November 2017 - Linux-stable-mirror

[Linux-stable-mirror] + fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: fat: Fix sb_rdonly() change has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Subject: fat: Fix sb_rdonly() change bc98a42c1f7d0f ("VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)") converted fat_remount():new_rdonly from a bool to an int. However fat_remount() depends upon the compiler's conversion of a non-zero integer into boolean `true'. Fix it by switching `new_rdonly' back into a bool. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87mv3d5x51.fsf@mail.parknet.co.jp Fixes: bc98a42c1f7d0f8 ("VFS: Convert sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY to sb_rdonly(sb)") Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Joe Perches <joe(a)perches.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/fat/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN fs/fat/inode.c~fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change fs/fat/inode.c --- a/fs/fat/inode.c~fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change +++ a/fs/fat/inode.c @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ static void __exit fat_destroy_inodecach static int fat_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) { - int new_rdonly; + bool new_rdonly; struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(sb); *flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | (sbi->options.isvfat ? 0 : SB_NOATIME); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp are fat-fix-sb_rdonly-change.patch

6 years, 12 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] + revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_pr… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_pr… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Subject: kernel/async.c: revert "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" This reverts 92266d6ef60c2381 ("async: simplify lowest_in_progress()"), which was simply wrong: In the case where domain is NULL, we now use the wrong offsetof() in the list_first_entry macro, so we don't actually fetch the ->cookie value, but rather the eight bytes located sizeof(struct list_head) further into the struct async_entry. On 64 bit, that's the data member, while on 32 bit, that's a u64 built from func and data in some order. I think the bug happens to be harmless in practice: It obviously only affects callers which pass a NULL domain, and AFAICT the only such caller is async_synchronize_full() -> async_synchronize_full_domain(NULL) -> async_synchronize_cookie_domain(ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX, NULL) and the ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX means that in practice we end up waiting for the async_global_pending list to be empty - but it would break if somebody happened to pass (void*)-1 as the data element to async_schedule, and of course also if somebody ever does a async_synchronize_cookie_domain(, NULL) with a "finite" cookie value. Maybe the "harmless in practice" means this isn't -stable material. But I'm not completely confident my quick git grep'ing is enough, and there might be affected code in one of the earlier kernels that has since been removed, so I'll leave the decision to the stable guys. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128104938.3921-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk Fixes: 92266d6ef60c "async: simplify lowest_in_progress()" Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Adam Wallis <awallis(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [3.10+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/async.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff -puN kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress kernel/async.c --- a/kernel/async.c~revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress +++ a/kernel/async.c @@ -84,20 +84,24 @@ static atomic_t entry_count; static async_cookie_t lowest_in_progress(struct async_domain *domain) { - struct list_head *pending; + struct async_entry *first = NULL; async_cookie_t ret = ASYNC_COOKIE_MAX; unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&async_lock, flags); - if (domain) - pending = &domain->pending; - else - pending = &async_global_pending; + if (domain) { + if (!list_empty(&domain->pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&domain->pending, + struct async_entry, domain_list); + } else { + if (!list_empty(&async_global_pending)) + first = list_first_entry(&async_global_pending, + struct async_entry, global_list); + } - if (!list_empty(pending)) - ret = list_first_entry(pending, struct async_entry, - domain_list)->cookie; + if (first) + ret = first->cookie; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&async_lock, flags); return ret; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from linux(a)rasmusvillemoes.dk are revert-async-simplify-lowest_in_progress.patch

6 years, 12 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] + mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: mm, memcg: fix mem_cgroup_swapout() for THPs has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-fo… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-fo… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Subject: mm, memcg: fix mem_cgroup_swapout() for THPs d6810d730022 ("memcg, THP, swap: make mem_cgroup_swapout() support THP") changed mem_cgroup_swapout() to support transparent huge page (THP). However the patch missed one location which should be changed for correctly handling THPs. The resulting bug will cause the memory cgroups whose THPs were swapped out to become zombies on deletion. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128161941.20931-1-shakeelb@google.com Fixes: d6810d730022 ("memcg, THP, swap: make mem_cgroup_swapout() support THP") Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang(a)intel.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev(a)gmail.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen(a)google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff -puN mm/memcontrol.c~mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps mm/memcontrol.c --- a/mm/memcontrol.c~mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps +++ a/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -6044,7 +6044,7 @@ void mem_cgroup_swapout(struct page *pag memcg_check_events(memcg, page); if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg)) - css_put(&memcg->css); + css_put_many(&memcg->css, nr_entries); } /** _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from shakeelb(a)google.com are mm-memcg-fix-mem_cgroup_swapout-for-thps.patch mm-mlock-vmscan-no-more-skipping-pagevecs.patch vfs-remove-might_sleep-from-clear_inode.patch

6 years, 12 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH rdma-rc v2] IB/core: Only enforce security for InfiniBand

by Leon Romanovsky

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj(a)mellanox.com> For now the only LSM security enforcement mechanism available is specific to InfiniBand. Bypass enforcement for non-IB link types. This fixes a regression where modify_qp fails for iWARP because querying the PKEY returns -EINVAL. Cc: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Cc: Don Dutile <ddutile(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat(a)chelsio.com> Fixes: d291f1a65232("IB/core: Enforce PKey security on QPs") Fixes: 47a2b338fe63("IB/core: Enforce security on management datagrams") Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj(a)mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav(a)mellanox.com> Tested-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat(a)chelsio.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> --- Changelog: v1->v2: Fixed build errors v0->v1: Added proper SElinux patch --- drivers/infiniband/core/security.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c index 23278ed5be45..06c608c07b65 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/security.c @@ -417,8 +417,17 @@ void ib_close_shared_qp_security(struct ib_qp_security *sec) int ib_create_qp_security(struct ib_qp *qp, struct ib_device *dev) { + u8 i = rdma_start_port(dev); + bool is_ib = false; int ret; + while (i <= rdma_end_port(dev) && !is_ib) + is_ib = rdma_protocol_ib(dev, i++); + + /* If this isn't an IB device don't create the security context */ + if (!is_ib) + return 0; + qp->qp_sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*qp->qp_sec), GFP_KERNEL); if (!qp->qp_sec) return -ENOMEM; @@ -441,6 +450,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_create_qp_security); void ib_destroy_qp_security_begin(struct ib_qp_security *sec) { + /* Return if not IB */ + if (!sec) + return; + mutex_lock(&sec->mutex); /* Remove the QP from the lists so it won't get added to @@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_abort(struct ib_qp_security *sec) int ret; int i; + /* Return if not IB */ + if (!sec) + return; + /* If a concurrent cache update is in progress this * QP security could be marked for an error state * transition. Wait for this to complete. @@ -505,6 +522,10 @@ void ib_destroy_qp_security_end(struct ib_qp_security *sec) { int i; + /* Return if not IB */ + if (!sec) + return; + /* If a concurrent cache update is occurring we must * wait until this QP security structure is processed * in the QP to error flow before destroying it because @@ -565,13 +586,19 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp, bool pps_change = ((qp_attr_mask & (IB_QP_PKEY_INDEX | IB_QP_PORT)) || (qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_ALT_PATH)); + WARN_ONCE((qp_attr_mask & IB_QP_PORT && + rdma_protocol_ib(real_qp->device, qp_attr->port_num) && + !real_qp->qp_sec), + "%s: QP security is not initialized for IB QP: %d\n", + __func__, real_qp->qp_num); + /* The port/pkey settings are maintained only for the real QP. Open * handles on the real QP will be in the shared_qp_list. When * enforcing security on the real QP all the shared QPs will be * checked as well. */ - if (pps_change && !special_qp) { + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) { mutex_lock(&real_qp->qp_sec->mutex); new_pps = get_new_pps(real_qp, qp_attr, @@ -600,7 +627,7 @@ int ib_security_modify_qp(struct ib_qp *qp, qp_attr_mask, udata); - if (pps_change && !special_qp) { + if (pps_change && !special_qp && real_qp->qp_sec) { /* Clean up the lists and free the appropriate * ports_pkeys structure. */ @@ -631,6 +658,9 @@ int ib_security_pkey_access(struct ib_device *dev, u16 pkey; int ret; + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(dev, port_num)) + return 0; + ret = ib_get_cached_pkey(dev, port_num, pkey_index, &pkey); if (ret) return ret; @@ -665,6 +695,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, { int ret; + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) + return 0; + ret = security_ib_alloc_security(&agent->security); if (ret) return ret; @@ -690,6 +723,9 @@ int ib_mad_agent_security_setup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) { + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(agent->device, agent->port_num)) + return; + security_ib_free_security(agent->security); if (agent->lsm_nb_reg) unregister_lsm_notifier(&agent->lsm_nb); @@ -697,6 +733,9 @@ void ib_mad_agent_security_cleanup(struct ib_mad_agent *agent) int ib_mad_enforce_security(struct ib_mad_agent_private *map, u16 pkey_index) { + if (!rdma_protocol_ib(map->agent.device, map->agent.port_num)) + return 0; + if (map->agent.qp->qp_type == IB_QPT_SMI && !map->agent.smp_allowed) return -EACCES; -- 2.15.0

6 years, 12 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH v2] KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However, there is actually no permission check. This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING) then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring. Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring. Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key(). Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used. We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also, request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable. We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f ("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where /sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users who actually do that, though...) Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- v2: also skip permission check if default dest_keyring is NULL security/keys/request_key.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index e8036cd0ad54..7dc741382154 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -251,11 +251,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info, * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the * caller must release. */ -static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) +static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) { struct request_key_auth *rka; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey; + int ret; kenter("%p", dest_keyring); @@ -264,6 +265,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) /* the caller supplied one */ key_get(dest_keyring); } else { + bool do_perm_check = true; + /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we * find one that we actually have */ switch (cred->jit_keyring) { @@ -278,8 +281,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring); up_read(&authkey->sem); - if (dest_keyring) + if (dest_keyring) { + do_perm_check = false; break; + } } case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING: @@ -314,11 +319,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) default: BUG(); } + + /* + * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential + * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and + * joining a keyring only requires Search permission. + * + * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so + * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add + * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. + */ + if (dest_keyring && do_perm_check) { + ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1), + KEY_NEED_WRITE); + if (ret) { + key_put(dest_keyring); + return ret; + } + } } *_dest_keyring = dest_keyring; kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring)); - return; + return 0; } /* @@ -444,11 +467,15 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); - if (!user) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + if (ret) + goto error; - construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); + if (!user) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; + } ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key); key_user_put(user); @@ -463,7 +490,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, } else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { ret = 0; } else { - goto couldnt_alloc_key; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; } key_put(dest_keyring); @@ -473,8 +500,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, construction_failed: key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL); key_put(key); -couldnt_alloc_key: +error_put_dest_keyring: key_put(dest_keyring); +error: kleave(" = %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } -- 2.15.0.417.g466bffb3ac-goog

6 years, 12 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key keyring. This should require Write permission to the keyring. However, there is actually no permission check. This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search permission is granted. This is because Search permission allows joining the keyring. keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING) then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring. Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring. Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this method. Adding negative keys is trivial. Adding a positive key is a bit trickier. It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key(). Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used. We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key(). Also, request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable. We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b59f ("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where /sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. (I don't know of any users who actually do that, though...) Fixes: 3e30148c3d52 ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.13+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- security/keys/request_key.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index c6880af8b411..4557c1c368aa 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -251,11 +251,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info, * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the * caller must release. */ -static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) +static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) { struct request_key_auth *rka; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey; + int ret; kenter("%p", dest_keyring); @@ -264,6 +265,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) /* the caller supplied one */ key_get(dest_keyring); } else { + bool do_perm_check = true; + /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we * find one that we actually have */ switch (cred->jit_keyring) { @@ -278,8 +281,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring); up_read(&authkey->sem); - if (dest_keyring) + if (dest_keyring) { + do_perm_check = false; break; + } } case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING: @@ -314,11 +319,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) default: BUG(); } + + /* + * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential + * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and + * joining a keyring only requires Search permission. + * + * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so + * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add + * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. + */ + if (do_perm_check) { + ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1), + KEY_NEED_WRITE); + if (ret) { + key_put(dest_keyring); + return ret; + } + } } *_dest_keyring = dest_keyring; kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring)); - return; + return 0; } /* @@ -444,11 +467,15 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); - if (!user) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + if (ret) + goto error; - construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); + if (!user) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; + } ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key); key_user_put(user); @@ -463,7 +490,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, } else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { ret = 0; } else { - goto couldnt_alloc_key; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; } key_put(dest_keyring); @@ -473,8 +500,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, construction_failed: key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL); key_put(key); -couldnt_alloc_key: +error_put_dest_keyring: key_put(dest_keyring); +error: kleave(" = %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } -- 2.15.0.448.gf294e3d99a-goog

6 years, 12 months

2
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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH v2] X.509: fix comparisons of ->pkey_algo

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> ->pkey_algo used to be an enum, but was changed to a string by commit 4e8ae72a75aa ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum"). But two comparisons were not updated. Fix them to use strcmp(). This bug broke signature verification in certain configurations, depending on whether the string constants were deduplicated or not. Fixes: 4e8ae72a75aa ("X.509: Make algo identifiers text instead of enum") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- v2: use != 0 in comparisons crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 2d93d9eccb4d..986033e64a83 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n", sinfo->index, certix); - if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) { + if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) { pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n", sinfo->index); continue; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index c9013582c026..3d6f124a8b34 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert) } ret = -EKEYREJECTED; - if (cert->pub->pkey_algo != cert->sig->pkey_algo) + if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) goto out; ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig); -- 2.15.0.417.g466bffb3ac-goog

6 years, 12 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] patch "fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use" added to char-misc-next

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use to my char-misc git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git in the char-misc-next branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release during the merge window. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. >From 0f5eb1545907edeea7672a9c1652c4231150ff22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Abbott <abbotti(a)mev.co.uk> Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 16:33:12 -0600 Subject: fpga: region: release of_parse_phandle nodes after use Both fpga_region_get_manager() and fpga_region_get_bridges() call of_parse_phandle(), but nothing calls of_node_put() on the returned struct device_node pointers. Make sure to do that to stop their reference counters getting out of whack. Fixes: 0fa20cdfcc1f ("fpga: fpga-region: device tree control for FPGA") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.10+ Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti(a)mev.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Alan Tull <atull(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c b/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c index c6b21194dcbc..119ff75522f1 100644 --- a/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c +++ b/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static struct fpga_manager *of_fpga_region_get_mgr(struct device_node *np) mgr_node = of_parse_phandle(np, "fpga-mgr", 0); if (mgr_node) { mgr = of_fpga_mgr_get(mgr_node); + of_node_put(mgr_node); of_node_put(np); return mgr; } @@ -120,10 +121,13 @@ static int of_fpga_region_get_bridges(struct fpga_region *region) parent_br = region_np->parent; /* If overlay has a list of bridges, use it. */ - if (of_parse_phandle(info->overlay, "fpga-bridges", 0)) + br = of_parse_phandle(info->overlay, "fpga-bridges", 0); + if (br) { + of_node_put(br); np = info->overlay; - else + } else { np = region_np; + } for (i = 0; ; i++) { br = of_parse_phandle(np, "fpga-bridges", i); @@ -131,12 +135,15 @@ static int of_fpga_region_get_bridges(struct fpga_region *region) break; /* If parent bridge is in list, skip it. */ - if (br == parent_br) + if (br == parent_br) { + of_node_put(br); continue; + } /* If node is a bridge, get it and add to list */ ret = of_fpga_bridge_get_to_list(br, info, &region->bridge_list); + of_node_put(br); /* If any of the bridges are in use, give up */ if (ret == -EBUSY) { -- 2.15.0

6 years, 12 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] patch "firmware: vpd: Tie firmware kobject to device lifetime" added to char-misc-linus

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled firmware: vpd: Tie firmware kobject to device lifetime to my char-misc git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git in the char-misc-linus branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the next -rc kernel release. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. >From e4b28b3c3a405b251fa25db58abe1512814a680a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 13:00:44 -0800 Subject: firmware: vpd: Tie firmware kobject to device lifetime It doesn't make sense to have /sys/firmware/vpd if the device is not instantiated, so tie its lifetime to the device. Fixes: 049a59db34eb ("firmware: Google VPD sysfs driver") Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c index 84217172297b..942e358efa60 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c @@ -295,7 +295,17 @@ static int vpd_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (ret) return ret; - return vpd_sections_init(entry.cbmem_addr); + vpd_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("vpd", firmware_kobj); + if (!vpd_kobj) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = vpd_sections_init(entry.cbmem_addr); + if (ret) { + kobject_put(vpd_kobj); + return ret; + } + + return 0; } static int vpd_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) @@ -303,6 +313,8 @@ static int vpd_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) vpd_section_destroy(&ro_vpd); vpd_section_destroy(&rw_vpd); + kobject_put(vpd_kobj); + return 0; } @@ -322,10 +334,6 @@ static int __init vpd_platform_init(void) if (IS_ERR(pdev)) return PTR_ERR(pdev); - vpd_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("vpd", firmware_kobj); - if (!vpd_kobj) - return -ENOMEM; - platform_driver_register(&vpd_driver); return 0; @@ -333,7 +341,6 @@ static int __init vpd_platform_init(void) static void __exit vpd_platform_exit(void) { - kobject_put(vpd_kobj); } module_init(vpd_platform_init); -- 2.15.0

7 years

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[Linux-stable-mirror] patch "firmware: vpd: Fix platform driver and device" added to char-misc-linus

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled firmware: vpd: Fix platform driver and device to my char-misc git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git in the char-misc-linus branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the next -rc kernel release. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. >From 0631fb8b027f5968c2f5031f0b3ff7be3e4bebcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2017 13:00:45 -0800 Subject: firmware: vpd: Fix platform driver and device registration/unregistration The driver exit function needs to unregister both platform device and driver. Also, during registration, register driver first and perform error checks. Fixes: 049a59db34eb ("firmware: Google VPD sysfs driver") Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap(a)infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c index 942e358efa60..e4b40f2b4627 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c @@ -326,21 +326,29 @@ static struct platform_driver vpd_driver = { }, }; +static struct platform_device *vpd_pdev; + static int __init vpd_platform_init(void) { - struct platform_device *pdev; + int ret; - pdev = platform_device_register_simple("vpd", -1, NULL, 0); - if (IS_ERR(pdev)) - return PTR_ERR(pdev); + ret = platform_driver_register(&vpd_driver); + if (ret) + return ret; - platform_driver_register(&vpd_driver); + vpd_pdev = platform_device_register_simple("vpd", -1, NULL, 0); + if (IS_ERR(vpd_pdev)) { + platform_driver_unregister(&vpd_driver); + return PTR_ERR(vpd_pdev); + } return 0; } static void __exit vpd_platform_exit(void) { + platform_device_unregister(vpd_pdev); + platform_driver_unregister(&vpd_driver); } module_init(vpd_platform_init); -- 2.15.0

7 years

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Linux-stable-mirror November 2017