February 2023 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 01/25] drm/amd/display: Revert Reduce delay when sink device not able to ACK 00340h write

by Sasha Levin

From: Ian Chen <ian.chen(a)amd.com> [ Upstream commit 639f6ad6df7f47db48b59956b469a6917a136afb ] [WHY] It causes regression AMD source will not write DPCD 340. Reviewed-by: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Jasdeep Dhillon <jdhillon(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Chen <ian.chen(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link.c | 6 ------ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dp.c | 14 +++----------- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h | 1 - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link.c index 3c4205248efc2..b727bd7e039d7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link.c @@ -1665,12 +1665,6 @@ struct dc_link *link_create(const struct link_init_data *init_params) if (false == dc_link_construct(link, init_params)) goto construct_fail; - /* - * Must use preferred_link_setting, not reported_link_cap or verified_link_cap, - * since struct preferred_link_setting won't be reset after S3. - */ - link->preferred_link_setting.dpcd_source_device_specific_field_support = true; - return link; construct_fail: diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dp.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dp.c index a6ff1b17fd22a..6777adb66f9d7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dp.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dp.c @@ -4841,18 +4841,10 @@ void dpcd_set_source_specific_data(struct dc_link *link) uint8_t hblank_size = (uint8_t)link->dc->caps.min_horizontal_blanking_period; - if (link->preferred_link_setting.dpcd_source_device_specific_field_support) { - result_write_min_hblank = core_link_write_dpcd(link, - DP_SOURCE_MINIMUM_HBLANK_SUPPORTED, (uint8_t *)(&hblank_size), - sizeof(hblank_size)); - - if (result_write_min_hblank == DC_ERROR_UNEXPECTED) - link->preferred_link_setting.dpcd_source_device_specific_field_support = false; - } else { - DC_LOG_DC("Sink device does not support 00340h DPCD write. Skipping on purpose.\n"); - } + result_write_min_hblank = core_link_write_dpcd(link, + DP_SOURCE_MINIMUM_HBLANK_SUPPORTED, (uint8_t *)(&hblank_size), + sizeof(hblank_size)); } - DC_TRACE_LEVEL_MESSAGE(DAL_TRACE_LEVEL_INFORMATION, WPP_BIT_FLAG_DC_DETECTION_DP_CAPS, "result=%u link_index=%u enum dce_version=%d DPCD=0x%04X min_hblank=%u branch_dev_id=0x%x branch_dev_name='%c%c%c%c%c%c'", diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h index 4f54bde1bb1c7..1948cd9427d7e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h @@ -109,7 +109,6 @@ struct dc_link_settings { enum dc_link_spread link_spread; bool use_link_rate_set; uint8_t link_rate_set; - bool dpcd_source_device_specific_field_support; }; struct dc_lane_settings { -- 2.39.0

2 years, 1 month

3
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Please backport commit a449dfbfc089 (PM: sleep: Avoid using pr_cont() in the tasks freezing code)

by Paul Menzel

Dear Linux folks, It’d be great if you could apply the commit below [1], present in Linux since 6.2-rc1, to at least the Linux 6.1 LTS series. commit a449dfbfc0894676ad0aa1873383265047529e3a Author: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> Date: Thu Dec 1 19:33:09 2022 +0100 PM: sleep: Avoid using pr_cont() in the tasks freezing code Using pr_cont() in the tasks freezing code related to system-wide suspend and hibernation is problematic, because the continuation messages printed there are susceptible to interspersing with other unrelated messages which results in output that is hard to understand. Address this issue by modifying try_to_freeze_tasks() to print messages that don't require continuations and adjusting its callers accordingly. Reported-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux(a)weissschuh.net> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek(a)suse.com> On a Dell Precision 3540, Linux 6.1.12 from Debian sid/unstable logs the stray warning below: $ sudo dmesg --level=warn | grep elapsed [ 3063.289579] (elapsed 0.047 seconds) done. It’s due to `pr_cont` usage, and the another (DRM) log message adds the unexpected newline character, splitting the message: [ 0.000000] Linux version 6.1.0-5-amd64 (debian-kernel(a)lists.debian.org) (gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Debian 6.1.12-1 (2023-02-15) […] [ 0.000000] DMI: Dell Inc. Precision 3540/0M14W7, BIOS 1.23.0 12/19/2022 […] [ 3063.241846] Freezing user space processes ... [ 3063.281999] [drm] VCE initialized successfully. [ 3063.289579] (elapsed 0.047 seconds) done. Backporting the patch would change the log messages a little though. No idea, if that is acceptable for commit for stable series. Kind regards, Paul [1]: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…

2 years, 1 month

2
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[PATCH] Avoid deadlock for recursive I/O on dm-thin when used as swap

by Coly Li

This is an alrady known issue that dm-thin volume cannot be used as swap, otherwise a deadlock may happen when dm-thin internal memory demond triggers swap I/O on the dm-thin volume itself. Thanks to Mikulas Patocka for commit a666e5c05e7c ("dm: fix deadlock when swapping to encrypted device"), this method can also be used for dm-thin to avoid the recursive I/O when it is used as swap. This patch just simply sets ti->limit_swap_bios by tree in pool_ctr() and thin_ctr(), other important stuffs are already done by Patocka in the above mentioned commit. In my test, I create a dm-thin volume /dev/vg/swap and use it as swap device. Then I run fio on another dm-thin volume /dev/vg/main and use large --blocksize to trigger swap I/O onto /dev/vg/swap. The following fio command line is used in my test, fio --name recursive-swap-io --lockmem 1 --iodepth 128 \ --ioengine libaio --filename /dev/vg/main --rw randrw \ --blocksize 1M --numjobs 32 --time_based --runtime=12h Without the patch, the whole system can be locked up within 15 seconds. With this patch, there is no any deadlock or hang task observed after 2 hours fio running. Further more, I change --blocksize from 1M to 128M, around 30 seconds after fio running, no I/O rate displayed by fio, and the out-of-memory killer message shows up in kernel message. After around 20 minutes all fio processes are killed and the whole system backs to be alive. This is exactly what is expected when recursive I/O happens on dm-thin volume when it is used as swap. NOTE: this change depends on commit a666e5c05e7c ("dm: fix deadlock when swapping to encrypted device") Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli(a)suse.de> Cc: Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-thin.c b/drivers/md/dm-thin.c index 6cd105c1cef3..13d4677baafd 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-thin.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin.c @@ -3369,6 +3369,7 @@ static int pool_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) pt->low_water_blocks = low_water_blocks; pt->adjusted_pf = pt->requested_pf = pf; ti->num_flush_bios = 1; + ti->limit_swap_bios = true; /* * Only need to enable discards if the pool should pass @@ -4249,6 +4250,7 @@ static int thin_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv) goto bad; ti->num_flush_bios = 1; + ti->limit_swap_bios = true; ti->flush_supported = true; ti->accounts_remapped_io = true; ti->per_io_data_size = sizeof(struct dm_thin_endio_hook); -- 2.39.2

2 years, 1 month

1
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[PATCH v5 1/7] serial: 8250_em: Fix UART port type

by Biju Das

As per HW manual for EMEV2 "R19UH0040EJ0400 Rev.4.00", the UART IP found on EMMA mobile SoC is Register-compatible with the general-purpose 16750 UART chip. Fix UART port type as 16750 and enable 64-bytes fifo support. Fixes: 22886ee96895 ("serial8250-em: Emma Mobile UART driver V2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Biju Das <biju.das.jz(a)bp.renesas.com> --- v4->v5: * Added fixes tag * Updated commit header and description * Removed UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF from flags. * Reordered the patch (from patch#4 to patch#1) to make it easier for applying it to stable branches. v3->v4: * Both {RZ/V2M, EMMA mobile} SoC is Register-compatible with the general-purpose 16750 UART chip. So started using generic compatible and removed struct serial8250_em_hw_info. * Removed Rb tag from Ilpo as it is new change. v2->v3: * Replaced of_device_get_match_data()->device_get_match_data(). * Replaced of_device.h->property.h * Dropped struct serial8250_em_hw_info *info from priv and started using a local variable info in probe(). * Retained Rb tag from Ilpo as changes are trivial. v2: * New patch --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_em.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_em.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_em.c index f8e99995eee9..d94c3811a8f7 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_em.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_em.c @@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ static int serial8250_em_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) memset(&up, 0, sizeof(up)); up.port.mapbase = regs->start; up.port.irq = irq; - up.port.type = PORT_UNKNOWN; - up.port.flags = UPF_BOOT_AUTOCONF | UPF_FIXED_PORT | UPF_IOREMAP; + up.port.type = PORT_16750; + up.port.flags = UPF_FIXED_PORT | UPF_IOREMAP | UPF_FIXED_TYPE; up.port.dev = &pdev->dev; up.port.private_data = priv; -- 2.25.1

2 years, 1 month

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Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in tc_chain_fill_node

by syzbot

This bug is marked as fixed by commit: net: core: netlink: add helper refcount dec and lock function net: sched: add helper function to take reference to Qdisc net: sched: extend Qdisc with rcu net: sched: rename qdisc_destroy() to qdisc_put() net: sched: use Qdisc rcu API instead of relying on rtnl lock But I can't find it in the tested trees[1] for more than 90 days. Is it a correct commit? Please update it by replying: #syz fix: exact-commit-title Until then the bug is still considered open and new crashes with the same signature are ignored. Kernel: Linux 4.19 Dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5f229e48cccc804062c0 --- [1] I expect the commit to be present in: 1. linux-4.19.y branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git

2 years, 1 month

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Hello, good day,

by kateryna mudrik

Hello, good day, Please don't be offended by my unsolicited email. First of all, I would like to briefly introduce myself. My name is kateryna mudrik, I come from Mariupol in the Donetsk oblast in northern Ukraine. We may have been humiliated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but I still believe that we Ukrainians can be friends with good people like you. Now, time won't allow me to say much, but I will tell you the main reason I contacted you when I get your response. Thank you and waiting for your response.

2 years, 1 month

1
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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.1 01/58] drm: panel-orientation-quirks: Add quirk for Lenovo Yoga Tab 3 X90F

by Sasha Levin

From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 8a238d7f7eea7592e0764bc3b9e79e7c6354b04c ] The Lenovo Yoga Tab 3 X90F has a portrait 1600x2560 LCD used in landscape mode, add a quirk for this. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221127181539.104223-1-hdego… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c index 3659f0465a724..23d63a4d42d9c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_panel_orientation_quirks.c @@ -127,6 +127,12 @@ static const struct drm_dmi_panel_orientation_data lcd1600x2560_leftside_up = { .orientation = DRM_MODE_PANEL_ORIENTATION_LEFT_UP, }; +static const struct drm_dmi_panel_orientation_data lcd1600x2560_rightside_up = { + .width = 1600, + .height = 2560, + .orientation = DRM_MODE_PANEL_ORIENTATION_RIGHT_UP, +}; + static const struct dmi_system_id orientation_data[] = { { /* Acer One 10 (S1003) */ .matches = { @@ -331,6 +337,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id orientation_data[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "BLADE_21"), }, .driver_data = (void *)&lcd1200x1920_rightside_up, + }, { /* Lenovo Yoga Tab 3 X90F */ + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "CHERRYVIEW D1 PLATFORM"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "Blade3-10A-001"), + }, + .driver_data = (void *)&lcd1600x2560_rightside_up, }, { /* Nanote UMPC-01 */ .matches = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "RWC CO.,LTD"), -- 2.39.0

2 years, 1 month

2
58
0 0

[PATCH v3 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS

by KP Singh

When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed. The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which STIBP protects. Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter). Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS") Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo(a)kernelhacking.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index cf81848b72f4..44e22cda7fb3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1133,14 +1133,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; +} + static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -1203,12 +1207,20 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) } /* - * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, - * STIBP is not required. + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP + * is not required. + * + * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target + * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which + * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS + * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return + * to userspace. This disables the implicit + * cross-thread protection, so allow for STIBP to be selected in that + * case. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -2340,7 +2352,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { -- 2.39.2.637.g21b0678d19-goog

2 years, 1 month

2
3
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[PATCH] crypto: testmgr - fix RNG performance in fuzz tests

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> The performance of the crypto fuzz tests has greatly regressed since v5.18. When booting a kernel on an arm64 dev board with all software crypto algorithms and CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS enabled, the fuzz tests now take about 200 seconds to run, or about 325 seconds with lockdep enabled, compared to about 5 seconds before. The root cause is that the random number generation has become much slower due to commit d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness"). On my same arm64 dev board, at the time the fuzz tests are run, get_random_u8() is about 345x slower than prandom_u32_state(), or about 469x if lockdep is enabled. Lockdep makes a big difference, but much of the rest comes from the get_random_*() functions taking a *very* slow path when the CRNG is not yet initialized. Since the crypto self-tests run early during boot, even having a hardware RNG driver enabled (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCOM_RNG in my case) doesn't prevent this. x86 systems don't have this issue, but they still see a significant regression if lockdep is enabled. Converting the "Fully random bytes" case in generate_random_bytes() to use get_random_bytes() helps significantly, improving the test time to about 27 seconds. But that's still over 5x slower than before. This is all a bit silly, though, since the fuzz tests don't actually need cryptographically secure random numbers. So let's just make them use a non-cryptographically-secure RNG as they did before. The original prandom_u32() is gone now, so let's use prandom_u32_state() instead, with an explicitly managed state, like various other self-tests in the kernel source tree (rbtree_test.c, test_scanf.c, etc.) already do. This also has the benefit that no locking is required anymore, so performance should be even better than the original version that used prandom_u32(). Fixes: d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- crypto/testmgr.c | 268 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 171 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index c91e93ece20b..2cbd2f8ce3c3 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -860,12 +860,52 @@ static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS +/* + * The fuzz tests use prandom instead of the normal Linux RNG since they don't + * need cryptographically secure random numbers. This greatly improves the + * performance of these tests, especially if they are run before the Linux RNG + * has been initialized or if they are run on a lockdep-enabled kernel. + */ + +static inline void init_rnd_state(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + static atomic64_t next_seed; + + prandom_seed_state(rng, atomic64_inc_return(&next_seed)); +} + +static inline u8 prandom_u8(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + return prandom_u32_state(rng); +} + +static inline u32 prandom_u32_below(struct rnd_state *rng, u32 n) +{ + /* + * This is slightly biased for non-power-of-2 values of n, but this + * isn't important here. + */ + return prandom_u32_state(rng) % n; +} + +static inline bool prandom_bool(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + return prandom_u32_below(rng, 2); +} + +static inline u32 prandom_u32_inclusive(struct rnd_state *rng, + u32 floor, u32 ceil) +{ + return floor + prandom_u32_below(rng, ceil - floor + 1); +} + /* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */ -static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) +static unsigned int generate_random_length(struct rnd_state *rng, + unsigned int max_len) { - unsigned int len = get_random_u32_below(max_len + 1); + unsigned int len = prandom_u32_below(rng, max_len + 1); - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: return len % 64; case 1: @@ -878,43 +918,44 @@ static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) } /* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void flip_random_bit(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void flip_random_bit(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { size_t bitpos; - bitpos = get_random_u32_below(size * 8); + bitpos = prandom_u32_below(rng, size * 8); buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8); } /* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void flip_random_byte(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void flip_random_byte(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { - buf[get_random_u32_below(size)] ^= 0xff; + buf[prandom_u32_below(rng, size)] ^= 0xff; } /* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void mutate_buffer(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void mutate_buffer(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { size_t num_flips; size_t i; /* Sometimes flip some bits */ - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) { - num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << get_random_u32_below(8), size * 8); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), + size * 8); for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) - flip_random_bit(buf, size); + flip_random_bit(rng, buf, size); } /* Sometimes flip some bytes */ - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) { - num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << get_random_u32_below(8), size); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), size); for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) - flip_random_byte(buf, size); + flip_random_byte(rng, buf, size); } } /* Randomly generate 'count' bytes, but sometimes make them "interesting" */ -static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) +static void generate_random_bytes(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t count) { u8 b; u8 increment; @@ -923,11 +964,11 @@ static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) if (count == 0) return; - switch (get_random_u32_below(8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ case 0: case 1: /* All the same byte, plus optional mutations */ - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: b = 0x00; break; @@ -935,28 +976,28 @@ static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) b = 0xff; break; default: - b = get_random_u8(); + b = prandom_u8(rng); break; } memset(buf, b, count); - mutate_buffer(buf, count); + mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count); break; case 2: /* Ascending or descending bytes, plus optional mutations */ - increment = get_random_u8(); - b = get_random_u8(); + increment = prandom_u8(rng); + b = prandom_u8(rng); for (i = 0; i < count; i++, b += increment) buf[i] = b; - mutate_buffer(buf, count); + mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count); break; default: /* Fully random bytes */ - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) - buf[i] = get_random_u8(); + prandom_bytes_state(rng, buf, count); } } -static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, +static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct test_sg_division *divs, size_t max_divs, char *p, char *end, bool gen_flushes, u32 req_flags) { @@ -967,24 +1008,26 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, unsigned int this_len; const char *flushtype_str; - if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_bool(rng)) this_len = remaining; else - this_len = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, remaining); + this_len = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, remaining); div->proportion_of_total = this_len; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - div->offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(PAGE_SIZE - 128, PAGE_SIZE - 1); - else if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) - div->offset = get_random_u32_below(32); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, + PAGE_SIZE - 128, + PAGE_SIZE - 1); + else if (prandom_bool(rng)) + div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, 32); else - div->offset = get_random_u32_below(PAGE_SIZE); - if (get_random_u32_below(8) == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, PAGE_SIZE); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8) == 0) div->offset_relative_to_alignmask = true; div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_NONE; if (gen_flushes) { - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT; break; @@ -996,7 +1039,7 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, if (div->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE && !(req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && - get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + prandom_bool(rng)) div->nosimd = true; switch (div->flush_type) { @@ -1031,7 +1074,8 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, } /* Generate a random testvec_config for fuzz testing */ -static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, +static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct testvec_config *cfg, char *name, size_t max_namelen) { char *p = name; @@ -1043,7 +1087,7 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "random:"); - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: case 1: cfg->inplace_mode = OUT_OF_PLACE; @@ -1058,12 +1102,12 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, break; } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { cfg->req_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " may_sleep"); } - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_final"); @@ -1078,36 +1122,37 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, break; } - if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && - get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && prandom_bool(rng)) { cfg->nosimd = true; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd"); } p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=["); - p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->src_divs, + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->src_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), p, end, (cfg->finalization_type != FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST), cfg->req_flags); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); - if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && prandom_bool(rng)) { p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " dst_divs=["); - p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->dst_divs, + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->dst_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), p, end, false, cfg->req_flags); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { - cfg->iv_offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { + cfg->iv_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset); } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { - cfg->key_offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { + cfg->key_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset); } @@ -1620,11 +1665,14 @@ static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_hash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); @@ -1642,15 +1690,16 @@ static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, * Generate a hash test vector from the given implementation. * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. */ -static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, +static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct shash_desc *desc, struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int maxkeysize, unsigned int maxdatasize, char *name, size_t max_namelen) { /* Data */ - vec->psize = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); + vec->psize = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); /* * Key: length in range [1, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize. @@ -1660,9 +1709,9 @@ static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, vec->ksize = 0; if (maxkeysize) { vec->ksize = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->ksize = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, maxkeysize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->ksize = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, maxkeysize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); vec->setkey_error = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize); @@ -1696,6 +1745,7 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; const char *algname = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_name; const char *driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm); + struct rnd_state rng; char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct crypto_shash *generic_tfm = NULL; struct shash_desc *generic_desc = NULL; @@ -1709,6 +1759,8 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, if (noextratests) return 0; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); if (err) @@ -1777,10 +1829,11 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, } for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_hash_testvec(generic_desc, &vec, + generate_random_hash_testvec(&rng, generic_desc, &vec, maxkeysize, maxdatasize, vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); - generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_hash_vec_cfg(&vec, vec_name, cfg, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); @@ -2182,11 +2235,14 @@ static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_aead_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, tsgls); @@ -2202,6 +2258,7 @@ static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { + struct rnd_state rng; struct aead_request *req; struct crypto_aead *tfm; const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc; @@ -2220,24 +2277,26 @@ struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag. The * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty. */ -static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, +static void mutate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, unsigned int ivsize) { const unsigned int aad_tail_size = aad_iv ? ivsize : 0; const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0 && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { + if (prandom_bool(rng) && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { /* Mutate the AAD */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen - aad_tail_size); - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, + vec->alen - aad_tail_size); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) return; } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { /* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); } else { /* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); } } @@ -2248,7 +2307,8 @@ static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, */ #define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8 -static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, +static void generate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_request *req, const struct aead_test_suite *suite, struct aead_testvec *vec, bool prefer_inauthentic) @@ -2257,17 +2317,18 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) && - (prefer_inauthentic || get_random_u32_below(4) == 0); + (prefer_inauthentic || + prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0); /* Generate the AAD. */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); if (suite->aad_iv && vec->alen >= ivsize) /* Avoid implementation-defined behavior. */ memcpy((u8 *)vec->assoc + vec->alen - ivsize, vec->iv, ivsize); - if (inauthentic && get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (inauthentic && prandom_bool(rng)) { /* Generate a random ciphertext. */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); } else { int i = 0; struct scatterlist src[2], dst; @@ -2279,7 +2340,7 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, if (vec->alen) sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen); if (vec->plen) { - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen); } sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen); @@ -2299,7 +2360,7 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an * inauthentic one. */ - mutate_aead_message(vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); + mutate_aead_message(rng, vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); } vec->novrfy = 1; if (suite->einval_allowed) @@ -2313,7 +2374,8 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often. */ -static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, +static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_request *req, struct aead_testvec *vec, const struct aead_test_suite *suite, unsigned int maxkeysize, @@ -2329,18 +2391,18 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ vec->klen = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->klen = get_random_u32_below(maxkeysize + 1); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); vec->setkey_error = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); /* IV */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); /* Tag length: in [0, maxauthsize], but usually choose maxauthsize */ authsize = maxauthsize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - authsize = get_random_u32_below(maxauthsize + 1); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + authsize = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxauthsize + 1); if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE; if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize)) @@ -2349,11 +2411,11 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize); /* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */ - total_len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) + total_len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) vec->alen = 0; else - vec->alen = generate_random_length(total_len); + vec->alen = generate_random_length(rng, total_len); vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen; vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize; @@ -2364,7 +2426,7 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, vec->novrfy = 0; vec->crypt_error = 0; if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0) - generate_aead_message(req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); + generate_aead_message(rng, req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"", vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy); @@ -2376,7 +2438,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec( int i; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - generate_random_aead_testvec(ctx->req, &ctx->vec, + generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, ctx->req, &ctx->vec, &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, ctx->vec_name, @@ -2407,7 +2469,8 @@ static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) */ try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx); if (ctx->vec.novrfy) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->cfgname, sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); err = test_aead_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &ctx->vec, ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg, @@ -2497,12 +2560,13 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) * the other implementation against them. */ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_aead_testvec(generic_req, &ctx->vec, + generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, generic_req, &ctx->vec, &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, ctx->vec_name, sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false); - generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->cfgname, sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) { err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec, @@ -2541,6 +2605,7 @@ static int test_aead_extra(const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc, ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; + init_rnd_state(&ctx->rng); ctx->req = req; ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); ctx->test_desc = test_desc; @@ -2930,11 +2995,14 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, tsgls); @@ -2952,7 +3020,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec, * Generate a symmetric cipher test vector from the given implementation. * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. */ -static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, +static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct skcipher_request *req, struct cipher_testvec *vec, unsigned int maxdatasize, char *name, size_t max_namelen) @@ -2966,17 +3035,17 @@ static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ vec->klen = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->klen = get_random_u32_below(maxkeysize + 1); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); vec->setkey_error = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); /* IV */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); /* Plaintext */ - vec->len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); + vec->len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to encrypt. */ if (vec->setkey_error) @@ -3018,6 +3087,7 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; const char *algname = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name; const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm); + struct rnd_state rng; char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct crypto_skcipher *generic_tfm = NULL; struct skcipher_request *generic_req = NULL; @@ -3035,6 +3105,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, if (strncmp(algname, "kw(", 3) == 0) return 0; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); if (err) @@ -3119,9 +3191,11 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, } for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_cipher_testvec(generic_req, &vec, maxdatasize, + generate_random_cipher_testvec(&rng, generic_req, &vec, + maxdatasize, vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); - generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name, cfg, req, tsgls); base-commit: 2fcd07b7ccd5fd10b2120d298363e4e6c53ccf9c -- 2.39.2

2 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

stable/linux-5.15.y baseline: 59 runs, 15 regressions (v5.15.96)

by kernelci.org bot

stable/linux-5.15.y baseline: 59 runs, 15 regressions (v5.15.96) Regressions Summary ------------------- platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_i386-uefi | i386 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | i386_defconfig | 1 qemu_i386-uefi | i386 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | i386_defconfig | 1 qemu_i386-uefi | i386 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | i386_defconfig | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/job/stable/branch/linux-5.15.y/kernel/v5.15.96/pl… Test: baseline Tree: stable Branch: linux-5.15.y Describe: v5.15.96 URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git SHA: d383d0f28ecac0f3375bdfb9a0c4bfac979f6f8f Test Regressions ---------------- platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_i386-uefi | i386 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | i386_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa05af0ff46cf25a8c863d Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: i386_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/i386/i386_defcon… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/i386/i386_defcon… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa05af0ff46cf25a8c863e failing since 10 days (last pass: v5.15.93, first fail: v5.15.94) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_i386-uefi | i386 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | i386_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa0610adc91f16618c8643 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: i386_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/i386/i386_defcon… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/i386/i386_defcon… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa0610adc91f16618c8644 failing since 10 days (last pass: v5.15.93, first fail: v5.15.94) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_i386-uefi | i386 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | i386_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa05ad0ff46cf25a8c8637 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: i386_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/i386/i386_defcon… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/i386/i386_defcon… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa05ad0ff46cf25a8c8638 failing since 10 days (last pass: v5.15.93, first fail: v5.15.94) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa0510160a2c8b9c8c8650 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig+x86-chromebook Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa0510160a2c8b9c8c8651 new failure (last pass: v5.15.93) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa066396d5fa95d18c8661 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa066396d5fa95d18c8662 failing since 10 days (last pass: v5.15.92, first fail: v5.15.94) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa050e160a2c8b9c8c863f Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig+x86-chromebook Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa050e160a2c8b9c8c8640 new failure (last pass: v5.15.93) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa068895746915f18c865b Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa068895746915f18c865c failing since 10 days (last pass: v5.15.92, first fail: v5.15.94) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa04f9ae8bea4b5a8c863c Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig+x86-chromebook Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa04f9ae8bea4b5a8c863d new failure (last pass: v5.15.93) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi | x86_64 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa064d95746915f18c862f Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa064d95746915f18c8630 failing since 10 days (last pass: v5.15.92, first fail: v5.15.94) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa0511160a2c8b9c8c8653 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig+x86-chromebook Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa0511160a2c8b9c8c8654 new failure (last pass: v5.15.92) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-baylibre | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa066495746915f18c8644 Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa066495746915f18c8645 new failure (last pass: v5.15.90) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa0548ace22fbe798c864d Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig+x86-chromebook Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa0548ace22fbe798c864e new failure (last pass: v5.15.92) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-broonie | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa068ad17764eaf68c862f Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa068ad17764eaf68c8630 new failure (last pass: v5.15.90) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | x86_64_defcon...6-chromebook | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa050d160a2c8b9c8c863c Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig+x86-chromebook Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa050d160a2c8b9c8c863d new failure (last pass: v5.15.92) platform | arch | lab | compiler | defconfig | regressions -----------------------+--------+---------------+----------+------------------------------+------------ qemu_x86_64-uefi-mixed | x86_64 | lab-collabora | gcc-10 | x86_64_defconfig | 1 Details: https://kernelci.org/test/plan/id/63fa064e96d5fa95d18c865b Results: 0 PASS, 1 FAIL, 0 SKIP Full config: x86_64_defconfig Compiler: gcc-10 (gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110) Plain log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… HTML log: https://storage.kernelci.org//stable/linux-5.15.y/v5.15.96/x86_64/x86_64_de… Rootfs: http://storage.kernelci.org/images/rootfs/buildroot/buildroot-baseline/2023… * baseline.login: https://kernelci.org/test/case/id/63fa064e96d5fa95d18c865c new failure (last pass: v5.15.90)

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Linux-stable-mirror February 2023