January 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] ARM: sunxi_defconfig: Enable CMA

by Maxime Ripard

The DRM driver most notably, but also out of tree drivers (for now) like the VPU or GPU drivers, are quite big consumers of large, contiguous memory buffers. However, the sunxi_defconfig doesn't enable CMA in order to mitigate that, which makes them almost unusable. Enable it to make sure it somewhat works. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard(a)free-electrons.com> --- Hi Arnd, Olof, Could you queue that patch as a fix? Thanks! Maxime arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig b/arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig index 5caaf971fb50..df433abfcb02 100644 --- a/arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ CONFIG_SMP=y CONFIG_NR_CPUS=8 CONFIG_AEABI=y CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y +CONFIG_CMA=y CONFIG_ARM_APPENDED_DTB=y CONFIG_ARM_ATAG_DTB_COMPAT=y CONFIG_CPU_FREQ=y @@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ CONFIG_CAN_SUN4I=y # CONFIG_WIRELESS is not set CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT=y +CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD=y CONFIG_ATA=y CONFIG_AHCI_SUNXI=y -- 2.14.3

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH] NFS: reject request for id_legacy key without auxdata

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall() is supposed to be called with 'aux' pointing to a 'struct idmap', via the call to request_key_with_auxdata() in nfs_idmap_request_key(). However it can also be reached via the request_key() system call in which case 'aux' will be NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference in nfs_idmap_prepare_pipe_upcall(), assuming that the key description is valid enough to get that far. Fix this by making nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall() negate the key if no auxdata is provided. As usual, this bug was found by syzkaller. A simple reproducer using the command-line keyctl program is: keyctl request2 id_legacy uid:0 '' @s Fixes: 57e62324e469 ("NFS: Store the legacy idmapper result in the keyring") Reported-by: syzbot+5dfdbcf7b3eb5912abbb(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c index 30426c1a1bbd..22dc30a679a0 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c @@ -568,9 +568,13 @@ static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struct key_construction *cons, struct idmap_msg *im; struct idmap *idmap = (struct idmap *)aux; struct key *key = cons->key; - int ret = -ENOMEM; + int ret = -ENOKEY; + + if (!aux) + goto out1; /* msg and im are freed in idmap_pipe_destroy_msg */ + ret = -ENOMEM; data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) goto out1; -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] + lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang.patch added to -mm tree

by akpm＠linux-foundation.org

The patch titled Subject: lib/ubsan: add type mismatch handler for new GCC/Clang has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handle… and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handle… Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Subject: lib/ubsan: add type mismatch handler for new GCC/Clang UBSAN=y fails to build with new GCC/clang: arch/x86/kernel/head64.o: In function `sanitize_boot_params': arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h:37: undefined reference to `__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1' because Clang and GCC 8 slightly changed ABI for 'type mismatch' errors. Compiler now uses new __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1() function with slightly modified 'struct type_mismatch_data'. Let's add new 'struct type_mismatch_data_common' which is independent from compiler's layout of 'struct type_mismatch_data'. And make __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch[_v1]() functions transform compiler-dependent type mismatch data to our internal representation. This way, we can support both old and new compilers with minimal amount of change. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180119152853.16806-1-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Reported-by: Sodagudi Prasad <psodagud(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> [4.5+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- lib/ubsan.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- lib/ubsan.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff -puN lib/ubsan.c~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang lib/ubsan.c --- a/lib/ubsan.c~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang +++ a/lib/ubsan.c @@ -265,14 +265,14 @@ void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(stru } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow); -static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data *data) +static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s null pointer of type %s\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], @@ -281,15 +281,15 @@ static void handle_null_ptr_deref(struct ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void handle_misaligned_access(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s misaligned address %p for type %s\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], @@ -299,15 +299,15 @@ static void handle_misaligned_access(str ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void handle_object_size_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { unsigned long flags; - if (suppress_report(&data->location)) + if (suppress_report(data->location)) return; - ubsan_prologue(&data->location, &flags); + ubsan_prologue(data->location, &flags); pr_err("%s address %p with insufficient space\n", type_check_kinds[data->type_check_kind], (void *) ptr); @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static void handle_object_size_mismatch( ubsan_epilogue(&flags); } -void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, +static void ubsan_type_mismatch_common(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data, unsigned long ptr) { @@ -326,8 +326,36 @@ void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct else handle_object_size_mismatch(data, ptr); } + +void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data, + unsigned long ptr) +{ + struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = { + .location = &data->location, + .type = data->type, + .alignment = data->alignment, + .type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind + }; + + ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr); +} EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch); +void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(struct type_mismatch_data_v1 *data, + unsigned long ptr) +{ + + struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = { + .location = &data->location, + .type = data->type, + .alignment = 1UL << data->log_alignment, + .type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind + }; + + ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1); + void __ubsan_handle_nonnull_return(struct nonnull_return_data *data) { unsigned long flags; diff -puN lib/ubsan.h~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang lib/ubsan.h --- a/lib/ubsan.h~lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang +++ a/lib/ubsan.h @@ -37,6 +37,20 @@ struct type_mismatch_data { unsigned char type_check_kind; }; +struct type_mismatch_data_v1 { + struct source_location location; + struct type_descriptor *type; + unsigned char log_alignment; + unsigned char type_check_kind; +}; + +struct type_mismatch_data_common { + struct source_location *location; + struct type_descriptor *type; + unsigned long alignment; + unsigned char type_check_kind; +}; + struct nonnull_arg_data { struct source_location location; struct source_location attr_location; _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com are mm-memcg-try-harder-to-decrease-limit_in_bytes.patch kasan-makefile-support-llvm-style-asan-parameters.patch lib-strscpy-remove-word-at-a-time-optimization.patch lib-ubsan-add-type-mismatch-handler-for-new-gcc-clang.patch lib-ubsan-remove-returns-nonnull-attribute-checks.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 2/3] Input: synaptics_rmi4 - unmask F03 interrupts when port is opened

by Dmitry Torokhov

Currently we register the pass-through serio port when we probe the F03 RMI function, and then, in sensor configure phase, we unmask interrupts. Unfortunately this is too late, as other drivers are free probe devices attached to the serio port as soon as it is probed. Because interrupts are masked, the IO times out, which may result in not being able to detect trackpoints on the pass-through port. To fix the issue we implement open() and close() methods for the pass-through serio port and unmask interrupts from there. We also move creation of the pass-through port form probe to configure stage, as RMI driver does not enable transport interrupt until all functions are probed (we should change this, but this is a separate topic). We also try to clear the pending data before unmasking interrupts, because some devices like to spam the system with multiple 0xaa 0x00 announcements, which may interfere with us trying to query ID of the device. Fixes: c5e8848fc98e ("Input: synaptics-rmi4 - add support for F03") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f03.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f03.c b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f03.c index ad71a5e768dc4..7ccbb370a9a81 100644 --- a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f03.c +++ b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f03.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ struct f03_data { struct rmi_function *fn; struct serio *serio; + bool serio_registered; unsigned int overwrite_buttons; @@ -138,6 +139,37 @@ static int rmi_f03_initialize(struct f03_data *f03) return 0; } +static int rmi_f03_pt_open(struct serio *serio) +{ + struct f03_data *f03 = serio->port_data; + struct rmi_function *fn = f03->fn; + const u8 ob_len = f03->rx_queue_length * RMI_F03_OB_SIZE; + const u16 data_addr = fn->fd.data_base_addr + RMI_F03_OB_OFFSET; + u8 obs[RMI_F03_QUEUE_LENGTH * RMI_F03_OB_SIZE]; + int error; + + /* + * Consume any pending data. Some devices like to spam with + * 0xaa 0x00 announcements which may confuse us as we try to + * probe the device. + */ + error = rmi_read_block(fn->rmi_dev, data_addr, &obs, ob_len); + if (!error) + rmi_dbg(RMI_DEBUG_FN, &fn->dev, + "%s: Consumed %*ph (%d) from PS2 guest\n", + __func__, ob_len, obs, ob_len); + + return fn->rmi_dev->driver->set_irq_bits(fn->rmi_dev, fn->irq_mask); +} + +static void rmi_f03_pt_close(struct serio *serio) +{ + struct f03_data *f03 = serio->port_data; + struct rmi_function *fn = f03->fn; + + fn->rmi_dev->driver->clear_irq_bits(fn->rmi_dev, fn->irq_mask); +} + static int rmi_f03_register_pt(struct f03_data *f03) { struct serio *serio; @@ -148,6 +180,8 @@ static int rmi_f03_register_pt(struct f03_data *f03) serio->id.type = SERIO_PS_PSTHRU; serio->write = rmi_f03_pt_write; + serio->open = rmi_f03_pt_open; + serio->close = rmi_f03_pt_close; serio->port_data = f03; strlcpy(serio->name, "Synaptics RMI4 PS/2 pass-through", @@ -184,17 +218,27 @@ static int rmi_f03_probe(struct rmi_function *fn) f03->device_count); dev_set_drvdata(dev, f03); - - error = rmi_f03_register_pt(f03); - if (error) - return error; - return 0; } static int rmi_f03_config(struct rmi_function *fn) { - fn->rmi_dev->driver->set_irq_bits(fn->rmi_dev, fn->irq_mask); + struct f03_data *f03 = dev_get_drvdata(&fn->dev); + int error; + + if (!f03->serio_registered) { + error = rmi_f03_register_pt(f03); + if (error) + return error; + + f03->serio_registered = true; + } else { + /* + * We must be re-configuring the sensor, just enable + * interrupts for this function. + */ + fn->rmi_dev->driver->set_irq_bits(fn->rmi_dev, fn->irq_mask); + } return 0; } @@ -204,7 +248,7 @@ static int rmi_f03_attention(struct rmi_function *fn, unsigned long *irq_bits) struct rmi_device *rmi_dev = fn->rmi_dev; struct rmi_driver_data *drvdata = dev_get_drvdata(&rmi_dev->dev); struct f03_data *f03 = dev_get_drvdata(&fn->dev); - u16 data_addr = fn->fd.data_base_addr; + const u16 data_addr = fn->fd.data_base_addr + RMI_F03_OB_OFFSET; const u8 ob_len = f03->rx_queue_length * RMI_F03_OB_SIZE; u8 obs[RMI_F03_QUEUE_LENGTH * RMI_F03_OB_SIZE]; u8 ob_status; @@ -226,8 +270,7 @@ static int rmi_f03_attention(struct rmi_function *fn, unsigned long *irq_bits) drvdata->attn_data.size -= ob_len; } else { /* Grab all of the data registers, and check them for data */ - error = rmi_read_block(fn->rmi_dev, data_addr + RMI_F03_OB_OFFSET, - &obs, ob_len); + error = rmi_read_block(fn->rmi_dev, data_addr, &obs, ob_len); if (error) { dev_err(&fn->dev, "%s: Failed to read F03 output buffers: %d\n", @@ -266,7 +309,8 @@ static void rmi_f03_remove(struct rmi_function *fn) { struct f03_data *f03 = dev_get_drvdata(&fn->dev); - serio_unregister_port(f03->serio); + if (f03->serio_registered) + serio_unregister_port(f03->serio); } struct rmi_function_handler rmi_f03_handler = { -- 2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCHv2] mm, page_vma_mapped: Drop faulty pointer arithmetics in check_pte()

by Kirill A. Shutemov

Tetsuo reported random crashes under memory pressure on 32-bit x86 system and tracked down to change that introduced page_vma_mapped_walk(). The root cause of the issue is the faulty pointer math in check_pte(). As ->pte may point to an arbitrary page we have to check that they are belong to the section before doing math. Otherwise it may lead to weird results. It wasn't noticed until now as mem_map[] is virtually contiguous on flatmem or vmemmap sparsemem. Pointer arithmetic just works against all 'struct page' pointers. But with classic sparsemem, it doesn't because each section memap is allocated separately and so consecutive pfns crossing two sections might have struct pages at completely unrelated addresses. Let's restructure code a bit and replace pointer arithmetic with operations on pfns. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Fixes: ace71a19cec5 ("mm: introduce page_vma_mapped_walk()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- v2: - Do not use uninitialized 'pfn' for !MIGRATION case (Michal) --- include/linux/swapops.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++ mm/page_vma_mapped.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/swapops.h b/include/linux/swapops.h index 9c5a2628d6ce..1d3877c39a00 100644 --- a/include/linux/swapops.h +++ b/include/linux/swapops.h @@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ static inline bool is_write_device_private_entry(swp_entry_t entry) return unlikely(swp_type(entry) == SWP_DEVICE_WRITE); } +static inline unsigned long device_private_entry_to_pfn(swp_entry_t entry) +{ + return swp_offset(entry); +} + static inline struct page *device_private_entry_to_page(swp_entry_t entry) { return pfn_to_page(swp_offset(entry)); @@ -154,6 +159,11 @@ static inline bool is_write_device_private_entry(swp_entry_t entry) return false; } +static inline unsigned long device_private_entry_to_pfn(swp_entry_t entry) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline struct page *device_private_entry_to_page(swp_entry_t entry) { return NULL; @@ -189,6 +199,11 @@ static inline int is_write_migration_entry(swp_entry_t entry) return unlikely(swp_type(entry) == SWP_MIGRATION_WRITE); } +static inline unsigned long migration_entry_to_pfn(swp_entry_t entry) +{ + return swp_offset(entry); +} + static inline struct page *migration_entry_to_page(swp_entry_t entry) { struct page *p = pfn_to_page(swp_offset(entry)); @@ -218,6 +233,12 @@ static inline int is_migration_entry(swp_entry_t swp) { return 0; } + +static inline unsigned long migration_entry_to_pfn(swp_entry_t entry) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline struct page *migration_entry_to_page(swp_entry_t entry) { return NULL; diff --git a/mm/page_vma_mapped.c b/mm/page_vma_mapped.c index d22b84310f6d..956015614395 100644 --- a/mm/page_vma_mapped.c +++ b/mm/page_vma_mapped.c @@ -30,10 +30,29 @@ static bool map_pte(struct page_vma_mapped_walk *pvmw) return true; } +/** + * check_pte - check if @pvmw->page is mapped at the @pvmw->pte + * + * page_vma_mapped_walk() found a place where @pvmw->page is *potentially* + * mapped. check_pte() has to validate this. + * + * @pvmw->pte may point to empty PTE, swap PTE or PTE pointing to arbitrary + * page. + * + * If PVMW_MIGRATION flag is set, returns true if @pvmw->pte contains migration + * entry that points to @pvmw->page or any subpage in case of THP. + * + * If PVMW_MIGRATION flag is not set, returns true if @pvmw->pte points to + * @pvmw->page or any subpage in case of THP. + * + * Otherwise, return false. + * + */ static bool check_pte(struct page_vma_mapped_walk *pvmw) { + unsigned long pfn; + if (pvmw->flags & PVMW_MIGRATION) { -#ifdef CONFIG_MIGRATION swp_entry_t entry; if (!is_swap_pte(*pvmw->pte)) return false; @@ -41,37 +60,31 @@ static bool check_pte(struct page_vma_mapped_walk *pvmw) if (!is_migration_entry(entry)) return false; - if (migration_entry_to_page(entry) - pvmw->page >= - hpage_nr_pages(pvmw->page)) { - return false; - } - if (migration_entry_to_page(entry) < pvmw->page) - return false; -#else - WARN_ON_ONCE(1); -#endif - } else { - if (is_swap_pte(*pvmw->pte)) { - swp_entry_t entry; - entry = pte_to_swp_entry(*pvmw->pte); - if (is_device_private_entry(entry) && - device_private_entry_to_page(entry) == pvmw->page) - return true; - } + pfn = migration_entry_to_pfn(entry); + } else if (is_swap_pte(*pvmw->pte)) { + swp_entry_t entry; - if (!pte_present(*pvmw->pte)) + /* Handle un-addressable ZONE_DEVICE memory */ + entry = pte_to_swp_entry(*pvmw->pte); + if (!is_device_private_entry(entry)) return false; - /* THP can be referenced by any subpage */ - if (pte_page(*pvmw->pte) - pvmw->page >= - hpage_nr_pages(pvmw->page)) { - return false; - } - if (pte_page(*pvmw->pte) < pvmw->page) + pfn = device_private_entry_to_pfn(entry); + } else { + if (!pte_present(*pvmw->pte)) return false; + + pfn = pte_pfn(*pvmw->pte); } + if (pfn < page_to_pfn(pvmw->page)) + return false; + + /* THP can be referenced by any subpage */ + if (pfn - page_to_pfn(pvmw->page) >= hpage_nr_pages(pvmw->page)) + return false; + return true; } -- 2.15.1

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] [PATCH 2/2] tracing: Fix converting enums from the map in trace_event_eval_update()

by Steven Rostedt

From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Since enums do not get converted by the TRACE_EVENT macro into their values, the event format displaces the enum name and not the value. This breaks tools like perf and trace-cmd that need to interpret the raw binary data. To solve this, an enum map was created to convert these enums into their actual numbers on boot up. This is done by TRACE_EVENTS() adding a TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() macro. Some enums were not being converted. This was caused by an optization that had a bug in it. All calls get checked against this enum map to see if it should be converted or not, and it compares the call's system to the system that the enum map was created under. If they match, then they call is processed. To cut down on the number of iterations needed to find the maps with a matching system, since calls and maps are grouped by system, when a match is made, the index into the map array is saved, so that the next call, if it belongs to the same system as the previous call, could start right at that array index and not have to scan all the previous arrays. The problem was, the saved index was used as the variable to know if this is a call in a new system or not. If the index was zero, it was assumed that the call is in a new system and would keep incrementing the saved index until it found a matching system. The issue arises when the first matching system was at index zero. The next map, if it belonged to the same system, would then think it was the first match and increment the index to one. If the next call belong to the same system, it would begin its search of the maps off by one, and miss the first enum that should be converted. This left a single enum not converted properly. Also add a comment to describe exactly what that index was for. It took me a bit too long to figure out what I was thinking when debugging this issue. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/717BE572-2070-4C1E-9902-9F2E0FEDA4F8@oracle.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0c564a538aa93 ("tracing: Add TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM() macro to map enums to their values") Reported-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Teste-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c index ec0f9aa4e151..1b87157edbff 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c @@ -2213,6 +2213,7 @@ void trace_event_eval_update(struct trace_eval_map **map, int len) { struct trace_event_call *call, *p; const char *last_system = NULL; + bool first = false; int last_i; int i; @@ -2220,15 +2221,28 @@ void trace_event_eval_update(struct trace_eval_map **map, int len) list_for_each_entry_safe(call, p, &ftrace_events, list) { /* events are usually grouped together with systems */ if (!last_system || call->class->system != last_system) { + first = true; last_i = 0; last_system = call->class->system; } + /* + * Since calls are grouped by systems, the likelyhood that the + * next call in the iteration belongs to the same system as the + * previous call is high. As an optimization, we skip seaching + * for a map[] that matches the call's system if the last call + * was from the same system. That's what last_i is for. If the + * call has the same system as the previous call, then last_i + * will be the index of the first map[] that has a matching + * system. + */ for (i = last_i; i < len; i++) { if (call->class->system == map[i]->system) { /* Save the first system if need be */ - if (!last_i) + if (first) { last_i = i; + first = false; + } update_event_printk(call, map[i]); } } -- 2.13.2

7 years, 3 months

1
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[Linux-stable-mirror] KPTI for 4.1 LTS

by Francesco Del Degan

Hi everyone, do you know if there's any plan to backport the KPTI patches on 4.1 LTS? Cheers, Francesco

7 years, 3 months

4
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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME PGD mapping" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME PGD mapping to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-mm-use-a-struct-to-reduce-parameters-for-sme-pgd-mapping.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From bacf6b499e11760aef73a3bb5ce4e5eea74a3fd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:26:05 -0600 Subject: x86/mm: Use a struct to reduce parameters for SME PGD mapping From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> commit bacf6b499e11760aef73a3bb5ce4e5eea74a3fd4 upstream. In preparation for follow-on patches, combine the PGD mapping parameters into a struct to reduce the number of function arguments and allow for direct updating of the next pagetable mapping area pointer. Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192605.6026.96206.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoff… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -213,6 +213,14 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *va set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT); } +struct sme_populate_pgd_data { + void *pgtable_area; + pgd_t *pgd; + + pmdval_t pmd_val; + unsigned long vaddr; +}; + static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { @@ -235,15 +243,14 @@ static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t * #define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC #define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) -static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area, - unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val) +static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { pgd_t *pgd_p; p4d_t *p4d_p; pud_t *pud_p; pmd_t *pmd_p; - pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr); + pgd_p = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr); if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) p4d_p = (p4d_t *)(native_pgd_val(*pgd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); @@ -253,15 +260,15 @@ static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd pgd_t pgd; if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { - p4d_p = pgtable_area; + p4d_p = ppd->pgtable_area; memset(p4d_p, 0, sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D; + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D; pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)p4d_p + PGD_FLAGS); } else { - pud_p = pgtable_area; + pud_p = ppd->pgtable_area; memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD; + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD; pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)pud_p + PGD_FLAGS); } @@ -269,44 +276,41 @@ static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { - p4d_p += p4d_index(vaddr); + p4d_p += p4d_index(ppd->vaddr); if (native_p4d_val(*p4d_p)) { pud_p = (pud_t *)(native_p4d_val(*p4d_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); } else { p4d_t p4d; - pud_p = pgtable_area; + pud_p = ppd->pgtable_area; memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD; + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD; p4d = native_make_p4d((pudval_t)pud_p + P4D_FLAGS); native_set_p4d(p4d_p, p4d); } } - pud_p += pud_index(vaddr); + pud_p += pud_index(ppd->vaddr); if (native_pud_val(*pud_p)) { if (native_pud_val(*pud_p) & _PAGE_PSE) - goto out; + return; pmd_p = (pmd_t *)(native_pud_val(*pud_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); } else { pud_t pud; - pmd_p = pgtable_area; + pmd_p = ppd->pgtable_area; memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD; + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD; pud = native_make_pud((pmdval_t)pmd_p + PUD_FLAGS); native_set_pud(pud_p, pud); } - pmd_p += pmd_index(vaddr); + pmd_p += pmd_index(ppd->vaddr); if (!native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) || !(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE)) - native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(pmd_val)); - -out: - return pgtable_area; + native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(ppd->pmd_val)); } static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len) @@ -364,11 +368,10 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len; unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len; unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len; + struct sme_populate_pgd_data ppd; unsigned long pgtable_area_len; unsigned long paddr, pmd_flags; unsigned long decrypted_base; - void *pgtable_area; - pgd_t *pgd; if (!sme_active()) return; @@ -432,18 +435,18 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) * pagetables and when the new encrypted and decrypted kernel * mappings are populated. */ - pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end; + ppd.pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end; /* * Make sure the current pagetable structure has entries for * addressing the workarea. */ - pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa(); + ppd.pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa(); paddr = workarea_start; while (paddr < workarea_end) { - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr, - paddr + PMD_FLAGS); + ppd.pmd_val = paddr + PMD_FLAGS; + ppd.vaddr = paddr; + sme_populate_pgd_large(&ppd); paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; } @@ -457,17 +460,17 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) * populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and decrypted * kernel mappings are created. */ - pgd = pgtable_area; - memset(pgd, 0, sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD); - pgtable_area += sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD; + ppd.pgd = ppd.pgtable_area; + memset(ppd.pgd, 0, sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD); + ppd.pgtable_area += sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD; /* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */ pmd_flags = PMD_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC; paddr = kernel_start; while (paddr < kernel_end) { - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr, - paddr + pmd_flags); + ppd.pmd_val = paddr + pmd_flags; + ppd.vaddr = paddr; + sme_populate_pgd_large(&ppd); paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; } @@ -485,9 +488,9 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) pmd_flags = (PMD_FLAGS & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT); paddr = kernel_start; while (paddr < kernel_end) { - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr + decrypted_base, - paddr + pmd_flags); + ppd.pmd_val = paddr + pmd_flags; + ppd.vaddr = paddr + decrypted_base; + sme_populate_pgd_large(&ppd); paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; } @@ -495,30 +498,29 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) /* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */ paddr = workarea_start; while (paddr < workarea_end) { - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr, - paddr + PMD_FLAGS); - - pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area, - paddr + decrypted_base, - paddr + PMD_FLAGS); + ppd.pmd_val = paddr + PMD_FLAGS; + ppd.vaddr = paddr; + sme_populate_pgd_large(&ppd); + + ppd.vaddr = paddr + decrypted_base; + sme_populate_pgd_large(&ppd); paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE; } /* Perform the encryption */ sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base, - kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)pgd); + kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)ppd.pgd); /* * At this point we are running encrypted. Remove the mappings for * the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove * the PGD entry/entries. */ - sme_clear_pgd(pgd, kernel_start + decrypted_base, + sme_clear_pgd(ppd.pgd, kernel_start + decrypted_base, kernel_end + decrypted_base); - sme_clear_pgd(pgd, workarea_start + decrypted_base, + sme_clear_pgd(ppd.pgd, workarea_start + decrypted_base, workarea_end + decrypted_base); /* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com are queue-4.14/x86-mm-clean-up-register-saving-in-the-__enc_copy-assembly-code.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-use-a-struct-to-reduce-parameters-for-sme-pgd-mapping.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-centralize-pmd-flags-in-sme_encrypt_kernel.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-fill-rsb-on-context-switch-for-affected-cpus.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-prepare-sme_encrypt_kernel-for-page-aligned-encryption.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-add-lfence-to-the-retpoline-rsb-filling-rsb-macros.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/mm: Prepare sme_encrypt_kernel() for PAGE aligned encryption" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/mm: Prepare sme_encrypt_kernel() for PAGE aligned encryption to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-mm-prepare-sme_encrypt_kernel-for-page-aligned-encryption.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From cc5f01e28d6c60f274fd1e33b245f679f79f543c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:26:26 -0600 Subject: x86/mm: Prepare sme_encrypt_kernel() for PAGE aligned encryption From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> commit cc5f01e28d6c60f274fd1e33b245f679f79f543c upstream. In preparation for encrypting more than just the kernel, the encryption support in sme_encrypt_kernel() needs to support 4KB page aligned encryption instead of just 2MB large page aligned encryption. Update the routines that populate the PGD to support non-2MB aligned addresses. This is done by creating PTE page tables for the start and end portion of the address range that fall outside of the 2MB alignment. This results in, at most, two extra pages to hold the PTE entries for each mapping of a range. Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192626.6026.75387.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoff… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 20 ++++-- 2 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ struct sme_populate_pgd_data { pgd_t *pgd; pmdval_t pmd_flags; + pteval_t pte_flags; unsigned long paddr; unsigned long vaddr; @@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct #define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC #define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC #define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC +#define PMD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC #define PMD_FLAGS_LARGE (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) @@ -251,7 +253,15 @@ static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct #define PMD_FLAGS_ENC (PMD_FLAGS_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC) -static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +#define PTE_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) + +#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC PTE_FLAGS +#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PTE_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \ + (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT)) + +#define PTE_FLAGS_ENC (PTE_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC) + +static pmd_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { pgd_t *pgd_p; p4d_t *p4d_p; @@ -302,7 +312,7 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd_larg pud_p += pud_index(ppd->vaddr); if (native_pud_val(*pud_p)) { if (native_pud_val(*pud_p) & _PAGE_PSE) - return; + return NULL; pmd_p = (pmd_t *)(native_pud_val(*pud_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); } else { @@ -316,16 +326,55 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd_larg native_set_pud(pud_p, pud); } + return pmd_p; +} + +static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + pmd_t *pmd_p; + + pmd_p = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd); + if (!pmd_p) + return; + pmd_p += pmd_index(ppd->vaddr); if (!native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) || !(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE)) native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags)); } -static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd, - pmdval_t pmd_flags) +static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { - ppd->pmd_flags = pmd_flags; + pmd_t *pmd_p; + pte_t *pte_p; + pmd_p = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd); + if (!pmd_p) + return; + + pmd_p += pmd_index(ppd->vaddr); + if (native_pmd_val(*pmd_p)) { + if (native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE) + return; + + pte_p = (pte_t *)(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK); + } else { + pmd_t pmd; + + pte_p = ppd->pgtable_area; + memset(pte_p, 0, sizeof(*pte_p) * PTRS_PER_PTE); + ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte_p) * PTRS_PER_PTE; + + pmd = native_make_pmd((pteval_t)pte_p + PMD_FLAGS); + native_set_pmd(pmd_p, pmd); + } + + pte_p += pte_index(ppd->vaddr); + if (!native_pte_val(*pte_p)) + native_set_pte(pte_p, native_make_pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags)); +} + +static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) { sme_populate_pgd_large(ppd); @@ -334,33 +383,71 @@ static void __init __sme_map_range(struc } } +static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) +{ + while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) { + sme_populate_pgd(ppd); + + ppd->vaddr += PAGE_SIZE; + ppd->paddr += PAGE_SIZE; + } +} + +static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd, + pmdval_t pmd_flags, pteval_t pte_flags) +{ + unsigned long vaddr_end; + + ppd->pmd_flags = pmd_flags; + ppd->pte_flags = pte_flags; + + /* Save original end value since we modify the struct value */ + vaddr_end = ppd->vaddr_end; + + /* If start is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */ + ppd->vaddr_end = ALIGN(ppd->vaddr, PMD_PAGE_SIZE); + __sme_map_range_pte(ppd); + + /* Create PMD entries */ + ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end & PMD_PAGE_MASK; + __sme_map_range_pmd(ppd); + + /* If end is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */ + ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end; + __sme_map_range_pte(ppd); +} + static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { - __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC); + __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC); } static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { - __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC); + __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC); } static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd) { - __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP); + __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP); } static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len) { - unsigned long p4d_size, pud_size, pmd_size; + unsigned long p4d_size, pud_size, pmd_size, pte_size; unsigned long total; /* * Perform a relatively simplistic calculation of the pagetable - * entries that are needed. That mappings will be covered by 2MB - * PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required + * entries that are needed. Those mappings will be covered mostly + * by 2MB PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required * number of P4D, PUD and PMD structures needed to perform the - * mappings. Incrementing the count for each covers the case where - * the addresses cross entries. + * mappings. For mappings that are not 2MB aligned, PTE mappings + * would be needed for the start and end portion of the address range + * that fall outside of the 2MB alignment. This results in, at most, + * two extra pages to hold PTE entries for each range that is mapped. + * Incrementing the count for each covers the case where the addresses + * cross entries. */ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) { p4d_size = (ALIGN(len, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1; @@ -374,8 +461,9 @@ static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_ } pmd_size = (ALIGN(len, PUD_SIZE) / PUD_SIZE) + 1; pmd_size *= sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD; + pte_size = 2 * sizeof(pte_t) * PTRS_PER_PTE; - total = p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size; + total = p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size + pte_size; /* * Now calculate the added pagetable structures needed to populate @@ -458,10 +546,13 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) /* * The total workarea includes the executable encryption area and - * the pagetable area. + * the pagetable area. The start of the workarea is already 2MB + * aligned, align the end of the workarea on a 2MB boundary so that + * we don't try to create/allocate PTE entries from the workarea + * before it is mapped. */ workarea_len = execute_len + pgtable_area_len; - workarea_end = workarea_start + workarea_len; + workarea_end = ALIGN(workarea_start + workarea_len, PMD_PAGE_SIZE); /* * Set the address to the start of where newly created pagetable --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy) mov %rdx, %cr4 push %r15 + push %r12 movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save kernel length */ movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted kernel address */ @@ -119,21 +120,27 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy) wbinvd /* Invalidate any cache entries */ - /* Copy/encrypt 2MB at a time */ + /* Copy/encrypt up to 2MB at a time */ + movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r12 1: + cmpq %r12, %r9 + jnb 2f + movq %r9, %r12 + +2: movq %r11, %rsi /* Source - decrypted kernel */ movq %r8, %rdi /* Dest - intermediate copy buffer */ - movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */ + movq %r12, %rcx rep movsb movq %r8, %rsi /* Source - intermediate copy buffer */ movq %r10, %rdi /* Dest - encrypted kernel */ - movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */ + movq %r12, %rcx rep movsb - addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r11 - addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r10 - subq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r9 /* Kernel length decrement */ + addq %r12, %r11 + addq %r12, %r10 + subq %r12, %r9 /* Kernel length decrement */ jnz 1b /* Kernel length not zero? */ /* Restore PAT register */ @@ -142,6 +149,7 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy) mov %r15, %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */ wrmsr + pop %r12 pop %r15 ret Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com are queue-4.14/x86-mm-clean-up-register-saving-in-the-__enc_copy-assembly-code.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-use-a-struct-to-reduce-parameters-for-sme-pgd-mapping.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-centralize-pmd-flags-in-sme_encrypt_kernel.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-fill-rsb-on-context-switch-for-affected-cpus.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-prepare-sme_encrypt_kernel-for-page-aligned-encryption.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-add-lfence-to-the-retpoline-rsb-filling-rsb-macros.patch

7 years, 3 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/mm: Clean up register saving in the __enc_copy() assembly code" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/mm: Clean up register saving in the __enc_copy() assembly code to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-mm-clean-up-register-saving-in-the-__enc_copy-assembly-code.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 1303880179e67c59e801429b7e5d0f6b21137d99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 13:25:56 -0600 Subject: x86/mm: Clean up register saving in the __enc_copy() assembly code From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> commit 1303880179e67c59e801429b7e5d0f6b21137d99 upstream. Clean up the use of PUSH and POP and when registers are saved in the __enc_copy() assembly function in order to improve the readability of the code. Move parameter register saving into general purpose registers earlier in the code and move all the pushes to the beginning of the function with corresponding pops at the end. We do this to prepare fixes. Tested-by: Gabriel Craciunescu <nix.or.die(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh(a)amd.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110192556.6026.74187.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoff… Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S @@ -103,20 +103,19 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy) orq $X86_CR4_PGE, %rdx mov %rdx, %cr4 + push %r15 + + movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save kernel length */ + movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted kernel address */ + movq %rsi, %r11 /* Save decrypted kernel address */ + /* Set the PAT register PA5 entry to write-protect */ - push %rcx movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx rdmsr - push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */ + mov %rdx, %r15 /* Save original PAT value */ andl $0xffff00ff, %edx /* Clear PA5 */ orl $0x00000500, %edx /* Set PA5 to WP */ wrmsr - pop %rdx /* RDX contains original PAT value */ - pop %rcx - - movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save kernel length */ - movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted kernel address */ - movq %rsi, %r11 /* Save decrypted kernel address */ wbinvd /* Invalidate any cache entries */ @@ -138,12 +137,13 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy) jnz 1b /* Kernel length not zero? */ /* Restore PAT register */ - push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */ movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx rdmsr - pop %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */ + mov %r15, %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */ wrmsr + pop %r15 + ret .L__enc_copy_end: ENDPROC(__enc_copy) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com are queue-4.14/x86-mm-clean-up-register-saving-in-the-__enc_copy-assembly-code.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-use-a-struct-to-reduce-parameters-for-sme-pgd-mapping.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-centralize-pmd-flags-in-sme_encrypt_kernel.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-fill-rsb-on-context-switch-for-affected-cpus.patch queue-4.14/x86-mm-prepare-sme_encrypt_kernel-for-page-aligned-encryption.patch queue-4.14/x86-retpoline-add-lfence-to-the-retpoline-rsb-filling-rsb-macros.patch

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Linux-stable-mirror January 2018