July 2018 - Linux-stable-mirror

nfp: don't tell FW about the reserved buffer space

by Jakub Kicinski

Hi! Can we get the following backported to the 4.9 branch? commit 9383b33771e566fa547daa2d09c6e0f1aaa298c3 Author: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com> Date: Thu Mar 2 15:26:20 2017 -0800 nfp: don't tell FW about the reserved buffer space Since commit c0f031bc8866 ("nfp_net: use alloc_frag() and build_skb()") we are allocating buffers which have to hold both the data and skb to be created in place by build_skb(). FW should only be told about the buffer space it can DMA to, that is without the build_skb() headroom and tailroom. Note: firmware applications should validate the buffers against both MTU and free list buffer size so oversized packets would not pass through the NIC anyway. Fixes: c0f031bc8866 ("nfp: use alloc_frag() and build_skb()") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski(a)netronome.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Thank you!

5 years, 10 months

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[PATCH 4/4] mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change erase functions to check chip good only

by Tokunori Ikegami

Currently the functions use to check both chip ready and good. But the chip ready is not enough to check the operation status. So change this to check the chip good instead of this. About the retry functions to make sure the error handling remain it. Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami(a)allied-telesis.co.jp> Reviewed-by: Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund(a)infinera.com> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham(a)alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace(a)gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)free-electrons.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut(a)gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Cc: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen(a)wedev4u.fr> Cc: linux-mtd(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)bootlin.com> --- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c index 13ce64362db8..2a39dc3a4760 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c @@ -2296,12 +2296,13 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) chip->erase_suspended = 0; } - if (chip_ready(map, adr)) + if (chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) break; if (time_after(jiffies, timeo)) { printk(KERN_WARNING "MTD %s(): software timeout\n", __func__ ); + ret = -EIO; break; } @@ -2309,15 +2310,15 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) UDELAY(map, chip, adr, 1000000/HZ); } /* Did we succeed? */ - if (!chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) { + if (ret) { /* reset on all failures. */ map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ - if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) { + ret = 0; goto retry; - - ret = -EIO; + } } chip->state = FL_READY; @@ -2391,7 +2392,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, chip->erase_suspended = 0; } - if (chip_ready(map, adr)) { + if (chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) { xip_enable(map, chip, adr); break; } @@ -2400,6 +2401,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, xip_enable(map, chip, adr); printk(KERN_WARNING "MTD %s(): software timeout\n", __func__ ); + ret = -EIO; break; } @@ -2407,15 +2409,15 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, UDELAY(map, chip, adr, 1000000/HZ); } /* Did we succeed? */ - if (!chip_good(map, adr, map_word_ff(map))) { + if (ret) { /* reset on all failures. */ map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ - if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) { + ret = 0; goto retry; - - ret = -EIO; + } } chip->state = FL_READY; -- 2.16.1

5 years, 10 months

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[PATCH 3/4] mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change erase functions to retry for error

by Tokunori Ikegami

For the word write functions it is retried for error. But it is not implemented to retry for the erase functions. To make sure for the erase functions change to retry as same. This is needed to prevent the flash erase error caused only once. It was caused by the error case of chip_good() in the do_erase_oneblock(). Also it was confirmed on the MACRONIX flash device MX29GL512FHT2I-11G. But the error issue behavior is not able to reproduce at this moment. The flash controller is parallel Flash interface integrated on BCM53003. Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami(a)allied-telesis.co.jp> Reviewed-by: Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund(a)infinera.com> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham(a)alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace(a)gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)free-electrons.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut(a)gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Cc: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen(a)wedev4u.fr> Cc: linux-mtd(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)bootlin.com> --- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c index 29913eeac5fb..13ce64362db8 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c @@ -2241,6 +2241,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) unsigned long int adr; DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); int ret = 0; + int retry_cnt = 0; adr = cfi->addr_unlock1; @@ -2258,6 +2259,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) ENABLE_VPP(map); xip_disable(map, chip, adr); + retry: cfi_send_gen_cmd(0xAA, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x55, cfi->addr_unlock2, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x80, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); @@ -2312,6 +2314,9 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_chip(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip) map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) + goto retry; + ret = -EIO; } @@ -2331,6 +2336,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, unsigned long timeo = jiffies + HZ; DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); int ret = 0; + int retry_cnt = 0; adr += chip->start; @@ -2348,6 +2354,7 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, ENABLE_VPP(map); xip_disable(map, chip, adr); + retry: cfi_send_gen_cmd(0xAA, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x55, cfi->addr_unlock2, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); cfi_send_gen_cmd(0x80, cfi->addr_unlock1, chip->start, map, cfi, cfi->device_type, NULL); @@ -2405,6 +2412,9 @@ static int __xipram do_erase_oneblock(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) + goto retry; + ret = -EIO; } -- 2.16.1

5 years, 10 months

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[PATCH 2/4] mtd: cfi_cmdset_0002: Change definition naming to retry write operation

by Tokunori Ikegami

The definition can be used for other program and erase operations also. So change the naming to MAX_RETRIES from MAX_WORD_RETRIES. Signed-off-by: Tokunori Ikegami <ikegami(a)allied-telesis.co.jp> Reviewed-by: Joakim Tjernlund <Joakim.Tjernlund(a)infinera.com> Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham(a)alliedtelesis.co.nz> Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace(a)gmail.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)free-electrons.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut(a)gmail.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Cc: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen(a)wedev4u.fr> Cc: linux-mtd(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon(a)bootlin.com> --- drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c index 9ab521d25ea2..29913eeac5fb 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ #define AMD_BOOTLOC_BUG #define FORCE_WORD_WRITE 0 -#define MAX_WORD_RETRIES 3 +#define MAX_RETRIES 3 #define SST49LF004B 0x0060 #define SST49LF040B 0x0050 @@ -1647,7 +1647,7 @@ static int __xipram do_write_oneword(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, map_write( map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start ); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ - if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_WORD_RETRIES) + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) goto retry; ret = -EIO; @@ -2106,7 +2106,7 @@ static int do_panic_write_oneword(struct map_info *map, struct flchip *chip, map_write(map, CMD(0xF0), chip->start); /* FIXME - should have reset delay before continuing */ - if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_WORD_RETRIES) + if (++retry_cnt <= MAX_RETRIES) goto retry; ret = -EIO; -- 2.16.1

5 years, 10 months

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virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once

by Justin Forbes

I didn't see this one sent to stable, though it probably should be. commit bd23a7269834dc7c1f93e83535d16ebc44b75eba Author: Wenwen Wang <wang6495(a)umn.edu> Date: Tue May 8 08:50:28 2018 -0500 virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once Thanks, Justin

5 years, 10 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 082f2300cfa1a3d9d5221c38c5eba85d4ab98bd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc(a)codecoup.pl> Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2018 13:40:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: Fix connection if directed advertising and privacy is used Local random address needs to be updated before creating connection if RPA from LE Direct Advertising Report was resolved in host. Otherwise remote device might ignore connection request due to address mismatch. This was affecting following qualification test cases: GAP/CONN/SCEP/BV-03-C, GAP/CONN/GCEP/BV-05-C, GAP/CONN/DCEP/BV-05-C Before patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #11350 [hci0] 84680.231216 Address: 56:BC:E8:24:11:68 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11351 [hci0] 84680.246022 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #11352 [hci0] 84680.246417 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11353 [hci0] 84680.248854 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11354 [hci0] 84680.249466 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11355 [hci0] 84680.253222 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #11356 [hci0] 84680.458387 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:D6:76:8C:DF:82 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F2:F1:06:3D:9C:42 (Static) RSSI: -74 dBm (0xb6) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #11357 [hci0] 84680.458737 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11358 [hci0] 84680.469982 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #11359 [hci0] 84680.470444 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 53:38:DA:46:8C:45 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #11360 [hci0] 84680.474971 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) plen 0 #11361 [hci0] 84682.545385 > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #11362 [hci0] 84682.551014 LE Create Connection Cancel (0x08|0x000e) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #11363 [hci0] 84682.551074 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Unknown Connection Identifier (0x02) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Public (0x00) Peer address: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (OUI 00-00-00) Connection interval: 0.00 msec (0x0000) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 0 msec (0x0000) Master clock accuracy: 0x00 After patch: < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) plen 7 #210 [hci0] 667.152459 Type: Passive (0x00) Interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Window: 30.000 msec (0x0030) Own address type: Random (0x01) Filter policy: Accept all advertisement, inc. directed unresolved RPA (0x02) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #211 [hci0] 667.153613 LE Set Scan Parameters (0x08|0x000b) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #212 [hci0] 667.153704 Scanning: Enabled (0x01) Filter duplicates: Enabled (0x01) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #213 [hci0] 667.154584 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 18 #214 [hci0] 667.182619 LE Direct Advertising Report (0x0b) Num reports: 1 Event type: Connectable directed - ADV_DIRECT_IND (0x01) Address type: Random (0x01) Address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Direct address type: Random (0x01) Direct address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) RSSI: -70 dBm (0xba) < HCI Command: LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) plen 2 #215 [hci0] 667.182704 Scanning: Disabled (0x00) Filter duplicates: Disabled (0x00) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #216 [hci0] 667.183599 LE Set Scan Enable (0x08|0x000c) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) plen 6 #217 [hci0] 667.183645 Address: 7C:C1:57:A5:B7:A8 (Resolvable) Identity type: Random (0x01) Identity: F4:28:73:5D:38:B0 (Static) > HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4 #218 [hci0] 667.184590 LE Set Random Address (0x08|0x0005) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) < HCI Command: LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) plen 25 #219 [hci0] 667.184613 Scan interval: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Scan window: 60.000 msec (0x0060) Filter policy: White list is not used (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Own address type: Random (0x01) Min connection interval: 30.00 msec (0x0018) Max connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Min connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) Max connection length: 0.000 msec (0x0000) > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 #220 [hci0] 667.186558 LE Create Connection (0x08|0x000d) ncmd 1 Status: Success (0x00) > HCI Event: LE Meta Event (0x3e) plen 19 #221 [hci0] 667.485824 LE Connection Complete (0x01) Status: Success (0x00) Handle: 0 Role: Master (0x00) Peer address type: Random (0x01) Peer address: 50:52:D9:A6:48:A0 (Resolvable) Identity type: Public (0x00) Identity: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Connection interval: 50.00 msec (0x0028) Connection latency: 0 (0x0000) Supervision timeout: 420 msec (0x002a) Master clock accuracy: 0x07 @ MGMT Event: Device Connected (0x000b) plen 13 {0x0002} [hci0] 667.485996 LE Address: 11:22:33:44:55:66 (OUI 11-22-33) Flags: 0x00000000 Data length: 0 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc(a)codecoup.pl> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel(a)holtmann.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 95ccc1eef558..b619a190ff12 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le_scan(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u16 conn_timeout); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level, u16 conn_timeout, - u8 role); + u8 role, bdaddr_t *direct_rpa); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_acl(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 sec_level, u8 auth_type); struct hci_conn *hci_connect_sco(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t *dst, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index a9682534c377..45ff5dc124cc 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -749,18 +749,31 @@ static bool conn_use_rpa(struct hci_conn *conn) } static void hci_req_add_le_create_conn(struct hci_request *req, - struct hci_conn *conn) + struct hci_conn *conn, + bdaddr_t *direct_rpa) { struct hci_cp_le_create_conn cp; struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev; u8 own_addr_type; - /* Update random address, but set require_privacy to false so - * that we never connect with an non-resolvable address. + /* If direct address was provided we use it instead of current + * address. */ - if (hci_update_random_address(req, false, conn_use_rpa(conn), - &own_addr_type)) - return; + if (direct_rpa) { + if (bacmp(&req->hdev->random_addr, direct_rpa)) + hci_req_add(req, HCI_OP_LE_SET_RANDOM_ADDR, 6, + direct_rpa); + + /* direct address is always RPA */ + own_addr_type = ADDR_LE_DEV_RANDOM; + } else { + /* Update random address, but set require_privacy to false so + * that we never connect with an non-resolvable address. + */ + if (hci_update_random_address(req, false, conn_use_rpa(conn), + &own_addr_type)) + return; + } memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); @@ -825,7 +838,7 @@ static void hci_req_directed_advertising(struct hci_request *req, struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, u8 dst_type, u8 sec_level, u16 conn_timeout, - u8 role) + u8 role, bdaddr_t *direct_rpa) { struct hci_conn_params *params; struct hci_conn *conn; @@ -940,7 +953,7 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_connect_le(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, hci_dev_set_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SCAN_INTERRUPTED); } - hci_req_add_le_create_conn(&req, conn); + hci_req_add_le_create_conn(&req, conn, direct_rpa); create_conn: err = hci_req_run(&req, create_le_conn_complete); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index cd3bbb766c24..139707cd9d35 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -4648,7 +4648,8 @@ static void hci_le_conn_update_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, /* This function requires the caller holds hdev->lock */ static struct hci_conn *check_pending_le_conn(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *addr, - u8 addr_type, u8 adv_type) + u8 addr_type, u8 adv_type, + bdaddr_t *direct_rpa) { struct hci_conn *conn; struct hci_conn_params *params; @@ -4699,7 +4700,8 @@ static struct hci_conn *check_pending_le_conn(struct hci_dev *hdev, } conn = hci_connect_le(hdev, addr, addr_type, BT_SECURITY_LOW, - HCI_LE_AUTOCONN_TIMEOUT, HCI_ROLE_MASTER); + HCI_LE_AUTOCONN_TIMEOUT, HCI_ROLE_MASTER, + direct_rpa); if (!IS_ERR(conn)) { /* If HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT is set, conn is already owned * by higher layer that tried to connect, if no then @@ -4808,8 +4810,13 @@ static void process_adv_report(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 type, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, bdaddr_type = irk->addr_type; } - /* Check if we have been requested to connect to this device */ - conn = check_pending_le_conn(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type, type); + /* Check if we have been requested to connect to this device. + * + * direct_addr is set only for directed advertising reports (it is NULL + * for advertising reports) and is already verified to be RPA above. + */ + conn = check_pending_le_conn(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type, type, + direct_addr); if (conn && type == LE_ADV_IND) { /* Store report for later inclusion by * mgmt_device_connected diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index fc6615d59165..9b7907ebfa01 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -7156,7 +7156,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __le16 psm, u16 cid, hcon = hci_connect_le(hdev, dst, dst_type, chan->sec_level, HCI_LE_CONN_TIMEOUT, - HCI_ROLE_SLAVE); + HCI_ROLE_SLAVE, NULL); else hcon = hci_connect_le_scan(hdev, dst, dst_type, chan->sec_level,

5 years, 10 months

3
2
0 0

[PATCH stable 4.9 and 4.4] cdc_ncm: avoid padding beyond end of skb

by Bjørn Mork

[ Upstream commit 49c2c3f246e2fc3009039e31a826333dcd0283cd ] Commit 4a0e3e989d66 ("cdc_ncm: Add support for moving NDP to end of NCM frame") added logic to reserve space for the NDP at the end of the NTB/skb. This reservation did not take the final alignment of the NDP into account, causing us to reserve too little space. Additionally the padding prior to NDP addition did not ensure there was enough space for the NDP. The NTB/skb with the NDP appended would then exceed the configured max size. This caused the final padding of the NTB to use a negative count, padding to almost INT_MAX, and resulting in: [60103.825970] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff9641f2004000 [60103.825998] IP: __memset+0x24/0x30 [60103.826001] PGD a6a06067 P4D a6a06067 PUD 4f65a063 PMD 72003063 PTE 0 [60103.826013] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI [60103.826018] Modules linked in: (removed( [60103.826158] CPU: 0 PID: 5990 Comm: Chrome_DevTools Tainted: G O 4.14.0-3-amd64 #1 Debian 4.14.17-1 [60103.826162] Hardware name: LENOVO 20081 BIOS 41CN28WW(V2.04) 05/03/2012 [60103.826166] task: ffff964193484fc0 task.stack: ffffb2890137c000 [60103.826171] RIP: 0010:__memset+0x24/0x30 [60103.826174] RSP: 0000:ffff964316c03b68 EFLAGS: 00010216 [60103.826178] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000fffffffd RCX: 000000001ffa5000 [60103.826181] RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9641f2003ffc [60103.826184] RBP: ffff964192f6c800 R08: 00000000304d434e R09: ffff9641f1d2c004 [60103.826187] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 00000000000005ae R12: ffff9642e6957a80 [60103.826190] R13: ffff964282ff2ee8 R14: 000000000000000d R15: ffff9642e4843900 [60103.826194] FS: 00007f395aaf6700(0000) GS:ffff964316c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [60103.826197] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [60103.826200] CR2: ffff9641f2004000 CR3: 0000000013b0c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [60103.826204] Call Trace: [60103.826212] <IRQ> [60103.826225] cdc_ncm_fill_tx_frame+0x5e3/0x740 [cdc_ncm] [60103.826236] cdc_ncm_tx_fixup+0x57/0x70 [cdc_ncm] [60103.826246] usbnet_start_xmit+0x5d/0x710 [usbnet] [60103.826254] ? netif_skb_features+0x119/0x250 [60103.826259] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa1/0x200 [60103.826267] sch_direct_xmit+0xf2/0x1b0 [60103.826273] __dev_queue_xmit+0x5e3/0x7c0 [60103.826280] ? ip_finish_output2+0x263/0x3c0 [60103.826284] ip_finish_output2+0x263/0x3c0 [60103.826289] ? ip_output+0x6c/0xe0 [60103.826293] ip_output+0x6c/0xe0 [60103.826298] ? ip_forward_options+0x1a0/0x1a0 [60103.826303] tcp_transmit_skb+0x516/0x9b0 [60103.826309] tcp_write_xmit+0x1aa/0xee0 [60103.826313] ? sch_direct_xmit+0x71/0x1b0 [60103.826318] tcp_tasklet_func+0x177/0x180 [60103.826325] tasklet_action+0x5f/0x110 [60103.826332] __do_softirq+0xde/0x2b3 [60103.826337] irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 [60103.826342] do_IRQ+0x81/0xd0 [60103.826347] common_interrupt+0x98/0x98 [60103.826351] </IRQ> [60103.826355] RIP: 0033:0x7f397bdf2282 [60103.826358] RSP: 002b:00007f395aaf57d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff6e [60103.826362] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00002f07bc6d0900 RCX: 00007f39752d7fe7 [60103.826365] RDX: 0000000000000022 RSI: 0000000000000147 RDI: 00002f07baea02c0 [60103.826368] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [60103.826371] R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00002f07baea02c0 [60103.826373] R13: 00002f07bba227a0 R14: 00002f07bc6d090c R15: 0000000000000000 [60103.826377] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 f9 48 89 d1 83 e2 07 48 c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 <f3> 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 [60103.826442] RIP: __memset+0x24/0x30 RSP: ffff964316c03b68 [60103.826444] CR2: ffff9641f2004000 Commit e1069bbfcf3b ("net: cdc_ncm: Reduce memory use when kernel memory low") made this bug much more likely to trigger by reducing the NTB size under memory pressure. Link: https://bugs.debian.org/893393 Reported-by: Горбешко Богдан <bodqhrohro(a)gmail.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Dennis Wassenberg <dennis.wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Cc: Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 4a0e3e989d66 ("cdc_ncm: Add support for moving NDP to end of NCM frame") [ bmork: tx_curr_size => tx_max and context fixup for v4.12 and older ] Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn(a)mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> --- This has already been applied to stable 4.14 and newer, but needed two minor changes for anything older than v4.13. The bug is only present in v4.3 and and newer, so there is no need to consider this backport for anything older than stable 4.4. Please apply to 4.4 and 4.9 stable. Thanks, Bjørn drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c index feb61eaffe32..3086cae62fdc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c @@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ cdc_ncm_fill_tx_frame(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 sign) * accordingly. Otherwise, we should check here. */ if (ctx->drvflags & CDC_NCM_FLAG_NDP_TO_END) - delayed_ndp_size = ctx->max_ndp_size; + delayed_ndp_size = ALIGN(ctx->max_ndp_size, ctx->tx_ndp_modulus); else delayed_ndp_size = 0; @@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ cdc_ncm_fill_tx_frame(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, __le32 sign) /* If requested, put NDP at end of frame. */ if (ctx->drvflags & CDC_NCM_FLAG_NDP_TO_END) { nth16 = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_nth16 *)skb_out->data; - cdc_ncm_align_tail(skb_out, ctx->tx_ndp_modulus, 0, ctx->tx_max); + cdc_ncm_align_tail(skb_out, ctx->tx_ndp_modulus, 0, ctx->tx_max - ctx->max_ndp_size); nth16->wNdpIndex = cpu_to_le16(skb_out->len); memcpy(skb_put(skb_out, ctx->max_ndp_size), ctx->delayed_ndp16, ctx->max_ndp_size); -- 2.11.0

5 years, 10 months

2
1
0 0

stable request for v4.14.x: xhci: Fix use-after-free in xhci_free_virt_device

by Sudip Mukherjee

Hi Greg, This fix missed the v4.14.x stable tree. The original patch with the bug was added in v4.14.44. The backported patch is attached with this mail, please apply to v4.14.x. -- Regards Sudip

5 years, 10 months

2
1
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked" failed to apply to 3.18-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 3.18-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 0da74120c5341389b97c4ee27487a97224999ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 20:39:54 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index c0cadbc5f85c..19e35dd695d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out;

5 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >From 0da74120c5341389b97c4ee27487a97224999ee1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jun 2018 20:39:54 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] selinux: move user accesses in selinuxfs out of locked regions If a user is accessing a file in selinuxfs with a pointer to a userspace buffer that is backed by e.g. a userfaultfd, the userspace access can stall indefinitely, which can block fsi->mutex if it is held. For sel_read_policy(), remove the locking, since this method doesn't seem to access anything that requires locking. For sel_read_bool(), move the user access below the locked region. For sel_write_bool() and sel_commit_bools_write(), move the user access up above the locked region. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds(a)tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: removed an unused variable in sel_read_policy()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index c0cadbc5f85c..19e35dd695d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -441,22 +441,16 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info; struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data; int ret; - mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); - ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL); if (ret) - goto out; + return ret; - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); -out: - mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len); } static vm_fault_t sel_mmap_policy_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) @@ -1188,25 +1182,29 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, ret = -EINVAL; if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; ret = -ENOMEM; page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (!page) - goto out; + goto out_unlock; cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; - goto out; + goto out_unlock; } length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out: mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); +out_free: free_page((unsigned long)page); return ret; + +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex); + goto out_free; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, @@ -1219,6 +1217,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK; const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1233,22 +1242,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out; @@ -1280,6 +1273,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, ssize_t length; int new_value; + if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* No partial writes. */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); + if (IS_ERR(page)) + return PTR_ERR(page); + mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex); length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -1289,22 +1293,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, if (length) goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; - if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) - goto out; - - /* No partial writes. */ - length = -EINVAL; - if (*ppos != 0) - goto out; - - page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(page)) { - length = PTR_ERR(page); - page = NULL; - goto out; - } - length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1) goto out;

5 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

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Linux-stable-mirror July 2018