February 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: af_alg - whitelist mask and type" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: af_alg - whitelist mask and type to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-af_alg-whitelist-mask-and-type.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From bb30b8848c85e18ca7e371d0a869e94b3e383bdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Mueller <smueller(a)chronox.de> Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2018 08:55:25 +0100 Subject: crypto: af_alg - whitelist mask and type From: Stephan Mueller <smueller(a)chronox.de> commit bb30b8848c85e18ca7e371d0a869e94b3e383bdf upstream. The user space interface allows specifying the type and mask field used to allocate the cipher. Only a subset of the possible flags are intended for user space. Therefore, white-list the allowed flags. In case the user space caller uses at least one non-allowed flag, EINVAL is returned. Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller(a)chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- crypto/af_alg.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_release_parent) static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) { - const u32 forbidden = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL; + const u32 allowed = CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); struct sockaddr_alg *sa = (void *)uaddr; @@ -158,6 +158,10 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, void *private; int err; + /* If caller uses non-allowed flag, return error. */ + if ((sa->salg_feat & ~allowed) || (sa->salg_mask & ~allowed)) + return -EINVAL; + if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTED) return -EINVAL; @@ -176,9 +180,7 @@ static int alg_bind(struct socket *sock, if (IS_ERR(type)) return PTR_ERR(type); - private = type->bind(sa->salg_name, - sa->salg_feat & ~forbidden, - sa->salg_mask & ~forbidden); + private = type->bind(sa->salg_name, sa->salg_feat, sa->salg_mask); if (IS_ERR(private)) { module_put(type->owner); return PTR_ERR(private); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from smueller(a)chronox.de are queue-4.14/crypto-af_alg-whitelist-mask-and-type.patch queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-handle-zero-length-dst-buffer.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: ecdh - fix typo in KPP dependency of CRYPTO_ECDH" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: ecdh - fix typo in KPP dependency of CRYPTO_ECDH to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-ecdh-fix-typo-in-kpp-dependency-of-crypto_ecdh.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b5b9007730ce1d90deaf25d7f678511550744bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke(a)hauke-m.de> Date: Sun, 26 Nov 2017 00:16:46 +0100 Subject: crypto: ecdh - fix typo in KPP dependency of CRYPTO_ECDH From: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke(a)hauke-m.de> commit b5b9007730ce1d90deaf25d7f678511550744bdc upstream. This fixes a typo in the CRYPTO_KPP dependency of CRYPTO_ECDH. Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support") Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke(a)hauke-m.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- crypto/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/Kconfig @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DH config CRYPTO_ECDH tristate "ECDH algorithm" - select CRYTPO_KPP + select CRYPTO_KPP select CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT help Generic implementation of the ECDH algorithm Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from hauke(a)hauke-m.de are queue-4.14/crypto-ecdh-fix-typo-in-kpp-dependency-of-crypto_ecdh.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: aesni - handle zero length dst buffer" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: aesni - handle zero length dst buffer to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-aesni-handle-zero-length-dst-buffer.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 9c674e1e2f9e24fa4392167efe343749008338e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephan Mueller <smueller(a)chronox.de> Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 20:41:09 +0100 Subject: crypto: aesni - handle zero length dst buffer From: Stephan Mueller <smueller(a)chronox.de> commit 9c674e1e2f9e24fa4392167efe343749008338e0 upstream. GCM can be invoked with a zero destination buffer. This is possible if the AAD and the ciphertext have zero lengths and only the tag exists in the source buffer (i.e. a source buffer cannot be zero). In this case, the GCM cipher only performs the authentication and no decryption operation. When the destination buffer has zero length, it is possible that no page is mapped to the SG pointing to the destination. In this case, sg_page(req->dst) is an invalid access. Therefore, page accesses should only be allowed if the req->dst->length is non-zero which is the indicator that a page must exist. This fixes a crash that can be triggered by user space via AF_ALG. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller(a)chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ static int gcmaes_decrypt(struct aead_re if (sg_is_last(req->src) && (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->src)) || req->src->offset + req->src->length <= PAGE_SIZE) && - sg_is_last(req->dst) && + sg_is_last(req->dst) && req->dst->length && (!PageHighMem(sg_page(req->dst)) || req->dst->offset + req->dst->length <= PAGE_SIZE)) { one_entry_in_sg = 1; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from smueller(a)chronox.de are queue-4.14/crypto-af_alg-whitelist-mask-and-type.patch queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-handle-zero-length-dst-buffer.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: aesni - Use GCM IV size constant" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: aesni - Use GCM IV size constant to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-aesni-use-gcm-iv-size-constant.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 46d93748e5a3628f9f553832cd64d8a59d8bafde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Corentin LABBE <clabbe.montjoie(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 10:08:18 +0200 Subject: crypto: aesni - Use GCM IV size constant From: Corentin LABBE <clabbe.montjoie(a)gmail.com> commit 46d93748e5a3628f9f553832cd64d8a59d8bafde upstream. This patch replace GCM IV size value by their constant name. Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <crypto/cryptd.h> #include <crypto/ctr.h> #include <crypto/b128ops.h> +#include <crypto/gcm.h> #include <crypto/xts.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/fpu/api.h> @@ -1131,7 +1132,7 @@ static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] .setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize, .encrypt = helper_rfc4106_encrypt, .decrypt = helper_rfc4106_decrypt, - .ivsize = 8, + .ivsize = GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE, .maxauthsize = 16, .base = { .cra_name = "__gcm-aes-aesni", @@ -1149,7 +1150,7 @@ static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] .setauthsize = rfc4106_set_authsize, .encrypt = rfc4106_encrypt, .decrypt = rfc4106_decrypt, - .ivsize = 8, + .ivsize = GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE, .maxauthsize = 16, .base = { .cra_name = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))", @@ -1165,7 +1166,7 @@ static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] .setauthsize = generic_gcmaes_set_authsize, .encrypt = generic_gcmaes_encrypt, .decrypt = generic_gcmaes_decrypt, - .ivsize = 12, + .ivsize = GCM_AES_IV_SIZE, .maxauthsize = 16, .base = { .cra_name = "gcm(aes)", Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from clabbe.montjoie(a)gmail.com are queue-4.14/crypto-gcm-add-gcm-iv-size-constant.patch queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-use-gcm-iv-size-constant.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: aesni - fix typo in generic_gcmaes_decrypt" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: aesni - fix typo in generic_gcmaes_decrypt to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-aesni-fix-typo-in-generic_gcmaes_decrypt.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 106840c41096a01079d3a2025225029c13713802 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 14:53:43 +0100 Subject: crypto: aesni - fix typo in generic_gcmaes_decrypt From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> commit 106840c41096a01079d3a2025225029c13713802 upstream. generic_gcmaes_decrypt needs to use generic_gcmaes_ctx, not aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx. This is actually harmless because the fields in struct generic_gcmaes_ctx share the layout of the same fields in aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx. Fixes: cce2ea8d90fe ("crypto: aesni - add generic gcm(aes)") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ static int generic_gcmaes_decrypt(struct { __be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1); struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); - struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm); + struct generic_gcmaes_ctx *ctx = generic_gcmaes_ctx_get(tfm); void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded); u8 iv[16] __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN))); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from sd(a)queasysnail.net are queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-add-wrapper-for-generic-gcm-aes.patch queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-fix-typo-in-generic_gcmaes_decrypt.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: aesni - Fix out-of-bounds access of the data buffer in generic-gcm-aesni" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: aesni - Fix out-of-bounds access of the data buffer in generic-gcm-aesni to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-aesni-fix-out-of-bounds-access-of-the-data-buffer-in-generic-gcm-aesni.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From b20209c91e23a9bbad9cac2f80bc16b3c259e10e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junaid Shahid <junaids(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 17:08:37 -0800 Subject: crypto: aesni - Fix out-of-bounds access of the data buffer in generic-gcm-aesni From: Junaid Shahid <junaids(a)google.com> commit b20209c91e23a9bbad9cac2f80bc16b3c259e10e upstream. The aesni_gcm_enc/dec functions can access memory before the start of the data buffer if the length of the data buffer is less than 16 bytes. This is because they perform the read via a single 16-byte load. This can potentially result in accessing a page that is not mapped and thus causing the machine to crash. This patch fixes that by reading the partial block byte-by-byte and optionally an via 8-byte load if the block was at least 8 bytes. Fixes: 0487ccac ("crypto: aesni - make non-AVX AES-GCM work with any aadlen") Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 87 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S @@ -257,6 +257,37 @@ aad_shift_arr: pxor \TMP1, \GH # result is in TMP1 .endm +# Reads DLEN bytes starting at DPTR and stores in XMMDst +# where 0 < DLEN < 16 +# Clobbers %rax, DLEN and XMM1 +.macro READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK DPTR DLEN XMM1 XMMDst + cmp $8, \DLEN + jl _read_lt8_\@ + mov (\DPTR), %rax + MOVQ_R64_XMM %rax, \XMMDst + sub $8, \DLEN + jz _done_read_partial_block_\@ + xor %eax, %eax +_read_next_byte_\@: + shl $8, %rax + mov 7(\DPTR, \DLEN, 1), %al + dec \DLEN + jnz _read_next_byte_\@ + MOVQ_R64_XMM %rax, \XMM1 + pslldq $8, \XMM1 + por \XMM1, \XMMDst + jmp _done_read_partial_block_\@ +_read_lt8_\@: + xor %eax, %eax +_read_next_byte_lt8_\@: + shl $8, %rax + mov -1(\DPTR, \DLEN, 1), %al + dec \DLEN + jnz _read_next_byte_lt8_\@ + MOVQ_R64_XMM %rax, \XMMDst +_done_read_partial_block_\@: +.endm + /* * if a = number of total plaintext bytes * b = floor(a/16) @@ -1386,14 +1417,6 @@ _esb_loop_\@: * * AAD Format with 64-bit Extended Sequence Number * -* aadLen: -* from the definition of the spec, aadLen can only be 8 or 12 bytes. -* The code supports 16 too but for other sizes, the code will fail. -* -* TLen: -* from the definition of the spec, TLen can only be 8, 12 or 16 bytes. -* For other sizes, the code will fail. -* * poly = x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1 * *****************************************************************************/ @@ -1487,19 +1510,16 @@ _zero_cipher_left_decrypt: PSHUFB_XMM %xmm10, %xmm0 ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK %xmm0, %xmm1 # E(K, Yn) - sub $16, %r11 - add %r13, %r11 - movdqu (%arg3,%r11,1), %xmm1 # receive the last <16 byte block - lea SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12 - sub %r13, %r12 -# adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be able to shift 16-%r13 bytes -# (%r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) - movdqu (%r12), %xmm2 # get the appropriate shuffle mask - PSHUFB_XMM %xmm2, %xmm1 # right shift 16-%r13 butes + lea (%arg3,%r11,1), %r10 + mov %r13, %r12 + READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10 %r12 %xmm2 %xmm1 + + lea ALL_F+16(%rip), %r12 + sub %r13, %r12 movdqa %xmm1, %xmm2 pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # Ciphertext XOR E(K, Yn) - movdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 + movdqu (%r12), %xmm1 # get the appropriate mask to mask out top 16-%r13 bytes of %xmm0 pand %xmm1, %xmm0 # mask out top 16-%r13 bytes of %xmm0 pand %xmm1, %xmm2 @@ -1508,9 +1528,6 @@ _zero_cipher_left_decrypt: pxor %xmm2, %xmm8 GHASH_MUL %xmm8, %xmm13, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 - # GHASH computation for the last <16 byte block - sub %r13, %r11 - add $16, %r11 # output %r13 bytes MOVQ_R64_XMM %xmm0, %rax @@ -1664,14 +1681,6 @@ ENDPROC(aesni_gcm_dec) * * AAD Format with 64-bit Extended Sequence Number * -* aadLen: -* from the definition of the spec, aadLen can only be 8 or 12 bytes. -* The code supports 16 too but for other sizes, the code will fail. -* -* TLen: -* from the definition of the spec, TLen can only be 8, 12 or 16 bytes. -* For other sizes, the code will fail. -* * poly = x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1 ***************************************************************************/ ENTRY(aesni_gcm_enc) @@ -1764,19 +1773,16 @@ _zero_cipher_left_encrypt: movdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10 PSHUFB_XMM %xmm10, %xmm0 - ENCRYPT_SINGLE_BLOCK %xmm0, %xmm1 # Encrypt(K, Yn) - sub $16, %r11 - add %r13, %r11 - movdqu (%arg3,%r11,1), %xmm1 # receive the last <16 byte blocks - lea SHIFT_MASK+16(%rip), %r12 + + lea (%arg3,%r11,1), %r10 + mov %r13, %r12 + READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10 %r12 %xmm2 %xmm1 + + lea ALL_F+16(%rip), %r12 sub %r13, %r12 - # adjust the shuffle mask pointer to be able to shift 16-r13 bytes - # (%r13 is the number of bytes in plaintext mod 16) - movdqu (%r12), %xmm2 # get the appropriate shuffle mask - PSHUFB_XMM %xmm2, %xmm1 # shift right 16-r13 byte pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # Plaintext XOR Encrypt(K, Yn) - movdqu ALL_F-SHIFT_MASK(%r12), %xmm1 + movdqu (%r12), %xmm1 # get the appropriate mask to mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm0 pand %xmm1, %xmm0 # mask out top 16-r13 bytes of xmm0 movdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10 @@ -1785,9 +1791,6 @@ _zero_cipher_left_encrypt: pxor %xmm0, %xmm8 GHASH_MUL %xmm8, %xmm13, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6 # GHASH computation for the last <16 byte block - sub %r13, %r11 - add $16, %r11 - movdqa SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm10 PSHUFB_XMM %xmm10, %xmm0 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from junaids(a)google.com are queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-fix-out-of-bounds-access-of-the-data-buffer-in-generic-gcm-aesni.patch queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-fix-out-of-bounds-access-of-the-aad-buffer-in-generic-gcm-aesni.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: aesni - Fix out-of-bounds access of the AAD buffer in generic-gcm-aesni" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: aesni - Fix out-of-bounds access of the AAD buffer in generic-gcm-aesni to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-aesni-fix-out-of-bounds-access-of-the-aad-buffer-in-generic-gcm-aesni.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 1ecdd37e308ca149dc378cce225068cbac54e3a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junaid Shahid <junaids(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 17:08:38 -0800 Subject: crypto: aesni - Fix out-of-bounds access of the AAD buffer in generic-gcm-aesni From: Junaid Shahid <junaids(a)google.com> commit 1ecdd37e308ca149dc378cce225068cbac54e3a6 upstream. The aesni_gcm_enc/dec functions can access memory after the end of the AAD buffer if the AAD length is not a multiple of 4 bytes. It didn't matter with rfc4106-gcm-aesni as in that case the AAD was always followed by the 8 byte IV, but that is no longer the case with generic-gcm-aesni. This can potentially result in accessing a page that is not mapped and thus causing the machine to crash. This patch fixes that by reading the last <16 byte block of the AAD byte-by-byte and optionally via an 8-byte load if the block was at least 8 bytes. Fixes: 0487ccac ("crypto: aesni - make non-AVX AES-GCM work with any aadlen") Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 112 ++++---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S @@ -90,30 +90,6 @@ SHIFT_MASK: .octa 0x0f0e0d0c0b0a09080706 ALL_F: .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff .octa 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 -.section .rodata -.align 16 -.type aad_shift_arr, @object -.size aad_shift_arr, 272 -aad_shift_arr: - .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0C - .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffff0D0C - .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffff0E0D0C - .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffff0F0E0D0C - .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffff0C0B0A0908 - .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffff0D0C0B0A0908 - .octa 0xffffffffffffffffff0E0D0C0B0A0908 - .octa 0xffffffffffffffff0F0E0D0C0B0A0908 - .octa 0xffffffffffffff0C0B0A090807060504 - .octa 0xffffffffffff0D0C0B0A090807060504 - .octa 0xffffffffff0E0D0C0B0A090807060504 - .octa 0xffffffff0F0E0D0C0B0A090807060504 - .octa 0xffffff0C0B0A09080706050403020100 - .octa 0xffff0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100 - .octa 0xff0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100 - .octa 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A09080706050403020100 - - .text @@ -304,62 +280,30 @@ _done_read_partial_block_\@: XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMMDst TMP6 TMP7 i i_seq operation MOVADQ SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm14 mov arg7, %r10 # %r10 = AAD - mov arg8, %r12 # %r12 = aadLen - mov %r12, %r11 + mov arg8, %r11 # %r11 = aadLen pxor %xmm\i, %xmm\i pxor \XMM2, \XMM2 cmp $16, %r11 - jl _get_AAD_rest8\num_initial_blocks\operation + jl _get_AAD_rest\num_initial_blocks\operation _get_AAD_blocks\num_initial_blocks\operation: movdqu (%r10), %xmm\i PSHUFB_XMM %xmm14, %xmm\i # byte-reflect the AAD data pxor %xmm\i, \XMM2 GHASH_MUL \XMM2, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1 add $16, %r10 - sub $16, %r12 sub $16, %r11 cmp $16, %r11 jge _get_AAD_blocks\num_initial_blocks\operation movdqu \XMM2, %xmm\i + + /* read the last <16B of AAD */ +_get_AAD_rest\num_initial_blocks\operation: cmp $0, %r11 je _get_AAD_done\num_initial_blocks\operation - pxor %xmm\i,%xmm\i - - /* read the last <16B of AAD. since we have at least 4B of - data right after the AAD (the ICV, and maybe some CT), we can - read 4B/8B blocks safely, and then get rid of the extra stuff */ -_get_AAD_rest8\num_initial_blocks\operation: - cmp $4, %r11 - jle _get_AAD_rest4\num_initial_blocks\operation - movq (%r10), \TMP1 - add $8, %r10 - sub $8, %r11 - pslldq $8, \TMP1 - psrldq $8, %xmm\i - pxor \TMP1, %xmm\i - jmp _get_AAD_rest8\num_initial_blocks\operation -_get_AAD_rest4\num_initial_blocks\operation: - cmp $0, %r11 - jle _get_AAD_rest0\num_initial_blocks\operation - mov (%r10), %eax - movq %rax, \TMP1 - add $4, %r10 - sub $4, %r10 - pslldq $12, \TMP1 - psrldq $4, %xmm\i - pxor \TMP1, %xmm\i -_get_AAD_rest0\num_initial_blocks\operation: - /* finalize: shift out the extra bytes we read, and align - left. since pslldq can only shift by an immediate, we use - vpshufb and an array of shuffle masks */ - movq %r12, %r11 - salq $4, %r11 - movdqu aad_shift_arr(%r11), \TMP1 - PSHUFB_XMM \TMP1, %xmm\i -_get_AAD_rest_final\num_initial_blocks\operation: + READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10, %r11, \TMP1, %xmm\i PSHUFB_XMM %xmm14, %xmm\i # byte-reflect the AAD data pxor \XMM2, %xmm\i GHASH_MUL %xmm\i, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1 @@ -563,62 +507,30 @@ _initial_blocks_done\num_initial_blocks\ XMM2 XMM3 XMM4 XMMDst TMP6 TMP7 i i_seq operation MOVADQ SHUF_MASK(%rip), %xmm14 mov arg7, %r10 # %r10 = AAD - mov arg8, %r12 # %r12 = aadLen - mov %r12, %r11 + mov arg8, %r11 # %r11 = aadLen pxor %xmm\i, %xmm\i pxor \XMM2, \XMM2 cmp $16, %r11 - jl _get_AAD_rest8\num_initial_blocks\operation + jl _get_AAD_rest\num_initial_blocks\operation _get_AAD_blocks\num_initial_blocks\operation: movdqu (%r10), %xmm\i PSHUFB_XMM %xmm14, %xmm\i # byte-reflect the AAD data pxor %xmm\i, \XMM2 GHASH_MUL \XMM2, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1 add $16, %r10 - sub $16, %r12 sub $16, %r11 cmp $16, %r11 jge _get_AAD_blocks\num_initial_blocks\operation movdqu \XMM2, %xmm\i + + /* read the last <16B of AAD */ +_get_AAD_rest\num_initial_blocks\operation: cmp $0, %r11 je _get_AAD_done\num_initial_blocks\operation - pxor %xmm\i,%xmm\i - - /* read the last <16B of AAD. since we have at least 4B of - data right after the AAD (the ICV, and maybe some PT), we can - read 4B/8B blocks safely, and then get rid of the extra stuff */ -_get_AAD_rest8\num_initial_blocks\operation: - cmp $4, %r11 - jle _get_AAD_rest4\num_initial_blocks\operation - movq (%r10), \TMP1 - add $8, %r10 - sub $8, %r11 - pslldq $8, \TMP1 - psrldq $8, %xmm\i - pxor \TMP1, %xmm\i - jmp _get_AAD_rest8\num_initial_blocks\operation -_get_AAD_rest4\num_initial_blocks\operation: - cmp $0, %r11 - jle _get_AAD_rest0\num_initial_blocks\operation - mov (%r10), %eax - movq %rax, \TMP1 - add $4, %r10 - sub $4, %r10 - pslldq $12, \TMP1 - psrldq $4, %xmm\i - pxor \TMP1, %xmm\i -_get_AAD_rest0\num_initial_blocks\operation: - /* finalize: shift out the extra bytes we read, and align - left. since pslldq can only shift by an immediate, we use - vpshufb and an array of shuffle masks */ - movq %r12, %r11 - salq $4, %r11 - movdqu aad_shift_arr(%r11), \TMP1 - PSHUFB_XMM \TMP1, %xmm\i -_get_AAD_rest_final\num_initial_blocks\operation: + READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10, %r11, \TMP1, %xmm\i PSHUFB_XMM %xmm14, %xmm\i # byte-reflect the AAD data pxor \XMM2, %xmm\i GHASH_MUL %xmm\i, \TMP3, \TMP1, \TMP2, \TMP4, \TMP5, \XMM1 Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from junaids(a)google.com are queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-fix-out-of-bounds-access-of-the-data-buffer-in-generic-gcm-aesni.patch queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-fix-out-of-bounds-access-of-the-aad-buffer-in-generic-gcm-aesni.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "crypto: aesni - add wrapper for generic gcm(aes)" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: aesni - add wrapper for generic gcm(aes) to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: crypto-aesni-add-wrapper-for-generic-gcm-aes.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From fc8517bf627c9b834f80274a1bc9ecd39b27231b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 14:54:36 +0100 Subject: crypto: aesni - add wrapper for generic gcm(aes) From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> commit fc8517bf627c9b834f80274a1bc9ecd39b27231b upstream. When I added generic-gcm-aes I didn't add a wrapper like the one provided for rfc4106(gcm(aes)). We need to add a cryptd wrapper to fall back on in case the FPU is not available, otherwise we might corrupt the FPU state. Fixes: cce2ea8d90fe ("crypto: aesni - add generic gcm(aes)") Reported-by: Ilya Lesokhin <ilyal(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -690,8 +690,8 @@ static int common_rfc4106_set_key(struct rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len); } -static int rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key, - unsigned int key_len) +static int gcmaes_wrapper_set_key(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key, + unsigned int key_len) { struct cryptd_aead **ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(parent); struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_tfm = *ctx; @@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ static int common_rfc4106_set_authsize(s /* This is the Integrity Check Value (aka the authentication tag length and can * be 8, 12 or 16 bytes long. */ -static int rfc4106_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *parent, - unsigned int authsize) +static int gcmaes_wrapper_set_authsize(struct crypto_aead *parent, + unsigned int authsize) { struct cryptd_aead **ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(parent); struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_tfm = *ctx; @@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aes_ctx); } -static int rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) +static int gcmaes_wrapper_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) { struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); struct cryptd_aead **ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); @@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ static int rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_r return crypto_aead_encrypt(req); } -static int rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) +static int gcmaes_wrapper_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) { struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); struct cryptd_aead **ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); @@ -1127,6 +1127,30 @@ static int generic_gcmaes_decrypt(struct aes_ctx); } +static int generic_gcmaes_init(struct crypto_aead *aead) +{ + struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_tfm; + struct cryptd_aead **ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); + + cryptd_tfm = cryptd_alloc_aead("__driver-generic-gcm-aes-aesni", + CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL); + if (IS_ERR(cryptd_tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(cryptd_tfm); + + *ctx = cryptd_tfm; + crypto_aead_set_reqsize(aead, crypto_aead_reqsize(&cryptd_tfm->base)); + + return 0; +} + +static void generic_gcmaes_exit(struct crypto_aead *aead) +{ + struct cryptd_aead **ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead); + + cryptd_free_aead(*ctx); +} + static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] = { { .setkey = common_rfc4106_set_key, .setauthsize = common_rfc4106_set_authsize, @@ -1146,10 +1170,10 @@ static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] }, { .init = rfc4106_init, .exit = rfc4106_exit, - .setkey = rfc4106_set_key, - .setauthsize = rfc4106_set_authsize, - .encrypt = rfc4106_encrypt, - .decrypt = rfc4106_decrypt, + .setkey = gcmaes_wrapper_set_key, + .setauthsize = gcmaes_wrapper_set_authsize, + .encrypt = gcmaes_wrapper_encrypt, + .decrypt = gcmaes_wrapper_decrypt, .ivsize = GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE, .maxauthsize = 16, .base = { @@ -1169,13 +1193,31 @@ static struct aead_alg aesni_aead_algs[] .ivsize = GCM_AES_IV_SIZE, .maxauthsize = 16, .base = { + .cra_name = "__generic-gcm-aes-aesni", + .cra_driver_name = "__driver-generic-gcm-aes-aesni", + .cra_priority = 0, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, + .cra_blocksize = 1, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct generic_gcmaes_ctx), + .cra_alignmask = AESNI_ALIGN - 1, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + }, +}, { + .init = generic_gcmaes_init, + .exit = generic_gcmaes_exit, + .setkey = gcmaes_wrapper_set_key, + .setauthsize = gcmaes_wrapper_set_authsize, + .encrypt = gcmaes_wrapper_encrypt, + .decrypt = gcmaes_wrapper_decrypt, + .ivsize = GCM_AES_IV_SIZE, + .maxauthsize = 16, + .base = { .cra_name = "gcm(aes)", .cra_driver_name = "generic-gcm-aesni", .cra_priority = 400, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, .cra_blocksize = 1, - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct generic_gcmaes_ctx), - .cra_alignmask = AESNI_ALIGN - 1, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct cryptd_aead *), .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, }, } }; Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from sd(a)queasysnail.net are queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-add-wrapper-for-generic-gcm-aes.patch queue-4.14/crypto-aesni-fix-typo-in-generic_gcmaes_decrypt.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "ALSA: hda - Reduce the suspend time consumption for ALC256" has been added to the 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled ALSA: hda - Reduce the suspend time consumption for ALC256 to the 4.14-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: alsa-hda-reduce-the-suspend-time-consumption-for-alc256.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.14 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 1c9609e3a8cf5997bd35205cfda1ff2218ee793b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 14:18:34 +0100 Subject: ALSA: hda - Reduce the suspend time consumption for ALC256 From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> commit 1c9609e3a8cf5997bd35205cfda1ff2218ee793b upstream. ALC256 has its own quirk to override the shutup call, and it contains the COEF update for pulling down the headset jack control. Currently, the COEF update is called after clearing the headphone pin, and this seems triggering a stall of the codec communication, and results in a long delay over a second at suspend. A quick resolution is to swap the calls: at first with the COEF update, then clear the headphone pin. Fixes: 4a219ef8f370 ("ALSA: hda/realtek - Add ALC256 HP depop function") Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198503 Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel(a)molgen.mpg.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -3131,11 +3131,13 @@ static void alc256_shutup(struct hda_cod if (hp_pin_sense) msleep(85); + /* 3k pull low control for Headset jack. */ + /* NOTE: call this before clearing the pin, otherwise codec stalls */ + alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x46, 0, 3 << 12); + snd_hda_codec_write(codec, hp_pin, 0, AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL, 0x0); - alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x46, 0, 3 << 12); /* 3k pull low control for Headset jack. */ - if (hp_pin_sense) msleep(100); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from tiwai(a)suse.de are queue-4.14/alsa-hda-reduce-the-suspend-time-consumption-for-alc256.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "igb: Free IRQs when device is hotplugged" has been added to the 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled igb: Free IRQs when device is hotplugged to the 3.18-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: igb-free-irqs-when-device-is-hotplugged.patch and it can be found in the queue-3.18 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From 888f22931478a05bc81ceb7295c626e1292bf0ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 14:31:30 -0500 Subject: igb: Free IRQs when device is hotplugged From: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> commit 888f22931478a05bc81ceb7295c626e1292bf0ed upstream. Recently I got a Caldigit TS3 Thunderbolt 3 dock, and noticed that upon hotplugging my kernel would immediately crash due to igb: [ 680.825801] kernel BUG at drivers/pci/msi.c:352! [ 680.828388] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 680.829194] Modules linked in: igb(O) thunderbolt i2c_algo_bit joydev vfat fat btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic hp_wmi sparse_keymap rfkill wmi_bmof iTCO_wdt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp crc32_pclmul snd_pcm rtsx_pci_ms mei_me snd_timer memstick snd pcspkr mei soundcore i2c_i801 tpm_tis psmouse shpchp wmi tpm_tis_core tpm video hp_wireless acpi_pad rtsx_pci_sdmmc mmc_core crc32c_intel serio_raw rtsx_pci mfd_core xhci_pci xhci_hcd i2c_hid i2c_core [last unloaded: igb] [ 680.831085] CPU: 1 PID: 78 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Tainted: G O 4.15.0-rc3Lyude-Test+ #6 [ 680.831596] Hardware name: HP HP ZBook Studio G4/826B, BIOS P71 Ver. 01.03 06/09/2017 [ 680.832168] Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_hotplug_work_fn [ 680.832687] RIP: 0010:free_msi_irqs+0x180/0x1b0 [ 680.833271] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000030fbf0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 680.833761] RAX: ffff8803405f9c00 RBX: ffff88033e3d2e40 RCX: 000000000000002c [ 680.834278] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000000ac RDI: ffff880340be2178 [ 680.834832] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff880340be1ff0 R09: ffff8803405f9c00 [ 680.835342] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff88033d63a298 [ 680.835822] R13: ffff88033d63a000 R14: 0000000000000060 R15: ffff880341959000 [ 680.836332] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88034f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 680.836817] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 680.837360] CR2: 000055e64044afdf CR3: 0000000001c09002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 680.837954] Call Trace: [ 680.838853] pci_disable_msix+0xce/0xf0 [ 680.839616] igb_reset_interrupt_capability+0x5d/0x60 [igb] [ 680.840278] igb_remove+0x9d/0x110 [igb] [ 680.840764] pci_device_remove+0x36/0xb0 [ 680.841279] device_release_driver_internal+0x157/0x220 [ 680.841739] pci_stop_bus_device+0x7d/0xa0 [ 680.842255] pci_stop_bus_device+0x2b/0xa0 [ 680.842722] pci_stop_bus_device+0x3d/0xa0 [ 680.843189] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xe/0x20 [ 680.843627] trim_stale_devices+0xf3/0x140 [ 680.844086] trim_stale_devices+0x94/0x140 [ 680.844532] trim_stale_devices+0xa6/0x140 [ 680.845031] ? get_slot_status+0x90/0xc0 [ 680.845536] acpiphp_check_bridge.part.5+0xfe/0x140 [ 680.846021] acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x175/0x200 [ 680.846581] ? free_bridge+0x100/0x100 [ 680.847113] acpi_device_hotplug+0x8a/0x490 [ 680.847535] acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x1a/0x30 [ 680.848076] process_one_work+0x182/0x3a0 [ 680.848543] worker_thread+0x2e/0x380 [ 680.848963] ? process_one_work+0x3a0/0x3a0 [ 680.849373] kthread+0x111/0x130 [ 680.849776] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x50/0x50 [ 680.850188] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 680.850601] Code: 43 14 85 c0 0f 84 d5 fe ff ff 31 ed eb 0f 83 c5 01 39 6b 14 0f 86 c5 fe ff ff 8b 7b 10 01 ef e8 b7 e4 d2 ff 48 83 78 70 00 74 e3 <0f> 0b 49 8d b5 a0 00 00 00 e8 62 6f d3 ff e9 c7 fe ff ff 48 8b [ 680.851497] RIP: free_msi_irqs+0x180/0x1b0 RSP: ffffc9000030fbf0 As it turns out, normally the freeing of IRQs that would fix this is called inside of the scope of __igb_close(). However, since the device is already gone by the point we try to unregister the netdevice from the driver due to a hotplug we end up seeing that the netif isn't present and thus, forget to free any of the device IRQs. So: make sure that if we're in the process of dismantling the netdev, we always allow __igb_close() to be called so that IRQs may be freed normally. Additionally, only allow igb_close() to be called from __igb_close() if it hasn't already been called for the given adapter. Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 9474933caf21 ("igb: close/suspend race in netif_device_detach") Cc: Todd Fujinaka <todd.fujinaka(a)intel.com> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen(a)networkplumber.org> Tested-by: Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c @@ -3172,7 +3172,7 @@ static int __igb_close(struct net_device static int igb_close(struct net_device *netdev) { - if (netif_device_present(netdev)) + if (netif_device_present(netdev) || netdev->dismantle) return __igb_close(netdev, false); return 0; } Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from lyude(a)redhat.com are queue-3.18/igb-free-irqs-when-device-is-hotplugged.patch

6 years, 8 months

1
0
0 0

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror February 2018