The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 42ffb0bf584ae5b6b38f72259af1e0ee417ac77f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 15:33:02 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: flush write bio if we loop in extent_write_cache_pages
There exists a deadlock with range_cyclic that has existed forever. If
we loop around with a bio already built we could deadlock with a writer
who has the page locked that we're attempting to write but is waiting on
a page in our bio to be written out. The task traces are as follows
PID: 1329874 TASK: ffff889ebcdf3800 CPU: 33 COMMAND: "kworker/u113:5"
#0 [ffffc900297bb658] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f
#1 [ffffc900297bb6e0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3
#2 [ffffc900297bb6f8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42
#3 [ffffc900297bb708] __lock_page at ffffffff811f145b
#4 [ffffc900297bb798] __process_pages_contig at ffffffff814bc502
#5 [ffffc900297bb8c8] lock_delalloc_pages at ffffffff814bc684
#6 [ffffc900297bb900] find_lock_delalloc_range at ffffffff814be9ff
#7 [ffffc900297bb9a0] writepage_delalloc at ffffffff814bebd0
#8 [ffffc900297bba18] __extent_writepage at ffffffff814bfbf2
#9 [ffffc900297bba98] extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffff814bffbd
PID: 2167901 TASK: ffff889dc6a59c00 CPU: 14 COMMAND:
"aio-dio-invalid"
#0 [ffffc9003b50bb18] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f
#1 [ffffc9003b50bba0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3
#2 [ffffc9003b50bbb8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42
#3 [ffffc9003b50bbc8] wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff811f24d6
#4 [ffffc9003b50bc60] prepare_pages at ffffffff814b05a7
#5 [ffffc9003b50bcd8] btrfs_buffered_write at ffffffff814b1359
#6 [ffffc9003b50bdb0] btrfs_file_write_iter at ffffffff814b5933
#7 [ffffc9003b50be38] new_sync_write at ffffffff8128f6a8
#8 [ffffc9003b50bec8] vfs_write at ffffffff81292b9d
#9 [ffffc9003b50bf00] ksys_pwrite64 at ffffffff81293032
I used drgn to find the respective pages we were stuck on
page_entry.page 0xffffea00fbfc7500 index 8148 bit 15 pid 2167901
page_entry.page 0xffffea00f9bb7400 index 7680 bit 0 pid 1329874
As you can see the kworker is waiting for bit 0 (PG_locked) on index
7680, and aio-dio-invalid is waiting for bit 15 (PG_writeback) on index
8148. aio-dio-invalid has 7680, and the kworker epd looks like the
following
crash> struct extent_page_data ffffc900297bbbb0
struct extent_page_data {
bio = 0xffff889f747ed830,
tree = 0xffff889eed6ba448,
extent_locked = 0,
sync_io = 0
}
Probably worth mentioning as well that it waits for writeback of the
page to complete while holding a lock on it (at prepare_pages()).
Using drgn I walked the bio pages looking for page
0xffffea00fbfc7500 which is the one we're waiting for writeback on
bio = Object(prog, 'struct bio', address=0xffff889f747ed830)
for i in range(0, bio.bi_vcnt.value_()):
bv = bio.bi_io_vec[i]
if bv.bv_page.value_() == 0xffffea00fbfc7500:
print("FOUND IT")
which validated what I suspected.
The fix for this is simple, flush the epd before we loop back around to
the beginning of the file during writeout.
Fixes: b293f02e1423 ("Btrfs: Add writepages support")
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com>
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
index e2d30287e2d5..8ff17bc30d5a 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
@@ -4166,7 +4166,16 @@ static int extent_write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
*/
scanned = 1;
index = 0;
- goto retry;
+
+ /*
+ * If we're looping we could run into a page that is locked by a
+ * writer and that writer could be waiting on writeback for a
+ * page in our current bio, and thus deadlock, so flush the
+ * write bio here.
+ */
+ ret = flush_write_bio(epd);
+ if (!ret)
+ goto retry;
}
if (wbc->range_cyclic || (wbc->nr_to_write > 0 && range_whole))
The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 4bf79cb089f6b1c6c632492c0271054ce52ad766 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:47:46 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() from Spectre-v1/L1TF
attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in kvm_lapic_reg_write().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.
Fixes: 0105d1a52640 ("KVM: x2apic interface to lapic")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index 88c3c0c6d1e3..865edce27a6a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -1960,15 +1960,20 @@ int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 reg, u32 val)
case APIC_LVTTHMR:
case APIC_LVTPC:
case APIC_LVT1:
- case APIC_LVTERR:
+ case APIC_LVTERR: {
/* TODO: Check vector */
+ size_t size;
+ u32 index;
+
if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))
val |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
-
- val &= apic_lvt_mask[(reg - APIC_LVTT) >> 4];
+ size = ARRAY_SIZE(apic_lvt_mask);
+ index = array_index_nospec(
+ (reg - APIC_LVTT) >> 4, size);
+ val &= apic_lvt_mask[index];
kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, reg, val);
-
break;
+ }
case APIC_LVTT:
if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))
The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 14e32321f3606e4b0970200b6e5e47ee6f1e6410 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis(a)google.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:47:43 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF
attacks
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in picdev_write().
It replaces index computations based on the (attacked-controlled) port
number with constants through a minor refactoring.
Fixes: 85f455f7ddbe ("KVM: Add support for in-kernel PIC emulation")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis(a)google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig(a)google.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c b/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c
index 8b38bb4868a6..629a09ca9860 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c
@@ -460,10 +460,14 @@ static int picdev_write(struct kvm_pic *s,
switch (addr) {
case 0x20:
case 0x21:
+ pic_lock(s);
+ pic_ioport_write(&s->pics[0], addr, data);
+ pic_unlock(s);
+ break;
case 0xa0:
case 0xa1:
pic_lock(s);
- pic_ioport_write(&s->pics[addr >> 7], addr, data);
+ pic_ioport_write(&s->pics[1], addr, data);
pic_unlock(s);
break;
case 0x4d0:
The patch below does not apply to the 5.5-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From d51224b73d18d207912f15ad4eb7a4b456682729 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 12:47:57 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] media: cec: check 'transmit_in_progress', not 'transmitting'
Currently wait_event_interruptible_timeout is called in cec_thread_func()
when adap->transmitting is set. But if the adapter is unconfigured
while transmitting, then adap->transmitting is set to NULL. But the
hardware is still actually transmitting the message, and that's
indicated by adap->transmit_in_progress and we should wait until that
is finished or times out before transmitting new messages.
As the original commit says: adap->transmitting is the userspace view,
adap->transmit_in_progress reflects the hardware state.
However, if adap->transmitting is NULL and adap->transmit_in_progress
is true, then wait_event_interruptible is called (no timeout), which
can get stuck indefinitely if the CEC driver is flaky and never marks
the transmit-in-progress as 'done'.
So test against transmit_in_progress when deciding whether to use
the timeout variant or not, instead of testing against adap->transmitting.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl>
Fixes: 32804fcb612b ("media: cec: keep track of outstanding transmits")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # for v4.19 and up
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
index 1060e633b623..6c95dc471d4c 100644
--- a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
+++ b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ int cec_thread_func(void *_adap)
bool timeout = false;
u8 attempts;
- if (adap->transmitting) {
+ if (adap->transmit_in_progress) {
int err;
/*
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ int cec_thread_func(void *_adap)
goto unlock;
}
- if (adap->transmitting && timeout) {
+ if (adap->transmit_in_progress && timeout) {
/*
* If we timeout, then log that. Normally this does
* not happen and it is an indication of a faulty CEC
@@ -509,14 +509,18 @@ int cec_thread_func(void *_adap)
* so much traffic on the bus that the adapter was
* unable to transmit for CEC_XFER_TIMEOUT_MS (2.1s).
*/
- pr_warn("cec-%s: message %*ph timed out\n", adap->name,
- adap->transmitting->msg.len,
- adap->transmitting->msg.msg);
+ if (adap->transmitting) {
+ pr_warn("cec-%s: message %*ph timed out\n", adap->name,
+ adap->transmitting->msg.len,
+ adap->transmitting->msg.msg);
+ /* Just give up on this. */
+ cec_data_cancel(adap->transmitting,
+ CEC_TX_STATUS_TIMEOUT);
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("cec-%s: transmit timed out\n", adap->name);
+ }
adap->transmit_in_progress = false;
adap->tx_timeouts++;
- /* Just give up on this. */
- cec_data_cancel(adap->transmitting,
- CEC_TX_STATUS_TIMEOUT);
goto unlock;
}
The patch below does not apply to the 5.5-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 4be77174c3fafc450527a0c383bb2034d2db6a2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl>
Date: Sat, 7 Dec 2019 23:48:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] media: cec: avoid decrementing transmit_queue_sz if it is 0
WARN if transmit_queue_sz is 0 but do not decrement it.
The CEC adapter will become unresponsive if it goes below
0 since then it thinks there are 4 billion messages in the
queue.
Obviously this should not happen, but a driver bug could
cause this.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # for v4.12 and up
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
index e90c30dac68b..1060e633b623 100644
--- a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
+++ b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
@@ -380,7 +380,8 @@ static void cec_data_cancel(struct cec_data *data, u8 tx_status)
} else {
list_del_init(&data->list);
if (!(data->msg.tx_status & CEC_TX_STATUS_OK))
- data->adap->transmit_queue_sz--;
+ if (!WARN_ON(!data->adap->transmit_queue_sz))
+ data->adap->transmit_queue_sz--;
}
if (data->msg.tx_status & CEC_TX_STATUS_OK) {
@@ -432,6 +433,14 @@ static void cec_flush(struct cec_adapter *adap)
* need to do anything special in that case.
*/
}
+ /*
+ * If something went wrong and this counter isn't what it should
+ * be, then this will reset it back to 0. Warn if it is not 0,
+ * since it indicates a bug, either in this framework or in a
+ * CEC driver.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON(adap->transmit_queue_sz))
+ adap->transmit_queue_sz = 0;
}
/*
@@ -522,7 +531,8 @@ int cec_thread_func(void *_adap)
data = list_first_entry(&adap->transmit_queue,
struct cec_data, list);
list_del_init(&data->list);
- adap->transmit_queue_sz--;
+ if (!WARN_ON(!data->adap->transmit_queue_sz))
+ adap->transmit_queue_sz--;
/* Make this the current transmitting message */
adap->transmitting = data;
The patch below does not apply to the 5.5-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 01d4fb115470e9f88a58975fe157a9e8b214dfe5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl>
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2019 08:52:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] media: cec: CEC 2.0-only bcast messages were ignored
Some messages are allowed to be a broadcast message in CEC 2.0
only, and should be ignored by CEC 1.4 devices.
Unfortunately, the check was wrong, causing such messages to be
marked as invalid under CEC 2.0.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # for v4.10 and up
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
index 9340435a94a0..e90c30dac68b 100644
--- a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
+++ b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
@@ -1085,11 +1085,11 @@ void cec_received_msg_ts(struct cec_adapter *adap,
valid_la = false;
else if (!cec_msg_is_broadcast(msg) && !(dir_fl & DIRECTED))
valid_la = false;
- else if (cec_msg_is_broadcast(msg) && !(dir_fl & BCAST1_4))
+ else if (cec_msg_is_broadcast(msg) && !(dir_fl & BCAST))
valid_la = false;
else if (cec_msg_is_broadcast(msg) &&
- adap->log_addrs.cec_version >= CEC_OP_CEC_VERSION_2_0 &&
- !(dir_fl & BCAST2_0))
+ adap->log_addrs.cec_version < CEC_OP_CEC_VERSION_2_0 &&
+ !(dir_fl & BCAST1_4))
valid_la = false;
}
if (valid_la && min_len) {
The patch below does not apply to the 5.5-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 64e62bdf04ab8529f45ed0a85122c703035dec3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin(a)amd.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 17:00:43 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr
[Why]
This patch is trying to address the issue observed when hotplug DP
daisy chain monitors.
e.g.
src-mstb-mstb-sst -> src (unplug) mstb-mstb-sst -> src-mstb-mstb-sst
(plug in again)
Once unplug a DP MST capable device, driver will call
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst() to disable MST. In this function,
it cleans data of topology manager while disabling mst_state. However,
it doesn't clean up the proposed_vcpis of topology manager.
If proposed_vcpi is not reset, once plug in MST daisy chain monitors
later, code will fail at checking port validation while trying to
allocate payloads.
When MST capable device is plugged in again and try to allocate
payloads by calling drm_dp_update_payload_part1(), this
function will iterate over all proposed virtual channels to see if
any proposed VCPI's num_slots is greater than 0. If any proposed
VCPI's num_slots is greater than 0 and the port which the
specific virtual channel directed to is not in the topology, code then
fails at the port validation. Since there are stale VCPI allocations
from the previous topology enablement in proposed_vcpi[], code will fail
at port validation and reurn EINVAL.
[How]
Clean up the data of stale proposed_vcpi[] and reset mgr->proposed_vcpis
to NULL while disabling mst in drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst().
Changes since v1:
*Add on more details in commit message to describe the issue which the
patch is trying to fix
Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin(a)amd.com>
[added cc to stable]
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191205090043.7580-1-Wayne.L…
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
index 87fc44895d83..1770754bcd4a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
@@ -3054,6 +3054,7 @@ static int drm_dp_get_vc_payload_bw(u8 dp_link_bw, u8 dp_link_count)
int drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr, bool mst_state)
{
int ret = 0;
+ int i = 0;
struct drm_dp_mst_branch *mstb = NULL;
mutex_lock(&mgr->lock);
@@ -3114,10 +3115,22 @@ int drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr, bool ms
/* this can fail if the device is gone */
drm_dp_dpcd_writeb(mgr->aux, DP_MSTM_CTRL, 0);
ret = 0;
+ mutex_lock(&mgr->payload_lock);
memset(mgr->payloads, 0, mgr->max_payloads * sizeof(struct drm_dp_payload));
mgr->payload_mask = 0;
set_bit(0, &mgr->payload_mask);
+ for (i = 0; i < mgr->max_payloads; i++) {
+ struct drm_dp_vcpi *vcpi = mgr->proposed_vcpis[i];
+
+ if (vcpi) {
+ vcpi->vcpi = 0;
+ vcpi->num_slots = 0;
+ }
+ mgr->proposed_vcpis[i] = NULL;
+ }
mgr->vcpi_mask = 0;
+ mutex_unlock(&mgr->payload_lock);
+
mgr->payload_id_table_cleared = false;
}