commit 770c79fb65506fc7c16459855c3839429f46cb32 upstream
Identifying and removing the stale device from the fs_uuids list is done
by btrfs_free_stale_devices(). btrfs_free_stale_devices() in turn
depends on device_path_matched() to check if the device appears in more
than one btrfs_device structure.
The matching of the device happens by its path, the device path. However,
when device mapper is in use, the dm device paths are nothing but a link
to the actual block device, which leads to the device_path_matched()
failing to match.
Fix this by matching the dev_t as provided by lookup_bdev() instead of
plain string compare of the device paths.
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org #5.4
Reported-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com>
---
fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
index c7706a769de1..548de841cee5 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c
@@ -713,15 +713,47 @@ static void pending_bios_fn(struct btrfs_work *work)
run_scheduled_bios(device);
}
-static bool device_path_matched(const char *path, struct btrfs_device *device)
+/*
+ * Check if the device in the path matches the device in the given struct device.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * true If it is the same device.
+ * false If it is not the same device or on error.
+ */
+static bool device_matched(const struct btrfs_device *device, const char *path)
{
- int found;
+ char *device_name;
+ struct block_device *bdev_old;
+ struct block_device *bdev_new;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are looking for a device with the matching dev_t, then skip
+ * device without a name (a missing device).
+ */
+ if (!device->name)
+ return false;
+
+ device_name = kzalloc(BTRFS_PATH_NAME_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!device_name)
+ return false;
rcu_read_lock();
- found = strcmp(rcu_str_deref(device->name), path);
+ scnprintf(device_name, BTRFS_PATH_NAME_MAX, "%s", rcu_str_deref(device->name));
rcu_read_unlock();
- return found == 0;
+ bdev_old = lookup_bdev(device_name);
+ kfree(device_name);
+ if (IS_ERR(bdev_old))
+ return false;
+
+ bdev_new = lookup_bdev(path);
+ if (IS_ERR(bdev_new))
+ return false;
+
+ if (bdev_old == bdev_new)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
}
/*
@@ -754,9 +786,7 @@ static int btrfs_free_stale_devices(const char *path,
&fs_devices->devices, dev_list) {
if (skip_device && skip_device == device)
continue;
- if (path && !device->name)
- continue;
- if (path && !device_path_matched(path, device))
+ if (path && !device_matched(device, path))
continue;
if (fs_devices->opened) {
/* for an already deleted device return 0 */
--
2.33.1
The patch below does not apply to the 5.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
Possible dependencies:
dd9373402280 ("Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From dd9373402280cf4715fdc8fd5070f7d039e43511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 16:46:18 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmd
Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has
Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may
be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way
to make that determination.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 001831458fa2..bffccdc494cb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
#include <linux/watch_queue.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "smack.h"
#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
@@ -4732,6 +4733,36 @@ static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
return -EPERM;
}
+/**
+ * smack_uring_cmd - check on file operations for io_uring
+ * @ioucmd: the command in question
+ *
+ * Make a best guess about whether a io_uring "command" should
+ * be allowed. Use the same logic used for determining if the
+ * file could be opened for read in the absence of better criteria.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
+ inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -4889,6 +4920,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
#endif
};
The patch below does not apply to the 5.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
Possible dependencies:
f4d653dcaa4e ("selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From f4d653dcaa4e4056e1630423e6a8ece4869b544f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2022 15:55:36 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook
Add a SELinux access control for the iouring IORING_OP_URING_CMD
command. This includes the addition of a new permission in the
existing "io_uring" object class: "cmd". The subject of the new
permission check is the domain of the process requesting access, the
object is the open file which points to the device/file that is the
target of the IORING_OP_URING_CMD operation. A sample policy rule
is shown below:
allow <domain> <file>:io_uring { cmd };
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 79573504783b..03bca97c8b29 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fanotify.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -6987,6 +6988,28 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
+ * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
+ * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
/*
@@ -7231,6 +7254,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
#endif
/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index ff757ae5f253..1c2f41ff4e55 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "anon_inode",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "io_uring",
- { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } },
+ { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
Possible dependencies:
f4d653dcaa4e ("selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook")
740b03414b20 ("selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls")
29cd6591ab6f ("selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From f4d653dcaa4e4056e1630423e6a8ece4869b544f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2022 15:55:36 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: implement the security_uring_cmd() LSM hook
Add a SELinux access control for the iouring IORING_OP_URING_CMD
command. This includes the addition of a new permission in the
existing "io_uring" object class: "cmd". The subject of the new
permission check is the domain of the process requesting access, the
object is the open file which points to the device/file that is the
target of the IORING_OP_URING_CMD operation. A sample policy rule
is shown below:
allow <domain> <file>:io_uring { cmd };
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 79573504783b..03bca97c8b29 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fanotify.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -6987,6 +6988,28 @@ static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
+ * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
+ * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
/*
@@ -7231,6 +7254,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
#endif
/*
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index ff757ae5f253..1c2f41ff4e55 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "anon_inode",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "io_uring",
- { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } },
+ { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
The patch below does not apply to the 5.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
Possible dependencies:
2a5840124009 ("lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op")
99f15d8d6136 ("io_uring: move uring_cmd handling to its own file")
cd40cae29ef8 ("io_uring: split out open/close operations")
453b329be5ea ("io_uring: separate out file table handling code")
f4c163dd7d4b ("io_uring: split out fadvise/madvise operations")
0d5847274037 ("io_uring: split out fs related sync/fallocate functions")
531113bbd5bf ("io_uring: split out splice related operations")
11aeb71406dd ("io_uring: split out filesystem related operations")
e28683bdfc2f ("io_uring: move nop into its own file")
5e2a18d93fec ("io_uring: move xattr related opcodes to its own file")
97b388d70b53 ("io_uring: handle completions in the core")
de23077eda61 ("io_uring: set completion results upfront")
e27f928ee1cb ("io_uring: add io_uring_types.h")
4d4c9cff4f70 ("io_uring: define a request type cleanup handler")
890968dc0336 ("io_uring: unify struct io_symlink and io_hardlink")
9a3a11f977f9 ("io_uring: convert iouring_cmd to io_cmd_type")
ceb452e1b4ba ("io_uring: convert xattr to use io_cmd_type")
ea5af87d29cf ("io_uring: convert rsrc_update to io_cmd_type")
c1ee55950155 ("io_uring: convert msg and nop to io_cmd_type")
2511d3030c5e ("io_uring: convert splice to use io_cmd_type")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2a5840124009f133bd09fd855963551fb2cefe22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof(a)kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2022 12:16:22 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for the new uring_cmd file op
io-uring cmd support was added through ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring:
add infrastructure for uring-cmd"), this extended the struct
file_operations to allow a new command which each subsystem can use
to enable command passthrough. Add an LSM specific for the command
passthrough which enables LSMs to inspect the command details.
This was discussed long ago without no clear pointer for something
conclusive, so this enables LSMs to at least reject this new file
operation.
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8adf55db-7bab-f59d-d612-ed906b948d19@schaufler-ca…
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd")
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 806448173033..60fff133c0b1 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -407,4 +407,5 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 84a0d7e02176..3aa6030302f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1582,6 +1582,9 @@
* Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling
* thread (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL).
*
+ * @uring_cmd:
+ * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run.
+ *
*/
union security_list_options {
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) RET (*NAME)(__VA_ARGS__);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1bc362cb413f..7bd0c490703d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2060,6 +2060,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
+extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
#else
static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
@@ -2069,6 +2070,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
index 8e0cc2d9205e..0f7ad956ddcb 100644
--- a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
+++ b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/io_uring.h>
@@ -88,6 +89,10 @@ int io_uring_cmd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
if (!req->file->f_op->uring_cmd)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ ret = security_uring_cmd(ioucmd);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_SQE128)
issue_flags |= IO_URING_F_SQE128;
if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_CQE32)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 14d30fec8a00..4b95de24bc8d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2660,4 +2660,8 @@ int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
{
return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
}
+int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
Possible dependencies:
4595a2544344 ("drm/i915/guc: clear stalled request after a reset")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 4595a25443447b9542b2a5ee7961eb290e94b496 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio(a)intel.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 14:08:12 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] drm/i915/guc: clear stalled request after a reset
If the GuC CTs are full and we need to stall the request submission
while waiting for space, we save the stalled request and where the stall
occurred; when the CTs have space again we pick up the request submission
from where we left off.
If a full GT reset occurs, the state of all contexts is cleared and all
non-guilty requests are unsubmitted, therefore we need to restart the
stalled request submission from scratch. To make sure that we do so,
clear the saved request after a reset.
Fixes note: the patch that introduced the bug is in 5.15, but no
officially supported platform had GuC submission enabled by default
in that kernel, so the backport to that particular version (and only
that one) can potentially be skipped.
Fixes: 925dc1cf58ed ("drm/i915/guc: Implement GuC submission tasklet")
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio(a)intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com>
Cc: John Harrison <john.c.harrison(a)intel.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.15+
Reviewed-by: John Harrison <John.C.Harrison(a)Intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220811210812.3239621-1-dani…
(cherry picked from commit f922fbb0f2ad1fd3e3186f39c46673419e6d9281)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com>
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c
index 76916aed897a..834c707d1877 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/uc/intel_guc_submission.c
@@ -4026,6 +4026,13 @@ static inline void guc_init_lrc_mapping(struct intel_guc *guc)
/* make sure all descriptors are clean... */
xa_destroy(&guc->context_lookup);
+ /*
+ * A reset might have occurred while we had a pending stalled request,
+ * so make sure we clean that up.
+ */
+ guc->stalled_request = NULL;
+ guc->submission_stall_reason = STALL_NONE;
+
/*
* Some contexts might have been pinned before we enabled GuC
* submission, so we need to add them to the GuC bookeeping.