February 2023 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH] Fix data race in mark_rt_mutex_waiters

by Hernan Ponce de Leon

From: Hernan Ponce de Leon <hernanl.leon(a)huawei.com> Following the defition of data race in tools/memory-model/linux-kernel.cat the dartagnan tool https://github.com/hernanponcedeleon/Dat3M reported a race between mark_rt_mutex_waiters and rt_mutex_cmpxchg_release. Commit 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core") later removed in commit d0aa7a70bf03 ("futex_requeue_pi optimization") and reverted in commit bd197234b0a6 ("Revert "futex_requeue_pi optimization"") The original commit introduced the data race. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v2.6.18.x Fixes: 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core") Signed-off-by: Hernan Ponce de Leon <hernanl.leon(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c index 010cf4e6d0b8..7ed9472edd48 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static __always_inline void mark_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex_base *lock) unsigned long owner, *p = (unsigned long *) &lock->owner; do { - owner = *p; + owner = READ_ONCE(*p); } while (cmpxchg_relaxed(p, owner, owner | RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS) != owner); -- 2.25.1

8 months, 3 weeks

9
23
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[PATCH v2] crypto: testmgr - fix RNG performance in fuzz tests

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> The performance of the crypto fuzz tests has greatly regressed since v5.18. When booting a kernel on an arm64 dev board with all software crypto algorithms and CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS enabled, the fuzz tests now take about 200 seconds to run, or about 325 seconds with lockdep enabled, compared to about 5 seconds before. The root cause is that the random number generation has become much slower due to commit d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness"). On my same arm64 dev board, at the time the fuzz tests are run, get_random_u8() is about 345x slower than prandom_u32_state(), or about 469x if lockdep is enabled. Lockdep makes a big difference, but much of the rest comes from the get_random_*() functions taking a *very* slow path when the CRNG is not yet initialized. Since the crypto self-tests run early during boot, even having a hardware RNG driver enabled (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCOM_RNG in my case) doesn't prevent this. x86 systems don't have this issue, but they still see a significant regression if lockdep is enabled. Converting the "Fully random bytes" case in generate_random_bytes() to use get_random_bytes() helps significantly, improving the test time to about 27 seconds. But that's still over 5x slower than before. This is all a bit silly, though, since the fuzz tests don't actually need cryptographically secure random numbers. So let's just make them use a non-cryptographically-secure RNG as they did before. The original prandom_u32() is gone now, so let's use prandom_u32_state() instead, with an explicitly managed state, like various other self-tests in the kernel source tree (rbtree_test.c, test_scanf.c, etc.) already do. This also has the benefit that no locking is required anymore, so performance should be even better than the original version that used prandom_u32(). Fixes: d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- v2: made init_rnd_state() use get_random_u64() crypto/testmgr.c | 266 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 169 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index c91e93ece20b..b160eeb12c8e 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -860,12 +860,50 @@ static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS +/* + * The fuzz tests use prandom instead of the normal Linux RNG since they don't + * need cryptographically secure random numbers. This greatly improves the + * performance of these tests, especially if they are run before the Linux RNG + * has been initialized or if they are run on a lockdep-enabled kernel. + */ + +static inline void init_rnd_state(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + prandom_seed_state(rng, get_random_u64()); +} + +static inline u8 prandom_u8(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + return prandom_u32_state(rng); +} + +static inline u32 prandom_u32_below(struct rnd_state *rng, u32 ceil) +{ + /* + * This is slightly biased for non-power-of-2 values of 'ceil', but this + * isn't important here. + */ + return prandom_u32_state(rng) % ceil; +} + +static inline bool prandom_bool(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + return prandom_u32_below(rng, 2); +} + +static inline u32 prandom_u32_inclusive(struct rnd_state *rng, + u32 floor, u32 ceil) +{ + return floor + prandom_u32_below(rng, ceil - floor + 1); +} + /* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */ -static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) +static unsigned int generate_random_length(struct rnd_state *rng, + unsigned int max_len) { - unsigned int len = get_random_u32_below(max_len + 1); + unsigned int len = prandom_u32_below(rng, max_len + 1); - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: return len % 64; case 1: @@ -878,43 +916,44 @@ static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) } /* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void flip_random_bit(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void flip_random_bit(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { size_t bitpos; - bitpos = get_random_u32_below(size * 8); + bitpos = prandom_u32_below(rng, size * 8); buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8); } /* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void flip_random_byte(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void flip_random_byte(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { - buf[get_random_u32_below(size)] ^= 0xff; + buf[prandom_u32_below(rng, size)] ^= 0xff; } /* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void mutate_buffer(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void mutate_buffer(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { size_t num_flips; size_t i; /* Sometimes flip some bits */ - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) { - num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << get_random_u32_below(8), size * 8); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), + size * 8); for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) - flip_random_bit(buf, size); + flip_random_bit(rng, buf, size); } /* Sometimes flip some bytes */ - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) { - num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << get_random_u32_below(8), size); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), size); for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) - flip_random_byte(buf, size); + flip_random_byte(rng, buf, size); } } /* Randomly generate 'count' bytes, but sometimes make them "interesting" */ -static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) +static void generate_random_bytes(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t count) { u8 b; u8 increment; @@ -923,11 +962,11 @@ static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) if (count == 0) return; - switch (get_random_u32_below(8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ case 0: case 1: /* All the same byte, plus optional mutations */ - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: b = 0x00; break; @@ -935,28 +974,28 @@ static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) b = 0xff; break; default: - b = get_random_u8(); + b = prandom_u8(rng); break; } memset(buf, b, count); - mutate_buffer(buf, count); + mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count); break; case 2: /* Ascending or descending bytes, plus optional mutations */ - increment = get_random_u8(); - b = get_random_u8(); + increment = prandom_u8(rng); + b = prandom_u8(rng); for (i = 0; i < count; i++, b += increment) buf[i] = b; - mutate_buffer(buf, count); + mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count); break; default: /* Fully random bytes */ - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) - buf[i] = get_random_u8(); + prandom_bytes_state(rng, buf, count); } } -static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, +static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct test_sg_division *divs, size_t max_divs, char *p, char *end, bool gen_flushes, u32 req_flags) { @@ -967,24 +1006,26 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, unsigned int this_len; const char *flushtype_str; - if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_bool(rng)) this_len = remaining; else - this_len = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, remaining); + this_len = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, remaining); div->proportion_of_total = this_len; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - div->offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(PAGE_SIZE - 128, PAGE_SIZE - 1); - else if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) - div->offset = get_random_u32_below(32); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, + PAGE_SIZE - 128, + PAGE_SIZE - 1); + else if (prandom_bool(rng)) + div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, 32); else - div->offset = get_random_u32_below(PAGE_SIZE); - if (get_random_u32_below(8) == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, PAGE_SIZE); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8) == 0) div->offset_relative_to_alignmask = true; div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_NONE; if (gen_flushes) { - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT; break; @@ -996,7 +1037,7 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, if (div->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE && !(req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && - get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + prandom_bool(rng)) div->nosimd = true; switch (div->flush_type) { @@ -1031,7 +1072,8 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, } /* Generate a random testvec_config for fuzz testing */ -static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, +static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct testvec_config *cfg, char *name, size_t max_namelen) { char *p = name; @@ -1043,7 +1085,7 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "random:"); - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: case 1: cfg->inplace_mode = OUT_OF_PLACE; @@ -1058,12 +1100,12 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, break; } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { cfg->req_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " may_sleep"); } - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_final"); @@ -1078,36 +1120,37 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, break; } - if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && - get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && prandom_bool(rng)) { cfg->nosimd = true; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd"); } p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=["); - p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->src_divs, + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->src_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), p, end, (cfg->finalization_type != FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST), cfg->req_flags); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); - if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && prandom_bool(rng)) { p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " dst_divs=["); - p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->dst_divs, + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->dst_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), p, end, false, cfg->req_flags); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { - cfg->iv_offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { + cfg->iv_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset); } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { - cfg->key_offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { + cfg->key_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset); } @@ -1620,11 +1663,14 @@ static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_hash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); @@ -1642,15 +1688,16 @@ static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, * Generate a hash test vector from the given implementation. * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. */ -static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, +static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct shash_desc *desc, struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int maxkeysize, unsigned int maxdatasize, char *name, size_t max_namelen) { /* Data */ - vec->psize = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); + vec->psize = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); /* * Key: length in range [1, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize. @@ -1660,9 +1707,9 @@ static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, vec->ksize = 0; if (maxkeysize) { vec->ksize = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->ksize = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, maxkeysize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->ksize = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, maxkeysize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); vec->setkey_error = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize); @@ -1696,6 +1743,7 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; const char *algname = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_name; const char *driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm); + struct rnd_state rng; char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct crypto_shash *generic_tfm = NULL; struct shash_desc *generic_desc = NULL; @@ -1709,6 +1757,8 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, if (noextratests) return 0; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); if (err) @@ -1777,10 +1827,11 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, } for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_hash_testvec(generic_desc, &vec, + generate_random_hash_testvec(&rng, generic_desc, &vec, maxkeysize, maxdatasize, vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); - generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_hash_vec_cfg(&vec, vec_name, cfg, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); @@ -2182,11 +2233,14 @@ static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_aead_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, tsgls); @@ -2202,6 +2256,7 @@ static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { + struct rnd_state rng; struct aead_request *req; struct crypto_aead *tfm; const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc; @@ -2220,24 +2275,26 @@ struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag. The * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty. */ -static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, +static void mutate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, unsigned int ivsize) { const unsigned int aad_tail_size = aad_iv ? ivsize : 0; const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0 && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { + if (prandom_bool(rng) && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { /* Mutate the AAD */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen - aad_tail_size); - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, + vec->alen - aad_tail_size); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) return; } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { /* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); } else { /* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); } } @@ -2248,7 +2305,8 @@ static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, */ #define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8 -static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, +static void generate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_request *req, const struct aead_test_suite *suite, struct aead_testvec *vec, bool prefer_inauthentic) @@ -2257,17 +2315,18 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) && - (prefer_inauthentic || get_random_u32_below(4) == 0); + (prefer_inauthentic || + prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0); /* Generate the AAD. */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); if (suite->aad_iv && vec->alen >= ivsize) /* Avoid implementation-defined behavior. */ memcpy((u8 *)vec->assoc + vec->alen - ivsize, vec->iv, ivsize); - if (inauthentic && get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (inauthentic && prandom_bool(rng)) { /* Generate a random ciphertext. */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); } else { int i = 0; struct scatterlist src[2], dst; @@ -2279,7 +2338,7 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, if (vec->alen) sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen); if (vec->plen) { - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen); } sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen); @@ -2299,7 +2358,7 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an * inauthentic one. */ - mutate_aead_message(vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); + mutate_aead_message(rng, vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); } vec->novrfy = 1; if (suite->einval_allowed) @@ -2313,7 +2372,8 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often. */ -static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, +static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_request *req, struct aead_testvec *vec, const struct aead_test_suite *suite, unsigned int maxkeysize, @@ -2329,18 +2389,18 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ vec->klen = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->klen = get_random_u32_below(maxkeysize + 1); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); vec->setkey_error = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); /* IV */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); /* Tag length: in [0, maxauthsize], but usually choose maxauthsize */ authsize = maxauthsize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - authsize = get_random_u32_below(maxauthsize + 1); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + authsize = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxauthsize + 1); if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE; if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize)) @@ -2349,11 +2409,11 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize); /* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */ - total_len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) + total_len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) vec->alen = 0; else - vec->alen = generate_random_length(total_len); + vec->alen = generate_random_length(rng, total_len); vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen; vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize; @@ -2364,7 +2424,7 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, vec->novrfy = 0; vec->crypt_error = 0; if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0) - generate_aead_message(req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); + generate_aead_message(rng, req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"", vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy); @@ -2376,7 +2436,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec( int i; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - generate_random_aead_testvec(ctx->req, &ctx->vec, + generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, ctx->req, &ctx->vec, &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, ctx->vec_name, @@ -2407,7 +2467,8 @@ static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) */ try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx); if (ctx->vec.novrfy) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->cfgname, sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); err = test_aead_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &ctx->vec, ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg, @@ -2497,12 +2558,13 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) * the other implementation against them. */ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_aead_testvec(generic_req, &ctx->vec, + generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, generic_req, &ctx->vec, &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, ctx->vec_name, sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false); - generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->cfgname, sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) { err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec, @@ -2541,6 +2603,7 @@ static int test_aead_extra(const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc, ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; + init_rnd_state(&ctx->rng); ctx->req = req; ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); ctx->test_desc = test_desc; @@ -2930,11 +2993,14 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, tsgls); @@ -2952,7 +3018,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec, * Generate a symmetric cipher test vector from the given implementation. * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. */ -static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, +static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct skcipher_request *req, struct cipher_testvec *vec, unsigned int maxdatasize, char *name, size_t max_namelen) @@ -2966,17 +3033,17 @@ static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ vec->klen = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->klen = get_random_u32_below(maxkeysize + 1); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); vec->setkey_error = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); /* IV */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); /* Plaintext */ - vec->len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); + vec->len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to encrypt. */ if (vec->setkey_error) @@ -3018,6 +3085,7 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; const char *algname = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name; const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm); + struct rnd_state rng; char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct crypto_skcipher *generic_tfm = NULL; struct skcipher_request *generic_req = NULL; @@ -3035,6 +3103,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, if (strncmp(algname, "kw(", 3) == 0) return 0; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); if (err) @@ -3119,9 +3189,11 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, } for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_cipher_testvec(generic_req, &vec, maxdatasize, + generate_random_cipher_testvec(&rng, generic_req, &vec, + maxdatasize, vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); - generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name, cfg, req, tsgls); base-commit: 2fcd07b7ccd5fd10b2120d298363e4e6c53ccf9c -- 2.39.2

8 months, 3 weeks

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - fix crash with CFI enabled

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> aesbs_ecb_encrypt(), aesbs_ecb_decrypt(), aesbs_xts_encrypt(), and aesbs_xts_decrypt() are called via indirect function calls. Therefore they need to use SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START instead of SYM_FUNC_START to cause their type hashes to be emitted when the kernel is built with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y. Otherwise, the code crashes with a CFI failure if the compiler doesn't happen to optimize out the indirect calls. Fixes: c50d32859e70 ("arm64: Add types to indirect called assembly functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S index 7278a37c2d5c..baf450717b24 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/cfi_types.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> .text @@ -620,12 +621,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_decrypt8) .endm .align 4 -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) __ecb_crypt aesbs_encrypt8, v0, v1, v4, v6, v3, v7, v2, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) .align 4 -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) __ecb_crypt aesbs_decrypt8, v0, v1, v6, v4, v2, v7, v3, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) @@ -799,11 +800,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__xts_crypt8) ret .endm -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_encrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_encrypt) __xts_crypt aesbs_encrypt8, v0, v1, v4, v6, v3, v7, v2, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_xts_encrypt) -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_decrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_decrypt) __xts_crypt aesbs_decrypt8, v0, v1, v6, v4, v2, v7, v3, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_xts_decrypt) base-commit: f3a2439f20d918930cc4ae8f76fe1c1afd26958f -- 2.39.2

8 months, 3 weeks

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] drm/i915: Preserve crtc_state->inherited during state clearing

by Ville Syrjala

From: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> intel_crtc_prepare_cleared_state() is unintentionally losing the "inherited" flag. This will happen if intel_initial_commit() is forced to go through the full modeset calculations for whatever reason. Afterwards the first real commit from userspace will not get forced to the full modeset path, and thus eg. audio state may not get recomputed properly. So if the monitor was already enabled during boot audio will not work until userspace itself does an explicit full modeset. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Lee Shawn C <shawn.c.lee(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c index a1fbdf32bd21..ed95c0acfaae 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c @@ -5078,6 +5078,7 @@ intel_crtc_prepare_cleared_state(struct intel_atomic_state *state, * only fields that are know to not cause problems are preserved. */ saved_state->uapi = crtc_state->uapi; + saved_state->inherited = crtc_state->inherited; saved_state->scaler_state = crtc_state->scaler_state; saved_state->shared_dpll = crtc_state->shared_dpll; saved_state->dpll_hw_state = crtc_state->dpll_hw_state; -- 2.39.2

8 months, 3 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH] PCI: kirin: Select REGMAP_MMIO for PCIE_KIRIN

by Xi Ruoyao

pcie-kirin.c invokes devm_regmap_init_mmio, so it's necessary to select REGMAP_MMIO or vmlinux fails to link with "undefined reference to `__devm_regmap_init_mmio_clk`. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # at least for 6.1 and 6.2 Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111(a)xry111.site> --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig index 434f6a4f4041..d29551261e80 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ config PCIE_KIRIN tristate "HiSilicon Kirin series SoCs PCIe controllers" depends on PCI_MSI select PCIE_DW_HOST + select REGMAP_MMIO help Say Y here if you want PCIe controller support on HiSilicon Kirin series SoCs. -- 2.39.2

8 months, 3 weeks

2
3
0 0

[PATCH v2] Input: xen-kbdfront - drop keys to shrink modalias

by Jason Andryuk

xen kbdfront registers itself as being able to deliver *any* key since it doesn't know what keys the backend may produce. Unfortunately, the generated modalias gets too large and uevent creation fails with -ENOMEM. This can lead to gdm not using the keyboard since there is no seat associated [1] and the debian installer crashing [2]. Trim the ranges of key capabilities by removing some BTN_* ranges. While doing this, some neighboring undefined ranges are removed to trim it further. An upper limit of KEY_KBD_LCD_MENU5 is still too large. Use an upper limit of KEY_BRIGHTNESS_MENU. This removes: BTN_DPAD_UP(0x220)..BTN_DPAD_RIGHT(0x223) Empty space 0x224..0x229 Empty space 0x28a..0x28f KEY_MACRO1(0x290)..KEY_MACRO30(0x2ad) KEY_MACRO_RECORD_START 0x2b0 KEY_MACRO_RECORD_STOP 0x2b1 KEY_MACRO_PRESET_CYCLE 0x2b2 KEY_MACRO_PRESET1(0x2b3)..KEY_MACRO_PRESET3(0xb5) Empty space 0x2b6..0x2b7 KEY_KBD_LCD_MENU1(0x2b8)..KEY_KBD_LCD_MENU5(0x2bc) Empty space 0x2bd..0x2bf BTN_TRIGGER_HAPPY(0x2c0)..BTN_TRIGGER_HAPPY40(0x2e7) Empty space 0x2e8..0x2ff The modalias shrinks from 2082 to 1550 bytes. A chunk of keys need to be removed to allow the keyboard to be used. This may break some functionality, but the hope is these macro keys are uncommon and don't affect any users. [1] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/22944 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/87o8dw52jc.fsf@vps.thesusis.net/T/ Cc: Phillip Susi <phill(a)thesusis.net> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) v2: Remove more keys: v1 didn't remove enough and modalias was still broken. diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c b/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c index 8d8ebdc2039b..4ecb579df748 100644 --- a/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c +++ b/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c @@ -256,7 +256,14 @@ static int xenkbd_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev, __set_bit(EV_KEY, kbd->evbit); for (i = KEY_ESC; i < KEY_UNKNOWN; i++) __set_bit(i, kbd->keybit); - for (i = KEY_OK; i < KEY_MAX; i++) + /* In theory we want to go KEY_OK..KEY_MAX, but that grows the + * modalias line too long. There is a gap of buttons from + * BTN_DPAD_UP..BTN_DPAD_RIGHT and KEY_ALS_TOGGLE is the next + * defined. Then continue up to KEY_BRIGHTNESS_MENU as an upper + * limit. */ + for (i = KEY_OK; i < BTN_DPAD_UP; i++) + __set_bit(i, kbd->keybit); + for (i = KEY_ALS_TOGGLE; i <= KEY_BRIGHTNESS_MENU; i++) __set_bit(i, kbd->keybit); ret = input_register_device(kbd); -- 2.38.1

8 months, 4 weeks

2
4
0 0

[PATCH v6 06/20] irqdomain: Fix mapping-creation race

by Johan Hovold

Parallel probing of devices that share interrupts (e.g. when a driver uses asynchronous probing) can currently result in two mappings for the same hardware interrupt to be created due to missing serialisation. Make sure to hold the irq_domain_mutex when creating mappings so that looking for an existing mapping before creating a new one is done atomically. Fixes: 765230b5f084 ("driver-core: add asynchronous probing support for drivers") Fixes: b62b2cf5759b ("irqdomain: Fix handling of type settings for existing mappings") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YuJXMHoT4ijUxnRb@hovoldconsulting.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.8 Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor(a)chromium.org> Cc: Jon Hunter <jonathanh(a)nvidia.com> Tested-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi(a)chromium.org> Tested-by: Mark-PK Tsai <mark-pk.tsai(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> --- kernel/irq/irqdomain.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c b/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c index 7b57949bc79c..bfda4adc05c0 100644 --- a/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c +++ b/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(irq_domain_mutex); static struct irq_domain *irq_default_domain; +static int irq_domain_alloc_irqs_locked(struct irq_domain *domain, int irq_base, + unsigned int nr_irqs, int node, void *arg, + bool realloc, const struct irq_affinity_desc *affinity); static void irq_domain_check_hierarchy(struct irq_domain *domain); struct irqchip_fwid { @@ -682,9 +685,9 @@ unsigned int irq_create_direct_mapping(struct irq_domain *domain) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(irq_create_direct_mapping); #endif -static unsigned int __irq_create_mapping_affinity(struct irq_domain *domain, - irq_hw_number_t hwirq, - const struct irq_affinity_desc *affinity) +static unsigned int irq_create_mapping_affinity_locked(struct irq_domain *domain, + irq_hw_number_t hwirq, + const struct irq_affinity_desc *affinity) { struct device_node *of_node = irq_domain_get_of_node(domain); int virq; @@ -699,7 +702,7 @@ static unsigned int __irq_create_mapping_affinity(struct irq_domain *domain, return 0; } - if (irq_domain_associate(domain, virq, hwirq)) { + if (irq_domain_associate_locked(domain, virq, hwirq)) { irq_free_desc(virq); return 0; } @@ -735,14 +738,20 @@ unsigned int irq_create_mapping_affinity(struct irq_domain *domain, return 0; } + mutex_lock(&irq_domain_mutex); + /* Check if mapping already exists */ virq = irq_find_mapping(domain, hwirq); if (virq) { pr_debug("existing mapping on virq %d\n", virq); - return virq; + goto out; } - return __irq_create_mapping_affinity(domain, hwirq, affinity); + virq = irq_create_mapping_affinity_locked(domain, hwirq, affinity); +out: + mutex_unlock(&irq_domain_mutex); + + return virq; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(irq_create_mapping_affinity); @@ -809,6 +818,8 @@ unsigned int irq_create_fwspec_mapping(struct irq_fwspec *fwspec) if (WARN_ON(type & ~IRQ_TYPE_SENSE_MASK)) type &= IRQ_TYPE_SENSE_MASK; + mutex_lock(&irq_domain_mutex); + /* * If we've already configured this interrupt, * don't do it again, or hell will break loose. @@ -821,7 +832,7 @@ unsigned int irq_create_fwspec_mapping(struct irq_fwspec *fwspec) * interrupt number. */ if (type == IRQ_TYPE_NONE || type == irq_get_trigger_type(virq)) - return virq; + goto out; /* * If the trigger type has not been set yet, then set @@ -829,35 +840,45 @@ unsigned int irq_create_fwspec_mapping(struct irq_fwspec *fwspec) */ if (irq_get_trigger_type(virq) == IRQ_TYPE_NONE) { irq_data = irq_get_irq_data(virq); - if (!irq_data) - return 0; + if (!irq_data) { + virq = 0; + goto out; + } irqd_set_trigger_type(irq_data, type); - return virq; + goto out; } pr_warn("type mismatch, failed to map hwirq-%lu for %s!\n", hwirq, of_node_full_name(to_of_node(fwspec->fwnode))); - return 0; + virq = 0; + goto out; } if (irq_domain_is_hierarchy(domain)) { - virq = irq_domain_alloc_irqs(domain, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, fwspec); - if (virq <= 0) - return 0; + virq = irq_domain_alloc_irqs_locked(domain, -1, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, + fwspec, false, NULL); + if (virq <= 0) { + virq = 0; + goto out; + } } else { /* Create mapping */ - virq = __irq_create_mapping_affinity(domain, hwirq, NULL); + virq = irq_create_mapping_affinity_locked(domain, hwirq, NULL); if (!virq) - return virq; + goto out; } irq_data = irq_get_irq_data(virq); - if (WARN_ON(!irq_data)) - return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!irq_data)) { + virq = 0; + goto out; + } /* Store trigger type */ irqd_set_trigger_type(irq_data, type); +out: + mutex_unlock(&irq_domain_mutex); return virq; } @@ -1888,6 +1909,13 @@ void irq_domain_set_info(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq, irq_set_handler_data(virq, handler_data); } +static int irq_domain_alloc_irqs_locked(struct irq_domain *domain, int irq_base, + unsigned int nr_irqs, int node, void *arg, + bool realloc, const struct irq_affinity_desc *affinity) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + static void irq_domain_check_hierarchy(struct irq_domain *domain) { } -- 2.39.1

8 months, 4 weeks

4
3
0 0

[PATCH] ext4: fix cgroup writeback accounting with fs-layer encryption

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> When writing a page from an encrypted file that is using filesystem-layer encryption (not inline encryption), ext4 encrypts the pagecache page into a bounce page, then writes the bounce page. It also passes the bounce page to wbc_account_cgroup_owner(). That's incorrect, because the bounce page is a newly allocated temporary page that doesn't have the memory cgroup of the original pagecache page. This makes wbc_account_cgroup_owner() not account the I/O to the owner of the pagecache page as it should. Fix this by always passing the pagecache page to wbc_account_cgroup_owner(). Fixes: 001e4a8775f6 ("ext4: implement cgroup writeback support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- fs/ext4/page-io.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/page-io.c b/fs/ext4/page-io.c index beaec6d81074a..1e4db96a04e63 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/page-io.c +++ b/fs/ext4/page-io.c @@ -409,7 +409,8 @@ static void io_submit_init_bio(struct ext4_io_submit *io, static void io_submit_add_bh(struct ext4_io_submit *io, struct inode *inode, - struct page *page, + struct page *pagecache_page, + struct page *bounce_page, struct buffer_head *bh) { int ret; @@ -421,10 +422,11 @@ static void io_submit_add_bh(struct ext4_io_submit *io, } if (io->io_bio == NULL) io_submit_init_bio(io, bh); - ret = bio_add_page(io->io_bio, page, bh->b_size, bh_offset(bh)); + ret = bio_add_page(io->io_bio, bounce_page ?: pagecache_page, + bh->b_size, bh_offset(bh)); if (ret != bh->b_size) goto submit_and_retry; - wbc_account_cgroup_owner(io->io_wbc, page, bh->b_size); + wbc_account_cgroup_owner(io->io_wbc, pagecache_page, bh->b_size); io->io_next_block++; } @@ -561,8 +563,7 @@ int ext4_bio_write_page(struct ext4_io_submit *io, do { if (!buffer_async_write(bh)) continue; - io_submit_add_bh(io, inode, - bounce_page ? bounce_page : page, bh); + io_submit_add_bh(io, inode, page, bounce_page, bh); } while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head); unlock: unlock_page(page); base-commit: 6d796c50f84ca79f1722bb131799e5a5710c4700 -- 2.39.1

8 months, 4 weeks

3
3
0 0

[PATCH] ath11k: allow system suspend to survive ath11k

by Len Brown

When ath11k runs into internal errors upon suspend, it returns an error code to pci_pm_suspend, which aborts the entire system suspend. The driver should not abort system suspend, but should keep its internal errors to itself, and allow the system to suspend. Otherwise, a user can suspend a laptop by closing the lid and sealing it into a case, assuming that is will suspend, rather than heating up and draining the battery when in transit. In practice, the ath11k device seems to have plenty of transient errors, and subsequent suspend cycles after this failure often succeed. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216968 Fixes: d1b0c33850d29 ("ath11k: implement suspend for QCA6390 PCI devices") Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown(a)intel.com> Cc: Carl Huang <cjhuang(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)codeaurora.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c index 99cf3357c66e..3c6005ab9a71 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/pci.c @@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ static __maybe_unused int ath11k_pci_pm_suspend(struct device *dev) if (ret) ath11k_warn(ab, "failed to suspend core: %d\n", ret); - return ret; + return 0; } static __maybe_unused int ath11k_pci_pm_resume(struct device *dev) -- 2.37.2

9 months

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[PATCH v2] scripts/tags.sh: fix incompatibility with PCRE2

by Carlos Llamas

Starting with release 10.38 PCRE2 drops default support for using \K in lookaround patterns as described in [1]. Unfortunately, scripts/tags.sh relies on such functionality to collect all_compiled_soures() leading to the following error: $ make COMPILED_SOURCE=1 tags GEN tags grep: \K is not allowed in lookarounds (but see PCRE2_EXTRA_ALLOW_LOOKAROUND_BSK) The usage of \K for this pattern was introduced in commit 4f491bb6ea2a ("scripts/tags.sh: collect compiled source precisely") which speeds up the generation of tags significantly. In order to fix this issue without compromising the performance we can switch over to an equivalent sed expression. The same matching pattern is preserved here except \K is replaced with a backreference \1. [1] https://www.pcre.org/current/doc/html/pcre2syntax.html#SEC11 Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea(a)collabora.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jialu Xu <xujialu(a)vimux.org> Cc: Vipin Sharma <vipinsh(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4f491bb6ea2a ("scripts/tags.sh: collect compiled source precisely") Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> --- v2: add Fixes tag and cc stable scripts/tags.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/tags.sh b/scripts/tags.sh index e137cf15aae9..0d045182c08c 100755 --- a/scripts/tags.sh +++ b/scripts/tags.sh @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ all_compiled_sources() { echo include/generated/autoconf.h find $ignore -name "*.cmd" -exec \ - grep -Poh '(?(?=^source_.* \K).*|(?=^ \K\S).*(?= \\))' {} \+ | + sed -n -E 's/^source_.* (.*)/\1/p; s/^ (\S.*) \\/\1/p' {} \+ | awk '!a[$0]++' } | xargs realpath -esq $([ -z "$KBUILD_ABS_SRCTREE" ] && echo --relative-to=.) | sort -u -- 2.39.1.637.g21b0678d19-goog

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Linux-stable-mirror February 2023