opt_load;break;case Opt_update:ret = Opt_update;break;case Opt_err:return -EINVAL;}return ret;+}
+static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +{
struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;int ret;ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p));if (ret < 0)return p;p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);p->migratable = tk_ops->migratable;return p;+}
+/*
- trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
- Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
- random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
- adding it to the specified keyring.
- On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
- */
+static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)+{
struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL;size_t datalen = prep->datalen;char *datablob;int ret = 0;int key_cmd;size_t key_len;if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)return -EINVAL;datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);if (!datablob)return -ENOMEM;memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);datablob[datalen] = '\0';payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);if (!payload) {ret = -ENOMEM;goto out;}key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload);if (key_cmd < 0) {ret = key_cmd;goto out;}dump_payload(payload);switch (key_cmd) {case Opt_load:ret = tk_ops->unseal(payload, datablob);dump_payload(payload);if (ret < 0)pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);break;case Opt_new:key_len = payload->key_len;ret = tk_ops->get_random(payload->key, key_len);if (ret != key_len) {pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);goto out;}ret = tk_ops->seal(payload, datablob);if (ret < 0)pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);break;default:ret = -EINVAL;}+out:
kzfree(datablob);if (!ret)rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);elsekzfree(payload);return ret;+}
+static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{
struct trusted_key_payload *p;p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);kzfree(p);+}
+/*
- trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
- */
+static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{
struct trusted_key_payload *p;struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;size_t datalen = prep->datalen;char *datablob;int ret = 0;if (key_is_negative(key))return -ENOKEY;p = key->payload.data[0];if (!p->migratable)return -EPERM;if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)return -EINVAL;datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);if (!datablob)return -ENOMEM;new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);if (!new_p) {ret = -ENOMEM;goto out;}memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);datablob[datalen] = '\0';ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p);if (ret != Opt_update) {ret = -EINVAL;kzfree(new_p);goto out;}/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */new_p->migratable = p->migratable;new_p->key_len = p->key_len;memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);dump_payload(p);dump_payload(new_p);ret = tk_ops->seal(new_p, datablob);if (ret < 0) {pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);kzfree(new_p);goto out;}rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);+out:
kzfree(datablob);return ret;+}
+/*
- trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
- On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
- */
+static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
size_t buflen)+{
const struct trusted_key_payload *p;char *ascii_buf;char *bufp;int i;p = dereference_key_locked(key);if (!p)return -EINVAL;if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);if (!ascii_buf)return -ENOMEM;bufp = ascii_buf;for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {kzfree(ascii_buf);return -EFAULT;}kzfree(ascii_buf);}return 2 * p->blob_len;+}
+/*
- trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
- */
+static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +{
kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);+}
+struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
.name = "trusted",.instantiate = trusted_instantiate,.update = trusted_update,.destroy = trusted_destroy,.describe = user_describe,.read = trusted_read,+}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
+static int __init init_trusted(void) +{
int i, ret = 0;for (i = 0; i < sizeof(available_tk_ops); i++) {tk_ops = available_tk_ops[i];if (!(tk_ops && tk_ops->init && tk_ops->seal &&tk_ops->unseal && tk_ops->get_random))continue;ret = tk_ops->init();if (ret) {if (tk_ops->cleanup)tk_ops->cleanup();} else {break;}}/** encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if* trusted key implementation is not found.*/if (ret == -ENODEV)return 0;return ret;+}
+static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +{
if (tk_ops->cleanup)tk_ops->cleanup();+}
+late_initcall(init_trusted); +module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c index 66687e7..dab7c32 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted-tpm.c @@ -1,29 +1,26 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /*
- Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
- Copyright (c) 2019, Linaro Limited
- Author:
- David Safford safford@us.ibm.com
*/
- Switch to generic trusted key framework: Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org
- See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
#include <crypto/hash_info.h> -#include <linux/uaccess.h> -#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/err.h> -#include <keys/user-type.h> #include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> -#include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/crypto.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/sha.h> -#include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
@@ -705,7 +702,6 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
enum { Opt_err,
Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, Opt_hash,@@ -714,9 +710,6 @@ enum { };
static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
{Opt_new, "new"},{Opt_load, "load"},{Opt_update, "update"}, {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"}, {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"}, {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"},@@ -843,71 +836,6 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return 0; }
-/*
- datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the
payload and options structures
- On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
- */
-static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)-{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];long keylen;int ret = -EINVAL;int key_cmd;char *c;/* main command */c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");if (!c)return -EINVAL;key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);switch (key_cmd) {case Opt_new:/* first argument is key size */c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");if (!c)return -EINVAL;ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)return -EINVAL;p->key_len = keylen;ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);if (ret < 0)return ret;ret = Opt_new;break;case Opt_load:/* first argument is sealed blob */c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");if (!c)return -EINVAL;p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)return -EINVAL;ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);if (ret < 0)return -EINVAL;ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);if (ret < 0)return ret;ret = Opt_load;break;case Opt_update:/* all arguments are options */ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o);if (ret < 0)return ret;ret = Opt_update;break;case Opt_err:return -EINVAL;break;}return ret;-}
static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) { struct trusted_key_options *options; @@ -928,258 +856,99 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) return options; }
-static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +static int tpm_tk_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) {
struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL;int ret;ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p);if (ret < 0)return p;p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL);if (p)p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */return p;-}
-/*
- trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key
- Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a
- random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key,
- adding it to the specified keyring.
- On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
- */
-static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)-{
struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;size_t datalen = prep->datalen;char *datablob; int ret = 0;int key_cmd;size_t key_len; int tpm2; tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2;if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)return -EINVAL;datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);if (!datablob)return -ENOMEM;memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);datablob[datalen] = '\0';options = trusted_options_alloc();if (!options) {ret = -ENOMEM;goto out;}payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key);if (!payload) {ret = -ENOMEM;goto out;}
if (!options)return -ENOMEM;
key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options);if (key_cmd < 0) {ret = key_cmd;
ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);if (ret < 0) goto out;
}
dump_options(options); if (!options->keyhandle) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; }
dump_payload(payload);dump_options(options);
if (tpm2)ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, p, options);elseret = key_seal(p, options);if (ret < 0) {pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);goto out;}
switch (key_cmd) {case Opt_load:if (tpm2)ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options);elseret = key_unseal(payload, options);dump_payload(payload);dump_options(options);if (ret < 0)pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);break;case Opt_new:key_len = payload->key_len;ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len);if (ret != key_len) {pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
if (options->pcrlock) {ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);if (ret < 0) {pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; }
if (tpm2)ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options);elseret = key_seal(payload, options);if (ret < 0)pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);break;default:ret = -EINVAL;goto out; }if (!ret && options->pcrlock)ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);out:
kzfree(datablob); kzfree(options);if (!ret)rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);elsekzfree(payload); return ret;}
-static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) -{
struct trusted_key_payload *p;p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);kzfree(p);-}
-/*
- trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values
- */
-static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +static int tpm_tk_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) {
struct trusted_key_payload *p;struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;struct trusted_key_options *new_o;size_t datalen = prep->datalen;char *datablob;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; int ret = 0;int tpm2;
if (key_is_negative(key))return -ENOKEY;p = key->payload.data[0];if (!p->migratable)return -EPERM;if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)return -EINVAL;
tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);if (tpm2 < 0)return tpm2;
datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);if (!datablob)
options = trusted_options_alloc();if (!options) return -ENOMEM;
new_o = trusted_options_alloc();if (!new_o) {ret = -ENOMEM;goto out;}new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key);if (!new_p) {ret = -ENOMEM;goto out;}memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);datablob[datalen] = '\0';ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);if (ret != Opt_update) {ret = -EINVAL;kzfree(new_p);
ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);if (ret < 0) goto out;
}
dump_options(options);
if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
if (!options->keyhandle) { ret = -EINVAL;
kzfree(new_p); goto out; }/* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */new_p->migratable = p->migratable;new_p->key_len = p->key_len;memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len);dump_payload(p);dump_payload(new_p);
if (tpm2)ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options);elseret = key_unseal(p, options);if (ret < 0)pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);if (ret < 0) {pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);kzfree(new_p);goto out;}if (new_o->pcrlock) {ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
if (options->pcrlock) {ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);kzfree(new_p);
pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } }
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);out:
kzfree(datablob);kzfree(new_o);
kzfree(options); return ret;}
-/*
- trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex.
- On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size.
- */
-static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
size_t buflen)-{
const struct trusted_key_payload *p;char *ascii_buf;char *bufp;int i;p = dereference_key_locked(key);if (!p)return -EINVAL;if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);if (!ascii_buf)return -ENOMEM;bufp = ascii_buf;for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {kzfree(ascii_buf);return -EFAULT;}kzfree(ascii_buf);}return 2 * p->blob_len;-}
-/*
- trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
- */
-static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +int tpm_tk_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) {
kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len);}
-struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
.name = "trusted",.instantiate = trusted_instantiate,.update = trusted_update,.destroy = trusted_destroy,.describe = user_describe,.read = trusted_read,-};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted);
static void trusted_shash_release(void) { if (hashalg) @@ -1194,14 +963,14 @@ static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void)
hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", hmac_alg); return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); } hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
pr_info("tpm_trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", hash_alg); ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); goto hashalg_fail;@@ -1237,16 +1006,13 @@ static int __init init_digests(void) return 0; }
-static int __init init_trusted(void) +static int __init init_tpm_trusted(void) { int ret;
/* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if* TPM is not used.*/ chip = tpm_default_chip(); if (!chip)return 0;
return -ENODEV; ret = init_digests(); if (ret < 0)@@ -1267,7 +1033,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) return ret; }
-static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +static void __exit cleanup_tpm_trusted(void) { if (chip) { put_device(&chip->dev); @@ -1277,7 +1043,12 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) } }
-late_initcall(init_trusted); -module_exit(cleanup_trusted);
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +struct trusted_key_ops tpm_trusted_key_ops = {
.migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */.init = init_tpm_trusted,.seal = tpm_tk_seal,.unseal = tpm_tk_unseal,.get_random = tpm_tk_get_random,.cleanup = cleanup_tpm_trusted,+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_trusted_key_ops);
2.7.4
On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 02:49:31PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Any comments/feedback on this patch before I send next version of TEE patch-set with this patch included?
Unfortunately don't have time before LPC to go deep with the follow up.
I will look into this in detail after LPC.
/JArkko
On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 08:20:31PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 02:49:31PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Any comments/feedback on this patch before I send next version of TEE patch-set with this patch included?
Unfortunately don't have time before LPC to go deep with the follow up.
I will look into this in detail after LPC.
I'll ping you once your first row of patches are in my tree so you can rebase these on top of that.
/JArkko
On Fri, 30 Aug 2019 at 22:54, Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com wrote:
On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 08:20:31PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 02:49:31PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Any comments/feedback on this patch before I send next version of TEE patch-set with this patch included?
Unfortunately don't have time before LPC to go deep with the follow up.
I will look into this in detail after LPC.
No worries, I will wait for your feedback.
I'll ping you once your first row of patches are in my tree so you can rebase these on top of that.
Thanks.
-Sumit
/JArkko
Hi Sumit,
On Tue, 2019-08-13 at 13:22 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
This patch-set is an outcome of discussion here [1]. It has evolved very much since v1 to create, consolidate and generalize trusted keys subsystem.
This framework has been tested with trusted keys support provided via TEE but I wasn't able to test it with a TPM device as I don't possess one. It would be really helpful if others could test this patch-set using a TPM device.
With the "CONFIG_HEADER_TEST" and "CONFIG_KERNEL_HEADER_TEST" config options enabled, which is required for linux-next, it fails to build.
Mimi
Hi Mimi,
On Wed, 14 Aug 2019 at 18:54, Mimi Zohar zohar@kernel.org wrote:
Hi Sumit,
On Tue, 2019-08-13 at 13:22 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
This patch-set is an outcome of discussion here [1]. It has evolved very much since v1 to create, consolidate and generalize trusted keys subsystem.
This framework has been tested with trusted keys support provided via TEE but I wasn't able to test it with a TPM device as I don't possess one. It would be really helpful if others could test this patch-set using a TPM device.
With the "CONFIG_HEADER_TEST" and "CONFIG_KERNEL_HEADER_TEST" config options enabled, which is required for linux-next, it fails to build.
TBH, I wasn't aware about this test feature for headers. It looks like the header which fails this test is "include/keys/trusted_tpm.h" which is basically a rename of "include/keys/trusted.h" plus changes in this patch-set.
And "include/keys/trusted.h" header is already put under blacklist here: "include/Kbuild +68" as it fails to build. So its that rename due to which build failure is observed now.
It seems to be an easy fix for this build failure via following changes:
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 7b593447920b..ca1bec0ef65d 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ #ifndef __TRUSTED_TPM_H #define __TRUSTED_TPM_H
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h> + /* implementation specific TPM constants */ #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
So I will include above changes in this patch-set and also remove "include/keys/trusted.h" header from the blacklist.
-Sumit
Mimi
On Thu, 2019-08-15 at 18:33 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Hi Mimi,
On Wed, 14 Aug 2019 at 18:54, Mimi Zohar zohar@kernel.org wrote:
Hi Sumit,
On Tue, 2019-08-13 at 13:22 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
This patch-set is an outcome of discussion here [1]. It has evolved very much since v1 to create, consolidate and generalize trusted keys subsystem.
This framework has been tested with trusted keys support provided via TEE but I wasn't able to test it with a TPM device as I don't possess one. It would be really helpful if others could test this patch-set using a TPM device.
With the "CONFIG_HEADER_TEST" and "CONFIG_KERNEL_HEADER_TEST" config options enabled, which is required for linux-next, it fails to build.
TBH, I wasn't aware about this test feature for headers.
It's new to me too.
It looks like the header which fails this test is "include/keys/trusted_tpm.h" which is basically a rename of "include/keys/trusted.h" plus changes in this patch-set.
And "include/keys/trusted.h" header is already put under blacklist here: "include/Kbuild +68" as it fails to build. So its that rename due to which build failure is observed now.
It seems to be an easy fix for this build failure via following changes:
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 7b593447920b..ca1bec0ef65d 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ #ifndef __TRUSTED_TPM_H #define __TRUSTED_TPM_H
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
/* implementation specific TPM constants */ #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
So I will include above changes in this patch-set and also remove "include/keys/trusted.h" header from the blacklist.
That works, thanks. With this patch set, at least the EVM trusted key is properly being decrypted by the encrypted key with both a TPM 1.2 and PTT TPM 2.0. My laptop still boots properly. Over the weekend I'll try to actually review the patches.
Mimi
On Thu, 15 Aug 2019 at 20:36, Mimi Zohar zohar@kernel.org wrote:
On Thu, 2019-08-15 at 18:33 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
Hi Mimi,
On Wed, 14 Aug 2019 at 18:54, Mimi Zohar zohar@kernel.org wrote:
Hi Sumit,
On Tue, 2019-08-13 at 13:22 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
This patch-set is an outcome of discussion here [1]. It has evolved very much since v1 to create, consolidate and generalize trusted keys subsystem.
This framework has been tested with trusted keys support provided via TEE but I wasn't able to test it with a TPM device as I don't possess one. It would be really helpful if others could test this patch-set using a TPM device.
With the "CONFIG_HEADER_TEST" and "CONFIG_KERNEL_HEADER_TEST" config options enabled, which is required for linux-next, it fails to build.
TBH, I wasn't aware about this test feature for headers.
It's new to me too.
It looks like the header which fails this test is "include/keys/trusted_tpm.h" which is basically a rename of "include/keys/trusted.h" plus changes in this patch-set.
And "include/keys/trusted.h" header is already put under blacklist here: "include/Kbuild +68" as it fails to build. So its that rename due to which build failure is observed now.
It seems to be an easy fix for this build failure via following changes:
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 7b593447920b..ca1bec0ef65d 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ #ifndef __TRUSTED_TPM_H #define __TRUSTED_TPM_H
+#include <keys/trusted-type.h> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
/* implementation specific TPM constants */ #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 1024 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
So I will include above changes in this patch-set and also remove "include/keys/trusted.h" header from the blacklist.
That works, thanks. With this patch set, at least the EVM trusted key is properly being decrypted by the encrypted key with both a TPM 1.2 and PTT TPM 2.0. My laptop still boots properly. Over the weekend I'll try to actually review the patches.
Thanks Mimi for testing this patch-set.
-Sumit
Mimi
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:22:59PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
This patch-set is an outcome of discussion here [1]. It has evolved very much since v1 to create, consolidate and generalize trusted keys subsystem.
This framework has been tested with trusted keys support provided via TEE but I wasn't able to test it with a TPM device as I don't possess one. It would be really helpful if others could test this patch-set using a TPM device.
I think 1/5-4/5 make up a non-RFC patch set that needs to reviewed, tested and merged as a separate entity.
On the other hand 5/5 cannot be merged even if I fully agreed on the code change as without TEE patch it does not add any value for Linux.
To straighten up thing I would suggest that the next patch set version would only consists of the first four patches and we meld them to the shape so that we can land them to the mainline. Then it should be way more easier to concentrate the actual problem you are trying to resolve.
/Jarkko
On Mon, 19 Aug 2019 at 22:24, Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com wrote:
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 01:22:59PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
This patch-set is an outcome of discussion here [1]. It has evolved very much since v1 to create, consolidate and generalize trusted keys subsystem.
This framework has been tested with trusted keys support provided via TEE but I wasn't able to test it with a TPM device as I don't possess one. It would be really helpful if others could test this patch-set using a TPM device.
I think 1/5-4/5 make up a non-RFC patch set that needs to reviewed, tested and merged as a separate entity.
Okay.
On the other hand 5/5 cannot be merged even if I fully agreed on the code change as without TEE patch it does not add any value for Linux.
I agree here that 5/5 should go along with TEE patch-set. But if you look at initial v1 patch-set, the idea was to get feedback on trusted keys abstraction as a standalone patch along with testing using a TPM (1.x or 2.0).
Since Mimi has tested this patch-set with TPM (1.x & 2.0), I am happy to merge 5/5 with TEE patch-set. But it would be nice if I could get feedback on 5/5 before I send next version of TEE patch-set.
To straighten up thing I would suggest that the next patch set version would only consists of the first four patches and we meld them to the shape so that we can land them to the mainline. Then it should be way more easier to concentrate the actual problem you are trying to resolve.
Okay will send next patch-set version with first four patches only.
-Sumit
/Jarkko
On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 11:16:46AM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
I agree here that 5/5 should go along with TEE patch-set. But if you look at initial v1 patch-set, the idea was to get feedback on trusted keys abstraction as a standalone patch along with testing using a TPM (1.x or 2.0).
Since Mimi has tested this patch-set with TPM (1.x & 2.0), I am happy to merge 5/5 with TEE patch-set. But it would be nice if I could get feedback on 5/5 before I send next version of TEE patch-set.
OK, that is understandable. I'll check it out tomorrow.
/Jarkko
-
Jarkko Sakkinen -
Mimi Zohar -
Sumit Garg