From: Nadav Amit <namit(a)vmware.com>
When a PTE is set by UFFD operations such as UFFDIO_COPY, the PTE is
currently only marked as write-protected if the VMA has VM_WRITE flag
set. This seems incorrect or at least would be unexpected by the users.
Consider the following sequence of operations that are being performed
on a certain page:
mprotect(PROT_READ)
UFFDIO_COPY(UFFDIO_COPY_MODE_WP)
mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE)
At this point the user would expect to still get UFFD notification when
the page is accessed for write, but the user would not get one, since
the PTE was not marked as UFFD_WP during UFFDIO_COPY.
Fix it by always marking PTEs as UFFD_WP regardless on the
write-permission in the VMA flags.
Fixes: 292924b26024 ("userfaultfd: wp: apply _PAGE_UFFD_WP bit")
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit(a)vmware.com>
---
mm/userfaultfd.c | 15 +++++++++------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c
index 0780c2a57ff1..885e5adb0168 100644
--- a/mm/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c
@@ -72,12 +72,15 @@ int mfill_atomic_install_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, pmd_t *dst_pmd,
_dst_pte = pte_mkdirty(_dst_pte);
if (page_in_cache && !vm_shared)
writable = false;
- if (writable) {
- if (wp_copy)
- _dst_pte = pte_mkuffd_wp(_dst_pte);
- else
- _dst_pte = pte_mkwrite(_dst_pte);
- }
+
+ /*
+ * Always mark a PTE as write-protected when needed, regardless of
+ * VM_WRITE, which the user might change.
+ */
+ if (wp_copy)
+ _dst_pte = pte_mkuffd_wp(_dst_pte);
+ else if (writable)
+ _dst_pte = pte_mkwrite(_dst_pte);
dst_pte = pte_offset_map_lock(dst_mm, dst_pmd, dst_addr, &ptl);
--
2.25.1
The following commit has been merged into the irq/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 83dbf898a2d45289be875deb580e93050ba67529
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/83dbf898a2d45289be875deb580e93050ba67529
Author: Stefan Roese <sr(a)denx.de>
AuthorDate: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 12:49:32 +01:00
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
CommitterDate: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 13:23:32 +01:00
PCI/MSI: Mask MSI-X vectors only on success
Masking all unused MSI-X entries is done to ensure that a crash kernel
starts from a clean slate, which correponds to the reset state of the
device as defined in the PCI-E specificion 3.0 and later:
Vector Control for MSI-X Table Entries
--------------------------------------
"00: Mask bit: When this bit is set, the function is prohibited from
sending a message using this MSI-X Table entry.
...
This bit’s state after reset is 1 (entry is masked)."
A Marvell NVME device fails to deliver MSI interrupts after trying to
enable MSI-X interrupts due to that masking. It seems to take the MSI-X
mask bits into account even when MSI-X is disabled.
While not specification compliant, this can be cured by moving the masking
into the success path, so that the MSI-X table entries stay in device reset
state when the MSI-X setup fails.
[ tglx: Move it into the success path, add comment and amend changelog ]
Fixes: aa8092c1d1f1 ("PCI/MSI: Mask all unused MSI-X entries")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roese <sr(a)denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-pci(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek(a)xilinx.com>
Cc: Marek Vasut <marex(a)denx.de>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210161025.3287927-1-sr@denx.de
---
drivers/pci/msi.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/msi.c b/drivers/pci/msi.c
index 48e3f4e..6748cf9 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/msi.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/msi.c
@@ -722,9 +722,6 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev, struct msix_entry *entries,
goto out_disable;
}
- /* Ensure that all table entries are masked. */
- msix_mask_all(base, tsize);
-
ret = msix_setup_entries(dev, base, entries, nvec, affd);
if (ret)
goto out_disable;
@@ -751,6 +748,16 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev, struct msix_entry *entries,
/* Set MSI-X enabled bits and unmask the function */
pci_intx_for_msi(dev, 0);
dev->msix_enabled = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that all table entries are masked to prevent
+ * stale entries from firing in a crash kernel.
+ *
+ * Done late to deal with a broken Marvell NVME device
+ * which takes the MSI-X mask bits into account even
+ * when MSI-X is disabled, which prevents MSI delivery.
+ */
+ msix_mask_all(base, tsize);
pci_msix_clear_and_set_ctrl(dev, PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL, 0);
pcibios_free_irq(dev);
For some reason, the Microsoft Surface Go 3 uses the standard ACPI
interface for battery information, but does not use the standard PNP0C0A
HID. Instead it uses MSHW0146 as identifier. Add that ID to the driver
as this seems to work well.
Additionally, the power state is not updated immediately after the AC
has been (un-)plugged, so add the respective quirk for that.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/acpi/battery.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/battery.c b/drivers/acpi/battery.c
index ea31ae01458b..dc208f5f5a1f 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/battery.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/battery.c
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(cache_time, "cache time in milliseconds");
static const struct acpi_device_id battery_device_ids[] = {
{"PNP0C0A", 0},
+
+ /* Microsoft Surface Go 3 */
+ {"MSHW0146", 0},
+
{"", 0},
};
@@ -1148,6 +1152,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id bat_dmi_table[] __initconst = {
DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "ThinkPad"),
},
},
+ {
+ /* Microsoft Surface Go 3 */
+ .callback = battery_notification_delay_quirk,
+ .matches = {
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Microsoft Corporation"),
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Surface Go 3"),
+ },
+ },
{},
};
--
2.35.1
Even if SPI_NOR_NO_ERASE was set, one could still send erase opcodes
to the flash. It is not recommended to send unsupported opcodes to
flashes. Fix the logic and do not set mtd->_erase when SPI_NOR_NO_ERASE
is specified. With this users will not be able to issue erase opcodes to
flashes and instead they will recive an -ENOTSUPP error.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b199489d37b2 ("mtd: spi-nor: add the framework for SPI NOR")
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus(a)microchip.com>
---
drivers/mtd/spi-nor/core.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/core.c b/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/core.c
index 86a536c97c18..cd2d094ef837 100644
--- a/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/core.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/spi-nor/core.c
@@ -2969,10 +2969,11 @@ static void spi_nor_set_mtd_info(struct spi_nor *nor)
mtd->flags = MTD_CAP_NORFLASH;
if (nor->info->flags & SPI_NOR_NO_ERASE)
mtd->flags |= MTD_NO_ERASE;
+ else
+ mtd->_erase = spi_nor_erase;
mtd->writesize = nor->params->writesize;
mtd->writebufsize = nor->params->page_size;
mtd->size = nor->params->size;
- mtd->_erase = spi_nor_erase;
mtd->_read = spi_nor_read;
/* Might be already set by some SST flashes. */
if (!mtd->_write)
--
2.25.1
From: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley(a)intel.com>
commit e6ba5273d4ede03d075d7a116b8edad1f6115f4d upstream.
[I had to fix the cherry-pick manually as the patch added a line around
some context that was missing.]
The VF can be configured via the PF's ndo ops at the same time the PF is
receiving/handling virtchnl messages. This has many issues, with
one of them being the ndo op could be actively resetting a VF (i.e.
resetting it to the default state and deleting/re-adding the VF's VSI)
while a virtchnl message is being handled. The following error was seen
because a VF ndo op was used to change a VF's trust setting while the
VIRTCHNL_OP_CONFIG_VSI_QUEUES was ongoing:
[35274.192484] ice 0000:88:00.0: Failed to set LAN Tx queue context, error: ICE_ERR_PARAM
[35274.193074] ice 0000:88:00.0: VF 0 failed opcode 6, retval: -5
[35274.193640] iavf 0000:88:01.0: PF returned error -5 (IAVF_ERR_PARAM) to our request 6
Fix this by making sure the virtchnl handling and VF ndo ops that
trigger VF resets cannot run concurrently. This is done by adding a
struct mutex cfg_lock to each VF structure. For VF ndo ops, the mutex
will be locked around the critical operations and VFR. Since the ndo ops
will trigger a VFR, the virtchnl thread will use mutex_trylock(). This
is done because if any other thread (i.e. VF ndo op) has the mutex, then
that means the current VF message being handled is no longer valid, so
just ignore it.
This issue can be seen using the following commands:
for i in {0..50}; do
rmmod ice
modprobe ice
sleep 1
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/ens785f0/device/sriov_numvfs
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/ens785f1/device/sriov_numvfs
ip link set ens785f1 vf 0 trust on
ip link set ens785f0 vf 0 trust on
sleep 2
echo 0 > /sys/class/net/ens785f0/device/sriov_numvfs
echo 0 > /sys/class/net/ens785f1/device/sriov_numvfs
sleep 1
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/ens785f0/device/sriov_numvfs
echo 1 > /sys/class/net/ens785f1/device/sriov_numvfs
ip link set ens785f1 vf 0 trust on
ip link set ens785f0 vf 0 trust on
done
Fixes: 7c710869d64e ("ice: Add handlers for VF netdevice operations")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley(a)intel.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Jankowski <konrad0.jankowski(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com>
---
.../net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++
.../net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h | 5 ++++
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c
index a78e8f00cf71..a0b8436f50ba 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.c
@@ -646,6 +646,8 @@ void ice_free_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf)
set_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, pf->vf[i].vf_states);
ice_free_vf_res(&pf->vf[i]);
}
+
+ mutex_destroy(&pf->vf[i].cfg_lock);
}
if (ice_sriov_free_msix_res(pf))
@@ -1894,6 +1896,8 @@ static void ice_set_dflt_settings_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf)
*/
ice_vf_ctrl_invalidate_vsi(vf);
ice_vf_fdir_init(vf);
+
+ mutex_init(&vf->cfg_lock);
}
}
@@ -4082,6 +4086,8 @@ ice_set_vf_port_vlan(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, u16 vlan_id, u8 qos,
return 0;
}
+ mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
+
vf->port_vlan_info = vlanprio;
if (vf->port_vlan_info)
@@ -4091,6 +4097,7 @@ ice_set_vf_port_vlan(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, u16 vlan_id, u8 qos,
dev_info(dev, "Clearing port VLAN on VF %d\n", vf_id);
ice_vc_reset_vf(vf);
+ mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock);
return 0;
}
@@ -4465,6 +4472,15 @@ void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
return;
}
+ /* VF is being configured in another context that triggers a VFR, so no
+ * need to process this message
+ */
+ if (!mutex_trylock(&vf->cfg_lock)) {
+ dev_info(dev, "VF %u is being configured in another context that will trigger a VFR, so there is no need to handle this message\n",
+ vf->vf_id);
+ return;
+ }
+
switch (v_opcode) {
case VIRTCHNL_OP_VERSION:
err = ice_vc_get_ver_msg(vf, msg);
@@ -4553,6 +4569,8 @@ void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
dev_info(dev, "PF failed to honor VF %d, opcode %d, error %d\n",
vf_id, v_opcode, err);
}
+
+ mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock);
}
/**
@@ -4668,6 +4686,8 @@ int ice_set_vf_mac(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, u8 *mac)
return -EINVAL;
}
+ mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
+
/* VF is notified of its new MAC via the PF's response to the
* VIRTCHNL_OP_GET_VF_RESOURCES message after the VF has been reset
*/
@@ -4686,6 +4706,7 @@ int ice_set_vf_mac(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, u8 *mac)
}
ice_vc_reset_vf(vf);
+ mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock);
return 0;
}
@@ -4715,11 +4736,15 @@ int ice_set_vf_trust(struct net_device *netdev, int vf_id, bool trusted)
if (trusted == vf->trusted)
return 0;
+ mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
+
vf->trusted = trusted;
ice_vc_reset_vf(vf);
dev_info(ice_pf_to_dev(pf), "VF %u is now %strusted\n",
vf_id, trusted ? "" : "un");
+ mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock);
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h
index 38b4dc82c5c1..a750e9a9d712 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl_pf.h
@@ -74,6 +74,11 @@ struct ice_mdd_vf_events {
struct ice_vf {
struct ice_pf *pf;
+ /* Used during virtchnl message handling and NDO ops against the VF
+ * that will trigger a VFR
+ */
+ struct mutex cfg_lock;
+
u16 vf_id; /* VF ID in the PF space */
u16 lan_vsi_idx; /* index into PF struct */
u16 ctrl_vsi_idx;
--
2.35.1.129.gb80121027d12