The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 868f9f2f8e004bfe0d3935b1976f625b2924893b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 22:58:49 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] vfs: fix copy_file_range() regression in cross-fs copies
A regression has been reported by Nicolas Boichat, found while using the
copy_file_range syscall to copy a tracefs file.
Before commit 5dae222a5ff0 ("vfs: allow copy_file_range to copy across
devices") the kernel would return -EXDEV to userspace when trying to
copy a file across different filesystems. After this commit, the
syscall doesn't fail anymore and instead returns zero (zero bytes
copied), as this file's content is generated on-the-fly and thus reports
a size of zero.
Another regression has been reported by He Zhe - the assertion of
WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) can be triggered from userspace when
copying from a sysfs file whose read operation may return -EOPNOTSUPP.
Since we do not have test coverage for copy_file_range() between any two
types of filesystems, the best way to avoid these sort of issues in the
future is for the kernel to be more picky about filesystems that are
allowed to do copy_file_range().
This patch restores some cross-filesystem copy restrictions that existed
prior to commit 5dae222a5ff0 ("vfs: allow copy_file_range to copy across
devices"), namely, cross-sb copy is not allowed for filesystems that do
not implement ->copy_file_range().
Filesystems that do implement ->copy_file_range() have full control of
the result - if this method returns an error, the error is returned to
the user. Before this change this was only true for fs that did not
implement the ->remap_file_range() operation (i.e. nfsv3).
Filesystems that do not implement ->copy_file_range() still fall-back to
the generic_copy_file_range() implementation when the copy is within the
same sb. This helps the kernel can maintain a more consistent story
about which filesystems support copy_file_range().
nfsd and ksmbd servers are modified to fall-back to the
generic_copy_file_range() implementation in case vfs_copy_file_range()
fails with -EOPNOTSUPP or -EXDEV, which preserves behavior of
server-side-copy.
fall-back to generic_copy_file_range() is not implemented for the smb
operation FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE, which is arguably a correct
change of behavior.
Fixes: 5dae222a5ff0 ("vfs: allow copy_file_range to copy across devices")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210212044405.4120619-1-drinkcat@chr…
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/CANMq1KDZuxir2LM5jOTm0xx+BnvW=ZmpsG47…
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210126135012.1.If45b7cdc3ff707bc1ef…
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210630161320.29006-1-lhenriques@sus…
Reported-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat(a)chromium.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques(a)suse.de>
Fixes: 64bf5ff58dff ("vfs: no fallback for ->copy_file_range")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20f17f64-88cb-4e80-07c1-85cb96c83619@…
Reported-by: He Zhe <zhe.he(a)windriver.com>
Tested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org>
Tested-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques(a)suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
index 94ab1dcd80e7..353f047e783c 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c
@@ -7810,14 +7810,24 @@ int smb2_ioctl(struct ksmbd_work *work)
src_off = le64_to_cpu(dup_ext->SourceFileOffset);
dst_off = le64_to_cpu(dup_ext->TargetFileOffset);
length = le64_to_cpu(dup_ext->ByteCount);
- cloned = vfs_clone_file_range(fp_in->filp, src_off, fp_out->filp,
- dst_off, length, 0);
+ /*
+ * XXX: It is not clear if FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE
+ * should fall back to vfs_copy_file_range(). This could be
+ * beneficial when re-exporting nfs/smb mount, but note that
+ * this can result in partial copy that returns an error status.
+ * If/when FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE_EX is implemented,
+ * fall back to vfs_copy_file_range(), should be avoided when
+ * the flag DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_DATA_EX_SOURCE_ATOMIC is set.
+ */
+ cloned = vfs_clone_file_range(fp_in->filp, src_off,
+ fp_out->filp, dst_off, length, 0);
if (cloned == -EXDEV || cloned == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto dup_ext_out;
} else if (cloned != length) {
cloned = vfs_copy_file_range(fp_in->filp, src_off,
- fp_out->filp, dst_off, length, 0);
+ fp_out->filp, dst_off,
+ length, 0);
if (cloned != length) {
if (cloned < 0)
ret = cloned;
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c b/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c
index 5d185564aef6..05efcdf7a4a7 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/vfs.c
@@ -1779,6 +1779,10 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_copy_file_ranges(struct ksmbd_work *work,
ret = vfs_copy_file_range(src_fp->filp, src_off,
dst_fp->filp, dst_off, len, 0);
+ if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP || ret == -EXDEV)
+ ret = generic_copy_file_range(src_fp->filp, src_off,
+ dst_fp->filp, dst_off,
+ len, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 840e3af63a6f..b764213bcc55 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -577,6 +577,7 @@ __be32 nfsd4_clone_file_range(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
ssize_t nfsd_copy_file_range(struct file *src, u64 src_pos, struct file *dst,
u64 dst_pos, u64 count)
{
+ ssize_t ret;
/*
* Limit copy to 4MB to prevent indefinitely blocking an nfsd
@@ -587,7 +588,12 @@ ssize_t nfsd_copy_file_range(struct file *src, u64 src_pos, struct file *dst,
* limit like this and pipeline multiple COPY requests.
*/
count = min_t(u64, count, 1 << 22);
- return vfs_copy_file_range(src, src_pos, dst, dst_pos, count, 0);
+ ret = vfs_copy_file_range(src, src_pos, dst, dst_pos, count, 0);
+
+ if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP || ret == -EXDEV)
+ ret = generic_copy_file_range(src, src_pos, dst, dst_pos,
+ count, 0);
+ return ret;
}
__be32 nfsd4_vfs_fallocate(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
index b1b1cdfee9d3..e0777eefd846 100644
--- a/fs/read_write.c
+++ b/fs/read_write.c
@@ -1397,28 +1397,6 @@ ssize_t generic_copy_file_range(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_copy_file_range);
-static ssize_t do_copy_file_range(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
- struct file *file_out, loff_t pos_out,
- size_t len, unsigned int flags)
-{
- /*
- * Although we now allow filesystems to handle cross sb copy, passing
- * a file of the wrong filesystem type to filesystem driver can result
- * in an attempt to dereference the wrong type of ->private_data, so
- * avoid doing that until we really have a good reason. NFS defines
- * several different file_system_type structures, but they all end up
- * using the same ->copy_file_range() function pointer.
- */
- if (file_out->f_op->copy_file_range &&
- file_out->f_op->copy_file_range == file_in->f_op->copy_file_range)
- return file_out->f_op->copy_file_range(file_in, pos_in,
- file_out, pos_out,
- len, flags);
-
- return generic_copy_file_range(file_in, pos_in, file_out, pos_out, len,
- flags);
-}
-
/*
* Performs necessary checks before doing a file copy
*
@@ -1440,6 +1418,24 @@ static int generic_copy_file_checks(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
if (ret)
return ret;
+ /*
+ * We allow some filesystems to handle cross sb copy, but passing
+ * a file of the wrong filesystem type to filesystem driver can result
+ * in an attempt to dereference the wrong type of ->private_data, so
+ * avoid doing that until we really have a good reason.
+ *
+ * nfs and cifs define several different file_system_type structures
+ * and several different sets of file_operations, but they all end up
+ * using the same ->copy_file_range() function pointer.
+ */
+ if (file_out->f_op->copy_file_range) {
+ if (file_in->f_op->copy_file_range !=
+ file_out->f_op->copy_file_range)
+ return -EXDEV;
+ } else if (file_inode(file_in)->i_sb != file_inode(file_out)->i_sb) {
+ return -EXDEV;
+ }
+
/* Don't touch certain kinds of inodes */
if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode_out))
return -EPERM;
@@ -1505,26 +1501,41 @@ ssize_t vfs_copy_file_range(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
file_start_write(file_out);
/*
- * Try cloning first, this is supported by more file systems, and
- * more efficient if both clone and copy are supported (e.g. NFS).
+ * Cloning is supported by more file systems, so we implement copy on
+ * same sb using clone, but for filesystems where both clone and copy
+ * are supported (e.g. nfs,cifs), we only call the copy method.
*/
+ if (file_out->f_op->copy_file_range) {
+ ret = file_out->f_op->copy_file_range(file_in, pos_in,
+ file_out, pos_out,
+ len, flags);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
if (file_in->f_op->remap_file_range &&
file_inode(file_in)->i_sb == file_inode(file_out)->i_sb) {
- loff_t cloned;
-
- cloned = file_in->f_op->remap_file_range(file_in, pos_in,
+ ret = file_in->f_op->remap_file_range(file_in, pos_in,
file_out, pos_out,
min_t(loff_t, MAX_RW_COUNT, len),
REMAP_FILE_CAN_SHORTEN);
- if (cloned > 0) {
- ret = cloned;
+ if (ret > 0)
goto done;
- }
}
- ret = do_copy_file_range(file_in, pos_in, file_out, pos_out, len,
- flags);
- WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EOPNOTSUPP);
+ /*
+ * We can get here for same sb copy of filesystems that do not implement
+ * ->copy_file_range() in case filesystem does not support clone or in
+ * case filesystem supports clone but rejected the clone request (e.g.
+ * because it was not block aligned).
+ *
+ * In both cases, fall back to kernel copy so we are able to maintain a
+ * consistent story about which filesystems support copy_file_range()
+ * and which filesystems do not, that will allow userspace tools to
+ * make consistent desicions w.r.t using copy_file_range().
+ */
+ ret = generic_copy_file_range(file_in, pos_in, file_out, pos_out, len,
+ flags);
+
done:
if (ret > 0) {
fsnotify_access(file_in);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e4f74400308cb8abde5fdc9cad609c2aba32110c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Jun 2022 00:20:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and
initialize earlier
s390x appears to present two RNG interfaces:
- a "TRNG" that gathers entropy using some hardware function; and
- a "DRBG" that takes in a seed and expands it.
Previously, the TRNG was wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), but
it was observed that this was being called really frequently, resulting
in high overhead. So it was changed to be wired up to arch_get_random_
seed_{long,int}(), which was a reasonable decision. Later on, the DRBG
was then wired up to arch_get_random_{long,int}(), with a complicated
buffer filling thread, to control overhead and rate.
Fortunately, none of the performance issues matter much now. The RNG
always attempts to use arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}() first, which
means a complicated implementation of arch_get_random_{long,int}() isn't
really valuable or useful to have around. And it's only used when
reseeding, which means it won't hit the high throughput complications
that were faced before.
So this commit returns to an earlier design of just calling the TRNG in
arch_get_random_seed_{long,int}(), and returning false in arch_get_
random_{long,int}().
Part of what makes the simplification possible is that the RNG now seeds
itself using the TRNG at bootup. But this only works if the TRNG is
detected early in boot, before random_init() is called. So this commit
also causes that check to happen in setup_arch().
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Harald Freudenberger <freude(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Juergen Christ <jchrist(a)linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610222023.378448-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude(a)linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev(a)linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
index 56007c763902..1f2d40993c4d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/arch_random.c
@@ -4,232 +4,15 @@
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020
* Author(s): Harald Freudenberger
- *
- * The s390_arch_random_generate() function may be called from random.c
- * in interrupt context. So this implementation does the best to be very
- * fast. There is a buffer of random data which is asynchronously checked
- * and filled by a workqueue thread.
- * If there are enough bytes in the buffer the s390_arch_random_generate()
- * just delivers these bytes. Otherwise false is returned until the
- * worker thread refills the buffer.
- * The worker fills the rng buffer by pulling fresh entropy from the
- * high quality (but slow) true hardware random generator. This entropy
- * is then spread over the buffer with an pseudo random generator PRNG.
- * As the arch_get_random_seed_long() fetches 8 bytes and the calling
- * function add_interrupt_randomness() counts this as 1 bit entropy the
- * distribution needs to make sure there is in fact 1 bit entropy contained
- * in 8 bytes of the buffer. The current values pull 32 byte entropy
- * and scatter this into a 2048 byte buffer. So 8 byte in the buffer
- * will contain 1 bit of entropy.
- * The worker thread is rescheduled based on the charge level of the
- * buffer but at least with 500 ms delay to avoid too much CPU consumption.
- * So the max. amount of rng data delivered via arch_get_random_seed is
- * limited to 4k bytes per second.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/static_key.h>
-#include <linux/workqueue.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <asm/cpacf.h>
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available);
atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_counter);
-
-#define ARCH_REFILL_TICKS (HZ/2)
-#define ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE 32
-#define ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE 2048
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(arch_rng_lock);
-static u8 *arch_rng_buf;
-static unsigned int arch_rng_buf_idx;
-
-static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *);
-static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(arch_rng_work, arch_rng_refill_buffer);
-
-bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes)
-{
- /* max hunk is ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE */
- if (nbytes > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE)
- return false;
-
- /* lock rng buffer */
- if (!spin_trylock(&arch_rng_lock))
- return false;
-
- /* try to resolve the requested amount of bytes from the buffer */
- arch_rng_buf_idx -= nbytes;
- if (arch_rng_buf_idx < ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {
- memcpy(buf, arch_rng_buf + arch_rng_buf_idx, nbytes);
- atomic64_add(nbytes, &s390_arch_random_counter);
- spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
- return true;
- }
-
- /* not enough bytes in rng buffer, refill is done asynchronously */
- spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
-
- return false;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_generate);
-
-static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *unused)
-{
- unsigned int delay = ARCH_REFILL_TICKS;
-
- spin_lock(&arch_rng_lock);
- if (arch_rng_buf_idx > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {
- /* buffer is exhausted and needs refill */
- u8 seed[ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE];
- u8 prng_wa[240];
- /* fetch ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE bytes of entropy */
- cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
- /* blow this entropy up to ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE with PRNG */
- memset(prng_wa, 0, sizeof(prng_wa));
- cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
- &prng_wa, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
- cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
- &prng_wa, arch_rng_buf, ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, NULL, 0);
- arch_rng_buf_idx = ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
- }
- delay += (ARCH_REFILL_TICKS * arch_rng_buf_idx) / ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
- spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
-
- /* kick next check */
- queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &arch_rng_work, delay);
-}
-
-/*
- * Here follows the implementation of s390_arch_get_random_long().
- *
- * The random longs to be pulled by arch_get_random_long() are
- * prepared in an 4K buffer which is filled from the NIST 800-90
- * compliant s390 drbg. By default the random long buffer is refilled
- * 256 times before the drbg itself needs a reseed. The reseed of the
- * drbg is done with 32 bytes fetched from the high quality (but slow)
- * trng which is assumed to deliver 100% entropy. So the 32 * 8 = 256
- * bits of entropy are spread over 256 * 4KB = 1MB serving 131072
- * arch_get_random_long() invocations before reseeded.
- *
- * How often the 4K random long buffer is refilled with the drbg
- * before the drbg is reseeded can be adjusted. There is a module
- * parameter 's390_arch_rnd_long_drbg_reseed' accessible via
- * /sys/module/arch_random/parameters/rndlong_drbg_reseed
- * or as kernel command line parameter
- * arch_random.rndlong_drbg_reseed=<value>
- * This parameter tells how often the drbg fills the 4K buffer before
- * it is re-seeded by fresh entropy from the trng.
- * A value of 16 results in reseeding the drbg at every 16 * 4 KB = 64
- * KB with 32 bytes of fresh entropy pulled from the trng. So a value
- * of 16 would result in 256 bits entropy per 64 KB.
- * A value of 256 results in 1MB of drbg output before a reseed of the
- * drbg is done. So this would spread the 256 bits of entropy among 1MB.
- * Setting this parameter to 0 forces the reseed to take place every
- * time the 4K buffer is depleted, so the entropy rises to 256 bits
- * entropy per 4K or 0.5 bit entropy per arch_get_random_long(). With
- * setting this parameter to negative values all this effort is
- * disabled, arch_get_random long() returns false and thus indicating
- * that the arch_get_random_long() feature is disabled at all.
- */
-
-static unsigned long rndlong_buf[512];
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rndlong_lock);
-static int rndlong_buf_index;
-
-static int rndlong_drbg_reseed = 256;
-module_param_named(rndlong_drbg_reseed, rndlong_drbg_reseed, int, 0600);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(rndlong_drbg_reseed, "s390 arch_get_random_long() drbg reseed");
-
-static inline void refill_rndlong_buf(void)
-{
- static u8 prng_ws[240];
- static int drbg_counter;
-
- if (--drbg_counter < 0) {
- /* need to re-seed the drbg */
- u8 seed[32];
-
- /* fetch seed from trng */
- cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
- /* seed drbg */
- memset(prng_ws, 0, sizeof(prng_ws));
- cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
- &prng_ws, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
- /* re-init counter for drbg */
- drbg_counter = rndlong_drbg_reseed;
- }
-
- /* fill the arch_get_random_long buffer from drbg */
- cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN, &prng_ws,
- (u8 *) rndlong_buf, sizeof(rndlong_buf),
- NULL, 0);
-}
-
-bool s390_arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
- bool rc = false;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- /* arch_get_random_long() disabled ? */
- if (rndlong_drbg_reseed < 0)
- return false;
-
- /* try to lock the random long lock */
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&rndlong_lock, flags))
- return false;
-
- if (--rndlong_buf_index >= 0) {
- /* deliver next long value from the buffer */
- *v = rndlong_buf[rndlong_buf_index];
- rc = true;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* buffer is depleted and needs refill */
- if (in_interrupt()) {
- /* delay refill in interrupt context to next caller */
- rndlong_buf_index = 0;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* refill random long buffer */
- refill_rndlong_buf();
- rndlong_buf_index = ARRAY_SIZE(rndlong_buf);
-
- /* and provide one random long */
- *v = rndlong_buf[--rndlong_buf_index];
- rc = true;
-
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rndlong_lock, flags);
- return rc;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_get_random_long);
-
-static int __init s390_arch_random_init(void)
-{
- /* all the needed PRNO subfunctions available ? */
- if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG) &&
- cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
-
- /* alloc arch random working buffer */
- arch_rng_buf = kmalloc(ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!arch_rng_buf)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- /* kick worker queue job to fill the random buffer */
- queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq,
- &arch_rng_work, ARCH_REFILL_TICKS);
-
- /* enable arch random to the outside world */
- static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-arch_initcall(s390_arch_random_init);
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
index 5dc712fde3c7..2c6e1c6ecbe7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h
@@ -15,17 +15,13 @@
#include <linux/static_key.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/cpacf.h>
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available);
extern atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter;
-bool s390_arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v);
-bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes);
-
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
- if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available))
- return s390_arch_get_random_long(v);
return false;
}
@@ -37,7 +33,9 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {
- return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
+ cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
+ atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter);
+ return true;
}
return false;
}
@@ -45,7 +43,9 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {
- return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
+ cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
+ atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter);
+ return true;
}
return false;
}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
index 8d91eccc0963..0a37f5de2863 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
@@ -875,6 +875,11 @@ static void __init setup_randomness(void)
if (stsi(vmms, 3, 2, 2) == 0 && vmms->count)
add_device_randomness(&vmms->vm, sizeof(vmms->vm[0]) * vmms->count);
memblock_free(vmms, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
+ if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG))
+ static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available);
+#endif
}
/*
In commit 169d00a25658 ("can: mcp251xfd: add TX IRQ coalescing
support") software based TX coalescing was added to the driver. The
key idea is to keep the TX complete IRQ disabled for some time after
processing it and re-enable later by a hrtimer. When bringing the
interface down, this timer has to be stopped.
Add the missing hrtimer_cancel() of the tx_irq_time hrtimer to
mcp251xfd_stop().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220620143942.891811-1-mkl@pengutronix.de
Fixes: 169d00a25658 ("can: mcp251xfd: add TX IRQ coalescing support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.18
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
---
drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-core.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-core.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-core.c
index b21252390216..34b160024ce3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-core.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-core.c
@@ -1650,6 +1650,7 @@ static int mcp251xfd_stop(struct net_device *ndev)
netif_stop_queue(ndev);
set_bit(MCP251XFD_FLAGS_DOWN, priv->flags);
hrtimer_cancel(&priv->rx_irq_timer);
+ hrtimer_cancel(&priv->tx_irq_timer);
mcp251xfd_chip_interrupts_disable(priv);
free_irq(ndev->irq, priv);
can_rx_offload_disable(&priv->offload);
--
2.35.1
From: Thomas Kopp <thomas.kopp(a)microchip.com>
The mcp251xfd compatible chips have an erratum ([1], [2]), where the
received CRC doesn't match the calculated CRC. In commit
c7eb923c3caf ("can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read(): work
around broken CRC on TBC register") the following workaround was
implementierend.
- If a CRC read error on the TBC register is detected and the first
byte is 0x00 or 0x80, the most significant bit of the first byte is
flipped and the CRC is calculated again.
- If the CRC now matches, the _original_ data is passed to the reader.
For now we assume transferred data was OK.
New investigations and simulations indicate that the CRC send by the
device is calculated on correct data, and the data is incorrectly
received by the SPI host controller.
Use flipped instead of original data and update workaround description
in mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read().
[1] mcp2517fd: DS80000792C: "Incorrect CRC for certain READ_CRC commands"
[2] mcp2518fd: DS80000789C: "Incorrect CRC for certain READ_CRC commands"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/DM4PR11MB53901D49578FE265B239E55AFB7C9@DM4PR11M…
Fixes: c7eb923c3caf ("can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read(): work around broken CRC on TBC register")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Kopp <thomas.kopp(a)microchip.com>
[mkl: split into 2 patches, update patch description and documentation]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
---
drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c | 9 +++------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c
index 211edd9ef0c9..92b7bc7f14b9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c
@@ -343,9 +343,8 @@ mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read(void *context,
*
* If the highest bit in the lowest byte is flipped
* the transferred CRC matches the calculated one. We
- * assume for now the CRC calculation in the chip
- * works on wrong data and the transferred data is
- * correct.
+ * assume for now the CRC operates on the correct
+ * data.
*/
if (reg == MCP251XFD_REG_TBC &&
((buf_rx->data[0] & 0xf8) == 0x0 ||
@@ -359,10 +358,8 @@ mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read(void *context,
val_len);
if (!err) {
/* If CRC is now correct, assume
- * transferred data was OK, flip bit
- * back to original value.
+ * flipped data is OK.
*/
- buf_rx->data[0] ^= 0x80;
goto out;
}
}
--
2.35.1
From: Thomas Kopp <thomas.kopp(a)microchip.com>
The mcp251xfd compatible chips have an erratum ([1], [2]), where the
received CRC doesn't match the calculated CRC. In commit
c7eb923c3caf ("can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read(): work
around broken CRC on TBC register") the following workaround was
implementierend.
- If a CRC read error on the TBC register is detected and the first
byte is 0x00 or 0x80, the most significant bit of the first byte is
flipped and the CRC is calculated again.
- If the CRC now matches, the _original_ data is passed to the reader.
For now we assume transferred data was OK.
Measurements on the mcp2517fd show that the workaround is applicable
not only of the lowest byte is 0x00 or 0x80, but also if 3 least
significant bits are set.
Update check on 1st data byte and workaround description accordingly.
[1] mcp2517fd: DS80000792C: "Incorrect CRC for certain READ_CRC commands"
[2] mcp2518fd: DS80000789C: "Incorrect CRC for certain READ_CRC commands"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/DM4PR11MB53901D49578FE265B239E55AFB7C9@DM4PR11M…
Fixes: c7eb923c3caf ("can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read(): work around broken CRC on TBC register")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Pavel Modilaynen <pavel.modilaynen(a)volvocars.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Kopp <thomas.kopp(a)microchip.com>
[mkl: split into 2 patches, update patch description and documentation]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de>
---
drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c
index 217510c12af5..211edd9ef0c9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251xfd/mcp251xfd-regmap.c
@@ -334,10 +334,12 @@ mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read(void *context,
* register. It increments once per SYS clock tick,
* which is 20 or 40 MHz.
*
- * Observation shows that if the lowest byte (which is
- * transferred first on the SPI bus) of that register
- * is 0x00 or 0x80 the calculated CRC doesn't always
- * match the transferred one.
+ * Observation on the mcp2518fd shows that if the
+ * lowest byte (which is transferred first on the SPI
+ * bus) of that register is 0x00 or 0x80 the
+ * calculated CRC doesn't always match the transferred
+ * one. On the mcp2517fd this problem is not limited
+ * to the first byte being 0x00 or 0x80.
*
* If the highest bit in the lowest byte is flipped
* the transferred CRC matches the calculated one. We
@@ -346,7 +348,8 @@ mcp251xfd_regmap_crc_read(void *context,
* correct.
*/
if (reg == MCP251XFD_REG_TBC &&
- (buf_rx->data[0] == 0x0 || buf_rx->data[0] == 0x80)) {
+ ((buf_rx->data[0] & 0xf8) == 0x0 ||
+ (buf_rx->data[0] & 0xf8) == 0x80)) {
/* Flip highest bit in lowest byte of le32 */
buf_rx->data[0] ^= 0x80;
--
2.35.1