November 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH RCU -stable] Make need_resched() respond to urgent RCU-QS needs

by Paul E. McKenney

commit 92aa39e9dc77 upstream. The per-CPU rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs variable communicates an urgent need for an RCU quiescent state from the force-quiescent-state processing within the grace-period kthread to context switches and to cond_resched(). Unfortunately, such urgent needs are not communicated to need_resched(), which is sometimes used to decide when to invoke cond_resched(), for but one example, within the KVM vcpu_run() function. As of v4.15, this can result in synchronize_sched() being delayed by up to ten seconds, which can be problematic, to say nothing of annoying. This commit therefore checks rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs from within rcu_check_callbacks(), which is invoked from the scheduling-clock interrupt handler. If the current task is not an idle task and is not executing in usermode, a context switch is forced, and either way, the rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs variable is set to false. If the current task is an idle task, then RCU's dyntick-idle code will detect the quiescent state, so no further action is required. Similarly, if the task is executing in usermode, other code in rcu_check_callbacks() and its called functions will report the corresponding quiescent state. Reported-by: Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb(a)amazon.de> Reported-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> [ paulmck: Backported to make patch apply cleanly on older versions. ] Tested-by: Marius Hillenbrand <mhillenb(a)amazon.de> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.12.x - 4.19.x diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree.c b/kernel/rcu/tree.c index 0b760c1369f7..15301ed19da6 100644 --- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c +++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c @@ -2662,6 +2662,15 @@ void rcu_check_callbacks(int user) rcu_bh_qs(); } rcu_preempt_check_callbacks(); + /* The load-acquire pairs with the store-release setting to true. */ + if (smp_load_acquire(this_cpu_ptr(&rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs))) { + /* Idle and userspace execution already are quiescent states. */ + if (!rcu_is_cpu_rrupt_from_idle() && !user) { + set_tsk_need_resched(current); + set_preempt_need_resched(); + } + __this_cpu_write(rcu_dynticks.rcu_urgent_qs, false); + } if (rcu_pending()) invoke_rcu_core();

5 years, 6 months

2
1
0 0

[PATCH] namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files

by Loic

Hello, Please picked up this patch for linux 4.9 and 4.14 (linux 4.4 needs a small modification). Indeed, this code will be beneficial to the GNU/Linux distributions that use a longterm kernel. Compiled/tested without problem. Thank. [ Upstream commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5 ] From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16(a)gmail.com> Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 17:00:35 -0700 Subject: namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag. The purpose is to make data spoofing attacks harder. This protection can be turned on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like the symlinks/hardlinks protection. This patch is based on Openwall's "HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer. This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation: CVE-2000-1134 CVE-2007-3852 CVE-2008-0525 CVE-2009-0416 CVE-2011-4834 CVE-2015-1838 CVE-2015-7442 CVE-2016-7489 This list is not meant to be complete. It's difficult to track down all vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any mention of this particular attack vector. In fact, before hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite vehicle to exploit them. [s.mesoraca16(a)gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gma… [keescook(a)chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future] [keescook(a)chromium.org: adjust commit subjet] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Suggested-by: Solar Designer <solar(a)openwall.com> Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> --- Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/namei.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++ kernel/sysctl.c | 18 +++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt index 6c00c1e2743f..819caf8ca05f 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt @@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs: - overflowgid - pipe-user-pages-hard - pipe-user-pages-soft +- protected_fifos - protected_hardlinks +- protected_regular - protected_symlinks - suid_dumpable - super-max @@ -182,6 +184,24 @@ applied. ============================================================== +protected_fifos: + +The intent of this protection is to avoid unintentional writes to +an attacker-controlled FIFO, where a program expected to create a regular +file. + +When set to "0", writing to FIFOs is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" don't allow O_CREAT open on FIFOs that we don't own +in world writable sticky directories, unless they are owned by the +owner of the directory. + +When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall. + +============================================================== + protected_hardlinks: A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based @@ -202,6 +222,22 @@ This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. ============================================================== +protected_regular: + +This protection is similar to protected_fifos, but it +avoids writes to an attacker-controlled regular file, where a program +expected to create one. + +When set to "0", writing to regular files is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" don't allow O_CREAT open on regular files that we +don't own in world writable sticky directories, unless they are +owned by the owner of the directory. + +When set to "2" it also applies to group writable sticky directories. + +============================================================== + protected_symlinks: A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index ae6aa9ae757c..0cab6494978c 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -887,6 +887,8 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd) int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0; int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0; +int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly; +int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly; /** * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations @@ -1003,6 +1005,45 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link) return -EPERM; } +/** + * may_create_in_sticky - Check whether an O_CREAT open in a sticky directory + * should be allowed, or not, on files that already + * exist. + * @dir: the sticky parent directory + * @inode: the inode of the file to open + * + * Block an O_CREAT open of a FIFO (or a regular file) when: + * - sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is enabled + * - the file already exists + * - we are in a sticky directory + * - we don't own the file + * - the owner of the directory doesn't own the file + * - the directory is world writable + * If the sysctl_protected_fifos (or sysctl_protected_regular) is set to 2 + * the directory doesn't have to be world writable: being group writable will + * be enough. + * + * Returns 0 if the open is allowed, -ve on error. + */ +static int may_create_in_sticky(struct dentry * const dir, + struct inode * const inode) +{ + if ((!sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) || + (!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) || + likely(!(dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX)) || + uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir->d_inode->i_uid) || + uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) + return 0; + + if (likely(dir->d_inode->i_mode & 0002) || + (dir->d_inode->i_mode & 0020 && + ((sysctl_protected_fifos >= 2 && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) || + (sysctl_protected_regular >= 2 && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))))) { + return -EACCES; + } + return 0; +} + static __always_inline const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd) { @@ -3348,9 +3389,15 @@ finish_open: if (error) return error; audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0); - error = -EISDIR; - if ((open_flag & O_CREAT) && d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry)) - goto out; + if (open_flag & O_CREAT) { + error = -EISDIR; + if (d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry)) + goto out; + error = may_create_in_sticky(dir, + d_backing_inode(nd->path.dentry)); + if (unlikely(error)) + goto out; + } error = -ENOTDIR; if ((nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) && !d_can_lookup(nd->path.dentry)) goto out; diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index e5710541183b..33322702c910 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ extern struct inodes_stat_t inodes_stat; extern int leases_enable, lease_break_time; extern int sysctl_protected_symlinks; extern int sysctl_protected_hardlinks; +extern int sysctl_protected_fifos; +extern int sysctl_protected_regular; typedef __kernel_rwf_t rwf_t; diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 71ceb6c13c1a..cc02050fd0c4 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1807,6 +1807,24 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = { .extra1 = &zero, .extra2 = &one, }, + { + .procname = "protected_fifos", + .data = &sysctl_protected_fifos, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &two, + }, + { + .procname = "protected_regular", + .data = &sysctl_protected_regular, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &two, + }, { .procname = "suid_dumpable", .data = &suid_dumpable, -- cgit 1.2-0.3.lf.el7

5 years, 6 months

4
8
0 0

[PATCH] gfs2: Fix iomap buffer head reference counting bug

by Andreas Gruenbacher

commit c26b5aa8ef0d46035060fded475e6ab957b9f69f upstream. GFS2 passes the inode buffer head (dibh) from gfs2_iomap_begin to gfs2_iomap_end in iomap->private. It sets that private pointer in gfs2_iomap_get. Users of gfs2_iomap_get other than gfs2_iomap_begin would have to release iomap->private, but this isn't done correctly, leading to a leak of buffer head references. To fix this, move the code for setting iomap->private from gfs2_iomap_get to gfs2_iomap_begin. Fixes: 64bc06bb32 ("gfs2: iomap buffered write support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.19 Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/gfs2/bmap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/gfs2/bmap.c b/fs/gfs2/bmap.c index 84544a4f012d..be9cc9a388a6 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/bmap.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/bmap.c @@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_get(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, ret = gfs2_meta_inode_buffer(ip, &dibh); if (ret) goto unlock; - iomap->private = dibh; + mp->mp_bh[0] = dibh; if (gfs2_is_stuffed(ip)) { if (flags & IOMAP_WRITE) { @@ -863,9 +863,6 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_get(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, len = lblock_stop - lblock + 1; iomap->length = len << inode->i_blkbits; - get_bh(dibh); - mp->mp_bh[0] = dibh; - height = ip->i_height; while ((lblock + 1) * sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize > sdp->sd_heightsize[height]) height++; @@ -898,8 +895,6 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_get(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, iomap->bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev; unlock: up_read(&ip->i_rw_mutex); - if (ret && dibh) - brelse(dibh); return ret; do_alloc: @@ -980,9 +975,9 @@ static void gfs2_iomap_journaled_page_done(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, static int gfs2_iomap_begin_write(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, unsigned flags, - struct iomap *iomap) + struct iomap *iomap, + struct metapath *mp) { - struct metapath mp = { .mp_aheight = 1, }; struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode); struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = GFS2_SB(inode); unsigned int data_blocks = 0, ind_blocks = 0, rblocks; @@ -996,9 +991,9 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_begin_write(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, unstuff = gfs2_is_stuffed(ip) && pos + length > gfs2_max_stuffed_size(ip); - ret = gfs2_iomap_get(inode, pos, length, flags, iomap, &mp); + ret = gfs2_iomap_get(inode, pos, length, flags, iomap, mp); if (ret) - goto out_release; + goto out_unlock; alloc_required = unstuff || iomap->type == IOMAP_HOLE; @@ -1013,7 +1008,7 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_begin_write(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, ret = gfs2_quota_lock_check(ip, &ap); if (ret) - goto out_release; + goto out_unlock; ret = gfs2_inplace_reserve(ip, &ap); if (ret) @@ -1038,17 +1033,15 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_begin_write(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, ret = gfs2_unstuff_dinode(ip, NULL); if (ret) goto out_trans_end; - release_metapath(&mp); - brelse(iomap->private); - iomap->private = NULL; + release_metapath(mp); ret = gfs2_iomap_get(inode, iomap->offset, iomap->length, - flags, iomap, &mp); + flags, iomap, mp); if (ret) goto out_trans_end; } if (iomap->type == IOMAP_HOLE) { - ret = gfs2_iomap_alloc(inode, iomap, flags, &mp); + ret = gfs2_iomap_alloc(inode, iomap, flags, mp); if (ret) { gfs2_trans_end(sdp); gfs2_inplace_release(ip); @@ -1056,7 +1049,6 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_begin_write(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, goto out_qunlock; } } - release_metapath(&mp); if (!gfs2_is_stuffed(ip) && gfs2_is_jdata(ip)) iomap->page_done = gfs2_iomap_journaled_page_done; return 0; @@ -1069,10 +1061,7 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_begin_write(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, out_qunlock: if (alloc_required) gfs2_quota_unlock(ip); -out_release: - if (iomap->private) - brelse(iomap->private); - release_metapath(&mp); +out_unlock: gfs2_write_unlock(inode); return ret; } @@ -1088,10 +1077,10 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_begin(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, trace_gfs2_iomap_start(ip, pos, length, flags); if ((flags & IOMAP_WRITE) && !(flags & IOMAP_DIRECT)) { - ret = gfs2_iomap_begin_write(inode, pos, length, flags, iomap); + ret = gfs2_iomap_begin_write(inode, pos, length, flags, iomap, &mp); } else { ret = gfs2_iomap_get(inode, pos, length, flags, iomap, &mp); - release_metapath(&mp); + /* * Silently fall back to buffered I/O for stuffed files or if * we've hot a hole (see gfs2_file_direct_write). @@ -1100,6 +1089,11 @@ static int gfs2_iomap_begin(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length, iomap->type != IOMAP_MAPPED) ret = -ENOTBLK; } + if (!ret) { + get_bh(mp.mp_bh[0]); + iomap->private = mp.mp_bh[0]; + } + release_metapath(&mp); trace_gfs2_iomap_end(ip, iomap, ret); return ret; } -- 2.19.1.546.g028f9c799.dirty

5 years, 6 months

2
1
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: Ensure btrfs_trim_fs can trim the whole filesystem" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 6ba9fc8e628becf0e3ec94083450d089b0dec5f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 14:16:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: Ensure btrfs_trim_fs can trim the whole filesystem [BUG] fstrim on some btrfs only trims the unallocated space, not trimming any space in existing block groups. [CAUSE] Before fstrim_range passed to btrfs_trim_fs(), it gets truncated to range [0, super->total_bytes). So later btrfs_trim_fs() will only be able to trim block groups in range [0, super->total_bytes). While for btrfs, any bytenr aligned to sectorsize is valid, since btrfs uses its logical address space, there is nothing limiting the location where we put block groups. For filesystem with frequent balance, it's quite easy to relocate all block groups and bytenr of block groups will start beyond super->total_bytes. In that case, btrfs will not trim existing block groups. [FIX] Just remove the truncation in btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(), so btrfs_trim_fs() can get the unmodified range, which is normally set to [0, U64_MAX]. Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists(a)colorremedies.com> Fixes: f4c697e6406d ("btrfs: return EINVAL if start > total_bytes in fitrim ioctl") CC: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index 5dbb3f713125..da3257585e29 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -10851,21 +10851,13 @@ int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct fstrim_range *range) u64 start; u64 end; u64 trimmed = 0; - u64 total_bytes = btrfs_super_total_bytes(fs_info->super_copy); u64 bg_failed = 0; u64 dev_failed = 0; int bg_ret = 0; int dev_ret = 0; int ret = 0; - /* - * try to trim all FS space, our block group may start from non-zero. - */ - if (range->len == total_bytes) - cache = btrfs_lookup_first_block_group(fs_info, range->start); - else - cache = btrfs_lookup_block_group(fs_info, range->start); - + cache = btrfs_lookup_first_block_group(fs_info, range->start); for (; cache; cache = next_block_group(fs_info, cache)) { if (cache->key.objectid >= (range->start + range->len)) { btrfs_put_block_group(cache); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index 4905d13dee0a..a990a9045139 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -491,7 +491,6 @@ static noinline int btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(struct file *file, void __user *arg) struct fstrim_range range; u64 minlen = ULLONG_MAX; u64 num_devices = 0; - u64 total_bytes = btrfs_super_total_bytes(fs_info->super_copy); int ret; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) @@ -515,11 +514,15 @@ static noinline int btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(struct file *file, void __user *arg) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (copy_from_user(&range, arg, sizeof(range))) return -EFAULT; - if (range.start > total_bytes || - range.len < fs_info->sb->s_blocksize) + + /* + * NOTE: Don't truncate the range using super->total_bytes. Bytenr of + * block group is in the logical address space, which can be any + * sectorsize aligned bytenr in the range [0, U64_MAX]. + */ + if (range.len < fs_info->sb->s_blocksize) return -EINVAL; - range.len = min(range.len, total_bytes - range.start); range.minlen = max(range.minlen, minlen); ret = btrfs_trim_fs(fs_info, &range); if (ret < 0)

5 years, 6 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] usb: xhci: fix uninitialized completion when USB3 port got wrong status

by Aaron Ma

commit 958c0bd86075d4ef1c936998deefe1947e539240 upstream. Realtek USB3.0 Card Reader [0bda:0328] reports wrong port status on Cannon lake PCH USB3.1 xHCI [8086:a36d] after resume from S3, after clear port reset it works fine. Since this device is registered on USB3 roothub at boot, when port status reports not superspeed, xhci_get_port_status will call an uninitialized completion in bus_state[0]. Kernel will hang because of NULL pointer. Restrict the USB2 resume status check in USB2 roothub to fix hang issue. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.17.x- Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma <aaron.ma(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma <aaron.ma(a)canonical.com> --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c | 2 +- drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c index aee29604bd79..b3376b1ab009 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-hub.c @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static u32 xhci_get_port_status(struct usb_hcd *hcd, status |= USB_PORT_STAT_SUSPEND; } if ((raw_port_status & PORT_PLS_MASK) == XDEV_RESUME && - !DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(raw_port_status)) { + !DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(raw_port_status) && hcd->speed < HCD_USB3) { if ((raw_port_status & PORT_RESET) || !(raw_port_status & PORT_PE)) return 0xffffffff; diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c index ece0787d62bf..9f141113f202 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c @@ -1673,7 +1673,7 @@ static void handle_port_status(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, * RExit to a disconnect state). If so, let the the driver know it's * out of the RExit state. */ - if (!DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(temp) && + if (!DEV_SUPERSPEED_ANY(portsc) && hcd->speed < HCD_USB3 && test_and_clear_bit(faked_port_index, &bus_state->rexit_ports)) { complete(&bus_state->rexit_done[faked_port_index]); -- 2.19.2

5 years, 6 months

2
1
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] can: flexcan: handle tx-complete CAN frames via rx-offload" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From ed72bc8bcb9277061e753faf300b20f97323761c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel(a)pengutronix.de> Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2018 11:40:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] can: flexcan: handle tx-complete CAN frames via rx-offload infrastructure Current flexcan driver will put TX-ECHO in regular unsorted way, in this case TX-ECHO can come after the response to the same TXed message. In some cases, for example for J1939 stack, things will break. This patch is using new rx-offload API to put the messages just in the right place. Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel(a)pengutronix.de> Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> diff --git a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c index 68b46395c580..41a175f80c4b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c @@ -787,8 +787,11 @@ static irqreturn_t flexcan_irq(int irq, void *dev_id) /* transmission complete interrupt */ if (reg_iflag2 & FLEXCAN_IFLAG_MB(FLEXCAN_TX_MB)) { + u32 reg_ctrl = priv->read(&regs->mb[FLEXCAN_TX_MB].can_ctrl); + handled = IRQ_HANDLED; - stats->tx_bytes += can_get_echo_skb(dev, 0); + stats->tx_bytes += can_rx_offload_get_echo_skb(&priv->offload, + 0, reg_ctrl << 16); stats->tx_packets++; can_led_event(dev, CAN_LED_EVENT_TX);

5 years, 6 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] can: flexcan: use can_rx_offload_queue_sorted() for" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From d788905f68fd4714c82936f6f7f1d3644d7ae7ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel(a)pengutronix.de> Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2018 11:40:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] can: flexcan: use can_rx_offload_queue_sorted() for flexcan_irq_bus_*() Currently, in case of bus error, driver will generate error message and put in the tail of the message queue. To avoid confusions, this change should place the bus related messages in proper order. Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel(a)pengutronix.de> Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> diff --git a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c index 5923bd0ec118..75ce11395ee8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c @@ -561,9 +561,13 @@ static netdev_tx_t flexcan_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *de static void flexcan_irq_bus_err(struct net_device *dev, u32 reg_esr) { struct flexcan_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev); + struct flexcan_regs __iomem *regs = priv->regs; struct sk_buff *skb; struct can_frame *cf; bool rx_errors = false, tx_errors = false; + u32 timestamp; + + timestamp = priv->read(&regs->timer) << 16; skb = alloc_can_err_skb(dev, &cf); if (unlikely(!skb)) @@ -610,17 +614,21 @@ static void flexcan_irq_bus_err(struct net_device *dev, u32 reg_esr) if (tx_errors) dev->stats.tx_errors++; - can_rx_offload_queue_tail(&priv->offload, skb); + can_rx_offload_queue_sorted(&priv->offload, skb, timestamp); } static void flexcan_irq_state(struct net_device *dev, u32 reg_esr) { struct flexcan_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev); + struct flexcan_regs __iomem *regs = priv->regs; struct sk_buff *skb; struct can_frame *cf; enum can_state new_state, rx_state, tx_state; int flt; struct can_berr_counter bec; + u32 timestamp; + + timestamp = priv->read(&regs->timer) << 16; flt = reg_esr & FLEXCAN_ESR_FLT_CONF_MASK; if (likely(flt == FLEXCAN_ESR_FLT_CONF_ACTIVE)) { @@ -650,7 +658,7 @@ static void flexcan_irq_state(struct net_device *dev, u32 reg_esr) if (unlikely(new_state == CAN_STATE_BUS_OFF)) can_bus_off(dev); - can_rx_offload_queue_tail(&priv->offload, skb); + can_rx_offload_queue_sorted(&priv->offload, skb, timestamp); } static inline struct flexcan_priv *rx_offload_to_priv(struct can_rx_offload *offload)

5 years, 6 months

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patch "Revert "usb: dwc3: gadget: skip Set/Clear Halt when invalid"" added to usb-linus

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled Revert "usb: dwc3: gadget: skip Set/Clear Halt when invalid" to my usb git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git in the usb-linus branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the next -rc kernel release. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. >From 38317f5c0f2faae5110854f36edad810f841d62f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 08:34:04 +0200 Subject: Revert "usb: dwc3: gadget: skip Set/Clear Halt when invalid" This reverts commit ffb80fc672c3a7b6afd0cefcb1524fb99917b2f3. Turns out that commit is wrong. Host controllers are allowed to use Clear Feature HALT as means to sync data toggle between host and periperal. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index 9faad896b3a1..9f92ee03dde7 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -1470,9 +1470,6 @@ int __dwc3_gadget_ep_set_halt(struct dwc3_ep *dep, int value, int protocol) unsigned transfer_in_flight; unsigned started; - if (dep->flags & DWC3_EP_STALL) - return 0; - if (dep->number > 1) trb = dwc3_ep_prev_trb(dep, dep->trb_enqueue); else @@ -1494,8 +1491,6 @@ int __dwc3_gadget_ep_set_halt(struct dwc3_ep *dep, int value, int protocol) else dep->flags |= DWC3_EP_STALL; } else { - if (!(dep->flags & DWC3_EP_STALL)) - return 0; ret = dwc3_send_clear_stall_ep_cmd(dep); if (ret) -- 2.19.2

5 years, 6 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] iwlwifi: mvm: fix regulatory domain update when the firmware" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 82715ac71e6b94a2c2136e31f3a8e6748e33aa8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 11:16:54 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] iwlwifi: mvm: fix regulatory domain update when the firmware starts When the firmware starts, it doesn't have any regulatory information, hence it uses the world wide limitations. The driver can feed the firmware with previous knowledge that was kept in the driver, but the firmware may still not update its internal tables. This happens when we start a BSS interface, and then the firmware can change the regulatory tables based on our location and it'll use more lenient, location specific rules. Then, if the firmware is shut down (when the interface is brought down), and then an AP interface is created, the firmware will forget the country specific rules. The host will think that we are in a certain country that may allow channels and will try to teach the firmware about our location, but the firmware may still not allow to drop the world wide limitations and apply country specific rules because it was just re-started. In this case, the firmware will reply with MCC_RESP_ILLEGAL to the MCC_UPDATE_CMD. In that case, iwlwifi needs to let the upper layers (cfg80211 / hostapd) know that the channel list they know about has been updated. This fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201105 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c index 7c09ce20e8b1..00f831d88366 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c @@ -301,8 +301,12 @@ struct ieee80211_regdomain *iwl_mvm_get_regdomain(struct wiphy *wiphy, goto out; } - if (changed) - *changed = (resp->status == MCC_RESP_NEW_CHAN_PROFILE); + if (changed) { + u32 status = le32_to_cpu(resp->status); + + *changed = (status == MCC_RESP_NEW_CHAN_PROFILE || + status == MCC_RESP_ILLEGAL); + } regd = iwl_parse_nvm_mcc_info(mvm->trans->dev, mvm->cfg, __le32_to_cpu(resp->n_channels), diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c index 3633f27d048a..6fc5cc1f2b5b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c @@ -539,9 +539,8 @@ iwl_mvm_update_mcc(struct iwl_mvm *mvm, const char *alpha2, } IWL_DEBUG_LAR(mvm, - "MCC response status: 0x%x. new MCC: 0x%x ('%c%c') change: %d n_chans: %d\n", - status, mcc, mcc >> 8, mcc & 0xff, - !!(status == MCC_RESP_NEW_CHAN_PROFILE), n_channels); + "MCC response status: 0x%x. new MCC: 0x%x ('%c%c') n_chans: %d\n", + status, mcc, mcc >> 8, mcc & 0xff, n_channels); exit: iwl_free_resp(&cmd);

5 years, 6 months

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request for 4.14-stable: 0c47cd7a9b6c ("PCI: endpoint: Populate func_no before calling pci_epc_add_epf()")

by Sudip Mukherjee

Hi Greg, This was not marked for stable but seems it should be in stable. Please apply to your queue of 4.14-stable. -- Regards Sudip

5 years, 6 months

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Linux-stable-mirror November 2018