On 07/25/2014 12:00 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On Jul 23, 2014 10:40 PM, "AKASHI Takahiro" takahiro.akashi@linaro.org wrote:
On 07/24/2014 12:52 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
On 07/22/2014 02:14 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
secure_computing() should always be called first in syscall_trace_enter().
If secure_computing() returns -1, we should stop further handling. Then that system call may eventually fail with a specified return value (errno), be trapped or the process itself be killed depending on loaded rules. In these cases, syscall_trace_enter() also returns -1, that results in skiping a normal syscall handling as well as syscall_trace_exit().
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 3 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +++++ 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 3a18571..eeac003 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
- select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
@@ -259,6 +260,19 @@ config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
source "mm/Kconfig"
+config SECCOMP
- bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
- ---help---
This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applicationsthat may need to compute untrusted bytecode during theirexecution. By using pipes or other transports made available tothe process as file descriptors supporting the read/writesyscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications intheir own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp isenabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabledand the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscallsdefined by each seccomp mode.- config XEN_DOM0 def_bool y depends on XEN
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c76fac9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/*
- arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h
- Copyright (C) 2014 Linaro Limited
- Author: AKASHI Takahiro takahiro.akashi@linaro.org
- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
- published by the Free Software Foundation.
- */
+#ifndef _ASM_SECCOMP_H +#define _ASM_SECCOMP_H
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +#define __NR_seccomp_read_32 __NR_compat_read +#define __NR_seccomp_write_32 __NR_compat_write +#define __NR_seccomp_exit_32 __NR_compat_exit +#define __NR_seccomp_sigreturn_32 __NR_compat_rt_sigreturn +#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
+#include <asm-generic/seccomp.h>
+#endif /* _ASM_SECCOMP_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h index c980ab7..729c155 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ * Compat syscall numbers used by the AArch64 kernel. */ #define __NR_compat_restart_syscall 0 +#define __NR_compat_exit 1 +#define __NR_compat_read 3 +#define __NR_compat_write 4 #define __NR_compat_sigreturn 119 #define __NR_compat_rt_sigreturn 173
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c index 100d7d1..e477f6f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/user.h> +#include <linux/seccomp.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/signal.h> @@ -1115,6 +1116,10 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) saved_x0 = regs->regs[0]; saved_x8 = regs->regs[8];
- if (secure_computing(regs->syscallno) == -1)
/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */return -1;This will conflict with the fastpath stuff in Kees' tree. (Actually, it's likely to apply cleanly, but fail to compile.) The fix is trivial, but, given that the fastpath stuff is new, can you take a look and see if arm64 can use it effectively?
I will look into the code later.
I suspect that the performance considerations are rather different on arm64 as compared to x86 (I really hope that x86 is the only architecture with the absurd sysret vs. iret distinction), but at least the seccomp_data stuff ought to help anywhere. (It looks like there's a distinct fast path, too, so the two-phase thing might also be a fairly large win if it's supportable.)
See:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/log/?h=seccomp/f...
Also, I'll ask the usual question? What are all of the factors other than nr and args that affect syscall execution? What are the audit arch values? Do they match correctly?
As far as I know,
For example, it looks like, if arm64 adds OABI support, you'll have a problem. (Note that arm currently disables audit and seccomp if OABI is enabled for exactly this reason.)
I don't think that arm64 will add OABI support in the future.
Do any syscall implementations care whether the user code is LE or BE? Are the arguments encoded the same way?
when I implemented audit for arm64, the assumptions were
- If userspace is LE, then the kernel is also LE and if BE, then the kernel is BE.
- the syscall numbers and how arguments are encoded are the same btw BE and LE.
So syscall_get_arch() always return the same value.
If arm64 ever adds support for mixed-endian userspace, this could become awkward. Hmm.
IMO this matters more for seccomp than for audit. The audit code doesn't seem to do anything terribly interesting w/ the arch field, at least in terms of interpretation of syscall args.
I digged into libseccomp source files, and found that there is some endianness-dependent code. Especially, "classic" BPF interpreter handles only 32-bit accumulator/registers, and so special care should be taken when a filter wants to check a 64-bit argument of system call. If we don't support mixed-endianness, this issue can be fixed by statically compiling the library with BYTE_ORDER macro. But otherwise syscall_get_arch() should return a dedicated value for BE kernel and this change will also have some impact on audit commands.
An arm-specific question: will there be any confusion as a result of the fact that compat syscalls seems to stick nr in w7, but arm64 puts them somewhere else?
I don't know, but syscall_get_arch() returns ARCH_ARM for 32-bit tasks.
Will 32-bit tracers be compatible between arm and arm64 kernels? That is, if a 32-bit program installs a seccomp filter with a trace action and traces a 32-bit process, will everything work correctly? (Kees' and Will's tests should work for this, I think.)
I found a bug in my current patch (v5). When 32-bit tracer skips a system call, we should not update syscallno from x8 since syscallno is re-written directly via ptrace(PTRACE_SET_SYSCALL). I'm sure that my next version should work with 32/64-bit tracers on 64-bit kernel.
Thanks, -Takahiro AKASHI
--Andy