May 2022 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty" failed to apply to 4.14-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.14-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From dcd46d897adb70d63e025f175a00a89797d31a43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 16:09:47 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill: "In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour, but it is not an explicit requirement[2]: The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is associated with the process being started by one of the exec functions. ... Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3], but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then. Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4] of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider. This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]." While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL (or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8] existing userspace programs. The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0 seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv. Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so userspace has some notice about the change: process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.or… [2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408 [4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt [5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176 [6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+… [7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%… [8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ Reported-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)dereferenced.org> Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias(a)libc.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)dereferenced.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 79f2c9483302..40b1008fb0f7 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -495,8 +495,14 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't * signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space. * Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully. + * + * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a + * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused + * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking + * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident. + * See do_execveat_common(). */ - ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); + ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); if (limit <= ptr_size) return -E2BIG; limit -= ptr_size; @@ -1897,6 +1903,9 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, } retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); + if (retval == 0) + pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n", + current->comm, bprm->filename); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval; @@ -1923,6 +1932,19 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, if (retval < 0) goto out_free; + /* + * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to + * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing + * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also + * bprm_stack_limits(). + */ + if (bprm->argc == 0) { + retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out_free; + bprm->argc = 1; + } + retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, flags); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); @@ -1951,6 +1973,8 @@ int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_filename, } retval = count_strings_kernel(argv); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0)) + retval = -EINVAL; if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval;

3 years

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1
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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From dcd46d897adb70d63e025f175a00a89797d31a43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 16:09:47 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill: "In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour, but it is not an explicit requirement[2]: The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is associated with the process being started by one of the exec functions. ... Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3], but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then. Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4] of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider. This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]." While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL (or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8] existing userspace programs. The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0 seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv. Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so userspace has some notice about the change: process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.or… [2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408 [4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt [5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176 [6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+… [7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%… [8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ Reported-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)dereferenced.org> Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias(a)libc.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)dereferenced.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 79f2c9483302..40b1008fb0f7 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -495,8 +495,14 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't * signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space. * Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully. + * + * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a + * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused + * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking + * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident. + * See do_execveat_common(). */ - ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); + ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); if (limit <= ptr_size) return -E2BIG; limit -= ptr_size; @@ -1897,6 +1903,9 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, } retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); + if (retval == 0) + pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n", + current->comm, bprm->filename); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval; @@ -1923,6 +1932,19 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, if (retval < 0) goto out_free; + /* + * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to + * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing + * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also + * bprm_stack_limits(). + */ + if (bprm->argc == 0) { + retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out_free; + bprm->argc = 1; + } + retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, flags); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); @@ -1951,6 +1973,8 @@ int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_filename, } retval = count_strings_kernel(argv); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0)) + retval = -EINVAL; if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval;

3 years

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1
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From dcd46d897adb70d63e025f175a00a89797d31a43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 16:09:47 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] exec: Force single empty string when argv is empty Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill: "In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour, but it is not an explicit requirement[2]: The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is associated with the process being started by one of the exec functions. ... Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3], but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then. Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4] of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider. This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]." While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL (or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8] existing userspace programs. The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0 seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv. Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so userspace has some notice about the change: process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.or… [2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408 [4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt [5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176 [6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+… [7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%… [8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/ Reported-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)dereferenced.org> Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages(a)gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias(a)libc.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm(a)xmission.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)dereferenced.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 79f2c9483302..40b1008fb0f7 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -495,8 +495,14 @@ static int bprm_stack_limits(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * the stack. They aren't stored until much later when we can't * signal to the parent that the child has run out of stack space. * Instead, calculate it here so it's possible to fail gracefully. + * + * In the case of argc = 0, make sure there is space for adding a + * empty string (which will bump argc to 1), to ensure confused + * userspace programs don't start processing from argv[1], thinking + * argc can never be 0, to keep them from walking envp by accident. + * See do_execveat_common(). */ - ptr_size = (bprm->argc + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); + ptr_size = (max(bprm->argc, 1) + bprm->envc) * sizeof(void *); if (limit <= ptr_size) return -E2BIG; limit -= ptr_size; @@ -1897,6 +1903,9 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, } retval = count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS); + if (retval == 0) + pr_warn_once("process '%s' launched '%s' with NULL argv: empty string added\n", + current->comm, bprm->filename); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval; @@ -1923,6 +1932,19 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, if (retval < 0) goto out_free; + /* + * When argv is empty, add an empty string ("") as argv[0] to + * ensure confused userspace programs that start processing + * from argv[1] won't end up walking envp. See also + * bprm_stack_limits(). + */ + if (bprm->argc == 0) { + retval = copy_string_kernel("", bprm); + if (retval < 0) + goto out_free; + bprm->argc = 1; + } + retval = bprm_execve(bprm, fd, filename, flags); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); @@ -1951,6 +1973,8 @@ int kernel_execve(const char *kernel_filename, } retval = count_strings_kernel(argv); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(retval == 0)) + retval = -EINVAL; if (retval < 0) goto out_free; bprm->argc = retval;

3 years

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1
0 0

[PATCH 5.10 000/163] 5.10.119-rc1 review

by Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.119 release. There are 163 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know. Responses should be made by Sun, 29 May 2022 08:46:26 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late. The whole patch series can be found in one patch at: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.119-r… or in the git tree and branch at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y and the diffstat can be found below. thanks, greg k-h ------------- Pseudo-Shortlog of commits: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Linux 5.10.119-rc1 Edward Matijevic <motolav(a)gmail.com> ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: check for signals after page of pool writes Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: unify batched entropy implementations Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: make consistent use of buf and len Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove extern from functions in header Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use static branch for crng_ready() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: credit architectural init the exact amount Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> xtensa: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> sparc: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> um: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> x86/tsc: Use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> nios2: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> riscv: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> powerpc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> alpha: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> parisc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> s390: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: fix sysctl documentation nits Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Jan Varho <jan.varho(a)gmail.com> random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: reseed more often immediately after booting Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: don't let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: cleanup UUID handling Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: unify early init crng load accounting Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: rewrite header introductory comment Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: group sysctl functions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: group userspace read/write functions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: group entropy collection functions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: group entropy extraction functions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: group crng functions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: group initialization wait functions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove useless header comment Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: add proper SPDX header Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove unused tracepoints Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove ifdef'd out interrupt bench Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Dominik Brodowski <linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net> random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: make more consistent use of integer types Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: get rid of secondary crngs Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Dominik Brodowski <linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net> random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove batched entropy locking Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: simplify entropy debiting Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Dominik Brodowski <linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net> random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng Dominik Brodowski <linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net> random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer Dominik Brodowski <linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net> random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_ Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: remove incomplete last_data logic Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: cleanup integer types Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction Schspa Shi <schspa(a)gmail.com> random: fix typo in comments Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> random: don't reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Dominik Brodowski <linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net> random: early initialization of ChaCha constants Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs Dominik Brodowski <linux(a)dominikbrodowski.net> random: harmonize "crng init done" messages Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: mix bootloader randomness into pool Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> lib/crypto: blake2s: avoid indirect calls to compression function for Clang CFI Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: blake2s - add comment for blake2s_state fields Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: blake2s - optimize blake2s initialization Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: blake2s - share the "shash" API boilerplate code Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: blake2s - move update and final logic to internal/blake2s.h Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: blake2s - remove unneeded includes Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: x86/blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macros Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> crypto: blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macros Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> MAINTAINERS: add git tree for random.c Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi(a)arm.com> ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> ACPI: sysfs: Make sparse happy about address space in use Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl> media: vim2m: initialize the media device earlier Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus(a)linux.intel.com> media: vim2m: Register video device after setting up internals Willy Tarreau <w(a)1wt.eu> secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> KVM: x86: Properly handle APF vs disabled LAPIC situation Denis Efremov (Oracle) <efremov(a)linux.com> staging: rtl8723bs: prevent ->Ssid overflow in rtw_wx_set_scan() Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org> lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use ------------- Diffstat: Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 + Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 22 +- MAINTAINERS | 2 + Makefile | 4 +- arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h | 2 +- arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h | 17 +- arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h | 3 + arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h | 3 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h | 4 +- arch/um/include/asm/timex.h | 9 +- arch/x86/crypto/Makefile | 4 +- arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c | 166 +- arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c | 77 + arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h | 9 + arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h | 7 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 6 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h | 6 +- crypto/Kconfig | 3 +- crypto/blake2s_generic.c | 158 +- crypto/drbg.c | 17 +- drivers/acpi/sysfs.c | 23 +- drivers/char/Kconfig | 3 +- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 1 + drivers/char/random.c | 3035 +++++++++-------------- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 2 +- drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c | 22 +- drivers/net/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c | 45 +- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 6 +- include/crypto/blake2s.h | 66 +- include/crypto/chacha.h | 15 +- include/crypto/drbg.h | 2 +- include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h | 123 +- include/linux/cpuhotplug.h | 2 + include/linux/hw_random.h | 2 - include/linux/mm.h | 1 + include/linux/prandom.h | 23 +- include/linux/random.h | 100 +- include/linux/security.h | 2 + include/linux/siphash.h | 28 + include/linux/timex.h | 10 +- include/net/inet_hashtables.h | 2 +- include/net/secure_seq.h | 4 +- include/trace/events/random.h | 330 --- init/main.c | 13 +- kernel/cpu.c | 11 + kernel/debug/debug_core.c | 24 + kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 62 +- kernel/irq/handle.c | 2 +- kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 15 + lib/Kconfig.debug | 3 +- lib/crypto/Kconfig | 23 +- lib/crypto/Makefile | 9 +- lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c | 6 +- lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c | 33 +- lib/crypto/blake2s.c | 81 +- lib/random32.c | 16 +- lib/sha1.c | 95 +- lib/siphash.c | 32 +- lib/vsprintf.c | 10 +- mm/util.c | 32 + net/core/secure_seq.c | 4 +- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 28 +- net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 4 +- security/security.c | 2 + sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c | 2 + sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h | 3 +- 76 files changed, 1865 insertions(+), 3035 deletions(-)

3 years

9
176
0 0

+ x86-kexec-fix-memory-leak-of-elf-header-buffer.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: x86/kexec: fix memory leak of elf header buffer has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is x86-kexec-fix-memory-leak-of-elf-header-buffer.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Subject: x86/kexec: fix memory leak of elf header buffer Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2022 19:32:24 +0800 This is reported by kmemleak detector: unreferenced object 0xffffc900002a9000 (size 4096): comm "kexec", pid 14950, jiffies 4295110793 (age 373.951s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 7f 45 4c 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .ELF............ 04 00 3e 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..>............. backtrace: [<0000000016a8ef9f>] __vmalloc_node_range+0x101/0x170 [<000000002b66b6c0>] __vmalloc_node+0xb4/0x160 [<00000000ad40107d>] crash_prepare_elf64_headers+0x8e/0xcd0 [<0000000019afff23>] crash_load_segments+0x260/0x470 [<0000000019ebe95c>] bzImage64_load+0x814/0xad0 [<0000000093e16b05>] arch_kexec_kernel_image_load+0x1be/0x2a0 [<000000009ef2fc88>] kimage_file_alloc_init+0x2ec/0x5a0 [<0000000038f5a97a>] __do_sys_kexec_file_load+0x28d/0x530 [<0000000087c19992>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [<0000000066e063a4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae In crash_prepare_elf64_headers(), a buffer is allocated via vmalloc() to store elf headers. While it's not freed back to system correctly when kdump kernel is reloaded or unloaded. Then memory leak is caused. Fix it by introducing x86 specific function arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(), and freeing the buffer there. And also remove the incorrect elf header buffer freeing code. Before calling arch specific kexec_file loading function, the image instance has been initialized. So 'image->elf_headers' must be NULL. It doesn't make sense to free the elf header buffer in the place. Three different people have reported three bugs about the memory leak on x86_64 inside Redhat. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223113225.63106-2-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung(a)redhat.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c~x86-kexec-fix-memory-leak-of-elf-header-buffer +++ a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c @@ -376,9 +376,6 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image) #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image) { - vfree(image->elf_headers); - image->elf_headers = NULL; - if (!image->fops || !image->fops->load) return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC); @@ -514,6 +511,15 @@ overflow: (int)ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info), value); return -ENOEXEC; } + +int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) +{ + vfree(image->elf_headers); + image->elf_headers = NULL; + image->elf_headers_sz = 0; + + return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image); +} #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */ static int _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from bhe(a)redhat.com are x86-kexec-fix-memory-leak-of-elf-header-buffer.patch

3 years

1
0
0 0

+ mm-memremap-fix-missing-call-to-untrack_pfn-in-pagemap_range.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: mm/memremap: fix missing call to untrack_pfn() in pagemap_range() has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is mm-memremap-fix-missing-call-to-untrack_pfn-in-pagemap_range.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Subject: mm/memremap: fix missing call to untrack_pfn() in pagemap_range() Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 20:26:43 +0800 We forget to call untrack_pfn() to pair with track_pfn_remap() when range is not allowed to hotplug. Fix it by jump err_kasan. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220531122643.25249-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: bca3feaa0764 ("mm/memory_hotplug: prevalidate the address range being added with platform") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual(a)arm.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- mm/memremap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/mm/memremap.c~mm-memremap-fix-missing-call-to-untrack_pfn-in-pagemap_range +++ a/mm/memremap.c @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int pagemap_range(struct dev_page if (!mhp_range_allowed(range->start, range_len(range), !is_private)) { error = -EINVAL; - goto err_pfn_remap; + goto err_kasan; } mem_hotplug_begin(); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from linmiaohe(a)huawei.com are maintainers-add-maintainer-information-for-z3fold.patch mm-memremap-fix-missing-call-to-untrack_pfn-in-pagemap_range.patch mm-shmemc-clean-up-comment-of-shmem_swapin_folio.patch mm-reduce-the-rcu-lock-duration.patch mm-migration-remove-unneeded-lock-page-and-pagemovable-check.patch mm-migration-return-errno-when-isolate_huge_page-failed.patch mm-migration-fix-potential-pte_unmap-on-an-not-mapped-pte.patch

3 years

1
0
0 0

我需要你的帮助

by payen jane

我希望你能理解这条信息，因为我正在使用翻译给你写信。我是简·佩恩中士夫人。在美国陆军的军事部门。美国，一名中士，32 岁，我是来自美国田纳西州克利夫兰的单身，目前在利比亚班加西执行一项特殊任务。我是一个充满爱心、诚实和深情的人，具有良好的幽默感，我喜欢结识新朋友并了解他们的生活方式，我喜欢看到大海的波涛和山脉的美丽以及大自然所拥有的一切提供。很高兴能更多地了解您，我认为我们可以建立良好的商业友谊。我一直很不开心，因为几年来生活对我不公平；我在 21 岁时失去了父母。我父亲的名字是帕特里斯佩恩和我的母亲玛丽佩恩。没有人帮助我，但我很高兴我终于在美军中找到了自己。我结婚生了一个孩子，但他去世了，在我丈夫开始背叛我后不久，我不得不放弃婚姻。我也很幸运在我的国家美国和利比亚班加西这里拥有我生活中需要的一切，但没有人给我建议。我需要一个诚实的人来信任，他也会建议我如何投资我的钱。因为我是我父母在他们死前生下的唯一一个女孩。我不认识你，但我认为有一个可以信任的好人，可以建立真正的信任和良好的商业友谊，如果你真的有一个诚实的名字，我也有一些事情要和你分享相信。在你身上，因为我需要你的帮助。我拥有我在利比亚班加西赚到的总额（470 万美元）。我将在下一封电子邮件中告诉你我是如何做到的，不要惊慌，它们是无风险的，我还在与 Red 有联系的人道主义医生的帮助下将这笔钱存入了一家银行。我希望你以我的受益人身份接受基金，并在我在这里完成后妥善保管它，并获得我的军事通行证，以便在你的国家与你会面；不要害怕银行会通过电汇将资金转给您，这对我们来说安全且快捷。笔记;我不知道我们要在这里待多久和我的命运，因为我在这里幸免于两次炸弹袭击，这导致我寻找一个值得信赖的人来帮助我接收和投资基金，因为我将来到你的国家出身投资，开始新生活，不再当兵。如果您愿意谨慎处理，请回复我。我会告诉你接下来的流程，并给你发送更多关于基金存入银行的信息。以及银行将如何帮助我们通过电汇将资金转移到您的国家，电汇也是银行到银行的转帐。若有兴趣请联系本人。

3 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v3] x86/vmware: use unsigned integer for shifting

by Shreenidhi Shedi

From: Shreenidhi Shedi <sshedi(a)vmware.com> Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is implementation-defined behaviour. Using unsigned is better option for this. Fixes: 4cca6ea04d31 ("x86/apic: Allow x2apic without IR on VMware platform") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shreenidhi Shedi <sshedi(a)vmware.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c index c04b933f4..02039ec35 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c @@ -476,8 +476,8 @@ static bool __init vmware_legacy_x2apic_available(void) { uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx; VMWARE_CMD(GETVCPU_INFO, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); - return (eax & (1 << VMWARE_CMD_VCPU_RESERVED)) == 0 && - (eax & (1 << VMWARE_CMD_LEGACY_X2APIC)) != 0; + return !(eax & BIT(VMWARE_CMD_VCPU_RESERVED)) && + (eax & BIT(VMWARE_CMD_LEGACY_X2APIC)); } #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT -- 2.36.1

3 years

3
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[PATCH v1] selftests/kselftest: Make failed tests exit with 1

by Mickaël Salaün

To check that tests are passing we must parse the kselftest runner output. It is much more convenient to check the return value of the runner instead: 0 is OK, and 1 implies one or more errors. This has an impact on the kselftest's gen_tar bundle and the run_tests make target. Backporting this change would be useful to consistently test older kernels as well. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark(a)amazon.de> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 303f8e2d0200: selftests/kselftest/runner/run_one(): allow running non-executable files Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic(a)digikod.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220527162417.2646998-1-mic@digikod.net --- tools/testing/selftests/kselftest/runner.sh | 36 +++++++++++++-------- tools/testing/selftests/run_kselftest.sh | 4 ++- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest/runner.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest/runner.sh index 294619ade49f..f6488a53a78c 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest/runner.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest/runner.sh @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ run_one() DIR="$1" TEST="$2" NUM="$3" + local rc=1 + local ret=1 BASENAME_TEST=$(basename $TEST) @@ -107,29 +109,36 @@ run_one() cmd="$interpreter ./$BASENAME_TEST" else echo "not ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG" - return + return 1 fi fi cd `dirname $TEST` > /dev/null - ((((( tap_timeout "$cmd" 2>&1; echo $? >&3) | + if (((( tap_timeout "$cmd" 2>&1; echo $? >&3) | tap_prefix >&4) 3>&1) | - (read xs; exit $xs)) 4>>"$logfile" && - echo "ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG") || - (rc=$?; \ - if [ $rc -eq $skip_rc ]; then \ - echo "ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG # SKIP" - elif [ $rc -eq $timeout_rc ]; then \ - echo "#" - echo "not ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG # TIMEOUT $kselftest_timeout seconds" + (read xs; exit $xs)) 4>>"$logfile"; then + echo "ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG" + ret=0 else - echo "not ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG # exit=$rc" - fi) + rc=$? + if [ $rc -eq $skip_rc ]; then + echo "ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG # SKIP" + ret=0 + elif [ $rc -eq $timeout_rc ]; then + echo "#" + echo "not ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG # TIMEOUT $kselftest_timeout seconds" + else + echo "not ok $test_num $TEST_HDR_MSG # exit=$rc" + fi + fi cd - >/dev/null fi + return $ret } run_many() { + local ret=0 + echo "TAP version 13" DIR="${PWD#${BASE_DIR}/}" test_num=0 @@ -142,6 +151,7 @@ run_many() logfile="/tmp/$BASENAME_TEST" cat /dev/null > "$logfile" fi - run_one "$DIR" "$TEST" "$test_num" + run_one "$DIR" "$TEST" "$test_num" || ret=1 done + return $ret } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/run_kselftest.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/run_kselftest.sh index 97165a83df63..6164314f837e 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/run_kselftest.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/run_kselftest.sh @@ -85,9 +85,11 @@ if [ -n "$TESTS" ]; then available="$(echo "$valid" | sed -e 's/ /\n/g')" fi +ret=0 collections=$(echo "$available" | cut -d: -f1 | uniq) for collection in $collections ; do [ -w /dev/kmsg ] && echo "kselftest: Running tests in $collection" >> /dev/kmsg tests=$(echo "$available" | grep "^$collection:" | cut -d: -f2) - ($dryrun cd "$collection" && $dryrun run_many $tests) + ($dryrun cd "$collection" && $dryrun run_many $tests) || ret=1 done +exit $ret base-commit: 7e284070abe53d448517b80493863595af4ab5f0 -- 2.36.0

3 years

2
1
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Zagospodarowanie miejsc magazynowych

by Marek Pozyrewski

Dzień dobry, czy interesują Państwo regały magazynowe, które pozwolą odpowiednio zagospodarować i całościowo wykorzystać przestrzeń hali? Kontaktuję się ponieważ mogę zaproponować Państwu wytrzymałe i stabilne regały, szafy oraz pojemniki, a także skrzyniopalety i kontenery samowyładowcze. Jeżeli zależy Państwu na bezpiecznym i wygodnym składowaniu towarów, produktów i półfabrykatów, nasze rozwiązania zagwarantują firmie efektywne wykorzystanie dostępnej przestrzeni. Ze swojej strony zapewniamy transport oraz długoletnią gwarancję. Czy byliby Państwo zainteresowani wstępną wyceną? Pozdrawiam Marek Pozyrewski

3 years

1
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0 0

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