From: Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander(a)sony.com>
The sony driver is not properly cleaning up from potential failures in
sony_input_configured. Currently it calls hid_hw_stop, while hid_connect
is still running. This is not a good idea, instead hid_hw_stop should
be moved to sony_probe. Similar changes were recently made to Logitech
drivers, which were also doing improper cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Roderick Colenbrander <roderick.colenbrander(a)sony.com>
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/hid/hid-sony.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c b/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c
index 31f1023214d3..09f2c617b09f 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sony.c
@@ -2806,7 +2806,6 @@ static int sony_input_configured(struct hid_device *hdev,
sony_cancel_work_sync(sc);
sony_remove_dev_list(sc);
sony_release_device_id(sc);
- hid_hw_stop(hdev);
return ret;
}
@@ -2868,6 +2867,7 @@ static int sony_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id)
*/
if (!(hdev->claimed & HID_CLAIMED_INPUT)) {
hid_err(hdev, "failed to claim input\n");
+ hid_hw_stop(hdev);
return -ENODEV;
}
--
2.21.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
serial: sprd: correct the wrong sequence of arguments
to my tty git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty.git
in the tty-next branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release
during the merge window.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 9c801e313195addaf11c16e155f50789d6ebfd19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang(a)unisoc.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 15:41:51 +0800
Subject: serial: sprd: correct the wrong sequence of arguments
The sequence of arguments which was passed to handle_lsr_errors() didn't
match the parameters defined in that function, &lsr was passed to flag
and &flag was passed to lsr, this patch fixed that.
Fixes: b7396a38fb28 ("tty/serial: Add Spreadtrum sc9836-uart driver support")
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang(a)unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang <zhang.lyra(a)gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190905074151.5268-1-zhang.lyra@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
index f8db5c8e4e39..771d11196523 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ static inline void sprd_rx(struct uart_port *port)
if (lsr & (SPRD_LSR_BI | SPRD_LSR_PE |
SPRD_LSR_FE | SPRD_LSR_OE))
- if (handle_lsr_errors(port, &lsr, &flag))
+ if (handle_lsr_errors(port, &flag, &lsr))
continue;
if (uart_handle_sysrq_char(port, ch))
continue;
--
2.23.0
This is an automatic generated email to let you know that the following patch were queued:
Subject: media: videobuf-core.c: poll_wait needs a non-NULL buf pointer
Author: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl>
Date: Wed Sep 4 06:04:07 2019 -0300
poll_wait uses &buf->done, but buf is NULL. Move the poll_wait to later
in the function once buf is correctly set and only call it if it is
non-NULL.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)oracle.com>
Fixes: bb436cbeb918 ("media: videobuf: fix epoll() by calling poll_wait first")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # for v5.1 and up
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung(a)kernel.org>
drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-core.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
---
diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-core.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-core.c
index 7ef3e4d22bf6..939fc11cf080 100644
--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-core.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-core.c
@@ -1123,7 +1123,6 @@ __poll_t videobuf_poll_stream(struct file *file,
struct videobuf_buffer *buf = NULL;
__poll_t rc = 0;
- poll_wait(file, &buf->done, wait);
videobuf_queue_lock(q);
if (q->streaming) {
if (!list_empty(&q->stream))
@@ -1143,7 +1142,9 @@ __poll_t videobuf_poll_stream(struct file *file,
}
buf = q->read_buf;
}
- if (!buf)
+ if (buf)
+ poll_wait(file, &buf->done, wait);
+ else
rc = EPOLLERR;
if (0 == rc) {
These patches support upcoming UV systems that do not have a UV HUB.
* Save OEM_ID from ACPI MADT probe
* Return UV Hubless System Type
* Add return code to UV BIOS Init function
* Setup UV functions for Hubless UV Systems
* Add UV Hubbed/Hubless Proc FS Files
* Decode UVsystab Info
* Account for UV Hubless in is_uvX_hub Ops
--
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
serial: sprd: correct the wrong sequence of arguments
to my tty git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty.git
in the tty-testing branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will be merged to the tty-next branch sometime soon,
after it passes testing, and the merge window is open.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 9c801e313195addaf11c16e155f50789d6ebfd19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang(a)unisoc.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 15:41:51 +0800
Subject: serial: sprd: correct the wrong sequence of arguments
The sequence of arguments which was passed to handle_lsr_errors() didn't
match the parameters defined in that function, &lsr was passed to flag
and &flag was passed to lsr, this patch fixed that.
Fixes: b7396a38fb28 ("tty/serial: Add Spreadtrum sc9836-uart driver support")
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang <chunyan.zhang(a)unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang <zhang.lyra(a)gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190905074151.5268-1-zhang.lyra@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
index f8db5c8e4e39..771d11196523 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/sprd_serial.c
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ static inline void sprd_rx(struct uart_port *port)
if (lsr & (SPRD_LSR_BI | SPRD_LSR_PE |
SPRD_LSR_FE | SPRD_LSR_OE))
- if (handle_lsr_errors(port, &lsr, &flag))
+ if (handle_lsr_errors(port, &flag, &lsr))
continue;
if (uart_handle_sysrq_char(port, ch))
continue;
--
2.23.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
firmware: google: check if size is valid when decoding VPD data
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-next branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release
during the merge window.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 4b708b7b1a2c09fbdfff6b942ebe3a160213aacd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hung-Te Lin <hungte(a)chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 10:23:58 +0800
Subject: firmware: google: check if size is valid when decoding VPD data
The VPD implementation from Chromium Vital Product Data project used to
parse data from untrusted input without checking if the meta data is
invalid or corrupted. For example, the size from decoded content may
be negative value, or larger than whole input buffer. Such invalid data
may cause buffer overflow.
To fix that, the size parameters passed to vpd_decode functions should
be changed to unsigned integer (u32) type, and the parsing of entry
header should be refactored so every size field is correctly verified
before starting to decode.
Fixes: ad2ac9d5c5e0 ("firmware: Google VPD: import lib_vpd source files")
Signed-off-by: Hung-Te Lin <hungte(a)chromium.org>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd(a)chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830022402.214442-1-hungte@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c | 4 +-
drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++------------
drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h | 6 +--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
index 0739f3b70347..db0812263d46 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd.c
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ static int vpd_section_check_key_name(const u8 *key, s32 key_len)
return VPD_OK;
}
-static int vpd_section_attrib_add(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
- const u8 *value, s32 value_len,
+static int vpd_section_attrib_add(const u8 *key, u32 key_len,
+ const u8 *value, u32 value_len,
void *arg)
{
int ret;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
index 92e3258552fc..dda525c0f968 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.c
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
#include "vpd_decode.h"
-static int vpd_decode_len(const s32 max_len, const u8 *in,
- s32 *length, s32 *decoded_len)
+static int vpd_decode_len(const u32 max_len, const u8 *in,
+ u32 *length, u32 *decoded_len)
{
u8 more;
int i = 0;
@@ -30,18 +30,39 @@ static int vpd_decode_len(const s32 max_len, const u8 *in,
} while (more);
*decoded_len = i;
+ return VPD_OK;
+}
+
+static int vpd_decode_entry(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf,
+ u32 *_consumed, const u8 **entry, u32 *entry_len)
+{
+ u32 decoded_len;
+ u32 consumed = *_consumed;
+
+ if (vpd_decode_len(max_len - consumed, &input_buf[consumed],
+ entry_len, &decoded_len) != VPD_OK)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+ if (max_len - consumed < decoded_len)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+
+ consumed += decoded_len;
+ *entry = input_buf + consumed;
+
+ /* entry_len is untrusted data and must be checked again. */
+ if (max_len - consumed < *entry_len)
+ return VPD_FAIL;
+ consumed += decoded_len;
+ *_consumed = consumed;
return VPD_OK;
}
-int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
+int vpd_decode_string(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, u32 *consumed,
vpd_decode_callback callback, void *callback_arg)
{
int type;
- int res;
- s32 key_len;
- s32 value_len;
- s32 decoded_len;
+ u32 key_len;
+ u32 value_len;
const u8 *key;
const u8 *value;
@@ -56,26 +77,14 @@ int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
case VPD_TYPE_STRING:
(*consumed)++;
- /* key */
- res = vpd_decode_len(max_len - *consumed, &input_buf[*consumed],
- &key_len, &decoded_len);
- if (res != VPD_OK || *consumed + decoded_len >= max_len)
+ if (vpd_decode_entry(max_len, input_buf, consumed, &key,
+ &key_len) != VPD_OK)
return VPD_FAIL;
- *consumed += decoded_len;
- key = &input_buf[*consumed];
- *consumed += key_len;
-
- /* value */
- res = vpd_decode_len(max_len - *consumed, &input_buf[*consumed],
- &value_len, &decoded_len);
- if (res != VPD_OK || *consumed + decoded_len > max_len)
+ if (vpd_decode_entry(max_len, input_buf, consumed, &value,
+ &value_len) != VPD_OK)
return VPD_FAIL;
- *consumed += decoded_len;
- value = &input_buf[*consumed];
- *consumed += value_len;
-
if (type == VPD_TYPE_STRING)
return callback(key, key_len, value, value_len,
callback_arg);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
index cf8c2ace155a..8dbe41cac599 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/google/vpd_decode.h
@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ enum {
};
/* Callback for vpd_decode_string to invoke. */
-typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
- const u8 *value, s32 value_len,
+typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, u32 key_len,
+ const u8 *value, u32 value_len,
void *arg);
/*
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ typedef int vpd_decode_callback(const u8 *key, s32 key_len,
* If one entry is successfully decoded, sends it to callback and returns the
* result.
*/
-int vpd_decode_string(const s32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, s32 *consumed,
+int vpd_decode_string(const u32 max_len, const u8 *input_buf, u32 *consumed,
vpd_decode_callback callback, void *callback_arg);
#endif /* __VPD_DECODE_H */
--
2.23.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
/dev/mem: Bail out upon SIGKILL.
to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-next branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release
during the merge window.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 8619e5bdeee8b2c685d686281f2d2a6017c4bc15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 22:13:25 +0900
Subject: /dev/mem: Bail out upon SIGKILL.
syzbot found that a thread can stall for minutes inside read_mem() or
write_mem() after that thread was killed by SIGKILL [1]. Reading from
iomem areas of /dev/mem can be slow, depending on the hardware.
While reading 2GB at one read() is legal, delaying termination of killed
thread for minutes is bad. Thus, allow reading/writing /dev/mem and
/dev/kmem to be preemptible and killable.
[ 1335.912419][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134565632
[ 1335.943194][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134561536
[ 1335.978280][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134557440
[ 1336.011147][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134553344
[ 1336.041897][T20577] read_mem: sz=4096 count=2134549248
Theoretically, reading/writing /dev/mem and /dev/kmem can become
"interruptible". But this patch chose "killable". Future patch will make
them "interruptible" so that we can revert to "killable" if some program
regressed.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a0e3436829698d5824231251fad9d8e998f94f…
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+8ab2d0f39fb79fe6ca40(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1566825205-10703-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@…
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index b08dc50f9f26..9eb564c002f6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ void __weak unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
}
#endif
+static inline bool should_stop_iteration(void)
+{
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
+ return fatal_signal_pending(current);
+}
+
/*
* This funcion reads the *physical* memory. The f_pos points directly to the
* memory location.
@@ -175,6 +182,8 @@ static ssize_t read_mem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
read += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
kfree(bounce);
@@ -251,6 +260,8 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
written += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
*ppos += written;
@@ -468,6 +479,10 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
read += sz;
low_count -= sz;
count -= sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration()) {
+ count = 0;
+ break;
+ }
}
}
@@ -492,6 +507,8 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
buf += sz;
read += sz;
p += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
free_page((unsigned long)kbuf);
}
@@ -544,6 +561,8 @@ static ssize_t do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const char __user *buf,
p += sz;
count -= sz;
written += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
*ppos += written;
@@ -595,6 +614,8 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
buf += sz;
virtr += sz;
p += sz;
+ if (should_stop_iteration())
+ break;
}
free_page((unsigned long)kbuf);
}
--
2.23.0
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
USB: usbcore: Fix slab-out-of-bounds bug during device reset
to my usb git tree which can be found at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git
in the usb-next branch.
The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)
The patch will also be merged in the next major kernel release
during the merge window.
If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.
>From 3dd550a2d36596a1b0ee7955da3b611c031d3873 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 11:56:27 -0400
Subject: USB: usbcore: Fix slab-out-of-bounds bug during device reset
The syzbot fuzzer provoked a slab-out-of-bounds error in the USB core:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xa6/0xb0 lib/string.c:904
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881d175bed6 by task kworker/0:3/2746
CPU: 0 PID: 2746 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5+ #28
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xca/0x13e lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x6a/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:351
__kasan_report.cold+0x1a/0x33 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xe/0x12 mm/kasan/common.c:612
memcmp+0xa6/0xb0 lib/string.c:904
memcmp include/linux/string.h:400 [inline]
descriptors_changed drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5579 [inline]
usb_reset_and_verify_device+0x564/0x1300 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5729
usb_reset_device+0x4c1/0x920 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5898
rt2x00usb_probe+0x53/0x7af
drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c:806
The error occurs when the descriptors_changed() routine (called during
a device reset) attempts to compare the old and new BOS and capability
descriptors. The length it uses for the comparison is the
wTotalLength value stored in BOS descriptor, but this value is not
necessarily the same as the length actually allocated for the
descriptors. If it is larger the routine will call memcmp() with a
length that is too big, thus reading beyond the end of the allocated
region and leading to this fault.
The kernel reads the BOS descriptor twice: first to get the total
length of all the capability descriptors, and second to read it along
with all those other descriptors. A malicious (or very faulty) device
may send different values for the BOS descriptor fields each time.
The memory area will be allocated using the wTotalLength value read
the first time, but stored within it will be the value read the second
time.
To prevent this possibility from causing any errors, this patch
modifies the BOS descriptor after it has been read the second time:
It sets the wTotalLength field to the actual length of the descriptors
that were read in and validated. Then the memcpy() call, or any other
code using these descriptors, will be able to rely on wTotalLength
being valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+35f4d916c623118d576e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.1909041154260.1722-100000@iolanth…
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/config.c | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/config.c b/drivers/usb/core/config.c
index 9d6cb709ca7b..151a74a54386 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/config.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/config.c
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev)
struct usb_bos_descriptor *bos;
struct usb_dev_cap_header *cap;
struct usb_ssp_cap_descriptor *ssp_cap;
- unsigned char *buffer;
+ unsigned char *buffer, *buffer0;
int length, total_len, num, i, ssac;
__u8 cap_type;
int ret;
@@ -966,10 +966,12 @@ int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev)
ret = -ENOMSG;
goto err;
}
+
+ buffer0 = buffer;
total_len -= length;
+ buffer += length;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- buffer += length;
cap = (struct usb_dev_cap_header *)buffer;
if (total_len < sizeof(*cap) || total_len < cap->bLength) {
@@ -983,8 +985,6 @@ int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev)
break;
}
- total_len -= length;
-
if (cap->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_DEVICE_CAPABILITY) {
dev_warn(ddev, "descriptor type invalid, skip\n");
continue;
@@ -1019,7 +1019,11 @@ int usb_get_bos_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev)
default:
break;
}
+
+ total_len -= length;
+ buffer += length;
}
+ dev->bos->desc->wTotalLength = cpu_to_le16(buffer - buffer0);
return 0;
--
2.23.0