Since we recently started warning about uses of this function after the
atomic check phase completes, we've started getting warnings about this in
nouveau. It appears a misplaced drm_atomic_get_crtc_state() call has been
hiding in our .prepare_fb callback for a while.
So, fix this by adding a new nv50_head_atom_get_new() function and use that
in our .prepare_fb callback instead.
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com>
Fixes: 1590700d94ac ("drm/nouveau/kms/nv50-: split each resource type into their own source files")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
---
V2:
* Don't call IS_ERR against the return value of
drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state(), it doesn't return pointer errors.
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h | 13 +++++++++++++
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h
index 93f8f4f645784..b43c4f9bbcdf5 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h
@@ -152,8 +152,21 @@ static inline struct nv50_head_atom *
nv50_head_atom_get(struct drm_atomic_state *state, struct drm_crtc *crtc)
{
struct drm_crtc_state *statec = drm_atomic_get_crtc_state(state, crtc);
+
if (IS_ERR(statec))
return (void *)statec;
+
+ return nv50_head_atom(statec);
+}
+
+static inline struct nv50_head_atom *
+nv50_head_atom_get_new(struct drm_atomic_state *state, struct drm_crtc *crtc)
+{
+ struct drm_crtc_state *statec = drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state(state, crtc);
+
+ if (!statec)
+ return NULL;
+
return nv50_head_atom(statec);
}
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c
index ef9e410babbfb..9a2c20fce0f3e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ nv50_wndw_prepare_fb(struct drm_plane *plane, struct drm_plane_state *state)
asyw->image.offset[0] = nvbo->offset;
if (wndw->func->prepare) {
- asyh = nv50_head_atom_get(asyw->state.state, asyw->state.crtc);
+ asyh = nv50_head_atom_get_new(asyw->state.state, asyw->state.crtc);
if (IS_ERR(asyh))
return PTR_ERR(asyh);
base-commit: c7685d11108acb387e44e3d81194d0d8959eaa44
--
2.52.0
From: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh(a)amazon.de>
It is possible to degrade host performance by manipulating performance
counters from a VM and tricking the host hypervisor to enable branch
tracing. When the guest programs a CPU to track branch instructions and
deliver an interrupt after exactly one branch instruction, the value one
is handled by the host KVM/perf subsystems and treated incorrectly as a
special value to enable the branch trace store (BTS) subsystem. It
should not be possible to enable BTS from a guest. When BTS is enabled,
it leads to general host performance degradation to both VMs and host.
Perf considers the combination of PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS with
a sample_period of 1 a special case and handles this as a BTS event (see
intel_pmu_has_bts_period()) -- a deviation from the usual semantic,
where the sample_period represents the amount of branch instructions to
encounter before the overflow handler is invoked.
Nothing prevents a guest from programming its vPMU with the above
settings (count branch, interrupt after one branch), which causes KVM to
erroneously instruct perf to create a BTS event within
pmc_reprogram_counter(), which does not have the desired semantics.
The guest could also do more benign actions and request an interrupt
after a more reasonable number of branch instructions via its vPMU. In
that case counting works initially. However, KVM occasionally pauses and
resumes the created performance counters. If the remaining amount of
branch instructions until interrupt has reached 1 exactly,
pmc_resume_counter() fails to resume the counter and a BTS event is
created instead with its incorrect semantics.
Fix this behavior by not passing the special value "1" as sample_period
to perf. Instead, perform the same quirk that happens later in
x86_perf_event_set_period() anyway, when the performance counter is
transferred to the actual PMU: bump the sample_period to 2.
Testing:
From guest:
`./wrmsr -p 12 0x186 0x1100c4`
`./wrmsr -p 12 0xc1 0xffffffffffff`
`./wrmsr -p 12 0x186 0x5100c4`
This sequence sets up branch instruction counting, initializes the counter
to overflow after one event (0xffffffffffff), and then enables edge
detection (bit 18) for branch events.
./wrmsr -p 12 0x186 0x1100c4
Writes to IA32_PERFEVTSEL0 (0x186)
Value 0x1100c4 breaks down as:
Event = 0xC4 (Branch instructions)
Bits 16-17: 0x1 (User mode only)
Bit 22: 1 (Enable counter)
./wrmsr -p 12 0xc1 0xffffffffffff
Writes to IA32_PMC0 (0xC1)
Sets counter to maximum value (0xffffffffffff)
This effectively sets up the counter to overflow on the next branch
./wrmsr -p 12 0x186 0x5100c4
Updates IA32_PERFEVTSEL0 again
Similar to first command but adds bit 18 (0x4 to 0x5)
Enables edge detection (bit 18)
These MSR writes are trapped by the hypervisor in KVM and forwarded to
the perf subsystem to create corresponding monitoring events.
It is possible to repro this problem in a more realistic guest scenario:
`perf record -e branches:u -c 2 -a &`
`perf record -e branches:u -c 2 -a &`
This presumably triggers the issue by KVM pausing and resuming the
performance counter at the wrong moment, when its value is about to
overflow.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh(a)amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Fernand Sieber <sieberf(a)amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Borghorst <hborghor(a)amazon.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251124100220.238177-1-sieberf@amazon.com
---
arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
index 487ad19a236e..547512028e24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.c
@@ -225,6 +225,19 @@ static u64 get_sample_period(struct kvm_pmc *pmc, u64 counter_value)
{
u64 sample_period = (-counter_value) & pmc_bitmask(pmc);
+ /*
+ * A sample_period of 1 might get mistaken by perf for a BTS event, see
+ * intel_pmu_has_bts_period(). This would prevent re-arming the counter
+ * via pmc_resume_counter(), followed by the accidental creation of an
+ * actual BTS event, which we do not want.
+ *
+ * Avoid this by bumping the sampling period. Note, that we do not lose
+ * any precision, because the same quirk happens later anyway (for
+ * different reasons) in x86_perf_event_set_period().
+ */
+ if (sample_period == 1)
+ sample_period = 2;
+
if (!sample_period)
sample_period = pmc_bitmask(pmc) + 1;
return sample_period;
--
2.43.0
Amazon Development Centre (South Africa) (Proprietary) Limited
29 Gogosoa Street, Observatory, Cape Town, Western Cape, 7925, South Africa
Registration Number: 2004 / 034463 / 07
of_get_child_by_name() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented.
Use the __free() attribute to manage the pgc_node reference, ensuring
automatic of_node_put() cleanup when pgc_node goes out of scope.
This eliminates the need for explicit error handling paths and avoids
reference count leaks.
Fixes: 721cabf6c660 ("soc: imx: move PGC handling to a new GPC driver")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
Change in V4:
- Fix typo error in code
Change in V3:
- Ensure variable is assigned when using cleanup attribute
Change in V2:
- Use __free() attribute instead of explicit of_node_put() calls
---
drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c b/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
index f18c7e6e75dd..56a78cc86584 100644
--- a/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
+++ b/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
@@ -403,13 +403,12 @@ static int imx_gpc_old_dt_init(struct device *dev, struct regmap *regmap,
static int imx_gpc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
const struct imx_gpc_dt_data *of_id_data = device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev);
- struct device_node *pgc_node;
+ struct device_node *pgc_node __free(device_node)
+ = of_get_child_by_name(pdev->dev.of_node, "pgc");
struct regmap *regmap;
void __iomem *base;
int ret;
- pgc_node = of_get_child_by_name(pdev->dev.of_node, "pgc");
-
/* bail out if DT too old and doesn't provide the necessary info */
if (!of_property_present(pdev->dev.of_node, "#power-domain-cells") &&
!pgc_node)
--
2.34.1
According to PCIe r7.0, sec. 6.2.11, "Implementation Note: Determination
of DPC Control", it is recommended that the Operating System link the
enablement of Downstream Port Containment (DPC) to the enablement of
Advanced Error Reporting (AER).
However, AER is advertised only on Root Port (RP) or Root Complex Event
Collector (RCEC) devices. On the other hand, DPC may be advertised on
any PCIe device in the hierarchy. In fact, since the main usecase of DPC
is for the switch upstream of an endpoint device to trigger a signal to
the host-bridge, it is imperative that it be supported on non-RP,
non-RCEC devices.
Previously portdrv has interpreted the spec to mean that the AER service
must be available on the same device in order for DPC to be available.
This is not what the implementation note meant to imply. If the firmware
hands Linux control of AER via _OSC on the host bridge upstream of the
device, then Linux should be allowed to assume control of DPC on the device.
The comment above this check alludes to this, by saying:
> With dpc-native, allow Linux to use DPC even if it doesn't have
> permission to use AER.
However, permission to use AER is negotiated at the host bridge, not
per-device. So we should not link DPC to enabling AER at the device.
Instead, DPC should be enabled if the OS has control of AER for the
host bridge that is upstream of the device in question, or if dpc-native
was set on the command line.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Darshit Shah <darnshah(a)amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy(a)linux.intel.com>
---
Changes from v2:
* + stable(a)vger.kernel.org since moving to v6.2+ breaks DPC on our systems
* Minor stylistic changes to commit message
* NO functional changes
drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv.c
index 38a41ccf79b9..8db2fa140ae2 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ static int get_port_device_capability(struct pci_dev *dev)
*/
if (pci_find_ext_capability(dev, PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_DPC) &&
pci_aer_available() &&
- (pcie_ports_dpc_native || (services & PCIE_PORT_SERVICE_AER)))
+ (host->native_aer || pcie_ports_dpc_native))
services |= PCIE_PORT_SERVICE_DPC;
/* Enable bandwidth control if more than one speed is supported. */
--
2.47.3
Amazon Web Services Development Center Germany GmbH
Tamara-Danz-Str. 13
10243 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christof Hellmis, Andreas Stieger
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 257764 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 365 538 597
scx_enable() calls scx_bypass(true) to initialize in bypass mode and then
scx_bypass(false) on success to exit. If scx_enable() fails during task
initialization - e.g. scx_cgroup_init() or scx_init_task() returns an error -
it jumps to err_disable while bypass is still active. scx_disable_workfn()
then calls scx_bypass(true/false) for its own bypass, leaving the bypass depth
at 1 instead of 0. This causes the system to remain permanently in bypass mode
after a failed scx_enable().
Failures after task initialization is complete - e.g. scx_tryset_enable_state()
at the end - already call scx_bypass(false) before reaching the error path and
are not affected. This only affects a subset of failure modes.
Fix it by tracking whether scx_enable() called scx_bypass(true) in a bool and
having scx_disable_workfn() call an extra scx_bypass(false) to clear it. This
is a temporary measure as the bypass depth will be moved into the sched
instance, which will make this tracking unnecessary.
Fixes: 8c2090c504e9 ("sched_ext: Initialize in bypass mode")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.12+
Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm(a)meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org>
---
kernel/sched/ext.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/sched/ext.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/ext.c
@@ -41,6 +41,13 @@ static bool scx_init_task_enabled;
static bool scx_switching_all;
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__scx_switched_all);
+/*
+ * Tracks whether scx_enable() called scx_bypass(true). Used to balance bypass
+ * depth on enable failure. Will be removed when bypass depth is moved into the
+ * sched instance.
+ */
+static bool scx_bypassed_for_enable;
+
static atomic_long_t scx_nr_rejected = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
static atomic_long_t scx_hotplug_seq = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
@@ -4318,6 +4325,11 @@ static void scx_disable_workfn(struct kt
scx_dsp_max_batch = 0;
free_kick_syncs();
+ if (scx_bypassed_for_enable) {
+ scx_bypassed_for_enable = false;
+ scx_bypass(false);
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&scx_enable_mutex);
WARN_ON_ONCE(scx_set_enable_state(SCX_DISABLED) != SCX_DISABLING);
@@ -4970,6 +4982,7 @@ static int scx_enable(struct sched_ext_o
* Init in bypass mode to guarantee forward progress.
*/
scx_bypass(true);
+ scx_bypassed_for_enable = true;
for (i = SCX_OPI_NORMAL_BEGIN; i < SCX_OPI_NORMAL_END; i++)
if (((void (**)(void))ops)[i])
@@ -5067,6 +5080,7 @@ static int scx_enable(struct sched_ext_o
scx_task_iter_stop(&sti);
percpu_up_write(&scx_fork_rwsem);
+ scx_bypassed_for_enable = false;
scx_bypass(false);
if (!scx_tryset_enable_state(SCX_ENABLED, SCX_ENABLING)) {
--
tejun
Initialize the eb.vma array with values of 0 when the eb structure is
first set up. In particular, this sets the eb->vma[i].vma pointers to
NULL, simplifying cleanup and getting rid of the bug described below.
During the execution of eb_lookup_vmas(), the eb->vma array is
successively filled up with struct eb_vma objects. This process includes
calling eb_add_vma(), which might fail; however, even in the event of
failure, eb->vma[i].vma is set for the currently processed buffer.
If eb_add_vma() fails, eb_lookup_vmas() returns with an error, which
prompts a call to eb_release_vmas() to clean up the mess. Since
eb_lookup_vmas() might fail during processing any (possibly not first)
buffer, eb_release_vmas() checks whether a buffer's vma is NULL to know
at what point did the lookup function fail.
In eb_lookup_vmas(), eb->vma[i].vma is set to NULL if either the helper
function eb_lookup_vma() or eb_validate_vma() fails. eb->vma[i+1].vma is
set to NULL in case i915_gem_object_userptr_submit_init() fails; the
current one needs to be cleaned up by eb_release_vmas() at this point,
so the next one is set. If eb_add_vma() fails, neither the current nor
the next vma is nullified, which is a source of a NULL deref bug
described in the issue linked in the Closes tag.
When entering eb_lookup_vmas(), the vma pointers are set to the slab
poison value, instead of NULL. This doesn't matter for the actual
lookup, since it gets overwritten anyway, however the eb_release_vmas()
function only recognizes NULL as the stopping value, hence the pointers
are being nullified as they go in case of intermediate failure. This
patch changes the approach to filling them all with NULL at the start
instead, rather than handling that manually during failure.
Reported-by: Gangmin Kim <km.kim1503(a)gmail.com>
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/15062
Fixes: 544460c33821 ("drm/i915: Multi-BB execbuf")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 5.16.x
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Niemiec <krzysztof.niemiec(a)intel.com>
---
I messed up the continuity in previous revisions; the original patch
was sent as [1], and the first revision (which I didn't mark as v2 due
to the title change) was sent as [2].
This is the full current changelog:
v3:
- use memset() to fill the entire eb.vma array with zeros instead of
looping through the elements (Janusz)
- add a comment clarifying the mechanism of the initial allocation (Janusz)
- change the commit log again, including title
- rearrange the tags to keep checkpatch happy
v2:
- set the eb->vma[i].vma pointers to NULL during setup instead of
ad-hoc at failure (Janusz)
- romanize the reporter's name (Andi, offline)
- change the commit log, including title
[1] https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/156832/
[2] https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/158036/
.../gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 36 +++++++++----------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
index b057c2fa03a4..5f2b736b53ab 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c
@@ -951,13 +951,13 @@ static int eb_lookup_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb)
vma = eb_lookup_vma(eb, eb->exec[i].handle);
if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
err = PTR_ERR(vma);
- goto err;
+ return err;
}
err = eb_validate_vma(eb, &eb->exec[i], vma);
if (unlikely(err)) {
i915_vma_put(vma);
- goto err;
+ return err;
}
err = eb_add_vma(eb, ¤t_batch, i, vma);
@@ -966,19 +966,8 @@ static int eb_lookup_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb)
if (i915_gem_object_is_userptr(vma->obj)) {
err = i915_gem_object_userptr_submit_init(vma->obj);
- if (err) {
- if (i + 1 < eb->buffer_count) {
- /*
- * Execbuffer code expects last vma entry to be NULL,
- * since we already initialized this entry,
- * set the next value to NULL or we mess up
- * cleanup handling.
- */
- eb->vma[i + 1].vma = NULL;
- }
-
+ if (err)
return err;
- }
eb->vma[i].flags |= __EXEC_OBJECT_USERPTR_INIT;
eb->args->flags |= __EXEC_USERPTR_USED;
@@ -986,10 +975,6 @@ static int eb_lookup_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb)
}
return 0;
-
-err:
- eb->vma[i].vma = NULL;
- return err;
}
static int eb_lock_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb)
@@ -3375,7 +3360,9 @@ i915_gem_do_execbuffer(struct drm_device *dev,
eb.exec = exec;
eb.vma = (struct eb_vma *)(exec + args->buffer_count + 1);
- eb.vma[0].vma = NULL;
+
+ memset(eb.vma, 0x00, args->buffer_count * sizeof(struct eb_vma));
+
eb.batch_pool = NULL;
eb.invalid_flags = __EXEC_OBJECT_UNKNOWN_FLAGS;
@@ -3584,7 +3571,16 @@ i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
if (err)
return err;
- /* Allocate extra slots for use by the command parser */
+ /*
+ * Allocate extra slots for use by the command parser.
+ *
+ * Note that this allocation handles two different arrays (the
+ * exec2_list array, and the eventual eb.vma array introduced in
+ * i915_gem_do_execubuffer()), that reside in virtually contiguous
+ * memory. Also note that the allocation doesn't fill the area with
+ * zeros (the first part doesn't need to be), but the second part only
+ * is explicitly zeroed later in i915_gem_do_execbuffer().
+ */
exec2_list = kvmalloc_array(count + 2, eb_element_size(),
__GFP_NOWARN | GFP_KERNEL);
if (exec2_list == NULL) {
--
2.45.2
When nvmem_cell_read() fails in mt798x_phy_calibration(), the function
returns without calling nvmem_cell_put(), leaking the cell reference.
Move nvmem_cell_put() right after nvmem_cell_read() to ensure the cell
reference is always released regardless of the read result.
Found via static analysis and code review.
Fixes: 98c485eaf509 ("net: phy: add driver for MediaTek SoC built-in GE PHYs")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/net/phy/mediatek/mtk-ge-soc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/mediatek/mtk-ge-soc.c b/drivers/net/phy/mediatek/mtk-ge-soc.c
index cd09fbf92ef2..2c4bbc236202 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/mediatek/mtk-ge-soc.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/mediatek/mtk-ge-soc.c
@@ -1167,9 +1167,9 @@ static int mt798x_phy_calibration(struct phy_device *phydev)
}
buf = (u32 *)nvmem_cell_read(cell, &len);
+ nvmem_cell_put(cell);
if (IS_ERR(buf))
return PTR_ERR(buf);
- nvmem_cell_put(cell);
if (!buf[0] || !buf[1] || !buf[2] || !buf[3] || len < 4 * sizeof(u32)) {
phydev_err(phydev, "invalid efuse data\n");
--
2.25.1
It is checked almost always in dpu_encoder_phys_wb_setup_ctl(), but in a
single place the check is missing.
Also use convenient locals instead of phys_enc->* where available.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d7d0e73f7de33 ("drm/msm/dpu: introduce the dpu_encoder_phys_* for writeback")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Kuratov <kniv(a)yandex-team.ru>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_encoder_phys_wb.c | 10 ++++------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_encoder_phys_wb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_encoder_phys_wb.c
index 46f348972a97..6d28f2281c76 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_encoder_phys_wb.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/disp/dpu1/dpu_encoder_phys_wb.c
@@ -247,14 +247,12 @@ static void dpu_encoder_phys_wb_setup_ctl(struct dpu_encoder_phys *phys_enc)
if (hw_cdm)
intf_cfg.cdm = hw_cdm->idx;
- if (phys_enc->hw_pp->merge_3d && phys_enc->hw_pp->merge_3d->ops.setup_3d_mode)
- phys_enc->hw_pp->merge_3d->ops.setup_3d_mode(phys_enc->hw_pp->merge_3d,
- mode_3d);
+ if (hw_pp && hw_pp->merge_3d && hw_pp->merge_3d->ops.setup_3d_mode)
+ hw_pp->merge_3d->ops.setup_3d_mode(hw_pp->merge_3d, mode_3d);
/* setup which pp blk will connect to this wb */
- if (hw_pp && phys_enc->hw_wb->ops.bind_pingpong_blk)
- phys_enc->hw_wb->ops.bind_pingpong_blk(phys_enc->hw_wb,
- phys_enc->hw_pp->idx);
+ if (hw_pp && hw_wb->ops.bind_pingpong_blk)
+ hw_wb->ops.bind_pingpong_blk(hw_wb, hw_pp->idx);
phys_enc->hw_ctl->ops.setup_intf_cfg(phys_enc->hw_ctl, &intf_cfg);
} else if (phys_enc->hw_ctl && phys_enc->hw_ctl->ops.setup_intf_cfg) {
--
2.34.1
Hi,
The following patch has already been merged into mainline (master) and
the linux-6.12.y stable branch:
net: lan743x: Allocate rings outside ZONE_DMA (commit
8a8f3f4991761a70834fe6719d09e9fd338a766e)
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=…
I believe this patch should be backported. Our customer is experiencing
an issue where a Microchip LAN7430 NIC fails to work in a crashkernel
environment.
Because the driver uses the ZONE_DMA flag, memory allocation fails when
crashkernel reserves memory — preventing the card from functioning,
especially when they try to transfer the VMcore file over network.
We are using older kernel versions and request that this fix be applied
to the following branches:
linux-6.1.y
linux-6.6.y
linux-6.12.y
Could you please help backport this fix?
Thank you for your time and support.
Best regards,
Liyin
We switched from (wrongly) using the page count to an independent
shared count. Now, shared page tables have a refcount of 1 (excluding
speculative references) and instead use ptdesc->pt_share_count to
identify sharing.
We didn't convert hugetlb_pmd_shared(), so right now, we would never
detect a shared PMD table as such, because sharing/unsharing no longer
touches the refcount of a PMD table.
Page migration, like mbind() or migrate_pages() would allow for migrating
folios mapped into such shared PMD tables, even though the folios are
not exclusive. In smaps we would account them as "private" although they
are "shared", and we would be wrongly setting the PM_MMAP_EXCLUSIVE in the
pagemap interface.
Fix it by properly using ptdesc_pmd_is_shared() in hugetlb_pmd_shared().
Fixes: 59d9094df3d7 ("mm: hugetlb: independent PMD page table shared count")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Red Hat) <david(a)kernel.org>
---
include/linux/hugetlb.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/hugetlb.h b/include/linux/hugetlb.h
index 019a1c5281e4e..03c8725efa289 100644
--- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h
+++ b/include/linux/hugetlb.h
@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ static inline __init void hugetlb_cma_reserve(int order)
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING
static inline bool hugetlb_pmd_shared(pte_t *pte)
{
- return page_count(virt_to_page(pte)) > 1;
+ return ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(virt_to_ptdesc(pte));
}
#else
static inline bool hugetlb_pmd_shared(pte_t *pte)
--
2.52.0
Hi, all
We hit hard-lockups when the Intel IOMMU waits indefinitely for an ATS invalidation
that cannot complete, especially under GDR high-load conditions.
1. Hard-lock when a passthrough PCIe NIC with ATS enabled link-down in Intel IOMMU
non-scalable mode. Two scenarios exist: NIC link-down with an explicit link-down
event and link-down without any event.
a) NIC link-down with an explicit link-dow event.
Call Trace:
qi_submit_sync
qi_flush_dev_iotlb
__context_flush_dev_iotlb.part.0
domain_context_clear_one_cb
pci_for_each_dma_alias
device_block_translation
blocking_domain_attach_dev
iommu_deinit_device
__iommu_group_remove_device
iommu_release_device
iommu_bus_notifier
blocking_notifier_call_chain
bus_notify
device_del
pci_remove_bus_device
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device
pciehp_unconfigure_device
pciehp_disable_slot
pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change
pciehp_ist
b) NIC link-down without an event - hard-lock on VM destroy.
Call Trace:
qi_submit_sync
qi_flush_dev_iotlb
__context_flush_dev_iotlb.part.0
domain_context_clear_one_cb
pci_for_each_dma_alias
device_block_translation
blocking_domain_attach_dev
__iommu_attach_device
__iommu_device_set_domain
__iommu_group_set_domain_internal
iommu_detach_group
vfio_iommu_type1_detach_group
vfio_group_detach_container
vfio_group_fops_release
__fput
2. Hard-lock when a passthrough PCIe NIC with ATS enabled link-down in Intel IOMMU
scalable mode; NIC link-down without an event hard-locks on VM destroy.
Call Trace:
qi_submit_sync
qi_flush_dev_iotlb
intel_pasid_tear_down_entry
device_block_translation
blocking_domain_attach_dev
__iommu_attach_device
__iommu_device_set_domain
__iommu_group_set_domain_internal
iommu_detach_group
vfio_iommu_type1_detach_group
vfio_group_detach_container
vfio_group_fops_release
__fput
Fix both issues with two patches:
1. Skip dev-IOTLB flush for inaccessible devices in __context_flush_dev_iotlb() using
pci_device_is_present().
2. Use pci_device_is_present() instead of pci_dev_is_disconnected() to decide when to
skip ATS invalidation in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid().
Best Regards,
Jinhui
---
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251210171431.1589-1-guojinhui.liam@bytedance.…
Changelog in v1 -> v2 (suggested by Baolu Lu)
- Simplify the pci_device_is_present() check in __context_flush_dev_iotlb().
- Add Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org to both patches.
Jinhui Guo (2):
iommu/vt-d: Skip dev-iotlb flush for inaccessible PCIe device without
scalable mode
iommu/vt-d: Flush dev-IOTLB only when PCIe device is accessible in
scalable mode
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.20.1
Since we recently started warning about uses of this function after the
atomic check phase completes, we've started getting warnings about this in
nouveau. It appears a misplaced drm_atomic_get_crtc_state() call has been
hiding in our .prepare_fb callback for a while.
So, fix this by adding a new nv50_head_atom_get_new() function and use that
in our .prepare_fb callback instead.
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com>
Fixes: 1590700d94ac ("drm/nouveau/kms/nv50-: split each resource type into their own source files")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h | 13 +++++++++++++
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h
index 93f8f4f645784..85b7cf70d13c4 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/atom.h
@@ -152,8 +152,21 @@ static inline struct nv50_head_atom *
nv50_head_atom_get(struct drm_atomic_state *state, struct drm_crtc *crtc)
{
struct drm_crtc_state *statec = drm_atomic_get_crtc_state(state, crtc);
+
if (IS_ERR(statec))
return (void *)statec;
+
+ return nv50_head_atom(statec);
+}
+
+static inline struct nv50_head_atom *
+nv50_head_atom_get_new(struct drm_atomic_state *state, struct drm_crtc *crtc)
+{
+ struct drm_crtc_state *statec = drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state(state, crtc);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(statec))
+ return (void*)statec;
+
return nv50_head_atom(statec);
}
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c
index ef9e410babbfb..9a2c20fce0f3e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/wndw.c
@@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ nv50_wndw_prepare_fb(struct drm_plane *plane, struct drm_plane_state *state)
asyw->image.offset[0] = nvbo->offset;
if (wndw->func->prepare) {
- asyh = nv50_head_atom_get(asyw->state.state, asyw->state.crtc);
+ asyh = nv50_head_atom_get_new(asyw->state.state, asyw->state.crtc);
if (IS_ERR(asyh))
return PTR_ERR(asyh);
--
2.52.0
__pci_read_base() sets resource start and end addresses when resource
is larger than 4G but pci_bus_addr_t or resource_size_t are not capable
of representing 64-bit PCI addresses. This creates a problematic
resource that has non-zero flags but the start and end addresses do not
yield to resource size of 0 but 1.
Replace custom resource addresses setup with resource_set_range()
that correctly sets end address as -1 which results in resource_size()
returning 0.
For consistency, also use resource_set_range() in the other branch that
does size based resource setup.
Fixes: 23b13bc76f35 ("PCI: Fail safely if we can't handle BARs larger than 4GB")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251207215359.28895-1-ansuelsmth@gmail.com/T/#…
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Marangi <ansuelsmth(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/pci/probe.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/probe.c b/drivers/pci/probe.c
index 124d2d309c58..b8294a2f11f9 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/probe.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/probe.c
@@ -287,8 +287,7 @@ int __pci_read_base(struct pci_dev *dev, enum pci_bar_type type,
if ((sizeof(pci_bus_addr_t) < 8 || sizeof(resource_size_t) < 8)
&& sz64 > 0x100000000ULL) {
res->flags |= IORESOURCE_UNSET | IORESOURCE_DISABLED;
- res->start = 0;
- res->end = 0;
+ resource_set_range(res, 0, 0);
pci_err(dev, "%s: can't handle BAR larger than 4GB (size %#010llx)\n",
res_name, (unsigned long long)sz64);
goto out;
@@ -297,8 +296,7 @@ int __pci_read_base(struct pci_dev *dev, enum pci_bar_type type,
if ((sizeof(pci_bus_addr_t) < 8) && l) {
/* Above 32-bit boundary; try to reallocate */
res->flags |= IORESOURCE_UNSET;
- res->start = 0;
- res->end = sz64 - 1;
+ resource_set_range(res, 0, sz64);
pci_info(dev, "%s: can't handle BAR above 4GB (bus address %#010llx)\n",
res_name, (unsigned long long)l64);
goto out;
base-commit: 43dfc13ca972988e620a6edb72956981b75ab6b0
--
2.39.5
¿Cuánto cuesta una mala contratación?
body {
margin: 0;
padding: 0;
font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
font-size: 14px;
color: #333;
background-color: #ffffff;
}
table {
border-spacing: 0;
width: 100%;
max-width: 600px;
margin: auto;
}
td {
padding: 12px 20px;
}
a {
color: #1a73e8;
text-decoration: none;
}
.footer {
font-size: 12px;
color: #888888;
text-align: center;
}
Una mala contratación cuesta 3X el salario. Evítalo con datos, no percepciones.
Hola, ,
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Hello,
On Sat, Nov 15, 2025 at 10:59:38AM +0100, Fernando Fernandez Mancera wrote:
> When an IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) is received for a prefix, the
> kernel creates the corresponding on-link route with flags RTF_ADDRCONF
> and RTF_PREFIX_RT configured and RTF_EXPIRES if lifetime is set.
>
> If later a user configures a static IPv6 address on the same prefix the
> kernel clears the RTF_EXPIRES flag but it doesn't clear the RTF_ADDRCONF
> and RTF_PREFIX_RT. When the next RA for that prefix is received, the
> kernel sees the route as RA-learned and wrongly configures back the
> lifetime. This is problematic because if the route expires, the static
> address won't have the corresponding on-link route.
>
> This fix clears the RTF_ADDRCONF and RTF_PREFIX_RT flags preventing that
> the lifetime is configured when the next RA arrives. If the static
> address is deleted, the route becomes RA-learned again.
>
> Fixes: 14ef37b6d00e ("ipv6: fix route lookup in addrconf_prefix_rcv()")
> Reported-by: Garri Djavadyan <g.djavadyan(a)gmail.com>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ba807d39aca5b4dcf395cc11dca61a130a52cfd3.cam…
> Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de>
this commit is in the mainline now as
f72514b3c5698e4b900b25345e09f9ed33123de6 and is supposed to fix
https://bugs.debian.org/1117959.
I would have expected this to get backported to stable (here: 6.12.x),
but it's not in the list for 6.12.62-rc1[1].
Can we please have this patch backported?
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251210072948.125620687@linuxfoundation.org/
Thanks
Uwe
of_get_child_by_name() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented.
Use the __free() attribute to manage the pgc_node reference, ensuring
automatic of_node_put() cleanup when pgc_node goes out of scope.
This eliminates the need for explicit error handling paths and avoids
reference count leaks.
Fixes: 721cabf6c660 ("soc: imx: move PGC handling to a new GPC driver")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
Change in V3:
- Ensure variable is assigned when using cleanup attribute
Change in V2:
- Use __free() attribute instead of explicit of_node_put() calls
---
drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c b/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
index f18c7e6e75dd..0fb3250dbf5f 100644
--- a/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
+++ b/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
@@ -403,13 +403,12 @@ static int imx_gpc_old_dt_init(struct device *dev, struct regmap *regmap,
static int imx_gpc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
const struct imx_gpc_dt_data *of_id_data = device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev);
- struct device_node *pgc_node;
+ struct device_node *pgc_node __free(pgc_node)
+ = of_get_child_by_name(pdev->dev.of_node, "pgc");
struct regmap *regmap;
void __iomem *base;
int ret;
- pgc_node = of_get_child_by_name(pdev->dev.of_node, "pgc");
-
/* bail out if DT too old and doesn't provide the necessary info */
if (!of_property_present(pdev->dev.of_node, "#power-domain-cells") &&
!pgc_node)
--
2.34.1
It may happen that VF spawned for E610 adapter has problem with setting
link up. This happens when ixgbevf supporting mailbox API 1.6 coopearates
with PF driver which doesn't support this version of API, and hence
doesn't support new approach for getting PF link data.
In that case VF asks PF to provide link data but as PF doesn't support
it, returns -EOPNOTSUPP what leads to early bail from link configuration
sequence.
Avoid such situation by using legacy VFLINKS approach whenever negotiated
API version is less than 1.6.
Fixes: 53f0eb62b4d2 ("ixgbevf: fix getting link speed data for E610 devices")
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Kwapulinski <piotr.kwapulinski(a)intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jedrzej Jagielski <jedrzej.jagielski(a)intel.com>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c
index 29c5ce967938..8af88f615776 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c
@@ -846,7 +846,8 @@ static s32 ixgbevf_check_mac_link_vf(struct ixgbe_hw *hw,
if (!mac->get_link_status)
goto out;
- if (hw->mac.type == ixgbe_mac_e610_vf) {
+ if (hw->mac.type == ixgbe_mac_e610_vf &&
+ hw->api_version >= ixgbe_mbox_api_16) {
ret_val = ixgbevf_get_pf_link_state(hw, speed, link_up);
if (ret_val)
goto out;
--
2.31.1
It may happen that VF spawned for E610 adapter has problem with setting
link up. This happens when ixgbevf supporting mailbox API 1.6 cooperates
with PF driver which doesn't support this version of API, and hence
doesn't support new approach for getting PF link data.
In that case VF asks PF to provide link data but as PF doesn't support
it, returns -EOPNOTSUPP what leads to early bail from link configuration
sequence.
Avoid such situation by using legacy VFLINKS approach whenever negotiated
API version is less than 1.6.
To reproduce the issue just create VF and set its link up - adapter must
be any from the E610 family, ixgbevf must support API 1.6 or higher while
ixgbevf must not.
Fixes: 53f0eb62b4d2 ("ixgbevf: fix getting link speed data for E610 devices")
Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Piotr Kwapulinski <piotr.kwapulinski(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel(a)molgen.mpg.de>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jedrzej Jagielski <jedrzej.jagielski(a)intel.com>
---
v2: extend the commit msg (Paul)
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c
index 29c5ce967938..8af88f615776 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/vf.c
@@ -846,7 +846,8 @@ static s32 ixgbevf_check_mac_link_vf(struct ixgbe_hw *hw,
if (!mac->get_link_status)
goto out;
- if (hw->mac.type == ixgbe_mac_e610_vf) {
+ if (hw->mac.type == ixgbe_mac_e610_vf &&
+ hw->api_version >= ixgbe_mbox_api_16) {
ret_val = ixgbevf_get_pf_link_state(hw, speed, link_up);
if (ret_val)
goto out;
--
2.31.1
The Dell XPS 13 9350 and XPS 16 9640 both have an upside-down mounted
OV02C10 sensor. This rotation of 180° is reported in neither the SSDB nor
the _PLD for the sensor (both report a rotation of 0°).
Add a DMI quirk mechanism for upside-down sensors and add 2 initial entries
to the DMI quirk list for these 2 laptops.
Note the OV02C10 driver was originally developed on a XPS 16 9640 which
resulted in inverted vflip + hflip settings making it look like the sensor
was upright on the XPS 16 9640 and upside down elsewhere this has been
fixed in commit 69fe27173396 ("media: ov02c10: Fix default vertical flip").
This makes this commit a regression fix since now the video is upside down
on these Dell XPS models where it was not before.
Fixes: 69fe27173396 ("media: ov02c10: Fix default vertical flip")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
---
drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu-bridge.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu-bridge.c b/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu-bridge.c
index 58ea01d40c0d..6463b2a47d78 100644
--- a/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu-bridge.c
+++ b/drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu-bridge.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <acpi/acpi_bus.h>
#include <linux/cleanup.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/i2c.h>
#include <linux/mei_cl_bus.h>
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
@@ -99,6 +100,28 @@ static const struct ipu_sensor_config ipu_supported_sensors[] = {
IPU_SENSOR_CONFIG("XMCC0003", 1, 321468000),
};
+/*
+ * DMI matches for laptops which have their sensor mounted upside-down
+ * without reporting a rotation of 180° in neither the SSDB nor the _PLD.
+ */
+static const struct dmi_system_id upside_down_sensor_dmi_ids[] = {
+ {
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Dell Inc."),
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "XPS 13 9350"),
+ },
+ .driver_data = "OVTI02C1",
+ },
+ {
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Dell Inc."),
+ DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "XPS 16 9640"),
+ },
+ .driver_data = "OVTI02C1",
+ },
+ {} /* Terminating entry */
+};
+
static const struct ipu_property_names prop_names = {
.clock_frequency = "clock-frequency",
.rotation = "rotation",
@@ -249,6 +272,12 @@ static int ipu_bridge_read_acpi_buffer(struct acpi_device *adev, char *id,
static u32 ipu_bridge_parse_rotation(struct acpi_device *adev,
struct ipu_sensor_ssdb *ssdb)
{
+ const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
+
+ dmi_id = dmi_first_match(upside_down_sensor_dmi_ids);
+ if (dmi_id && acpi_dev_hid_match(adev, dmi_id->driver_data))
+ return 180;
+
switch (ssdb->degree) {
case IPU_SENSOR_ROTATION_NORMAL:
return 0;
--
2.52.0
handshake_req_submit() replaces sk->sk_destruct but never restores it when
submission fails before the request is hashed. handshake_sk_destruct() then
returns early and the original destructor never runs, leaking the socket.
Restore sk_destruct on the error path.
Fixes: 3b3009ea8abb ("net/handshake: Create a NETLINK service for handling handshake requests")
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: caoping <caoping(a)cmss.chinamobile.com>
---
net/handshake/request.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/handshake/request.c b/net/handshake/request.c
index 274d2c89b6b2..89435ed755cd 100644
--- a/net/handshake/request.c
+++ b/net/handshake/request.c
@@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ int handshake_req_submit(struct socket *sock, struct handshake_req *req,
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&hn->hn_lock);
out_err:
+ /* Restore original destructor so socket teardown still runs on failure */
+ req->hr_sk->sk_destruct = req->hr_odestruct;
trace_handshake_submit_err(net, req, req->hr_sk, ret);
handshake_req_destroy(req);
return ret;
base-commit: 4a26e7032d7d57c998598c08a034872d6f0d3945
--
2.47.3
Some Xe bos are allocated with extra backing-store for the CCS
metadata. It's never been the intention to share the CCS metadata
when exporting such bos as dma-buf. Don't include it in the
dma-buf sg-table.
Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com>
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom(a)linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c
index 54e42960daad..7c74a31d4486 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static struct sg_table *xe_dma_buf_map(struct dma_buf_attachment *attach,
case XE_PL_TT:
sgt = drm_prime_pages_to_sg(obj->dev,
bo->ttm.ttm->pages,
- bo->ttm.ttm->num_pages);
+ obj->size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (IS_ERR(sgt))
return sgt;
--
2.51.1
Commit 2603be9e8167 ("can: gs_usb: gs_can_open(): improve error handling")
added missing error handling to the gs_can_open() function.
The driver uses 2 USB anchors to track the allocated URBs: the TX URBs in
struct gs_can::tx_submitted for each netdev and the RX URBs in struct
gs_usb::rx_submitted for the USB device. gs_can_open() allocates the RX
URBs, while TX URBs are allocated during gs_can_start_xmit().
The cleanup in gs_can_open() kills all anchored dev->tx_submitted
URBs (which is not necessary since the netdev is not yet registered), but
misses the parent->rx_submitted URBs.
Fix the problem by killing the rx_submitted instead of the tx_submitted.
Fixes: 2603be9e8167 ("can: gs_usb: gs_can_open(): improve error handling")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251210-gs_usb-fix-error-handling-v1-1-d6a5a03f10…
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
---
drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
index e29e85b67fd4..a0233e550a5a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev)
usb_free_urb(urb);
out_usb_kill_anchored_urbs:
if (!parent->active_channels) {
- usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->tx_submitted);
+ usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&parent->rx_submitted);
if (dev->feature & GS_CAN_FEATURE_HW_TIMESTAMP)
gs_usb_timestamp_stop(parent);
--
2.51.0
Commit 2603be9e8167 ("can: gs_usb: gs_can_open(): improve error handling")
added missing error handling to the gs_can_open() function.
The driver uses 2 USB anchors to track the allocated URBs: the TX URBs in
struct gs_can::tx_submitted for each netdev and the RX URBs in struct
gs_usb::rx_submitted for the USB device. gs_can_open() allocates the RX
URBs, while TX URBs are allocated during gs_can_start_xmit().
The cleanup in gs_can_open() kills all anchored dev->tx_submitted
URBs (which is not necessary since the netdev is not yet registered), but
misses the parent->rx_submitted URBs.
Fix the problem by killing the rx_submitted instead of the tx_submitted.
Fixes: 2603be9e8167 ("can: gs_usb: gs_can_open(): improve error handling")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
---
drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
index e29e85b67fd4..a0233e550a5a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/gs_usb.c
@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ static int gs_can_open(struct net_device *netdev)
usb_free_urb(urb);
out_usb_kill_anchored_urbs:
if (!parent->active_channels) {
- usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->tx_submitted);
+ usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&parent->rx_submitted);
if (dev->feature & GS_CAN_FEATURE_HW_TIMESTAMP)
gs_usb_timestamp_stop(parent);
---
base-commit: 186468c67fc687650b7fb713d8c627d5c8566886
change-id: 20251210-gs_usb-fix-error-handling-4f980294424c
Best regards,
--
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
Since commit 9c328f54741b ("net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for
packet data") communication with nci nfc chips is not working any more.
The mentioned commit tries to fix access of uninitialized data, but
failed to understand that in some cases the data packet is of variable
length and can therefore not be compared to the maximum packet length
given by the sizeof(struct).
For these cases it is only possible to check for minimum packet length.
Fixes: 9c328f54741b ("net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Thalmeier <michael.thalmeier(a)hale.at>
---
Changes in v2:
- Reference correct commit hash
---
net/nfc/nci/ntf.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
index 418b84e2b260..5161e94f067f 100644
--- a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
+++ b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ static int nci_core_conn_credits_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nci_conn_info *conn_info;
int i;
- if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nci_core_conn_credit_ntf))
+ /* Minimal packet size for num_entries=1 is 1 x __u8 + 1 x conn_credit_entry */
+ if (skb->len < (sizeof(__u8) + sizeof(struct conn_credit_entry)))
return -EINVAL;
ntf = (struct nci_core_conn_credit_ntf *)skb->data;
@@ -364,7 +365,8 @@ static int nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
const __u8 *data;
bool add_target = true;
- if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nci_rf_discover_ntf))
+ /* Minimal packet size is 5 if rf_tech_specific_params_len=0 */
+ if (skb->len < (5 * sizeof(__u8)))
return -EINVAL;
data = skb->data;
@@ -596,7 +598,10 @@ static int nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
const __u8 *data;
int err = NCI_STATUS_OK;
- if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf))
+ /* Minimal packet size is 11 if
+ * f_tech_specific_params_len=0 and activation_params_len=0
+ */
+ if (skb->len < (11 * sizeof(__u8)))
return -EINVAL;
data = skb->data;
--
2.52.0
Since commit 8fcc7315a10a ("net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for
packet data") communication with nci nfc chips is not working any more.
The mentioned commit tries to fix access of uninitialized data, but
failed to understand that in some cases the data packet is of variable
length and can therefore not be compared to the maximum packet length
given by the sizeof(struct).
For these cases it is only possible to check for minimum packet length.
Fixes: 8fcc7315a10a ("net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Thalmeier <michael.thalmeier(a)hale.at>
---
net/nfc/nci/ntf.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
index 418b84e2b260..5161e94f067f 100644
--- a/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
+++ b/net/nfc/nci/ntf.c
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ static int nci_core_conn_credits_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nci_conn_info *conn_info;
int i;
- if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nci_core_conn_credit_ntf))
+ /* Minimal packet size for num_entries=1 is 1 x __u8 + 1 x conn_credit_entry */
+ if (skb->len < (sizeof(__u8) + sizeof(struct conn_credit_entry)))
return -EINVAL;
ntf = (struct nci_core_conn_credit_ntf *)skb->data;
@@ -364,7 +365,8 @@ static int nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
const __u8 *data;
bool add_target = true;
- if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nci_rf_discover_ntf))
+ /* Minimal packet size is 5 if rf_tech_specific_params_len=0 */
+ if (skb->len < (5 * sizeof(__u8)))
return -EINVAL;
data = skb->data;
@@ -596,7 +598,10 @@ static int nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet(struct nci_dev *ndev,
const __u8 *data;
int err = NCI_STATUS_OK;
- if (skb->len < sizeof(struct nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf))
+ /* Minimal packet size is 11 if
+ * f_tech_specific_params_len=0 and activation_params_len=0
+ */
+ if (skb->len < (11 * sizeof(__u8)))
return -EINVAL;
data = skb->data;
--
2.52.0
On Sun, Dec 07, 2025 at 10:07:49PM -0500, Sasha Levin wrote:
> This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
>
> dma-mapping: Allow use of DMA_BIT_MASK(64) in global scope
>
> to the 6.17-stable tree which can be found at:
> http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum…
>
> The filename of the patch is:
> dma-mapping-allow-use-of-dma_bit_mask-64-in-global-s.patch
> and it can be found in the queue-6.17 subdirectory.
>
> If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
> please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>
>
>
> commit 51a1912d46ceb70602de50c167e440966b9836f1
> Author: James Clark <james.clark(a)linaro.org>
> Date: Thu Oct 30 14:05:27 2025 +0000
>
> dma-mapping: Allow use of DMA_BIT_MASK(64) in global scope
>
> [ Upstream commit a50f7456f853ec3a6f07cbe1d16ad8a8b2501320 ]
This change has a pending bug fix, consider waiting to apply this to the
stable trees.
https://lore.kernel.org/20251207184756.97904-1-johannes.goede@oss.qualcomm.…
Cheers,
Nathan
From: Wenhua Lin <Wenhua.Lin(a)unisoc.com>
[ Upstream commit 29e8a0c587e328ed458380a45d6028adf64d7487 ]
In sprd_clk_init(), when devm_clk_get() returns -EPROBE_DEFER
for either uart or source clock, we should propagate the
error instead of just warning and continuing with NULL clocks.
Currently the driver only emits a warning when clock acquisition
fails and proceeds with NULL clock pointers. This can lead to
issues later when the clocks are actually needed. More importantly,
when the clock provider is not ready yet and returns -EPROBE_DEFER,
we should return this error to allow deferred probing.
This change adds explicit checks for -EPROBE_DEFER after both:
1. devm_clk_get(uport->dev, uart)
2. devm_clk_get(uport->dev, source)
When -EPROBE_DEFER is encountered, the function now returns
-EPROBE_DEFER to let the driver framework retry probing
later when the clock dependencies are resolved.
Signed-off-by: Wenhua Lin <Wenhua.Lin(a)unisoc.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251022030840.956589-1-Wenhua.Lin@unisoc.com
Reviewed-by: Cixi Geng <cixi.geng(a)linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
## Commit Analysis: serial: sprd: Return -EPROBE_DEFER when uart clock
is not ready
### 1. COMMIT MESSAGE ANALYSIS
**Subject**: Fixes incorrect handling of `-EPROBE_DEFER` error from
`devm_clk_get()`
**Key observations**:
- No `Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org` tag present
- No `Fixes:` tag pointing to when the bug was introduced
- Has `Reviewed-by:` from Cixi Geng
- Accepted by Greg Kroah-Hartman (serial subsystem maintainer)
### 2. CODE CHANGE ANALYSIS
The change adds two checks in `sprd_clk_init()`:
```c
clk_uart = devm_clk_get(uport->dev, "uart");
if (IS_ERR(clk_uart)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(clk_uart) == -EPROBE_DEFER)
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
dev_warn(...);
clk_uart = NULL;
}
clk_parent = devm_clk_get(uport->dev, "source");
if (IS_ERR(clk_parent)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(clk_parent) == -EPROBE_DEFER)
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
dev_warn(...);
clk_parent = NULL;
}
```
**Technical bug mechanism**: When clock providers aren't ready yet,
`devm_clk_get()` returns `-EPROBE_DEFER`. The existing code ignores this
error, sets the clock pointer to NULL, and continues. This bypasses the
kernel's deferred probing mechanism which exists precisely to handle
this dependency ordering scenario.
**Existing pattern**: The function already has identical handling for
the "enable" clock (visible in the context lines). This fix makes the
handling consistent for all three clocks.
### 3. CLASSIFICATION
**Type**: Bug fix (not a feature addition)
This fixes incorrect error handling. The `-EPROBE_DEFER` mechanism is a
fundamental kernel feature for handling driver load order dependencies.
Not propagating this error is a bug.
### 4. SCOPE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
- **Lines changed**: 6 lines added (two 3-line checks)
- **Files touched**: 1 file (`drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c`)
- **Complexity**: Very low - follows identical pattern already in the
same function
- **Subsystem**: Hardware-specific serial driver for Spreadtrum/Unisoc
UARTs
**Risk**: Very low
- Pattern is already established and proven in the same function
- Only affects error handling during probe
- No changes to normal operation when clocks are available
- Worst case: probe failure happens earlier/more explicitly
### 5. USER IMPACT
**Affected users**: Users of Spreadtrum/Unisoc UART hardware (embedded
devices, some Android phones)
**Severity**: Medium-High for affected users - without this fix, the
serial port may not work correctly on systems where clock providers load
after the serial driver. This is common in embedded systems with device
tree-based configurations.
**Real bug**: This is a practical issue in probe ordering scenarios. The
driver would proceed with NULL clocks instead of waiting for
dependencies to be ready.
### 6. STABILITY INDICATORS
- Reviewed-by tag indicates code review
- Maintainer accepted the change
- Simple, straightforward change following existing code patterns
- No complex logic introduced
### 7. DEPENDENCY CHECK
- **Dependencies**: None - self-contained fix
- **Code existence in stable**: The sprd_serial driver has existed since
~2015 (commit 3e1f2029a4b40), so it's present in all active stable
trees
### SUMMARY
**What it fixes**: Incorrect handling of `-EPROBE_DEFER` from
`devm_clk_get()` for two clocks ("uart" and "source"), causing the
driver to proceed with NULL clocks instead of deferring probe when clock
providers aren't ready.
**Stable kernel criteria**:
- ✅ Obviously correct (follows identical pattern already in function)
- ✅ Fixes a real bug (broken deferred probing)
- ✅ Small and contained (6 lines, 1 file)
- ✅ No new features
- ✅ Low risk of regression
**Concerns**:
- No explicit `Cc: stable` tag (author/maintainer didn't flag for
stable)
- Relatively niche driver (Spreadtrum hardware)
**Risk vs Benefit**: The fix is minimal risk (identical pattern to
existing code) and addresses a real bug that could leave serial hardware
non-functional on embedded systems. The benefit outweighs the minimal
risk.
The lack of `Cc: stable` tag is notable but not determinative - this is
a straightforward bug fix that meets all stable criteria. The fix is
small, obviously correct, and addresses a real probe ordering issue that
embedded system users could encounter.
**YES**
drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
index 8c9366321f8e7..092755f356836 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
@@ -1133,6 +1133,9 @@ static int sprd_clk_init(struct uart_port *uport)
clk_uart = devm_clk_get(uport->dev, "uart");
if (IS_ERR(clk_uart)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(clk_uart) == -EPROBE_DEFER)
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
+
dev_warn(uport->dev, "uart%d can't get uart clock\n",
uport->line);
clk_uart = NULL;
@@ -1140,6 +1143,9 @@ static int sprd_clk_init(struct uart_port *uport)
clk_parent = devm_clk_get(uport->dev, "source");
if (IS_ERR(clk_parent)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(clk_parent) == -EPROBE_DEFER)
+ return -EPROBE_DEFER;
+
dev_warn(uport->dev, "uart%d can't get source clock\n",
uport->line);
clk_parent = NULL;
--
2.51.0
Since Linux v6.7, booting using BootX on an Old World PowerMac produces
an early crash. Stan Johnson writes, "the symptoms are that the screen
goes blank and the backlight stays on, and the system freezes (Linux
doesn't boot)."
Further testing revealed that the failure can be avoided by disabling
CONFIG_BOOTX_TEXT. Bisection revealed that the regression was caused by
a change to the font bitmap pointer that's used when btext_init() begins
painting characters on the display, early in the boot process.
Christophe Leroy explains, "before kernel text is relocated to its final
location ... data is addressed with an offset which is added to the
Global Offset Table (GOT) entries at the start of bootx_init()
by function reloc_got2(). But the pointers that are located inside a
structure are not referenced in the GOT and are therefore not updated by
reloc_got2(). It is therefore needed to apply the offset manually by using
PTRRELOC() macro."
Cc: Cedar Maxwell <cedarmaxwell(a)mac.com>
Cc: Stan Johnson <userm57(a)yahoo.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <linux(a)treblig.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh(a)kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lists.debian.org/debian-powerpc/2025/10/msg00111.html
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/d81ddca8-c5ee-d583-d579-02b19ed95301@y…
Reported-by: Cedar Maxwell <cedarmaxwell(a)mac.com>
Closes: https://lists.debian.org/debian-powerpc/2025/09/msg00031.html
Bisected-by: Stan Johnson <userm57(a)yahoo.com>
Tested-by: Stan Johnson <userm57(a)yahoo.com>
Fixes: 0ebc7feae79a ("powerpc: Use shared font data")
Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Finn Thain <fthain(a)linux-m68k.org>
---
Changed since v1:
- Improved commit log entry to better explain the need for PTRRELOC().
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c
index 7f63f1cdc6c3..ca00c4824e31 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/udbg.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
#define NO_SCROLL
@@ -463,7 +464,7 @@ static noinline void draw_byte(unsigned char c, long locX, long locY)
{
unsigned char *base = calc_base(locX << 3, locY << 4);
unsigned int font_index = c * 16;
- const unsigned char *font = font_sun_8x16.data + font_index;
+ const unsigned char *font = PTRRELOC(font_sun_8x16.data) + font_index;
int rb = dispDeviceRowBytes;
rmci_maybe_on();
--
2.49.1
From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[ Upstream commit e5bf5ee266633cb18fff6f98f0b7d59a62819eee ]
ffs_epfile_open() can race with removal, ending up with file->private_data
pointing to freed object.
There is a total count of opened files on functionfs (both ep0 and
dynamic ones) and when it hits zero, dynamic files get removed.
Unfortunately, that removal can happen while another thread is
in ffs_epfile_open(), but has not incremented the count yet.
In that case open will succeed, leaving us with UAF on any subsequent
read() or write().
The root cause is that ffs->opened is misused; atomic_dec_and_test() vs.
atomic_add_return() is not a good idea, when object remains visible all
along.
To untangle that
* serialize openers on ffs->mutex (both for ep0 and for dynamic files)
* have dynamic ones use atomic_inc_not_zero() and fail if we had
zero ->opened; in that case the file we are opening is doomed.
* have the inodes of dynamic files marked on removal (from the
callback of simple_recursive_removal()) - clear ->i_private there.
* have open of dynamic ones verify they hadn't been already removed,
along with checking that state is FFS_ACTIVE.
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
## Summary
### What the Commit Fixes
This commit fixes a **Use-After-Free (UAF)** vulnerability in USB gadget
functionfs. The race condition occurs between `ffs_epfile_open()` and
file removal:
1. Thread A is in `ffs_epfile_open()` but hasn't incremented
`ffs->opened` yet
2. Thread B closes the last file handle, triggering removal (since
`opened` is 0)
3. Thread A's open succeeds with `file->private_data` pointing to freed
memory
4. Subsequent `read()`/`write()` operations cause UAF
### Fix Mechanism
The fix implements proper synchronization:
- Serializes openers using `ffs->mutex`
- Uses `atomic_inc_not_zero()` to fail if counter already zero
- Uses `smp_load_acquire()`/`smp_store_release()` for memory ordering
- Clears `i_private` during removal via `simple_recursive_removal()`
callback
- Uses `file->private_data` instead of `inode->i_private` in release
path
### Stable Kernel Criteria Assessment
| Criterion | Assessment |
|-----------|------------|
| Obviously correct | ✅ Uses standard kernel primitives, proper locking
patterns |
| Fixes real bug | ✅ UAF vulnerability, security-relevant |
| Important issue | ✅ Security bug, potential for crashes/exploitation |
| Small and contained | ✅ Single file, +43/-10 lines, localized changes
|
| No new features | ✅ Pure bug fix, no new APIs |
### Risk vs Benefit
**Benefits:**
- Fixes serious UAF vulnerability
- USB gadget functionfs used in Android, embedded systems
- Reviewed by Greg Kroah-Hartman (USB maintainer, stable maintainer)
- Written by Al Viro (highly respected kernel developer)
**Risks:**
- Moderate complexity (changes locking behavior)
- Recent commit (November 2025), limited mainline soak time
- No explicit `Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org` tag
### Dependencies
- `ffs_mutex_lock()` - exists in functionfs since early versions
- `simple_recursive_removal()` with callback - available since ~5.x
kernels
- Standard kernel APIs (`atomic_inc_not_zero`, memory barriers) -
universally available
### Concerns
1. **No Fixes: tag** - Makes it harder to determine which stable trees
need this fix
2. **No Cc: stable tag** - May indicate maintainers wanted soak time, or
an oversight given Greg KH reviewed it
3. **Backport effort** - May need adjustment for older stable trees
depending on functionfs evolution
### Conclusion
This is a legitimate UAF security fix that affects real-world users
(Android, embedded USB gadgets). Despite moderate complexity, the fix:
- Addresses a serious vulnerability class (UAF)
- Uses correct synchronization patterns
- Has been reviewed by the appropriate maintainer who also maintains
stable trees
- Is self-contained with no feature additions
The lack of explicit stable tags appears to be an oversight given the
security nature of the bug and Greg KH's review. UAF vulnerabilities
typically warrant expedited backporting.
**YES**
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
index 47cfbe41fdff8..69f6e3c0f7e00 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c
@@ -640,13 +640,22 @@ static ssize_t ffs_ep0_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
static int ffs_ep0_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- struct ffs_data *ffs = inode->i_private;
+ struct ffs_data *ffs = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ int ret;
- if (ffs->state == FFS_CLOSING)
- return -EBUSY;
+ /* Acquire mutex */
+ ret = ffs_mutex_lock(&ffs->mutex, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
- file->private_data = ffs;
ffs_data_opened(ffs);
+ if (ffs->state == FFS_CLOSING) {
+ ffs_data_closed(ffs);
+ mutex_unlock(&ffs->mutex);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ffs->mutex);
+ file->private_data = ffs;
return stream_open(inode, file);
}
@@ -1193,14 +1202,33 @@ static ssize_t ffs_epfile_io(struct file *file, struct ffs_io_data *io_data)
static int
ffs_epfile_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- struct ffs_epfile *epfile = inode->i_private;
+ struct ffs_data *ffs = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+ struct ffs_epfile *epfile;
+ int ret;
- if (WARN_ON(epfile->ffs->state != FFS_ACTIVE))
+ /* Acquire mutex */
+ ret = ffs_mutex_lock(&ffs->mutex, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&ffs->opened)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ffs->mutex);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ /*
+ * we want the state to be FFS_ACTIVE; FFS_ACTIVE alone is
+ * not enough, though - we might have been through FFS_CLOSING
+ * and back to FFS_ACTIVE, with our file already removed.
+ */
+ epfile = smp_load_acquire(&inode->i_private);
+ if (unlikely(ffs->state != FFS_ACTIVE || !epfile)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ffs->mutex);
+ ffs_data_closed(ffs);
return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ffs->mutex);
file->private_data = epfile;
- ffs_data_opened(epfile->ffs);
-
return stream_open(inode, file);
}
@@ -1332,7 +1360,7 @@ static void ffs_dmabuf_put(struct dma_buf_attachment *attach)
static int
ffs_epfile_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- struct ffs_epfile *epfile = inode->i_private;
+ struct ffs_epfile *epfile = file->private_data;
struct ffs_dmabuf_priv *priv, *tmp;
struct ffs_data *ffs = epfile->ffs;
@@ -2352,6 +2380,11 @@ static int ffs_epfiles_create(struct ffs_data *ffs)
return 0;
}
+static void clear_one(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ smp_store_release(&dentry->d_inode->i_private, NULL);
+}
+
static void ffs_epfiles_destroy(struct ffs_epfile *epfiles, unsigned count)
{
struct ffs_epfile *epfile = epfiles;
@@ -2359,7 +2392,7 @@ static void ffs_epfiles_destroy(struct ffs_epfile *epfiles, unsigned count)
for (; count; --count, ++epfile) {
BUG_ON(mutex_is_locked(&epfile->mutex));
if (epfile->dentry) {
- simple_recursive_removal(epfile->dentry, NULL);
+ simple_recursive_removal(epfile->dentry, clear_one);
epfile->dentry = NULL;
}
}
--
2.51.0
Hello,
Resend my last email without HTML.
---- zyc zyc <zyc199902(a)zohomail.cn> 在 Sat, 2025-11-29 18:57:01 写到:---
> Hello, maintainer
>
> I would like to report what appears to be a regression in 6.12.50 kernel release related to netem.
> It rejects our configuration with the message:
> Error: netem: cannot mix duplicating netems with other netems in tree.
>
> This breaks setups that previously worked correctly for many years.
>
>
> Our team uses multiple netem qdiscs in the same HTB branch, arranged in a parallel fashion using a prio fan-out. Each branch of the prio qdisc has its own distinct netem instance with different duplication characteristics.
>
> This is used to emulate our production conditions where a single logical path fans out into two downstream segments, for example:
>
> two ECMP next hops with different misbehaviour characteristics, or
>
>
> an HA firewall cluster where only one node is replaying frames, or
>
>
> two LAG / ToR paths where one path intermittently duplicates packets.
>
>
> In our environments, only a subset of flows are affected, and different downstream devices may cause different styles of duplication.
> This regression breaks existing automated tests, training environments, and network simulation pipelines.
>
> I would be happy to provide our reproducer if needed.
>
> Thank you for your time and for maintaining Linux kernel.
>
>
>
> Best regards,
> zyc
>
>
>
of_get_child_by_name() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented,
we should use the __free() attribute to manage the pgc_node reference.
This ensures automatic of_node_put() cleanup when pgc_node goes out of
scope, eliminating the need for explicit error handling paths and
avoiding reference count leaks.
Fixes: 721cabf6c660 ("soc: imx: move PGC handling to a new GPC driver")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
Change in V2:
- Use __free() attribute instead of explicit of_node_put() calls
---
drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c b/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
index f18c7e6e75dd..89d5d68c055d 100644
--- a/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
+++ b/drivers/pmdomain/imx/gpc.c
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static int imx_gpc_old_dt_init(struct device *dev, struct regmap *regmap,
static int imx_gpc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
const struct imx_gpc_dt_data *of_id_data = device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev);
- struct device_node *pgc_node;
+ struct device_node *pgc_node __free(pgc_node);
struct regmap *regmap;
void __iomem *base;
int ret;
--
2.34.1
From: Yongxin Liu <yongxin.liu(a)windriver.com>
Zero can be a valid value of num_records. For example, on Intel Atom x6425RE,
only x87 and SSE are supported (features 0, 1), and fpu_user_cfg.max_features
is 3. The for_each_extended_xfeature() loop only iterates feature 2, which is
not enabled, so num_records = 0. This is valid and should not cause core dump
failure.
The issue is that dump_xsave_layout_desc() returns 0 for both genuine errors
(dump_emit() failure) and valid cases (no extended features). Use negative
return values for errors and only abort on genuine failures.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ba386777a30b ("x86/elf: Add a new FPU buffer layout info to x86 core files")
Signed-off-by: Yongxin Liu <yongxin.liu(a)windriver.com>
---
V2: Keep error checking but use negative value for genuine error
V1: Remove error checking entirely
---
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 48113c5193aa..76153dfb58c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -1946,7 +1946,7 @@ static int dump_xsave_layout_desc(struct coredump_params *cprm)
};
if (!dump_emit(cprm, &xc, sizeof(xc)))
- return 0;
+ return -1;
num_records++;
}
@@ -1984,7 +1984,7 @@ int elf_coredump_extra_notes_write(struct coredump_params *cprm)
return 1;
num_records = dump_xsave_layout_desc(cprm);
- if (!num_records)
+ if (num_records < 0)
return 1;
/* Total size should be equal to the number of records */
--
2.46.2
From: Yongxin Liu <yongxin.liu(a)windriver.com>
Zero can be a valid value of num_records. For example, on Intel Atom x6425RE,
only x87 and SSE are supported (features 0, 1), and fpu_user_cfg.max_features
is 3. The for_each_extended_xfeature() loop only iterates feature 2, which is
not enabled, so num_records = 0. This is valid and should not cause core dump
failure.
The size check already validates consistency: if num_records = 0, then
en.n_descsz = 0, so the check passes.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ba386777a30b ("x86/elf: Add a new FPU buffer layout info to x86 core files")
Signed-off-by: Yongxin Liu <yongxin.liu(a)windriver.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 48113c5193aa..b1dd30eb21a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -1984,8 +1984,6 @@ int elf_coredump_extra_notes_write(struct coredump_params *cprm)
return 1;
num_records = dump_xsave_layout_desc(cprm);
- if (!num_records)
- return 1;
/* Total size should be equal to the number of records */
if ((sizeof(struct x86_xfeat_component) * num_records) != en.n_descsz)
--
2.46.2
Replace the RISCV_ISA_V dependency of the RISC-V crypto code with
RISCV_EFFICIENT_VECTOR_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, which implies RISCV_ISA_V as
well as vector unaligned accesses being efficient.
This is necessary because this code assumes that vector unaligned
accesses are supported and are efficient. (It does so to avoid having
to use lots of extra vsetvli instructions to switch the element width
back and forth between 8 and either 32 or 64.)
This was omitted from the code originally just because the RISC-V kernel
support for detecting this feature didn't exist yet. Support has now
been added, but it's fragmented into per-CPU runtime detection, a
command-line parameter, and a kconfig option. The kconfig option is the
only reasonable way to do it, though, so let's just rely on that.
Fixes: eb24af5d7a05 ("crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated AES-{ECB,CBC,CTR,XTS}")
Fixes: bb54668837a0 ("crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated ChaCha20")
Fixes: 600a3853dfa0 ("crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated GHASH")
Fixes: 8c8e40470ffe ("crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated SHA-{256,224}")
Fixes: b3415925a08b ("crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated SHA-{512,384}")
Fixes: 563a5255afa2 ("crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated SM3")
Fixes: b8d06352bbf3 ("crypto: riscv - add vector crypto accelerated SM4")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org>
---
arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++----
lib/crypto/Kconfig | 9 ++++++---
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig
index a75d6325607b..14c5acb935e9 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@
menu "Accelerated Cryptographic Algorithms for CPU (riscv)"
config CRYPTO_AES_RISCV64
tristate "Ciphers: AES, modes: ECB, CBC, CTS, CTR, XTS"
- depends on 64BIT && RISCV_ISA_V && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO
+ depends on 64BIT && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO && \
+ RISCV_EFFICIENT_VECTOR_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
help
Block cipher: AES cipher algorithms
@@ -18,21 +19,23 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_RISCV64
- Zvkb vector crypto extension (CTR)
- Zvkg vector crypto extension (XTS)
config CRYPTO_GHASH_RISCV64
tristate "Hash functions: GHASH"
- depends on 64BIT && RISCV_ISA_V && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO
+ depends on 64BIT && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO && \
+ RISCV_EFFICIENT_VECTOR_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
select CRYPTO_GCM
help
GCM GHASH function (NIST SP 800-38D)
Architecture: riscv64 using:
- Zvkg vector crypto extension
config CRYPTO_SM3_RISCV64
tristate "Hash functions: SM3 (ShangMi 3)"
- depends on 64BIT && RISCV_ISA_V && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO
+ depends on 64BIT && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO && \
+ RISCV_EFFICIENT_VECTOR_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_LIB_SM3
help
SM3 (ShangMi 3) secure hash function (OSCCA GM/T 0004-2012)
@@ -40,11 +43,12 @@ config CRYPTO_SM3_RISCV64
- Zvksh vector crypto extension
- Zvkb vector crypto extension
config CRYPTO_SM4_RISCV64
tristate "Ciphers: SM4 (ShangMi 4)"
- depends on 64BIT && RISCV_ISA_V && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO
+ depends on 64BIT && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO && \
+ RISCV_EFFICIENT_VECTOR_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
select CRYPTO_SM4
help
SM4 block cipher algorithm (OSCCA GB/T 32907-2016,
ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010/Amd 1:2021)
diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
index a3647352bff6..6871a41e5069 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -59,11 +59,12 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_ARCH
depends on CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA && !UML && !KMSAN
default y if ARM
default y if ARM64 && KERNEL_MODE_NEON
default y if MIPS && CPU_MIPS32_R2
default y if PPC64 && CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN && VSX
- default y if RISCV && 64BIT && RISCV_ISA_V && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO
+ default y if RISCV && 64BIT && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO && \
+ RISCV_EFFICIENT_VECTOR_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
default y if S390
default y if X86_64
config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
tristate
@@ -182,11 +183,12 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256_ARCH
depends on CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 && !UML
default y if ARM && !CPU_V7M
default y if ARM64
default y if MIPS && CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
default y if PPC && SPE
- default y if RISCV && 64BIT && RISCV_ISA_V && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO
+ default y if RISCV && 64BIT && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO && \
+ RISCV_EFFICIENT_VECTOR_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
default y if S390
default y if SPARC64
default y if X86_64
config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512
@@ -200,11 +202,12 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512_ARCH
bool
depends on CRYPTO_LIB_SHA512 && !UML
default y if ARM && !CPU_V7M
default y if ARM64
default y if MIPS && CPU_CAVIUM_OCTEON
- default y if RISCV && 64BIT && RISCV_ISA_V && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO
+ default y if RISCV && 64BIT && TOOLCHAIN_HAS_VECTOR_CRYPTO && \
+ RISCV_EFFICIENT_VECTOR_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
default y if S390
default y if SPARC64
default y if X86_64
config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA3
base-commit: 43dfc13ca972988e620a6edb72956981b75ab6b0
--
2.52.0
Hi,
This Linux kernel patch series introduces support for error recovery for
passthrough PCI devices on System Z (s390x).
Background
----------
For PCI devices on s390x an operating system receives platform specific
error events from firmware rather than through AER.Today for
passthrough/userspace devices, we don't attempt any error recovery and
ignore any error events for the devices. The passthrough/userspace devices
are managed by the vfio-pci driver. The driver does register error handling
callbacks (error_detected), and on an error trigger an eventfd to
userspace. But we need a mechanism to notify userspace
(QEMU/guest/userspace drivers) about the error event.
Proposal
--------
We can expose this error information (currently only the PCI Error Code)
via a device feature. Userspace can then obtain the error information
via VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE ioctl and take appropriate actions such as driving
a device reset.
This is how a typical flow for passthrough devices to a VM would work:
For passthrough devices to a VM, the driver bound to the device on the host
is vfio-pci. vfio-pci driver does support the error_detected() callback
(vfio_pci_core_aer_err_detected()), and on an PCI error s390x recovery
code on the host will call the vfio-pci error_detected() callback. The
vfio-pci error_detected() callback will notify userspace/QEMU via an
eventfd, and return PCI_ERS_RESULT_CAN_RECOVER. At this point the s390x
error recovery on the host will skip any further action(see patch 6) and
let userspace drive the error recovery.
Once userspace/QEMU is notified, it then injects this error into the VM
so device drivers in the VM can take recovery actions. For example for a
passthrough NVMe device, the VM's OS NVMe driver will access the device.
At this point the VM's NVMe driver's error_detected() will drive the
recovery by returning PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET, and the s390x error
recovery in the VM's OS will try to do a reset. Resets are privileged
operations and so the VM will need intervention from QEMU to perform the
reset. QEMU will invoke the VFIO_DEVICE_RESET ioctl to now notify the
host that the VM is requesting a reset of the device. The vfio-pci driver
on the host will then perform the reset on the device to recover it.
Thanks
Farhan
ChangeLog
---------
v5 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251113183502.2388-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v5 -> v6
- Rebase on 6.18 + Lukas's PCI: Universal error recoverability of
devices series (https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1763483367.git.lukas@wunner.de/)
- Re-work config space accessibility check to pci_dev_save_and_disable() (patch 3).
This avoids saving the config space, in the reset path, if the device's config space is
corrupted or inaccessible.
v4 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250924171628.826-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v4 -> v5
- Rebase on 6.18-rc5
- Move bug fixes to the beginning of the series (patch 1 and 2). These patches
were posted as a separate fixes series
https://lore.kernel.org/all/a14936ac-47d6-461b-816f-0fd66f869b0f@linux.ibm.…
- Add matching pci_put_dev() for pci_get_slot() (patch 6).
v3 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250911183307.1910-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v3 -> v4
- Remove warn messages for each PCI capability not restored (patch 1)
- Check PCI_COMMAND and PCI_STATUS register for error value instead of device id
(patch 1)
- Fix kernel crash in patch 3
- Added reviewed by tags
- Address comments from Niklas's (patches 4, 5, 7)
- Fix compilation error non s390x system (patch 8)
- Explicitly align struct vfio_device_feature_zpci_err (patch 8)
v2 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250825171226.1602-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v2 -> v3
- Patch 1 avoids saving any config space state if the device is in error
(suggested by Alex)
- Patch 2 adds additional check only for FLR reset to try other function
reset method (suggested by Alex).
- Patch 3 fixes a bug in s390 for resetting PCI devices with multiple
functions. Creates a new flag pci_slot to allow per function slot.
- Patch 4 fixes a bug in s390 for resource to bus address translation.
- Rebase on 6.17-rc5
v1 series https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250813170821.1115-1-alifm@linux.ibm.com/
v1 - > v2
- Patches 1 and 2 adds some additional checks for FLR/PM reset to
try other function reset method (suggested by Alex).
- Patch 3 fixes a bug in s390 for resetting PCI devices with multiple
functions.
- Patch 7 adds a new device feature for zPCI devices for the VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE
ioctl. The ioctl is used by userspace to retriece any PCI error
information for the device (suggested by Alex).
- Patch 8 adds a reset_done() callback for the vfio-pci driver, to
restore the state of the device after a reset.
- Patch 9 removes the pcie check for triggering VFIO_PCI_ERR_IRQ_INDEX.
Farhan Ali (9):
PCI: Allow per function PCI slots
s390/pci: Add architecture specific resource/bus address translation
PCI: Avoid saving config space state if inaccessible
PCI: Add additional checks for flr reset
s390/pci: Update the logic for detecting passthrough device
s390/pci: Store PCI error information for passthrough devices
vfio-pci/zdev: Add a device feature for error information
vfio: Add a reset_done callback for vfio-pci driver
vfio: Remove the pcie check for VFIO_PCI_ERR_IRQ_INDEX
arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h | 29 ++++++++
arch/s390/pci/pci.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c | 107 +++++++++++++++++-------------
drivers/pci/host-bridge.c | 4 +-
drivers/pci/pci.c | 19 +++++-
drivers/pci/slot.c | 25 ++++++-
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 20 ++++--
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_intrs.c | 3 +-
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_priv.h | 9 +++
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_zdev.c | 45 ++++++++++++-
include/linux/pci.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/vfio.h | 15 +++++
12 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
¿Cuánto cuesta una mala contratación?
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Una mala contratación cuesta 3X el salario. Evítalo con datos, no percepciones.
Hola, ,
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The quilt patch titled
Subject: ocfs2: fix kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
ocfs2-fix-kernel-bug-in-ocfs2_find_victim_chain.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-nonmm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com>
Subject: ocfs2: fix kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2025 18:37:11 +0530
syzbot reported a kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain() because the
`cl_next_free_rec` field of the allocation chain list (next free slot in
the chain list) is 0, triggring the BUG_ON(!cl->cl_next_free_rec)
condition in ocfs2_find_victim_chain() and panicking the kernel.
To fix this, an if condition is introduced in ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(),
just before calling ocfs2_find_victim_chain(), the code block in it being
executed when either of the following conditions is true:
1. `cl_next_free_rec` is equal to 0, indicating that there are no free
chains in the allocation chain list
2. `cl_next_free_rec` is greater than `cl_count` (the total number of
chains in the allocation chain list)
Either of them being true is indicative of the fact that there are no
chains left for usage.
This is addressed using ocfs2_error(), which prints
the error log for debugging purposes, rather than panicking the kernel.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251201130711.143900-1-activprithvi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=96d38c6e1655c1420a72
Tested-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark(a)fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec(a)evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei(a)live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao(a)suse.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c~ocfs2-fix-kernel-bug-in-ocfs2_find_victim_chain
+++ a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
@@ -1993,6 +1993,16 @@ static int ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(str
}
cl = (struct ocfs2_chain_list *) &fe->id2.i_chain;
+ if (!le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) ||
+ le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) > le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count)) {
+ status = ocfs2_error(ac->ac_inode->i_sb,
+ "Chain allocator dinode %llu has invalid next "
+ "free chain record %u, but only %u total\n",
+ (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(fe->i_blkno),
+ le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec),
+ le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count));
+ goto bail;
+ }
victim = ocfs2_find_victim_chain(cl);
ac->ac_chain = victim;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from activprithvi(a)gmail.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix excessive IPI broadcasts when unsharing PMD tables using mmu_gather
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: "David Hildenbrand (Red Hat)" <david(a)kernel.org>
Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix excessive IPI broadcasts when unsharing PMD tables using mmu_gather
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 22:35:58 +0100
As reported, ever since commit 1013af4f585f ("mm/hugetlb: fix
huge_pmd_unshare() vs GUP-fast race") we can end up in some situations
where we perform so many IPI broadcasts when unsharing hugetlb PMD page
tables that it severely regresses some workloads.
In particular, when we fork()+exit(), or when we munmap() a large area
backed by many shared PMD tables, we perform one IPI broadcast per
unshared PMD table.
There are two optimizations to be had:
(1) When we process (unshare) multiple such PMD tables, such as during
exit(), it is sufficient to send a single IPI broadcast (as long as
we respect locking rules) instead of one per PMD table.
Locking prevents that any of these PMD tables could get reuse before
we drop the lock.
(2) When we are not the last sharer (> 2 users including us), there is
no need to send the IPI broadcast. The shared PMD tables cannot
become exclusive (fully unshared) before an IPI will be broadcasted
by the last sharer.
Concurrent GUP-fast could walk into a PMD table just before we
unshared it. It could then succeed in grabbing a page from the
shared page table even after munmap() etc succeeded (and supressed
an IPI). But there is not difference compared to GUP-fast just
sleeping for a while after grabbing the page and re-enabling IRQs.
Most importantly, GUP-fast will never walk into page tables that are
no-longer shared, because the last sharer will issue an IPI
broadcast.
(if ever required, checking whether the PUD changed in GUP-fast
after grabbing the page like we do in the PTE case could handle
this)
So let's rework PMD sharing TLB flushing + IPI sync to use the mmu_gather
infrastructure so we can implement these optimizations and demystify the
code at least a bit. Extend the mmu_gather infrastructure to be able to
deal with our special hugetlb PMD table sharing implementation.
We'll consolidate the handling for (full) unsharing of PMD tables in
tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc() and tlb_flush_unshared_tables(), and track in
"struct mmu_gather" whether we had (full) unsharing of PMD tables.
Because locking is very special (concurrent unsharing+reuse must be
prevented), we disallow deferring flushing to tlb_finish_mmu() and instead
require an explicit earlier call to tlb_flush_unshared_tables().
From hugetlb code, we call huge_pmd_unshare_flush() where we make sure
that the expected lock protecting us from concurrent unsharing+reuse is
still held.
Check with a VM_WARN_ON_ONCE() in tlb_finish_mmu() that
tlb_flush_unshared_tables() was properly called earlier.
Document it all properly.
Notes about tlb_remove_table_sync_one() interaction with unsharing:
There are two fairly tricky things:
(1) tlb_remove_table_sync_one() is a NOP on architectures without
CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE.
Here, the assumption is that the previous TLB flush would send an
IPI to all relevant CPUs. Careful: some architectures like x86 only
send IPIs to all relevant CPUs when tlb->freed_tables is set.
The relevant architectures should be selecting
MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE, but x86 might not do that in stable
kernels and it might have been problematic before this patch.
Also, the arch flushing behavior (independent of IPIs) is different
when tlb->freed_tables is set. Do we have to enlighten them to also
take care of tlb->unshared_tables? So far we didn't care, so
hopefully we are fine. Of course, we could be setting
tlb->freed_tables as well, but that might then unnecessarily flush
too much, because the semantics of tlb->freed_tables are a bit
fuzzy.
This patch changes nothing in this regard.
(2) tlb_remove_table_sync_one() is not a NOP on architectures with
CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE that actually don't need a sync.
Take x86 as an example: in the common case (!pv, !X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB)
we still issue IPIs during TLB flushes and don't actually need the
second tlb_remove_table_sync_one().
This optimized can be implemented on top of this, by checking e.g., in
tlb_remove_table_sync_one() whether we really need IPIs. But as
described in (1), it really must honor tlb->freed_tables then to
send IPIs to all relevant CPUs.
Further note that the ptdesc_pmd_pts_dec() in huge_pmd_share() is not a
concern, as we are holding the i_mmap_lock the whole time, preventing
concurrent unsharing. That ptdesc_pmd_pts_dec() usage will be removed
separately as a cleanup later.
There are plenty more cleanups to be had, but they have to wait until
this is fixed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251205213558.2980480-5-david@kernel.org
Fixes: 1013af4f585f ("mm/hugetlb: fix huge_pmd_unshare() vs GUP-fast race")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Red Hat) <david(a)kernel.org>
Reported-by: Uschakow, Stanislav" <suschako(a)amazon.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4d3878531c76479d9f8ca9789dc6485d@amazon.de/
Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman(a)redhat.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)surriel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Lance Yang <lance.yang(a)linux.dev>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/asm-generic/tlb.h | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/hugetlb.h | 19 +++--
mm/hugetlb.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
mm/mmu_gather.c | 6 +
mm/mprotect.c | 2
mm/rmap.c | 25 +++++--
6 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
--- a/include/asm-generic/tlb.h~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/include/asm-generic/tlb.h
@@ -364,6 +364,17 @@ struct mmu_gather {
unsigned int vma_huge : 1;
unsigned int vma_pfn : 1;
+ /*
+ * Did we unshare (unmap) any shared page tables?
+ */
+ unsigned int unshared_tables : 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Did we unshare any page tables such that they are now exclusive
+ * and could get reused+modified by the new owner?
+ */
+ unsigned int fully_unshared_tables : 1;
+
unsigned int batch_count;
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER
@@ -400,6 +411,7 @@ static inline void __tlb_reset_range(str
tlb->cleared_pmds = 0;
tlb->cleared_puds = 0;
tlb->cleared_p4ds = 0;
+ tlb->unshared_tables = 0;
/*
* Do not reset mmu_gather::vma_* fields here, we do not
* call into tlb_start_vma() again to set them if there is an
@@ -484,7 +496,7 @@ static inline void tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly
* these bits.
*/
if (!(tlb->freed_tables || tlb->cleared_ptes || tlb->cleared_pmds ||
- tlb->cleared_puds || tlb->cleared_p4ds))
+ tlb->cleared_puds || tlb->cleared_p4ds || tlb->unshared_tables))
return;
tlb_flush(tlb);
@@ -773,6 +785,61 @@ static inline bool huge_pmd_needs_flush(
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING
+static inline void tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct ptdesc *pt,
+ unsigned long addr)
+{
+ /*
+ * The caller must make sure that concurrent unsharing + exclusive
+ * reuse is impossible until tlb_flush_unshared_tables() was called.
+ */
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(pt));
+ ptdesc_pmd_pts_dec(pt);
+
+ /* Clearing a PUD pointing at a PMD table with PMD leaves. */
+ tlb_flush_pmd_range(tlb, addr & PUD_MASK, PUD_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * If the page table is now exclusively owned, we fully unshared
+ * a page table.
+ */
+ if (!ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(pt))
+ tlb->fully_unshared_tables = true;
+ tlb->unshared_tables = true;
+}
+
+static inline void tlb_flush_unshared_tables(struct mmu_gather *tlb)
+{
+ /*
+ * As soon as the caller drops locks to allow for reuse of
+ * previously-shared tables, these tables could get modified and
+ * even reused outside of hugetlb context. So flush the TLB now.
+ *
+ * Note that we cannot defer the flush to a later point even if we are
+ * not the last sharer of the page table.
+ */
+ if (tlb->unshared_tables)
+ tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(tlb);
+
+ /*
+ * Similarly, we must make sure that concurrent GUP-fast will not
+ * walk previously-shared page tables that are getting modified+reused
+ * elsewhere. So broadcast an IPI to wait for any concurrent GUP-fast.
+ *
+ * We only perform this when we are the last sharer of a page table,
+ * as the IPI will reach all CPUs: any GUP-fast.
+ *
+ * Note that on configs where tlb_remove_table_sync_one() is a NOP,
+ * the expectation is that the tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() would have issued
+ * required IPIs already for us.
+ */
+ if (tlb->fully_unshared_tables) {
+ tlb_remove_table_sync_one();
+ tlb->fully_unshared_tables = false;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING */
+
#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
#endif /* _ASM_GENERIC__TLB_H */
--- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/include/linux/hugetlb.h
@@ -240,8 +240,9 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *
pte_t *huge_pte_offset(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz);
unsigned long hugetlb_mask_last_page(struct hstate *h);
-int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep);
+int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep);
+void huge_pmd_unshare_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end);
@@ -271,7 +272,7 @@ void hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(struct vm_
int hugetlb_vma_trylock_write(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
void hugetlb_vma_assert_locked(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
void hugetlb_vma_lock_release(struct kref *kref);
-long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+long hugetlb_change_protection(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot,
unsigned long cp_flags);
void hugetlb_unshare_all_pmds(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
@@ -300,13 +301,17 @@ static inline struct address_space *huge
return NULL;
}
-static inline int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm,
- struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
+static inline int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline void huge_pmd_unshare_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+}
+
static inline void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
@@ -432,7 +437,7 @@ static inline void move_hugetlb_state(st
{
}
-static inline long hugetlb_change_protection(
+static inline long hugetlb_change_protection(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot,
unsigned long cp_flags)
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -5096,8 +5096,9 @@ int move_hugetlb_page_tables(struct vm_a
unsigned long last_addr_mask;
pte_t *src_pte, *dst_pte;
struct mmu_notifier_range range;
- bool shared_pmd = false;
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, vma->vm_mm);
mmu_notifier_range_init(&range, MMU_NOTIFY_CLEAR, 0, mm, old_addr,
old_end);
adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(vma, &range.start, &range.end);
@@ -5122,12 +5123,12 @@ int move_hugetlb_page_tables(struct vm_a
if (huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(mm, old_addr, src_pte)))
continue;
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, old_addr, src_pte)) {
- shared_pmd = true;
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, old_addr, src_pte)) {
old_addr |= last_addr_mask;
new_addr |= last_addr_mask;
continue;
}
+ tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry(h, &tlb, src_pte, old_addr);
dst_pte = huge_pte_alloc(mm, new_vma, new_addr, sz);
if (!dst_pte)
@@ -5136,13 +5137,13 @@ int move_hugetlb_page_tables(struct vm_a
move_huge_pte(vma, old_addr, new_addr, src_pte, dst_pte, sz);
}
- if (shared_pmd)
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, range.start, range.end);
- else
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, old_end - len, old_end);
+ tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(&tlb);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
+
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(&range);
i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
return len + old_addr - old_end;
}
@@ -5161,7 +5162,6 @@ void __unmap_hugepage_range(struct mmu_g
unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(h);
bool adjust_reservation;
unsigned long last_addr_mask;
- bool force_flush = false;
WARN_ON(!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma));
BUG_ON(start & ~huge_page_mask(h));
@@ -5184,10 +5184,8 @@ void __unmap_hugepage_range(struct mmu_g
}
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, ptep)) {
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(tlb, vma, address, ptep)) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
- tlb_flush_pmd_range(tlb, address & PUD_MASK, PUD_SIZE);
- force_flush = true;
address |= last_addr_mask;
continue;
}
@@ -5303,14 +5301,7 @@ void __unmap_hugepage_range(struct mmu_g
}
tlb_end_vma(tlb, vma);
- /*
- * There is nothing protecting a previously-shared page table that we
- * unshared through huge_pmd_unshare() from getting freed after we
- * release i_mmap_rwsem, so flush the TLB now. If huge_pmd_unshare()
- * succeeded, flush the range corresponding to the pud.
- */
- if (force_flush)
- tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(tlb);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(tlb, vma);
}
void __hugetlb_zap_begin(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -6399,7 +6390,7 @@ out_release_nounlock:
}
#endif /* CONFIG_USERFAULTFD */
-long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+long hugetlb_change_protection(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned long end,
pgprot_t newprot, unsigned long cp_flags)
{
@@ -6409,7 +6400,6 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
pte_t pte;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
long pages = 0, psize = huge_page_size(h);
- bool shared_pmd = false;
struct mmu_notifier_range range;
unsigned long last_addr_mask;
bool uffd_wp = cp_flags & MM_CP_UFFD_WP;
@@ -6452,7 +6442,7 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
}
}
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, ptep)) {
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(tlb, vma, address, ptep)) {
/*
* When uffd-wp is enabled on the vma, unshare
* shouldn't happen at all. Warn about it if it
@@ -6461,7 +6451,6 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
WARN_ON_ONCE(uffd_wp || uffd_wp_resolve);
pages++;
spin_unlock(ptl);
- shared_pmd = true;
address |= last_addr_mask;
continue;
}
@@ -6522,22 +6511,16 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
pte = huge_pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte);
huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit(vma, address, ptep, old_pte, pte);
pages++;
+ tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry(h, tlb, ptep, address);
}
next:
spin_unlock(ptl);
cond_resched();
}
- /*
- * There is nothing protecting a previously-shared page table that we
- * unshared through huge_pmd_unshare() from getting freed after we
- * release i_mmap_rwsem, so flush the TLB now. If huge_pmd_unshare()
- * succeeded, flush the range corresponding to the pud.
- */
- if (shared_pmd)
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, range.start, range.end);
- else
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
+
+ tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(tlb);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(tlb, vma);
/*
* No need to call mmu_notifier_arch_invalidate_secondary_tlbs() we are
* downgrading page table protection not changing it to point to a new
@@ -6904,18 +6887,27 @@ out:
return pte;
}
-/*
- * unmap huge page backed by shared pte.
+/**
+ * huge_pmd_unshare - Unmap a pmd table if it is shared by multiple users
+ * @tlb: the current mmu_gather.
+ * @vma: the vma covering the pmd table.
+ * @addr: the address we are trying to unshare.
+ * @ptep: pointer into the (pmd) page table.
+ *
+ * Called with the page table lock held, the i_mmap_rwsem held in write mode
+ * and the hugetlb vma lock held in write mode.
*
- * Called with page table lock held.
+ * Note: The caller must call huge_pmd_unshare_flush() before dropping the
+ * i_mmap_rwsem.
*
- * returns: 1 successfully unmapped a shared pte page
- * 0 the underlying pte page is not shared, or it is the last user
+ * Returns: 1 if it was a shared PMD table and it got unmapped, or 0 if it
+ * was not a shared PMD table.
*/
-int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
+int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
{
unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(hstate_vma(vma));
+ struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
@@ -6927,18 +6919,36 @@ int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *m
i_mmap_assert_write_locked(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
hugetlb_vma_assert_locked(vma);
pud_clear(pud);
- /*
- * Once our caller drops the rmap lock, some other process might be
- * using this page table as a normal, non-hugetlb page table.
- * Wait for pending gup_fast() in other threads to finish before letting
- * that happen.
- */
- tlb_remove_table_sync_one();
- ptdesc_pmd_pts_dec(virt_to_ptdesc(ptep));
+
+ tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc(tlb, virt_to_ptdesc(ptep), addr);
+
mm_dec_nr_pmds(mm);
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * huge_pmd_unshare_flush - Complete a sequence of huge_pmd_unshare() calls
+ * @tlb: the current mmu_gather.
+ * @vma: the vma covering the pmd table.
+ *
+ * Perform necessary TLB flushes or IPI broadcasts to synchronize PMD table
+ * unsharing with concurrent page table walkers (TLB, GUP-fast, etc.).
+ *
+ * This function must be called after a sequence of huge_pmd_unshare()
+ * calls while still holding the i_mmap_rwsem.
+ */
+void huge_pmd_unshare_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ /*
+ * We must synchronize page table unsharing such that nobody will
+ * try reusing a previously-shared page table while it might still
+ * be in use by previous sharers (TLB, GUP_fast).
+ */
+ i_mmap_assert_write_locked(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
+
+ tlb_flush_unshared_tables(tlb);
+}
+
#else /* !CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING */
pte_t *huge_pmd_share(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -6947,12 +6957,16 @@ pte_t *huge_pmd_share(struct mm_struct *
return NULL;
}
-int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
+int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
{
return 0;
}
+void huge_pmd_unshare_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+}
+
void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
{
@@ -7219,6 +7233,7 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(h);
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct mmu_notifier_range range;
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
unsigned long address;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *ptep;
@@ -7229,6 +7244,7 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
if (start >= end)
return;
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
flush_cache_range(vma, start, end);
/*
* No need to call adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(), because
@@ -7248,10 +7264,10 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
if (!ptep)
continue;
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
- huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, ptep);
+ huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, address, ptep);
spin_unlock(ptl);
}
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
if (take_locks) {
i_mmap_unlock_write(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
@@ -7261,6 +7277,7 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
* Documentation/mm/mmu_notifier.rst.
*/
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(&range);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
}
/*
--- a/mm/mmu_gather.c~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/mm/mmu_gather.c
@@ -469,6 +469,12 @@ void tlb_gather_mmu_fullmm(struct mmu_ga
void tlb_finish_mmu(struct mmu_gather *tlb)
{
/*
+ * We expect an earlier huge_pmd_unshare_flush() call to sort this out,
+ * due to complicated locking requirements with page table unsharing.
+ */
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(tlb->fully_unshared_tables);
+
+ /*
* If there are parallel threads are doing PTE changes on same range
* under non-exclusive lock (e.g., mmap_lock read-side) but defer TLB
* flush by batching, one thread may end up seeing inconsistent PTEs
--- a/mm/mprotect.c~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ long change_protection(struct mmu_gather
#endif
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
- pages = hugetlb_change_protection(vma, start, end, newprot,
+ pages = hugetlb_change_protection(tlb, vma, start, end, newprot,
cp_flags);
else
pages = change_protection_range(tlb, vma, start, end, newprot,
--- a/mm/rmap.c~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/mm/rmap.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
#include <linux/oom.h>
-#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/tlb.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/migrate.h>
@@ -2008,13 +2008,17 @@ static bool try_to_unmap_one(struct foli
* if unsuccessful.
*/
if (!anon) {
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
+
VM_BUG_ON(!(flags & TTU_RMAP_LOCKED));
if (!hugetlb_vma_trylock_write(vma))
goto walk_abort;
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, pvmw.pte)) {
+
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, address, pvmw.pte)) {
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
- flush_tlb_range(vma,
- range.start, range.end);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
/*
* The PMD table was unmapped,
* consequently unmapping the folio.
@@ -2022,6 +2026,7 @@ static bool try_to_unmap_one(struct foli
goto walk_done;
}
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
}
pteval = huge_ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pvmw.pte);
if (pte_dirty(pteval))
@@ -2398,17 +2403,20 @@ static bool try_to_migrate_one(struct fo
* fail if unsuccessful.
*/
if (!anon) {
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
+
VM_BUG_ON(!(flags & TTU_RMAP_LOCKED));
if (!hugetlb_vma_trylock_write(vma)) {
page_vma_mapped_walk_done(&pvmw);
ret = false;
break;
}
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, pvmw.pte)) {
- hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
- flush_tlb_range(vma,
- range.start, range.end);
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, address, pvmw.pte)) {
+ hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
/*
* The PMD table was unmapped,
* consequently unmapping the folio.
@@ -2417,6 +2425,7 @@ static bool try_to_migrate_one(struct fo
break;
}
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
}
/* Nuke the hugetlb page table entry */
pteval = huge_ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pvmw.pte);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david(a)kernel.org are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-hugetlb-fix-hugetlb_pmd_shared.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: "David Hildenbrand (Red Hat)" <david(a)kernel.org>
Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 22:35:55 +0100
Patch series "mm/hugetlb: fixes for PMD table sharing (incl. using
mmu_gather)".
One functional fix, one performance regression fix, and two related
comment fixes.
I cleaned up my prototype I recently shared [1] for the performance fix,
deferring most of the cleanups I had in the prototype to a later point.
While doing that I identified the other things.
The goal of this patch set is to be backported to stable trees "fairly"
easily. At least patch #1 and #4.
Patch #1 fixes hugetlb_pmd_shared() not detecting any sharing
Patch #2 + #3 are simple comment fixes that patch #4 interacts with.
Patch #4 is a fix for the reported performance regression due to excessive
IPI broadcasts during fork()+exit().
The last patch is all about TLB flushes, IPIs and mmu_gather. Read:
complicated
I added as much comments + description that I possibly could, and I am
hoping for review from Jann.
There are plenty of cleanups in the future to be had + one reasonable
optimization on x86. But that's all out of scope for this series.
This patch (of 4):
We switched from (wrongly) using the page count to an independent shared
count. Now, shared page tables have a refcount of 1 (excluding
speculative references) and instead use ptdesc->pt_share_count to identify
sharing.
We didn't convert hugetlb_pmd_shared(), so right now, we would never
detect a shared PMD table as such, because sharing/unsharing no longer
touches the refcount of a PMD table.
Page migration, like mbind() or migrate_pages() would allow for migrating
folios mapped into such shared PMD tables, even though the folios are not
exclusive. In smaps we would account them as "private" although they are
"shared", and we would be wrongly setting the PM_MMAP_EXCLUSIVE in the
pagemap interface.
Fix it by properly using ptdesc_pmd_is_shared() in hugetlb_pmd_shared().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251205213558.2980480-1-david@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251205213558.2980480-2-david@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8cab934d-4a56-44aa-b641-bfd7e23bd673@kernel.org/ [1]
Fixes: 59d9094df3d7 ("mm: hugetlb: independent PMD page table shared count")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Red Hat) <david(a)kernel.org>
Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel(a)surriel.com>
Reviewed-by: Lance Yang <lance.yang(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Uschakow, Stanislav" <suschako(a)amazon.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/hugetlb.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h~mm-hugetlb-fix-hugetlb_pmd_shared
+++ a/include/linux/hugetlb.h
@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ static inline __init void hugetlb_cma_re
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING
static inline bool hugetlb_pmd_shared(pte_t *pte)
{
- return page_count(virt_to_page(pte)) > 1;
+ return ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(virt_to_ptdesc(pte));
}
#else
static inline bool hugetlb_pmd_shared(pte_t *pte)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david(a)kernel.org are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: powerpc/pseries/cmm: adjust BALLOON_MIGRATE when migrating pages
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
powerpc-pseries-cmm-adjust-balloon_migrate-when-migrating-pages.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Subject: powerpc/pseries/cmm: adjust BALLOON_MIGRATE when migrating pages
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:06:06 +0200
Let's properly adjust BALLOON_MIGRATE like the other drivers.
Note that the INFLATE/DEFLATE events are triggered from the core when
enqueueing/dequeueing pages.
This was found by code inspection.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251021100606.148294-3-david@redhat.com
Fixes: fe030c9b85e6 ("powerpc/pseries/cmm: Implement balloon compaction")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cmm.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cmm.c~powerpc-pseries-cmm-adjust-balloon_migrate-when-migrating-pages
+++ a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cmm.c
@@ -532,6 +532,7 @@ static int cmm_migratepage(struct balloo
spin_lock_irqsave(&b_dev_info->pages_lock, flags);
balloon_page_insert(b_dev_info, newpage);
+ __count_vm_event(BALLOON_MIGRATE);
b_dev_info->isolated_pages--;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&b_dev_info->pages_lock, flags);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david(a)redhat.com are
The quilt patch titled
Subject: powerpc/pseries/cmm: call balloon_devinfo_init() also without CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
powerpc-pseries-cmm-call-balloon_devinfo_init-also-without-config_balloon_compaction.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Subject: powerpc/pseries/cmm: call balloon_devinfo_init() also without CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:06:05 +0200
Patch series "powerpc/pseries/cmm: two smaller fixes".
Two smaller fixes identified while doing a bigger rework.
This patch (of 2):
We always have to initialize the balloon_dev_info, even when compaction is
not configured in: otherwise the containing list and the lock are left
uninitialized.
Likely not many such configs exist in practice, but let's CC stable to
be sure.
This was found by code inspection.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251021100606.148294-1-david@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251021100606.148294-2-david@redhat.com
Fixes: fe030c9b85e6 ("powerpc/pseries/cmm: Implement balloon compaction")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cmm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cmm.c~powerpc-pseries-cmm-call-balloon_devinfo_init-also-without-config_balloon_compaction
+++ a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/cmm.c
@@ -550,7 +550,6 @@ static int cmm_migratepage(struct balloo
static void cmm_balloon_compaction_init(void)
{
- balloon_devinfo_init(&b_dev_info);
b_dev_info.migratepage = cmm_migratepage;
}
#else /* CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION */
@@ -572,6 +571,7 @@ static int cmm_init(void)
if (!firmware_has_feature(FW_FEATURE_CMO) && !simulate)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ balloon_devinfo_init(&b_dev_info);
cmm_balloon_compaction_init();
rc = register_oom_notifier(&cmm_oom_nb);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david(a)redhat.com are
This reverts commit 3b5e5185881edf4ee5a1af575e3aedac4a38a764.
The REO queue lookup table feature was enabled in 6.12.y due to an
upstream backport, but it causes severe RX performance degradation on
QCN9274 hw2.0 devices.
With this feature enabled, the vast majority of received packets are
dropped, reducing throughput drastically and making the device nearly
unusable.
Reverting this change restores full RX performance.
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.5-01651-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
Fixes: 3b5e5185881e ("wifi: ath12k: Enable REO queue lookup table feature on QCN9274 hw2.0")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Sedlbauer <os(a)dev.tdt.de>
---
Note:
This commit reverts a backport that was not a fix. The backported change
breaks previously working behavior on QCN9274 hw2.0 devices and should
not have been applied to the 6.12.y stable kernel.
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hw.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hw.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hw.c
index 057ef2d282b2..e3eb22bb9e1c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hw.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hw.c
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ static const struct ath12k_hw_params ath12k_hw_params[] = {
.download_calib = true,
.supports_suspend = false,
.tcl_ring_retry = true,
- .reoq_lut_support = true,
+ .reoq_lut_support = false,
.supports_shadow_regs = false,
.num_tcl_banks = 48,
--
2.39.5
The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 01439286514ce9d13b8123f8ec3717d7135ff1d6
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/01439286514ce9d13b8123f8ec3717d7135ff1d6
Author: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das(a)amd.com>
AuthorDate: Tue, 09 Dec 2025 13:56:38 +05:30
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Tue, 09 Dec 2025 12:21:47 +01:00
perf/x86/amd/uncore: Fix the return value of amd_uncore_df_event_init() on error
If amd_uncore_event_init() fails, return an error irrespective of the
pmu_version. Setting hwc->config should be safe even if there is an
error so use this opportunity to simplify the code.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aTaI0ci3vZ44lmBn@stanley.mountain/
Fixes: d6389d3ccc13 ("perf/x86/amd/uncore: Refactor uncore management")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/076935e23a70335d33bd6e23308b75ae0ad35ba2.176526866…
---
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c | 5 +----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c
index e8b6af1..9293ce5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c
@@ -656,14 +656,11 @@ static int amd_uncore_df_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
int ret = amd_uncore_event_init(event);
- if (ret || pmu_version < 2)
- return ret;
-
hwc->config = event->attr.config &
(pmu_version >= 2 ? AMD64_PERFMON_V2_RAW_EVENT_MASK_NB :
AMD64_RAW_EVENT_MASK_NB);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
static int amd_uncore_df_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
On hardware based on Toradex Verdin AM62 the recovery mechanism added by
commit ad5c6ecef27e ("drm: bridge: ti-sn65dsi83: Add error recovery
mechanism") has been reported [0] to make the display turn on and off and
and the kernel logging "Unexpected link status 0x01".
According to the report, the error recovery mechanism is triggered by the
PLL_UNLOCK error going active. Analysis suggested the board is unable to
provide the correct DSI clock neede by the SN65DSI84, to which the TI
SN65DSI84 reacts by raising the PLL_UNLOCK, while the display still works
apparently without issues.
On other hardware, where all the clocks are within the components
specifications, the PLL_UNLOCK bit does not trigger while the display is in
normal use. It can trigger for e.g. electromagnetic interference, which is
a transient event and exactly the reason why the error recovery mechanism
has been implemented.
Idelly the PLL_UNLOCK bit could be ignored when working out of
specification, but this requires to detect in software whether it triggers
because the device is working out of specification but visually correctly
for the user or for good reasons (e.g. EMI, or even because working out of
specifications but compromising the visual output).
The ongoing analysis as of this writing [1][2] has not yet found a way for
the driver to discriminate among the two cases. So as a temporary measure
mask the PLL_UNLOCK error bit unconditionally.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/r/bhkn6hley4xrol5o3ytn343h4unkwsr26p6s6ltcwexnrsjsd…
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/b71e941c-fc8a-4ac1-9407-0fe7df73b412@gmail.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251125103900.31750-1-francesco@dolcini.it/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bhkn6hley4xrol5o3ytn343h4unkwsr26p6s6ltcwexnrsjsd…
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.15+
Co-developed-by: Hervé Codina <herve.codina(a)bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Hervé Codina <herve.codina(a)bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli(a)bootlin.com>
---
Francesco, Emanuele, João: can you please apply this patch and report
whether the display on the affected boards gets back to working as before?
Cc: João Paulo Gonçalves <jpaulo.silvagoncalves(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Francesco Dolcini <francesco(a)dolcini.it>
Cc: Emanuele Ghidoli <ghidoliemanuele(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c
index 033c44326552..fffb47b62f43 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ti-sn65dsi83.c
@@ -429,7 +429,14 @@ static void sn65dsi83_handle_errors(struct sn65dsi83 *ctx)
*/
ret = regmap_read(ctx->regmap, REG_IRQ_STAT, &irq_stat);
- if (ret || irq_stat) {
+
+ /*
+ * Some hardware (Toradex Verdin AM62) is known to report the
+ * PLL_UNLOCK error interrupt while working without visible
+ * problems. In lack of a reliable way to discriminate such cases
+ * from user-visible PLL_UNLOCK cases, ignore that bit entirely.
+ */
+ if (ret || irq_stat & ~REG_IRQ_STAT_CHA_PLL_UNLOCK) {
/*
* IRQ acknowledged is not always possible (the bridge can be in
* a state where it doesn't answer anymore). To prevent an
@@ -654,7 +661,7 @@ static void sn65dsi83_atomic_enable(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
if (ctx->irq) {
/* Enable irq to detect errors */
regmap_write(ctx->regmap, REG_IRQ_GLOBAL, REG_IRQ_GLOBAL_IRQ_EN);
- regmap_write(ctx->regmap, REG_IRQ_EN, 0xff);
+ regmap_write(ctx->regmap, REG_IRQ_EN, 0xff & ~REG_IRQ_EN_CHA_PLL_UNLOCK_EN);
} else {
/* Use the polling task */
sn65dsi83_monitor_start(ctx);
---
base-commit: c884ee70b15a8d63184d7c1e02eba99676a6fcf7
change-id: 20251126-drm-ti-sn65dsi83-ignore-pll-unlock-4a28aa29eb5c
Best regards,
--
Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli(a)bootlin.com>
When trying to get the system name in the _HID path, after successfully
retrieving the subsystem ID the return value isn't set to 0 but instead
still kept at -ENODATA, leading to a false negative:
[ 12.382507] cs35l41 spi-VLV1776:00: Subsystem ID: VLV1776
[ 12.382521] cs35l41 spi-VLV1776:00: probe with driver cs35l41 failed with error -61
Always return 0 when a subsystem ID is found to mitigate these false
negatives.
Link: https://github.com/CachyOS/CachyOS-Handheld/issues/83
Fixes: 46c8b4d2a693 ("ASoC: cs35l41: Fallback to reading Subsystem ID property if not ACPI")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.18
Signed-off-by: Eric Naim <dnaim(a)cachyos.org>
---
sound/soc/codecs/cs35l41.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l41.c b/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l41.c
index 173d7c59b725..5001a546a3e7 100644
--- a/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l41.c
+++ b/sound/soc/codecs/cs35l41.c
@@ -1188,13 +1188,14 @@ static int cs35l41_get_system_name(struct cs35l41_private *cs35l41)
}
}
-err:
if (sub) {
cs35l41->dsp.system_name = sub;
dev_info(cs35l41->dev, "Subsystem ID: %s\n", cs35l41->dsp.system_name);
- } else
- dev_warn(cs35l41->dev, "Subsystem ID not found\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+err:
+ dev_warn(cs35l41->dev, "Subsystem ID not found\n");
return ret;
}
--
2.52.0
Vincent reports:
> The ath5k driver seems to do an array-index-out-of-bounds access as
> shown by the UBSAN kernel message:
> UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath5k/base.c:1741:20
> index 4 is out of range for type 'ieee80211_tx_rate [4]'
> ...
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
> ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x2b
> __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x46/0x4b
> ath5k_tasklet_tx+0x4e0/0x560 [ath5k]
> tasklet_action_common+0xb5/0x1c0
It is real. 'ts->ts_final_idx' can be 3 on 5212, so:
info->status.rates[ts->ts_final_idx + 1].idx = -1;
with the array defined as:
struct ieee80211_tx_rate rates[IEEE80211_TX_MAX_RATES];
while the size is:
#define IEEE80211_TX_MAX_RATES 4
is indeed bogus.
Set this 'idx = -1' sentinel only if the array index is less than the
array size. As mac80211 will not look at rates beyond the size
(IEEE80211_TX_MAX_RATES).
Note: The effect of the OOB write is negligible. It just overwrites the
next member of info->status, i.e. ack_signal.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <jirislaby(a)kernel.org>
Reported-by: Vincent Danjean <vdanjean(a)debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aQYUkIaT87ccDCin@eldamar.lan
Closes: https://bugs.debian.org/1119093
Fixes: 6d7b97b23e11 ("ath5k: fix tx status reporting issues")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
[v2] added Fixes + Cc: stable
Cc: 1119093(a)bugs.debian.org
Cc: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil(a)debian.org>
Cc: Nick Kossifidis <mickflemm(a)gmail.com>,
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof(a)kernel.org>
Cc: linux-wireless(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath5k/base.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath5k/base.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath5k/base.c
index 4d88b02ffa79..917e1b087924 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath5k/base.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath5k/base.c
@@ -1738,7 +1738,8 @@ ath5k_tx_frame_completed(struct ath5k_hw *ah, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
info->status.rates[ts->ts_final_idx].count = ts->ts_final_retry;
- info->status.rates[ts->ts_final_idx + 1].idx = -1;
+ if (ts->ts_final_idx + 1 < IEEE80211_TX_MAX_RATES)
+ info->status.rates[ts->ts_final_idx + 1].idx = -1;
if (unlikely(ts->ts_status)) {
ah->stats.ack_fail++;
--
2.52.0
The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 3ce7078debf267e12aab93528b40ba6c373bfa52
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/3ce7078debf267e12aab93528b40ba6c373bfa52
Author: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das(a)amd.com>
AuthorDate: Tue, 09 Dec 2025 13:56:38 +05:30
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Tue, 09 Dec 2025 09:59:14 +01:00
perf/x86/amd/uncore: Fix the return value of amd_uncore_df_event_init() on error
If amd_uncore_event_init() fails, return an error irrespective of the
pmu_version. Setting hwc->config should be safe even if there is an
error so use this opportunity to simplify the code.
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aTaI0ci3vZ44lmBn@stanley.mountain/
Fixes: d6389d3ccc13 ("perf/x86/amd/uncore: Refactor uncore management")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/076935e23a70335d33bd6e23308b75ae0ad35ba2.176526866…
---
arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c | 5 +----
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c
index e8b6af1..9293ce5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/uncore.c
@@ -656,14 +656,11 @@ static int amd_uncore_df_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
int ret = amd_uncore_event_init(event);
- if (ret || pmu_version < 2)
- return ret;
-
hwc->config = event->attr.config &
(pmu_version >= 2 ? AMD64_PERFMON_V2_RAW_EVENT_MASK_NB :
AMD64_RAW_EVENT_MASK_NB);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
static int amd_uncore_df_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
In the non-RT kernel, local_bh_disable() merely disables preemption,
whereas it maps to an actual spin lock in the RT kernel. Consequently,
when attempting to refill RX buffers via netdev_alloc_skb() in
macb_mac_link_up(), a deadlock scenario arises as follows:
Chain caused by macb_mac_link_up():
&bp->lock --> (softirq_ctrl.lock)
Chain caused by macb_start_xmit():
(softirq_ctrl.lock) --> _xmit_ETHER#2 --> &bp->lock
Notably, invoking the mog_init_rings() callback upon link establishment
is unnecessary. Instead, we can exclusively call mog_init_rings() within
the ndo_open() callback. This adjustment resolves the deadlock issue.
Given that mog_init_rings() is only applicable to
non-MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC cases, we can simply move it to macb_open()
and simultaneously eliminate the MACB_CAPS_MACB_IS_EMAC check.
Fixes: 633e98a711ac ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Kevin Hao <kexin.hao(a)windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <xiaolei.wang(a)windriver.com>
---
V1: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20251128103647.351259-…
V2: Update the correct lock dependency chain and add the Fix tag.
drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
index ca2386b83473..064fccdcf699 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
@@ -744,7 +744,6 @@ static void macb_mac_link_up(struct phylink_config *config,
/* Initialize rings & buffers as clearing MACB_BIT(TE) in link down
* cleared the pipeline and control registers.
*/
- bp->macbgem_ops.mog_init_rings(bp);
macb_init_buffers(bp);
for (q = 0, queue = bp->queues; q < bp->num_queues; ++q, ++queue)
@@ -2991,6 +2990,8 @@ static int macb_open(struct net_device *dev)
goto pm_exit;
}
+ bp->macbgem_ops.mog_init_rings(bp);
+
for (q = 0, queue = bp->queues; q < bp->num_queues; ++q, ++queue) {
napi_enable(&queue->napi_rx);
napi_enable(&queue->napi_tx);
--
2.43.0
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La Ciudad de los Palacios
Memory region assignment in ath11k_qmi_assign_target_mem_chunk()
assumes that:
1. firmware will make a HOST_DDR_REGION_TYPE request, and
2. this request is processed before CALDB_MEM_REGION_TYPE
In this case CALDB_MEM_REGION_TYPE, can safely be assigned immediately
after the host region.
However, if the HOST_DDR_REGION_TYPE request is not made, or the
reserved-memory node is not present, then res.start and res.end are 0,
and host_ddr_sz remains uninitialized. The physical address should
fall back to ATH11K_QMI_CALDB_ADDRESS. That doesn't happen:
resource_size(&res) returns 1 for an empty resource, and thus the if
clause never takes the fallback path. ab->qmi.target_mem[idx].paddr
is assigned the uninitialized value of host_ddr_sz + 0 (res.start).
Use "if (res.end > res.start)" for the predicate, which correctly
falls back to ATH11K_QMI_CALDB_ADDRESS.
Fixes: 900730dc4705 ("wifi: ath: Use of_reserved_mem_region_to_resource() for "memory-region"")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.18
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c
index aea56c38bf8f3..6cc26d1c1e2a4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c
@@ -2054,7 +2054,7 @@ static int ath11k_qmi_assign_target_mem_chunk(struct ath11k_base *ab)
return ret;
}
- if (res.end - res.start + 1 < ab->qmi.target_mem[i].size) {
+ if (resource_size(&res) < ab->qmi.target_mem[i].size) {
ath11k_dbg(ab, ATH11K_DBG_QMI,
"fail to assign memory of sz\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ static int ath11k_qmi_assign_target_mem_chunk(struct ath11k_base *ab)
}
if (ath11k_core_coldboot_cal_support(ab)) {
- if (resource_size(&res)) {
+ if (res.end > res.start) {
ab->qmi.target_mem[idx].paddr =
res.start + host_ddr_sz;
ab->qmi.target_mem[idx].iaddr =
--
2.45.1
When VM boots with one virtio-crypto PCI device and builtin backend,
run openssl benchmark command with multiple processes, such as
openssl speed -evp aes-128-cbc -engine afalg -seconds 10 -multi 32
openssl processes will hangup and there is error reported like this:
virtio_crypto virtio0: dataq.0:id 3 is not a head!
It seems that the data virtqueue need protection when it is handled
for virtio done notification. If the spinlock protection is added
in virtcrypto_done_task(), openssl benchmark with multiple processes
works well.
Fixes: fed93fb62e05 ("crypto: virtio - Handle dataq logic with tasklet")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo(a)loongson.cn>
---
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
index 3d241446099c..ccc6b5c1b24b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
@@ -75,15 +75,20 @@ static void virtcrypto_done_task(unsigned long data)
struct data_queue *data_vq = (struct data_queue *)data;
struct virtqueue *vq = data_vq->vq;
struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req;
+ unsigned long flags;
unsigned int len;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&data_vq->lock, flags);
do {
virtqueue_disable_cb(vq);
while ((vc_req = virtqueue_get_buf(vq, &len)) != NULL) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data_vq->lock, flags);
if (vc_req->alg_cb)
vc_req->alg_cb(vc_req, len);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&data_vq->lock, flags);
}
} while (!virtqueue_enable_cb(vq));
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data_vq->lock, flags);
}
static void virtcrypto_dataq_callback(struct virtqueue *vq)
--
2.39.3
Guten Morgen,
mein Name ist Shun Tung, und ich vertrete die Interessen der Familie
Wing Mau, die an verschiedenen Investitionsmöglichkeiten in Ihrem Land
interessiert ist. Besonders interessieren wir uns für die Sektoren
Immobilien, Tourismus, erneuerbare Energien und Fertigung.
Aufgrund politischer Herausforderungen in unserem Heimatland suchen
wir einen zuverlässigen und vertrauenswürdigen Partner im Ausland, der
diese Investitionen in unserem Auftrag verwaltet und absichert.
Ihre Rolle würde darin bestehen, die Investitionen zu überwachen und
sicherzustellen, dass sie erfolgreich sind. Im Gegenzug würden Sie
einen vereinbarten Prozentsatz der Managementgebühren erhalten,
während die Gewinne gleichmäßig zwischen beiden Parteien aufgeteilt
werden.
Falls dieses Angebot Ihr Interesse weckt, würde ich mich über ein
weiteres Gespräch freuen. Ich freue mich auf Ihre Antwort.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Shun Tung
When VM boots with one virtio-crypto PCI device and builtin backend,
run openssl benchmark command with multiple processes, such as
openssl speed -evp aes-128-cbc -engine afalg -seconds 10 -multi 32
openssl processes will hangup and there is error reported like this:
virtio_crypto virtio0: dataq.0:id 3 is not a head!
It seems that the data virtqueue need protection when it is handled
for virtio done notification. If the spinlock protection is added
in virtcrypto_done_task(), openssl benchmark with multiple processes
works well.
Fixes: fed93fb62e05 ("crypto: virtio - Handle dataq logic with tasklet")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo(a)loongson.cn>
---
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
index 3d241446099c..ccc6b5c1b24b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
@@ -75,15 +75,20 @@ static void virtcrypto_done_task(unsigned long data)
struct data_queue *data_vq = (struct data_queue *)data;
struct virtqueue *vq = data_vq->vq;
struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req;
+ unsigned long flags;
unsigned int len;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&data_vq->lock, flags);
do {
virtqueue_disable_cb(vq);
while ((vc_req = virtqueue_get_buf(vq, &len)) != NULL) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data_vq->lock, flags);
if (vc_req->alg_cb)
vc_req->alg_cb(vc_req, len);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&data_vq->lock, flags);
}
} while (!virtqueue_enable_cb(vq));
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data_vq->lock, flags);
}
static void virtcrypto_dataq_callback(struct virtqueue *vq)
--
2.39.3
When the SLAB_STORE_USER debug flag is used, any metadata placed after
the original kmalloc request size (orig_size) is not properly aligned
on 64-bit architectures because its type is unsigned int. When both KASAN
and SLAB_STORE_USER are enabled, kasan_alloc_meta is misaligned.
Note that 64-bit architectures without HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
are assumed to require 64-bit accesses to be 64-bit aligned.
See HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS and commit adab66b71abf ("Revert:
"ring-buffer: Remove HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS"") for more details.
Because not all architectures support unaligned memory accesses,
ensure that all metadata (track, orig_size, kasan_{alloc,free}_meta)
in a slab object are word-aligned. struct track, kasan_{alloc,free}_meta
are aligned by adding __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)).
For orig_size, use ALIGN(sizeof(unsigned int), sizeof(unsigned long)) to
make clear that its size remains unsigned int but it must be aligned to
a word boundary. On 64-bit architectures, this reserves 8 bytes for
orig_size, which is acceptable since kmalloc's original request size
tracking is intended for debugging rather than production use.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6edf2576a6cc ("mm/slub: enable debugging memory wasting of kmalloc")
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo(a)oracle.com>
---
v1 -> v2:
- Added Andrey's Acked-by.
- Added references to HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS and the commit that
resurrected it.
- Used __alignof__() instead of sizeof(), as suggested by Pedro (off-list).
Note: either __alignof__ or sizeof() produces the exactly same mm/slub.o
files, so there's no functional difference.
Thanks!
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 4 ++--
mm/slub.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 129178be5e64..b86b6e9f456a 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ struct kasan_alloc_meta {
struct kasan_track alloc_track;
/* Free track is stored in kasan_free_meta. */
depot_stack_handle_t aux_stack[2];
-};
+} __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long));
struct qlist_node {
struct qlist_node *next;
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ struct qlist_node {
struct kasan_free_meta {
struct qlist_node quarantine_link;
struct kasan_track free_track;
-};
+} __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long));
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index a585d0ac45d4..462a39d57b3a 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ struct track {
int cpu; /* Was running on cpu */
int pid; /* Pid context */
unsigned long when; /* When did the operation occur */
-};
+} __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long));
enum track_item { TRACK_ALLOC, TRACK_FREE };
@@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, u8 *p)
off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
if (slub_debug_orig_size(s))
- off += sizeof(unsigned int);
+ off += ALIGN(sizeof(unsigned int), __alignof__(unsigned long));
off += kasan_metadata_size(s, false);
@@ -1392,7 +1392,8 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, u8 *p)
off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
if (s->flags & SLAB_KMALLOC)
- off += sizeof(unsigned int);
+ off += ALIGN(sizeof(unsigned int),
+ __alignof__(unsigned long));
}
off += kasan_metadata_size(s, false);
@@ -7820,9 +7821,14 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache_args *args, struct kmem_cache *s)
*/
size += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
- /* Save the original kmalloc request size */
+ /*
+ * Save the original kmalloc request size.
+ * Although the request size is an unsigned int,
+ * make sure that is aligned to word boundary.
+ */
if (flags & SLAB_KMALLOC)
- size += sizeof(unsigned int);
+ size += ALIGN(sizeof(unsigned int),
+ __alignof__(unsigned long));
}
#endif
--
2.43.0
Hi,
I would like to request backporting commit b441cf3f8c4b ("xfrm: delete
x->tunnel as we delete x") to all LTS kernels.
This patch actually fixes a use-after-free issue, but it hasn't been
backported to any of the LTS versions, which are still being affected.
As the patch describes, a specific trigger scenario could be:
If a tunnel packet is received (e.g., in ip_local_deliver()), with the
outer layer being IPComp protocol and the inner layer being fragmented
packets, during outer packet processing, it will go through xfrm_input()
to hold a reference to the IPComp xfrm_state. Then, it is re-injected into
the network stack via gro_cells_receive() and placed in the reassembly
queue. When exiting the netns and calling cleanup_net(), although
ipv4_frags_exit_net() is called before xfrm_net_exit(), due to asynchronous
scheduling, fqdir_free_work() may execute after xfrm_state_fini().
In xfrm_state_fini(), xfrm_state_flush() puts and deletes the xfrm_state
for IPPROTO_COMP, but does not delete the xfrm_state for IPPROTO_IPIP.
Meanwhile, the skb in the reassembly queue holds the last reference to the
IPPROTO_COMP xfrm_state, so it isn't destroyed yet. Only when the skb in
the reassembly queue is destroyed does the IPPROTO_COMP xfrm_state get
fully destroyed, which calls ipcomp_destroy() to delete the IPPROTO_IPIP
xfrm_state. However, by this time, the hash tables (net->xfrm.state_byxxx)
have already been kfreed in xfrm_state_fini(), leading to a use-after-free
during the deletion.
The bug has existed since kernel v2.6.29, so the patch should be
backported to all LTS kernels.
thanks,
Slavin Liu
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From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b39a1833cc4a2755b02603eec3a71a85e9dff926 ]
Under high concurrency, A tree-connection object (tcon) is freed on
a disconnect path while another path still holds a reference and later
executes *_put()/write on it.
Reported-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhitong Liu <liuzhitong1993(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
### 3. CLASSIFICATION
This is a **security/stability bug fix**:
- **Use-after-free (UAF)** is a serious memory safety issue
- ksmbd is **network-facing code** (SMB server) - security-sensitive
- Can lead to kernel crashes, data corruption, or potential remote
exploitation
### 4. SCOPE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
**Size**: ~30 lines changed across 3 files
**Files affected**:
- `fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c` - core reference counting logic
- `fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.h` - struct definition
- `fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c` - disconnect path
**Technical mechanism of the bug**:
The previous fix (commit 33b235a6e6ebe) introduced a waitqueue-based
refcount mechanism:
1. `ksmbd_tree_conn_disconnect()` would decrement refcount, wait for it
to hit 0, then always call `kfree()`
2. `ksmbd_tree_connect_put()` would decrement refcount and wake up
waiters
**The race condition**:
- Thread A: In disconnect, waits for refcount to hit 0, then runs more
code before `kfree()`
- Thread B: Drops last reference via `_put()`, refcount hits 0
- Thread A: Wakes up, but Thread B might still be executing code that
accesses `tcon`
- Thread A: Frees `tcon`
- Thread B: UAF when accessing `tcon` after `_put()` returns
**The fix**: Changes to standard "kref-style" reference counting:
- Whoever drops refcount to 0 immediately calls `kfree()`
- No window between refcount hitting 0 and free
- Removes the buggy waitqueue mechanism entirely
**Risk**: LOW
- The new pattern (free on last put) is the standard kernel pattern
(kref)
- Simpler code is easier to verify correct
- Self-contained within tree_connect subsystem
### 5. USER IMPACT
- **Affected users**: Anyone running ksmbd (kernel SMB server)
- **Trigger**: High concurrency - realistic for file servers
- **Severity**: HIGH - kernel crash or potential security exploitation
- **Real-world occurrence**: Two Reported-by tags confirm users hit this
### 6. STABILITY INDICATORS
- Signed-off by ksmbd maintainer (Namjae Jeon) and CIFS/SMB maintainer
(Steve French)
- Two independent reporters indicate real bug
- The buggy code was introduced in commit 33b235a6e6ebe (v6.6-rc1)
### 7. DEPENDENCY CHECK
- The fix is self-contained
- Depends only on commit 33b235a6e6ebe being present (which introduced
the bug)
- Affects: v6.6 and all later versions
- Should apply cleanly - only 2 minor unrelated commits to
tree_connect.c since the buggy commit
### Summary
| Criterion | Assessment |
|-----------|------------|
| Fixes real bug | ✅ UAF in network-facing code |
| Security impact | ✅ High - potential remote exploitation |
| Small and contained | ✅ ~30 lines, 3 files, single subsystem |
| No new features | ✅ Pure bug fix |
| User-reported | ✅ Two Reported-by tags |
| Clean backport | ✅ Self-contained fix |
This commit fixes a use-after-free vulnerability in ksmbd, the in-kernel
SMB server. The bug exists in the reference counting mechanism for tree
connections and can be triggered under concurrent access - a realistic
scenario for network file servers. UAF bugs in network-facing kernel
code are serious security issues. The fix is small, uses a well-
established kernel pattern (kref-style refcounting), and is self-
contained. It should be backported to all stable kernels containing
commit 33b235a6e6ebe (v6.6+).
**YES**
fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c | 18 ++++--------------
fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.h | 1 -
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 3 ---
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c
index ecfc575086712..d3483d9c757c7 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ ksmbd_tree_conn_connect(struct ksmbd_work *work, const char *share_name)
tree_conn->t_state = TREE_NEW;
status.tree_conn = tree_conn;
atomic_set(&tree_conn->refcount, 1);
- init_waitqueue_head(&tree_conn->refcount_q);
ret = xa_err(xa_store(&sess->tree_conns, tree_conn->id, tree_conn,
KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP));
@@ -100,14 +99,8 @@ ksmbd_tree_conn_connect(struct ksmbd_work *work, const char *share_name)
void ksmbd_tree_connect_put(struct ksmbd_tree_connect *tcon)
{
- /*
- * Checking waitqueue to releasing tree connect on
- * tree disconnect. waitqueue_active is safe because it
- * uses atomic operation for condition.
- */
- if (!atomic_dec_return(&tcon->refcount) &&
- waitqueue_active(&tcon->refcount_q))
- wake_up(&tcon->refcount_q);
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tcon->refcount))
+ kfree(tcon);
}
int ksmbd_tree_conn_disconnect(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
@@ -119,14 +112,11 @@ int ksmbd_tree_conn_disconnect(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
xa_erase(&sess->tree_conns, tree_conn->id);
write_unlock(&sess->tree_conns_lock);
- if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&tree_conn->refcount))
- wait_event(tree_conn->refcount_q,
- atomic_read(&tree_conn->refcount) == 0);
-
ret = ksmbd_ipc_tree_disconnect_request(sess->id, tree_conn->id);
ksmbd_release_tree_conn_id(sess, tree_conn->id);
ksmbd_share_config_put(tree_conn->share_conf);
- kfree(tree_conn);
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&tree_conn->refcount))
+ kfree(tree_conn);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.h b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.h
index a42cdd0510411..f0023d86716f2 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.h
+++ b/fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.h
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct ksmbd_tree_connect {
int maximal_access;
bool posix_extensions;
atomic_t refcount;
- wait_queue_head_t refcount_q;
unsigned int t_state;
};
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
index 447e76da44409..aae42d2abf7bc 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c
@@ -2200,7 +2200,6 @@ int smb2_tree_disconnect(struct ksmbd_work *work)
goto err_out;
}
- WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_dec_and_test(&tcon->refcount));
tcon->t_state = TREE_DISCONNECTED;
write_unlock(&sess->tree_conns_lock);
@@ -2210,8 +2209,6 @@ int smb2_tree_disconnect(struct ksmbd_work *work)
goto err_out;
}
- work->tcon = NULL;
-
rsp->StructureSize = cpu_to_le16(4);
err = ksmbd_iov_pin_rsp(work, rsp,
sizeof(struct smb2_tree_disconnect_rsp));
--
2.51.0
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x baeb66fbd4201d1c4325074e78b1f557dff89b5b
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120129-earthlike-curse-b3f8@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From baeb66fbd4201d1c4325074e78b1f557dff89b5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jimmy Hu <hhhuuu(a)google.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 05:49:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work
A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free
in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0
Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work
The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an
interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget->work
at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget().
Commit 399a45e5237c ("usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after
device removal") attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after
device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new
work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but
before the gadget's memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free.
This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a 'teardown'
flag and a 'state_lock' spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is
set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to
prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced.
The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under
the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window.
Fixes: 5702f75375aa9 ("usb: gadget: udc-core: move sysfs_notify() to a workqueue")
Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jimmy Hu <hhhuuu(a)google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251023054945.233861-1-hhhuuu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
index 694653761c44..8dbe79bdc0f9 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
@@ -1126,8 +1126,13 @@ static void usb_gadget_state_work(struct work_struct *work)
void usb_gadget_set_state(struct usb_gadget *gadget,
enum usb_device_state state)
{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&gadget->state_lock, flags);
gadget->state = state;
- schedule_work(&gadget->work);
+ if (!gadget->teardown)
+ schedule_work(&gadget->work);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gadget->state_lock, flags);
trace_usb_gadget_set_state(gadget, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_gadget_set_state);
@@ -1361,6 +1366,8 @@ static void usb_udc_nop_release(struct device *dev)
void usb_initialize_gadget(struct device *parent, struct usb_gadget *gadget,
void (*release)(struct device *dev))
{
+ spin_lock_init(&gadget->state_lock);
+ gadget->teardown = false;
INIT_WORK(&gadget->work, usb_gadget_state_work);
gadget->dev.parent = parent;
@@ -1535,6 +1542,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_add_gadget_udc);
void usb_del_gadget(struct usb_gadget *gadget)
{
struct usb_udc *udc = gadget->udc;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (!udc)
return;
@@ -1548,6 +1556,13 @@ void usb_del_gadget(struct usb_gadget *gadget)
kobject_uevent(&udc->dev.kobj, KOBJ_REMOVE);
sysfs_remove_link(&udc->dev.kobj, "gadget");
device_del(&gadget->dev);
+ /*
+ * Set the teardown flag before flushing the work to prevent new work
+ * from being scheduled while we are cleaning up.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&gadget->state_lock, flags);
+ gadget->teardown = true;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gadget->state_lock, flags);
flush_work(&gadget->work);
ida_free(&gadget_id_numbers, gadget->id_number);
cancel_work_sync(&udc->vbus_work);
diff --git a/include/linux/usb/gadget.h b/include/linux/usb/gadget.h
index 3aaf19e77558..8285b19a25e0 100644
--- a/include/linux/usb/gadget.h
+++ b/include/linux/usb/gadget.h
@@ -376,6 +376,9 @@ struct usb_gadget_ops {
* can handle. The UDC must support this and all slower speeds and lower
* number of lanes.
* @state: the state we are now (attached, suspended, configured, etc)
+ * @state_lock: Spinlock protecting the `state` and `teardown` members.
+ * @teardown: True if the device is undergoing teardown, used to prevent
+ * new work from being scheduled during cleanup.
* @name: Identifies the controller hardware type. Used in diagnostics
* and sometimes configuration.
* @dev: Driver model state for this abstract device.
@@ -451,6 +454,8 @@ struct usb_gadget {
enum usb_ssp_rate max_ssp_rate;
enum usb_device_state state;
+ spinlock_t state_lock;
+ bool teardown;
const char *name;
struct device dev;
unsigned isoch_delay;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x baeb66fbd4201d1c4325074e78b1f557dff89b5b
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120123-borax-cut-5c52@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From baeb66fbd4201d1c4325074e78b1f557dff89b5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jimmy Hu <hhhuuu(a)google.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 05:49:45 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work
A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free
in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0
Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work
The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an
interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget->work
at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget().
Commit 399a45e5237c ("usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after
device removal") attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after
device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new
work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but
before the gadget's memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free.
This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a 'teardown'
flag and a 'state_lock' spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is
set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to
prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced.
The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under
the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window.
Fixes: 5702f75375aa9 ("usb: gadget: udc-core: move sysfs_notify() to a workqueue")
Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jimmy Hu <hhhuuu(a)google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251023054945.233861-1-hhhuuu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
index 694653761c44..8dbe79bdc0f9 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c
@@ -1126,8 +1126,13 @@ static void usb_gadget_state_work(struct work_struct *work)
void usb_gadget_set_state(struct usb_gadget *gadget,
enum usb_device_state state)
{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&gadget->state_lock, flags);
gadget->state = state;
- schedule_work(&gadget->work);
+ if (!gadget->teardown)
+ schedule_work(&gadget->work);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gadget->state_lock, flags);
trace_usb_gadget_set_state(gadget, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_gadget_set_state);
@@ -1361,6 +1366,8 @@ static void usb_udc_nop_release(struct device *dev)
void usb_initialize_gadget(struct device *parent, struct usb_gadget *gadget,
void (*release)(struct device *dev))
{
+ spin_lock_init(&gadget->state_lock);
+ gadget->teardown = false;
INIT_WORK(&gadget->work, usb_gadget_state_work);
gadget->dev.parent = parent;
@@ -1535,6 +1542,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_add_gadget_udc);
void usb_del_gadget(struct usb_gadget *gadget)
{
struct usb_udc *udc = gadget->udc;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (!udc)
return;
@@ -1548,6 +1556,13 @@ void usb_del_gadget(struct usb_gadget *gadget)
kobject_uevent(&udc->dev.kobj, KOBJ_REMOVE);
sysfs_remove_link(&udc->dev.kobj, "gadget");
device_del(&gadget->dev);
+ /*
+ * Set the teardown flag before flushing the work to prevent new work
+ * from being scheduled while we are cleaning up.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&gadget->state_lock, flags);
+ gadget->teardown = true;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gadget->state_lock, flags);
flush_work(&gadget->work);
ida_free(&gadget_id_numbers, gadget->id_number);
cancel_work_sync(&udc->vbus_work);
diff --git a/include/linux/usb/gadget.h b/include/linux/usb/gadget.h
index 3aaf19e77558..8285b19a25e0 100644
--- a/include/linux/usb/gadget.h
+++ b/include/linux/usb/gadget.h
@@ -376,6 +376,9 @@ struct usb_gadget_ops {
* can handle. The UDC must support this and all slower speeds and lower
* number of lanes.
* @state: the state we are now (attached, suspended, configured, etc)
+ * @state_lock: Spinlock protecting the `state` and `teardown` members.
+ * @teardown: True if the device is undergoing teardown, used to prevent
+ * new work from being scheduled during cleanup.
* @name: Identifies the controller hardware type. Used in diagnostics
* and sometimes configuration.
* @dev: Driver model state for this abstract device.
@@ -451,6 +454,8 @@ struct usb_gadget {
enum usb_ssp_rate max_ssp_rate;
enum usb_device_state state;
+ spinlock_t state_lock;
+ bool teardown;
const char *name;
struct device dev;
unsigned isoch_delay;
On converting to the of_reserved_mem_region_to_resource() helper with
commit 900730dc4705 ("wifi: ath: Use
of_reserved_mem_region_to_resource() for "memory-region"") a logic error
was introduced in the ath11k_core_coldboot_cal_support() if condition.
The original code checked for hremote_node presence and skipped
ath11k_core_coldboot_cal_support() in the other switch case but now
everything is driven entirely on the values of the resource struct.
resource_size() (in this case) is wrongly assumed to return a size of
zero if the passed resource struct is init to zero. This is not the case
as a resource struct should be always init with correct values (or at
best set the end value to -1 to signal it's not configured)
(the return value of resource_size() for a resource struct with start
and end set to zero is 1)
On top of this, using resource_size() to check if a resource struct is
initialized or not is generally wrong and other measure should be used
instead.
To better handle this, use the DEFINE_RES macro to initialize the
resource struct and set the IORESOURCE_UNSET flag by default.
Replace the resource_size() check with checking for the resource struct
flags and check if it's IORESOURCE_UNSET.
This change effectively restore the original logic and restore correct
loading of the ath11k firmware (restoring correct functionality of
Wi-Fi)
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 900730dc4705 ("wifi: ath: Use of_reserved_mem_region_to_resource() for "memory-region"")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251207215359.28895-1-ansuelsmth@gmail.com/T/#…
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen(a)linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Marangi <ansuelsmth(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c
index ff6a97e328b8..afa663c00620 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/qmi.c
@@ -2039,8 +2039,8 @@ static int ath11k_qmi_alloc_target_mem_chunk(struct ath11k_base *ab)
static int ath11k_qmi_assign_target_mem_chunk(struct ath11k_base *ab)
{
+ struct resource res = DEFINE_RES(0, 0, IORESOURCE_UNSET);
struct device *dev = ab->dev;
- struct resource res = {};
u32 host_ddr_sz;
int i, idx, ret;
@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ static int ath11k_qmi_assign_target_mem_chunk(struct ath11k_base *ab)
}
if (ath11k_core_coldboot_cal_support(ab)) {
- if (resource_size(&res)) {
+ if (res.flags != IORESOURCE_UNSET) {
ab->qmi.target_mem[idx].paddr =
res.start + host_ddr_sz;
ab->qmi.target_mem[idx].iaddr =
--
2.51.0
When the filesystem is being mounted, the kernel panics while the data
regarding slot map allocation to the local node, is being written to the
disk. This occurs because the value of slot map buffer head block
number, which should have been greater than or equal to
`OCFS2_SUPER_BLOCK_BLKNO` (evaluating to 2) is less than it, indicative
of disk metadata corruption. This triggers
BUG_ON(bh->b_blocknr < OCFS2_SUPER_BLOCK_BLKNO) in ocfs2_write_block(),
causing the kernel to panic.
This is fixed by introducing an if condition block in
ocfs2_update_disk_slot(), right before calling ocfs2_write_block(), which
checks if `bh->b_blocknr` is lesser than `OCFS2_SUPER_BLOCK_BLKNO`; if
yes, then ocfs2_error is called, which prints the error log, for
debugging purposes, and the return value of ocfs2_error() is returned
back to caller of ocfs2_update_disk_slot() i.e. ocfs2_find_slot(). If
the return value is zero. then error code EIO is returned.
Reported-by: syzbot+c818e5c4559444f88aa0(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c818e5c4559444f88aa0
Tested-by: syzbot+c818e5c4559444f88aa0(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com>
---
fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c b/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c
index e544c704b583..788924fc3663 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c
@@ -193,6 +193,16 @@ static int ocfs2_update_disk_slot(struct ocfs2_super *osb,
else
ocfs2_update_disk_slot_old(si, slot_num, &bh);
spin_unlock(&osb->osb_lock);
+ if (bh->b_blocknr < OCFS2_SUPER_BLOCK_BLKNO) {
+ status = ocfs2_error(osb->sb,
+ "Invalid Slot Map Buffer Head "
+ "Block Number : %llu, Should be >= %d",
+ le16_to_cpu(bh->b_blocknr),
+ le16_to_cpu((int)OCFS2_SUPER_BLOCK_BLKNO));
+ if (!status)
+ return -EIO;
+ return status;
+ }
status = ocfs2_write_block(osb, bh, INODE_CACHE(si->si_inode));
if (status < 0)
base-commit: 24172e0d79900908cf5ebf366600616d29c9b417
--
2.43.0
tpm2_key_decode() overrides the explicit keyhandle parameter, which can
lead to problems, if the loaded parent handle does not match the handle
stored to the key file. This can easily happen as handle by definition
is an ambiguous attribute.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index fb76c4ea496f..950684e54c71 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -121,7 +121,9 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
return -ENOMEM;
*buf = blob;
- options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+
+ if (!options->keyhandle)
+ options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
blob += ctx.priv_len;
--
2.39.5
The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 4da3768e1820cf15cced390242d8789aed34f54d
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120802-remedy-glimmer-fc9d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4da3768e1820cf15cced390242d8789aed34f54d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2025 09:55:26 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SVM: Don't skip unrelated instruction if INT3/INTO is
replaced
When re-injecting a soft interrupt from an INT3, INT0, or (select) INTn
instruction, discard the exception and retry the instruction if the code
stream is changed (e.g. by a different vCPU) between when the CPU
executes the instruction and when KVM decodes the instruction to get the
next RIP.
As effectively predicted by commit 6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject
INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction"), failure to verify that
the correct INTn instruction was decoded can effectively clobber guest
state due to decoding the wrong instruction and thus specifying the
wrong next RIP.
The bug most often manifests as "Oops: int3" panics on static branch
checks in Linux guests. Enabling or disabling a static branch in Linux
uses the kernel's "text poke" code patching mechanism. To modify code
while other CPUs may be executing that code, Linux (temporarily)
replaces the first byte of the original instruction with an int3 (opcode
0xcc), then patches in the new code stream except for the first byte,
and finally replaces the int3 with the first byte of the new code
stream. If a CPU hits the int3, i.e. executes the code while it's being
modified, then the guest kernel must look up the RIP to determine how to
handle the #BP, e.g. by emulating the new instruction. If the RIP is
incorrect, then this lookup fails and the guest kernel panics.
The bug reproduces almost instantly by hacking the guest kernel to
repeatedly check a static branch[1] while running a drgn script[2] on
the host to constantly swap out the memory containing the guest's TSS.
[1]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/44d17c51c28c0ac998ea0334edf90b5a
[2]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/10e45e45afa29b11e0c7209247afc00b
Fixes: 6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1cc6dcdf36e3add7ee7c8d90ad58414eeb6c3d34.176227876…
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 48598d017d6f..974d64bf0a4d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2143,6 +2143,11 @@ u64 vcpu_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
* the gfn, i.e. retrying the instruction will hit a
* !PRESENT fault, which results in a new shadow page
* and sends KVM back to square one.
+ *
+ * EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT - Set in combination with EMULTYPE_SKIP to only skip
+ * an instruction if it could generate a given software
+ * interrupt, which must be encoded via
+ * EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR().
*/
#define EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE (1 << 0)
#define EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD (1 << 1)
@@ -2153,6 +2158,10 @@ u64 vcpu_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
#define EMULTYPE_PF (1 << 6)
#define EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT (1 << 7)
#define EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP (1 << 8)
+#define EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT (1 << 9)
+
+#define EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(v) ((u32)((v) & 0xff) << 16)
+#define EMULTYPE_GET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(e) (((e) >> 16) & 0xff)
static inline bool kvm_can_emulate_event_vectoring(int emul_type)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 1ae7b3c5a7c5..459db8154929 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
}
static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ int emul_type,
bool commit_side_effects)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
@@ -293,7 +294,7 @@ static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
old_rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;
- if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+ if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, emul_type))
return 0;
if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
@@ -311,11 +312,13 @@ static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
static int svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, true);
+ return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP, true);
}
-static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
{
+ const int emul_type = EMULTYPE_SKIP | EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT |
+ EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(vector);
unsigned long rip, old_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
@@ -331,7 +334,7 @@ static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* in use, the skip must not commit any side effects such as clearing
* the interrupt shadow or RFLAGS.RF.
*/
- if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, !nrips))
+ if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, emul_type, !nrips))
return -EIO;
rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
@@ -367,7 +370,7 @@ static void svm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector) &&
- svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu))
+ svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu, ex->vector))
return;
svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = ex->vector
@@ -3642,11 +3645,12 @@ static bool svm_set_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
{
+ struct kvm_queued_interrupt *intr = &vcpu->arch.interrupt;
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
u32 type;
- if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
- if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu))
+ if (intr->soft) {
+ if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu, intr->nr))
return;
type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_SOFT;
@@ -3654,12 +3658,10 @@ static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
}
- trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr,
- vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected);
+ trace_kvm_inj_virq(intr->nr, intr->soft, reinjected);
++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
- svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr |
- SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type;
+ svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = intr->nr | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type;
}
void svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int delivery_mode,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 42ecd093bb4c..8e14c0292809 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9338,6 +9338,23 @@ static bool is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
return false;
}
+static bool is_soft_int_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+ int emulation_type)
+{
+ u8 vector = EMULTYPE_GET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(emulation_type);
+
+ switch (ctxt->b) {
+ case 0xcc:
+ return vector == BP_VECTOR;
+ case 0xcd:
+ return vector == ctxt->src.val;
+ case 0xce:
+ return vector == OF_VECTOR;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Decode an instruction for emulation. The caller is responsible for handling
* code breakpoints. Note, manually detecting code breakpoints is unnecessary
@@ -9448,6 +9465,10 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
* injecting single-step #DBs.
*/
if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) {
+ if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT &&
+ !is_soft_int_instruction(ctxt, emulation_type))
+ return 0;
+
if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip;
else
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The function of_node_get() returns a node pointer with its refcount
incremented, but in the error path of the fsi_master_gpio_probe(),
this reference is not released before freeing the master structure,
causing a refcount leak.
Add the missing of_node_put() in the error handling path to properly
release the device tree node reference.
Fixes: 8ef9ccf81044 ("fsi: master-gpio: Add missing release function")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn>
---
drivers/fsi/fsi-master-gpio.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/fsi/fsi-master-gpio.c b/drivers/fsi/fsi-master-gpio.c
index 69de0b5b9cbd..ae9e156284d0 100644
--- a/drivers/fsi/fsi-master-gpio.c
+++ b/drivers/fsi/fsi-master-gpio.c
@@ -861,6 +861,7 @@ static int fsi_master_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
}
return 0;
err_free:
+ of_node_put(master->master.dev.of_node);
kfree(master);
return rc;
}
--
2.34.1
Commit 900730dc4705 ("wifi: ath: Use
of_reserved_mem_region_to_resource() for "memory-region"") uncovered a
massive problem with the usage of resource_size() helper.
The reported commit caused a regression with ath11k WiFi firmware
loading and the change was just a simple replacement of duplicate code
with a new helper of_reserved_mem_region_to_resource().
On reworking this, in the commit also a check for the presence of the
node was replaced with resource_size(&res). This was done following the
logic that if the node wasn't present then it's expected that also the
resource_size is zero, mimicking the same if-else logic.
This was also the reason the regression was mostly hard to catch at
first sight as the rework is correctly done given the assumption on the
used helpers.
BUT this is actually not the case. On further inspection on
resource_size() it was found that it NEVER actually returns 0.
Even if the resource value of start and end are 0, the return value of
resource_size() will ALWAYS be 1, resulting in the broken if-else
condition ALWAYS going in the first if condition.
This was simply confirmed by reading the resource_size() logic:
return res->end - res->start + 1;
Given the confusion, also other case of such usage were searched in the
kernel and with great suprise it seems LOTS of place assume
resource_size() should return zero in the context of the resource start
and end set to 0.
Quoting for example comments in drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c:
/*
* The PCI core shouldn't set up a resource with a
* type but zero size. But there may be bugs that
* cause us to do that.
*/
if (!resource_size(res))
goto no_mmap;
It really seems resource_size() was tought with the assumption that
resource struct was always correctly initialized before calling it and
never set to zero.
But across the year this got lost and now there are lots of driver that
assume resource_size() returns 0 if start and end are also 0.
To better handle this and make resource_size() returns correct value in
such case, add a simple check and return 0 if both resource start and
resource end are zero.
Cc: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh(a)kernel.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1a4e564b7db9 ("resource: add resource_size()")
Signed-off-by: Christian Marangi <ansuelsmth(a)gmail.com>
---
include/linux/ioport.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/ioport.h b/include/linux/ioport.h
index 9afa30f9346f..1b8ce62255db 100644
--- a/include/linux/ioport.h
+++ b/include/linux/ioport.h
@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ static inline void resource_set_range(struct resource *res,
static inline resource_size_t resource_size(const struct resource *res)
{
+ if (!res->start && !res->end)
+ return 0;
+
return res->end - res->start + 1;
}
static inline unsigned long resource_type(const struct resource *res)
--
2.51.0
Nilay reported that since commit daaa574aba6f ("powerpc/pseries/msi: Switch
to msi_create_parent_irq_domain()"), the NVMe driver cannot enable MSI-X
when the device's MSI-X table size is larger than the firmware's MSI quota
for the device.
This is because the commit changes how rtas_prepare_msi_irqs() is called:
- Before, it is called when interrupts are allocated at the global
interrupt domain with nvec_in being the number of allocated interrupts.
rtas_prepare_msi_irqs() can return a positive number and the allocation
will be retried.
- Now, it is called at the creation of per-device interrupt domain with
nvec_in being the number of interrupts that the device supports. If
rtas_prepare_msi_irqs() returns positive, domain creation just fails.
For Nilay's NVMe driver case, rtas_prepare_msi_irqs() returns a positive
number (the quota). This causes per-device interrupt domain creation to
fail and thus the NVMe driver cannot enable MSI-X.
Rework to make this scenario works again:
- pseries_msi_ops_prepare() only prepares as many interrupts as the quota
permit.
- pseries_irq_domain_alloc() fails if the device's quota is exceeded.
Now, if the quota is exceeded, pseries_msi_ops_prepare() will only prepare
as allowed by the quota. If device drivers attempt to allocate more
interrupts than the quota permits, pseries_irq_domain_alloc() will return
an error code and msi_handle_pci_fail() will allow device drivers a retry.
Reported-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay(a)inux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/6af2c4c2-97f6-4758-be33-256638ef39e5@l…
Fixes: daaa574aba6f ("powerpc/pseries/msi: Switch to msi_create_parent_irq_domain()")
Signed-off-by: Nam Cao <namcao(a)linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay(a)inux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c
index a82aaa786e9e..8898a968a59b 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
#include "pseries.h"
+struct pseries_msi_device {
+ unsigned int msi_quota;
+ unsigned int msi_used;
+};
+
static int query_token, change_token;
#define RTAS_QUERY_FN 0
@@ -433,8 +438,26 @@ static int pseries_msi_ops_prepare(struct irq_domain *domain, struct device *dev
struct msi_domain_info *info = domain->host_data;
struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(dev);
int type = (info->flags & MSI_FLAG_PCI_MSIX) ? PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX : PCI_CAP_ID_MSI;
+ int ret;
+
+ struct pseries_msi_device *pseries_dev __free(kfree)
+ = kmalloc(sizeof(*pseries_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pseries_dev)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = rtas_prepare_msi_irqs(pdev, nvec, type, arg);
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ nvec = ret;
+ ret = rtas_prepare_msi_irqs(pdev, nvec, type, arg);
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
- return rtas_prepare_msi_irqs(pdev, nvec, type, arg);
+ pseries_dev->msi_quota = nvec;
+ pseries_dev->msi_used = 0;
+
+ arg->scratchpad[0].ptr = no_free_ptr(pseries_dev);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -443,9 +466,13 @@ static int pseries_msi_ops_prepare(struct irq_domain *domain, struct device *dev
*/
static void pseries_msi_ops_teardown(struct irq_domain *domain, msi_alloc_info_t *arg)
{
+ struct pseries_msi_device *pseries_dev = arg->scratchpad[0].ptr;
struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(domain->dev);
rtas_disable_msi(pdev);
+
+ WARN_ON(pseries_dev->msi_used);
+ kfree(pseries_dev);
}
static void pseries_msi_shutdown(struct irq_data *d)
@@ -546,12 +573,18 @@ static int pseries_irq_domain_alloc(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq
unsigned int nr_irqs, void *arg)
{
struct pci_controller *phb = domain->host_data;
+ struct pseries_msi_device *pseries_dev;
msi_alloc_info_t *info = arg;
struct msi_desc *desc = info->desc;
struct pci_dev *pdev = msi_desc_to_pci_dev(desc);
int hwirq;
int i, ret;
+ pseries_dev = info->scratchpad[0].ptr;
+
+ if (pseries_dev->msi_used + nr_irqs > pseries_dev->msi_quota)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
hwirq = rtas_query_irq_number(pci_get_pdn(pdev), desc->msi_index);
if (hwirq < 0) {
dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to query HW IRQ: %d\n", hwirq);
@@ -567,9 +600,10 @@ static int pseries_irq_domain_alloc(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq
goto out;
irq_domain_set_hwirq_and_chip(domain, virq + i, hwirq + i,
- &pseries_msi_irq_chip, domain->host_data);
+ &pseries_msi_irq_chip, pseries_dev);
}
+ pseries_dev->msi_used++;
return 0;
out:
@@ -582,9 +616,11 @@ static void pseries_irq_domain_free(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq
unsigned int nr_irqs)
{
struct irq_data *d = irq_domain_get_irq_data(domain, virq);
- struct pci_controller *phb = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
+ struct pseries_msi_device *pseries_dev = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
+ struct pci_controller *phb = domain->host_data;
pr_debug("%s bridge %pOF %d #%d\n", __func__, phb->dn, virq, nr_irqs);
+ pseries_dev->msi_used -= nr_irqs;
irq_domain_free_irqs_parent(domain, virq, nr_irqs);
}
--
2.47.3
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 1f73b8b56cf35de29a433aee7bfff26cea98be3f
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120110-coastal-litigator-8952@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 1f73b8b56cf35de29a433aee7bfff26cea98be3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?=C5=81ukasz=20Bartosik?= <ukaszb(a)chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 21:29:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xhci: dbgtty: fix device unregister
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When DbC is disconnected then xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device()
is called. However if there is any user space process blocked
on write to DbC terminal device then it will never be signalled
and thus stay blocked indifinitely.
This fix adds a tty_vhangup() call in xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device().
The tty_vhangup() wakes up any blocked writers and causes subsequent
write attempts to DbC terminal device to fail.
Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org>
Fixes: dfba2174dc42 ("usb: xhci: Add DbC support in xHCI driver")
Signed-off-by: Łukasz Bartosik <ukaszb(a)chromium.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119212910.1245694-1-ukaszb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
index b7f95565524d..57cdda4e09c8 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -550,6 +550,12 @@ static void xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device(struct xhci_dbc *dbc)
if (!port->registered)
return;
+ /*
+ * Hang up the TTY. This wakes up any blocked
+ * writers and causes subsequent writes to fail.
+ */
+ tty_vhangup(port->port.tty);
+
tty_unregister_device(dbc_tty_driver, port->minor);
xhci_dbc_tty_exit_port(port);
port->registered = false;
Hi there,
While running performance benchmarks for the 5.15.196 LTS tags , it was
observed that several regressions across different benchmarks is being
introduced when compared to the previous 5.15.193 kernel tag. Running an
automated bisect on both of them narrowed down the culprit commit to:
- 5666bcc3c00f7 Revert "cpuidle: menu: Avoid discarding useful
information" for 5.15
Regressions on 5.15.196 include:
-9.3% : Phoronix pts/sqlite using 2 processes on OnPrem X6-2
-6.3% : Phoronix system/sqlite on OnPrem X6-2
-18% : rds-stress -M 1 (readonly rdma-mode) metrics with 1 depth & 1
thread & 1M buffer size on OnPrem X6-2
-4 -> -8% : rds-stress -M 2 (writeonly rdma-mode) metrics with 1 depth &
1 thread & 1M buffer size on OnPrem X6-2
Up to -30% : Some Netpipe metrics on OnPrem X5-2
The culprit commits' messages mention that these reverts were done due
to performance regressions introduced in Intel Jasper Lake systems but
this revert is causing issues in other systems unfortunately. I wanted
to know the maintainers' opinion on how we should proceed in order to
fix this. If we reapply it'll bring back the previous regressions on
Jasper Lake systems and if we don't revert it then it's stuck with
current regressions. If this problem has been reported before and a fix
is in the works then please let me know I shall follow developments to
that mail thread.
Thanks & Regards,
Harshvardhan
From: Liang Jie <liangjie(a)lixiang.com>
The return value of sdio_alloc_irq() was not stored in status.
If sdio_alloc_irq() fails after rtw_drv_register_netdev() succeeds,
status remains _SUCCESS and the error path skips resource cleanup,
while rtw_drv_init() still returns success.
Store the return value of sdio_alloc_irq() in status and reuse the
existing error handling which relies on status.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Reviewed-by: fanggeng <fanggeng(a)lixiang.com>
Signed-off-by: Liang Jie <liangjie(a)lixiang.com>
---
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/sdio_intf.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/sdio_intf.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/sdio_intf.c
index f3caaa857c86..139ace51486d 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/sdio_intf.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/sdio_intf.c
@@ -377,7 +377,8 @@ static int rtw_drv_init(
if (status != _SUCCESS)
goto free_if1;
- if (sdio_alloc_irq(dvobj) != _SUCCESS)
+ status = sdio_alloc_irq(dvobj);
+ if (status != _SUCCESS)
goto free_if1;
status = _SUCCESS;
--
2.25.1
After commit a50f7456f853 ("dma-mapping: Allow use of DMA_BIT_MASK(64) in
global scope"), the DMA_BIT_MASK() macro is broken when passed non trivial
statements for the value of 'n'. This is caused by the new version missing
parenthesis around 'n' when evaluating 'n'.
One example of this breakage is the IPU6 driver now crashing due to
it getting DMA-addresses with address bit 32 set even though it has
tried to set a 32 bit DMA mask.
The IPU6 CSI2 engine has a DMA mask of either 31 or 32 bits depending
on if it is in secure mode or not and it sets this masks like this:
mmu_info->aperture_end =
(dma_addr_t)DMA_BIT_MASK(isp->secure_mode ?
IPU6_MMU_ADDR_BITS :
IPU6_MMU_ADDR_BITS_NON_SECURE);
So the 'n' argument here is "isp->secure_mode ? IPU6_MMU_ADDR_BITS :
IPU6_MMU_ADDR_BITS_NON_SECURE" which gets expanded into:
isp->secure_mode ? IPU6_MMU_ADDR_BITS : IPU6_MMU_ADDR_BITS_NON_SECURE - 1
With the -1 only being applied in the non secure case, causing
the secure mode mask to be one 1 bit too large.
Fixes: a50f7456f853 ("dma-mapping: Allow use of DMA_BIT_MASK(64) in global scope")
Cc: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark(a)linaro.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <johannes.goede(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
---
include/linux/dma-mapping.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
index 2ceda49c609f..aa36a0d1d9df 100644
--- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@
*/
#define DMA_MAPPING_ERROR (~(dma_addr_t)0)
-#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) GENMASK_ULL(n - 1, 0)
+#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) GENMASK_ULL((n) - 1, 0)
struct dma_iova_state {
dma_addr_t addr;
--
2.52.0
This is a special device that's created dynamically and is supposed to
stay in memory forever. We also currently don't have a devlink between
it and the actual reset consumer. Suppress sysfs bind attributes so that
user-space can't unbind the device because - as of now - it will cause a
use-after-free splat from any user that puts the reset control handle.
Fixes: cee544a40e44 ("reset: gpio: Add GPIO-based reset controller")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)oss.qualcomm.com>
---
drivers/reset/reset-gpio.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/reset/reset-gpio.c b/drivers/reset/reset-gpio.c
index e5512b3b596b..626c4c639c15 100644
--- a/drivers/reset/reset-gpio.c
+++ b/drivers/reset/reset-gpio.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static struct auxiliary_driver reset_gpio_driver = {
.id_table = reset_gpio_ids,
.driver = {
.name = "reset-gpio",
+ .suppress_bind_attrs = true,
},
};
module_auxiliary_driver(reset_gpio_driver);
--
2.51.0
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 1f73b8b56cf35de29a433aee7bfff26cea98be3f
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025120110-deuce-arrange-e66c@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 1f73b8b56cf35de29a433aee7bfff26cea98be3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?=C5=81ukasz=20Bartosik?= <ukaszb(a)chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2025 21:29:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xhci: dbgtty: fix device unregister
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
When DbC is disconnected then xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device()
is called. However if there is any user space process blocked
on write to DbC terminal device then it will never be signalled
and thus stay blocked indifinitely.
This fix adds a tty_vhangup() call in xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device().
The tty_vhangup() wakes up any blocked writers and causes subsequent
write attempts to DbC terminal device to fail.
Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org>
Fixes: dfba2174dc42 ("usb: xhci: Add DbC support in xHCI driver")
Signed-off-by: Łukasz Bartosik <ukaszb(a)chromium.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251119212910.1245694-1-ukaszb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
index b7f95565524d..57cdda4e09c8 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-dbgtty.c
@@ -550,6 +550,12 @@ static void xhci_dbc_tty_unregister_device(struct xhci_dbc *dbc)
if (!port->registered)
return;
+ /*
+ * Hang up the TTY. This wakes up any blocked
+ * writers and causes subsequent writes to fail.
+ */
+ tty_vhangup(port->port.tty);
+
tty_unregister_device(dbc_tty_driver, port->minor);
xhci_dbc_tty_exit_port(port);
port->registered = false;
Hello,
Status summary for stable/linux-5.10.y
Dashboard:
https://d.kernelci.org/c/stable/linux-5.10.y/f964b940099f9982d723d4c77988d4…
giturl: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
branch: linux-5.10.y
commit hash: f964b940099f9982d723d4c77988d4b0dda9c165
origin: maestro
test start time: 2025-12-06 22:05:22.856000+00:00
Builds: 38 ✅ 0 ❌ 0 ⚠️
Boots: 69 ✅ 0 ❌ 0 ⚠️
Tests: 972 ✅ 267 ❌ 200 ⚠️
### POSSIBLE REGRESSIONS
No possible regressions observed.
### FIXED REGRESSIONS
Hardware: beaglebone-black
> Config: multi_v7_defconfig
- Architecture/compiler: arm/gcc-14
- ltp
last run: https://d.kernelci.org/test/maestro:6934ce3b1ca5bf9d0fd6c4d7
history: > ❌ > ❌ > ✅ > ✅ > ✅
### UNSTABLE TESTS
No unstable tests observed.
Sent every day if there were changes in the past 24 hours.
Legend: ✅ PASS ❌ FAIL ⚠️ INCONCLUSIVE
--
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Hello,
Status summary for stable/linux-5.15.y
Dashboard:
https://d.kernelci.org/c/stable/linux-5.15.y/68efe5a6c16a05391e3d96025b41e9…
giturl: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
branch: linux-5.15.y
commit hash: 68efe5a6c16a05391e3d96025b41e9bf573f968c
origin: maestro
test start time: 2025-12-06 22:05:23.274000+00:00
Builds: 34 ✅ 4 ❌ 0 ⚠️
Boots: 45 ✅ 0 ❌ 0 ⚠️
Tests: 855 ✅ 252 ❌ 887 ⚠️
### POSSIBLE REGRESSIONS
No possible regressions observed.
### FIXED REGRESSIONS
Hardware: beaglebone-black
> Config: multi_v7_defconfig
- Architecture/compiler: arm/gcc-14
- ltp
last run: https://d.kernelci.org/test/maestro:6934ae5d1ca5bf9d0fd6352c
history: > ❌ > ❌ > ❌ > ✅ > ✅
### UNSTABLE TESTS
No unstable tests observed.
This branch has 4 pre-existing build issues. See details in the dashboard.
Sent every day if there were changes in the past 24 hours.
Legend: ✅ PASS ❌ FAIL ⚠️ INCONCLUSIVE
--
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Talk to us at kernelci(a)lists.linux.dev
Made with love by the KernelCI team - https://kernelci.org
Hello,
Status summary for stable/linux-6.6.y
Dashboard:
https://d.kernelci.org/c/stable/linux-6.6.y/5fa4793a2d2d70ad08b85387b41020f…
giturl: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
branch: linux-6.6.y
commit hash: 5fa4793a2d2d70ad08b85387b41020f1fcc2d19e
origin: maestro
test start time: 2025-12-06 22:05:24.119000+00:00
Builds: 35 ✅ 4 ❌ 0 ⚠️
Boots: 92 ✅ 0 ❌ 0 ⚠️
Tests: 4404 ✅ 350 ❌ 1689 ⚠️
### POSSIBLE REGRESSIONS
No possible regressions observed.
### FIXED REGRESSIONS
Hardware: beaglebone-black
> Config: multi_v7_defconfig
- Architecture/compiler: arm/gcc-14
- ltp
last run: https://d.kernelci.org/test/maestro:6934b2071ca5bf9d0fd63f8f
history: > ❌ > ❌ > ❌ > ✅ > ✅
### UNSTABLE TESTS
No unstable tests observed.
This branch has 4 pre-existing build issues. See details in the dashboard.
Sent every day if there were changes in the past 24 hours.
Legend: ✅ PASS ❌ FAIL ⚠️ INCONCLUSIVE
--
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Hello,
Status summary for stable/linux-6.1.y
Dashboard:
https://d.kernelci.org/c/stable/linux-6.1.y/50cbba13faa294918f0e1a9cb2b0aba…
giturl: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
branch: linux-6.1.y
commit hash: 50cbba13faa294918f0e1a9cb2b0aba19f4e6fba
origin: maestro
test start time: 2025-12-06 22:05:23.711000+00:00
Builds: 35 ✅ 4 ❌ 0 ⚠️
Boots: 47 ✅ 0 ❌ 0 ⚠️
Tests: 2078 ✅ 242 ❌ 1351 ⚠️
### POSSIBLE REGRESSIONS
No possible regressions observed.
### FIXED REGRESSIONS
Hardware: beaglebone-black
> Config: multi_v7_defconfig
- Architecture/compiler: arm/gcc-14
- ltp
last run: https://d.kernelci.org/test/maestro:6934b8381ca5bf9d0fd66360
history: > ❌ > ❌ > ❌ > ✅ > ✅
### UNSTABLE TESTS
No unstable tests observed.
This branch has 4 pre-existing build issues. See details in the dashboard.
Sent every day if there were changes in the past 24 hours.
Legend: ✅ PASS ❌ FAIL ⚠️ INCONCLUSIVE
--
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Currently, kvfree_rcu_barrier() flushes RCU sheaves across all slab
caches when a cache is destroyed. This is unnecessary; only the RCU
sheaves belonging to the cache being destroyed need to be flushed.
As suggested by Vlastimil Babka, introduce a weaker form of
kvfree_rcu_barrier() that operates on a specific slab cache.
Factor out flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache() from flush_all_rcu_sheaves() and
call it from flush_all_rcu_sheaves() and kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache().
Call kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache() instead of kvfree_rcu_barrier() on
cache destruction.
The performance benefit is evaluated on a 12 core 24 threads AMD Ryzen
5900X machine (1 socket), by loading slub_kunit module.
Before:
Total calls: 19
Average latency (us): 18127
Total time (us): 344414
After:
Total calls: 19
Average latency (us): 10066
Total time (us): 191264
Two performance regression have been reported:
- stress module loader test's runtime increases by 50-60% (Daniel)
- internal graphics test's runtime on Tegra23 increases by 35% (Jon)
They are fixed by this change.
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Fixes: ec66e0d59952 ("slab: add sheaf support for batching kfree_rcu() operations")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1bda09da-93be-4737-aef0-d47f8c5c9301@suse.…
Reported-and-tested-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez(a)samsung.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/0406562e-2066-4cf8-9902-b2b0616dd742@kerne…
Reported-and-tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh(a)nvidia.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/e988eff6-1287-425e-a06c-805af5bbf262@nvidi…
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo(a)oracle.com>
---
v2 -> v3:
- Addressed Suren's comment [1], thanks!
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAJuCfpE+g65Dm8-r=psDJQf_O1rfBG62DOzx4mE1m…
include/linux/slab.h | 7 ++++++
mm/slab.h | 1 +
mm/slab_common.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
mm/slub.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index cf443f064a66..2482992248dc 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -1150,10 +1150,17 @@ static inline void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
rcu_barrier();
}
+static inline void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ rcu_barrier();
+}
+
static inline void kfree_rcu_scheduler_running(void) { }
#else
void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void);
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s);
+
void kfree_rcu_scheduler_running(void);
#endif
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index f730e012553c..e767aa7e91b0 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static inline bool is_kmalloc_normal(struct kmem_cache *s)
bool __kfree_rcu_sheaf(struct kmem_cache *s, void *obj);
void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void);
+void flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s);
#define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 | SLAB_PANIC | \
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 84dfff4f7b1f..dd8a49d6f9cc 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s)
return;
/* in-flight kfree_rcu()'s may include objects from our cache */
- kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+ kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(s);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG) &&
(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) {
@@ -2038,25 +2038,13 @@ void kvfree_call_rcu(struct rcu_head *head, void *ptr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_call_rcu);
-/**
- * kvfree_rcu_barrier - Wait until all in-flight kvfree_rcu() complete.
- *
- * Note that a single argument of kvfree_rcu() call has a slow path that
- * triggers synchronize_rcu() following by freeing a pointer. It is done
- * before the return from the function. Therefore for any single-argument
- * call that will result in a kfree() to a cache that is to be destroyed
- * during module exit, it is developer's responsibility to ensure that all
- * such calls have returned before the call to kmem_cache_destroy().
- */
-void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
+static inline void __kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
{
struct kfree_rcu_cpu_work *krwp;
struct kfree_rcu_cpu *krcp;
bool queued;
int i, cpu;
- flush_all_rcu_sheaves();
-
/*
* Firstly we detach objects and queue them over an RCU-batch
* for all CPUs. Finally queued works are flushed for each CPU.
@@ -2118,8 +2106,43 @@ void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
}
}
}
+
+/**
+ * kvfree_rcu_barrier - Wait until all in-flight kvfree_rcu() complete.
+ *
+ * Note that a single argument of kvfree_rcu() call has a slow path that
+ * triggers synchronize_rcu() following by freeing a pointer. It is done
+ * before the return from the function. Therefore for any single-argument
+ * call that will result in a kfree() to a cache that is to be destroyed
+ * during module exit, it is developer's responsibility to ensure that all
+ * such calls have returned before the call to kmem_cache_destroy().
+ */
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
+{
+ flush_all_rcu_sheaves();
+ __kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_rcu_barrier);
+/**
+ * kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache - Wait for in-flight kvfree_rcu() calls on a
+ * specific slab cache.
+ * @s: slab cache to wait for
+ *
+ * See the description of kvfree_rcu_barrier() for details.
+ */
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ if (s->cpu_sheaves)
+ flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(s);
+ /*
+ * TODO: Introduce a version of __kvfree_rcu_barrier() that works
+ * on a specific slab cache.
+ */
+ __kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache);
+
static unsigned long
kfree_rcu_shrink_count(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
@@ -2215,4 +2238,3 @@ void __init kvfree_rcu_init(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVFREE_RCU_BATCHED */
-
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 785e25a14999..7cec2220712b 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -4118,42 +4118,47 @@ static void flush_rcu_sheaf(struct work_struct *w)
/* needed for kvfree_rcu_barrier() */
-void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void)
+void flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
struct slub_flush_work *sfw;
- struct kmem_cache *s;
unsigned int cpu;
- cpus_read_lock();
- mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&flush_lock);
- list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
- if (!s->cpu_sheaves)
- continue;
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
- mutex_lock(&flush_lock);
+ /*
+ * we don't check if rcu_free sheaf exists - racing
+ * __kfree_rcu_sheaf() might have just removed it.
+ * by executing flush_rcu_sheaf() on the cpu we make
+ * sure the __kfree_rcu_sheaf() finished its call_rcu()
+ */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
+ INIT_WORK(&sfw->work, flush_rcu_sheaf);
+ sfw->s = s;
+ queue_work_on(cpu, flushwq, &sfw->work);
+ }
- /*
- * we don't check if rcu_free sheaf exists - racing
- * __kfree_rcu_sheaf() might have just removed it.
- * by executing flush_rcu_sheaf() on the cpu we make
- * sure the __kfree_rcu_sheaf() finished its call_rcu()
- */
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
+ flush_work(&sfw->work);
+ }
- INIT_WORK(&sfw->work, flush_rcu_sheaf);
- sfw->s = s;
- queue_work_on(cpu, flushwq, &sfw->work);
- }
+ mutex_unlock(&flush_lock);
+}
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
- flush_work(&sfw->work);
- }
+void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void)
+{
+ struct kmem_cache *s;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(&flush_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
+ if (!s->cpu_sheaves)
+ continue;
+ flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(s);
}
mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
--
2.43.0
The local variable 'curr_energy' was never clamped to
PAC_193X_MIN_POWER_ACC or PAC_193X_MAX_POWER_ACC because the return
value of clamp() was not used. Fix this by assigning the clamped value
back to 'curr_energy'.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0fb528c8255b ("iio: adc: adding support for PAC193x")
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum(a)linux.dev>
---
drivers/iio/adc/pac1934.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/pac1934.c b/drivers/iio/adc/pac1934.c
index 48df16509260..256488d3936b 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/pac1934.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/pac1934.c
@@ -665,7 +665,8 @@ static int pac1934_reg_snapshot(struct pac1934_chip_info *info,
/* add the power_acc field */
curr_energy += inc;
- clamp(curr_energy, PAC_193X_MIN_POWER_ACC, PAC_193X_MAX_POWER_ACC);
+ curr_energy = clamp(curr_energy, PAC_193X_MIN_POWER_ACC,
+ PAC_193X_MAX_POWER_ACC);
reg_data->energy_sec_acc[cnt] = curr_energy;
}
--
Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum(a)linux.dev>
GPG: 1D60 735E 8AEF 3BE4 73B6 9D84 7336 78FD 8DFE EAD4
Hi stable folks,
Please apply commit 5b1e38c0792c ("dpaa2-mac: bail if the dpmacs fwnode
is not found") to 5.15, where it addresses an instance of
-Wsometimes-uninitialized with clang-21 and newer, introduced by commit
3264f599c1a8 ("net: dpaa2-mac: Add ACPI support for DPAA2 MAC driver")
in 5.14.
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-mac.c:54:13: error: variable 'parent' is used uninitialized whenever 'if' condition is false [-Werror,-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
54 | } else if (is_acpi_node(fwnode)) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-mac.c:58:29: note: uninitialized use occurs here
58 | fwnode_for_each_child_node(parent, child) {
| ^~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-mac.c:54:9: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always true
54 | } else if (is_acpi_node(fwnode)) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-mac.c:43:39: note: initialize the variable 'parent' to silence this warning
43 | struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, *parent, *child = NULL;
| ^
| = NULL
It applies and builds cleanly for me. If there are any issues, please
let me know.
Cheers,
Nathan
Hi stable folks,
Please apply commit fc7bf4c0d65a ("drm/i915/selftests: Fix inconsistent
IS_ERR and PTR_ERR") to 5.15, where it resolves a couple of instances of
-Wuninitialized with clang-21 or newer that were introduced by commit
cdb35d1ed6d2 ("drm/i915/gem: Migrate to system at dma-buf attach time
(v7)") in 5.15.
In file included from drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_dmabuf.c:329:
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/selftests/i915_gem_dmabuf.c:105:18: error: variable 'dmabuf' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized]
105 | PTR_ERR(dmabuf));
| ^~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/selftests/i915_gem_dmabuf.c:94:24: note: initialize the variable 'dmabuf' to silence this warning
94 | struct dma_buf *dmabuf;
| ^
| = NULL
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/selftests/i915_gem_dmabuf.c:161:18: error: variable 'dmabuf' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized]
161 | PTR_ERR(dmabuf));
| ^~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/selftests/i915_gem_dmabuf.c:149:24: note: initialize the variable 'dmabuf' to silence this warning
149 | struct dma_buf *dmabuf;
| ^
| = NULL
It applies and builds cleanly for me. If there are any issues, please
let me know.
Cheers,
Nathan
Hi stable folks,
Please apply commit ccc35ff2fd29 ("leds: spi-byte: Use
devm_led_classdev_register_ext()") to 5.15, 6.1, and 6.6. It
inadvertently addresses an instance of -Wuninitialized visible with
clang-21 and newer:
drivers/leds/leds-spi-byte.c:99:26: error: variable 'child' is uninitialized when used here [-Werror,-Wuninitialized]
99 | of_property_read_string(child, "label", &name);
| ^~~~~
drivers/leds/leds-spi-byte.c:83:27: note: initialize the variable 'child' to silence this warning
83 | struct device_node *child;
| ^
| = NULL
It applies cleanly to 6.6. I have attached a backport for 6.1 and 5.15,
which can be generated locally with:
$ git format-patch -1 --stdout ccc35ff2fd2911986b716a87fe65e03fac2312c9 | sed 's;strscpy;strlcpy;' | patch -p1
This change seems safe to me but if I am missing a massive dependency
chain, an alternative would be moving child's initialization up in these
stable branches.
Cheers,
Nathan
diff --git a/drivers/leds/leds-spi-byte.c b/drivers/leds/leds-spi-byte.c
index 82696e0607a5..7dd876df8b36 100644
--- a/drivers/leds/leds-spi-byte.c
+++ b/drivers/leds/leds-spi-byte.c
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static int spi_byte_probe(struct spi_device *spi)
if (!led)
return -ENOMEM;
+ child = of_get_next_available_child(dev_of_node(dev), NULL);
of_property_read_string(child, "label", &name);
strlcpy(led->name, name, sizeof(led->name));
led->spi = spi;
@@ -106,7 +107,6 @@ static int spi_byte_probe(struct spi_device *spi)
led->ldev.max_brightness = led->cdef->max_value - led->cdef->off_value;
led->ldev.brightness_set_blocking = spi_byte_brightness_set_blocking;
- child = of_get_next_available_child(dev_of_node(dev), NULL);
state = of_get_property(child, "default-state", NULL);
if (state) {
if (!strcmp(state, "on")) {
The patch titled
Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix excessive IPI broadcasts when unsharing PMD tables using mmu_gather
has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is
mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: "David Hildenbrand (Red Hat)" <david(a)kernel.org>
Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix excessive IPI broadcasts when unsharing PMD tables using mmu_gather
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 22:35:58 +0100
As reported, ever since commit 1013af4f585f ("mm/hugetlb: fix
huge_pmd_unshare() vs GUP-fast race") we can end up in some situations
where we perform so many IPI broadcasts when unsharing hugetlb PMD page
tables that it severely regresses some workloads.
In particular, when we fork()+exit(), or when we munmap() a large area
backed by many shared PMD tables, we perform one IPI broadcast per
unshared PMD table.
There are two optimizations to be had:
(1) When we process (unshare) multiple such PMD tables, such as during
exit(), it is sufficient to send a single IPI broadcast (as long as
we respect locking rules) instead of one per PMD table.
Locking prevents that any of these PMD tables could get reuse before
we drop the lock.
(2) When we are not the last sharer (> 2 users including us), there is
no need to send the IPI broadcast. The shared PMD tables cannot
become exclusive (fully unshared) before an IPI will be broadcasted
by the last sharer.
Concurrent GUP-fast could walk into a PMD table just before we
unshared it. It could then succeed in grabbing a page from the
shared page table even after munmap() etc succeeded (and supressed
an IPI). But there is not difference compared to GUP-fast just
sleeping for a while after grabbing the page and re-enabling IRQs.
Most importantly, GUP-fast will never walk into page tables that are
no-longer shared, because the last sharer will issue an IPI
broadcast.
(if ever required, checking whether the PUD changed in GUP-fast
after grabbing the page like we do in the PTE case could handle
this)
So let's rework PMD sharing TLB flushing + IPI sync to use the mmu_gather
infrastructure so we can implement these optimizations and demystify the
code at least a bit. Extend the mmu_gather infrastructure to be able to
deal with our special hugetlb PMD table sharing implementation.
We'll consolidate the handling for (full) unsharing of PMD tables in
tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc() and tlb_flush_unshared_tables(), and track in
"struct mmu_gather" whether we had (full) unsharing of PMD tables.
Because locking is very special (concurrent unsharing+reuse must be
prevented), we disallow deferring flushing to tlb_finish_mmu() and instead
require an explicit earlier call to tlb_flush_unshared_tables().
From hugetlb code, we call huge_pmd_unshare_flush() where we make sure
that the expected lock protecting us from concurrent unsharing+reuse is
still held.
Check with a VM_WARN_ON_ONCE() in tlb_finish_mmu() that
tlb_flush_unshared_tables() was properly called earlier.
Document it all properly.
Notes about tlb_remove_table_sync_one() interaction with unsharing:
There are two fairly tricky things:
(1) tlb_remove_table_sync_one() is a NOP on architectures without
CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE.
Here, the assumption is that the previous TLB flush would send an
IPI to all relevant CPUs. Careful: some architectures like x86 only
send IPIs to all relevant CPUs when tlb->freed_tables is set.
The relevant architectures should be selecting
MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE, but x86 might not do that in stable
kernels and it might have been problematic before this patch.
Also, the arch flushing behavior (independent of IPIs) is different
when tlb->freed_tables is set. Do we have to enlighten them to also
take care of tlb->unshared_tables? So far we didn't care, so
hopefully we are fine. Of course, we could be setting
tlb->freed_tables as well, but that might then unnecessarily flush
too much, because the semantics of tlb->freed_tables are a bit
fuzzy.
This patch changes nothing in this regard.
(2) tlb_remove_table_sync_one() is not a NOP on architectures with
CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE that actually don't need a sync.
Take x86 as an example: in the common case (!pv, !X86_FEATURE_INVLPGB)
we still issue IPIs during TLB flushes and don't actually need the
second tlb_remove_table_sync_one().
This optimized can be implemented on top of this, by checking e.g., in
tlb_remove_table_sync_one() whether we really need IPIs. But as
described in (1), it really must honor tlb->freed_tables then to
send IPIs to all relevant CPUs.
Further note that the ptdesc_pmd_pts_dec() in huge_pmd_share() is not a
concern, as we are holding the i_mmap_lock the whole time, preventing
concurrent unsharing. That ptdesc_pmd_pts_dec() usage will be removed
separately as a cleanup later.
There are plenty more cleanups to be had, but they have to wait until
this is fixed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251205213558.2980480-5-david@kernel.org
Fixes: 1013af4f585f ("mm/hugetlb: fix huge_pmd_unshare() vs GUP-fast race")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Red Hat) <david(a)kernel.org>
Reported-by: Uschakow, Stanislav" <suschako(a)amazon.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/4d3878531c76479d9f8ca9789dc6485d@amazon.de/
Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman(a)redhat.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel(a)surriel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Lance Yang <lance.yang(a)linux.dev>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/asm-generic/tlb.h | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/hugetlb.h | 19 +++--
mm/hugetlb.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
mm/mmu_gather.c | 6 +
mm/mprotect.c | 2
mm/rmap.c | 25 +++++--
6 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
--- a/include/asm-generic/tlb.h~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/include/asm-generic/tlb.h
@@ -364,6 +364,17 @@ struct mmu_gather {
unsigned int vma_huge : 1;
unsigned int vma_pfn : 1;
+ /*
+ * Did we unshare (unmap) any shared page tables?
+ */
+ unsigned int unshared_tables : 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Did we unshare any page tables such that they are now exclusive
+ * and could get reused+modified by the new owner?
+ */
+ unsigned int fully_unshared_tables : 1;
+
unsigned int batch_count;
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_NO_GATHER
@@ -400,6 +411,7 @@ static inline void __tlb_reset_range(str
tlb->cleared_pmds = 0;
tlb->cleared_puds = 0;
tlb->cleared_p4ds = 0;
+ tlb->unshared_tables = 0;
/*
* Do not reset mmu_gather::vma_* fields here, we do not
* call into tlb_start_vma() again to set them if there is an
@@ -484,7 +496,7 @@ static inline void tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly
* these bits.
*/
if (!(tlb->freed_tables || tlb->cleared_ptes || tlb->cleared_pmds ||
- tlb->cleared_puds || tlb->cleared_p4ds))
+ tlb->cleared_puds || tlb->cleared_p4ds || tlb->unshared_tables))
return;
tlb_flush(tlb);
@@ -773,6 +785,61 @@ static inline bool huge_pmd_needs_flush(
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING
+static inline void tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct ptdesc *pt,
+ unsigned long addr)
+{
+ /*
+ * The caller must make sure that concurrent unsharing + exclusive
+ * reuse is impossible until tlb_flush_unshared_tables() was called.
+ */
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(pt));
+ ptdesc_pmd_pts_dec(pt);
+
+ /* Clearing a PUD pointing at a PMD table with PMD leaves. */
+ tlb_flush_pmd_range(tlb, addr & PUD_MASK, PUD_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * If the page table is now exclusively owned, we fully unshared
+ * a page table.
+ */
+ if (!ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(pt))
+ tlb->fully_unshared_tables = true;
+ tlb->unshared_tables = true;
+}
+
+static inline void tlb_flush_unshared_tables(struct mmu_gather *tlb)
+{
+ /*
+ * As soon as the caller drops locks to allow for reuse of
+ * previously-shared tables, these tables could get modified and
+ * even reused outside of hugetlb context. So flush the TLB now.
+ *
+ * Note that we cannot defer the flush to a later point even if we are
+ * not the last sharer of the page table.
+ */
+ if (tlb->unshared_tables)
+ tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(tlb);
+
+ /*
+ * Similarly, we must make sure that concurrent GUP-fast will not
+ * walk previously-shared page tables that are getting modified+reused
+ * elsewhere. So broadcast an IPI to wait for any concurrent GUP-fast.
+ *
+ * We only perform this when we are the last sharer of a page table,
+ * as the IPI will reach all CPUs: any GUP-fast.
+ *
+ * Note that on configs where tlb_remove_table_sync_one() is a NOP,
+ * the expectation is that the tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() would have issued
+ * required IPIs already for us.
+ */
+ if (tlb->fully_unshared_tables) {
+ tlb_remove_table_sync_one();
+ tlb->fully_unshared_tables = false;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING */
+
#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
#endif /* _ASM_GENERIC__TLB_H */
--- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/include/linux/hugetlb.h
@@ -240,8 +240,9 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *
pte_t *huge_pte_offset(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz);
unsigned long hugetlb_mask_last_page(struct hstate *h);
-int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep);
+int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep);
+void huge_pmd_unshare_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end);
@@ -271,7 +272,7 @@ void hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(struct vm_
int hugetlb_vma_trylock_write(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
void hugetlb_vma_assert_locked(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
void hugetlb_vma_lock_release(struct kref *kref);
-long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+long hugetlb_change_protection(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot,
unsigned long cp_flags);
void hugetlb_unshare_all_pmds(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
@@ -300,13 +301,17 @@ static inline struct address_space *huge
return NULL;
}
-static inline int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm,
- struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
+static inline int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline void huge_pmd_unshare_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+}
+
static inline void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
@@ -432,7 +437,7 @@ static inline void move_hugetlb_state(st
{
}
-static inline long hugetlb_change_protection(
+static inline long hugetlb_change_protection(struct mmu_gather *tlb,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot,
unsigned long cp_flags)
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -5096,8 +5096,9 @@ int move_hugetlb_page_tables(struct vm_a
unsigned long last_addr_mask;
pte_t *src_pte, *dst_pte;
struct mmu_notifier_range range;
- bool shared_pmd = false;
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, vma->vm_mm);
mmu_notifier_range_init(&range, MMU_NOTIFY_CLEAR, 0, mm, old_addr,
old_end);
adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(vma, &range.start, &range.end);
@@ -5122,12 +5123,12 @@ int move_hugetlb_page_tables(struct vm_a
if (huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(mm, old_addr, src_pte)))
continue;
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, old_addr, src_pte)) {
- shared_pmd = true;
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, old_addr, src_pte)) {
old_addr |= last_addr_mask;
new_addr |= last_addr_mask;
continue;
}
+ tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry(h, &tlb, src_pte, old_addr);
dst_pte = huge_pte_alloc(mm, new_vma, new_addr, sz);
if (!dst_pte)
@@ -5136,13 +5137,13 @@ int move_hugetlb_page_tables(struct vm_a
move_huge_pte(vma, old_addr, new_addr, src_pte, dst_pte, sz);
}
- if (shared_pmd)
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, range.start, range.end);
- else
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, old_end - len, old_end);
+ tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(&tlb);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
+
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(&range);
i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
return len + old_addr - old_end;
}
@@ -5161,7 +5162,6 @@ void __unmap_hugepage_range(struct mmu_g
unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(h);
bool adjust_reservation;
unsigned long last_addr_mask;
- bool force_flush = false;
WARN_ON(!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma));
BUG_ON(start & ~huge_page_mask(h));
@@ -5184,10 +5184,8 @@ void __unmap_hugepage_range(struct mmu_g
}
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, ptep)) {
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(tlb, vma, address, ptep)) {
spin_unlock(ptl);
- tlb_flush_pmd_range(tlb, address & PUD_MASK, PUD_SIZE);
- force_flush = true;
address |= last_addr_mask;
continue;
}
@@ -5303,14 +5301,7 @@ void __unmap_hugepage_range(struct mmu_g
}
tlb_end_vma(tlb, vma);
- /*
- * There is nothing protecting a previously-shared page table that we
- * unshared through huge_pmd_unshare() from getting freed after we
- * release i_mmap_rwsem, so flush the TLB now. If huge_pmd_unshare()
- * succeeded, flush the range corresponding to the pud.
- */
- if (force_flush)
- tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(tlb);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(tlb, vma);
}
void __hugetlb_zap_begin(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -6399,7 +6390,7 @@ out_release_nounlock:
}
#endif /* CONFIG_USERFAULTFD */
-long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+long hugetlb_change_protection(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned long end,
pgprot_t newprot, unsigned long cp_flags)
{
@@ -6409,7 +6400,6 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
pte_t pte;
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
long pages = 0, psize = huge_page_size(h);
- bool shared_pmd = false;
struct mmu_notifier_range range;
unsigned long last_addr_mask;
bool uffd_wp = cp_flags & MM_CP_UFFD_WP;
@@ -6452,7 +6442,7 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
}
}
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, ptep)) {
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(tlb, vma, address, ptep)) {
/*
* When uffd-wp is enabled on the vma, unshare
* shouldn't happen at all. Warn about it if it
@@ -6461,7 +6451,6 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
WARN_ON_ONCE(uffd_wp || uffd_wp_resolve);
pages++;
spin_unlock(ptl);
- shared_pmd = true;
address |= last_addr_mask;
continue;
}
@@ -6522,22 +6511,16 @@ long hugetlb_change_protection(struct vm
pte = huge_pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte);
huge_ptep_modify_prot_commit(vma, address, ptep, old_pte, pte);
pages++;
+ tlb_remove_huge_tlb_entry(h, tlb, ptep, address);
}
next:
spin_unlock(ptl);
cond_resched();
}
- /*
- * There is nothing protecting a previously-shared page table that we
- * unshared through huge_pmd_unshare() from getting freed after we
- * release i_mmap_rwsem, so flush the TLB now. If huge_pmd_unshare()
- * succeeded, flush the range corresponding to the pud.
- */
- if (shared_pmd)
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, range.start, range.end);
- else
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
+
+ tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(tlb);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(tlb, vma);
/*
* No need to call mmu_notifier_arch_invalidate_secondary_tlbs() we are
* downgrading page table protection not changing it to point to a new
@@ -6904,18 +6887,27 @@ out:
return pte;
}
-/*
- * unmap huge page backed by shared pte.
+/**
+ * huge_pmd_unshare - Unmap a pmd table if it is shared by multiple users
+ * @tlb: the current mmu_gather.
+ * @vma: the vma covering the pmd table.
+ * @addr: the address we are trying to unshare.
+ * @ptep: pointer into the (pmd) page table.
+ *
+ * Called with the page table lock held, the i_mmap_rwsem held in write mode
+ * and the hugetlb vma lock held in write mode.
*
- * Called with page table lock held.
+ * Note: The caller must call huge_pmd_unshare_flush() before dropping the
+ * i_mmap_rwsem.
*
- * returns: 1 successfully unmapped a shared pte page
- * 0 the underlying pte page is not shared, or it is the last user
+ * Returns: 1 if it was a shared PMD table and it got unmapped, or 0 if it
+ * was not a shared PMD table.
*/
-int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
+int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
{
unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(hstate_vma(vma));
+ struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset(mm, addr);
p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
@@ -6927,18 +6919,36 @@ int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *m
i_mmap_assert_write_locked(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
hugetlb_vma_assert_locked(vma);
pud_clear(pud);
- /*
- * Once our caller drops the rmap lock, some other process might be
- * using this page table as a normal, non-hugetlb page table.
- * Wait for pending gup_fast() in other threads to finish before letting
- * that happen.
- */
- tlb_remove_table_sync_one();
- ptdesc_pmd_pts_dec(virt_to_ptdesc(ptep));
+
+ tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc(tlb, virt_to_ptdesc(ptep), addr);
+
mm_dec_nr_pmds(mm);
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * huge_pmd_unshare_flush - Complete a sequence of huge_pmd_unshare() calls
+ * @tlb: the current mmu_gather.
+ * @vma: the vma covering the pmd table.
+ *
+ * Perform necessary TLB flushes or IPI broadcasts to synchronize PMD table
+ * unsharing with concurrent page table walkers (TLB, GUP-fast, etc.).
+ *
+ * This function must be called after a sequence of huge_pmd_unshare()
+ * calls while still holding the i_mmap_rwsem.
+ */
+void huge_pmd_unshare_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ /*
+ * We must synchronize page table unsharing such that nobody will
+ * try reusing a previously-shared page table while it might still
+ * be in use by previous sharers (TLB, GUP_fast).
+ */
+ i_mmap_assert_write_locked(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
+
+ tlb_flush_unshared_tables(tlb);
+}
+
#else /* !CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING */
pte_t *huge_pmd_share(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -6947,12 +6957,16 @@ pte_t *huge_pmd_share(struct mm_struct *
return NULL;
}
-int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
+int huge_pmd_unshare(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
{
return 0;
}
+void huge_pmd_unshare_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+}
+
void adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *start, unsigned long *end)
{
@@ -7219,6 +7233,7 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
unsigned long sz = huge_page_size(h);
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct mmu_notifier_range range;
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
unsigned long address;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *ptep;
@@ -7229,6 +7244,7 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
if (start >= end)
return;
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
flush_cache_range(vma, start, end);
/*
* No need to call adjust_range_if_pmd_sharing_possible(), because
@@ -7248,10 +7264,10 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
if (!ptep)
continue;
ptl = huge_pte_lock(h, mm, ptep);
- huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, ptep);
+ huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, address, ptep);
spin_unlock(ptl);
}
- flush_hugetlb_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
if (take_locks) {
i_mmap_unlock_write(vma->vm_file->f_mapping);
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
@@ -7261,6 +7277,7 @@ static void hugetlb_unshare_pmds(struct
* Documentation/mm/mmu_notifier.rst.
*/
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(&range);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
}
/*
--- a/mm/mmu_gather.c~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/mm/mmu_gather.c
@@ -469,6 +469,12 @@ void tlb_gather_mmu_fullmm(struct mmu_ga
void tlb_finish_mmu(struct mmu_gather *tlb)
{
/*
+ * We expect an earlier huge_pmd_unshare_flush() call to sort this out,
+ * due to complicated locking requirements with page table unsharing.
+ */
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(tlb->fully_unshared_tables);
+
+ /*
* If there are parallel threads are doing PTE changes on same range
* under non-exclusive lock (e.g., mmap_lock read-side) but defer TLB
* flush by batching, one thread may end up seeing inconsistent PTEs
--- a/mm/mprotect.c~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ long change_protection(struct mmu_gather
#endif
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
- pages = hugetlb_change_protection(vma, start, end, newprot,
+ pages = hugetlb_change_protection(tlb, vma, start, end, newprot,
cp_flags);
else
pages = change_protection_range(tlb, vma, start, end, newprot,
--- a/mm/rmap.c~mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather
+++ a/mm/rmap.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
#include <linux/oom.h>
-#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/tlb.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include <trace/events/migrate.h>
@@ -2008,13 +2008,17 @@ static bool try_to_unmap_one(struct foli
* if unsuccessful.
*/
if (!anon) {
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
+
VM_BUG_ON(!(flags & TTU_RMAP_LOCKED));
if (!hugetlb_vma_trylock_write(vma))
goto walk_abort;
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, pvmw.pte)) {
+
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, address, pvmw.pte)) {
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
- flush_tlb_range(vma,
- range.start, range.end);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
/*
* The PMD table was unmapped,
* consequently unmapping the folio.
@@ -2022,6 +2026,7 @@ static bool try_to_unmap_one(struct foli
goto walk_done;
}
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
}
pteval = huge_ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pvmw.pte);
if (pte_dirty(pteval))
@@ -2398,17 +2403,20 @@ static bool try_to_migrate_one(struct fo
* fail if unsuccessful.
*/
if (!anon) {
+ struct mmu_gather tlb;
+
VM_BUG_ON(!(flags & TTU_RMAP_LOCKED));
if (!hugetlb_vma_trylock_write(vma)) {
page_vma_mapped_walk_done(&pvmw);
ret = false;
break;
}
- if (huge_pmd_unshare(mm, vma, address, pvmw.pte)) {
- hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
- flush_tlb_range(vma,
- range.start, range.end);
+ tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
+ if (huge_pmd_unshare(&tlb, vma, address, pvmw.pte)) {
+ hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
+ huge_pmd_unshare_flush(&tlb, vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
/*
* The PMD table was unmapped,
* consequently unmapping the folio.
@@ -2417,6 +2425,7 @@ static bool try_to_migrate_one(struct fo
break;
}
hugetlb_vma_unlock_write(vma);
+ tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
}
/* Nuke the hugetlb page table entry */
pteval = huge_ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, pvmw.pte);
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david(a)kernel.org are
mm-hugetlb-fix-hugetlb_pmd_shared.patch
mm-hugetlb-fix-two-comments-related-to-huge_pmd_unshare.patch
mm-rmap-fix-two-comments-related-to-huge_pmd_unshare.patch
mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather.patch
The patch titled
Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()
has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is
mm-hugetlb-fix-hugetlb_pmd_shared.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: "David Hildenbrand (Red Hat)" <david(a)kernel.org>
Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb_pmd_shared()
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 22:35:55 +0100
Patch series "mm/hugetlb: fixes for PMD table sharing (incl. using
mmu_gather)".
One functional fix, one performance regression fix, and two related
comment fixes.
I cleaned up my prototype I recently shared [1] for the performance fix,
deferring most of the cleanups I had in the prototype to a later point.
While doing that I identified the other things.
The goal of this patch set is to be backported to stable trees "fairly"
easily. At least patch #1 and #4.
Patch #1 fixes hugetlb_pmd_shared() not detecting any sharing
Patch #2 + #3 are simple comment fixes that patch #4 interacts with.
Patch #4 is a fix for the reported performance regression due to excessive
IPI broadcasts during fork()+exit().
The last patch is all about TLB flushes, IPIs and mmu_gather. Read:
complicated
I added as much comments + description that I possibly could, and I am
hoping for review from Jann.
There are plenty of cleanups in the future to be had + one reasonable
optimization on x86. But that's all out of scope for this series.
This patch (of 4):
We switched from (wrongly) using the page count to an independent shared
count. Now, shared page tables have a refcount of 1 (excluding
speculative references) and instead use ptdesc->pt_share_count to identify
sharing.
We didn't convert hugetlb_pmd_shared(), so right now, we would never
detect a shared PMD table as such, because sharing/unsharing no longer
touches the refcount of a PMD table.
Page migration, like mbind() or migrate_pages() would allow for migrating
folios mapped into such shared PMD tables, even though the folios are not
exclusive. In smaps we would account them as "private" although they are
"shared", and we would be wrongly setting the PM_MMAP_EXCLUSIVE in the
pagemap interface.
Fix it by properly using ptdesc_pmd_is_shared() in hugetlb_pmd_shared().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251205213558.2980480-1-david@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251205213558.2980480-2-david@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8cab934d-4a56-44aa-b641-bfd7e23bd673@kernel.org/ [1]
Fixes: 59d9094df3d7 ("mm: hugetlb: independent PMD page table shared count")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Red Hat) <david(a)kernel.org>
Tested-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel(a)surriel.com>
Reviewed-by: Lance Yang <lance.yang(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Cc: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Uschakow, Stanislav" <suschako(a)amazon.de>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/hugetlb.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/include/linux/hugetlb.h~mm-hugetlb-fix-hugetlb_pmd_shared
+++ a/include/linux/hugetlb.h
@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ static inline __init void hugetlb_cma_re
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PMD_PAGE_TABLE_SHARING
static inline bool hugetlb_pmd_shared(pte_t *pte)
{
- return page_count(virt_to_page(pte)) > 1;
+ return ptdesc_pmd_is_shared(virt_to_ptdesc(pte));
}
#else
static inline bool hugetlb_pmd_shared(pte_t *pte)
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from david(a)kernel.org are
mm-hugetlb-fix-hugetlb_pmd_shared.patch
mm-hugetlb-fix-two-comments-related-to-huge_pmd_unshare.patch
mm-rmap-fix-two-comments-related-to-huge_pmd_unshare.patch
mm-hugetlb-fix-excessive-ipi-broadcasts-when-unsharing-pmd-tables-using-mmu_gather.patch
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From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
The commit 4d38328eb442d ("tracing: Fix synth event printk format for str
fields") replaced "%.*s" with "%s" but missed removing the number size of
the dynamic and static strings. The commit e1a453a57bc7 ("tracing: Do not
add length to print format in synthetic events") fixed the dynamic part
but did not fix the static part. That is, with the commands:
# echo 's:wake_lat char[] wakee; u64 delta;' >> /sys/kernel/tracing/dynamic_events
# echo 'hist:keys=pid:ts=common_timestamp.usecs if !(common_flags & 0x18)' > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
# echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:delta=common_timestamp.usecs-$ts:onmatch(sched.sched_waking).trace(wake_lat,next_comm,$delta)' > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
That caused the output of:
<idle>-0 [001] d..5. 193.428167: wake_lat: wakee=(efault)sshd-sessiondelta=155
sshd-session-879 [001] d..5. 193.811080: wake_lat: wakee=(efault)kworker/u34:5delta=58
<idle>-0 [002] d..5. 193.811198: wake_lat: wakee=(efault)bashdelta=91
The commit e1a453a57bc7 fixed the part where the synthetic event had
"char[] wakee". But if one were to replace that with a static size string:
# echo 's:wake_lat char[16] wakee; u64 delta;' >> /sys/kernel/tracing/dynamic_events
Where "wakee" is defined as "char[16]" and not "char[]" making it a static
size, the code triggered the "(efaul)" again.
Remove the added STR_VAR_LEN_MAX size as the string is still going to be
nul terminated.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com>
Cc: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard(a)arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251204151935.5fa30355@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: e1a453a57bc7 ("tracing: Do not add length to print format in synthetic events")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
index 2f19bbe73d27..4554c458b78c 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
@@ -375,7 +375,6 @@ static enum print_line_t print_synth_event(struct trace_iterator *iter,
n_u64++;
} else {
trace_seq_printf(s, print_fmt, se->fields[i]->name,
- STR_VAR_LEN_MAX,
(char *)&entry->fields[n_u64].as_u64,
i == se->n_fields - 1 ? "" : " ");
n_u64 += STR_VAR_LEN_MAX / sizeof(u64);
--
2.51.0
A new warning in Clang 22 [1] complains that @clidr passed to
get_clidr_el1() is an uninitialized const pointer. get_clidr_el1()
doesn't really care since it casts away the const-ness anyways.
Silence the warning by initializing the struct.
This patch won't apply to anything past v6.1 as this code section was
reworked in Commit 7af0c2534f4c ("KVM: arm64: Normalize cache
configuration"). There is no upstream equivalent so this patch only
needs to be applied (stable only) to 6.1.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7c8c5e6a9101e ("arm64: KVM: system register handling")
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/00dacf8c22f065cb52efb14cd091d44… [1]
Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com>
---
Resending this with Nathan's RB tag, an updated commit log and better
recipients from checkpatch.pl.
I've also sent a similar patch resend for 5.15
---
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
index f4a7c5abcbca..d7ebd7387221 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
@@ -2948,7 +2948,7 @@ int kvm_sys_reg_table_init(void)
{
bool valid = true;
unsigned int i;
- struct sys_reg_desc clidr;
+ struct sys_reg_desc clidr = {0};
/* Make sure tables are unique and in order. */
valid &= check_sysreg_table(sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs), false);
---
base-commit: 830b3c68c1fb1e9176028d02ef86f3cf76aa2476
change-id: 20250724-b4-clidr-unint-const-ptr-7edb960bc3bd
Best regards,
--
Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com>
A new warning in Clang 22 [1] complains that @clidr passed to
get_clidr_el1() is an uninitialized const pointer. get_clidr_el1()
doesn't really care since it casts away the const-ness anyways -- it is
a false positive.
This patch isn't needed for anything past 6.1 as this code section was
reworked in Commit 7af0c2534f4c ("KVM: arm64: Normalize cache
configuration") which incidentally removed the aforementioned warning.
Since there is no upstream equivalent, this patch just needs to be
applied to 6.1.
Disable this warning for sys_regs.o instead of backporting the patches
from 6.2+ that modified this code area.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7c8c5e6a9101e ("arm64: KVM: system register handling")
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/00dacf8c22f065cb52efb14cd091d44… [1]
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- disable warning for TU instead of initialising the struct
- update commit message
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250724-b4-clidr-unint-const-ptr-v1-1-67c4d620…
- Link to v1 resend (sent wrong diff, thanks Nathan): https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251204-b4-clidr-unint-const-ptr-v1-1-95161315…
---
arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile
index 5e33c2d4645a..5fdb5331bfad 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ kvm-y += arm.o mmu.o mmio.o psci.o hypercalls.o pvtime.o \
kvm-$(CONFIG_HW_PERF_EVENTS) += pmu-emul.o pmu.o
+# Work around a false positive Clang 22 -Wuninitialized-const-pointer warning
+CFLAGS_sys_regs.o := $(call cc-disable-warning, uninitialized-const-pointer)
+
always-y := hyp_constants.h hyp-constants.s
define rule_gen_hyp_constants
---
base-commit: 830b3c68c1fb1e9176028d02ef86f3cf76aa2476
change-id: 20250728-stable-disable-unit-ptr-warn-281fee82539c
Best regards,
--
Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com>
When compiling the device tree for the Integrator/AP with IM-PD1, the
following warning is observed regarding the display controller node:
arch/arm/boot/dts/arm/integratorap-im-pd1.dts:251.3-14: Warning
(dma_ranges_format):
/bus@c0000000/bus@c0000000/display@1000000:dma-ranges: empty
"dma-ranges" property but its #address-cells (2) differs from
/bus@c0000000/bus@c0000000 (1)
The display node specifies an empty "dma-ranges" property, intended to
describe a 1:1 identity mapping. However, the node lacks explicit
"#address-cells" and "#size-cells" properties. In this case, the device
tree compiler defaults the address cells to 2 (64-bit), which conflicts
with the parent bus configuration (32-bit, 1 cell).
Fix this by explicitly defining "#address-cells" and "#size-cells" as
1. This matches the 32-bit architecture of the Integrator platform and
ensures the address translation range is correctly parsed by the
compiler.
Fixes: 7bea67a99430 ("ARM: dts: integrator: Fix DMA ranges")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Wei Chiu <visitorckw(a)gmail.com>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/arm/integratorap-im-pd1.dts | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/arm/integratorap-im-pd1.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/arm/integratorap-im-pd1.dts
index db13e09f2fab..6d90d9a42dc9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/arm/integratorap-im-pd1.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/arm/integratorap-im-pd1.dts
@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ display@1000000 {
/* 640x480 16bpp @ 25.175MHz is 36827428 bytes/s */
max-memory-bandwidth = <40000000>;
memory-region = <&impd1_ram>;
+ #address-cells = <1>;
+ #size-cells = <1>;
dma-ranges;
port@0 {
--
2.52.0.177.g9f829587af-goog
Pinctrl is responsible for bias settings and possibly other pin config,
so call gpiochip_generic_config to apply such config values. This might
also include settings that pinctrl does not support, but then it can
return ENOTSUPP as appropriate.
This makes sure any bias and other pin config set by userspace (via
gpiod) actually takes effect.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Matthijs Kooijman <matthijs(a)stdin.nl>
---
drivers/gpio/gpio-rockchip.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-rockchip.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-rockchip.c
index 47174eb3ba76f..106f7f734b4ff 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-rockchip.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-rockchip.c
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static int rockchip_gpio_set_config(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned int offset,
*/
return -ENOTSUPP;
default:
- return -ENOTSUPP;
+ return gpiochip_generic_config(gc, offset, config);
}
}
--
2.48.1
The VM_BIND ioctl did not validate args->num_syncs, allowing userspace
to pass excessively large values that could lead to oversized allocations
or other unexpected behavior.
Add a check to ensure num_syncs does not exceed XE_MAX_SYNCS,
returning -EINVAL when the limit is violated.
Fixes: dd08ebf6c352 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.12+
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com>
Cc: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek(a)intel.com>
Cc: Carl Zhang <carl.zhang(a)intel.com>
Cc: José Roberto de Souza <jose.souza(a)intel.com>
Cc: Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin(a)intel.com>
Cc: Ivan Briano <ivan.briano(a)intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuicheng Lin <shuicheng.lin(a)intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
index c2012d20faa6..2ada14ed1f3c 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm.c
@@ -3341,6 +3341,9 @@ static int vm_bind_ioctl_check_args(struct xe_device *xe, struct xe_vm *vm,
if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, args->extensions))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, args->num_syncs > XE_MAX_SYNCS))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (args->num_binds > 1) {
u64 __user *bind_user =
u64_to_user_ptr(args->vector_of_binds);
--
2.50.1
On a Xen dom0 boot, this feature does not behave, and we end up
calculating:
num_roots = 1
num_nodes = 2
roots_per_node = 0
This causes a divide-by-zero in the modulus inside the loop.
This change adds a couple of guards for invalid states where we might
get a divide-by-zero.
Signed-off-by: Steven Noonan <steven(a)uplinklabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)ariadne.space>
CC: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam(a)amd.com>
CC: x86(a)vger.kernel.org
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/amd_node.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_node.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_node.c
index 3d0a4768d603c..cdc6ba224d4ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_node.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_node.c
@@ -282,6 +282,17 @@ static int __init amd_smn_init(void)
return -ENODEV;
num_nodes = amd_num_nodes();
+
+ if (!num_nodes)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ /* Possibly a virtualized environment (e.g. Xen) where we wi
ll get
+ * roots_per_node=0 if the number of roots is fewer than number of
+ * nodes
+ */
+ if (num_roots < num_nodes)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
amd_roots = kcalloc(num_nodes, sizeof(*amd_roots), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!amd_roots)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.51.2
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
the following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Use the new vmalloc flag that disables random tag assignment in
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() - pass the same random tag to all the
vm_structs by tagging the pointers before they go inside
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). Assigning a common tag resolves the pcpu
chunk address mismatch.
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
---
Changelog v4:
- Add WARN_ON_ONCE() if the new flag is already set in the helper.
(Andrey)
- Remove pr_warn() since the comment should be enough. (Andrey)
Changelog v3:
- Redo the patch by using a flag instead of a new argument in
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() (Andrey Konovalov)
Changelog v2:
- Revise the whole patch to match the fixed refactorization from the
first patch.
Changelog v1:
- Rewrite the patch message to point at the user impact of the issue.
- Move helper to common.c so it can be compiled in all KASAN modes.
mm/kasan/common.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 1ed6289d471a..589be3d86735 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -591,11 +591,26 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
unsigned long size;
void *addr;
int area;
+ u8 tag;
+
+ /*
+ * If KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG was set at this point, all vms[] pointers
+ * would be unpoisoned with the KASAN_TAG_KERNEL which would disable
+ * KASAN checks down the line.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG))
+ return;
+
+ size = vms[0]->size;
+ addr = vms[0]->addr;
+ vms[0]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ tag = get_tag(vms[0]->addr);
- for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ for (area = 1 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
size = vms[area]->size;
- addr = vms[area]->addr;
- vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ addr = set_tag(vms[area]->addr, tag);
+ vms[area]->addr =
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags | KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
}
}
#endif
--
2.52.0
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
the following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Refactor code by reusing __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc in a new helper in
preparation for the actual fix.
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
---
Changelog v1: (after splitting of from the KASAN series)
- Rewrite first paragraph of the patch message to point at the user
impact of the issue.
- Move helper to common.c so it can be compiled in all KASAN modes.
Changelog v2:
- Redo the whole patch so it's an actual refactor.
Changelog v3:
- Redo the patch after applying Andrey's comments to align the code more
with what's already in include/linux/kasan.h
include/linux/kasan.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
mm/kasan/common.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +---
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 6d7972bb390c..cde493cb7702 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -615,6 +615,16 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start,
__kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size);
}
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags);
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, flags);
+}
+
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
@@ -639,6 +649,11 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start,
static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
{ }
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{ }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index d4c14359feaf..1ed6289d471a 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
@@ -582,3 +583,19 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
}
return true;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ unsigned long size;
+ void *addr;
+ int area;
+
+ for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ size = vms[area]->size;
+ addr = vms[area]->addr;
+ vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ }
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
index 22a73a087135..33e705ccafba 100644
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c
+++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -4872,9 +4872,7 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets,
* With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for
* non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
*/
- for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++)
- vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr,
- vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
kfree(vas);
return vms;
--
2.52.0
The acpi_get_first_physical_node() function can return NULL, in which
case the get_device() function also returns NULL, but this value is
then dereferenced without checking,so add a check to prevent a crash.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: 7b2f3eb492da ("ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Add support for CS35L41 in HDA systems")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru>
---
sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c b/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c
index c0f2a3ff77a1..21e00055c0c4 100644
--- a/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c
+++ b/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c
@@ -1901,6 +1901,8 @@ static int cs35l41_hda_read_acpi(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41, const char *hid, i
cs35l41->dacpi = adev;
physdev = get_device(acpi_get_first_physical_node(adev));
+ if (!physdev)
+ return -ENODEV;
sub = acpi_get_subsystem_id(ACPI_HANDLE(physdev));
if (IS_ERR(sub))
--
2.43.0
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
the following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Use the new vmalloc flag that disables random tag assignment in
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() - pass the same random tag to all the
vm_structs by tagging the pointers before they go inside
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). Assigning a common tag resolves the pcpu
chunk address mismatch.
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
---
Changelog v3:
- Redo the patch by using a flag instead of a new argument in
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() (Andrey Konovalov)
Changelog v2:
- Revise the whole patch to match the fixed refactorization from the
first patch.
Changelog v1:
- Rewrite the patch message to point at the user impact of the issue.
- Move helper to common.c so it can be compiled in all KASAN modes.
mm/kasan/common.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 1ed6289d471a..496bb2c56911 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -591,11 +591,28 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
unsigned long size;
void *addr;
int area;
+ u8 tag;
+
+ /*
+ * If KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG was set at this point, all vms[] pointers
+ * would be unpoisoned with the KASAN_TAG_KERNEL which would disable
+ * KASAN checks down the line.
+ */
+ if (flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG) {
+ pr_warn("KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG flag shouldn't be already set!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ size = vms[0]->size;
+ addr = vms[0]->addr;
+ vms[0]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ tag = get_tag(vms[0]->addr);
- for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ for (area = 1 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
size = vms[area]->size;
- addr = vms[area]->addr;
- vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ addr = set_tag(vms[area]->addr, tag);
+ vms[area]->addr =
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags | KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
}
}
#endif
--
2.52.0
Xorg fails to start with defaults on AMD KV260, /var/log/Xorg.0.log:
[ 23.491] (II) Loading /usr/lib/xorg/modules/drivers/fbdev_drv.so
[ 23.491] (II) Module fbdev: vendor="X.Org Foundation"
[ 23.491] compiled for 1.21.1.18, module version = 0.5.1
[ 23.491] Module class: X.Org Video Driver
[ 23.491] ABI class: X.Org Video Driver, version 25.2
[ 23.491] (II) modesetting: Driver for Modesetting Kernel Drivers:
kms
[ 23.491] (II) FBDEV: driver for framebuffer: fbdev
[ 23.510] (II) modeset(0): using drv /dev/dri/card1
[ 23.511] (WW) Falling back to old probe method for fbdev
[ 23.511] (II) Loading sub module "fbdevhw"
[ 23.511] (II) LoadModule: "fbdevhw"
[ 23.511] (II) Loading /usr/lib/xorg/modules/libfbdevhw.so
[ 23.511] (II) Module fbdevhw: vendor="X.Org Foundation"
[ 23.511] compiled for 1.21.1.18, module version = 0.0.2
[ 23.511] ABI class: X.Org Video Driver, version 25.2
[ 23.512] (II) modeset(0): Creating default Display subsection in
Screen section
"Default Screen Section" for depth/fbbpp 24/32
[ 23.512] (==) modeset(0): Depth 24, (==) framebuffer bpp 32
[ 23.512] (==) modeset(0): RGB weight 888
[ 23.512] (==) modeset(0): Default visual is TrueColor
...
[ 23.911] (II) Loading sub module "fb"
[ 23.911] (II) LoadModule: "fb"
[ 23.911] (II) Module "fb" already built-in
[ 23.911] (II) UnloadModule: "fbdev"
[ 23.911] (II) Unloading fbdev
[ 23.912] (II) UnloadSubModule: "fbdevhw"
[ 23.912] (II) Unloading fbdevhw
[ 24.238] (==) modeset(0): Backing store enabled
[ 24.238] (==) modeset(0): Silken mouse enabled
[ 24.249] (II) modeset(0): Initializing kms color map for depth 24, 8
bpc.
[ 24.250] (==) modeset(0): DPMS enabled
[ 24.250] (II) modeset(0): [DRI2] Setup complete
[ 24.250] (II) modeset(0): [DRI2] DRI driver: kms_swrast
[ 24.250] (II) modeset(0): [DRI2] VDPAU driver: kms_swrast
...
[ 24.770] (II) modeset(0): Disabling kernel dirty updates, not
required.
[ 24.770] (EE) modeset(0): failed to set mode: Invalid argument
xorg tries to use 24 and 32 bpp which pass on the fb API but which
don't actually work on AMD KV260 when Xorg starts. As a workaround
Xorg config can set color depth to 16 using /etc/X11/xorg.conf snippet:
Section "Screen"
Identifier "Default Screen"
Monitor "Configured Monitor"
Device "Configured Video Device"
DefaultDepth 16
EndSection
But this is cumbersome on images meant for multiple different arm64
devices and boards. So instead set 16 bpp as preferred depth
in zynqmp_kms fb driver which is used by Xorg in the logic to find
out a working depth.
Now Xorg startup and bpp query using fb API works and HDMI display
shows graphics. /var/log/Xorg.0.log shows:
[ 23.219] (II) LoadModule: "fbdev"
[ 23.219] (II) Loading /usr/lib/xorg/modules/drivers/fbdev_drv.so
[ 23.219] (II) Module fbdev: vendor="X.Org Foundation"
[ 23.219] compiled for 1.21.1.18, module version = 0.5.1
[ 23.219] Module class: X.Org Video Driver
[ 23.219] ABI class: X.Org Video Driver, version 25.2
[ 23.219] (II) modesetting: Driver for Modesetting Kernel Drivers:
kms
[ 23.219] (II) FBDEV: driver for framebuffer: fbdev
[ 23.238] (II) modeset(0): using drv /dev/dri/card1
[ 23.238] (WW) Falling back to old probe method for fbdev
[ 23.238] (II) Loading sub module "fbdevhw"
[ 23.238] (II) LoadModule: "fbdevhw"
[ 23.239] (II) Loading /usr/lib/xorg/modules/libfbdevhw.so
[ 23.239] (II) Module fbdevhw: vendor="X.Org Foundation"
[ 23.239] compiled for 1.21.1.18, module version = 0.0.2
[ 23.239] ABI class: X.Org Video Driver, version 25.2
[ 23.240] (II) modeset(0): Creating default Display subsection in Screen section
"Default Screen Section" for depth/fbbpp 16/16
[ 23.240] (==) modeset(0): Depth 16, (==) framebuffer bpp 16
[ 23.240] (==) modeset(0): RGB weight 565
[ 23.240] (==) modeset(0): Default visual is TrueColor
...
[ 24.015] (==) modeset(0): Backing store enabled
[ 24.015] (==) modeset(0): Silken mouse enabled
[ 24.027] (II) modeset(0): Initializing kms color map for depth 16, 6 bpc.
[ 24.028] (==) modeset(0): DPMS enabled
[ 24.028] (II) modeset(0): [DRI2] Setup complete
[ 24.028] (II) modeset(0): [DRI2] DRI driver: kms_swrast
[ 24.028] (II) modeset(0): [DRI2] VDPAU driver: kms_swrast
Cc: Bill Mills <bill.mills(a)linaro.org>
Cc: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>
Cc: Anatoliy Klymenko <anatoliy.klymenko(a)amd.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli(a)linaro.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c
index ccc35cacd10cb..a42192c827af0 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c
@@ -506,6 +506,7 @@ int zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init(struct zynqmp_dpsub *dpsub)
drm->mode_config.min_height = 0;
drm->mode_config.max_width = ZYNQMP_DISP_MAX_WIDTH;
drm->mode_config.max_height = ZYNQMP_DISP_MAX_HEIGHT;
+ drm->mode_config.preferred_depth = 16;
ret = drm_vblank_init(drm, 1);
if (ret)
--
2.34.1
From: Anatoliy Klymenko <anatoliy.klymenko(a)amd.com>
Use RG16 buffer format for fbdev emulation. Fbdev backend is being used
by Mali 400 userspace driver which expects 16 bit RGB pixel color format.
This change should not affect console or other fbdev applications as we
still have plenty of colors left.
Cc: Bill Mills <bill.mills(a)linaro.org>
Cc: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anatoliy Klymenko <anatoliy.klymenko(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli(a)linaro.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c
index 2bee0a2275ede..ccc35cacd10cb 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xlnx/zynqmp_kms.c
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int zynqmp_dpsub_drm_init(struct zynqmp_dpsub *dpsub)
goto err_poll_fini;
/* Initialize fbdev generic emulation. */
- drm_client_setup_with_fourcc(drm, DRM_FORMAT_RGB888);
+ drm_client_setup_with_fourcc(drm, DRM_FORMAT_RGB565);
return 0;
--
2.34.1
Originally, the notification for connector change will be enabled after
the first read of the connector status. Therefore, if the event happens
during this window, it will be missing and make the status unsynced.
Get the connector status only after enabling the notification for
connector change to ensure the status is synced.
Fixes: c1b0bc2dabfa ("usb: typec: Add support for UCSI interface")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Signed-off-by: Hsin-Te Yuan <yuanhsinte(a)chromium.org>
---
Changes in v6:
- Free the locks in error path.
- Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251205-ucsi-v5-1-488eb89bc9b8@chromium.org
Changes in v5:
- Hold the lock of each connector during the initialization to avoid
race condition between initialization and other event handler
- Add Fixes tag
- Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251125-ucsi-v4-1-8c94568ddaa5@chromium.org
Changes in v4:
- Handle a single connector in ucsi_init_port() and call it in a loop
- Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251121-ucsi-v3-1-b1047ca371b8@chromium.org
Changes in v3:
- Seperate the status checking part into a new function called
ucsi_init_port() and call it after enabling the notifications
- Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251118-ucsi-v2-1-d314d50333e2@chromium.org
Changes in v2:
- Remove unnecessary braces.
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251117-ucsi-v1-1-1dcbc5ea642b@chromium.org
---
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 131 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
index 3f568f790f39b0271667e80816270274b8dd3008..3a0471fa4cc980c0512bc71776e3984e6cd2cdb7 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c
@@ -1560,11 +1560,70 @@ static struct fwnode_handle *ucsi_find_fwnode(struct ucsi_connector *con)
return NULL;
}
+static void ucsi_init_port(struct ucsi *ucsi, struct ucsi_connector *con)
+{
+ enum usb_role u_role = USB_ROLE_NONE;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Get the status */
+ ret = ucsi_get_connector_status(con, false);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(ucsi->dev, "con%d: failed to get status\n", con->num);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ucsi->ops->connector_status)
+ ucsi->ops->connector_status(con);
+
+ switch (UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PARTNER_TYPE)) {
+ case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_UFP:
+ case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_CABLE_AND_UFP:
+ u_role = USB_ROLE_HOST;
+ fallthrough;
+ case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_CABLE:
+ typec_set_data_role(con->port, TYPEC_HOST);
+ break;
+ case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_DFP:
+ u_role = USB_ROLE_DEVICE;
+ typec_set_data_role(con->port, TYPEC_DEVICE);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if there is already something connected */
+ if (UCSI_CONSTAT(con, CONNECTED)) {
+ typec_set_pwr_role(con->port, UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PWR_DIR));
+ ucsi_register_partner(con);
+ ucsi_pwr_opmode_change(con);
+ ucsi_port_psy_changed(con);
+ if (con->ucsi->cap.features & UCSI_CAP_GET_PD_MESSAGE)
+ ucsi_get_partner_identity(con);
+ if (con->ucsi->cap.features & UCSI_CAP_CABLE_DETAILS)
+ ucsi_check_cable(con);
+ }
+
+ /* Only notify USB controller if partner supports USB data */
+ if (!(UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PARTNER_FLAG_USB)))
+ u_role = USB_ROLE_NONE;
+
+ ret = usb_role_switch_set_role(con->usb_role_sw, u_role);
+ if (ret)
+ dev_err(ucsi->dev, "con:%d: failed to set usb role:%d\n",
+ con->num, u_role);
+
+ if (con->partner && UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PWR_OPMODE) == UCSI_CONSTAT_PWR_OPMODE_PD) {
+ ucsi_register_device_pdos(con);
+ ucsi_get_src_pdos(con);
+ ucsi_check_altmodes(con);
+ ucsi_check_connector_capability(con);
+ }
+}
+
static int ucsi_register_port(struct ucsi *ucsi, struct ucsi_connector *con)
{
struct typec_capability *cap = &con->typec_cap;
enum typec_accessory *accessory = cap->accessory;
- enum usb_role u_role = USB_ROLE_NONE;
u64 command;
char *name;
int ret;
@@ -1659,62 +1718,6 @@ static int ucsi_register_port(struct ucsi *ucsi, struct ucsi_connector *con)
goto out;
}
- /* Get the status */
- ret = ucsi_get_connector_status(con, false);
- if (ret) {
- dev_err(ucsi->dev, "con%d: failed to get status\n", con->num);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (ucsi->ops->connector_status)
- ucsi->ops->connector_status(con);
-
- switch (UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PARTNER_TYPE)) {
- case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_UFP:
- case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_CABLE_AND_UFP:
- u_role = USB_ROLE_HOST;
- fallthrough;
- case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_CABLE:
- typec_set_data_role(con->port, TYPEC_HOST);
- break;
- case UCSI_CONSTAT_PARTNER_TYPE_DFP:
- u_role = USB_ROLE_DEVICE;
- typec_set_data_role(con->port, TYPEC_DEVICE);
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- /* Check if there is already something connected */
- if (UCSI_CONSTAT(con, CONNECTED)) {
- typec_set_pwr_role(con->port, UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PWR_DIR));
- ucsi_register_partner(con);
- ucsi_pwr_opmode_change(con);
- ucsi_port_psy_changed(con);
- if (con->ucsi->cap.features & UCSI_CAP_GET_PD_MESSAGE)
- ucsi_get_partner_identity(con);
- if (con->ucsi->cap.features & UCSI_CAP_CABLE_DETAILS)
- ucsi_check_cable(con);
- }
-
- /* Only notify USB controller if partner supports USB data */
- if (!(UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PARTNER_FLAG_USB)))
- u_role = USB_ROLE_NONE;
-
- ret = usb_role_switch_set_role(con->usb_role_sw, u_role);
- if (ret) {
- dev_err(ucsi->dev, "con:%d: failed to set usb role:%d\n",
- con->num, u_role);
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- if (con->partner && UCSI_CONSTAT(con, PWR_OPMODE) == UCSI_CONSTAT_PWR_OPMODE_PD) {
- ucsi_register_device_pdos(con);
- ucsi_get_src_pdos(con);
- ucsi_check_altmodes(con);
- ucsi_check_connector_capability(con);
- }
-
trace_ucsi_register_port(con->num, con);
out:
@@ -1823,16 +1826,28 @@ static int ucsi_init(struct ucsi *ucsi)
goto err_unregister;
}
+ /* Delay other interactions with each connector until ucsi_init_port is done */
+ for (i = 0; i < ucsi->cap.num_connectors; i++)
+ mutex_lock(&connector[i].lock);
+
/* Enable all supported notifications */
ntfy = ucsi_get_supported_notifications(ucsi);
command = UCSI_SET_NOTIFICATION_ENABLE | ntfy;
ret = ucsi_send_command(ucsi, command, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ucsi->cap.num_connectors; i++)
+ mutex_unlock(&connector[i].lock);
goto err_unregister;
+ }
ucsi->connector = connector;
ucsi->ntfy = ntfy;
+ for (i = 0; i < ucsi->cap.num_connectors; i++) {
+ ucsi_init_port(ucsi, &connector[i]);
+ mutex_unlock(&connector[i].lock);
+ }
+
mutex_lock(&ucsi->ppm_lock);
ret = ucsi->ops->read_cci(ucsi, &cci);
mutex_unlock(&ucsi->ppm_lock);
---
base-commit: 2061f18ad76ecaddf8ed17df81b8611ea88dbddd
change-id: 20251117-ucsi-c2dfe8c006d7
Best regards,
--
Hsin-Te Yuan <yuanhsinte(a)chromium.org>
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
the following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Refactor code by reusing __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc in a new helper in
preparation for the actual fix.
Changelog v1 (after splitting of from the KASAN series):
- Rewrite first paragraph of the patch message to point at the user
impact of the issue.
- Move helper to common.c so it can be compiled in all KASAN modes.
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1+
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
---
Changelog v3:
- Redo the patch after applying Andrey's comments to align the code more
with what's already in include/linux/kasan.h
Changelog v2:
- Redo the whole patch so it's an actual refactor.
include/linux/kasan.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
mm/kasan/common.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +---
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 6d7972bb390c..cde493cb7702 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -615,6 +615,16 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start,
__kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size);
}
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags);
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, flags);
+}
+
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
@@ -639,6 +649,11 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const void *start,
static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
{ }
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{ }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index d4c14359feaf..1ed6289d471a 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
@@ -582,3 +583,19 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
}
return true;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ unsigned long size;
+ void *addr;
+ int area;
+
+ for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ size = vms[area]->size;
+ addr = vms[area]->addr;
+ vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ }
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c
index 22a73a087135..33e705ccafba 100644
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c
+++ b/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -4872,9 +4872,7 @@ struct vm_struct **pcpu_get_vm_areas(const unsigned long *offsets,
* With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for
* non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
*/
- for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++)
- vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr,
- vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
kfree(vas);
return vms;
--
2.52.0
From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
[ Upstream commit 5f2b28b79d2d1946ee36ad8b3dc0066f73c90481 ]
There are actually 2 problems:
- deleting the last element doesn't require the memmove of elements
[i + 1, end) over it. Actually, element i+1 is out of bounds.
- The memmove itself should move size - i - 1 elements, because the last
element is out of bounds.
The out-of-bounds element still remains out of bounds after being
accessed, so the problem is only that we touch it, not that it becomes
in active use. But I suppose it can lead to issues if the out-of-bounds
element is part of an unmapped page.
Fixes: 6666cebc5e30 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Add support for VLAN operations")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250318115716.2124395-4-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <xnguchen(a)sina.cn>
---
drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
index baba204ad62f..2ac91fe2a79b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
@@ -1921,8 +1921,10 @@ int sja1105_table_delete_entry(struct sja1105_table *table, int i)
if (i > table->entry_count)
return -ERANGE;
- memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size,
- (table->entry_count - i) * entry_size);
+ if (i + 1 < table->entry_count) {
+ memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size,
+ (table->entry_count - i - 1) * entry_size);
+ }
table->entry_count--;
--
2.17.1
From: "Mario Limonciello (AMD)" <superm1(a)kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9fc6290117259a8dbf8247cb54559df62fd1550f ]
PCI device 0x115A is similar to pspv5, except it doesn't have platform
access mailbox support.
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
## Comprehensive Analysis
### 1. COMMIT MESSAGE ANALYSIS
**Subject:** `crypto: ccp - Add support for PCI device 0x115A`
**Key Information:**
- PCI device 0x115A is a new AMD security processor variant
- The commit message states it's "similar to pspv5, except it doesn't
have platform access mailbox support"
- Signed off by Mario Limonciello (AMD engineer) and Tom Lendacky (AMD)
- Merged by Herbert Xu (crypto maintainer)
**Tags Present:**
- `Signed-off-by`: 3 (proper sign-off chain)
- `Acked-by`: Tom Lendacky (driver maintainer acknowledgment)
- **NO** `Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org` tag
- **NO** `Fixes:` tag (this is expected - it's not fixing a bug, it's
enabling hardware)
### 2. CODE CHANGE ANALYSIS
The commit adds:
**A) New `pspv7` structure (~10 lines):**
```c
static const struct psp_vdata pspv7 = {
.tee = &teev2,
.cmdresp_reg = 0x10944,
.cmdbuff_addr_lo_reg = 0x10948,
.cmdbuff_addr_hi_reg = 0x1094c,
.bootloader_info_reg = 0x109ec,
.feature_reg = 0x109fc,
.inten_reg = 0x10510,
.intsts_reg = 0x10514,
};
```
This is **identical to pspv5** except it omits the `.platform_access =
&pa_v2` field. This is the explicit difference mentioned in the commit
message.
**B) New `dev_vdata[9]` entry (~6 lines):**
```c
{ /* 9 */
.bar = 2,
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
.psp_vdata = &pspv7,
#endif
},
```
**C) New PCI device ID entry (1 line):**
```c
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x115A), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[9] },
```
### 3. CLASSIFICATION
**This is a NEW DEVICE ID addition** - one of the explicitly allowed
exceptions for stable kernel backports.
The commit:
- Does NOT add new features or APIs
- Does NOT change existing behavior
- Only enables existing PSP driver functionality on new hardware
- Uses established patterns already in the driver
### 4. SCOPE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
**Change size:** ~17 lines total
- Small, contained data-only change
- No logic changes whatsoever
- Follows identical patterns used by existing pspv1-pspv6 structures
**Risk assessment: VERY LOW**
- The driver already handles NULL `platform_access` - verified in `psp-
dev.c`:
```c
if (psp->vdata->platform_access) {
ret = platform_access_dev_init(psp);
...
}
```
- Several existing structures (pspv1, pspv4, pspv6) already omit
`platform_access`
- The `teev2` structure referenced already exists since v6.5
- All register offsets are identical to pspv5
### 5. USER IMPACT
**Who is affected:**
- Users with AMD PCI device 0x115A (new AMD security processor variant)
- Without this patch, this hardware is completely non-functional
**Severity:** HIGH for affected users - enables critical security
hardware (TPM-like functionality)
### 6. STABILITY INDICATORS
**Positive signals:**
- Acked by Tom Lendacky (the original driver author and AMD maintainer)
- Follows exact same pattern as 10+ previous device ID additions in this
driver
- Same author (Mario Limonciello) has successfully added similar devices
before (0x17E0, 0x156E, etc.)
### 7. DEPENDENCY CHECK
**Required in stable tree:**
- `teev2` structure - added in v6.5 (commit 4aa0931be8f0a)
- Verified present in v6.6 and later
**Recent related commits:**
- 52e8ae868a824: "Add missing bootloader info reg for pspv5" (May 2025)
- 72942d6538564: "Add missing tee info reg for teev2" (May 2025)
The pspv7 structure in this commit already includes the
`bootloader_info_reg` correctly, so it was created after these fixes.
### 8. COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR COMMITS
This commit follows the exact same pattern as:
- `bb4185e595e47`: "Add support for PCI device 0x156E" - Added pspv6 +
dev_vdata[8] + PCI ID
- `4aa0931be8f0a`: "Add support for PCI device 0x17E0" - Added
pspv5/teev2 + dev_vdata[7] + PCI ID
- `6cb345939b8cc`: "Add support for PCI device 0x1134" - Added PCI ID
only
- `63935e2ee1f2a`: "Add support for PCI device 0x17D8" - Added PCI ID
only
These similar device ID additions are routinely considered for stable
trees.
---
## Final Assessment
**Should this be backported?**
**YES**, for the following reasons:
1. **Falls under the NEW DEVICE ID exception** - explicitly allowed per
stable kernel rules for enabling real hardware
2. **Trivial, data-only change** - ~17 lines, no logic changes
3. **Uses existing, proven infrastructure** - teev2 exists, NULL
platform_access handling exists
4. **Follows established patterns** - identical to 10+ previous similar
commits in this driver
5. **Zero risk of regression** - only affects users with the specific
0x115A device
6. **Enables real hardware** - without this, users with this AMD
security processor cannot use it at all
7. **Properly reviewed** - Acked by AMD maintainer, merged by crypto
subsystem maintainer
**Concerns:**
- Requires stable tree to have v6.6+ (for teev2 structure)
- May need the bootloader_info_reg fixes backported first for
consistency (commits 52e8ae868a824 and 72942d6538564)
The change is obviously correct, well-tested (used same patterns as
existing code), and enables hardware support that users need. This is
exactly the type of device ID addition that stable trees accept.
**YES**
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
index e7bb803912a6d..8891ceee1d7d0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
@@ -459,6 +459,17 @@ static const struct psp_vdata pspv6 = {
.intsts_reg = 0x10514, /* P2CMSG_INTSTS */
};
+static const struct psp_vdata pspv7 = {
+ .tee = &teev2,
+ .cmdresp_reg = 0x10944, /* C2PMSG_17 */
+ .cmdbuff_addr_lo_reg = 0x10948, /* C2PMSG_18 */
+ .cmdbuff_addr_hi_reg = 0x1094c, /* C2PMSG_19 */
+ .bootloader_info_reg = 0x109ec, /* C2PMSG_59 */
+ .feature_reg = 0x109fc, /* C2PMSG_63 */
+ .inten_reg = 0x10510, /* P2CMSG_INTEN */
+ .intsts_reg = 0x10514, /* P2CMSG_INTSTS */
+};
+
#endif
static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
@@ -525,6 +536,13 @@ static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
.psp_vdata = &pspv6,
#endif
},
+ { /* 9 */
+ .bar = 2,
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+ .psp_vdata = &pspv7,
+#endif
+ },
+
};
static const struct pci_device_id sp_pci_table[] = {
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x1537), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[0] },
@@ -539,6 +557,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id sp_pci_table[] = {
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x17E0), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[7] },
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x156E), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[8] },
{ PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x17D8), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[8] },
+ { PCI_VDEVICE(AMD, 0x115A), (kernel_ulong_t)&dev_vdata[9] },
/* Last entry must be zero */
{ 0, }
};
--
2.51.0
The documentation states that on machines supporting only global
fan mode control, the pwmX_enable attributes should only be created
for the first fan channel (pwm1_enable, aka channel 0).
Fix the off-by-one error caused by the fact that fan channels have
a zero-based index.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1c1658058c99 ("hwmon: (dell-smm) Add support for automatic fan mode")
Signed-off-by: Armin Wolf <W_Armin(a)gmx.de>
---
drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c b/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c
index 683baf361c4c..a34753fc2973 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/dell-smm-hwmon.c
@@ -861,9 +861,9 @@ static umode_t dell_smm_is_visible(const void *drvdata, enum hwmon_sensor_types
if (auto_fan) {
/*
* The setting affects all fans, so only create a
- * single attribute.
+ * single attribute for the first fan channel.
*/
- if (channel != 1)
+ if (channel != 0)
return 0;
/*
--
2.39.5
The macro FAN_FROM_REG evaluates its arguments multiple times. When used
in lockless contexts involving shared driver data, this leads to
Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race conditions, potentially
causing divide-by-zero errors.
Convert the macro to a static function. This guarantees that arguments
are evaluated only once (pass-by-value), preventing the race
conditions.
Additionally, in store_fan_div, move the calculation of the minimum
limit inside the update lock. This ensures that the read-modify-write
sequence operates on consistent data.
Adhere to the principle of minimal changes by only converting macros
that evaluate arguments multiple times and are used in lockless
contexts.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CALbr=LYJ_ehtp53HXEVkSpYoub+XYSTU8Rg=o1xxMJ8=5z…
Fixes: 9873964d6eb2 ("[PATCH] HWMON: w83791d: New hardware monitoring driver for the Winbond W83791D")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02(a)gmail.com>
---
Based on the discussion in the link, I will submit a series of patches to
address TOCTOU issues in the hwmon subsystem by converting macros to
functions or adjusting locking where appropriate.
---
drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c | 17 +++++++++++------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c b/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c
index ace854b370a0..996e36951f9d 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/w83791d.c
@@ -218,9 +218,14 @@ static u8 fan_to_reg(long rpm, int div)
return clamp_val((1350000 + rpm * div / 2) / (rpm * div), 1, 254);
}
-#define FAN_FROM_REG(val, div) ((val) == 0 ? -1 : \
- ((val) == 255 ? 0 : \
- 1350000 / ((val) * (div))))
+static int fan_from_reg(int val, int div)
+{
+ if (val == 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (val == 255)
+ return 0;
+ return 1350000 / (val * div);
+}
/* for temp1 which is 8-bit resolution, LSB = 1 degree Celsius */
#define TEMP1_FROM_REG(val) ((val) * 1000)
@@ -521,7 +526,7 @@ static ssize_t show_##reg(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
struct w83791d_data *data = w83791d_update_device(dev); \
int nr = sensor_attr->index; \
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", \
- FAN_FROM_REG(data->reg[nr], DIV_FROM_REG(data->fan_div[nr]))); \
+ fan_from_reg(data->reg[nr], DIV_FROM_REG(data->fan_div[nr]))); \
}
show_fan_reg(fan);
@@ -585,10 +590,10 @@ static ssize_t store_fan_div(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
if (err)
return err;
+ mutex_lock(&data->update_lock);
/* Save fan_min */
- min = FAN_FROM_REG(data->fan_min[nr], DIV_FROM_REG(data->fan_div[nr]));
+ min = fan_from_reg(data->fan_min[nr], DIV_FROM_REG(data->fan_div[nr]));
- mutex_lock(&data->update_lock);
data->fan_div[nr] = div_to_reg(nr, val);
switch (nr) {
--
2.43.0
From: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus(a)linux.intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 5d010473cdeaabf6a2d3a9e2aed2186c1b73c213 ]
Calling fwnode_get_next_child_node() in ACPI implementation of the fwnode
property API is somewhat problematic as the latter is used in the
impelementation of the former. Instead of using
fwnode_get_next_child_node() in acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint(), call
acpi_get_next_subnode() directly instead.
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart+renesas(a)ideasonboard.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron(a)huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251001104320.1272752-3-sakari.ailus@linux.intel.…
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
## Analysis
### 1. COMMIT MESSAGE ANALYSIS
The commit message states:
- Problem: `acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint()` calls
`fwnode_get_next_child_node()`, which dispatches back to ACPI code,
creating unnecessary indirection.
- Solution: Call `acpi_get_next_subnode()` directly instead.
No "Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org" tag, no "Fixes:" tag, no explicit bug
report link. The message says "somewhat problematic," indicating an
architectural issue rather than a critical bug.
### 2. CODE CHANGE ANALYSIS
The diff shows 4 replacements in `acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint()`:
- Line 1475: `fwnode_get_next_child_node(fwnode, port)` →
`acpi_get_next_subnode(fwnode, port)`
- Line 1493: `fwnode_get_next_child_node(port, prev)` →
`acpi_get_next_subnode(port, prev)`
- Line 1495: `fwnode_get_next_child_node(fwnode, port)` →
`acpi_get_next_subnode(fwnode, port)`
- Line 1499: `fwnode_get_next_child_node(port, NULL)` →
`acpi_get_next_subnode(port, NULL)`
Call chain:
1. `fwnode_get_next_child_node()` dispatches via `fwnode_call_ptr_op()`
to the fwnode-specific implementation.
2. For ACPI fwnodes, it calls `acpi_get_next_present_subnode()`
(registered at line 1747).
3. `acpi_get_next_present_subnode()` filters non-present device nodes
and calls `acpi_get_next_subnode()`.
Why the change is safe:
- Graph endpoints are ACPI data nodes (checked by `is_acpi_graph_node()`
at line 1448: `is_acpi_data_node(fwnode)`).
- `acpi_get_next_present_subnode()` only filters non-present device
nodes (lines 1407-1408), not data nodes.
- Therefore, for graph endpoints, `acpi_get_next_subnode()` and
`fwnode_get_next_child_node()` behave the same.
### 3. CLASSIFICATION
This is a bug fix addressing an architectural issue:
- Removes unnecessary indirection in ACPI-specific code.
- Avoids a circular dependency pattern (ACPI → generic → ACPI).
- Functionally equivalent for graph endpoints.
Not a feature addition, not a new API, not a refactor.
### 4. SCOPE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
- Scope: 4 lines changed in one function in one file.
- Risk: Very low — same behavior for graph endpoints, cleaner
architecture.
- Complexity: Low — direct function call replacement.
### 5. USER IMPACT
- Who is affected: Users of ACPI graph endpoints (e.g., camera/media
drivers, device tree-like ACPI usage).
- Severity: Low — architectural improvement, not a visible bug fix.
- Likelihood: The "somewhat problematic" wording suggests no immediate
user-visible issue.
### 6. STABILITY INDICATORS
- Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart, Jonathan Cameron
- Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (ACPI maintainer)
- No "Tested-by:" tags
- Commit date: October 1, 2025 (recent)
### 7. DEPENDENCY CHECK
- `acpi_get_next_subnode()` exists in the same file and has been present
for years.
- No external dependencies introduced.
- Should apply cleanly to stable trees that have this code.
### 8. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Related commits:
- `79389a83bc388`: Introduced `acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint()` with
`fwnode_get_next_child_node()` calls.
- `48698e6cf44c3`: Introduced `acpi_get_next_present_subnode()` to
filter non-present devices.
- `5d010473cdeaa` (this commit): Removes the indirection.
The pattern existed since the function was introduced; this commit
cleans it up.
### 9. STABLE KERNEL CRITERIA EVALUATION
- Obviously correct: Yes — direct call instead of indirection.
- Fixes a real bug: Yes — architectural issue that could cause problems.
- Important issue: Moderate — architectural improvement, not a critical
bug.
- Small and contained: Yes — 4 lines, single function.
- No new features: Yes — same behavior, cleaner code.
- Applies cleanly: Yes — should apply without conflicts.
### 10. RISK VS BENEFIT
Benefits:
- Removes unnecessary indirection.
- Avoids circular dependency pattern.
- Improves code clarity.
- No functional change for graph endpoints.
Risks:
- Very low — functionally equivalent change.
- No new code paths or logic changes.
### 11. CONCERNS AND CONSIDERATIONS
- No "Cc: stable" tag, but that alone doesn't disqualify.
- Recent commit (Oct 2025) — hasn't been in mainline long.
- No explicit bug report or user complaint mentioned.
- Architectural improvement rather than a critical fix.
### CONCLUSION
This is a small, correct fix that removes unnecessary indirection in
ACPI code. It fixes an architectural issue and is functionally
equivalent for graph endpoints. It meets stable kernel criteria:
correct, fixes a real issue, small scope, no new features, and should
apply cleanly.
However, it's an architectural improvement rather than a critical bug
fix, and there's no explicit stable tag or user-visible bug report. The
"somewhat problematic" wording suggests it may not cause immediate
visible problems.
Given the conservative nature of stable trees and the lack of evidence
of user-visible impact, this is borderline but leans toward acceptable
for stable backporting due to its correctness, small scope, and
architectural benefit.
**YES**
drivers/acpi/property.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/property.c b/drivers/acpi/property.c
index 43d5e457814e1..76158b1399029 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/property.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/property.c
@@ -1472,7 +1472,7 @@ static struct fwnode_handle *acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint(
if (!prev) {
do {
- port = fwnode_get_next_child_node(fwnode, port);
+ port = acpi_get_next_subnode(fwnode, port);
/*
* The names of the port nodes begin with "port@"
* followed by the number of the port node and they also
@@ -1490,13 +1490,13 @@ static struct fwnode_handle *acpi_graph_get_next_endpoint(
if (!port)
return NULL;
- endpoint = fwnode_get_next_child_node(port, prev);
+ endpoint = acpi_get_next_subnode(port, prev);
while (!endpoint) {
- port = fwnode_get_next_child_node(fwnode, port);
+ port = acpi_get_next_subnode(fwnode, port);
if (!port)
break;
if (is_acpi_graph_node(port, "port"))
- endpoint = fwnode_get_next_child_node(port, NULL);
+ endpoint = acpi_get_next_subnode(port, NULL);
}
/*
--
2.51.0
The local variable 'val' was never clamped to -75000 or 180000 because
the return value of clamp_val() was not used. Fix this by assigning the
clamped value back to 'val', and use clamp() instead of clamp_val().
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a557a92e6881 ("net: phy: marvell-88q2xxx: add support for temperature sensor")
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum(a)linux.dev>
---
drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c b/drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c
index f3d83b04c953..201dee1a1698 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/marvell-88q2xxx.c
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static int mv88q2xxx_hwmon_write(struct device *dev,
switch (attr) {
case hwmon_temp_max:
- clamp_val(val, -75000, 180000);
+ val = clamp(val, -75000, 180000);
val = (val / 1000) + 75;
val = FIELD_PREP(MDIO_MMD_PCS_MV_TEMP_SENSOR3_INT_THRESH_MASK,
val);
--
Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum(a)linux.dev>
GPG: 1D60 735E 8AEF 3BE4 73B6 9D84 7336 78FD 8DFE EAD4
From: Haotien Hsu <haotienh(a)nvidia.com>
The UTMIP sleepwalk programming sequence requires asserting both
LINEVAL_WALK_EN and WAKE_WALK_EN when enabling the sleepwalk logic.
However, the current code mistakenly cleared WAKE_WALK_EN, which
prevents the sleepwalk trigger from operating correctly.
Fix this by asserting WAKE_WALK_EN together with LINEVAL_WALK_EN.
Fixes: 1f9cab6cc20c ("phy: tegra: xusb: Add wake/sleepwalk for Tegra186")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haotien Hsu <haotienh(a)nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Wayne Chang <waynec(a)nvidia.com>
---
drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c b/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
index e818f6c3980e..b2a76710c0c4 100644
--- a/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/tegra/xusb-tegra186.c
@@ -401,8 +401,7 @@ static int tegra186_utmi_enable_phy_sleepwalk(struct tegra_xusb_lane *lane,
/* enable the trigger of the sleepwalk logic */
value = ao_readl(priv, XUSB_AO_UTMIP_SLEEPWALK_CFG(index));
- value |= LINEVAL_WALK_EN;
- value &= ~WAKE_WALK_EN;
+ value |= LINEVAL_WALK_EN | WAKE_WALK_EN;
ao_writel(priv, value, XUSB_AO_UTMIP_SLEEPWALK_CFG(index));
/* reset the walk pointer and clear the alarm of the sleepwalk logic,
--
2.25.1
From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
[ Upstream commit 5f2b28b79d2d1946ee36ad8b3dc0066f73c90481 ]
There are actually 2 problems:
- deleting the last element doesn't require the memmove of elements
[i + 1, end) over it. Actually, element i+1 is out of bounds.
- The memmove itself should move size - i - 1 elements, because the last
element is out of bounds.
The out-of-bounds element still remains out of bounds after being
accessed, so the problem is only that we touch it, not that it becomes
in active use. But I suppose it can lead to issues if the out-of-bounds
element is part of an unmapped page.
Fixes: 6666cebc5e30 ("net: dsa: sja1105: Add support for VLAN operations")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250318115716.2124395-4-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <xnguchen(a)sina.cn>
---
drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
index baba204ad62f..2ac91fe2a79b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_static_config.c
@@ -1921,8 +1921,10 @@ int sja1105_table_delete_entry(struct sja1105_table *table, int i)
if (i > table->entry_count)
return -ERANGE;
- memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size,
- (table->entry_count - i) * entry_size);
+ if (i + 1 < table->entry_count) {
+ memmove(entries + i * entry_size, entries + (i + 1) * entry_size,
+ (table->entry_count - i - 1) * entry_size);
+ }
table->entry_count--;
--
2.17.1
get_user/put_user change didn't spend time in next and
seems a bit too risky to rush. I'm keeping it in my tree
and we'll get it in the next cycle.
The following changes since commit ac3fd01e4c1efce8f2c054cdeb2ddd2fc0fb150d:
Linux 6.18-rc7 (2025-11-23 14:53:16 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost.git tags/for_linus
for you to fetch changes up to 205dd7a5d6ad6f4c8e8fcd3c3b95a7c0e7067fee:
virtio_pci: drop kernel.h (2025-11-30 18:02:43 -0500)
----------------------------------------------------------------
virtio,vhost: fixes, cleanups
Just a bunch of fixes and cleanups, mostly very simple. Several
features are merged through net-next this time around.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com>
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alok Tiwari (3):
virtio_vdpa: fix misleading return in void function
vdpa/mlx5: Fix incorrect error code reporting in query_virtqueues
vdpa/pds: use %pe for ERR_PTR() in event handler registration
Kriish Sharma (1):
virtio: fix kernel-doc for mapping/free_coherent functions
Marco Crivellari (2):
virtio_balloon: add WQ_PERCPU to alloc_workqueue users
vduse: add WQ_PERCPU to alloc_workqueue users
Miaoqian Lin (1):
virtio: vdpa: Fix reference count leak in octep_sriov_enable()
Michael S. Tsirkin (11):
virtio: fix typo in virtio_device_ready() comment
virtio: fix whitespace in virtio_config_ops
virtio: fix grammar in virtio_queue_info docs
virtio: fix grammar in virtio_map_ops docs
virtio: standardize Returns documentation style
virtio: fix virtqueue_set_affinity() docs
virtio: fix map ops comment
virtio: clean up features qword/dword terms
vhost/test: add test specific macro for features
vhost: switch to arrays of feature bits
virtio_pci: drop kernel.h
Mike Christie (1):
vhost: Fix kthread worker cgroup failure handling
drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 2 +-
drivers/vdpa/octeon_ep/octep_vdpa_main.c | 1 +
drivers/vdpa/pds/vdpa_dev.c | 2 +-
drivers/vdpa/vdpa_user/vduse_dev.c | 3 ++-
drivers/vhost/net.c | 29 +++++++++++-----------
drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 9 ++++---
drivers/vhost/test.c | 10 ++++++--
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 4 ++-
drivers/vhost/vhost.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
drivers/vhost/vsock.c | 10 +++++---
drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 12 ++++-----
drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c | 3 ++-
drivers/virtio/virtio_debug.c | 10 ++++----
drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_modern_dev.c | 6 ++---
drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 7 +++---
drivers/virtio/virtio_vdpa.c | 2 +-
include/linux/virtio.h | 2 +-
include/linux/virtio_config.h | 24 +++++++++---------
include/linux/virtio_features.h | 29 +++++++++++-----------
include/linux/virtio_pci_modern.h | 8 +++---
include/uapi/linux/virtio_pci.h | 2 +-
21 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-)
When VM boots with one virtio-crypto PCI device and builtin backend,
run openssl benchmark command with multiple processes, such as
openssl speed -evp aes-128-cbc -engine afalg -seconds 10 -multi 32
openssl processes will hangup and there is error reported like this:
virtio_crypto virtio0: dataq.0:id 3 is not a head!
It seems that the data virtqueue need protection when it is handled
for virtio done notification. If the spinlock protection is added
in virtcrypto_done_task(), openssl benchmark with multiple processes
works well.
Fixes: fed93fb62e05 ("crypto: virtio - Handle dataq logic with tasklet")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo(a)loongson.cn>
---
drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
index 3d241446099c..ccc6b5c1b24b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/virtio/virtio_crypto_core.c
@@ -75,15 +75,20 @@ static void virtcrypto_done_task(unsigned long data)
struct data_queue *data_vq = (struct data_queue *)data;
struct virtqueue *vq = data_vq->vq;
struct virtio_crypto_request *vc_req;
+ unsigned long flags;
unsigned int len;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&data_vq->lock, flags);
do {
virtqueue_disable_cb(vq);
while ((vc_req = virtqueue_get_buf(vq, &len)) != NULL) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data_vq->lock, flags);
if (vc_req->alg_cb)
vc_req->alg_cb(vc_req, len);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&data_vq->lock, flags);
}
} while (!virtqueue_enable_cb(vq));
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data_vq->lock, flags);
}
static void virtcrypto_dataq_callback(struct virtqueue *vq)
--
2.39.3
Currently, kvfree_rcu_barrier() flushes RCU sheaves across all slab
caches when a cache is destroyed. This is unnecessary; only the RCU
sheaves belonging to the cache being destroyed need to be flushed.
As suggested by Vlastimil Babka, introduce a weaker form of
kvfree_rcu_barrier() that operates on a specific slab cache.
Factor out flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache() from flush_all_rcu_sheaves() and
call it from flush_all_rcu_sheaves() and kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache().
Call kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache() instead of kvfree_rcu_barrier() on
cache destruction.
The performance benefit is evaluated on a 12 core 24 threads AMD Ryzen
5900X machine (1 socket), by loading slub_kunit module.
Before:
Total calls: 19
Average latency (us): 18127
Total time (us): 344414
After:
Total calls: 19
Average latency (us): 10066
Total time (us): 191264
Two performance regression have been reported:
- stress module loader test's runtime increases by 50-60% (Daniel)
- internal graphics test's runtime on Tegra23 increases by 35% (Jon)
They are fixed by this change.
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Fixes: ec66e0d59952 ("slab: add sheaf support for batching kfree_rcu() operations")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1bda09da-93be-4737-aef0-d47f8c5c9301@suse.…
Reported-and-tested-by: Daniel Gomez <da.gomez(a)samsung.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/0406562e-2066-4cf8-9902-b2b0616dd742@kerne…
Reported-and-tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh(a)nvidia.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/e988eff6-1287-425e-a06c-805af5bbf262@nvidi…
Signed-off-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo(a)oracle.com>
---
No code change, added proper tags and updated changelog.
include/linux/slab.h | 5 ++++
mm/slab.h | 1 +
mm/slab_common.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
mm/slub.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index cf443f064a66..937c93d44e8c 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -1149,6 +1149,10 @@ static inline void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
{
rcu_barrier();
}
+static inline void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ rcu_barrier();
+}
static inline void kfree_rcu_scheduler_running(void) { }
#else
@@ -1156,6 +1160,7 @@ void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void);
void kfree_rcu_scheduler_running(void);
#endif
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s);
/**
* kmalloc_size_roundup - Report allocation bucket size for the given size
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index f730e012553c..e767aa7e91b0 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static inline bool is_kmalloc_normal(struct kmem_cache *s)
bool __kfree_rcu_sheaf(struct kmem_cache *s, void *obj);
void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void);
+void flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s);
#define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
SLAB_CACHE_DMA32 | SLAB_PANIC | \
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 84dfff4f7b1f..dd8a49d6f9cc 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s)
return;
/* in-flight kfree_rcu()'s may include objects from our cache */
- kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+ kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(s);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG) &&
(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) {
@@ -2038,25 +2038,13 @@ void kvfree_call_rcu(struct rcu_head *head, void *ptr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_call_rcu);
-/**
- * kvfree_rcu_barrier - Wait until all in-flight kvfree_rcu() complete.
- *
- * Note that a single argument of kvfree_rcu() call has a slow path that
- * triggers synchronize_rcu() following by freeing a pointer. It is done
- * before the return from the function. Therefore for any single-argument
- * call that will result in a kfree() to a cache that is to be destroyed
- * during module exit, it is developer's responsibility to ensure that all
- * such calls have returned before the call to kmem_cache_destroy().
- */
-void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
+static inline void __kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
{
struct kfree_rcu_cpu_work *krwp;
struct kfree_rcu_cpu *krcp;
bool queued;
int i, cpu;
- flush_all_rcu_sheaves();
-
/*
* Firstly we detach objects and queue them over an RCU-batch
* for all CPUs. Finally queued works are flushed for each CPU.
@@ -2118,8 +2106,43 @@ void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
}
}
}
+
+/**
+ * kvfree_rcu_barrier - Wait until all in-flight kvfree_rcu() complete.
+ *
+ * Note that a single argument of kvfree_rcu() call has a slow path that
+ * triggers synchronize_rcu() following by freeing a pointer. It is done
+ * before the return from the function. Therefore for any single-argument
+ * call that will result in a kfree() to a cache that is to be destroyed
+ * during module exit, it is developer's responsibility to ensure that all
+ * such calls have returned before the call to kmem_cache_destroy().
+ */
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier(void)
+{
+ flush_all_rcu_sheaves();
+ __kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_rcu_barrier);
+/**
+ * kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache - Wait for in-flight kvfree_rcu() calls on a
+ * specific slab cache.
+ * @s: slab cache to wait for
+ *
+ * See the description of kvfree_rcu_barrier() for details.
+ */
+void kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
+{
+ if (s->cpu_sheaves)
+ flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(s);
+ /*
+ * TODO: Introduce a version of __kvfree_rcu_barrier() that works
+ * on a specific slab cache.
+ */
+ __kvfree_rcu_barrier();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvfree_rcu_barrier_on_cache);
+
static unsigned long
kfree_rcu_shrink_count(struct shrinker *shrink, struct shrink_control *sc)
{
@@ -2215,4 +2238,3 @@ void __init kvfree_rcu_init(void)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KVFREE_RCU_BATCHED */
-
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 785e25a14999..7cec2220712b 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -4118,42 +4118,47 @@ static void flush_rcu_sheaf(struct work_struct *w)
/* needed for kvfree_rcu_barrier() */
-void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void)
+void flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
struct slub_flush_work *sfw;
- struct kmem_cache *s;
unsigned int cpu;
- cpus_read_lock();
- mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&flush_lock);
- list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
- if (!s->cpu_sheaves)
- continue;
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
- mutex_lock(&flush_lock);
+ /*
+ * we don't check if rcu_free sheaf exists - racing
+ * __kfree_rcu_sheaf() might have just removed it.
+ * by executing flush_rcu_sheaf() on the cpu we make
+ * sure the __kfree_rcu_sheaf() finished its call_rcu()
+ */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
+ INIT_WORK(&sfw->work, flush_rcu_sheaf);
+ sfw->s = s;
+ queue_work_on(cpu, flushwq, &sfw->work);
+ }
- /*
- * we don't check if rcu_free sheaf exists - racing
- * __kfree_rcu_sheaf() might have just removed it.
- * by executing flush_rcu_sheaf() on the cpu we make
- * sure the __kfree_rcu_sheaf() finished its call_rcu()
- */
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
+ flush_work(&sfw->work);
+ }
- INIT_WORK(&sfw->work, flush_rcu_sheaf);
- sfw->s = s;
- queue_work_on(cpu, flushwq, &sfw->work);
- }
+ mutex_unlock(&flush_lock);
+}
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- sfw = &per_cpu(slub_flush, cpu);
- flush_work(&sfw->work);
- }
+void flush_all_rcu_sheaves(void)
+{
+ struct kmem_cache *s;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(&flush_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
+ if (!s->cpu_sheaves)
+ continue;
+ flush_rcu_sheaves_on_cache(s);
}
mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);
--
2.43.0
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
[ Upstream commit 1fe4002cf7f23d70c79bda429ca2a9423ebcfdfa ]
A KASAN build bloats these single load/store helpers such that
it fails to inline them:
vmlinux.o: error: objtool: irqentry_exit+0x5e8: call to instruction_pointer_set() with UACCESS enabled
Make sure the compiler isn't allowed to do stupid.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251031105435.GU4068168@noisy.programming.kicks-a…
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:
## Comprehensive Analysis: x86/ptrace: Always inline trivial accessors
### 1. COMMIT MESSAGE ANALYSIS
**Subject:** `x86/ptrace: Always inline trivial accessors`
**Key points from the commit message:**
- A **KASAN build** bloats these single load/store helpers such that
they fail to inline
- The result is an **objtool ERROR**: `vmlinux.o: error: objtool:
irqentry_exit+0x5e8: call to instruction_pointer_set() with UACCESS
enabled`
- The commit ensures "the compiler isn't allowed to do stupid"
**Author:** Peter Zijlstra (Intel) - a highly respected kernel developer
and maintainer
**Committer:** Ingo Molnar - x86 subsystem maintainer
**Missing tags:**
- No `Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org` tag
- No `Fixes:` tag
### 2. CODE CHANGE ANALYSIS
The diff changes 8 trivial accessor functions from `static inline` to
`static __always_inline`:
| Function | Purpose | Complexity |
|----------|---------|------------|
| `regs_return_value()` | Returns `regs->ax` | 1 line |
| `regs_set_return_value()` | Sets `regs->ax = rc` | 1 line |
| `kernel_stack_pointer()` | Returns `regs->sp` | 1 line |
| `instruction_pointer()` | Returns `regs->ip` | 1 line |
| `instruction_pointer_set()` | Sets `regs->ip = val` | 1 line |
| `frame_pointer()` | Returns `regs->bp` | 1 line |
| `user_stack_pointer()` | Returns `regs->sp` | 1 line |
| `user_stack_pointer_set()` | Sets `regs->sp = val` | 1 line |
**Technical mechanism of the bug:**
1. KASAN adds memory sanitization instrumentation to functions
2. Even trivial one-liner functions get bloated with KASAN checks
3. The compiler decides the bloated functions are "too big" to inline
4. These functions get called from `irqentry_exit()` in contexts where
UACCESS is enabled (SMAP disabled via STAC)
5. Objtool validates that no unexpected function calls happen with
UACCESS enabled (security/correctness requirement)
6. Result: **BUILD FAILURE** (error, not warning)
**Why `__always_inline` fixes it:**
```c
#define __always_inline inline
__attribute__((__always_inline__))
```
This compiler attribute forces inlining regardless of any optimization
settings or instrumentation, ensuring these trivial accessors always
become inline code rather than function calls.
### 3. CLASSIFICATION
- **Category:** BUILD FIX
- **Type:** Fixes compilation error with KASAN on x86
- **Not a feature:** Simply enforces behavior that was intended
(functions should always inline)
- **Not a quirk/device ID/DT:** N/A
### 4. SCOPE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
**Scope:**
- 1 file changed: `arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h`
- 10 insertions, 10 deletions (only adding `__always_` prefix)
- Changes are purely compile-time
**Risk: VERY LOW**
- Zero runtime functional change when compiler already inlines
- Only forces the compiler to do what it was supposed to do
- Same pattern already successfully applied to other functions in the
same file:
- `user_mode()` - already `__always_inline`
- `v8086_mode()` - commit b008893b08dcc
- `ip_within_syscall_gap()` - commit c6b01dace2cd7
- `regs_irqs_disabled()` - already `__always_inline`
### 5. USER IMPACT
**Who is affected:**
- Anyone building x86 kernels with `CONFIG_KASAN=y`
- KASAN is used for memory debugging, commonly in development and CI
systems
- Enterprise distributions often enable KASAN in debug/test builds
**Severity:** HIGH (build failure = kernel cannot be compiled)
### 6. STABILITY INDICATORS
- **Reviewed-by:** None explicit, but committed through tip tree
- **Tested-by:** None explicit, but the error message shows it was
reproduced
- **Author credibility:** Peter Zijlstra is a top kernel maintainer
- **Committer credibility:** Ingo Molnar is the x86 maintainer
### 7. DEPENDENCY CHECK
**Dependencies:** NONE
- This is a standalone fix
- Does not depend on any other commits
- The affected code exists unchanged in all stable kernels (5.10, 5.15,
6.1, 6.6)
**Backport applicability verified:**
```
v5.10: static inline void instruction_pointer_set(...) ✓
v5.15: static inline void instruction_pointer_set(...) ✓
v6.1: static inline void instruction_pointer_set(...) ✓
v6.6: static inline void instruction_pointer_set(...) ✓
```
The patch should apply cleanly to all stable trees.
### 8. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Similar fixes have been applied to this same file and other kernel
files:
| Commit | Description | Pattern |
|--------|-------------|---------|
| c6b01dace2cd7 | x86: Always inline ip_within_syscall_gap() | Same |
| b008893b08dcc | x86/ptrace: Always inline v8086_mode() | Same |
| cb0ca08b326aa | kcov: mark in_softirq_really() as __always_inline |
Same (backported to stable) |
The KASAN + objtool UACCESS validation issue is a known pattern that has
been addressed multiple times with `__always_inline`.
### SUMMARY
**Strong YES signals:**
- ✅ Fixes a build failure (compilation error, not warning)
- ✅ Small, surgical fix with clear scope (only adds `__always_inline`)
- ✅ Obviously correct - trivial accessors should always inline
- ✅ Zero functional/runtime change
- ✅ No dependencies, applies cleanly to all stable trees
- ✅ Well-established fix pattern used elsewhere in kernel
- ✅ Authored by highly trusted maintainer (Peter Zijlstra)
- ✅ Committed through the proper channel (tip tree via Ingo Molnar)
**Weak NO signals:**
- ⚠️ No explicit `Cc: stable` tag
- ⚠️ No `Fixes:` tag
The absence of stable tags is not disqualifying for build fixes. The
stable kernel rules explicitly state that "build fixes that prevent
compilation" are acceptable. This is a clear-cut build fix that prevents
KASAN-enabled x86 kernels from compiling.
### CONCLUSION
This commit **should be backported** to stable kernel trees. It's a
textbook example of a build fix:
- Small, contained, obviously correct
- Fixes a real build failure affecting KASAN users
- Zero risk of regression (only forces intended behavior)
- No dependencies, clean backport
- Follows established patterns from similar successful fixes
**YES**
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 20 ++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
index 50f75467f73d0..b5dec859bc75a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
@@ -187,12 +187,12 @@ convert_ip_to_linear(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs);
extern void send_sigtrap(struct pt_regs *regs, int error_code, int si_code);
-static inline unsigned long regs_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long regs_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->ax;
}
-static inline void regs_set_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long rc)
+static __always_inline void regs_set_return_value(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long rc)
{
regs->ax = rc;
}
@@ -277,34 +277,34 @@ static __always_inline bool ip_within_syscall_gap(struct pt_regs *regs)
}
#endif
-static inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->sp;
}
-static inline unsigned long instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->ip;
}
-static inline void instruction_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs,
- unsigned long val)
+static __always_inline
+void instruction_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long val)
{
regs->ip = val;
}
-static inline unsigned long frame_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long frame_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->bp;
}
-static inline unsigned long user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+static __always_inline unsigned long user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return regs->sp;
}
-static inline void user_stack_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs,
- unsigned long val)
+static __always_inline
+void user_stack_pointer_set(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long val)
{
regs->sp = val;
}
--
2.51.0
The patch titled
Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Subject: kasan: unpoison vms[area] addresses with a common tag
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:00:11 +0000
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed on
systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes. It
was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in the
following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Use the new vmalloc flag that disables random tag assignment in
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() - pass the same random tag to all the
vm_structs by tagging the pointers before they go inside
__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). Assigning a common tag resolves the pcpu
chunk address mismatch.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/873821114a9f722ffb5d6702b94782e902883fdf.17648745…
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -591,11 +591,28 @@ void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct
unsigned long size;
void *addr;
int area;
+ u8 tag;
- for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ /*
+ * If KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG was set at this point, all vms[] pointers
+ * would be unpoisoned with the KASAN_TAG_KERNEL which would disable
+ * KASAN checks down the line.
+ */
+ if (flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG) {
+ pr_warn("KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG flag shouldn't be already set!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ size = vms[0]->size;
+ addr = vms[0]->addr;
+ vms[0]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ tag = get_tag(vms[0]->addr);
+
+ for (area = 1 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
size = vms[area]->size;
- addr = vms[area]->addr;
- vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ addr = set_tag(vms[area]->addr, tag);
+ vms[area]->addr =
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags | KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
}
}
#endif
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are
kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison.patch
kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch
The patch titled
Subject: kasan: refactor pcpu kasan vmalloc unpoison
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Subject: kasan: refactor pcpu kasan vmalloc unpoison
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:00:04 +0000
A KASAN tag mismatch, possibly causing a kernel panic, can be observed
on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with multiple NUMA nodes.
It was reported on arm64 and reproduced on x86. It can be explained in
the following points:
1. There can be more than one virtual memory chunk.
2. Chunk's base address has a tag.
3. The base address points at the first chunk and thus inherits
the tag of the first chunk.
4. The subsequent chunks will be accessed with the tag from the
first chunk.
5. Thus, the subsequent chunks need to have their tag set to
match that of the first chunk.
Refactor code by reusing __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc in a new helper in
preparation for the actual fix.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/eb61d93b907e262eefcaa130261a08bcb6c5ce51.17648745…
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Fixes: 1d96320f8d53 ("kasan, vmalloc: add vmalloc tagging for SW_TAGS")
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [6.1+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
mm/kasan/common.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +---
3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -615,6 +615,16 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison
__kasan_poison_vmalloc(start, size);
}
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags);
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ if (kasan_enabled())
+ __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, flags);
+}
+
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
static inline void kasan_populate_early_vm_area_shadow(void *start,
@@ -639,6 +649,11 @@ static inline void *kasan_unpoison_vmall
static inline void kasan_poison_vmalloc(const void *start, unsigned long size)
{ }
+static __always_inline void
+kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{ }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
#if (defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
@@ -582,3 +583,19 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *addr
}
return true;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC
+void __kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(struct vm_struct **vms, int nr_vms,
+ kasan_vmalloc_flags_t flags)
+{
+ unsigned long size;
+ void *addr;
+ int area;
+
+ for (area = 0 ; area < nr_vms ; area++) {
+ size = vms[area]->size;
+ addr = vms[area]->addr;
+ vms[area]->addr = __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(addr, size, flags);
+ }
+}
+#endif
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c~kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison
+++ a/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -4872,9 +4872,7 @@ retry:
* With hardware tag-based KASAN, marking is skipped for
* non-VM_ALLOC mappings, see __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc().
*/
- for (area = 0; area < nr_vms; area++)
- vms[area]->addr = kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(vms[area]->addr,
- vms[area]->size, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ kasan_unpoison_vmap_areas(vms, nr_vms, KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
kfree(vas);
return vms;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com are
kasan-refactor-pcpu-kasan-vmalloc-unpoison.patch
kasan-unpoison-vms-addresses-with-a-common-tag.patch
The patch titled
Subject: mm/kasan: fix incorrect unpoisoning in vrealloc for KASAN
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Subject: mm/kasan: fix incorrect unpoisoning in vrealloc for KASAN
Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2025 18:59:55 +0000
Patch series "kasan: vmalloc: Fixes for the percpu allocator and
vrealloc", v3.
Patches fix two issues related to KASAN and vmalloc.
The first one, a KASAN tag mismatch, possibly resulting in a kernel panic,
can be observed on systems with a tag-based KASAN enabled and with
multiple NUMA nodes. Initially it was only noticed on x86 [1] but later a
similar issue was also reported on arm64 [2].
Specifically the problem is related to how vm_structs interact with
pcpu_chunks - both when they are allocated, assigned and when pcpu_chunk
addresses are derived.
When vm_structs are allocated they are unpoisoned, each with a different
random tag, if vmalloc support is enabled along the KASAN mode. Later
when first pcpu chunk is allocated it gets its 'base_addr' field set to
the first allocated vm_struct. With that it inherits that vm_struct's
tag.
When pcpu_chunk addresses are later derived (by pcpu_chunk_addr(), for
example in pcpu_alloc_noprof()) the base_addr field is used and offsets
are added to it. If the initial conditions are satisfied then some of the
offsets will point into memory allocated with a different vm_struct. So
while the lower bits will get accurately derived the tag bits in the top
of the pointer won't match the shadow memory contents.
The solution (proposed at v2 of the x86 KASAN series [3]) is to unpoison
the vm_structs with the same tag when allocating them for the per cpu
allocator (in pcpu_get_vm_areas()).
The second one reported by syzkaller [4] is related to vrealloc and
happens because of random tag generation when unpoisoning memory without
allocating new pages. This breaks shadow memory tracking and needs to
reuse the existing tag instead of generating a new one. At the same time
an inconsistency in used flags is corrected.
This patch (of 3):
Syzkaller reported a memory out-of-bounds bug [4]. This patch fixes two
issues:
1. In vrealloc the KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC flag is missing when
unpoisoning the extended region. This flag is required to correctly
associate the allocation with KASAN's vmalloc tracking.
Note: In contrast, vzalloc (via __vmalloc_node_range_noprof)
explicitly sets KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC and calls
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() with it. vrealloc must behave consistently --
especially when reusing existing vmalloc regions -- to ensure KASAN can
track allocations correctly.
2. When vrealloc reuses an existing vmalloc region (without allocating
new pages) KASAN generates a new tag, which breaks tag-based memory
access tracking.
Introduce KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG, a new KASAN flag that allows reusing the
tag already attached to the pointer, ensuring consistent tag behavior
during reallocation.
Pass KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG and KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC to the
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc inside vrealloc_node_align_noprof().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/38dece0a4074c43e48150d1e242f8242c73bf1a5.17648745…
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e7e04692866d02e6d3b32bb43b998e5d17092ba4.173868… [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aMUrW1Znp1GEj7St@MiWiFi-R3L-srv/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAPAsAGxDRv_uFeMYu9TwhBVWHCCtkSxoWY4xmFB_vowMbi… [3]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3D997752115a851cb0cf36 [4]
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev>
Co-developed-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman(a)intel.com>
Fixes: a0309faf1cb0 ("mm: vmalloc: support more granular vrealloc() sizing"
)
Reported-by: syzbot+997752115a851cb0cf36(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68e243a2.050a0220.1696c6.007d.GAE@google.com/T/
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com>
Cc: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino(a)arm.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 1 +
mm/kasan/hw_tags.c | 2 +-
mm/kasan/shadow.c | 4 +++-
mm/vmalloc.c | 4 +++-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ typedef unsigned int __bitwise kasan_vma
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_INIT ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x01u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x02u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x04u)
+#define KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG ((__force kasan_vmalloc_flags_t)0x08u)
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_PAGE_RANGE 0x1 /* Apply exsiting page range */
#define KASAN_VMALLOC_TLB_FLUSH 0x2 /* TLB flush */
--- a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/kasan/hw_tags.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const voi
return (void *)start;
}
- tag = kasan_random_tag();
+ tag = (flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG) ? get_tag(start) : kasan_random_tag();
start = set_tag(start, tag);
/* Unpoison and initialize memory up to size. */
--- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
@@ -648,7 +648,9 @@ void *__kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(const voi
!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL))
return (void *)start;
- start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
+ if (unlikely(!(flags & KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG)))
+ start = set_tag(start, kasan_random_tag());
+
kasan_unpoison(start, size, false);
return (void *)start;
}
--- a/mm/vmalloc.c~mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan
+++ a/mm/vmalloc.c
@@ -4176,7 +4176,9 @@ void *vrealloc_node_align_noprof(const v
*/
if (size <= alloced_size) {
kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(p + old_size, size - old_size,
- KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL);
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL |
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC |
+ KASAN_VMALLOC_KEEP_TAG);
/*
* No need to zero memory here, as unused memory will have
* already been zeroed at initial allocation time or during
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev are
mm-kasan-fix-incorrect-unpoisoning-in-vrealloc-for-kasan.patch
The patch titled
Subject: Revert "mm: fix MAX_FOLIO_ORDER on powerpc configs with hugetlb"
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Revert "mm: fix MAX_FOLIO_ORDER on powerpc configs with hugetlb"
Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 19:33:56 -0700
This reverts commit 39231e8d6ba7f794b566fd91ebd88c0834a23b98.
Enabling HAVE_GIGANTIC_FOLIOS broke kernel build and git clone on two
systems. git fetch-pack fails when cloning large repos and make hangs or
errors out of Makefile.build with Error: 139. These failures are random
with git clone failing after fetching 1% of the objects, and make hangs
while compiling random files.
Below is is one of the git clone failures:
git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git linux_6.19
Cloning into 'linux_6.19'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 11173575, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (785/785), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (373/373), done.
remote: Total 11173575 (delta 534), reused 505 (delta 411), pack-reused 11172790 (from 1)
Receiving objects: 100% (11173575/11173575), 3.00 GiB | 7.08 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (9195212/9195212), done.
fatal: did not receive expected object 0002003e951b5057c16de5a39140abcbf6e44e50
fatal: fetch-pack: invalid index-pack output
(akpm: reverting this probably just hides a bug, but let's do that for now
while the bug is being worked on).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251204023358.54107-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org
Fixes: 39231e8d6ba7 ("mm: fix MAX_FOLIO_ORDER on powerpc configs with hugetlb")
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy(a)csgroup.eu>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com>
Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype | 1 +
include/linux/mm.h | 13 +++----------
mm/Kconfig | 7 -------
4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig~revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb
+++ a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -137,7 +137,6 @@ config PPC
select ARCH_HAS_DMA_OPS if PPC64
select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
- select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE if ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGETLBFS
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
select ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT if PPC64 && PPC_FPU
select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype~revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb
+++ a/arch/powerpc/platforms/Kconfig.cputype
@@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ config PPC_64S_HASH_MMU
config PPC_RADIX_MMU
bool "Radix MMU Support"
depends on PPC_BOOK3S_64
+ select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
default y
help
Enable support for the Power ISA 3.0 Radix style MMU. Currently this
--- a/include/linux/mm.h~revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb
+++ a/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2074,7 +2074,7 @@ static inline unsigned long folio_nr_pag
return folio_large_nr_pages(folio);
}
-#if !defined(CONFIG_HAVE_GIGANTIC_FOLIOS)
+#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE)
/*
* We don't expect any folios that exceed buddy sizes (and consequently
* memory sections).
@@ -2087,17 +2087,10 @@ static inline unsigned long folio_nr_pag
* pages are guaranteed to be contiguous.
*/
#define MAX_FOLIO_ORDER PFN_SECTION_SHIFT
-#elif defined(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE)
-/*
- * There is no real limit on the folio size. We limit them to the maximum we
- * currently expect (see CONFIG_HAVE_GIGANTIC_FOLIOS): with hugetlb, we expect
- * no folios larger than 16 GiB on 64bit and 1 GiB on 32bit.
- */
-#define MAX_FOLIO_ORDER get_order(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) ? SZ_16G : SZ_1G)
#else
/*
- * Without hugetlb, gigantic folios that are bigger than a single PUD are
- * currently impossible.
+ * There is no real limit on the folio size. We limit them to the maximum we
+ * currently expect (e.g., hugetlb, dax).
*/
#define MAX_FOLIO_ORDER PUD_ORDER
#endif
--- a/mm/Kconfig~revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb
+++ a/mm/Kconfig
@@ -908,13 +908,6 @@ config PAGE_MAPCOUNT
config PGTABLE_HAS_HUGE_LEAVES
def_bool TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE || HUGETLB_PAGE
-#
-# We can end up creating gigantic folio.
-#
-config HAVE_GIGANTIC_FOLIOS
- def_bool (HUGETLB_PAGE && ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE) || \
- (ZONE_DEVICE && HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD)
-
# TODO: Allow to be enabled without THP
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_HUGE_PFNMAP
def_bool n
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org are
revert-mm-fix-max_folio_order-on-powerpc-configs-with-hugetlb.patch
When cloning with node replacements (IORING_REGISTER_DST_REPLACE),
destination entries after the cloned range are not copied over.
Add logic to copy them over to the new destination table.
Fixes: c1329532d5aa ("io_uring/rsrc: allow cloning with node replacements")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong(a)gmail.com>
---
io_uring/rsrc.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/io_uring/rsrc.c b/io_uring/rsrc.c
index 04f56212398a..a63474b331bf 100644
--- a/io_uring/rsrc.c
+++ b/io_uring/rsrc.c
@@ -1205,7 +1205,7 @@ static int io_clone_buffers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_ring_ctx *src_ctx
if (ret)
return ret;
- /* Fill entries in data from dst that won't overlap with src */
+ /* Copy original dst nodes from before the cloned range */
for (i = 0; i < min(arg->dst_off, ctx->buf_table.nr); i++) {
struct io_rsrc_node *node = ctx->buf_table.nodes[i];
@@ -1238,6 +1238,16 @@ static int io_clone_buffers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct io_ring_ctx *src_ctx
i++;
}
+ /* Copy original dst nodes from after the cloned range */
+ for (i = nbufs; i < ctx->buf_table.nr; i++) {
+ struct io_rsrc_node *node = ctx->buf_table.nodes[i];
+
+ if (node) {
+ data.nodes[i] = node;
+ node->refs++;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* If asked for replace, put the old table. data->nodes[] holds both
* old and new nodes at this point.
--
2.47.3
A new warning in Clang 22 [1] complains that @clidr passed to
get_clidr_el1() is an uninitialized const pointer. get_clidr_el1()
doesn't really care since it casts away the const-ness anyways -- it is
a false positive.
| ../arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c:2838:23: warning: variable 'clidr' is uninitialized when passed as a const pointer argument here [-Wuninitialized-const-pointer]
| 2838 | get_clidr_el1(NULL, &clidr); /* Ugly... */
| | ^~~~~
This patch isn't needed for anything past 6.1 as this code section was
reworked in Commit 7af0c2534f4c ("KVM: arm64: Normalize cache
configuration"). Since there is no upstream equivalent, this patch just
needs to be applied to 5.15.
Disable this warning for sys_regs.o with an iron fist as it doesn't make
sense to waste maintainer's time or potentially break builds by
backporting large changelists from 6.2+.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7c8c5e6a9101e ("arm64: KVM: system register handling")
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/00dacf8c22f065cb52efb14cd091d44… [1]
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com>
---
Resending this with Nathan's RB tag, an updated commit log and better
recipients from checkpatch.pl.
I'm also sending a similar patch resend for 6.1.
---
arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile
index 989bb5dad2c8..109cca425d3e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile
@@ -25,3 +25,6 @@ kvm-y := $(KVM)/kvm_main.o $(KVM)/coalesced_mmio.o $(KVM)/eventfd.o \
vgic/vgic-its.o vgic/vgic-debug.o
kvm-$(CONFIG_HW_PERF_EVENTS) += pmu-emul.o
+
+# Work around a false positive Clang 22 -Wuninitialized-const-pointer warning
+CFLAGS_sys_regs.o := $(call cc-disable-warning, uninitialized-const-pointer)
---
base-commit: 8bb7eca972ad531c9b149c0a51ab43a417385813
change-id: 20250728-b4-stable-disable-uninit-ptr-warn-5-15-c0c9db3df206
Best regards,
--
Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com>
Mejora tus contrataciones con PsicoSmart
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Si estás buscando mejorar tus contrataciones, podría ser una muy buena opción. Si quieres conocer más puedes responder este correo o simplemente contactarme, mis datos están abajo.
Saludos,
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Atte.: Valeria Pérez
Ciudad de México: (55) 5018 0565
WhatsApp: +52 33 1607 2089
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