Some GPIO lines have stopped working after the patch
commit 2ab73c6d8323f ("gpio: Support GPIO controllers without pin-ranges")
And this has supposedly been fixed in the following patches
commit 89ad556b7f96a ("gpio: Avoid using pin ranges with !PINCTRL")
commit 6dbbf84603961 ("gpiolib: Don't free if pin ranges are not defined")
But an erratic behavior where some GPIO lines work while others do not work
has been introduced.
This patch reverts those changes so that the sysfs-gpio interface works
properly again.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Roberto Jimenez <marcelo.jimenez(a)gmail.com>
---
Hi,
My system is ARM926EJ-S rev 5 (v5l) (AT91SAM9G25), the board is an ACME Systems Arietta.
The system used sysfs-gpio to manage a few gpio lines, and I have noticed that some have stopped working.
The test script is very simple:
#! /bin/bash
cd /sys/class/gpio/
echo 24 > export
cd pioA24
echo out > direction
echo 0 > value
cat value
echo 1 > value
cat value
echo 0 > value
cat value
echo 1 > value
cat value
cd ..
echo 24 > unexport
In a "good" kernel, this script outputs 0, 1, 0, 1. In a bad kernel, the output result is 1, 1, 1, 1. Also it must be possible to run this script twice without errors, that was the issue with the gpiochip_generic_free() call that had been addressed in another patch.
In my system PINCTRL is automatically selected by
SOC_AT91SAM9 [=y] && ARCH_AT91 [=y] && ARCH_MULTI_V5 [=y]
So it is not an option to disable it to make it work.
Best regards,
Marcelo.
drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 10 ----------
1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
index af5bb8fedfea..ac69ec8fb37a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
+++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c
@@ -1804,11 +1804,6 @@ static inline void gpiochip_irqchip_free_valid_mask(struct gpio_chip *gc)
*/
int gpiochip_generic_request(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned offset)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_PINCTRL
- if (list_empty(&gc->gpiodev->pin_ranges))
- return 0;
-#endif
-
return pinctrl_gpio_request(gc->gpiodev->base + offset);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gpiochip_generic_request);
@@ -1820,11 +1815,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gpiochip_generic_request);
*/
void gpiochip_generic_free(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned offset)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_PINCTRL
- if (list_empty(&gc->gpiodev->pin_ranges))
- return;
-#endif
-
pinctrl_gpio_free(gc->gpiodev->base + offset);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gpiochip_generic_free);
--
2.30.2
While the $val/$val2 values passed in from userspace are always >= 0
integers, the limits of the control can be signed integers and the $min
can be non-zero and less than zero. To correctly validate $val/$val2
against platform_max, add the $min offset to val first.
Fixes: 817f7c9335ec0 ("ASoC: ops: Reject out of bounds values in snd_soc_put_volsw()")
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex(a)denx.de>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
sound/soc/soc-ops.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-ops.c b/sound/soc/soc-ops.c
index f24f7354f46fe..6389a512c4dc6 100644
--- a/sound/soc/soc-ops.c
+++ b/sound/soc/soc-ops.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int snd_soc_put_volsw(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
mask = BIT(sign_bit + 1) - 1;
val = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0];
- if (mc->platform_max && val > mc->platform_max)
+ if (mc->platform_max && ((int)val + min) > mc->platform_max)
return -EINVAL;
if (val > max - min)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int snd_soc_put_volsw(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
val = val << shift;
if (snd_soc_volsw_is_stereo(mc)) {
val2 = ucontrol->value.integer.value[1];
- if (mc->platform_max && val2 > mc->platform_max)
+ if (mc->platform_max && ((int)val2 + min) > mc->platform_max)
return -EINVAL;
if (val2 > max - min)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.34.1
From: Bob Peterson <rpeterso(a)redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 428f651cb80b227af47fc302e4931791f2fb4741 ]
Before this patch, function read_rindex_entry called compute_bitstructs
before it allocated a glock for the rgrp. But if compute_bitstructs found
a problem with the rgrp, it called gfs2_consist_rgrpd, and that called
gfs2_dump_glock for rgd->rd_gl which had not yet been assigned.
read_rindex_entry
compute_bitstructs
gfs2_consist_rgrpd
gfs2_dump_glock <---------rgd->rd_gl was not set.
This patch changes read_rindex_entry so it assigns an rgrp glock before
calling compute_bitstructs so gfs2_dump_glock does not reference an
unassigned pointer. If an error is discovered, the glock must also be
put, so a new goto and label were added.
Reported-by: syzbot+c6fd14145e2f62ca0784(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
fs/gfs2/rgrp.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/gfs2/rgrp.c b/fs/gfs2/rgrp.c
index c3b00ba92ed2..e21f8e10d70b 100644
--- a/fs/gfs2/rgrp.c
+++ b/fs/gfs2/rgrp.c
@@ -922,15 +922,15 @@ static int read_rindex_entry(struct gfs2_inode *ip)
spin_lock_init(&rgd->rd_rsspin);
mutex_init(&rgd->rd_mutex);
- error = compute_bitstructs(rgd);
- if (error)
- goto fail;
-
error = gfs2_glock_get(sdp, rgd->rd_addr,
&gfs2_rgrp_glops, CREATE, &rgd->rd_gl);
if (error)
goto fail;
+ error = compute_bitstructs(rgd);
+ if (error)
+ goto fail_glock;
+
rgd->rd_rgl = (struct gfs2_rgrp_lvb *)rgd->rd_gl->gl_lksb.sb_lvbptr;
rgd->rd_flags &= ~(GFS2_RDF_UPTODATE | GFS2_RDF_PREFERRED);
if (rgd->rd_data > sdp->sd_max_rg_data)
@@ -944,6 +944,7 @@ static int read_rindex_entry(struct gfs2_inode *ip)
}
error = 0; /* someone else read in the rgrp; free it and ignore it */
+fail_glock:
gfs2_glock_put(rgd->rd_gl);
fail:
--
2.35.1
There are 3 places where the cpu and node masks of the top cpuset can
be initialized in the order they are executed:
1) start_kernel -> cpuset_init()
2) start_kernel -> cgroup_init() -> cpuset_bind()
3) kernel_init_freeable() -> do_basic_setup() -> cpuset_init_smp()
The first cpuset_init() function just sets all the bits in the masks.
The last one executed is cpuset_init_smp() which sets up cpu and node
masks suitable for v1, but not v2. cpuset_bind() does the right setup
for both v1 and v2 assuming that effective_mems and effective_cpus have
been set up properly which is not strictly the case here. As a result,
cpu and memory node hot add may fail to update the cpu and node masks
of the top cpuset to include the newly added cpu or node in a cgroup
v2 environment.
To fix this problem, the redundant cpus_allowed and mems_allowed
mask setup in cpuset_init_smp() are removed. The effective_cpus and
effective_mems setup there are moved to cpuset_bind().
cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com>
---
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 10 +++-------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
index 9390bfd9f1cd..a2e15a43397e 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c
@@ -2961,6 +2961,9 @@ static void cpuset_bind(struct cgroup_subsys_state *root_css)
percpu_down_write(&cpuset_rwsem);
spin_lock_irq(&callback_lock);
+ cpumask_copy(top_cpuset.effective_cpus, cpu_active_mask);
+ top_cpuset.effective_mems = node_states[N_MEMORY];
+
if (is_in_v2_mode()) {
cpumask_copy(top_cpuset.cpus_allowed, cpu_possible_mask);
top_cpuset.mems_allowed = node_possible_map;
@@ -3390,13 +3393,6 @@ static struct notifier_block cpuset_track_online_nodes_nb = {
*/
void __init cpuset_init_smp(void)
{
- cpumask_copy(top_cpuset.cpus_allowed, cpu_active_mask);
- top_cpuset.mems_allowed = node_states[N_MEMORY];
- top_cpuset.old_mems_allowed = top_cpuset.mems_allowed;
-
- cpumask_copy(top_cpuset.effective_cpus, cpu_active_mask);
- top_cpuset.effective_mems = node_states[N_MEMORY];
-
register_hotmemory_notifier(&cpuset_track_online_nodes_nb);
cpuset_migrate_mm_wq = alloc_ordered_workqueue("cpuset_migrate_mm", 0);
--
2.27.0
From: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08(a)live.com>
On T2 Macs, the secure boot is handled by the T2 Chip. If enabled, only
macOS and Windows are allowed to boot on these machines. Moreover, loading
UEFI Secure Boot certificates is not supported on these machines on Linux.
An attempt to do so causes a crash with the following logs :-
Call Trace:
<TASK>
page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0
? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80
? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80
? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60
kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110
__bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190
bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20
do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0
exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180
asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30
(Removed some logs from here)
? __efi_call+0x28/0x30
? switch_mm+0x20/0x30
? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0
? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0
? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0
? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0
? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]---
efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled!
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015
integrity: Couldn't get mokx list
integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000
As a result of not being able to read or load certificates, secure boot
cannot be enabled. This patch prevents querying of these UEFI variables,
since these Macs seem to use a non-standard EFI hardware.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08(a)live.com>
---
v2 :- Reduce code size of the table.
v3 :- Close the brackets which were left open by mistake.
v4 :- Fix comment style issues, remove blank spaces and limit use of dmi_first_match()
v4 RESEND :- Add stable to cc
.../platform_certs/keyring_handler.h | 8 +++++
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
index 284558f30..212d894a8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
@@ -35,3 +35,11 @@ efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
#endif
+
+#ifndef UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT
+#define UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT(vendor, product) \
+ .matches = { \
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, vendor), \
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, product), \
+ },
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index 5f45c3c07..c3393b2b1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -12,6 +13,33 @@
#include "../integrity.h"
#include "keyring_handler.h"
+/*
+ * Apple Macs with T2 Security chip seem to be using a non standard
+ * implementation of Secure Boot. For Linux to run on these machines
+ * Secure Boot needs to be turned off, since the T2 Chip manages
+ * Secure Boot and doesn't allow OS other than macOS or Windows to
+ * boot. If turned off, an attempt to get certificates causes a crash,
+ * so we simply prevent doing the same.
+ */
+static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = {
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,2") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,3") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro15,4") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,2") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,3") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookPro16,4") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir8,2") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacBookAir9,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacMini8,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") },
+ { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") },
+ { }
+};
+
/*
* Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if
* it does.
@@ -138,6 +166,13 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, mokxsize = 0;
efi_status_t status;
int rc = 0;
+ const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id;
+
+ dmi_id = dmi_first_match(uefi_skip_cert);
+ if (dmi_id) {
+ pr_err("Getting UEFI Secure Boot Certs is not supported on T2 Macs.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE))
return false;
--
2.25.1
As Yanming reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215895
I have encountered a bug in F2FS file system in kernel v5.17.
The kernel message is shown below:
kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:611!
Call Trace:
evict+0x282/0x4e0
__dentry_kill+0x2b2/0x4d0
dput+0x2dd/0x720
do_renameat2+0x596/0x970
__x64_sys_rename+0x78/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
The root cause is: fuzzed inode has both inline_data flag and encrypted
flag, so after it was deleted by rename(), during f2fs_evict_inode(),
it will cause inline data conversion due to flags confilction, then
page cache will be polluted and trigger panic in clear_inode().
This patch tries to fix the issue by do more sanity checks for inline
data inode in sanity_check_inode().
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ming Yan <yanming(a)tju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao.yu(a)oppo.com>
---
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 7 +++++++
fs/f2fs/inode.c | 3 +--
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index 27aa93caec06..64c511b498cc 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -4173,6 +4173,13 @@ static inline void f2fs_set_encrypted_inode(struct inode *inode)
*/
static inline bool f2fs_post_read_required(struct inode *inode)
{
+ /*
+ * used by sanity_check_inode(), when disk layout fields has not
+ * been synchronized to inmem fields.
+ */
+ if (file_is_encrypt(inode) || file_is_verity(inode) ||
+ F2FS_I(inode)->i_flags & F2FS_COMPR_FL)
+ return true;
return f2fs_encrypted_file(inode) || fsverity_active(inode) ||
f2fs_compressed_file(inode);
}
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
index 83639238a1fe..234b8ed02644 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c
@@ -276,8 +276,7 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page)
}
}
- if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) &&
- (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))) {
+ if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) && !f2fs_may_inline_data(inode)) {
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK);
f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx, mode=%u) should not have inline_data, run fsck to fix",
__func__, inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode);
--
2.25.1