In linux version 4.4, a 32-bit process may fail to allocate 64M hugepage
memory by function shmat even though there is a 64M memory gap in
the process.
It is the adjusted length that causes the problem, introduced from
commit db4fbfb9523c935 ("mm: vm_unmapped_area() lookup function").
Accounting for the worst case alignment overhead, function unmapped_area
and unmapped_area_topdown adjust the search length before searching
for available vma gap. This is an estimated length, sum of the desired
length and the longest alignment offset, which can cause misjudgement
if the system has very few virtual memory left. For example, if the
longest memory gap available is 64M, we can’t get it from the system
by allocating 64M hugepage memory via shmat function. The reason is
that it requires a longger length, the sum of the desired length(64M)
and the longest alignment offset.
To fix this error ,we can calculate the alignment offset of
gap_start or gap_end to get a desired gap_start or gap_end value,
before searching for the available gap. In this way, we don't
need to adjust the search length.
Problem reproduces procedure:
1. allocate a lot of virtual memory segments via shmat and malloc
2. release one of the biggest memory segment via shmdt
3. attach the biggest memory segment via shmat
e.g.
process maps:
00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 00:12 3385 /tmp/memory_mmap
00011000-00012000 rw-p 00001000 00:12 3385 /tmp/memory_mmap
27536000-f756a000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f756a000-f7691000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 560 /lib/libc-2.11.1.so
f7691000-f7699000 ---p 00127000 01:00 560 /lib/libc-2.11.1.so
f7699000-f769b000 r--p 00127000 01:00 560 /lib/libc-2.11.1.so
f769b000-f769c000 rw-p 00129000 01:00 560 /lib/libc-2.11.1.so
f769c000-f769f000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f769f000-f76c0000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 583 /lib/libgcc_s.so.1
f76c0000-f76c7000 ---p 00021000 01:00 583 /lib/libgcc_s.so.1
f76c7000-f76c8000 rw-p 00020000 01:00 583 /lib/libgcc_s.so.1
f76c8000-f76e5000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 543 /lib/ld-2.11.1.so
f76e9000-f76ea000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f76ea000-f76ec000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f76ec000-f76ed000 r--p 0001c000 01:00 543 /lib/ld-2.11.1.so
f76ed000-f76ee000 rw-p 0001d000 01:00 543 /lib/ld-2.11.1.so
f7800000-f7a00000 rw-s 00000000 00:0e 0 /SYSV000000ea (deleted)
fba00000-fca00000 rw-s 00000000 00:0e 65538 /SYSV000000ec (deleted)
fca00000-fce00000 rw-s 00000000 00:0e 98307 /SYSV000000ed (deleted)
fce00000-fd800000 rw-s 00000000 00:0e 131076 /SYSV000000ee (deleted)
ff913000-ff934000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
ffff0000-ffff1000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vectors]
from 0xf7a00000 to fba00000, it has 64M memory gap, but we can't get
it from kernel.
Signed-off-by: jianhong chen <chenjianhong2(a)huawei.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
mm/mmap.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index bd7b9f2..c5a5782 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1865,6 +1865,22 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
return error;
}
+static inline unsigned long gap_start_offset(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info,
+ unsigned long addr)
+{
+ /* get gap_start offset to adjust gap address to the
+ * desired alignment
+ */
+ return (info->align_offset - addr) & info->align_mask;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long gap_end_offset(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info,
+ unsigned long addr)
+{
+ /* get gap_end offset to adjust gap address to the desired alignment */
+ return (addr - info->align_offset) & info->align_mask;
+}
+
unsigned long unmapped_area(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
{
/*
@@ -1879,10 +1895,7 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long length, low_limit, high_limit, gap_start, gap_end;
- /* Adjust search length to account for worst case alignment overhead */
- length = info->length + info->align_mask;
- if (length < info->length)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ length = info->length;
/* Adjust search limits by the desired length */
if (info->high_limit < length)
@@ -1914,6 +1927,7 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
}
gap_start = vma->vm_prev ? vm_end_gap(vma->vm_prev) : 0;
+ gap_start += gap_start_offset(info, gap_start);
check_current:
/* Check if current node has a suitable gap */
if (gap_start > high_limit)
@@ -1942,6 +1956,7 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
struct vm_area_struct, vm_rb);
if (prev == vma->vm_rb.rb_left) {
gap_start = vm_end_gap(vma->vm_prev);
+ gap_start += gap_start_offset(info, gap_start);
gap_end = vm_start_gap(vma);
goto check_current;
}
@@ -1951,17 +1966,17 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
check_highest:
/* Check highest gap, which does not precede any rbtree node */
gap_start = mm->highest_vm_end;
+ gap_start += gap_start_offset(info, gap_start);
gap_end = ULONG_MAX; /* Only for VM_BUG_ON below */
if (gap_start > high_limit)
return -ENOMEM;
found:
/* We found a suitable gap. Clip it with the original low_limit. */
- if (gap_start < info->low_limit)
+ if (gap_start < info->low_limit) {
gap_start = info->low_limit;
-
- /* Adjust gap address to the desired alignment */
- gap_start += (info->align_offset - gap_start) & info->align_mask;
+ gap_start += gap_start_offset(info, gap_start);
+ }
VM_BUG_ON(gap_start + info->length > info->high_limit);
VM_BUG_ON(gap_start + info->length > gap_end);
@@ -1974,16 +1989,14 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area_topdown(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long length, low_limit, high_limit, gap_start, gap_end;
- /* Adjust search length to account for worst case alignment overhead */
- length = info->length + info->align_mask;
- if (length < info->length)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ length = info->length;
/*
* Adjust search limits by the desired length.
* See implementation comment at top of unmapped_area().
*/
gap_end = info->high_limit;
+ gap_end -= gap_end_offset(info, gap_end);
if (gap_end < length)
return -ENOMEM;
high_limit = gap_end - length;
@@ -2020,6 +2033,7 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area_topdown(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
check_current:
/* Check if current node has a suitable gap */
gap_end = vm_start_gap(vma);
+ gap_end -= gap_end_offset(info, gap_end);
if (gap_end < low_limit)
return -ENOMEM;
if (gap_start <= high_limit &&
@@ -2054,13 +2068,14 @@ unsigned long unmapped_area_topdown(struct vm_unmapped_area_info *info)
found:
/* We found a suitable gap. Clip it with the original high_limit. */
- if (gap_end > info->high_limit)
+ if (gap_end > info->high_limit) {
gap_end = info->high_limit;
+ gap_end -= gap_end_offset(info, gap_end);
+ }
found_highest:
/* Compute highest gap address at the desired alignment */
gap_end -= info->length;
- gap_end -= (gap_end - info->align_offset) & info->align_mask;
VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < info->low_limit);
VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < gap_start);
--
1.8.5.6
The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 6a1faa4a43f5fabf9cbeaa742d916e7b5e73120f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 14:44:27 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: ccm - fix incompatibility between "ccm" and
"ccm_base"
CCM instances can be created by either the "ccm" template, which only
allows choosing the block cipher, e.g. "ccm(aes)"; or by "ccm_base",
which allows choosing the ctr and cbcmac implementations, e.g.
"ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
However, a "ccm_base" instance prevents a "ccm" instance from being
registered using the same implementations. Nor will the instance be
found by lookups of "ccm". This can be used as a denial of service.
Moreover, "ccm_base" instances are never tested by the crypto
self-tests, even if there are compatible "ccm" tests.
The root cause of these problems is that instances of the two templates
use different cra_names. Therefore, fix these problems by making
"ccm_base" instances set the same cra_name as "ccm" instances, e.g.
"ccm(aes)" instead of "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))".
This requires extracting the block cipher name from the name of the ctr
and cbcmac algorithms. It also requires starting to verify that the
algorithms are really ctr and cbcmac using the same block cipher, not
something else entirely. But it would be bizarre if anyone were
actually using non-ccm-compatible algorithms with ccm_base, so this
shouldn't break anyone in practice.
Fixes: 4a49b499dfa0 ("[CRYPTO] ccm: Added CCM mode")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
diff --git a/crypto/ccm.c b/crypto/ccm.c
index 3d036df0f4d4..c1ef9d0b4271 100644
--- a/crypto/ccm.c
+++ b/crypto/ccm.c
@@ -458,7 +458,6 @@ static void crypto_ccm_free(struct aead_instance *inst)
static int crypto_ccm_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct rtattr **tb,
- const char *full_name,
const char *ctr_name,
const char *mac_name)
{
@@ -486,7 +485,8 @@ static int crypto_ccm_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
mac = __crypto_hash_alg_common(mac_alg);
err = -EINVAL;
- if (mac->digestsize != 16)
+ if (strncmp(mac->base.cra_name, "cbcmac(", 7) != 0 ||
+ mac->digestsize != 16)
goto out_put_mac;
inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -509,23 +509,27 @@ static int crypto_ccm_create_common(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
ctr = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg(&ictx->ctr);
- /* Not a stream cipher? */
+ /* The skcipher algorithm must be CTR mode, using 16-byte blocks. */
err = -EINVAL;
- if (ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
+ if (strncmp(ctr->base.cra_name, "ctr(", 4) != 0 ||
+ crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(ctr) != 16 ||
+ ctr->base.cra_blocksize != 1)
goto err_drop_ctr;
- /* We want the real thing! */
- if (crypto_skcipher_alg_ivsize(ctr) != 16)
+ /* ctr and cbcmac must use the same underlying block cipher. */
+ if (strcmp(ctr->base.cra_name + 4, mac->base.cra_name + 7) != 0)
goto err_drop_ctr;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "ccm(%s", ctr->base.cra_name + 4) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto err_drop_ctr;
+
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"ccm_base(%s,%s)", ctr->base.cra_driver_name,
mac->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_drop_ctr;
- memcpy(inst->alg.base.cra_name, full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
-
inst->alg.base.cra_flags = ctr->base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = (mac->base.cra_priority +
ctr->base.cra_priority) / 2;
@@ -567,7 +571,6 @@ static int crypto_ccm_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
const char *cipher_name;
char ctr_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
char mac_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
- char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(cipher_name))
@@ -581,35 +584,24 @@ static int crypto_ccm_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
cipher_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
- if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "ccm(%s)", cipher_name) >=
- CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-
- return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name, ctr_name,
- mac_name);
+ return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, mac_name);
}
static int crypto_ccm_base_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct rtattr **tb)
{
const char *ctr_name;
- const char *cipher_name;
- char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ const char *mac_name;
ctr_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(ctr_name))
return PTR_ERR(ctr_name);
- cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
- if (IS_ERR(cipher_name))
- return PTR_ERR(cipher_name);
-
- if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "ccm_base(%s,%s)",
- ctr_name, cipher_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ mac_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
+ if (IS_ERR(mac_name))
+ return PTR_ERR(mac_name);
- return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name, ctr_name,
- cipher_name);
+ return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, ctr_name, mac_name);
}
static int crypto_rfc4309_setkey(struct crypto_aead *parent, const u8 *key,
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
commit 767f015ea0b7ab9d60432ff6cd06b664fd71f50f upstream.
[Please apply to 4.9-stable and earlier.]
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
arm32 xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't
affected by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However
this is more subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to
the alignmask being removed by commit cc477bf64573 ("crypto: arm/aes -
replace bit-sliced OpenSSL NEON code"). Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to
start checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().
Fixes: e4e7f10bfc40 ("ARM: add support for bit sliced AES using NEON instructions")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
---
arch/arm/crypto/aesbs-glue.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/crypto/aesbs-glue.c b/arch/arm/crypto/aesbs-glue.c
index 5d934a0039d76..cb2486a526e66 100644
--- a/arch/arm/crypto/aesbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm/crypto/aesbs-glue.c
@@ -265,6 +265,8 @@ static int aesbs_xts_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, 8 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
/* generate the initial tweak */
AES_encrypt(walk.iv, walk.iv, &ctx->twkey);
@@ -289,6 +291,8 @@ static int aesbs_xts_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, 8 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
/* generate the initial tweak */
AES_encrypt(walk.iv, walk.iv, &ctx->twkey);
--
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
commit edaf28e996af69222b2cb40455dbb5459c2b875a upstream.
[Please apply to 4.14-stable and earlier.]
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
salsa20-generic doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and it was actually broken prior to the alignmask
being removed by commit b62b3db76f73 ("crypto: salsa20-generic - cleanup
and convert to skcipher API").
Since salsa20-generic does not update the IV and does not need any IV
alignment, update it to use req->iv instead of walk.iv.
Fixes: 2407d60872dd ("[CRYPTO] salsa20: Salsa20 stream cipher")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
---
crypto/salsa20_generic.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
index d7da0eea5622a..319d9962552e1 100644
--- a/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/salsa20_generic.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static int encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, 64);
- salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, walk.iv);
+ salsa20_ivsetup(ctx, desc->info);
while (walk.nbytes >= 64) {
salsa20_encrypt_bytes(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr,
--
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
commit 5e27f38f1f3f45a0c938299c3a34a2d2db77165a upstream.
[Please apply to 4.4-stable.]
If the rfc7539 template is instantiated with specific implementations,
e.g. "rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic)" rather than
"rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", then the implementation names end up
included in the instance's cra_name. This is incorrect because it then
prevents all users from allocating "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)", if the
highest priority implementations of chacha20 and poly1305 were selected.
Also, the self-tests aren't run on an instance allocated in this way.
Fix it by setting the instance's cra_name from the underlying
algorithms' actual cra_names, rather than from the requested names.
This matches what other templates do.
Fixes: 71ebc4d1b27d ("crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Add a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction, RFC7539")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Cc: Martin Willi <martin(a)strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin(a)strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
---
crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
index 0214600ba071e..6c4724222e3a0 100644
--- a/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -637,8 +637,8 @@ static int chachapoly_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb,
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha_name,
- poly_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ "%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha->cra_name,
+ poly->cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto out_drop_chacha;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"%s(%s,%s)", name, chacha->cra_driver_name,
--
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
commit 4a8108b70508df0b6c4ffa4a3974dab93dcbe851 upstream.
[Please apply to 4.14-stable.]
If the user-provided IV needs to be aligned to the algorithm's
alignmask, then skcipher_walk_virt() copies the IV into a new aligned
buffer walk.iv. But skcipher_walk_virt() can fail afterwards, and then
if the caller unconditionally accesses walk.iv, it's a use-after-free.
xts-aes-neonbs doesn't set an alignmask, so currently it isn't affected
by this despite unconditionally accessing walk.iv. However this is more
subtle than desired, and unconditionally accessing walk.iv has caused a
real problem in other algorithms. Thus, update xts-aes-neonbs to start
checking the return value of skcipher_walk_virt().
Fixes: 1abee99eafab ("crypto: arm64/aes - reimplement bit-sliced ARM/NEON implementation for arm64")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
---
arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
index c55d68ccb89f8..52975817fdb66 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ static int __xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req,
int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, true);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
kernel_neon_begin();
--
2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog