January 2022 - Linux-stable-mirror

by Limonciello, Mario

Hi, I've been noticing this on a number of Ryzen machines that a traceback comes up when allocating memory for ath11k. It's not a fatal failure, as it retries with smaller slices but makes a lot of spew in the logs. commit b9b5948cdd7bc8d9fa31c78cbbb04382c815587f ("ath11k: qmi: avoid error messages when dma allocation fails") fixes it, can you please bring it to 5.15.y? Thanks,

3 years, 1 month

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[PATCH v1 1/1] ASoC: dpcm: prevent snd_soc_dpcm use after free

by Will McVicker

From: KaiChieh Chuang <kaichieh.chuang(a)mediatek.com> [ Upstream commit a9764869779081e8bf24da07ac040e8f3efcf13a ] The dpcm get from fe_clients/be_clients may be free before use Add a spin lock at snd_soc_card level, to protect the dpcm instance. The lock may be used in atomic context, so use spin lock. Use irq spin lock version, since the lock may be used in interrupts. possible race condition between void dpcm_be_disconnect( ... list_del(&dpcm->list_be); list_del(&dpcm->list_fe); kfree(dpcm); ... and for_each_dpcm_fe() for_each_dpcm_be*() race condition example Thread 1: snd_soc_dapm_mixer_update_power() -> soc_dpcm_runtime_update() -> dpcm_be_disconnect() -> kfree(dpcm); Thread 2: dpcm_fe_dai_trigger() -> dpcm_be_dai_trigger() -> snd_soc_dpcm_can_be_free_stop() -> if (dpcm->fe == fe) Excpetion Scenario: two FE link to same BE FE1 -> BE FE2 -> Thread 1: switch of mixer between FE2 -> BE Thread 2: pcm_stop FE1 Exception: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dead0000000000e0 pc=<> [<ffffff8960e2cd10>] dpcm_be_dai_trigger+0x29c/0x47c sound/soc/soc-pcm.c:3226 if (dpcm->fe == fe) lr=<> [<ffffff8960e2f694>] dpcm_fe_dai_do_trigger+0x94/0x26c Backtrace: [<ffffff89602dba80>] notify_die+0x68/0xb8 [<ffffff896028c7dc>] die+0x118/0x2a8 [<ffffff89602a2f84>] __do_kernel_fault+0x13c/0x14c [<ffffff89602a27f4>] do_translation_fault+0x64/0xa0 [<ffffff8960280cf8>] do_mem_abort+0x4c/0xd0 [<ffffff8960282ad0>] el1_da+0x24/0x40 [<ffffff8960e2cd10>] dpcm_be_dai_trigger+0x29c/0x47c [<ffffff8960e2f694>] dpcm_fe_dai_do_trigger+0x94/0x26c [<ffffff8960e2edec>] dpcm_fe_dai_trigger+0x3c/0x44 [<ffffff8960de5588>] snd_pcm_do_stop+0x50/0x5c [<ffffff8960dded24>] snd_pcm_action+0xb4/0x13c [<ffffff8960ddfdb4>] snd_pcm_drop+0xa0/0x128 [<ffffff8960de69bc>] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x9d8/0x30f0 [<ffffff8960de1cac>] snd_pcm_ioctl_compat+0x29c/0x2f14 [<ffffff89604c9d60>] compat_SyS_ioctl+0x128/0x244 [<ffffff8960283740>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff Signed-off-by: KaiChieh Chuang <kaichieh.chuang(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> [willmcvicker: move spinlock to bottom of struct snd_soc_card] Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <willmcvicker(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ --- include/sound/soc.h | 2 ++ sound/soc/soc-core.c | 1 + sound/soc/soc-pcm.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/sound/soc.h b/include/sound/soc.h index 88aa48e5485f..7abd8d4746ef 100644 --- a/include/sound/soc.h +++ b/include/sound/soc.h @@ -1113,6 +1113,8 @@ struct snd_soc_card { u32 pop_time; void *drvdata; + + spinlock_t dpcm_lock; }; /* SoC machine DAI configuration, glues a codec and cpu DAI together */ diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-core.c b/sound/soc/soc-core.c index 8531b490f6f6..273898b358c4 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-core.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-core.c @@ -2752,6 +2752,7 @@ int snd_soc_register_card(struct snd_soc_card *card) card->instantiated = 0; mutex_init(&card->mutex); mutex_init(&card->dapm_mutex); + spin_lock_init(&card->dpcm_lock); ret = snd_soc_instantiate_card(card); if (ret != 0) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c b/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c index af14304645ce..c03b653bf6ff 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c @@ -1221,6 +1221,7 @@ static int dpcm_be_connect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *be, int stream) { struct snd_soc_dpcm *dpcm; + unsigned long flags; /* only add new dpcms */ list_for_each_entry(dpcm, &fe->dpcm[stream].be_clients, list_be) { @@ -1236,8 +1237,10 @@ static int dpcm_be_connect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, dpcm->fe = fe; be->dpcm[stream].runtime = fe->dpcm[stream].runtime; dpcm->state = SND_SOC_DPCM_LINK_STATE_NEW; + spin_lock_irqsave(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); list_add(&dpcm->list_be, &fe->dpcm[stream].be_clients); list_add(&dpcm->list_fe, &be->dpcm[stream].fe_clients); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); dev_dbg(fe->dev, "connected new DPCM %s path %s %s %s\n", stream ? "capture" : "playback", fe->dai_link->name, @@ -1283,6 +1286,7 @@ static void dpcm_be_reparent(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, void dpcm_be_disconnect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream) { struct snd_soc_dpcm *dpcm, *d; + unsigned long flags; list_for_each_entry_safe(dpcm, d, &fe->dpcm[stream].be_clients, list_be) { dev_dbg(fe->dev, "ASoC: BE %s disconnect check for %s\n", @@ -1302,8 +1306,10 @@ void dpcm_be_disconnect(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream) #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS debugfs_remove(dpcm->debugfs_state); #endif + spin_lock_irqsave(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); list_del(&dpcm->list_be); list_del(&dpcm->list_fe); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); kfree(dpcm); } } @@ -1557,10 +1563,13 @@ int dpcm_process_paths(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, void dpcm_clear_pending_state(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream) { struct snd_soc_dpcm *dpcm; + unsigned long flags; + spin_lock_irqsave(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); list_for_each_entry(dpcm, &fe->dpcm[stream].be_clients, list_be) dpcm->be->dpcm[stream].runtime_update = SND_SOC_DPCM_UPDATE_NO; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); } static void dpcm_be_dai_startup_unwind(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, @@ -2626,6 +2635,7 @@ static int dpcm_run_update_startup(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream) struct snd_soc_dpcm *dpcm; enum snd_soc_dpcm_trigger trigger = fe->dai_link->trigger[stream]; int ret; + unsigned long flags; dev_dbg(fe->dev, "ASoC: runtime %s open on FE %s\n", stream ? "capture" : "playback", fe->dai_link->name); @@ -2695,11 +2705,13 @@ static int dpcm_run_update_startup(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream) dpcm_be_dai_shutdown(fe, stream); disconnect: /* disconnect any non started BEs */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); list_for_each_entry(dpcm, &fe->dpcm[stream].be_clients, list_be) { struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *be = dpcm->be; if (be->dpcm[stream].state != SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_START) dpcm->state = SND_SOC_DPCM_LINK_STATE_FREE; } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); return ret; } @@ -3278,7 +3290,10 @@ int snd_soc_dpcm_can_be_free_stop(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, { struct snd_soc_dpcm *dpcm; int state; + int ret = 1; + unsigned long flags; + spin_lock_irqsave(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); list_for_each_entry(dpcm, &be->dpcm[stream].fe_clients, list_fe) { if (dpcm->fe == fe) @@ -3287,12 +3302,15 @@ int snd_soc_dpcm_can_be_free_stop(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, state = dpcm->fe->dpcm[stream].state; if (state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_START || state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_PAUSED || - state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_SUSPEND) - return 0; + state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_SUSPEND) { + ret = 0; + break; + } } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); /* it's safe to free/stop this BE DAI */ - return 1; + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_soc_dpcm_can_be_free_stop); @@ -3305,7 +3323,10 @@ int snd_soc_dpcm_can_be_params(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, { struct snd_soc_dpcm *dpcm; int state; + int ret = 1; + unsigned long flags; + spin_lock_irqsave(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); list_for_each_entry(dpcm, &be->dpcm[stream].fe_clients, list_fe) { if (dpcm->fe == fe) @@ -3315,12 +3336,15 @@ int snd_soc_dpcm_can_be_params(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, if (state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_START || state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_PAUSED || state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_SUSPEND || - state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_PREPARE) - return 0; + state == SND_SOC_DPCM_STATE_PREPARE) { + ret = 0; + break; + } } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); /* it's safe to change hw_params */ - return 1; + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_soc_dpcm_can_be_params); @@ -3359,6 +3383,7 @@ static ssize_t dpcm_show_state(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params = &fe->dpcm[stream].hw_params; struct snd_soc_dpcm *dpcm; ssize_t offset = 0; + unsigned long flags; /* FE state */ offset += scnprintf(buf + offset, size - offset, @@ -3386,6 +3411,7 @@ static ssize_t dpcm_show_state(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, goto out; } + spin_lock_irqsave(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); list_for_each_entry(dpcm, &fe->dpcm[stream].be_clients, list_be) { struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *be = dpcm->be; params = &dpcm->hw_params; @@ -3406,7 +3432,7 @@ static ssize_t dpcm_show_state(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, params_channels(params), params_rate(params)); } - + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fe->card->dpcm_lock, flags); out: return offset; } -- 2.35.0.rc0.227.g00780c9af4-goog

3 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: stm32/crc32 - Fix kernel BUG triggered in probe()" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 29009604ad4e3ef784fd9b9fef6f23610ddf633d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marek Vasut <marex(a)denx.de> Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 20:50:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: stm32/crc32 - Fix kernel BUG triggered in probe() The include/linux/crypto.h struct crypto_alg field cra_driver_name description states "Unique name of the transformation provider. " ... " this contains the name of the chip or provider and the name of the transformation algorithm." In case of the stm32-crc driver, field cra_driver_name is identical for all registered transformation providers and set to the name of the driver itself, which is incorrect. This patch fixes it by assigning a unique cra_driver_name to each registered transformation provider. The kernel crash is triggered when the driver calls crypto_register_shashes() which calls crypto_register_shash(), which calls crypto_register_alg(), which calls __crypto_register_alg(), which returns -EEXIST, which is propagated back through this call chain. Upon -EEXIST from crypto_register_shash(), the crypto_register_shashes() starts unregistering the providers back, and calls crypto_unregister_shash(), which calls crypto_unregister_alg(), and this is where the BUG() triggers due to incorrect cra_refcnt. Fixes: b51dbe90912a ("crypto: stm32 - Support for STM32 CRC32 crypto module") Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex(a)denx.de> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+ Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue(a)foss.st.com> Cc: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne(a)st.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Lionel Debieve <lionel.debieve(a)st.com> Cc: Nicolas Toromanoff <nicolas.toromanoff(a)st.com> Cc: linux-arm-kernel(a)lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-stm32(a)st-md-mailman.stormreply.com To: linux-crypto(a)vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Nicolas Toromanoff <nicolas.toromanoff(a)foss.st.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-crc32.c b/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-crc32.c index 75867c0b0017..be1bf39a317d 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-crc32.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-crc32.c @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { .digestsize = CHKSUM_DIGEST_SIZE, .base = { .cra_name = "crc32", - .cra_driver_name = DRIVER_NAME, + .cra_driver_name = "stm32-crc32-crc32", .cra_priority = 200, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, .cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE, @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = { .digestsize = CHKSUM_DIGEST_SIZE, .base = { .cra_name = "crc32c", - .cra_driver_name = DRIVER_NAME, + .cra_driver_name = "stm32-crc32-crc32c", .cra_priority = 200, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, .cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,

3 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tracing/osnoise: Properly unhook events if" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 0878355b51f5f26632e652c848a8e174bb02d22d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikita Yushchenko <nikita.yushchenko(a)virtuozzo.com> Date: Sun, 9 Jan 2022 18:34:59 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tracing/osnoise: Properly unhook events if start_per_cpu_kthreads() fails If start_per_cpu_kthreads() called from osnoise_workload_start() returns error, event hooks are left in broken state: unhook_irq_events() called but unhook_thread_events() and unhook_softirq_events() not called, and trace_osnoise_callback_enabled flag not cleared. On the next tracer enable, hooks get not installed due to trace_osnoise_callback_enabled flag. And on the further tracer disable an attempt to remove non-installed hooks happened, hitting a WARN_ON_ONCE() in tracepoint_remove_func(). Fix the error path by adding the missing part of cleanup. While at this, introduce osnoise_unhook_events() to avoid code duplication between this error path and normal tracer disable. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220109153459.3701773-1-nikita.yushchenko@virtuo… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: bce29ac9ce0b ("trace: Add osnoise tracer") Acked-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Nikita Yushchenko <nikita.yushchenko(a)virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c b/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c index 4719a848bf17..36d9d5be08b4 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c @@ -2122,6 +2122,13 @@ static int osnoise_hook_events(void) return -EINVAL; } +static void osnoise_unhook_events(void) +{ + unhook_thread_events(); + unhook_softirq_events(); + unhook_irq_events(); +} + /* * osnoise_workload_start - start the workload and hook to events */ @@ -2154,7 +2161,14 @@ static int osnoise_workload_start(void) retval = start_per_cpu_kthreads(); if (retval) { - unhook_irq_events(); + trace_osnoise_callback_enabled = false; + /* + * Make sure that ftrace_nmi_enter/exit() see + * trace_osnoise_callback_enabled as false before continuing. + */ + barrier(); + + osnoise_unhook_events(); return retval; } @@ -2185,9 +2199,7 @@ static void osnoise_workload_stop(void) stop_per_cpu_kthreads(); - unhook_irq_events(); - unhook_softirq_events(); - unhook_thread_events(); + osnoise_unhook_events(); } static void osnoise_tracer_start(struct trace_array *tr)

3 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Partially allow KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN" failed to apply to 5.16-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.16-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c6617c61e8fe44b9e9fdfede921f61cac6b5149d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 16:05:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Partially allow KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN Commit feb627e8d6f6 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN") forbade changing CPUID altogether but unfortunately this is not fully compatible with existing VMMs. In particular, QEMU reuses vCPU fds for CPU hotplug after unplug and it calls KVM_SET_CPUID2. Instead of full ban, check whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what was previously set. Reported-by: Igor Mammedov <imammedo(a)redhat.com> Fixes: feb627e8d6f6 ("KVM: x86: Forbid KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220117150542.2176196-3-vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org [Do not call kvm_find_cpuid_entry repeatedly. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 812190a707f6..7eb046d907c6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -119,6 +119,28 @@ static int kvm_check_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, return fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, xfeatures); } +/* Check whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what is already set for the vCPU. */ +static int kvm_cpuid_check_equal(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2, + int nent) +{ + struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *orig; + int i; + + if (nent != vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) { + orig = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[i]; + if (e2[i].function != orig->function || + e2[i].index != orig->index || + e2[i].eax != orig->eax || e2[i].ebx != orig->ebx || + e2[i].ecx != orig->ecx || e2[i].edx != orig->edx) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static void kvm_update_kvm_cpuid_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { u32 function; @@ -313,6 +335,20 @@ static int kvm_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *e2, __kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu, e2, nent); + /* + * KVM does not correctly handle changing guest CPUID after KVM_RUN, as + * MAXPHYADDR, GBPAGES support, AMD reserved bit behavior, etc.. aren't + * tracked in kvm_mmu_page_role. As a result, KVM may miss guest page + * faults due to reusing SPs/SPTEs. In practice no sane VMM mucks with + * the core vCPU model on the fly. It would've been better to forbid any + * KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} calls after KVM_RUN altogether but unfortunately + * some VMMs (e.g. QEMU) reuse vCPU fds for CPU hotplug/unplug and do + * KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} again. To support this legacy behavior, check + * whether the supplied CPUID data is equal to what's already set. + */ + if (vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1) + return kvm_cpuid_check_equal(vcpu, e2, nent); + r = kvm_check_cpuid(vcpu, e2, nent); if (r) return r; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 60da2331ec32..a0bc637348b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5230,17 +5230,6 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp, struct kvm_cpuid __user *cpuid_arg = argp; struct kvm_cpuid cpuid; - /* - * KVM does not correctly handle changing guest CPUID after KVM_RUN, as - * MAXPHYADDR, GBPAGES support, AMD reserved bit behavior, etc.. aren't - * tracked in kvm_mmu_page_role. As a result, KVM may miss guest page - * faults due to reusing SPs/SPTEs. In practice no sane VMM mucks with - * the core vCPU model on the fly, so fail. - */ - r = -EINVAL; - if (vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1) - goto out; - r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid))) goto out; @@ -5251,14 +5240,6 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp, struct kvm_cpuid2 __user *cpuid_arg = argp; struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid; - /* - * KVM_SET_CPUID{,2} after KVM_RUN is forbidded, see the comment in - * KVM_SET_CPUID case above. - */ - r = -EINVAL; - if (vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu != -1) - goto out; - r = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&cpuid, cpuid_arg, sizeof(cpuid))) goto out;

3 years, 1 month

2
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Fotowoltaika- propozycja instalacji

by "Przemysław Wróblewski"

Dzień dobry, Czy rozważali Państwo montaż systemu fotowoltaicznego? Instalacja fotowoltaiczna jest najlepszym sposobem na obniżenie wysokości rachunków za prąd (pozostają tylko opłaty stałe) i zabezpieczenie się przed rosnącymi cenami energii elektrycznej. Jest to w pełni odnawialne i bezemisyjne źródło energii, dzięki czemu przyczyniamy się do ochrony środowiska naturalnego. Działamy od wielu lat na rynku energetycznym. Przygotujemy projekt, wycenę oraz kompleksowo wykonamy i zgłosimy realizację do zakładu energetycznego. Czy chcą Państwo poznać naszą propozycję? Pozdrawiam, Przemysław Wróblewski

3 years, 1 month

1
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[PATCH] KVM: arm64: Use shadow SPSR_EL1 when injecting exceptions on !VHE

by Marc Zyngier

Injecting an exception into a guest with non-VHE is risky business. Instead of writing in the shadow register for the switch code to restore it, we override the CPU register instead. Which gets overriden a few instructions later by said restore code. The result is that although the guest correctly gets the exception, it will return to the original context in some random state, depending on what was there the first place... Boo. Fix the issue by writing to the shadow register. The original code is absolutely fine on VHE, as the state is already loaded, and writing to the shadow register in that case would actually be a bug. Fixes: bb666c472ca2 ("KVM: arm64: Inject AArch64 exceptions from HYP") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c index 0418399e0a20..c5d009715402 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c @@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ static inline void __vcpu_write_sys_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 val, int reg) static void __vcpu_write_spsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 val) { - write_sysreg_el1(val, SYS_SPSR); + if (has_vhe()) + write_sysreg_el1(val, SYS_SPSR); + else + __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, SPSR_EL1) = val; } static void __vcpu_write_spsr_abt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 val) -- 2.34.1

3 years, 1 month

2
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ATTN: BENEFICIARY

by OFFICE

ATTN: BENEFICIARY OVER-DUE PAYMENT RELEASED. FINALLY, YOUR FUND IS NOW HERE IN THE Nigeria AWAITING TO BE SHIPPED TO YOUR HOME ADDRESS. THIS IS THREE TIMES I HAVE SENT YOU THIS THE SAME MESSAGE AND TODAY IF YOU, FAIL TO COMPLY WITHIN THREE DAYS YOU WILL LOSE YOUR FUND FOREVER.YOUR FUND APPROVED PAYMENT OF $27,000,000.00 (TWENTY SEVEN MILLION DOLLARS THROUGH ATM CARD) This is to inform you that three gentle men came to my office with all the claim documents this morning at about (10:15amStandard Pacific Time), with a letter claiming to be from you.You are advise to contact this office immediately with your full contact details. EMAIL : Mr.RobertFerguson(a)aeiou.pt Regards Mr. Robert Ferguson Admin Chairman

3 years, 1 month

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix an use-after-free issue about data=journal" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 5c48a7df91499e371ef725895b2e2d21a126e227 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2021 17:09:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix an use-after-free issue about data=journal writeback mode Our syzkaller report an use-after-free issue that accessing the freed buffer_head on the writeback page in __ext4_journalled_writepage(). The problem is that if there was a truncate racing with the data=journalled writeback procedure, the writeback length could become zero and bget_one() refuse to get buffer_head's refcount, then the truncate procedure release buffer once we drop page lock, finally, the last ext4_walk_page_buffers() trigger the use-after-free problem. sync truncate ext4_sync_file() file_write_and_wait_range() ext4_setattr(0) inode->i_size = 0 ext4_writepage() len = 0 __ext4_journalled_writepage() page_bufs = page_buffers(page) ext4_walk_page_buffers(bget_one) <- does not get refcount do_invalidatepage() free_buffer_head() ext4_walk_page_buffers(page_bufs) <- trigger use-after-free After commit bdf96838aea6 ("ext4: fix race between truncate and __ext4_journalled_writepage()"), we have already handled the racing case, so the bget_one() and bput_one() are not needed. So this patch simply remove these hunk, and recheck the i_size to make it safe. Fixes: bdf96838aea6 ("ext4: fix race between truncate and __ext4_journalled_writepage()") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211225090937.712867-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index bca9951634d9..68070f34f0cf 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -1845,30 +1845,16 @@ int ext4_da_get_block_prep(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock, return 0; } -static int bget_one(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, - struct buffer_head *bh) -{ - get_bh(bh); - return 0; -} - -static int bput_one(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, - struct buffer_head *bh) -{ - put_bh(bh); - return 0; -} - static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, unsigned int len) { struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; - struct buffer_head *page_bufs = NULL; handle_t *handle = NULL; int ret = 0, err = 0; int inline_data = ext4_has_inline_data(inode); struct buffer_head *inode_bh = NULL; + loff_t size; ClearPageChecked(page); @@ -1878,14 +1864,6 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, inode_bh = ext4_journalled_write_inline_data(inode, len, page); if (inode_bh == NULL) goto out; - } else { - page_bufs = page_buffers(page); - if (!page_bufs) { - BUG(); - goto out; - } - ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, inode, page_bufs, 0, len, - NULL, bget_one); } /* * We need to release the page lock before we start the @@ -1906,7 +1884,8 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, lock_page(page); put_page(page); - if (page->mapping != mapping) { + size = i_size_read(inode); + if (page->mapping != mapping || page_offset(page) > size) { /* The page got truncated from under us */ ext4_journal_stop(handle); ret = 0; @@ -1916,6 +1895,13 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, if (inline_data) { ret = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); } else { + struct buffer_head *page_bufs = page_buffers(page); + + if (page->index == size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + len = size & ~PAGE_MASK; + else + len = PAGE_SIZE; + ret = ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, inode, page_bufs, 0, len, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access); @@ -1936,9 +1922,6 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, out: unlock_page(page); out_no_pagelock: - if (!inline_data && page_bufs) - ext4_walk_page_buffers(NULL, inode, page_bufs, 0, len, - NULL, bput_one); brelse(inode_bh); return ret; }

3 years, 1 month

1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix an use-after-free issue about data=journal" failed to apply to 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 5c48a7df91499e371ef725895b2e2d21a126e227 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2021 17:09:37 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix an use-after-free issue about data=journal writeback mode Our syzkaller report an use-after-free issue that accessing the freed buffer_head on the writeback page in __ext4_journalled_writepage(). The problem is that if there was a truncate racing with the data=journalled writeback procedure, the writeback length could become zero and bget_one() refuse to get buffer_head's refcount, then the truncate procedure release buffer once we drop page lock, finally, the last ext4_walk_page_buffers() trigger the use-after-free problem. sync truncate ext4_sync_file() file_write_and_wait_range() ext4_setattr(0) inode->i_size = 0 ext4_writepage() len = 0 __ext4_journalled_writepage() page_bufs = page_buffers(page) ext4_walk_page_buffers(bget_one) <- does not get refcount do_invalidatepage() free_buffer_head() ext4_walk_page_buffers(page_bufs) <- trigger use-after-free After commit bdf96838aea6 ("ext4: fix race between truncate and __ext4_journalled_writepage()"), we have already handled the racing case, so the bget_one() and bput_one() are not needed. So this patch simply remove these hunk, and recheck the i_size to make it safe. Fixes: bdf96838aea6 ("ext4: fix race between truncate and __ext4_journalled_writepage()") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211225090937.712867-1-yi.zhang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index bca9951634d9..68070f34f0cf 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -1845,30 +1845,16 @@ int ext4_da_get_block_prep(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock, return 0; } -static int bget_one(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, - struct buffer_head *bh) -{ - get_bh(bh); - return 0; -} - -static int bput_one(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, - struct buffer_head *bh) -{ - put_bh(bh); - return 0; -} - static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, unsigned int len) { struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; - struct buffer_head *page_bufs = NULL; handle_t *handle = NULL; int ret = 0, err = 0; int inline_data = ext4_has_inline_data(inode); struct buffer_head *inode_bh = NULL; + loff_t size; ClearPageChecked(page); @@ -1878,14 +1864,6 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, inode_bh = ext4_journalled_write_inline_data(inode, len, page); if (inode_bh == NULL) goto out; - } else { - page_bufs = page_buffers(page); - if (!page_bufs) { - BUG(); - goto out; - } - ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, inode, page_bufs, 0, len, - NULL, bget_one); } /* * We need to release the page lock before we start the @@ -1906,7 +1884,8 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, lock_page(page); put_page(page); - if (page->mapping != mapping) { + size = i_size_read(inode); + if (page->mapping != mapping || page_offset(page) > size) { /* The page got truncated from under us */ ext4_journal_stop(handle); ret = 0; @@ -1916,6 +1895,13 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, if (inline_data) { ret = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); } else { + struct buffer_head *page_bufs = page_buffers(page); + + if (page->index == size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + len = size & ~PAGE_MASK; + else + len = PAGE_SIZE; + ret = ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, inode, page_bufs, 0, len, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access); @@ -1936,9 +1922,6 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, out: unlock_page(page); out_no_pagelock: - if (!inline_data && page_bufs) - ext4_walk_page_buffers(NULL, inode, page_bufs, 0, len, - NULL, bput_one); brelse(inode_bh); return ret; }

3 years, 1 month

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