git-lng-odp June 2017

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[COMMIT] branch next updated. v1.14.0.0-168-g008a23fc

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The branch, next has been updated via 008a23fcbc95191f7569df8e0deb4228e32b82cb (commit) via ca5dce2a7988212c5c409ea5e6c73614e6856536 (commit) via 7dd6b62bd918a3c9c48b45fa3a8fc4057bba9ee0 (commit) via 6c49c6e8b2201e41213b5399c9fc1b4203df6612 (commit) via dbed4b92dd4431c43271167ff8bf84f5e2877ced (commit) via 3187310d67e8810c67168e004bd9e056ae0dc213 (commit) via c8b13fd727910b4606d0712c5116006aed1792d8 (commit) via 67e3173ae6c966c5d722cc89c838126385f77fec (commit) via 2e59669a8746a54f04b9036ec8c2758f1a4c18c8 (commit) via e6396aa4d737fdce41c22628f9f77bb5a4ef3d3e (commit) via 95696c71a245dc045953a7d75dfc209ac1692ffe (commit) via 7f13493f5b8c41c8a83c65ecc6bb5763b84d4225 (commit) via af566ae11d48162d21c1e2648fa0b32d189067f8 (commit) via df537d430d94f85de8d6e1d0643e4c65387cf392 (commit) via 2d25eca61e25d099017ec2924278dcea6c4b821f (commit) via 71cfbe6fe938f7351b0c7637f290ae823132c207 (commit) via 30bf39b9afb2ee5703bac4227effc5808bb337d7 (commit) via aeb33071432c5d4d3c83f4556199fabdbc540164 (commit) via f0968cf3a4281cd45f7c490e1cfc84f93d2a37b6 (commit) via 798182b6930bc70fb759516dd8a3964bcf1812a8 (commit) via 0ee8b0ec8668734a43b57b3d76f37a1bdddf03fb (commit) via 196521caf9adb8eea4e0b2c79d6aa2f3240c3944 (commit) via 60b2c5a0bb2595f7ef5ca3bbc59097674a28ae1d (commit) via 562059f5d7841f30eab228ac218a46d1c3110010 (commit) from 14bebe8bac40b2b0f4a00cce4ef9a7031cc1b8cc (commit) Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those revisions in full, below. - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit 008a23fcbc95191f7569df8e0deb4228e32b82cb Author: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> Date: Fri Jun 2 15:58:52 2017 +0300 update API version number from v1.14.0.0 to v1.15.0.0 Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 58682564..bea4e1f3 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ AC_PREREQ([2.5]) # Set correct API version ########################################################################## m4_define([odpapi_generation_version], [1]) -m4_define([odpapi_major_version], [14]) +m4_define([odpapi_major_version], [15]) m4_define([odpapi_minor_version], [0]) m4_define([odpapi_point_version], [0]) m4_define([odpapi_version], @@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ AM_SILENT_RULES([yes]) # 3. if interfaces were removed, then use C+1:0:0 ########################################################################## -ODP_LIBSO_VERSION=114:0:1 +ODP_LIBSO_VERSION=115:0:2 AC_SUBST(ODP_LIBSO_VERSION) -ODPHELPER_LIBSO_VERSION=112:0:0 +ODPHELPER_LIBSO_VERSION=112:1:0 AC_SUBST(ODPHELPER_LIBSO_VERSION) # Checks for programs. commit ca5dce2a7988212c5c409ea5e6c73614e6856536 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:39 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: add HMAC-SHA-512 authentication support Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 3117f65d..6fc1907d 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha256_hmac[] = { {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, {.digest_len = 32, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; +static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha512_hmac[] = { +{.digest_len = 32, .key_len = 64, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, +{.digest_len = 64, .key_len = 64, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; + static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_aes_gcm[] = { {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 0, .aad_len = {.min = 8, .max = 12, .inc = 4} } }; @@ -555,7 +559,7 @@ int odp_crypto_capability(odp_crypto_capability_t *capa) capa->auths.bit.md5_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.sha1_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.sha256_hmac = 1; - capa->auths.bit.sha512_hmac = 0; + capa->auths.bit.sha512_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.aes_gcm = 1; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API @@ -636,6 +640,10 @@ int odp_crypto_auth_capability(odp_auth_alg_t auth, src = auth_capa_sha256_hmac; num = sizeof(auth_capa_sha256_hmac) / size; break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC: + src = auth_capa_sha512_hmac; + num = sizeof(auth_capa_sha512_hmac) / size; + break; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: src = auth_capa_aes_gcm; num = sizeof(auth_capa_aes_gcm) / size; @@ -761,6 +769,9 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: rc = process_auth_param(session, 32, EVP_sha256()); break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC: + rc = process_auth_param(session, 64, EVP_sha512()); + break; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES128_GCM: if (param->cipher_alg == ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_GCM) commit 7dd6b62bd918a3c9c48b45fa3a8fc4057bba9ee0 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:38 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: add SHA-1 authentication support Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 9e5a1190..3117f65d 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_md5_hmac[] = { {.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; +static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha1_hmac[] = { +{.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 20, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, +{.digest_len = 20, .key_len = 20, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; + static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha256_hmac[] = { {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, {.digest_len = 32, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; @@ -549,7 +553,7 @@ int odp_crypto_capability(odp_crypto_capability_t *capa) capa->auths.bit.null = 1; capa->auths.bit.md5_hmac = 1; - capa->auths.bit.sha1_hmac = 0; + capa->auths.bit.sha1_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.sha256_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.sha512_hmac = 0; capa->auths.bit.aes_gcm = 1; @@ -624,6 +628,10 @@ int odp_crypto_auth_capability(odp_auth_alg_t auth, src = auth_capa_md5_hmac; num = sizeof(auth_capa_md5_hmac) / size; break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC: + src = auth_capa_sha1_hmac; + num = sizeof(auth_capa_sha1_hmac) / size; + break; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: src = auth_capa_sha256_hmac; num = sizeof(auth_capa_sha256_hmac) / size; @@ -741,6 +749,9 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: rc = process_auth_param(session, 16, EVP_md5()); break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC: + rc = process_auth_param(session, 20, EVP_sha1()); + break; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_128: /* Fixed digest tag length with deprecated algo */ commit 6c49c6e8b2201e41213b5399c9fc1b4203df6612 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:37 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: add HMAC-SHA-512 test cases Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h index 84e67379..dd15b448 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha1(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha1(void); void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void); -void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512(void); +void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha512(void); +void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha512(void); /* test arrays: */ extern odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[]; diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 6129d82d..ae600e23 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ static const char *auth_alg_name(odp_auth_alg_t auth) return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC"; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC: + return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM"; default: @@ -139,6 +141,9 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC && !(capa.auths.bit.sha256_hmac)) rc = -1; + if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC && + !(capa.auths.bit.sha512_hmac)) + rc = -1; CU_ASSERT(!rc); CU_ASSERT((~capa.auths.all_bits & capa.hw_auths.all_bits) == 0); @@ -1391,9 +1396,106 @@ static int check_alg_hmac_sha512(void) return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC); } -void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512(void) +/* This test verifies the correctness of HMAC_SHA512 digest operation. + * The output check length is truncated to 32 bytes (256 bits) as + * returned by the crypto operation API call. + * Note that hash digest is a one-way operation. + * In addition the test verifies if the implementation can use the + * packet buffer as completion event buffer. + * */ +void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha512(void) { - printf(" TEST NOT IMPLEMENTED YET "); + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_length) / + sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_length[0])); + + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + auth_key.data = hmac_sha512_reference_key[i]; + auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_key[i]); + + if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key.length, + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha512_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_digest[i], + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN); + } +} + +void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha512(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + uint8_t wrong_digest[HMAC_SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; + + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_length) / + sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_length[0])); + + unsigned int i; + + memset(wrong_digest, 0xa5, sizeof(wrong_digest)); + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + auth_key.data = hmac_sha512_reference_key[i]; + auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_key[i]); + + if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key.length, + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha512_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_digest[i], + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN); + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 1, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha512_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + wrong_digest, + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN); + } } int crypto_suite_sync_init(void) @@ -1461,7 +1563,9 @@ odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[] = { check_alg_hmac_sha256), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256, check_alg_hmac_sha256), - ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512, + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha512, + check_alg_hmac_sha512), + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha512, check_alg_hmac_sha512), ODP_TEST_INFO_NULL, }; diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index 1de54964..bd8bf347 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -397,4 +397,54 @@ static uint8_t hmac_sha1_reference_digest[][HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0x11, 0xcd, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x9a, 0xf4 }, }; +static uint8_t hmac_sha512_reference_key[][HMAC_SHA512_KEY_LEN] = { + { 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b }, + + /* "Jefe" */ + { 0x4a, 0x65, 0x66, 0x65 }, + + { 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa } +}; + +static uint32_t hmac_sha512_reference_length[] = { 8, 28, 50 }; + +static uint8_t +hmac_sha512_reference_plaintext[][HMAC_SHA512_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { + /* "Hi There" */ + { 0x48, 0x69, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x65}, + + /* what do ya want for nothing?*/ + { 0x77, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x20, + 0x79, 0x61, 0x20, 0x77, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, + 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3f }, + + { 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd } +}; + +static uint8_t hmac_sha512_reference_digest[][HMAC_SHA512_DIGEST_LEN] = { + { 0x87, 0xaa, 0x7c, 0xde, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x61, 0x9d, + 0x4f, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0x24, 0x1a, 0x1d, 0x6c, 0xb0, + 0x23, 0x79, 0xf4, 0xe2, 0xce, 0x4e, 0xc2, 0x78, + 0x7a, 0xd0, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x7c, 0xde }, + + { 0x16, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0x19, 0xe2, + 0xe3, 0x95, 0xfb, 0xe7, 0x3b, 0x56, 0xe0, 0xa3, + 0x87, 0xbd, 0x64, 0x22, 0x2e, 0x83, 0x1f, 0xd6, + 0x10, 0x27, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0xea, 0x25, 0x05, 0x54 }, + + { 0xfa, 0x73, 0xb0, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x84, + 0xef, 0xb0, 0xf0, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x0b, 0xe9, + 0xb1, 0xb5, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x1a, 0x36, + 0x55, 0xf8, 0x3e, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x39 } +}; + #endif diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h index 5c3ddcee..20a7ddba 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h @@ -41,4 +41,10 @@ #define HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN 20 #define HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN 12 +/* HMAC-SHA512 */ +#define HMAC_SHA512_KEY_LEN 64 +#define HMAC_SHA512_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 +#define HMAC_SHA512_DIGEST_LEN 64 +#define HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN 32 + #endif commit dbed4b92dd4431c43271167ff8bf84f5e2877ced Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:36 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: add HMAC-SHA-1 test cases Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h index 2a491c3c..84e67379 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h @@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void); void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void); void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void); -void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1(void); +void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha1(void); +void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha1(void); void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void); void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512(void); diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 4d8f7b54..6129d82d 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ static const char *auth_alg_name(odp_auth_alg_t auth) return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC"; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC: + return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: @@ -131,6 +133,9 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL && !(capa.auths.bit.null)) rc = -1; + if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC && + !(capa.auths.bit.sha1_hmac)) + rc = -1; if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC && !(capa.auths.bit.sha256_hmac)) rc = -1; @@ -1167,6 +1172,113 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) } } +static int check_alg_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC); +} + +/* This test verifies the correctness of HMAC_SHA1 digest operation. + * The output check length is truncated to 12 bytes (96 bits) as + * returned by the crypto operation API call. + * Note that hash digest is a one-way operation. + * In addition the test verifies if the implementation can use the + * packet buffer as completion event buffer. + * */ +void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_length) / + sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_length[0])); + + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + auth_key.data = hmac_sha1_reference_key[i]; + auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_key[i]); + + if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key.length, + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha1_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_digest[i], + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN); + } +} + +void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + uint8_t wrong_digest[HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN]; + + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_length) / + sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_length[0])); + + unsigned int i; + + memset(wrong_digest, 0xa5, sizeof(wrong_digest)); + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + auth_key.data = hmac_sha1_reference_key[i]; + auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_key[i]); + + if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key.length, + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha1_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_digest[i], + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN); + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 1, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha1_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + wrong_digest, + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN); + } +} + static int check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) { return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC); @@ -1274,16 +1386,6 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) } } -static int check_alg_hmac_sha1(void) -{ - return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC); -} - -void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1(void) -{ - printf(" TEST NOT IMPLEMENTED YET "); -} - static int check_alg_hmac_sha512(void) { return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC); @@ -1351,7 +1453,9 @@ odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[] = { check_alg_hmac_md5), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5, check_alg_hmac_md5), - ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1, + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha1, + check_alg_hmac_sha1), + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha1, check_alg_hmac_sha1), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256, check_alg_hmac_sha256), diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index 6d568b91..1de54964 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -353,4 +353,48 @@ static uint32_t hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[] = { 16, 16, 16 }; +static uint8_t hmac_sha1_reference_key[][HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN] = { + { 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b }, + + /* "Jefe" */ + { 0x4a, 0x65, 0x66, 0x65 }, + + { 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa } +}; + +static uint32_t hmac_sha1_reference_length[] = { 8, 28, 50 }; + +static uint8_t +hmac_sha1_reference_plaintext[][HMAC_SHA1_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { + /* "Hi There" */ + { 0x48, 0x69, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x65}, + + /* what do ya want for nothing?*/ + { 0x77, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x20, + 0x79, 0x61, 0x20, 0x77, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, + 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3f }, + + { 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd } +}; + +static uint8_t hmac_sha1_reference_digest[][HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN] = { + { 0xb6, 0x17, 0x31, 0x86, 0x55, 0x05, + 0x72, 0x64, 0xe2, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0xb6 }, + + { 0xef, 0xfc, 0xdf, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0xeb, + 0x2f, 0xa2, 0xd2, 0x74, 0x16, 0xd5 }, + + { 0x12, 0x5d, 0x73, 0x42, 0xb9, 0xac, + 0x11, 0xcd, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x9a, 0xf4 }, +}; + #endif diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h index c1521dd7..5c3ddcee 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h @@ -35,4 +35,10 @@ #define HMAC_SHA256_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 #define HMAC_SHA256_DIGEST_LEN 32 +/* HMAC-SHA1 */ +#define HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN 20 +#define HMAC_SHA1_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 +#define HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN 20 +#define HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN 12 + #endif commit 3187310d67e8810c67168e004bd9e056ae0dc213 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:35 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: add tests for NULL cipher Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h index 4d810f62..2a491c3c 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ #include "odp_cunit_common.h" /* test functions: */ +void crypto_test_enc_alg_null(void); +void crypto_test_dec_alg_null(void); void crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc(void); void crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc_ovr_iv(void); void crypto_test_dec_alg_3des_cbc(void); diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 470c5bc5..4d8f7b54 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -430,6 +430,73 @@ static int check_auth_options(odp_auth_alg_t auth, uint32_t key_len, return 1; } +static int check_alg_null(void) +{ + return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL); +} + +void crypto_test_enc_alg_null(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0}; + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(null_reference_length) / + sizeof(null_reference_length[0])); + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + if (!check_cipher_options(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + cipher_key.length, iv.length)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + NULL, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + null_reference_plaintext[i], + null_reference_length[i], + null_reference_plaintext[i], + null_reference_length[i], NULL, 0); + } +} + +void crypto_test_dec_alg_null(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(null_reference_length) / + sizeof(null_reference_length[0])); + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + if (!check_cipher_options(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + cipher_key.length, iv.length)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + NULL, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + null_reference_plaintext[i], + null_reference_length[i], + null_reference_plaintext[i], + null_reference_length[i], NULL, 0); + } +} + static int check_alg_3des_cbc(void) { return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_3DES_CBC, ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL); @@ -1252,6 +1319,10 @@ int crypto_suite_async_init(void) } odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[] = { + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_enc_alg_null, + check_alg_null), + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_dec_alg_null, + check_alg_null), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc, check_alg_3des_cbc), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_dec_alg_3des_cbc, diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index 0d36c249..6d568b91 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ #define _ODP_TEST_CRYPTO_VECTORS_H_ #include "test_vectors_len.h" + +/** length in bytes */ +static uint32_t null_reference_length[] = { 8, 16 }; + +static uint8_t +null_reference_plaintext[][NULL_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { + {0x32, 0x6a, 0x49, 0x4c, 0xd3, 0x3f, 0xe7, 0x56}, + + {0x84, 0x40, 0x1f, 0x78, 0xfe, 0x6c, 0x10, 0x87, 0x6d, 0x8e, 0xa2, 0x30, + 0x94, 0xea, 0x53, 0x09} +}; + /* TDES-CBC reference vectors, according to * "http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/des/DESMMT.pdf" */ diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h index 80fd927b..c1521dd7 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ #ifndef TEST_VECTORS_LEN_ #define TEST_VECTORS_LEN_ +/* NULL */ +#define NULL_MAX_DATA_LEN 16 + /* TDES-CBC */ #define TDES_CBC_KEY_LEN 24 #define TDES_CBC_IV_LEN 8 commit c8b13fd727910b4606d0712c5116006aed1792d8 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:34 2017 +0300 crypto: linux-generic: add capabilities for CIPHER_NULL and AUTH_NULL There is no point in having separate cases for NULL algorithms. Add capabilities returning 0 key/digest/iv length. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 32fece30..9e5a1190 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ * * Keep sorted: first by key length, then by IV length */ +static const odp_crypto_cipher_capability_t cipher_capa_null[] = { +{.key_len = 0, .iv_len = 0} }; + static const odp_crypto_cipher_capability_t cipher_capa_des[] = { {.key_len = 24, .iv_len = 8} }; @@ -51,6 +54,9 @@ static const odp_crypto_cipher_capability_t cipher_capa_aes_gcm[] = { * * Keep sorted: first by digest length, then by key length */ +static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_null[] = { +{.digest_len = 0, .key_len = 0, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; + static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_md5_hmac[] = { {.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; @@ -571,8 +577,8 @@ int odp_crypto_cipher_capability(odp_cipher_alg_t cipher, switch (cipher) { case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL: - src = NULL; - num = 0; + src = cipher_capa_null; + num = sizeof(cipher_capa_null) / size; break; case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_DES: src = cipher_capa_des; @@ -611,8 +617,8 @@ int odp_crypto_auth_capability(odp_auth_alg_t auth, switch (auth) { case ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL: - src = NULL; - num = 0; + src = auth_capa_null; + num = sizeof(auth_capa_null) / size; break; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: src = auth_capa_md5_hmac; diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index c89d04f9..470c5bc5 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -141,13 +141,8 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, num = odp_crypto_cipher_capability(cipher_alg, cipher_capa, MAX_ALG_CAPA); - if (cipher_alg != ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL) { - CU_ASSERT(num > 0); - found = 0; - } else { - CU_ASSERT(num == 0); - found = 1; - } + CU_ASSERT(num > 0); + found = 0; CU_ASSERT(num <= MAX_ALG_CAPA); @@ -167,13 +162,8 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, num = odp_crypto_auth_capability(auth_alg, auth_capa, MAX_ALG_CAPA); - if (auth_alg != ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL) { - CU_ASSERT(num > 0); - found = 0; - } else { - CU_ASSERT(num == 0); - found = 1; - } + CU_ASSERT(num > 0); + found = 0; CU_ASSERT(num <= MAX_ALG_CAPA); commit 67e3173ae6c966c5d722cc89c838126385f77fec Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:33 2017 +0300 test: odp_crypto: bail out if odp_crypto_session_create failed If odp_crypto_session_create() failed, there is no point in checking/freeing session, as it might not have been updated. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c b/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c index 6a58294a..c3dd6d38 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c +++ b/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c @@ -665,34 +665,32 @@ run_measure_one_config(crypto_args_t *cargs, int rc = 0; if (create_session_from_config(&session, config, cargs)) - rc = -1; - - if (!rc) { - if (cargs->payload_length) { - rc = run_measure_one(cargs, config, &session, - cargs->payload_length, &result); - if (!rc) { - print_result_header(); - print_result(cargs, cargs->payload_length, - config, &result); - } - } else { - unsigned i; + return -1; + if (cargs->payload_length) { + rc = run_measure_one(cargs, config, &session, + cargs->payload_length, &result); + if (!rc) { print_result_header(); - for (i = 0; i < num_payloads; i++) { - rc = run_measure_one(cargs, config, &session, - payloads[i], &result); - if (rc) - break; - print_result(cargs, payloads[i], - config, &result); - } + print_result(cargs, cargs->payload_length, + config, &result); + } + } else { + unsigned i; + + print_result_header(); + for (i = 0; i < num_payloads; i++) { + rc = run_measure_one(cargs, config, &session, + payloads[i], &result); + if (rc) + break; + print_result(cargs, payloads[i], + config, &result); } } - if (session != ODP_CRYPTO_SESSION_INVALID) - odp_crypto_session_destroy(session); + odp_crypto_session_destroy(session); + return rc; } commit 2e59669a8746a54f04b9036ec8c2758f1a4c18c8 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:32 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: NULL session->next pointer on session allocation Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index ea7c7026..32fece30 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -88,8 +88,10 @@ odp_crypto_generic_session_t *alloc_session(void) odp_spinlock_lock(&global->lock); session = global->free; - if (session) + if (session) { global->free = session->next; + session->next = NULL; + } odp_spinlock_unlock(&global->lock); return session; commit e6396aa4d737fdce41c22628f9f77bb5a4ef3d3e Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:31 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: make en/decryption work across packet segments Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 7ea90fb9..ea7c7026 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -190,14 +190,122 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_check(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, } static +int internal_encrypt(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, odp_crypto_op_param_t *param) +{ + odp_packet_t pkt = param->out_pkt; + unsigned in_pos = param->cipher_range.offset; + unsigned out_pos = param->cipher_range.offset; + unsigned in_len = param->cipher_range.length; + uint8_t block[2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned block_len = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)); + int cipher_len; + int ret; + + while (in_len > 0) { + uint32_t seglen = 0; /* GCC */ + uint8_t *insegaddr = odp_packet_offset(pkt, in_pos, + &seglen, NULL); + unsigned inseglen = in_len < seglen ? in_len : seglen; + + /* There should be at least 1 additional block in out buffer */ + if (inseglen > block_len) { + unsigned part = inseglen - block_len; + + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, insegaddr, &cipher_len, + insegaddr, part); + in_pos += part; + in_len -= part; + insegaddr += part; + inseglen -= part; + + out_pos += cipher_len; + } + + /* Use temporal storage */ + if (inseglen > 0) { + unsigned part = inseglen; + + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, block, &cipher_len, + insegaddr, part); + in_pos += part; + in_len -= part; + insegaddr += part; + inseglen -= part; + + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(pkt, out_pos, + cipher_len, block); + out_pos += cipher_len; + } + } + + ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, block, &cipher_len); + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(pkt, out_pos, cipher_len, block); + + return ret; +} + +static +int internal_decrypt(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, odp_crypto_op_param_t *param) +{ + odp_packet_t pkt = param->out_pkt; + unsigned in_pos = param->cipher_range.offset; + unsigned out_pos = param->cipher_range.offset; + unsigned in_len = param->cipher_range.length; + uint8_t block[2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned block_len = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)); + int cipher_len; + int ret; + + while (in_len > 0) { + uint32_t seglen = 0; /* GCC */ + uint8_t *insegaddr = odp_packet_offset(pkt, in_pos, + &seglen, NULL); + unsigned inseglen = in_len < seglen ? in_len : seglen; + + /* There should be at least 1 additional block in out buffer */ + if (inseglen > block_len) { + unsigned part = inseglen - block_len; + + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, insegaddr, &cipher_len, + insegaddr, part); + in_pos += part; + in_len -= part; + insegaddr += part; + inseglen -= part; + + out_pos += cipher_len; + } + + /* Use temporal storage */ + if (inseglen > 0) { + unsigned part = inseglen; + + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, block, &cipher_len, + insegaddr, part); + in_pos += part; + in_len -= part; + insegaddr += part; + inseglen -= part; + + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(pkt, out_pos, + cipher_len, block); + out_pos += cipher_len; + } + } + + ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, block, &cipher_len); + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(pkt, out_pos, cipher_len, block); + + return ret; +} + +static odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; void *iv_ptr; - int cipher_len = 0; + int ret; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -206,9 +314,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Encrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, @@ -216,13 +321,12 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); - - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); + ret = internal_encrypt(ctx, param); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; + return ret <= 0 ? ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE : + ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } static @@ -230,10 +334,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; - int plain_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; + int ret; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -242,9 +344,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Decrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, @@ -252,13 +351,12 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); - - EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len); + ret = internal_decrypt(ctx, param); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; + return ret <= 0 ? ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE : + ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } static int process_cipher_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, @@ -293,13 +391,12 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; void *iv_ptr; - int cipher_len = 0; - uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; + int dummy_len = 0; + uint8_t block[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int ret; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -308,9 +405,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Encrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, @@ -322,18 +416,20 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ if (aad_len > 0) - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &cipher_len, + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &dummy_len, aad_head, aad_len); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); + ret = internal_encrypt(ctx, param); - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, - session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); + session->p.auth_digest_len, block); + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset, + session->p.auth_digest_len, block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; + return ret <= 0 ? ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE : + ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } static @@ -341,13 +437,12 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; - int plain_len = 0; + int dummy_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; - uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; + uint8_t block[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int ret; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -356,9 +451,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Decrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, @@ -368,22 +460,22 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + odp_packet_copy_to_mem(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset, + session->p.auth_digest_len, block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, - session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); + session->p.auth_digest_len, block); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ if (aad_len > 0) - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &plain_len, + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &dummy_len, aad_head, aad_len); - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); - - if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len) <= 0) - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_ICV_CHECK; + ret = internal_decrypt(ctx, param); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; + return ret <= 0 ? ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_ICV_CHECK : + ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, commit 95696c71a245dc045953a7d75dfc209ac1692ffe Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:30 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: make HMAC work across segmented packets Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 2ba077f9..7ea90fb9 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -112,29 +112,53 @@ null_crypto_routine(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param ODP_UNUSED, } static +void packet_hmac(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, + odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, + uint8_t *hash) +{ + odp_packet_t pkt = param->out_pkt; + uint32_t offset = param->auth_range.offset; + uint32_t len = param->auth_range.length; + HMAC_CTX ctx; + + ODP_ASSERT(offset + len <= odp_packet_len(pkt)); + + /* Hash it */ + HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); + HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, + session->auth.key, + session->auth.key_length, + session->auth.evp_md, + NULL); + + while (len > 0) { + uint32_t seglen = 0; /* GCC */ + void *mapaddr = odp_packet_offset(pkt, offset, &seglen, NULL); + uint32_t maclen = len > seglen ? seglen : len; + + HMAC_Update(&ctx, mapaddr, maclen); + offset += maclen; + len -= maclen; + } + + HMAC_Final(&ctx, hash, NULL); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); +} + +static odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_gen(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint8_t *icv = data; - uint32_t len = param->auth_range.length; uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to auth */ - data += param->auth_range.offset; - icv += param->hash_result_offset; - /* Hash it */ - HMAC(session->auth.evp_md, - session->auth.key, - session->auth.key_length, - data, - len, - hash, - NULL); + packet_hmac(param, session, hash); /* Copy to the output location */ - memcpy(icv, hash, session->auth.bytes); + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(param->out_pkt, + param->hash_result_offset, + session->auth.bytes, + hash); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -143,31 +167,19 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_check(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint8_t *icv = data; - uint32_t len = param->auth_range.length; uint32_t bytes = session->auth.bytes; uint8_t hash_in[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; uint8_t hash_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to auth */ - data += param->auth_range.offset; - icv += param->hash_result_offset; - /* Copy current value out and clear it before authentication */ - memset(hash_in, 0, sizeof(hash_in)); - memcpy(hash_in, icv, bytes); - memset(icv, 0, bytes); - memset(hash_out, 0, sizeof(hash_out)); + odp_packet_copy_to_mem(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset, + bytes, hash_in); + + _odp_packet_set_data(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset, + 0, bytes); /* Hash it */ - HMAC(session->auth.evp_md, - session->auth.key, - session->auth.key_length, - data, - len, - hash_out, - NULL); + packet_hmac(param, session, hash_out); /* Verify match */ if (0 != memcmp(hash_in, hash_out, bytes)) commit 7f13493f5b8c41c8a83c65ecc6bb5763b84d4225 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:29 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: merge AES-CBC and 3DES-CBC support There is now nearly no difference between AES-CBC and 3DES-CBC code. Merge it into generic 'cipher' support, easing adding support for other ciphers in future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h index f4f1948f..c3b70b23 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h +++ b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h @@ -40,18 +40,9 @@ struct odp_crypto_generic_session { struct { /* Copy of session IV data */ uint8_t iv_data[MAX_IV_LEN]; + uint8_t key_data[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - union { - struct { - uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - } des; - struct { - uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - } aes; - struct { - uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - } aes_gcm; - } data; + const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher; crypto_func_t func; } cipher; diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index bff712d1..2ba077f9 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_check(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, } static -odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, - odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) +odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, + odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); @@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Encrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.aes.key, NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, + session->cipher.key_data, NULL); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); @@ -214,8 +214,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, } static -odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, - odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) +odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, + odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); @@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Decrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.aes.key, NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, + session->cipher.key_data, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); @@ -249,20 +249,29 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } -static int process_aes_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) +static int process_cipher_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { - /* Verify IV len is either 0 or 16 */ - if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || (16 == session->p.iv.length))) + /* Verify Key len is valid */ + if ((uint32_t)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) != + session->p.cipher_key.length) return -1; - memcpy(session->cipher.data.aes.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + /* Verify IV len is correct */ + if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || + ((uint32_t)EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) == session->p.iv.length))) + return -1; + + session->cipher.evp_cipher = cipher; + + memcpy(session->cipher.key_data, session->p.cipher_key.data, session->p.cipher_key.length); /* Set function */ if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) - session->cipher.func = aes_encrypt; + session->cipher.func = cipher_encrypt; else - session->cipher.func = aes_decrypt; + session->cipher.func = cipher_decrypt; return 0; } @@ -292,8 +301,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Encrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, + session->cipher.key_data, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); @@ -340,8 +349,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Decrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, + session->cipher.key_data, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); @@ -365,15 +374,19 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } -static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) +static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { - /* Verify Key len is 16 */ - if (session->p.cipher_key.length != 16) + /* Verify Key len is valid */ + if ((uint32_t)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) != + session->p.cipher_key.length) return -1; - memcpy(session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + memcpy(session->cipher.key_data, session->p.cipher_key.data, session->p.cipher_key.length); + session->cipher.evp_cipher = cipher; + /* Set function */ if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) session->cipher.func = aes_gcm_encrypt; @@ -383,96 +396,6 @@ static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) return 0; } -static -odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, - odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) -{ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; - void *iv_ptr; - int cipher_len = 0; - - if (param->override_iv_ptr) - iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; - else if (session->p.iv.data) - iv_ptr = session->cipher.iv_data; - else - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - - /* Encrypt it */ - ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.des.key, NULL); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); - - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); - - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; -} - -static -odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, - odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) -{ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; - int plain_len = 0; - void *iv_ptr; - - if (param->override_iv_ptr) - iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; - else if (session->p.iv.data) - iv_ptr = session->cipher.iv_data; - else - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - - /* Decrypt it */ - ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.des.key, NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); - - EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len); - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); - - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; -} - -static int process_des_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) -{ - /* Verify IV len is either 0 or 8 */ - if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || (8 == session->p.iv.length))) - return -1; - - memcpy(session->cipher.data.des.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, - session->p.cipher_key.length); - - /* Set function */ - if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) - session->cipher.func = des_encrypt; - else - session->cipher.func = des_decrypt; - - return 0; -} - static int process_auth_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, uint32_t key_length, const EVP_MD *evp_md) @@ -656,13 +579,13 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, break; case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_DES: case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_3DES_CBC: - rc = process_des_param(session); + rc = process_cipher_param(session, EVP_des_ede3_cbc()); break; case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES_CBC: #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_CBC: #endif - rc = process_aes_param(session); + rc = process_cipher_param(session, EVP_aes_128_cbc()); break; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_GCM: @@ -674,7 +597,7 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, /* AES-GCM requires to do both auth and * cipher at the same time */ if (param->auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM || aes_gcm) - rc = process_aes_gcm_param(session); + rc = process_aes_gcm_param(session, EVP_aes_128_gcm()); else rc = -1; break; commit af566ae11d48162d21c1e2648fa0b32d189067f8 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:28 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: rewrite 3DES-CBC support using EVP functions Rewrite 3DES-CBC to use generic EVP interface following AES-GCM implementation. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h index d6fd0400..f4f1948f 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h +++ b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif -#include <openssl/des.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #define MAX_IV_LEN 64 @@ -44,9 +43,7 @@ struct odp_crypto_generic_session { union { struct { - DES_key_schedule ks1; - DES_key_schedule ks2; - DES_key_schedule ks3; + uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; } des; struct { uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index f503bd98..bff712d1 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -387,10 +387,11 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t len = param->cipher_range.length; - DES_cblock iv; + uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; void *iv_ptr; + int cipher_len = 0; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -399,24 +400,21 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv, iv_ptr, sizeof(iv)); - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher */ + /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ data += param->cipher_range.offset; + /* Encrypt it */ - DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(data, - data, - len, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks1, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks2, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks3, - &iv, - 1); + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.des.key, NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); + + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -425,9 +423,10 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t len = param->cipher_range.length; - DES_cblock iv; + uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; + int plain_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; if (param->override_iv_ptr) @@ -437,25 +436,21 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv, iv_ptr, sizeof(iv)); - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher */ + /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ data += param->cipher_range.offset; /* Decrypt it */ - DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(data, - data, - len, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks1, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks2, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks3, - &iv, - 0); + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.des.key, NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); + + EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -466,20 +461,15 @@ static int process_des_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || (8 == session->p.iv.length))) return -1; + memcpy(session->cipher.data.des.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + session->p.cipher_key.length); + /* Set function */ if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) session->cipher.func = des_encrypt; else session->cipher.func = des_decrypt; - /* Convert keys */ - DES_set_key((DES_cblock *)&session->p.cipher_key.data[0], - &session->cipher.data.des.ks1); - DES_set_key((DES_cblock *)&session->p.cipher_key.data[8], - &session->cipher.data.des.ks2); - DES_set_key((DES_cblock *)&session->p.cipher_key.data[16], - &session->cipher.data.des.ks3); - return 0; } commit df537d430d94f85de8d6e1d0643e4c65387cf392 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:27 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: rewrite AES-CBC support using EVP functions Rewrite AES-CBC to use generic EVP interface following AES-GCM implementation. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h index d1020dba..d6fd0400 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h +++ b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif #include <openssl/des.h> -#include <openssl/aes.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #define MAX_IV_LEN 64 @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ struct odp_crypto_generic_session { DES_key_schedule ks3; } des; struct { - AES_KEY key; + uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; } aes; struct { uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index ff3f1ac7..f503bd98 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t len = param->cipher_range.length; - unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; void *iv_ptr; + int cipher_len = 0; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -193,18 +194,21 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher */ + /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ data += param->cipher_range.offset; + /* Encrypt it */ - AES_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, &session->cipher.data.aes.key, - iv_enc, AES_ENCRYPT); + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.aes.key, NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); + + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -213,9 +217,10 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t len = param->cipher_range.length; - unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; + int plain_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; if (param->override_iv_ptr) @@ -225,18 +230,21 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher */ + /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Encrypt it */ - AES_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, &session->cipher.data.aes.key, - iv_enc, AES_DECRYPT); + + /* Decrypt it */ + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.aes.key, NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); + + EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -247,16 +255,14 @@ static int process_aes_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || (16 == session->p.iv.length))) return -1; + memcpy(session->cipher.data.aes.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + session->p.cipher_key.length); + /* Set function */ - if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) { + if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) session->cipher.func = aes_encrypt; - AES_set_encrypt_key(session->p.cipher_key.data, 128, - &session->cipher.data.aes.key); - } else { + else session->cipher.func = aes_decrypt; - AES_set_decrypt_key(session->p.cipher_key.data, 128, - &session->cipher.data.aes.key); - } return 0; } commit 2d25eca61e25d099017ec2924278dcea6c4b821f Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:26 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: explicitly disable padding for AES-GCM Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 3deec7de..ff3f1ac7 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ if (aad_len > 0) @@ -338,6 +339,7 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); commit 71cfbe6fe938f7351b0c7637f290ae823132c207 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:25 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: make AES-GCM thread safe Using single context for all operations is not thread safe: multiple threads can access the same context in parallel, affecting its internal state. Make AES-GCM functions use local context for en/decryption operations. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h index 515cefaa..d1020dba 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h +++ b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct odp_crypto_generic_session { AES_KEY key; } aes; struct { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; } aes_gcm; } data; crypto_func_t func; diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 3f298485..3deec7de 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -265,11 +265,13 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; void *iv_ptr; + int cipher_len = 0; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; if (param->override_iv_ptr) @@ -280,12 +282,14 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - uint8_t *plaindata = data + param->cipher_range.offset; + data += param->cipher_range.offset; /* Encrypt it */ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx; - int cipher_len = 0; - + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, NULL); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, + session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ @@ -293,13 +297,14 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &cipher_len, aad_head, aad_len); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, plaindata, &cipher_len, - plaindata, plain_len); + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, plaindata + cipher_len, &cipher_len); + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -307,10 +312,12 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; + int plain_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -322,11 +329,14 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - uint8_t *cipherdata = data + param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Encrypt it */ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx; - int plain_len = 0; + data += param->cipher_range.offset; + /* Decrypt it */ + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, NULL); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, + session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, @@ -337,12 +347,13 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &plain_len, aad_head, aad_len); - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, cipherdata, &plain_len, - cipherdata, cipher_len); + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); - if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, cipherdata + plain_len, &plain_len) <= 0) + if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len) <= 0) return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_ICV_CHECK; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -352,27 +363,14 @@ static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) if (session->p.cipher_key.length != 16) return -1; - /* Set function */ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = - session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + memcpy(session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + session->p.cipher_key.length); - if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) { + /* Set function */ + if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) session->cipher.func = aes_gcm_encrypt; - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL); - } else { + else session->cipher.func = aes_gcm_decrypt; - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL); - } - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, - session->p.iv.length, NULL); - if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) { - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, - session->p.cipher_key.data, NULL); - } else { - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, - session->p.cipher_key.data, NULL); - } return 0; } @@ -635,17 +633,16 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, /* Copy parameters */ session->p = *param; - /* Copy IV data */ - if (session->p.iv.data) { - if (session->p.iv.length > MAX_IV_LEN) { - ODP_DBG("Maximum IV length exceeded\n"); - free_session(session); - return -1; - } + if (session->p.iv.length > MAX_IV_LEN) { + ODP_DBG("Maximum IV length exceeded\n"); + free_session(session); + return -1; + } + /* Copy IV data */ + if (session->p.iv.data) memcpy(session->cipher.iv_data, session->p.iv.data, session->p.iv.length); - } /* Derive order */ if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == param->op) @@ -757,15 +754,8 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, int odp_crypto_session_destroy(odp_crypto_session_t session) { odp_crypto_generic_session_t *generic; - int aes_gcm = 0; generic = (odp_crypto_generic_session_t *)(intptr_t)session; -#if ODP_DEPRECATED_API - if (generic->p.cipher_alg == ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_GCM) - aes_gcm = 1; -#endif - if (generic->p.cipher_alg == ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES_GCM || aes_gcm) - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(generic->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx); memset(generic, 0, sizeof(*generic)); free_session(generic); return 0; commit 30bf39b9afb2ee5703bac4227effc5808bb337d7 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:24 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: remote extra memcpy in AES-GCM There is no need to memcpy IV if it gets passed to EVP functions. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 352cfa53..3f298485 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; - unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -280,13 +279,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ uint8_t *plaindata = data + param->cipher_range.offset; @@ -294,7 +286,7 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx; int cipher_len = 0; - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ if (aad_len > 0) @@ -319,7 +311,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; - unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -330,20 +321,13 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ uint8_t *cipherdata = data + param->cipher_range.offset; /* Encrypt it */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx; int plain_len = 0; - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); commit aeb33071432c5d4d3c83f4556199fabdbc540164 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:23 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: update AES-GCM support to reflect aad and auth_digest_len Make AES-GCM use recently introduced aad and auth_digest_len fields. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 91ef05ae..352cfa53 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -267,10 +267,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, { uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; - uint8_t *aad_head = data + param->auth_range.offset; - uint8_t *aad_tail = data + param->cipher_range.offset + - param->cipher_range.length; - uint32_t auth_len = param->auth_range.length; + const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; + uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -282,12 +280,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* All cipher data must be part of the authentication */ - if (param->auth_range.offset > param->cipher_range.offset || - param->auth_range.offset + auth_len < - param->cipher_range.offset + plain_len) - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE; - /* * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads @@ -305,23 +297,16 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ - if (aad_head < plaindata) { + if (aad_len > 0) EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &cipher_len, - aad_head, plaindata - aad_head); - } + aad_head, aad_len); EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, plaindata, &cipher_len, plaindata, plain_len); - cipher_len = plain_len; - - /* Authenticate footer data (if any) without encrypting them */ - if (aad_head + auth_len > plaindata + plain_len) { - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, NULL, aad_tail, - auth_len - (aad_tail - aad_head)); - } EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, plaindata + cipher_len, &cipher_len); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, 16, tag); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, + session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -332,10 +317,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, { uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; - uint8_t *aad_head = data + param->auth_range.offset; - uint8_t *aad_tail = data + param->cipher_range.offset + - param->cipher_range.length; - uint32_t auth_len = param->auth_range.length; + const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; + uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -347,12 +330,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* All cipher data must be part of the authentication */ - if (param->auth_range.offset > param->cipher_range.offset || - param->auth_range.offset + auth_len < - param->cipher_range.offset + cipher_len) - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE; - /* * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads @@ -368,25 +345,18 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, 16, tag); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, + session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ - if (aad_head < cipherdata) { + if (aad_len > 0) EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &plain_len, - aad_head, cipherdata - aad_head); - } + aad_head, aad_len); EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, cipherdata, &plain_len, cipherdata, cipher_len); - plain_len = cipher_len; - - /* Authenticate footer data (if any) without encrypting them */ - if (aad_head + auth_len > cipherdata + cipher_len) { - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, NULL, aad_tail, - auth_len - (aad_tail - aad_head)); - } - if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, cipherdata + cipher_len, &plain_len) <= 0) + if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, cipherdata + plain_len, &plain_len) <= 0) return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_ICV_CHECK; return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; @@ -770,6 +740,8 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES128_GCM: if (param->cipher_alg == ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_GCM) aes_gcm = 1; + /* Fixed digest tag length with deprecated algo */ + session->p.auth_digest_len = 16; /* Fallthrough */ #endif case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: commit f0968cf3a4281cd45f7c490e1cfc84f93d2a37b6 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:22 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: add SHA* capabilities for full length digests In addition to truncated digests (used by IPsec) add full-length capabilities to SHA* algos. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 472ee310..91ef05ae 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -52,10 +52,12 @@ static const odp_crypto_cipher_capability_t cipher_capa_aes_gcm[] = { * Keep sorted: first by digest length, then by key length */ static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_md5_hmac[] = { -{.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; +{.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, +{.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha256_hmac[] = { -{.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; +{.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, +{.digest_len = 32, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_aes_gcm[] = { {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 0, .aad_len = {.min = 8, .max = 12, .inc = 4} } }; commit 798182b6930bc70fb759516dd8a3964bcf1812a8 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:21 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: use auth_digest_len when calculating HMACs Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index a993542f..472ee310 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -522,7 +522,6 @@ static int process_des_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) } static int process_auth_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, - uint32_t bits, uint32_t key_length, const EVP_MD *evp_md) { @@ -535,7 +534,9 @@ static int process_auth_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, session->auth.evp_md = evp_md; /* Number of valid bytes */ - session->auth.bytes = bits / 8; + session->auth.bytes = session->p.auth_digest_len; + if (session->auth.bytes < (unsigned)EVP_MD_size(evp_md) / 2) + return -1; /* Convert keys */ session->auth.key_length = key_length; @@ -745,17 +746,23 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, session->auth.func = null_crypto_routine; rc = 0; break; - case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_96: + /* Fixed digest tag length with deprecated algo */ + session->p.auth_digest_len = 96 / 8; + /* Fallthrough */ #endif - rc = process_auth_param(session, 96, 16, EVP_md5()); + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: + rc = process_auth_param(session, 16, EVP_md5()); break; - case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_128: + /* Fixed digest tag length with deprecated algo */ + session->p.auth_digest_len = 128 / 8; + /* Fallthrough */ #endif - rc = process_auth_param(session, 128, 32, EVP_sha256()); + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: + rc = process_auth_param(session, 32, EVP_sha256()); break; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES128_GCM: commit 0ee8b0ec8668734a43b57b3d76f37a1bdddf03fb Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:20 2017 +0300 example: ipsec: set auth_digest_len Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c b/example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c index b2a91c24..dba0ea0a 100644 --- a/example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c +++ b/example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ int create_ipsec_cache_entry(sa_db_entry_t *cipher_sa, params.auth_alg = auth_sa->alg.u.auth; params.auth_key.data = auth_sa->key.data; params.auth_key.length = auth_sa->key.length; + params.auth_digest_len = auth_sa->icv_len; mode = auth_sa->mode; } else { params.auth_alg = ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL; commit 196521caf9adb8eea4e0b2c79d6aa2f3240c3944 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:19 2017 +0300 test: odp_crypto: update performance test to set auth_digest_length Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c b/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c index b3857973..6a58294a 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c +++ b/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c @@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ static uint8_t test_key24[24] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, typedef struct { const char *name; /**< Algorithm name */ odp_crypto_session_param_t session; /**< Prefilled crypto session params */ - unsigned int hash_adjust; /**< Size of hash */ } crypto_alg_config_t; /** @@ -209,9 +208,9 @@ static crypto_alg_config_t algs_config[] = { .auth_key = { .data = test_key16, .length = sizeof(test_key16) - } + }, + .auth_digest_len = 12, }, - .hash_adjust = 12 }, { .name = "null-hmac-md5-96", @@ -221,9 +220,9 @@ static crypto_alg_config_t algs_config[] = { .auth_key = { .data = test_key16, .length = sizeof(test_key16) - } + }, + .auth_digest_len = 12, }, - .hash_adjust = 12 }, }; @@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ run_measure_one(crypto_args_t *cargs, mem = odp_packet_data(params.out_pkt); print_mem("Immediately encrypted packet", mem, payload_length + - config->hash_adjust); + config->session.auth_digest_len); } if (!cargs->in_place) { if (cargs->reuse_packet) { @@ -611,7 +610,8 @@ run_measure_one(crypto_args_t *cargs, print_mem("Receieved encrypted packet", mem, payload_length + - config->hash_adjust); + config-> + session.auth_digest_len); } if (cargs->reuse_packet) { params.pkt = out_pkt; commit 60b2c5a0bb2595f7ef5ca3bbc59097674a28ae1d Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:18 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: explicitly pass AAD to crypto subsystem Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 3d09e374..c89d04f9 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, odp_crypto_key_t auth_key, odp_packet_data_range_t *cipher_range, odp_packet_data_range_t *auth_range, + uint8_t *aad, + uint32_t aad_len, const uint8_t *plaintext, unsigned int plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ciphertext, @@ -240,6 +242,9 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, if (op_iv_ptr) op_params.override_iv_ptr = op_iv_ptr; + op_params.aad.ptr = aad; + op_params.aad.length = aad_len; + op_params.hash_result_offset = plaintext_len; if (0 != digest_len) { memcpy(data_addr + op_params.hash_result_offset, @@ -472,6 +477,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, tdes_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], tdes_cbc_reference_length[i], tdes_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -508,6 +514,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, tdes_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], tdes_cbc_reference_length[i], tdes_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -548,6 +555,7 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_3des_cbc(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, tdes_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], tdes_cbc_reference_length[i], tdes_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], @@ -586,6 +594,7 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_3des_cbc_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, tdes_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], tdes_cbc_reference_length[i], tdes_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], @@ -634,7 +643,9 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -679,7 +690,9 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -730,10 +743,11 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + - aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + @@ -749,10 +763,11 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + - aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], wrong_digest, @@ -798,10 +813,11 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + - aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + @@ -817,10 +833,11 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + - aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], wrong_digest, @@ -865,6 +882,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_cbc(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, aes128_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_cbc_reference_length[i], aes128_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -901,6 +919,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_cbc_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, aes128_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_cbc_reference_length[i], aes128_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -941,6 +960,7 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_cbc(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, aes128_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], aes128_cbc_reference_length[i], aes128_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], @@ -979,6 +999,7 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_cbc_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, aes128_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], aes128_cbc_reference_length[i], aes128_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], @@ -1025,6 +1046,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1063,6 +1085,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1078,6 +1101,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1127,6 +1151,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1167,6 +1192,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1182,6 +1208,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index defbda45..0d36c249 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -137,31 +137,31 @@ static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_iv[][AES128_GCM_IV_LEN] = { 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xa1, 0xa3 } }; -static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_length[] = { 84, 72, 72, 40}; +static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_length[] = { 72, 64, 64, 28}; static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[] = { 16, 16, 16, 16}; +static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[] = { 12, 8, 8, 12}; + static odp_packet_data_range_t aes128_gcm_cipher_range[] = { - { .offset = 12, .length = 72 }, - { .offset = 8, .length = 64 }, - { .offset = 8, .length = 64 }, - { .offset = 12, .length = 28 }, + { .offset = 0, .length = 72 }, + { .offset = 0, .length = 64 }, + { .offset = 0, .length = 64 }, + { .offset = 0, .length = 28 }, }; -static odp_packet_data_range_t aes128_gcm_auth_range[] = { - { .offset = 0, .length = 84 }, - { .offset = 0, .length = 72 }, - { .offset = 0, .length = 72 }, - { .offset = 0, .length = 40 }, +static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_aad[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x43, 0x21, 0x87, 0x65, 0x43, 0x21, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0xa5, 0xf8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, }, + { 0x42, 0xf6, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, + 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, }, }; static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x43, 0x21, 0x87, 0x65, 0x43, 0x21, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* Plain */ - 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x00, 0x00, + { 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x4d, 0xb7, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x02, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x9b, 0xf1, 0x56, 0x38, 0xd3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, @@ -171,10 +171,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0x63, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x02, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01 }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0xa5, 0xf8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, - /* Plain */ - 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3e, 0x69, 0x8f, 0x00, 0x00, + { 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3e, 0x69, 0x8f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x4d, 0xcc, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x02, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x98, 0x00, 0x35, 0x00, 0x2a, 0x23, 0x43, 0xb2, 0xd0, 0x01, 0x00, @@ -183,10 +180,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0x65, 0x72, 0x63, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x02, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - /* Plain */ - 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xc5, 0x00, 0x00, + { 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xc5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0x40, 0x67, 0x93, 0x18, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x00, 0x07, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x00, 0x44, 0x00, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, @@ -195,11 +189,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01 }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x42, 0xf6, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, - 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, - /* Plain */ - 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1c, 0x42, 0xa2, 0x00, 0x00, + { 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1c, 0x42, 0xa2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0x44, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x67, 0x93, 0xb6, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x0a, 0x00, 0xf5, 0xff, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01 } @@ -207,10 +197,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x43, 0x21, 0x87, 0x65, 0x43, 0x21, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* Plain */ + { /* Plain */ 0xfe, 0xcf, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x72, 0x9d, 0x5b, 0x07, 0xdc, 0x30, 0xdf, 0x52, 0x8d, 0xd2, 0x2b, 0x76, 0x8d, 0x1b, 0x98, 0x73, 0x66, 0x96, 0xa6, 0xfd, @@ -224,9 +211,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0x45, 0x90, 0x18, 0x14, 0x8f, 0x6c, 0xbe, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x47, 0x96, 0x56, 0x2d, 0xfd, 0xb4 }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0xa5, 0xf8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, - /* Plain */ + { /* Plain */ 0xde, 0xb2, 0x2c, 0xd9, 0xb0, 0x7c, 0x72, 0xc1, 0x6e, 0x3a, 0x65, 0xbe, 0xeb, 0x8d, 0xf3, 0x04, 0xa5, 0xa5, 0x89, 0x7d, 0x33, 0xae, 0x53, 0x0f, @@ -238,9 +223,8 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { /* Digest */ 0x83, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0x3a, 0xa8, 0xbc, 0x6e, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x09, 0xe9, 0xd8, 0x5a, 0x41, 0xad, 0x4a }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - /* Plain */ + + { /* Plain */ 0x46, 0x88, 0xda, 0xf2, 0xf9, 0x73, 0xa3, 0x92, 0x73, 0x29, 0x09, 0xc3, 0x31, 0xd5, 0x6d, 0x60, 0xf6, 0x94, 0xab, 0xaa, 0x41, 0x4b, 0x5e, 0x7f, @@ -253,10 +237,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0xf8, 0x21, 0xd4, 0x96, 0xee, 0xb0, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x8a, 0xd2, 0xb6, 0x9e, 0x47, 0x99, 0xc7, 0x1d }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x42, 0xf6, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, - 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, - /* Plain */ + { /* Plain */ 0xfb, 0xa2, 0xca, 0x84, 0x5e, 0x5d, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0x2c, 0x3e, 0x6e, 0x86, 0xdd, 0x83, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0xc6, 0x57, 0x92, 0xcd, 0x1a, 0xf9, 0x13, commit 562059f5d7841f30eab228ac218a46d1c3110010 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:17 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: explicitly pass auth_digest_len to crypto subsystem Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index bfc9da3c..3d09e374 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, ses_params.cipher_key = cipher_key; ses_params.iv = ses_iv; ses_params.auth_key = auth_key; + ses_params.auth_digest_len = digest_len; rc = odp_crypto_session_create(&ses_params, &session, &status); CU_ASSERT_FATAL(!rc); @@ -620,7 +621,8 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm(void) cipher_key.length, iv.length)) continue; if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, - auth_key.length, AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN)) + auth_key.length, + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, @@ -639,7 +641,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm(void) aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); } } @@ -664,7 +666,8 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) cipher_key.length, iv.length)) continue; if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, - auth_key.length, AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN)) + auth_key.length, + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, @@ -683,7 +686,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); } } @@ -714,7 +717,8 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) cipher_key.length, iv.length)) continue; if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, - auth_key.length, AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN)) + auth_key.length, + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, @@ -728,12 +732,13 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN, + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, 1, @@ -746,11 +751,12 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN, + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], wrong_digest, - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); } } @@ -779,7 +785,8 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) cipher_key.length, iv.length)) continue; if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, - auth_key.length, AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN)) + auth_key.length, + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, @@ -793,12 +800,13 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN, + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, 1, @@ -811,11 +819,12 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN, + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], wrong_digest, - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); } } @@ -1004,7 +1013,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void) auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_md5_reference_key[i]); if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key.length, - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN)) + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, @@ -1020,7 +1029,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void) hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_digest[i], - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i]); } } @@ -1042,7 +1051,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_md5_reference_key[i]); if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key.length, - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN)) + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, @@ -1058,7 +1067,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_digest[i], - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i]); alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, 1, @@ -1073,7 +1082,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, wrong_digest, - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i]); } } @@ -1106,7 +1115,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void) if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key.length, - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN)) + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, @@ -1122,7 +1131,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void) hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_digest[i], - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i]); } } @@ -1146,7 +1155,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key.length, - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN)) + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, @@ -1162,7 +1171,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_digest[i], - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i]); alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, 1, @@ -1177,7 +1186,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, wrong_digest, - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i]); } } diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index a1cf4faf..defbda45 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_iv[][AES128_GCM_IV_LEN] = { static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_length[] = { 84, 72, 72, 40}; +static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[] = { 16, 16, 16, 16}; + static odp_packet_data_range_t aes128_gcm_cipher_range[] = { { .offset = 12, .length = 72 }, { .offset = 8, .length = 64 }, @@ -306,6 +308,10 @@ static uint8_t hmac_md5_reference_digest[][HMAC_MD5_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 } }; +static uint32_t hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[] = { + 12, 12, 12 +}; + static uint8_t hmac_sha256_reference_key[][HMAC_SHA256_KEY_LEN] = { { 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, @@ -350,4 +356,8 @@ static uint8_t hmac_sha256_reference_digest[][HMAC_SHA256_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7 } }; +static uint32_t hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[] = { + 16, 16, 16 +}; + #endif diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h index 4fbb5cd7..80fd927b 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h @@ -21,18 +21,15 @@ #define AES128_GCM_IV_LEN 12 #define AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN 106 #define AES128_GCM_DIGEST_LEN 16 -#define AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN 16 /* HMAC-MD5 */ #define HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN 16 #define HMAC_MD5_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 #define HMAC_MD5_DIGEST_LEN 16 -#define HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN 12 /* HMAC-SHA256 */ #define HMAC_SHA256_KEY_LEN 32 #define HMAC_SHA256_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 #define HMAC_SHA256_DIGEST_LEN 32 -#define HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN 16 #endif ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: configure.ac | 6 +- example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c | 1 + .../linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h | 17 +- platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c | 628 +++++++++++---------- test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c | 58 +- test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h | 8 +- .../validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c | 417 ++++++++++++-- .../validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h | 181 ++++-- .../validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h | 18 +- 9 files changed, 874 insertions(+), 460 deletions(-) hooks/post-receive --

6 years, 11 months

[COMMIT] branch api-next updated. v1.14.0.0-421-g57783b35

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The branch, api-next has been updated via 57783b35f4383bdfdd146f2a3333bbc8bb995896 (commit) via 904631219eab0af46cb99e8a56742401452ac2c3 (commit) via f7bd3a7bbb3613260ef2bad1e3ede5145571dd6c (commit) via d3602cb56413bb31b4535976dfd3dd723a16bfc9 (commit) via 908e27635dfe08e249407f4c4e53aa2c7ce12ea1 (commit) via d80e025c8baebed0305648737e528580b84fae2a (commit) via 33a0dad444fab1c1567083b289eac7727eab3b31 (commit) via ccb2cd5eb7383f46051dff2b1e7675ed54f635b2 (commit) via d8e4647baa7b1159480dfde4d5a2143146e8c6cb (commit) via 20cc38e36a52f70758c3464014f4f00a94d2139d (commit) via 9bb2a439ae2a8751df5a6007a7e242d7bcb963e5 (commit) via a6fa9f3e721dbdb99e2a0bac320f988930e5f874 (commit) via b2261b9485e6993642c5c0c7ea58abb8a2d356a9 (commit) via c969cc4e6f6e2e0cc5c4e407dd696be069cf4525 (commit) via 3a1832865c90865de3fd8bd30103995637e7851c (commit) via ab5a099937bc3d81f610fcfc2a98bfb7e677a06a (commit) via 9f506fecfcd408a8af0df0e9627795d0b1059730 (commit) via c184a9c8d35c10b30014e7538a862a7bc42556e7 (commit) from 9ebcb7c6e2f3226c915c39c81dcd1895dda3639b (commit) Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those revisions in full, below. - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit 57783b35f4383bdfdd146f2a3333bbc8bb995896 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:39 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: add HMAC-SHA-512 authentication support Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 3117f65d..6fc1907d 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha256_hmac[] = { {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, {.digest_len = 32, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; +static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha512_hmac[] = { +{.digest_len = 32, .key_len = 64, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, +{.digest_len = 64, .key_len = 64, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; + static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_aes_gcm[] = { {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 0, .aad_len = {.min = 8, .max = 12, .inc = 4} } }; @@ -555,7 +559,7 @@ int odp_crypto_capability(odp_crypto_capability_t *capa) capa->auths.bit.md5_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.sha1_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.sha256_hmac = 1; - capa->auths.bit.sha512_hmac = 0; + capa->auths.bit.sha512_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.aes_gcm = 1; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API @@ -636,6 +640,10 @@ int odp_crypto_auth_capability(odp_auth_alg_t auth, src = auth_capa_sha256_hmac; num = sizeof(auth_capa_sha256_hmac) / size; break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC: + src = auth_capa_sha512_hmac; + num = sizeof(auth_capa_sha512_hmac) / size; + break; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: src = auth_capa_aes_gcm; num = sizeof(auth_capa_aes_gcm) / size; @@ -761,6 +769,9 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: rc = process_auth_param(session, 32, EVP_sha256()); break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC: + rc = process_auth_param(session, 64, EVP_sha512()); + break; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES128_GCM: if (param->cipher_alg == ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_GCM) commit 904631219eab0af46cb99e8a56742401452ac2c3 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:38 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: add SHA-1 authentication support Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 9e5a1190..3117f65d 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_md5_hmac[] = { {.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; +static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha1_hmac[] = { +{.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 20, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, +{.digest_len = 20, .key_len = 20, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; + static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha256_hmac[] = { {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, {.digest_len = 32, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; @@ -549,7 +553,7 @@ int odp_crypto_capability(odp_crypto_capability_t *capa) capa->auths.bit.null = 1; capa->auths.bit.md5_hmac = 1; - capa->auths.bit.sha1_hmac = 0; + capa->auths.bit.sha1_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.sha256_hmac = 1; capa->auths.bit.sha512_hmac = 0; capa->auths.bit.aes_gcm = 1; @@ -624,6 +628,10 @@ int odp_crypto_auth_capability(odp_auth_alg_t auth, src = auth_capa_md5_hmac; num = sizeof(auth_capa_md5_hmac) / size; break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC: + src = auth_capa_sha1_hmac; + num = sizeof(auth_capa_sha1_hmac) / size; + break; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: src = auth_capa_sha256_hmac; num = sizeof(auth_capa_sha256_hmac) / size; @@ -741,6 +749,9 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: rc = process_auth_param(session, 16, EVP_md5()); break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC: + rc = process_auth_param(session, 20, EVP_sha1()); + break; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_128: /* Fixed digest tag length with deprecated algo */ commit f7bd3a7bbb3613260ef2bad1e3ede5145571dd6c Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:37 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: add HMAC-SHA-512 test cases Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h index 84e67379..dd15b448 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h @@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha1(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha1(void); void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void); -void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512(void); +void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha512(void); +void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha512(void); /* test arrays: */ extern odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[]; diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 6129d82d..ae600e23 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ static const char *auth_alg_name(odp_auth_alg_t auth) return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC"; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC: + return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM"; default: @@ -139,6 +141,9 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC && !(capa.auths.bit.sha256_hmac)) rc = -1; + if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC && + !(capa.auths.bit.sha512_hmac)) + rc = -1; CU_ASSERT(!rc); CU_ASSERT((~capa.auths.all_bits & capa.hw_auths.all_bits) == 0); @@ -1391,9 +1396,106 @@ static int check_alg_hmac_sha512(void) return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC); } -void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512(void) +/* This test verifies the correctness of HMAC_SHA512 digest operation. + * The output check length is truncated to 32 bytes (256 bits) as + * returned by the crypto operation API call. + * Note that hash digest is a one-way operation. + * In addition the test verifies if the implementation can use the + * packet buffer as completion event buffer. + * */ +void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha512(void) { - printf(" TEST NOT IMPLEMENTED YET "); + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_length) / + sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_length[0])); + + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + auth_key.data = hmac_sha512_reference_key[i]; + auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_key[i]); + + if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key.length, + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha512_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_digest[i], + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN); + } +} + +void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha512(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + uint8_t wrong_digest[HMAC_SHA512_DIGEST_LEN]; + + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_length) / + sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_length[0])); + + unsigned int i; + + memset(wrong_digest, 0xa5, sizeof(wrong_digest)); + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + auth_key.data = hmac_sha512_reference_key[i]; + auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_sha512_reference_key[i]); + + if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key.length, + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha512_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_digest[i], + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN); + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 1, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha512_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha512_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + wrong_digest, + HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN); + } } int crypto_suite_sync_init(void) @@ -1461,7 +1563,9 @@ odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[] = { check_alg_hmac_sha256), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256, check_alg_hmac_sha256), - ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512, + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha512, + check_alg_hmac_sha512), + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha512, check_alg_hmac_sha512), ODP_TEST_INFO_NULL, }; diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index 1de54964..bd8bf347 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -397,4 +397,54 @@ static uint8_t hmac_sha1_reference_digest[][HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0x11, 0xcd, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x9a, 0xf4 }, }; +static uint8_t hmac_sha512_reference_key[][HMAC_SHA512_KEY_LEN] = { + { 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b }, + + /* "Jefe" */ + { 0x4a, 0x65, 0x66, 0x65 }, + + { 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa } +}; + +static uint32_t hmac_sha512_reference_length[] = { 8, 28, 50 }; + +static uint8_t +hmac_sha512_reference_plaintext[][HMAC_SHA512_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { + /* "Hi There" */ + { 0x48, 0x69, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x65}, + + /* what do ya want for nothing?*/ + { 0x77, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x20, + 0x79, 0x61, 0x20, 0x77, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, + 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3f }, + + { 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd } +}; + +static uint8_t hmac_sha512_reference_digest[][HMAC_SHA512_DIGEST_LEN] = { + { 0x87, 0xaa, 0x7c, 0xde, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x61, 0x9d, + 0x4f, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0x24, 0x1a, 0x1d, 0x6c, 0xb0, + 0x23, 0x79, 0xf4, 0xe2, 0xce, 0x4e, 0xc2, 0x78, + 0x7a, 0xd0, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x7c, 0xde }, + + { 0x16, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0x19, 0xe2, + 0xe3, 0x95, 0xfb, 0xe7, 0x3b, 0x56, 0xe0, 0xa3, + 0x87, 0xbd, 0x64, 0x22, 0x2e, 0x83, 0x1f, 0xd6, + 0x10, 0x27, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0xea, 0x25, 0x05, 0x54 }, + + { 0xfa, 0x73, 0xb0, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x84, + 0xef, 0xb0, 0xf0, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x0b, 0xe9, + 0xb1, 0xb5, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x1a, 0x36, + 0x55, 0xf8, 0x3e, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x39 } +}; + #endif diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h index 5c3ddcee..20a7ddba 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h @@ -41,4 +41,10 @@ #define HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN 20 #define HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN 12 +/* HMAC-SHA512 */ +#define HMAC_SHA512_KEY_LEN 64 +#define HMAC_SHA512_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 +#define HMAC_SHA512_DIGEST_LEN 64 +#define HMAC_SHA512_256_CHECK_LEN 32 + #endif commit d3602cb56413bb31b4535976dfd3dd723a16bfc9 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:36 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: add HMAC-SHA-1 test cases Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h index 2a491c3c..84e67379 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h @@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void); void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void); void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void); -void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1(void); +void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha1(void); +void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha1(void); void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void); void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512(void); diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 4d8f7b54..6129d82d 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ static const char *auth_alg_name(odp_auth_alg_t auth) return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC"; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC: + return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: return "ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC"; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: @@ -131,6 +133,9 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL && !(capa.auths.bit.null)) rc = -1; + if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC && + !(capa.auths.bit.sha1_hmac)) + rc = -1; if (auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC && !(capa.auths.bit.sha256_hmac)) rc = -1; @@ -1167,6 +1172,113 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) } } +static int check_alg_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC); +} + +/* This test verifies the correctness of HMAC_SHA1 digest operation. + * The output check length is truncated to 12 bytes (96 bits) as + * returned by the crypto operation API call. + * Note that hash digest is a one-way operation. + * In addition the test verifies if the implementation can use the + * packet buffer as completion event buffer. + * */ +void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_length) / + sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_length[0])); + + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + auth_key.data = hmac_sha1_reference_key[i]; + auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_key[i]); + + if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key.length, + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha1_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_digest[i], + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN); + } +} + +void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + uint8_t wrong_digest[HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN]; + + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_length) / + sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_length[0])); + + unsigned int i; + + memset(wrong_digest, 0xa5, sizeof(wrong_digest)); + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + auth_key.data = hmac_sha1_reference_key[i]; + auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_sha1_reference_key[i]); + + if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key.length, + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha1_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_digest[i], + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN); + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 1, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + iv.data, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + hmac_sha1_reference_plaintext[i], + hmac_sha1_reference_length[i], + NULL, 0, + wrong_digest, + HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN); + } +} + static int check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) { return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC); @@ -1274,16 +1386,6 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) } } -static int check_alg_hmac_sha1(void) -{ - return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC); -} - -void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1(void) -{ - printf(" TEST NOT IMPLEMENTED YET "); -} - static int check_alg_hmac_sha512(void) { return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC); @@ -1351,7 +1453,9 @@ odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[] = { check_alg_hmac_md5), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5, check_alg_hmac_md5), - ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1, + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha1, + check_alg_hmac_sha1), + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha1, check_alg_hmac_sha1), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256, check_alg_hmac_sha256), diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index 6d568b91..1de54964 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -353,4 +353,48 @@ static uint32_t hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[] = { 16, 16, 16 }; +static uint8_t hmac_sha1_reference_key[][HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN] = { + { 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, + 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b }, + + /* "Jefe" */ + { 0x4a, 0x65, 0x66, 0x65 }, + + { 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa } +}; + +static uint32_t hmac_sha1_reference_length[] = { 8, 28, 50 }; + +static uint8_t +hmac_sha1_reference_plaintext[][HMAC_SHA1_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { + /* "Hi There" */ + { 0x48, 0x69, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x65}, + + /* what do ya want for nothing?*/ + { 0x77, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x20, + 0x79, 0x61, 0x20, 0x77, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, + 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68, + 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3f }, + + { 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd } +}; + +static uint8_t hmac_sha1_reference_digest[][HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN] = { + { 0xb6, 0x17, 0x31, 0x86, 0x55, 0x05, + 0x72, 0x64, 0xe2, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0xb6 }, + + { 0xef, 0xfc, 0xdf, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0xeb, + 0x2f, 0xa2, 0xd2, 0x74, 0x16, 0xd5 }, + + { 0x12, 0x5d, 0x73, 0x42, 0xb9, 0xac, + 0x11, 0xcd, 0x91, 0xa3, 0x9a, 0xf4 }, +}; + #endif diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h index c1521dd7..5c3ddcee 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h @@ -35,4 +35,10 @@ #define HMAC_SHA256_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 #define HMAC_SHA256_DIGEST_LEN 32 +/* HMAC-SHA1 */ +#define HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN 20 +#define HMAC_SHA1_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 +#define HMAC_SHA1_DIGEST_LEN 20 +#define HMAC_SHA1_96_CHECK_LEN 12 + #endif commit 908e27635dfe08e249407f4c4e53aa2c7ce12ea1 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:35 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: add tests for NULL cipher Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h index 4d810f62..2a491c3c 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ #include "odp_cunit_common.h" /* test functions: */ +void crypto_test_enc_alg_null(void); +void crypto_test_dec_alg_null(void); void crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc(void); void crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc_ovr_iv(void); void crypto_test_dec_alg_3des_cbc(void); diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 470c5bc5..4d8f7b54 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -430,6 +430,73 @@ static int check_auth_options(odp_auth_alg_t auth, uint32_t key_len, return 1; } +static int check_alg_null(void) +{ + return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL); +} + +void crypto_test_enc_alg_null(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0}; + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(null_reference_length) / + sizeof(null_reference_length[0])); + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + if (!check_cipher_options(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + cipher_key.length, iv.length)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + NULL, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + null_reference_plaintext[i], + null_reference_length[i], + null_reference_plaintext[i], + null_reference_length[i], NULL, 0); + } +} + +void crypto_test_dec_alg_null(void) +{ + odp_crypto_key_t cipher_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }, + auth_key = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + odp_crypto_iv_t iv = { .data = NULL, .length = 0 }; + unsigned int test_vec_num = (sizeof(null_reference_length) / + sizeof(null_reference_length[0])); + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < test_vec_num; i++) { + if (!check_cipher_options(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + cipher_key.length, iv.length)) + continue; + + alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, + 0, + ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, + iv, + NULL, + cipher_key, + ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, + auth_key, + NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, + null_reference_plaintext[i], + null_reference_length[i], + null_reference_plaintext[i], + null_reference_length[i], NULL, 0); + } +} + static int check_alg_3des_cbc(void) { return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_3DES_CBC, ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL); @@ -1252,6 +1319,10 @@ int crypto_suite_async_init(void) } odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[] = { + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_enc_alg_null, + check_alg_null), + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_dec_alg_null, + check_alg_null), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc, check_alg_3des_cbc), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_dec_alg_3des_cbc, diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index 0d36c249..6d568b91 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ #define _ODP_TEST_CRYPTO_VECTORS_H_ #include "test_vectors_len.h" + +/** length in bytes */ +static uint32_t null_reference_length[] = { 8, 16 }; + +static uint8_t +null_reference_plaintext[][NULL_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { + {0x32, 0x6a, 0x49, 0x4c, 0xd3, 0x3f, 0xe7, 0x56}, + + {0x84, 0x40, 0x1f, 0x78, 0xfe, 0x6c, 0x10, 0x87, 0x6d, 0x8e, 0xa2, 0x30, + 0x94, 0xea, 0x53, 0x09} +}; + /* TDES-CBC reference vectors, according to * "http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/des/DESMMT.pdf" */ diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h index 80fd927b..c1521dd7 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ #ifndef TEST_VECTORS_LEN_ #define TEST_VECTORS_LEN_ +/* NULL */ +#define NULL_MAX_DATA_LEN 16 + /* TDES-CBC */ #define TDES_CBC_KEY_LEN 24 #define TDES_CBC_IV_LEN 8 commit d80e025c8baebed0305648737e528580b84fae2a Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:34 2017 +0300 crypto: linux-generic: add capabilities for CIPHER_NULL and AUTH_NULL There is no point in having separate cases for NULL algorithms. Add capabilities returning 0 key/digest/iv length. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 32fece30..9e5a1190 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ * * Keep sorted: first by key length, then by IV length */ +static const odp_crypto_cipher_capability_t cipher_capa_null[] = { +{.key_len = 0, .iv_len = 0} }; + static const odp_crypto_cipher_capability_t cipher_capa_des[] = { {.key_len = 24, .iv_len = 8} }; @@ -51,6 +54,9 @@ static const odp_crypto_cipher_capability_t cipher_capa_aes_gcm[] = { * * Keep sorted: first by digest length, then by key length */ +static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_null[] = { +{.digest_len = 0, .key_len = 0, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; + static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_md5_hmac[] = { {.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; @@ -571,8 +577,8 @@ int odp_crypto_cipher_capability(odp_cipher_alg_t cipher, switch (cipher) { case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL: - src = NULL; - num = 0; + src = cipher_capa_null; + num = sizeof(cipher_capa_null) / size; break; case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_DES: src = cipher_capa_des; @@ -611,8 +617,8 @@ int odp_crypto_auth_capability(odp_auth_alg_t auth, switch (auth) { case ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL: - src = NULL; - num = 0; + src = auth_capa_null; + num = sizeof(auth_capa_null) / size; break; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: src = auth_capa_md5_hmac; diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index c89d04f9..470c5bc5 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -141,13 +141,8 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, num = odp_crypto_cipher_capability(cipher_alg, cipher_capa, MAX_ALG_CAPA); - if (cipher_alg != ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL) { - CU_ASSERT(num > 0); - found = 0; - } else { - CU_ASSERT(num == 0); - found = 1; - } + CU_ASSERT(num > 0); + found = 0; CU_ASSERT(num <= MAX_ALG_CAPA); @@ -167,13 +162,8 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, num = odp_crypto_auth_capability(auth_alg, auth_capa, MAX_ALG_CAPA); - if (auth_alg != ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL) { - CU_ASSERT(num > 0); - found = 0; - } else { - CU_ASSERT(num == 0); - found = 1; - } + CU_ASSERT(num > 0); + found = 0; CU_ASSERT(num <= MAX_ALG_CAPA); commit 33a0dad444fab1c1567083b289eac7727eab3b31 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:33 2017 +0300 test: odp_crypto: bail out if odp_crypto_session_create failed If odp_crypto_session_create() failed, there is no point in checking/freeing session, as it might not have been updated. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c b/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c index 6a58294a..c3dd6d38 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c +++ b/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c @@ -665,34 +665,32 @@ run_measure_one_config(crypto_args_t *cargs, int rc = 0; if (create_session_from_config(&session, config, cargs)) - rc = -1; - - if (!rc) { - if (cargs->payload_length) { - rc = run_measure_one(cargs, config, &session, - cargs->payload_length, &result); - if (!rc) { - print_result_header(); - print_result(cargs, cargs->payload_length, - config, &result); - } - } else { - unsigned i; + return -1; + if (cargs->payload_length) { + rc = run_measure_one(cargs, config, &session, + cargs->payload_length, &result); + if (!rc) { print_result_header(); - for (i = 0; i < num_payloads; i++) { - rc = run_measure_one(cargs, config, &session, - payloads[i], &result); - if (rc) - break; - print_result(cargs, payloads[i], - config, &result); - } + print_result(cargs, cargs->payload_length, + config, &result); + } + } else { + unsigned i; + + print_result_header(); + for (i = 0; i < num_payloads; i++) { + rc = run_measure_one(cargs, config, &session, + payloads[i], &result); + if (rc) + break; + print_result(cargs, payloads[i], + config, &result); } } - if (session != ODP_CRYPTO_SESSION_INVALID) - odp_crypto_session_destroy(session); + odp_crypto_session_destroy(session); + return rc; } commit ccb2cd5eb7383f46051dff2b1e7675ed54f635b2 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:32 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: NULL session->next pointer on session allocation Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index ea7c7026..32fece30 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -88,8 +88,10 @@ odp_crypto_generic_session_t *alloc_session(void) odp_spinlock_lock(&global->lock); session = global->free; - if (session) + if (session) { global->free = session->next; + session->next = NULL; + } odp_spinlock_unlock(&global->lock); return session; commit d8e4647baa7b1159480dfde4d5a2143146e8c6cb Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:31 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: make en/decryption work across packet segments Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 7ea90fb9..ea7c7026 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -190,14 +190,122 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_check(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, } static +int internal_encrypt(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, odp_crypto_op_param_t *param) +{ + odp_packet_t pkt = param->out_pkt; + unsigned in_pos = param->cipher_range.offset; + unsigned out_pos = param->cipher_range.offset; + unsigned in_len = param->cipher_range.length; + uint8_t block[2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned block_len = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)); + int cipher_len; + int ret; + + while (in_len > 0) { + uint32_t seglen = 0; /* GCC */ + uint8_t *insegaddr = odp_packet_offset(pkt, in_pos, + &seglen, NULL); + unsigned inseglen = in_len < seglen ? in_len : seglen; + + /* There should be at least 1 additional block in out buffer */ + if (inseglen > block_len) { + unsigned part = inseglen - block_len; + + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, insegaddr, &cipher_len, + insegaddr, part); + in_pos += part; + in_len -= part; + insegaddr += part; + inseglen -= part; + + out_pos += cipher_len; + } + + /* Use temporal storage */ + if (inseglen > 0) { + unsigned part = inseglen; + + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, block, &cipher_len, + insegaddr, part); + in_pos += part; + in_len -= part; + insegaddr += part; + inseglen -= part; + + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(pkt, out_pos, + cipher_len, block); + out_pos += cipher_len; + } + } + + ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, block, &cipher_len); + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(pkt, out_pos, cipher_len, block); + + return ret; +} + +static +int internal_decrypt(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, odp_crypto_op_param_t *param) +{ + odp_packet_t pkt = param->out_pkt; + unsigned in_pos = param->cipher_range.offset; + unsigned out_pos = param->cipher_range.offset; + unsigned in_len = param->cipher_range.length; + uint8_t block[2 * EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + unsigned block_len = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)); + int cipher_len; + int ret; + + while (in_len > 0) { + uint32_t seglen = 0; /* GCC */ + uint8_t *insegaddr = odp_packet_offset(pkt, in_pos, + &seglen, NULL); + unsigned inseglen = in_len < seglen ? in_len : seglen; + + /* There should be at least 1 additional block in out buffer */ + if (inseglen > block_len) { + unsigned part = inseglen - block_len; + + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, insegaddr, &cipher_len, + insegaddr, part); + in_pos += part; + in_len -= part; + insegaddr += part; + inseglen -= part; + + out_pos += cipher_len; + } + + /* Use temporal storage */ + if (inseglen > 0) { + unsigned part = inseglen; + + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, block, &cipher_len, + insegaddr, part); + in_pos += part; + in_len -= part; + insegaddr += part; + inseglen -= part; + + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(pkt, out_pos, + cipher_len, block); + out_pos += cipher_len; + } + } + + ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, block, &cipher_len); + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(pkt, out_pos, cipher_len, block); + + return ret; +} + +static odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; void *iv_ptr; - int cipher_len = 0; + int ret; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -206,9 +314,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Encrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, @@ -216,13 +321,12 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); - - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); + ret = internal_encrypt(ctx, param); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; + return ret <= 0 ? ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE : + ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } static @@ -230,10 +334,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; - int plain_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; + int ret; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -242,9 +344,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Decrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, @@ -252,13 +351,12 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); - - EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len); + ret = internal_decrypt(ctx, param); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; + return ret <= 0 ? ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE : + ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } static int process_cipher_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, @@ -293,13 +391,12 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; void *iv_ptr; - int cipher_len = 0; - uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; + int dummy_len = 0; + uint8_t block[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int ret; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -308,9 +405,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Encrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, @@ -322,18 +416,20 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ if (aad_len > 0) - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &cipher_len, + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &dummy_len, aad_head, aad_len); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); + ret = internal_encrypt(ctx, param); - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, - session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); + session->p.auth_digest_len, block); + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset, + session->p.auth_digest_len, block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; + return ret <= 0 ? ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE : + ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } static @@ -341,13 +437,12 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; - int plain_len = 0; + int dummy_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; - uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; + uint8_t block[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int ret; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -356,9 +451,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Decrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, @@ -368,22 +460,22 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + odp_packet_copy_to_mem(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset, + session->p.auth_digest_len, block); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, - session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); + session->p.auth_digest_len, block); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ if (aad_len > 0) - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &plain_len, + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &dummy_len, aad_head, aad_len); - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); - - if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len) <= 0) - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_ICV_CHECK; + ret = internal_decrypt(ctx, param); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; + return ret <= 0 ? ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_ICV_CHECK : + ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, commit 20cc38e36a52f70758c3464014f4f00a94d2139d Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:30 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: make HMAC work across segmented packets Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 2ba077f9..7ea90fb9 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -112,29 +112,53 @@ null_crypto_routine(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param ODP_UNUSED, } static +void packet_hmac(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, + odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, + uint8_t *hash) +{ + odp_packet_t pkt = param->out_pkt; + uint32_t offset = param->auth_range.offset; + uint32_t len = param->auth_range.length; + HMAC_CTX ctx; + + ODP_ASSERT(offset + len <= odp_packet_len(pkt)); + + /* Hash it */ + HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx); + HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, + session->auth.key, + session->auth.key_length, + session->auth.evp_md, + NULL); + + while (len > 0) { + uint32_t seglen = 0; /* GCC */ + void *mapaddr = odp_packet_offset(pkt, offset, &seglen, NULL); + uint32_t maclen = len > seglen ? seglen : len; + + HMAC_Update(&ctx, mapaddr, maclen); + offset += maclen; + len -= maclen; + } + + HMAC_Final(&ctx, hash, NULL); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); +} + +static odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_gen(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint8_t *icv = data; - uint32_t len = param->auth_range.length; uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to auth */ - data += param->auth_range.offset; - icv += param->hash_result_offset; - /* Hash it */ - HMAC(session->auth.evp_md, - session->auth.key, - session->auth.key_length, - data, - len, - hash, - NULL); + packet_hmac(param, session, hash); /* Copy to the output location */ - memcpy(icv, hash, session->auth.bytes); + odp_packet_copy_from_mem(param->out_pkt, + param->hash_result_offset, + session->auth.bytes, + hash); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -143,31 +167,19 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_check(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint8_t *icv = data; - uint32_t len = param->auth_range.length; uint32_t bytes = session->auth.bytes; uint8_t hash_in[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; uint8_t hash_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to auth */ - data += param->auth_range.offset; - icv += param->hash_result_offset; - /* Copy current value out and clear it before authentication */ - memset(hash_in, 0, sizeof(hash_in)); - memcpy(hash_in, icv, bytes); - memset(icv, 0, bytes); - memset(hash_out, 0, sizeof(hash_out)); + odp_packet_copy_to_mem(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset, + bytes, hash_in); + + _odp_packet_set_data(param->out_pkt, param->hash_result_offset, + 0, bytes); /* Hash it */ - HMAC(session->auth.evp_md, - session->auth.key, - session->auth.key_length, - data, - len, - hash_out, - NULL); + packet_hmac(param, session, hash_out); /* Verify match */ if (0 != memcmp(hash_in, hash_out, bytes)) commit 9bb2a439ae2a8751df5a6007a7e242d7bcb963e5 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:29 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: merge AES-CBC and 3DES-CBC support There is now nearly no difference between AES-CBC and 3DES-CBC code. Merge it into generic 'cipher' support, easing adding support for other ciphers in future. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h index f4f1948f..c3b70b23 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h +++ b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h @@ -40,18 +40,9 @@ struct odp_crypto_generic_session { struct { /* Copy of session IV data */ uint8_t iv_data[MAX_IV_LEN]; + uint8_t key_data[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - union { - struct { - uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - } des; - struct { - uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - } aes; - struct { - uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - } aes_gcm; - } data; + const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher; crypto_func_t func; } cipher; diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index bff712d1..2ba077f9 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -178,8 +178,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t auth_check(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, } static -odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, - odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) +odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, + odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); @@ -199,8 +199,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Encrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.aes.key, NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, + session->cipher.key_data, NULL); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); @@ -214,8 +214,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, } static -odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, - odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) +odp_crypto_alg_err_t cipher_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, + odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); @@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Decrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.aes.key, NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, + session->cipher.key_data, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); @@ -249,20 +249,29 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } -static int process_aes_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) +static int process_cipher_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { - /* Verify IV len is either 0 or 16 */ - if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || (16 == session->p.iv.length))) + /* Verify Key len is valid */ + if ((uint32_t)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) != + session->p.cipher_key.length) return -1; - memcpy(session->cipher.data.aes.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + /* Verify IV len is correct */ + if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || + ((uint32_t)EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) == session->p.iv.length))) + return -1; + + session->cipher.evp_cipher = cipher; + + memcpy(session->cipher.key_data, session->p.cipher_key.data, session->p.cipher_key.length); /* Set function */ if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) - session->cipher.func = aes_encrypt; + session->cipher.func = cipher_encrypt; else - session->cipher.func = aes_decrypt; + session->cipher.func = cipher_decrypt; return 0; } @@ -292,8 +301,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Encrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, + session->cipher.key_data, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); @@ -340,8 +349,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, /* Decrypt it */ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, session->cipher.evp_cipher, NULL, + session->cipher.key_data, NULL); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); @@ -365,15 +374,19 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } -static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) +static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { - /* Verify Key len is 16 */ - if (session->p.cipher_key.length != 16) + /* Verify Key len is valid */ + if ((uint32_t)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) != + session->p.cipher_key.length) return -1; - memcpy(session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + memcpy(session->cipher.key_data, session->p.cipher_key.data, session->p.cipher_key.length); + session->cipher.evp_cipher = cipher; + /* Set function */ if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) session->cipher.func = aes_gcm_encrypt; @@ -383,96 +396,6 @@ static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) return 0; } -static -odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, - odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) -{ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; - void *iv_ptr; - int cipher_len = 0; - - if (param->override_iv_ptr) - iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; - else if (session->p.iv.data) - iv_ptr = session->cipher.iv_data; - else - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - - /* Encrypt it */ - ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.des.key, NULL); - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); - - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); - - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; -} - -static -odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, - odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) -{ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; - uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; - int plain_len = 0; - void *iv_ptr; - - if (param->override_iv_ptr) - iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; - else if (session->p.iv.data) - iv_ptr = session->cipher.iv_data; - else - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - data += param->cipher_range.offset; - - /* Decrypt it */ - ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, - session->cipher.data.des.key, NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); - - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); - - EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len); - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); - - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; -} - -static int process_des_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) -{ - /* Verify IV len is either 0 or 8 */ - if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || (8 == session->p.iv.length))) - return -1; - - memcpy(session->cipher.data.des.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, - session->p.cipher_key.length); - - /* Set function */ - if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) - session->cipher.func = des_encrypt; - else - session->cipher.func = des_decrypt; - - return 0; -} - static int process_auth_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, uint32_t key_length, const EVP_MD *evp_md) @@ -656,13 +579,13 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, break; case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_DES: case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_3DES_CBC: - rc = process_des_param(session); + rc = process_cipher_param(session, EVP_des_ede3_cbc()); break; case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES_CBC: #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_CBC: #endif - rc = process_aes_param(session); + rc = process_cipher_param(session, EVP_aes_128_cbc()); break; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_GCM: @@ -674,7 +597,7 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, /* AES-GCM requires to do both auth and * cipher at the same time */ if (param->auth_alg == ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM || aes_gcm) - rc = process_aes_gcm_param(session); + rc = process_aes_gcm_param(session, EVP_aes_128_gcm()); else rc = -1; break; commit a6fa9f3e721dbdb99e2a0bac320f988930e5f874 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:28 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: rewrite 3DES-CBC support using EVP functions Rewrite 3DES-CBC to use generic EVP interface following AES-GCM implementation. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h index d6fd0400..f4f1948f 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h +++ b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif -#include <openssl/des.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #define MAX_IV_LEN 64 @@ -44,9 +43,7 @@ struct odp_crypto_generic_session { union { struct { - DES_key_schedule ks1; - DES_key_schedule ks2; - DES_key_schedule ks3; + uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; } des; struct { uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index f503bd98..bff712d1 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -387,10 +387,11 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t len = param->cipher_range.length; - DES_cblock iv; + uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; void *iv_ptr; + int cipher_len = 0; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -399,24 +400,21 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv, iv_ptr, sizeof(iv)); - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher */ + /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ data += param->cipher_range.offset; + /* Encrypt it */ - DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(data, - data, - len, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks1, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks2, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks3, - &iv, - 1); + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.des.key, NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); + + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -425,9 +423,10 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t len = param->cipher_range.length; - DES_cblock iv; + uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; + int plain_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; if (param->override_iv_ptr) @@ -437,25 +436,21 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t des_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv, iv_ptr, sizeof(iv)); - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher */ + /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ data += param->cipher_range.offset; /* Decrypt it */ - DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(data, - data, - len, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks1, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks2, - &session->cipher.data.des.ks3, - &iv, - 0); + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.des.key, NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); + + EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -466,20 +461,15 @@ static int process_des_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || (8 == session->p.iv.length))) return -1; + memcpy(session->cipher.data.des.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + session->p.cipher_key.length); + /* Set function */ if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) session->cipher.func = des_encrypt; else session->cipher.func = des_decrypt; - /* Convert keys */ - DES_set_key((DES_cblock *)&session->p.cipher_key.data[0], - &session->cipher.data.des.ks1); - DES_set_key((DES_cblock *)&session->p.cipher_key.data[8], - &session->cipher.data.des.ks2); - DES_set_key((DES_cblock *)&session->p.cipher_key.data[16], - &session->cipher.data.des.ks3); - return 0; } commit b2261b9485e6993642c5c0c7ea58abb8a2d356a9 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:27 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: rewrite AES-CBC support using EVP functions Rewrite AES-CBC to use generic EVP interface following AES-GCM implementation. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h index d1020dba..d6fd0400 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h +++ b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif #include <openssl/des.h> -#include <openssl/aes.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #define MAX_IV_LEN 64 @@ -50,7 +49,7 @@ struct odp_crypto_generic_session { DES_key_schedule ks3; } des; struct { - AES_KEY key; + uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; } aes; struct { uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index ff3f1ac7..f503bd98 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -181,10 +181,11 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t len = param->cipher_range.length; - unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; void *iv_ptr; + int cipher_len = 0; if (param->override_iv_ptr) iv_ptr = param->override_iv_ptr; @@ -193,18 +194,21 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher */ + /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ data += param->cipher_range.offset; + /* Encrypt it */ - AES_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, &session->cipher.data.aes.key, - iv_enc, AES_ENCRYPT); + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.aes.key, NULL); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); + + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -213,9 +217,10 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); - uint32_t len = param->cipher_range.length; - unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; + int plain_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; if (param->override_iv_ptr) @@ -225,18 +230,21 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher */ + /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ data += param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Encrypt it */ - AES_cbc_encrypt(data, data, len, &session->cipher.data.aes.key, - iv_enc, AES_DECRYPT); + + /* Decrypt it */ + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.aes.key, NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); + + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); + + EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -247,16 +255,14 @@ static int process_aes_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) if (!((0 == session->p.iv.length) || (16 == session->p.iv.length))) return -1; + memcpy(session->cipher.data.aes.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + session->p.cipher_key.length); + /* Set function */ - if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) { + if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) session->cipher.func = aes_encrypt; - AES_set_encrypt_key(session->p.cipher_key.data, 128, - &session->cipher.data.aes.key); - } else { + else session->cipher.func = aes_decrypt; - AES_set_decrypt_key(session->p.cipher_key.data, 128, - &session->cipher.data.aes.key); - } return 0; } commit c969cc4e6f6e2e0cc5c4e407dd696be069cf4525 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:26 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: explicitly disable padding for AES-GCM Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 3deec7de..ff3f1ac7 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ if (aad_len > 0) @@ -338,6 +339,7 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); commit 3a1832865c90865de3fd8bd30103995637e7851c Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:25 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: make AES-GCM thread safe Using single context for all operations is not thread safe: multiple threads can access the same context in parallel, affecting its internal state. Make AES-GCM functions use local context for en/decryption operations. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h index 515cefaa..d1020dba 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h +++ b/platform/linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct odp_crypto_generic_session { AES_KEY key; } aes; struct { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; + uint8_t key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; } aes_gcm; } data; crypto_func_t func; diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 3f298485..3deec7de 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -265,11 +265,13 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; void *iv_ptr; + int cipher_len = 0; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; if (param->override_iv_ptr) @@ -280,12 +282,14 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - uint8_t *plaindata = data + param->cipher_range.offset; + data += param->cipher_range.offset; /* Encrypt it */ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx; - int cipher_len = 0; - + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, NULL); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, + session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ @@ -293,13 +297,14 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &cipher_len, aad_head, aad_len); - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, plaindata, &cipher_len, - plaindata, plain_len); + EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &cipher_len, data, plain_len); - EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, plaindata + cipher_len, &cipher_len); + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + cipher_len, &cipher_len); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -307,10 +312,12 @@ static odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; + int plain_len = 0; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -322,11 +329,14 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ - uint8_t *cipherdata = data + param->cipher_range.offset; - /* Encrypt it */ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx; - int plain_len = 0; + data += param->cipher_range.offset; + /* Decrypt it */ + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, + session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, NULL); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, + session->p.iv.length, NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, @@ -337,12 +347,13 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &plain_len, aad_head, aad_len); - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, cipherdata, &plain_len, - cipherdata, cipher_len); + EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &plain_len, data, cipher_len); - if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, cipherdata + plain_len, &plain_len) <= 0) + if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, data + plain_len, &plain_len) <= 0) return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_ICV_CHECK; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -352,27 +363,14 @@ static int process_aes_gcm_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) if (session->p.cipher_key.length != 16) return -1; - /* Set function */ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = - session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + memcpy(session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.key, session->p.cipher_key.data, + session->p.cipher_key.length); - if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) { + /* Set function */ + if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) session->cipher.func = aes_gcm_encrypt; - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL); - } else { + else session->cipher.func = aes_gcm_decrypt; - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL); - } - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, - session->p.iv.length, NULL); - if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == session->p.op) { - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, - session->p.cipher_key.data, NULL); - } else { - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, - session->p.cipher_key.data, NULL); - } return 0; } @@ -635,17 +633,16 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, /* Copy parameters */ session->p = *param; - /* Copy IV data */ - if (session->p.iv.data) { - if (session->p.iv.length > MAX_IV_LEN) { - ODP_DBG("Maximum IV length exceeded\n"); - free_session(session); - return -1; - } + if (session->p.iv.length > MAX_IV_LEN) { + ODP_DBG("Maximum IV length exceeded\n"); + free_session(session); + return -1; + } + /* Copy IV data */ + if (session->p.iv.data) memcpy(session->cipher.iv_data, session->p.iv.data, session->p.iv.length); - } /* Derive order */ if (ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE == param->op) @@ -757,15 +754,8 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, int odp_crypto_session_destroy(odp_crypto_session_t session) { odp_crypto_generic_session_t *generic; - int aes_gcm = 0; generic = (odp_crypto_generic_session_t *)(intptr_t)session; -#if ODP_DEPRECATED_API - if (generic->p.cipher_alg == ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_GCM) - aes_gcm = 1; -#endif - if (generic->p.cipher_alg == ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES_GCM || aes_gcm) - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(generic->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx); memset(generic, 0, sizeof(*generic)); free_session(generic); return 0; commit ab5a099937bc3d81f610fcfc2a98bfb7e677a06a Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:24 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: remote extra memcpy in AES-GCM There is no need to memcpy IV if it gets passed to EVP functions. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 352cfa53..3f298485 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; - unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -280,13 +279,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ uint8_t *plaindata = data + param->cipher_range.offset; @@ -294,7 +286,7 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx; int cipher_len = 0; - EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ if (aad_len > 0) @@ -319,7 +311,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; - unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -330,20 +321,13 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* - * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV - * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads - * we could get corruption. - */ - memcpy(iv_enc, iv_ptr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - /* Adjust pointer for beginning of area to cipher/auth */ uint8_t *cipherdata = data + param->cipher_range.offset; /* Encrypt it */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = session->cipher.data.aes_gcm.ctx; int plain_len = 0; - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); commit 9f506fecfcd408a8af0df0e9627795d0b1059730 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:23 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: update AES-GCM support to reflect aad and auth_digest_len Make AES-GCM use recently introduced aad and auth_digest_len fields. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 91ef05ae..352cfa53 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -267,10 +267,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, { uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); uint32_t plain_len = param->cipher_range.length; - uint8_t *aad_head = data + param->auth_range.offset; - uint8_t *aad_tail = data + param->cipher_range.offset + - param->cipher_range.length; - uint32_t auth_len = param->auth_range.length; + const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; + uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -282,12 +280,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* All cipher data must be part of the authentication */ - if (param->auth_range.offset > param->cipher_range.offset || - param->auth_range.offset + auth_len < - param->cipher_range.offset + plain_len) - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE; - /* * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads @@ -305,23 +297,16 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_encrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ - if (aad_head < plaindata) { + if (aad_len > 0) EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &cipher_len, - aad_head, plaindata - aad_head); - } + aad_head, aad_len); EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, plaindata, &cipher_len, plaindata, plain_len); - cipher_len = plain_len; - - /* Authenticate footer data (if any) without encrypting them */ - if (aad_head + auth_len > plaindata + plain_len) { - EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, NULL, aad_tail, - auth_len - (aad_tail - aad_head)); - } EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, plaindata + cipher_len, &cipher_len); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, 16, tag); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, + session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; } @@ -332,10 +317,8 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, { uint8_t *data = odp_packet_data(param->out_pkt); uint32_t cipher_len = param->cipher_range.length; - uint8_t *aad_head = data + param->auth_range.offset; - uint8_t *aad_tail = data + param->cipher_range.offset + - param->cipher_range.length; - uint32_t auth_len = param->auth_range.length; + const uint8_t *aad_head = param->aad.ptr; + uint32_t aad_len = param->aad.length; unsigned char iv_enc[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; void *iv_ptr; uint8_t *tag = data + param->hash_result_offset; @@ -347,12 +330,6 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, else return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_IV_INVALID; - /* All cipher data must be part of the authentication */ - if (param->auth_range.offset > param->cipher_range.offset || - param->auth_range.offset + auth_len < - param->cipher_range.offset + cipher_len) - return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_DATA_SIZE; - /* * Create a copy of the IV. The DES library modifies IV * and if we are processing packets on parallel threads @@ -368,25 +345,18 @@ odp_crypto_alg_err_t aes_gcm_decrypt(odp_crypto_op_param_t *param, EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv_enc); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, 16, tag); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, + session->p.auth_digest_len, tag); /* Authenticate header data (if any) without encrypting them */ - if (aad_head < cipherdata) { + if (aad_len > 0) EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &plain_len, - aad_head, cipherdata - aad_head); - } + aad_head, aad_len); EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, cipherdata, &plain_len, cipherdata, cipher_len); - plain_len = cipher_len; - - /* Authenticate footer data (if any) without encrypting them */ - if (aad_head + auth_len > cipherdata + cipher_len) { - EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, NULL, aad_tail, - auth_len - (aad_tail - aad_head)); - } - if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, cipherdata + cipher_len, &plain_len) <= 0) + if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, cipherdata + plain_len, &plain_len) <= 0) return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_ICV_CHECK; return ODP_CRYPTO_ALG_ERR_NONE; @@ -770,6 +740,8 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES128_GCM: if (param->cipher_alg == ODP_CIPHER_ALG_AES128_GCM) aes_gcm = 1; + /* Fixed digest tag length with deprecated algo */ + session->p.auth_digest_len = 16; /* Fallthrough */ #endif case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: commit c184a9c8d35c10b30014e7538a862a7bc42556e7 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:22 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: add SHA* capabilities for full length digests In addition to truncated digests (used by IPsec) add full-length capabilities to SHA* algos. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index 472ee310..91ef05ae 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -52,10 +52,12 @@ static const odp_crypto_cipher_capability_t cipher_capa_aes_gcm[] = { * Keep sorted: first by digest length, then by key length */ static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_md5_hmac[] = { -{.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; +{.digest_len = 12, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, +{.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 16, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_sha256_hmac[] = { -{.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; +{.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} }, +{.digest_len = 32, .key_len = 32, .aad_len = {.min = 0, .max = 0, .inc = 0} } }; static const odp_crypto_auth_capability_t auth_capa_aes_gcm[] = { {.digest_len = 16, .key_len = 0, .aad_len = {.min = 8, .max = 12, .inc = 4} } }; ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: .../linux-generic/include/odp_crypto_internal.h | 17 +- platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c | 609 +++++++++++---------- test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c | 44 +- test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h | 8 +- .../validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c | 321 ++++++++++- .../validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h | 106 ++++ .../validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h | 15 + 7 files changed, 751 insertions(+), 369 deletions(-) hooks/post-receive --

6 years, 11 months

[COMMIT] branch api-next updated. v1.14.0.0-403-g9ebcb7c6

by git＠git-us.linaro.org

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The branch, api-next has been updated via 9ebcb7c6e2f3226c915c39c81dcd1895dda3639b (commit) via 2f137b2bc9cb9c03a586d2cb324a6a5659098c39 (commit) via 2f1a96d47bb2e6c413ed06749633dcfe33f02b97 (commit) via 4cdaf5527dba63858080c0942ac1c971c615f066 (commit) via 77dff4e05611bc5b06b4bfb5dd86da6d4c3fffa5 (commit) from a9fc17e1bbef1c3585fd5de47e5023e4d66504f5 (commit) Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those revisions in full, below. - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit 9ebcb7c6e2f3226c915c39c81dcd1895dda3639b Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:21 2017 +0300 linux-generic: crypto: use auth_digest_len when calculating HMACs Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c index a993542f..472ee310 100644 --- a/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c +++ b/platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c @@ -522,7 +522,6 @@ static int process_des_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session) } static int process_auth_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, - uint32_t bits, uint32_t key_length, const EVP_MD *evp_md) { @@ -535,7 +534,9 @@ static int process_auth_param(odp_crypto_generic_session_t *session, session->auth.evp_md = evp_md; /* Number of valid bytes */ - session->auth.bytes = bits / 8; + session->auth.bytes = session->p.auth_digest_len; + if (session->auth.bytes < (unsigned)EVP_MD_size(evp_md) / 2) + return -1; /* Convert keys */ session->auth.key_length = key_length; @@ -745,17 +746,23 @@ odp_crypto_session_create(odp_crypto_session_param_t *param, session->auth.func = null_crypto_routine; rc = 0; break; - case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_96: + /* Fixed digest tag length with deprecated algo */ + session->p.auth_digest_len = 96 / 8; + /* Fallthrough */ #endif - rc = process_auth_param(session, 96, 16, EVP_md5()); + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC: + rc = process_auth_param(session, 16, EVP_md5()); break; - case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_128: + /* Fixed digest tag length with deprecated algo */ + session->p.auth_digest_len = 128 / 8; + /* Fallthrough */ #endif - rc = process_auth_param(session, 128, 32, EVP_sha256()); + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: + rc = process_auth_param(session, 32, EVP_sha256()); break; #if ODP_DEPRECATED_API case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES128_GCM: commit 2f137b2bc9cb9c03a586d2cb324a6a5659098c39 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:20 2017 +0300 example: ipsec: set auth_digest_len Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c b/example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c index b2a91c24..dba0ea0a 100644 --- a/example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c +++ b/example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ int create_ipsec_cache_entry(sa_db_entry_t *cipher_sa, params.auth_alg = auth_sa->alg.u.auth; params.auth_key.data = auth_sa->key.data; params.auth_key.length = auth_sa->key.length; + params.auth_digest_len = auth_sa->icv_len; mode = auth_sa->mode; } else { params.auth_alg = ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL; commit 2f1a96d47bb2e6c413ed06749633dcfe33f02b97 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:19 2017 +0300 test: odp_crypto: update performance test to set auth_digest_length Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c b/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c index b3857973..6a58294a 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c +++ b/test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c @@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ static uint8_t test_key24[24] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, typedef struct { const char *name; /**< Algorithm name */ odp_crypto_session_param_t session; /**< Prefilled crypto session params */ - unsigned int hash_adjust; /**< Size of hash */ } crypto_alg_config_t; /** @@ -209,9 +208,9 @@ static crypto_alg_config_t algs_config[] = { .auth_key = { .data = test_key16, .length = sizeof(test_key16) - } + }, + .auth_digest_len = 12, }, - .hash_adjust = 12 }, { .name = "null-hmac-md5-96", @@ -221,9 +220,9 @@ static crypto_alg_config_t algs_config[] = { .auth_key = { .data = test_key16, .length = sizeof(test_key16) - } + }, + .auth_digest_len = 12, }, - .hash_adjust = 12 }, }; @@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ run_measure_one(crypto_args_t *cargs, mem = odp_packet_data(params.out_pkt); print_mem("Immediately encrypted packet", mem, payload_length + - config->hash_adjust); + config->session.auth_digest_len); } if (!cargs->in_place) { if (cargs->reuse_packet) { @@ -611,7 +610,8 @@ run_measure_one(crypto_args_t *cargs, print_mem("Receieved encrypted packet", mem, payload_length + - config->hash_adjust); + config-> + session.auth_digest_len); } if (cargs->reuse_packet) { params.pkt = out_pkt; commit 4cdaf5527dba63858080c0942ac1c971c615f066 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:18 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: explicitly pass AAD to crypto subsystem Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 3d09e374..c89d04f9 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, odp_crypto_key_t auth_key, odp_packet_data_range_t *cipher_range, odp_packet_data_range_t *auth_range, + uint8_t *aad, + uint32_t aad_len, const uint8_t *plaintext, unsigned int plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ciphertext, @@ -240,6 +242,9 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, if (op_iv_ptr) op_params.override_iv_ptr = op_iv_ptr; + op_params.aad.ptr = aad; + op_params.aad.length = aad_len; + op_params.hash_result_offset = plaintext_len; if (0 != digest_len) { memcpy(data_addr + op_params.hash_result_offset, @@ -472,6 +477,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, tdes_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], tdes_cbc_reference_length[i], tdes_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -508,6 +514,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_3des_cbc_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, tdes_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], tdes_cbc_reference_length[i], tdes_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -548,6 +555,7 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_3des_cbc(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, tdes_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], tdes_cbc_reference_length[i], tdes_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], @@ -586,6 +594,7 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_3des_cbc_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, tdes_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], tdes_cbc_reference_length[i], tdes_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], @@ -634,7 +643,9 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -679,7 +690,9 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -730,10 +743,11 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + - aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + @@ -749,10 +763,11 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + - aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], wrong_digest, @@ -798,10 +813,11 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + - aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + @@ -817,10 +833,11 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, auth_key, &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], - &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], + &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + - aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], wrong_digest, @@ -865,6 +882,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_cbc(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, aes128_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_cbc_reference_length[i], aes128_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -901,6 +919,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_cbc_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, aes128_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_cbc_reference_length[i], aes128_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], @@ -941,6 +960,7 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_cbc(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, aes128_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], aes128_cbc_reference_length[i], aes128_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], @@ -979,6 +999,7 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_cbc_ovr_iv(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_NULL, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, aes128_cbc_reference_ciphertext[i], aes128_cbc_reference_length[i], aes128_cbc_reference_plaintext[i], @@ -1025,6 +1046,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1063,6 +1085,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1078,6 +1101,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1127,6 +1151,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1167,6 +1192,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, @@ -1182,6 +1208,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key, NULL, NULL, + NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_plaintext[i], hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index defbda45..0d36c249 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -137,31 +137,31 @@ static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_iv[][AES128_GCM_IV_LEN] = { 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xa1, 0xa3 } }; -static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_length[] = { 84, 72, 72, 40}; +static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_length[] = { 72, 64, 64, 28}; static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[] = { 16, 16, 16, 16}; +static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_aad_length[] = { 12, 8, 8, 12}; + static odp_packet_data_range_t aes128_gcm_cipher_range[] = { - { .offset = 12, .length = 72 }, - { .offset = 8, .length = 64 }, - { .offset = 8, .length = 64 }, - { .offset = 12, .length = 28 }, + { .offset = 0, .length = 72 }, + { .offset = 0, .length = 64 }, + { .offset = 0, .length = 64 }, + { .offset = 0, .length = 28 }, }; -static odp_packet_data_range_t aes128_gcm_auth_range[] = { - { .offset = 0, .length = 84 }, - { .offset = 0, .length = 72 }, - { .offset = 0, .length = 72 }, - { .offset = 0, .length = 40 }, +static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_aad[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x43, 0x21, 0x87, 0x65, 0x43, 0x21, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0xa5, 0xf8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, }, + { 0x42, 0xf6, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, + 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, }, }; static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x43, 0x21, 0x87, 0x65, 0x43, 0x21, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* Plain */ - 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x00, 0x00, + { 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x69, 0x9a, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x4d, 0xb7, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x02, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x9b, 0xf1, 0x56, 0x38, 0xd3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, @@ -171,10 +171,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0x63, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x02, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x21, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01 }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0xa5, 0xf8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, - /* Plain */ - 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3e, 0x69, 0x8f, 0x00, 0x00, + { 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3e, 0x69, 0x8f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x11, 0x4d, 0xcc, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x02, 0xc0, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x98, 0x00, 0x35, 0x00, 0x2a, 0x23, 0x43, 0xb2, 0xd0, 0x01, 0x00, @@ -183,10 +180,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0x65, 0x72, 0x63, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x02, 0x64, 0x6b, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - /* Plain */ - 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xc5, 0x00, 0x00, + { 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3c, 0x99, 0xc5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0x40, 0x67, 0x93, 0x18, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x00, 0x07, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x00, 0x44, 0x00, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, @@ -195,11 +189,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01 }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x42, 0xf6, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, - 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, - /* Plain */ - 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1c, 0x42, 0xa2, 0x00, 0x00, + { 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1c, 0x42, 0xa2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0x44, 0x1f, 0x40, 0x67, 0x93, 0xb6, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x0a, 0x00, 0xf5, 0xff, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01 } @@ -207,10 +197,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x43, 0x21, 0x87, 0x65, 0x43, 0x21, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - /* Plain */ + { /* Plain */ 0xfe, 0xcf, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x72, 0x9d, 0x5b, 0x07, 0xdc, 0x30, 0xdf, 0x52, 0x8d, 0xd2, 0x2b, 0x76, 0x8d, 0x1b, 0x98, 0x73, 0x66, 0x96, 0xa6, 0xfd, @@ -224,9 +211,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0x45, 0x90, 0x18, 0x14, 0x8f, 0x6c, 0xbe, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xd0, 0x47, 0x96, 0x56, 0x2d, 0xfd, 0xb4 }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0xa5, 0xf8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0a, - /* Plain */ + { /* Plain */ 0xde, 0xb2, 0x2c, 0xd9, 0xb0, 0x7c, 0x72, 0xc1, 0x6e, 0x3a, 0x65, 0xbe, 0xeb, 0x8d, 0xf3, 0x04, 0xa5, 0xa5, 0x89, 0x7d, 0x33, 0xae, 0x53, 0x0f, @@ -238,9 +223,8 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { /* Digest */ 0x83, 0xb7, 0x0d, 0x3a, 0xa8, 0xbc, 0x6e, 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x09, 0xe9, 0xd8, 0x5a, 0x41, 0xad, 0x4a }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, - /* Plain */ + + { /* Plain */ 0x46, 0x88, 0xda, 0xf2, 0xf9, 0x73, 0xa3, 0x92, 0x73, 0x29, 0x09, 0xc3, 0x31, 0xd5, 0x6d, 0x60, 0xf6, 0x94, 0xab, 0xaa, 0x41, 0x4b, 0x5e, 0x7f, @@ -253,10 +237,7 @@ aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[][AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN] = { 0xf8, 0x21, 0xd4, 0x96, 0xee, 0xb0, 0x96, 0xe9, 0x8a, 0xd2, 0xb6, 0x9e, 0x47, 0x99, 0xc7, 0x1d }, - { /* Aad */ - 0x42, 0xf6, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, - 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, 0x10, - /* Plain */ + { /* Plain */ 0xfb, 0xa2, 0xca, 0x84, 0x5e, 0x5d, 0xf9, 0xf0, 0xf2, 0x2c, 0x3e, 0x6e, 0x86, 0xdd, 0x83, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0xc6, 0x57, 0x92, 0xcd, 0x1a, 0xf9, 0x13, commit 77dff4e05611bc5b06b4bfb5dd86da6d4c3fffa5 Author: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 12:03:17 2017 +0300 validation: crypto: explicitly pass auth_digest_len to crypto subsystem Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index bfc9da3c..3d09e374 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static void alg_test(odp_crypto_op_t op, ses_params.cipher_key = cipher_key; ses_params.iv = ses_iv; ses_params.auth_key = auth_key; + ses_params.auth_digest_len = digest_len; rc = odp_crypto_session_create(&ses_params, &session, &status); CU_ASSERT_FATAL(!rc); @@ -620,7 +621,8 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm(void) cipher_key.length, iv.length)) continue; if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, - auth_key.length, AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN)) + auth_key.length, + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, @@ -639,7 +641,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm(void) aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); } } @@ -664,7 +666,8 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) cipher_key.length, iv.length)) continue; if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, - auth_key.length, AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN)) + auth_key.length, + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, @@ -683,7 +686,7 @@ void crypto_test_enc_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); } } @@ -714,7 +717,8 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) cipher_key.length, iv.length)) continue; if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, - auth_key.length, AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN)) + auth_key.length, + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, @@ -728,12 +732,13 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN, + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, 1, @@ -746,11 +751,12 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void) &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN, + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], wrong_digest, - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); } } @@ -779,7 +785,8 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) cipher_key.length, iv.length)) continue; if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM, - auth_key.length, AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN)) + auth_key.length, + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, @@ -793,12 +800,13 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN, + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i] + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, 1, @@ -811,11 +819,12 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void) &aes128_gcm_cipher_range[i], &aes128_gcm_auth_range[i], aes128_gcm_reference_ciphertext[i], - aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN, + aes128_gcm_reference_length[i] + + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i], aes128_gcm_reference_plaintext[i], aes128_gcm_reference_length[i], wrong_digest, - AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN); + aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[i]); } } @@ -1004,7 +1013,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void) auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_md5_reference_key[i]); if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key.length, - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN)) + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, @@ -1020,7 +1029,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void) hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_digest[i], - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i]); } } @@ -1042,7 +1051,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) auth_key.length = sizeof(hmac_md5_reference_key[i]); if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_MD5_HMAC, auth_key.length, - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN)) + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, @@ -1058,7 +1067,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, hmac_md5_reference_digest[i], - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i]); alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, 1, @@ -1073,7 +1082,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void) hmac_md5_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, wrong_digest, - HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[i]); } } @@ -1106,7 +1115,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void) if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key.length, - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN)) + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_ENCODE, @@ -1122,7 +1131,7 @@ void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void) hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_digest[i], - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i]); } } @@ -1146,7 +1155,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) if (!check_auth_options(ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC, auth_key.length, - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN)) + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i])) continue; alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, @@ -1162,7 +1171,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, hmac_sha256_reference_digest[i], - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i]); alg_test(ODP_CRYPTO_OP_DECODE, 1, @@ -1177,7 +1186,7 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) hmac_sha256_reference_length[i], NULL, 0, wrong_digest, - HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN); + hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[i]); } } diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h index a1cf4faf..defbda45 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h @@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static uint8_t aes128_gcm_reference_iv[][AES128_GCM_IV_LEN] = { static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_length[] = { 84, 72, 72, 40}; +static uint32_t aes128_gcm_reference_tag_length[] = { 16, 16, 16, 16}; + static odp_packet_data_range_t aes128_gcm_cipher_range[] = { { .offset = 12, .length = 72 }, { .offset = 8, .length = 64 }, @@ -306,6 +308,10 @@ static uint8_t hmac_md5_reference_digest[][HMAC_MD5_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 } }; +static uint32_t hmac_md5_reference_digest_length[] = { + 12, 12, 12 +}; + static uint8_t hmac_sha256_reference_key[][HMAC_SHA256_KEY_LEN] = { { 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, @@ -350,4 +356,8 @@ static uint8_t hmac_sha256_reference_digest[][HMAC_SHA256_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7 } }; +static uint32_t hmac_sha256_reference_digest_length[] = { + 16, 16, 16 +}; + #endif diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h index 4fbb5cd7..80fd927b 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h @@ -21,18 +21,15 @@ #define AES128_GCM_IV_LEN 12 #define AES128_GCM_MAX_DATA_LEN 106 #define AES128_GCM_DIGEST_LEN 16 -#define AES128_GCM_CHECK_LEN 16 /* HMAC-MD5 */ #define HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN 16 #define HMAC_MD5_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 #define HMAC_MD5_DIGEST_LEN 16 -#define HMAC_MD5_96_CHECK_LEN 12 /* HMAC-SHA256 */ #define HMAC_SHA256_KEY_LEN 32 #define HMAC_SHA256_MAX_DATA_LEN 128 #define HMAC_SHA256_DIGEST_LEN 32 -#define HMAC_SHA256_128_CHECK_LEN 16 #endif ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: example/ipsec/odp_ipsec_cache.c | 1 + platform/linux-generic/odp_crypto.c | 19 +++-- test/common_plat/performance/odp_crypto.c | 14 ++-- .../validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c | 96 +++++++++++++++------- .../validation/api/crypto/test_vectors.h | 75 ++++++++--------- .../validation/api/crypto/test_vectors_len.h | 3 - 6 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) hooks/post-receive --

6 years, 11 months

[COMMIT] branch master updated. v1.14.0.0-80-ge6be64e0

by git＠git-us.linaro.org

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. It was generated because a ref change was pushed to the repository containing the project "". The branch, master has been updated via e6be64e01589f1aa335ea178e8314bf35ad34847 (commit) via 15ea6562d284bd5f2bd20e9b79bd102db106555c (commit) via a48979af5b36c11fb5c7f8d2c6029c12bb191b51 (commit) from 7a7e3ff9d50d67b7c79058db98ba27ab5a806437 (commit) Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those revisions in full, below. - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit e6be64e01589f1aa335ea178e8314bf35ad34847 Author: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 14:00:47 2017 +0300 scripts: spelling: update to latest version Updated Linux spelling file to it's latest version. Signed-off-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bill Fischofer <bill.fischofer(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/scripts/spelling.txt b/scripts/spelling.txt index bb8e4d0a..eb38f49d 100644 --- a/scripts/spelling.txt +++ b/scripts/spelling.txt @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ absense||absence absolut||absolute absoulte||absolute acccess||access +acceess||access acceleratoin||acceleration accelleration||acceleration accesing||accessing @@ -32,19 +33,23 @@ accoring||according accout||account accquire||acquire accquired||acquired +accross||across acessable||accessible acess||access achitecture||architecture acient||ancient acitions||actions acitve||active -acknowldegement||acknowldegement +acknowldegement||acknowledgment acknowledgement||acknowledgment ackowledge||acknowledge ackowledged||acknowledged acording||according activete||activate +actived||activated +actualy||actually acumulating||accumulating +acumulator||accumulator adapater||adapter addional||additional additionaly||additionally @@ -59,16 +64,22 @@ adress||address adresses||addresses adviced||advised afecting||affecting +againt||against agaist||against albumns||albums alegorical||allegorical +algined||aligned algorith||algorithm algorithmical||algorithmically algoritm||algorithm algoritms||algorithms algorrithm||algorithm algorritm||algorithm +aligment||alignment +alignement||alignment allign||align +alligned||aligned +allocatote||allocate allocatrd||allocated allocte||allocate allpication||application @@ -83,6 +94,10 @@ alue||value ambigious||ambiguous amoung||among amout||amount +an union||a union +an user||a user +an userspace||a userspace +an one||a one analysator||analyzer ang||and anniversery||anniversary @@ -95,13 +110,16 @@ appearence||appearance applicaion||application appliction||application applictions||applications +applys||applies appplications||applications appropiate||appropriate appropriatly||appropriately approriate||appropriate approriately||appropriately +apropriate||appropriate aquainted||acquainted aquired||acquired +aquisition||acquisition arbitary||arbitrary architechture||architecture arguement||argument @@ -111,6 +129,8 @@ arne't||aren't arraival||arrival artifical||artificial artillary||artillery +asign||assign +assertation||assertion assiged||assigned assigment||assignment assigments||assignments @@ -125,6 +145,7 @@ asycronous||asynchronous asynchnous||asynchronous atomatically||automatically atomicly||atomically +atempt||attempt attachement||attachment attched||attached attemps||attempts @@ -136,6 +157,7 @@ automatize||automate automatized||automated automatizes||automates autonymous||autonomous +auxillary||auxiliary auxilliary||auxiliary avaiable||available avaible||available @@ -157,6 +179,7 @@ bakup||backup baloon||balloon baloons||balloons bandwith||bandwidth +banlance||balance batery||battery beacuse||because becasue||because @@ -178,6 +201,7 @@ cacluated||calculated caculation||calculation calender||calendar calle||called +callibration||calibration calucate||calculate calulate||calculate cancelation||cancellation @@ -187,6 +211,7 @@ capatibilities||capabilities carefuly||carefully cariage||carriage catagory||category +cehck||check challange||challenge challanges||challenges chanell||channel @@ -199,6 +224,8 @@ charactor||character charater||character charaters||characters charcter||character +chcek||check +chck||check checksuming||checksumming childern||children childs||children @@ -225,14 +252,20 @@ commited||committed commiting||committing committ||commit commoditiy||commodity +comsume||consume +comsumer||consumer +comsuming||consuming compability||compatibility compaibility||compatibility compatability||compatibility compatable||compatible compatibiliy||compatibility compatibilty||compatibility +compatiblity||compatibility +competion||completion compilant||compliant compleatly||completely +completition||completion completly||completely complient||compliant componnents||components @@ -243,9 +276,12 @@ comunication||communication conbination||combination conditionaly||conditionally conected||connected +connecetd||connected +configuartion||configuration configuratoin||configuration configuraton||configuration configuretion||configuration +configutation||configuration conider||consider conjuction||conjunction connectinos||connections @@ -262,11 +298,14 @@ continous||continuous continously||continuously continueing||continuing contraints||constraints +contol||control +contoller||controller controled||controlled controler||controller controll||control contruction||construction contry||country +conuntry||country convertion||conversion convertor||converter convienient||convenient @@ -281,6 +320,7 @@ coutner||counter cryptocraphic||cryptographic cunter||counter curently||currently +cylic||cyclic dafault||default deafult||default deamon||daemon @@ -291,8 +331,12 @@ defferred||deferred definate||definite definately||definitely defintion||definition +defintions||definitions defualt||default defult||default +deintializing||deinitializing +deintialize||deinitialize +deintialized||deinitialized deivce||device delared||declared delare||declare @@ -305,7 +349,9 @@ dependant||dependent depreacted||deprecated depreacte||deprecate desactivate||deactivate +desciptor||descriptor desciptors||descriptors +descripton||description descrition||description descritptor||descriptor desctiptor||descriptor @@ -327,14 +373,20 @@ devided||divided deviece||device diable||disable dictionnary||dictionary +didnt||didn't diferent||different differrence||difference +diffrent||different +diffrentiate||differentiate difinition||definition diplay||display direectly||directly +disassocation||disassociation disapear||disappear disapeared||disappeared disappared||disappeared +disble||disable +disbled||disabled disconnet||disconnect discontinous||discontinuous dispertion||dispersion @@ -344,6 +396,7 @@ docuentation||documentation documantation||documentation documentaion||documentation documment||document +doesnt||doesn't dorp||drop dosen||doesn downlad||download @@ -354,10 +407,13 @@ easilly||easily ecspecially||especially edditable||editable editting||editing +efective||effective efficently||efficiently ehther||ether eigth||eight +elementry||elementary eletronic||electronic +embeded||embedded enabledi||enabled enchanced||enhanced encorporating||incorporating @@ -393,6 +449,7 @@ expecially||especially explicite||explicit explicitely||explicitly explict||explicit +explictely||explicitly explictly||explicitly expresion||expression exprimental||experimental @@ -400,11 +457,15 @@ extened||extended extensability||extensibility extention||extension extracter||extractor +falied||failed faild||failed faill||fail +failied||failed +faillure||failure failue||failure failuer||failure faireness||fairness +falied||failed faliure||failure familar||familiar fatser||faster @@ -413,6 +474,7 @@ feautures||features fetaure||feature fetaures||features fileystem||filesystem +fimware||firmware finanize||finalize findn||find finilizes||finalizes @@ -420,11 +482,13 @@ finsih||finish flusing||flushing folloing||following followign||following +followings||following follwing||following forseeable||foreseeable forse||force fortan||fortran forwardig||forwarding +framming||framing framwork||framework frequncy||frequency frome||from @@ -443,6 +507,7 @@ futhermore||furthermore futrue||future gaurenteed||guaranteed generiously||generously +genereate||generate genric||generic globel||global grabing||grabbing @@ -450,11 +515,13 @@ grahical||graphical grahpical||graphical grapic||graphic guage||gauge +guarenteed||guaranteed guarentee||guarantee halfs||halves hander||handler handfull||handful hanled||handled +happend||happened harware||hardware heirarchically||hierarchically helpfull||helpful @@ -462,8 +529,11 @@ hierachy||hierarchy hierarchie||hierarchy howver||however hsould||should +hypervior||hypervisor hypter||hyper identidier||identifier +iligal||illegal +illigal||illegal imblance||imbalance immeadiately||immediately immedaite||immediate @@ -502,17 +572,21 @@ informtion||information infromation||information ingore||ignore inital||initial +initalized||initialized initalised||initialized initalise||initialize initalize||initialize initation||initiation initators||initiators +initialiazation||initialization initializiation||initialization initialzed||initialized initilization||initialization initilize||initialize inofficial||unofficial +insititute||institute instal||install +instanciated||instantiated inteface||interface integreated||integrated integrety||integrity @@ -534,19 +608,28 @@ interruptted||interrupted interupted||interrupted interupt||interrupt intial||initial +intialisation||initialisation +intialised||initialised +intialise||initialise +intialization||initialization intialized||initialized intialize||initialize intregral||integral intrrupt||interrupt +intterrupt||interrupt intuative||intuitive invaid||invalid -invalde||invald +invalde||invalid invalide||invalid +invalud||invalid invididual||individual invokation||invocation invokations||invocations irrelevent||irrelevant +isnt||isn't isssue||issue +iternations||iterations +itertation||iteration itslef||itself jave||java jeffies||jiffies @@ -558,6 +641,7 @@ langauage||language langauge||language langugage||language lauch||launch +layed||laid leightweight||lightweight lengh||length lenght||length @@ -600,16 +684,20 @@ messsage||message messsages||messages microprocesspr||microprocessor milliseonds||milliseconds +minium||minimum +minimam||minimum minumum||minimum +misalinged||misaligned miscelleneous||miscellaneous misformed||malformed mispelled||misspelled mispelt||misspelt +mising||missing miximum||maximum mmnemonic||mnemonic mnay||many -modeled||modelled modulues||modules +momery||memory monochorome||monochrome monochromo||monochrome monocrome||monochrome @@ -629,6 +717,7 @@ neccecary||necessary neccesary||necessary neccessary||necessary necesary||necessary +neded||needed negaive||negative negoitation||negotiation negotation||negotiation @@ -648,8 +737,11 @@ occurances||occurrences occured||occurred occurence||occurrence occure||occurred +occured||occurred occuring||occurring offet||offset +omited||omitted +omiting||omitting omitt||omit ommiting||omitting ommitted||omitted @@ -661,13 +753,19 @@ optionnal||optional optmizations||optimizations orientatied||orientated orientied||oriented +orignal||original otherise||otherwise ouput||output +oustanding||outstanding overaall||overall overhread||overhead overlaping||overlapping +overide||override +overrided||overridden overriden||overridden overun||overrun +overwritting||overwriting +overwriten||overwritten pacakge||package pachage||package packacge||package @@ -678,6 +776,7 @@ pakage||package pallette||palette paln||plan paramameters||parameters +paramaters||parameters paramater||parameter parametes||parameters parametised||parametrised @@ -685,6 +784,7 @@ paramter||parameter paramters||parameters particuarly||particularly particularily||particularly +partiton||partition pased||passed passin||passing pathes||paths @@ -704,6 +804,7 @@ pleaes||please ploting||plotting plugable||pluggable poinnter||pointer +pointeur||pointer poiter||pointer posible||possible positon||position @@ -714,6 +815,7 @@ preceeding||preceding preceed||precede precendence||precedence precission||precision +preemptable||preemptible prefered||preferred prefferably||preferably premption||preemption @@ -731,6 +833,7 @@ procceed||proceed proccesors||processors procesed||processed proces||process +procesing||processing processessing||processing processess||processes processpr||processor @@ -744,6 +847,7 @@ programers||programmers programm||program programms||programs progresss||progress +promiscous||promiscuous promps||prompts pronnounced||pronounced prononciation||pronunciation @@ -758,6 +862,7 @@ protable||portable protcol||protocol protecion||protection protocoll||protocol +promixity||proximity psudo||pseudo psuedo||pseudo psychadelic||psychedelic @@ -779,6 +884,7 @@ recommanded||recommended recyle||recycle redircet||redirect redirectrion||redirection +reename||rename refcounf||refcount refence||reference refered||referred @@ -791,6 +897,7 @@ registerd||registered registeresd||registered registes||registers registraration||registration +regsiter||register regster||register regualar||regular reguator||regulator @@ -808,6 +915,7 @@ replys||replies reponse||response representaion||representation reqeust||request +requestied||requested requiere||require requirment||requirement requred||required @@ -817,6 +925,7 @@ reseting||resetting resizeable||resizable resouces||resources resoures||resources +responce||response ressizes||resizes ressource||resource ressources||resources @@ -869,6 +978,7 @@ setts||sets settting||setting shotdown||shutdown shoud||should +shouldnt||shouldn't shoule||should shrinked||shrunk siginificantly||significantly @@ -899,6 +1009,7 @@ spinlcok||spinlock spinock||spinlock splitted||split spreaded||spread +spurrious||spurious sructure||structure stablilization||stabilization staically||statically @@ -913,12 +1024,17 @@ straming||streaming struc||struct structres||structures stuct||struct +strucuture||structure +stucture||structure sturcture||structure subdirectoires||subdirectories suble||subtle +substract||subtract succesfully||successfully succesful||successful +successed||succeeded successfull||successful +successfuly||successfully sucessfully||successfully sucess||success superflous||superfluous @@ -926,6 +1042,7 @@ superseeded||superseded suplied||supplied suported||supported suport||support +supportet||supported suppored||supported supportin||supporting suppoted||supported @@ -934,13 +1051,22 @@ suppport||support supress||suppress surpresses||suppresses susbsystem||subsystem +suspeneded||suspended suspicously||suspiciously swaping||swapping switchs||switches +swith||switch +swithable||switchable +swithc||switch +swithced||switched +swithcing||switching +swithed||switched +swithing||switching symetric||symmetric synax||syntax synchonized||synchronized syncronize||synchronize +syncronized||synchronized syncronizing||synchronizing syncronus||synchronous syste||system @@ -952,6 +1078,7 @@ targetting||targeting teh||the temorary||temporary temproarily||temporarily +therfore||therefore thier||their threds||threads threshhold||threshold @@ -959,13 +1086,14 @@ throught||through thses||these tiggered||triggered tipically||typically +timout||timeout tmis||this torerable||tolerable tramsmitted||transmitted tramsmit||transmit tranfer||transfer transciever||transceiver -transferd||transferrd +transferd||transferred transfered||transferred transfering||transferring transision||transition @@ -979,21 +1107,33 @@ ture||true tyep||type udpate||update uesd||used +uncommited||uncommitted unconditionaly||unconditionally underun||underrun unecessary||unnecessary unexecpted||unexpected +unexepected||unexpected +unexpcted||unexpected unexpectd||unexpected unexpeted||unexpected +unexpexted||unexpected unfortunatelly||unfortunately unifiy||unify +unintialized||uninitialized +unkmown||unknown unknonw||unknown unknow||unknown unkown||unknown +unneded||unneeded unneedingly||unnecessarily +unnsupported||unsupported +unmached||unmatched +unregester||unregister unresgister||unregister +unrgesiter||unregister unsinged||unsigned unstabel||unstable +unsolicitied||unsolicited unsuccessfull||unsuccessful unsuported||unsupported untill||until @@ -1014,6 +1154,7 @@ vaid||valid vaild||valid valide||valid variantions||variations +varible||variable varient||variant vaule||value verbse||verbose @@ -1027,7 +1168,9 @@ virtiual||virtual visiters||visitors vitual||virtual wating||waiting +wether||whether whataver||whatever +whcih||which whenver||whenever wheter||whether whe||when commit 15ea6562d284bd5f2bd20e9b79bd102db106555c Author: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 10:18:23 2017 +0300 scripts: checkpatch: ignore volatile and extern warnings These warnings were disabled with code modification. Use checkpatch config file to ignore those. Signed-off-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bill Fischofer <bill.fischofer(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/.checkpatch.conf b/.checkpatch.conf index 043551a4..990a54d2 100644 --- a/.checkpatch.conf +++ b/.checkpatch.conf @@ -8,5 +8,7 @@ --ignore=BIT_MACRO --ignore=PREFER_PRINTF --ignore=PREFER_SCANF +--ignore=VOLATILE +--ignore=AVOID_EXTERNS --codespell --codespellfile=/usr/share/codespell/dictionary.txt commit a48979af5b36c11fb5c7f8d2c6029c12bb191b51 Author: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 10:18:22 2017 +0300 scripts: checkpatch: revert code modification Checkpatch code should not be modified directly. When the code is updated to a next version, any local modifications would be lost and needed to be done again. Camelcase check is enabled again. Exceptions to camelcase are allowed e.g. when calling an external library interface. Signed-off-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bill Fischofer <bill.fischofer(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/scripts/checkpatch.pl b/scripts/checkpatch.pl index 1c27ac60..16316b92 100755 --- a/scripts/checkpatch.pl +++ b/scripts/checkpatch.pl @@ -4273,7 +4273,7 @@ sub process { $camelcase_file_seeded = 1; } } - if (!defined $camelcase{$word} && 0) { + if (!defined $camelcase{$word}) { $camelcase{$word} = 1; CHK("CAMELCASE", "Avoid CamelCase: <$word>\n" . $herecurr); @@ -4620,7 +4620,7 @@ sub process { # no volatiles please my $asm_volatile = qr{\b(__asm__|asm)\s+(__volatile__|volatile)\b}; - if ($line =~ /\bvolatile\b/ && 0 && $line !~ /$asm_volatile/) { + if ($line =~ /\bvolatile\b/ && $line !~ /$asm_volatile/) { WARN("VOLATILE", "Use of volatile is usually wrong: see Documentation/volatile-considered-harmful.txt\n" . $herecurr); } @@ -5134,7 +5134,7 @@ sub process { if (defined $cond) { substr($s, 0, length($cond), ''); } - if ($s =~ /^\s*;/ && 0 && + if ($s =~ /^\s*;/ && $function_name ne 'uninitialized_var') { WARN("AVOID_EXTERNS", ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: .checkpatch.conf | 2 + scripts/checkpatch.pl | 6 +- scripts/spelling.txt | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 152 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) hooks/post-receive --

6 years, 11 months

[COMMIT] branch next updated. v1.14.0.0-144-g14bebe8b

by git＠git-us.linaro.org

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. It was generated because a ref change was pushed to the repository containing the project "". The branch, next has been updated via 14bebe8bac40b2b0f4a00cce4ef9a7031cc1b8cc (commit) via f0483afab9c4a75210e1bd9a66b37432eafa6e3a (commit) from dbec145ddcf4a7362785cd15462ac561d8fe7a5b (commit) Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those revisions in full, below. - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit 14bebe8bac40b2b0f4a00cce4ef9a7031cc1b8cc Author: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> Date: Wed May 31 18:33:25 2017 +0300 test: time: do not fail under gcov code coverage gcov make test very slow and it does not pass accepted boundaries. Test if env TEST=coverage variable is set and do no generate fail result if some boundaries are missing. https://bugs.linaro.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3017 Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bill Fischofer <bill.fischofer(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am index 999fcf15..82682dfc 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am @@ -1,5 +1,12 @@ include ../Makefile.inc +TESTS_ENVIRONMENT += TEST_DIR=${builddir} + +TESTSCRIPTS = time.sh +TEST_EXTENSIONS = .sh + +TESTS = $(TESTSCRIPTS) + noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libtesttime.la libtesttime_la_SOURCES = time.c @@ -7,4 +14,5 @@ test_PROGRAMS = time_main$(EXEEXT) dist_time_main_SOURCES = time_main.c time_main_LDADD = libtesttime.la $(LIBCUNIT_COMMON) $(LIBODP) -EXTRA_DIST = time_test.h +EXTRA_DIST = time_test.h $(TESTSCRIPTS) +dist_check_SCRIPTS = $(TESTSCRIPTS) diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..02bf75a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Copyright (c) 2017, Linaro Limited +# All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +# directories where time_main binary can be found: +# -in the validation dir when running make check (intree or out of tree) +# -in the script directory, when running after 'make install', or +# -in the validation when running standalone (./time) intree. +# -in the current directory. +# running stand alone out of tree requires setting PATH +PATH=${TEST_DIR}/api/time:$PATH +PATH=$(dirname $0)/../../../../common_plat/validation/api/time:$PATH +PATH=$(dirname $0):$PATH +PATH=`pwd`:$PATH + +time_main_path=$(which time_main${EXEEXT}) +if [ -x "$time_main_path" ] ; then + echo "running with time_main: $time_run_path" +else + echo "cannot find time_main: please set you PATH for it." + exit 1 +fi + +# exit codes expected by automake for skipped tests +TEST_SKIPPED=77 + +time_main${EXEEXT} +ret=$? + +SIGSEGV=139 + +if [ "${TRAVIS}" = "true" ] && [ $ret -ne 0 ] && + [ ${TEST} = "coverage" ] && [ $ret -ne ${SIGSEGV} ]; then + echo "SKIP: skip due significant slowdown under code coverage" + exit ${TEST_SKIPPED} +fi + +exit $ret diff --git a/test/linux-generic/Makefile.am b/test/linux-generic/Makefile.am index 88a9275c..c34a1c41 100644 --- a/test/linux-generic/Makefile.am +++ b/test/linux-generic/Makefile.am @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ TESTS = validation/api/pktio/pktio_run.sh \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/scheduler/scheduler_main$(EXEEXT) \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/std_clib/std_clib_main$(EXEEXT) \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/thread/thread_main$(EXEEXT) \ - $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/time/time_main$(EXEEXT) \ + $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/time/time.sh \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/timer/timer_main$(EXEEXT) \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/traffic_mngr/traffic_mngr.sh \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/shmem/shmem_main$(EXEEXT) \ commit f0483afab9c4a75210e1bd9a66b37432eafa6e3a Author: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Date: Wed Feb 22 17:08:25 2017 +0200 validation: crypto: add stubs for sha-1 and sha-512 tests API enumerations are tested but functional tests are missing still. Signed-off-by: Petri Savolainen <petri.savolainen(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dmitry.ereminsolenikov(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h index 661fe5df..4d810f62 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h @@ -24,8 +24,10 @@ void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm(void); void crypto_test_dec_alg_aes128_gcm_ovr_iv(void); void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_md5(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5(void); +void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1(void); void crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256(void); void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void); +void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512(void); /* test arrays: */ extern odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[]; diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c index 9defdbfa..bfc9da3c 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c @@ -340,10 +340,18 @@ static int check_alg_support(odp_cipher_alg_t cipher, odp_auth_alg_t auth) if (!capability.auths.bit.md5_hmac) return ODP_TEST_INACTIVE; break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC: + if (!capability.auths.bit.sha1_hmac) + return ODP_TEST_INACTIVE; + break; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA256_HMAC: if (!capability.auths.bit.sha256_hmac) return ODP_TEST_INACTIVE; break; + case ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC: + if (!capability.auths.bit.sha512_hmac) + return ODP_TEST_INACTIVE; + break; case ODP_AUTH_ALG_AES_GCM: if (!capability.auths.bit.aes_gcm) return ODP_TEST_INACTIVE; @@ -1173,6 +1181,26 @@ void crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256(void) } } +static int check_alg_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA1_HMAC); +} + +void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1(void) +{ + printf(" TEST NOT IMPLEMENTED YET "); +} + +static int check_alg_hmac_sha512(void) +{ + return check_alg_support(ODP_CIPHER_ALG_NULL, ODP_AUTH_ALG_SHA512_HMAC); +} + +void crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512(void) +{ + printf(" TEST NOT IMPLEMENTED YET "); +} + int crypto_suite_sync_init(void) { suite_context.pool = odp_pool_lookup("packet_pool"); @@ -1226,10 +1254,14 @@ odp_testinfo_t crypto_suite[] = { check_alg_hmac_md5), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_md5, check_alg_hmac_md5), + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha1, + check_alg_hmac_sha1), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_gen_alg_hmac_sha256, check_alg_hmac_sha256), ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_check_alg_hmac_sha256, check_alg_hmac_sha256), + ODP_TEST_INFO_CONDITIONAL(crypto_test_alg_hmac_sha512, + check_alg_hmac_sha512), ODP_TEST_INFO_NULL, }; ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: test/common_plat/validation/api/crypto/crypto.h | 2 ++ .../validation/api/crypto/odp_crypto_test_inp.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++ test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am | 10 +++++- test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++ test/linux-generic/Makefile.am | 2 +- 5 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100755 test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh hooks/post-receive --

6 years, 11 months

[COMMIT] branch api-next updated. v1.14.0.0-398-ga9fc17e1

by git＠git-us.linaro.org

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. It was generated because a ref change was pushed to the repository containing the project "". The branch, api-next has been updated via a9fc17e1bbef1c3585fd5de47e5023e4d66504f5 (commit) via 7a7e3ff9d50d67b7c79058db98ba27ab5a806437 (commit) from b67bfce457a7546bbae4dad16b5185629eda77e5 (commit) Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those revisions in full, below. - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit a9fc17e1bbef1c3585fd5de47e5023e4d66504f5 Merge: b67bfce4 7a7e3ff9 Author: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> Date: Thu Jun 1 16:11:47 2017 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into api-next Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> diff --cc test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am index 999fcf15,72e6b7b2..82682dfc --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am @@@ -7,4 -14,5 +14,5 @@@ test_PROGRAMS = time_main$(EXEEXT dist_time_main_SOURCES = time_main.c time_main_LDADD = libtesttime.la $(LIBCUNIT_COMMON) $(LIBODP) - EXTRA_DIST = time_test.h -EXTRA_DIST = time.h $(TESTSCRIPTS) ++EXTRA_DIST = time_test.h $(TESTSCRIPTS) + dist_check_SCRIPTS = $(TESTSCRIPTS) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am | 10 +++++- test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ test/linux-generic/Makefile.am | 2 +- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100755 test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh hooks/post-receive --

6 years, 11 months

[COMMIT] branch master updated. v1.14.0.0-77-g7a7e3ff9

by git＠git-us.linaro.org

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script. It was generated because a ref change was pushed to the repository containing the project "". The branch, master has been updated via 7a7e3ff9d50d67b7c79058db98ba27ab5a806437 (commit) from 87bba414b4444d8247adf3411e8bbefd35899f1b (commit) Those revisions listed above that are new to this repository have not appeared on any other notification email; so we list those revisions in full, below. - Log ----------------------------------------------------------------- commit 7a7e3ff9d50d67b7c79058db98ba27ab5a806437 Author: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> Date: Wed May 31 18:33:25 2017 +0300 test: time: do not fail under gcov code coverage gcov make test very slow and it does not pass accepted boundaries. Test if env TEST=coverage variable is set and do no generate fail result if some boundaries are missing. https://bugs.linaro.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3017 Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bill Fischofer <bill.fischofer(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am index bf2d0268..72e6b7b2 100644 --- a/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am @@ -1,5 +1,12 @@ include ../Makefile.inc +TESTS_ENVIRONMENT += TEST_DIR=${builddir} + +TESTSCRIPTS = time.sh +TEST_EXTENSIONS = .sh + +TESTS = $(TESTSCRIPTS) + noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libtesttime.la libtesttime_la_SOURCES = time.c @@ -7,4 +14,5 @@ test_PROGRAMS = time_main$(EXEEXT) dist_time_main_SOURCES = time_main.c time_main_LDADD = libtesttime.la $(LIBCUNIT_COMMON) $(LIBODP) -EXTRA_DIST = time.h +EXTRA_DIST = time.h $(TESTSCRIPTS) +dist_check_SCRIPTS = $(TESTSCRIPTS) diff --git a/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..02bf75a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# +# Copyright (c) 2017, Linaro Limited +# All rights reserved. +# +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +# + +# directories where time_main binary can be found: +# -in the validation dir when running make check (intree or out of tree) +# -in the script directory, when running after 'make install', or +# -in the validation when running standalone (./time) intree. +# -in the current directory. +# running stand alone out of tree requires setting PATH +PATH=${TEST_DIR}/api/time:$PATH +PATH=$(dirname $0)/../../../../common_plat/validation/api/time:$PATH +PATH=$(dirname $0):$PATH +PATH=`pwd`:$PATH + +time_main_path=$(which time_main${EXEEXT}) +if [ -x "$time_main_path" ] ; then + echo "running with time_main: $time_run_path" +else + echo "cannot find time_main: please set you PATH for it." + exit 1 +fi + +# exit codes expected by automake for skipped tests +TEST_SKIPPED=77 + +time_main${EXEEXT} +ret=$? + +SIGSEGV=139 + +if [ "${TRAVIS}" = "true" ] && [ $ret -ne 0 ] && + [ ${TEST} = "coverage" ] && [ $ret -ne ${SIGSEGV} ]; then + echo "SKIP: skip due significant slowdown under code coverage" + exit ${TEST_SKIPPED} +fi + +exit $ret diff --git a/test/linux-generic/Makefile.am b/test/linux-generic/Makefile.am index 38516a43..f92083d7 100644 --- a/test/linux-generic/Makefile.am +++ b/test/linux-generic/Makefile.am @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ TESTS = validation/api/pktio/pktio_run.sh \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/scheduler/scheduler_main$(EXEEXT) \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/std_clib/std_clib_main$(EXEEXT) \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/thread/thread_main$(EXEEXT) \ - $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/time/time_main$(EXEEXT) \ + $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/time/time.sh \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/timer/timer_main$(EXEEXT) \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/traffic_mngr/traffic_mngr.sh \ $(ALL_API_VALIDATION_DIR)/shmem/shmem_main$(EXEEXT) \ ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary of changes: test/common_plat/validation/api/time/Makefile.am | 10 +++++- test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ test/linux-generic/Makefile.am | 2 +- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100755 test/common_plat/validation/api/time/time.sh hooks/post-receive --

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git-lng-odp June 2017