February 2023 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v3] tpm: disable hwrng for fTPM on some AMD designs

by Mario Limonciello

AMD has issued an advisory indicating that having fTPM enabled in BIOS can cause "stuttering" in the OS. This issue has been fixed in newer versions of the fTPM firmware, but it's up to system designers to decide whether to distribute it. This issue has existed for a while, but is more prevalent starting with kernel 6.1 because commit b006c439d58db ("hwrng: core - start hwrng kthread also for untrusted sources") started to use the fTPM for hwrng by default. However, all uses of /dev/hwrng result in unacceptable stuttering. So, simply disable registration of the defective hwrng when detecting these faulty fTPM versions. As this is caused by faulty firmware, it is plausible that such a problem could also be reproduced by other TPM interactions, but this hasn't been shown by any user's testing or reports. It is hypothesized to be triggered more frequently by the use of the RNG because userspace software will fetch random numbers regularly. Intentionally continue to register other TPM functionality so that users that rely upon PCR measurements or any storage of data will still have access to it. If it's found later that another TPM functionality is exacerbating this problem a module parameter it can be turned off entirely and a module parameter can be introduced to allow users who rely upon fTPM functionality to turn it on even though this problem is present. Link: https://www.amd.com/en/support/kb/faq/pa-410 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216989 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230209153120.261904-1-Jason@zx2c4.com/ Fixes: b006c439d58d ("hwrng: core - start hwrng kthread also for untrusted sources") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions(a)leemhuis.info> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley(a)hansenpartnership.com> Tested-by: reach622(a)mailcuk.com Tested-by: Bell <1138267643(a)qq.com> Co-developed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com> --- v2->v3: * Revert extra curl braces back to behavior in v1 * Remove needless goto * Pick up 2 tested tags --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 741d8f3e8fb3..c467eeae9973 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -512,6 +512,63 @@ static int tpm_add_legacy_sysfs(struct tpm_chip *chip) return 0; } +/* + * Some AMD fTPM versions may cause stutter + * https://www.amd.com/en/support/kb/faq/pa-410 + * + * Fixes are available in two series of fTPM firmware: + * 6.x.y.z series: 6.0.18.6 + + * 3.x.y.z series: 3.57.y.5 + + */ +static bool tpm_amd_is_rng_defective(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + u32 val1, val2; + u64 version; + int ret; + + if (!(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) + return false; + + ret = tpm_request_locality(chip); + if (ret) + return false; + + ret = tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, TPM2_PT_MANUFACTURER, &val1, NULL); + if (ret) + goto release; + if (val1 != 0x414D4400U /* AMD */) { + ret = -ENODEV; + goto release; + } + ret = tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, TPM2_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1, &val1, NULL); + if (ret) + goto release; + ret = tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, TPM2_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2, &val2, NULL); + +release: + tpm_relinquish_locality(chip); + + if (ret) + return false; + + version = ((u64)val1 << 32) | val2; + if ((version >> 48) == 6) { + if (version >= 0x0006000000180006ULL) + return false; + } else if ((version >> 48) == 3) { + if (version >= 0x0003005700000005ULL) + return false; + } else { + return false; + } + + dev_warn(&chip->dev, + "AMD fTPM version 0x%llx causes system stutter; hwrng disabled\n", + version); + + return true; +} + static int tpm_hwrng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait) { struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(rng, struct tpm_chip, hwrng); @@ -521,7 +578,8 @@ static int tpm_hwrng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *data, size_t max, bool wait) static int tpm_add_hwrng(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_TPM) || tpm_is_firmware_upgrade(chip)) + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_TPM) || tpm_is_firmware_upgrade(chip) || + tpm_amd_is_rng_defective(chip)) return 0; snprintf(chip->hwrng_name, sizeof(chip->hwrng_name), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 24ee4e1cc452..830014a26609 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -150,6 +150,79 @@ enum tpm_sub_capabilities { TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = 0x120, }; +enum tpm2_pt_props { + TPM2_PT_NONE = 0x00000000, + TPM2_PT_GROUP = 0x00000100, + TPM2_PT_FIXED = TPM2_PT_GROUP * 1, + TPM2_PT_FAMILY_INDICATOR = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 0, + TPM2_PT_LEVEL = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 1, + TPM2_PT_REVISION = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 2, + TPM2_PT_DAY_OF_YEAR = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 3, + TPM2_PT_YEAR = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 4, + TPM2_PT_MANUFACTURER = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 5, + TPM2_PT_VENDOR_STRING_1 = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 6, + TPM2_PT_VENDOR_STRING_2 = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 7, + TPM2_PT_VENDOR_STRING_3 = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 8, + TPM2_PT_VENDOR_STRING_4 = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 9, + TPM2_PT_VENDOR_TPM_TYPE = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 10, + TPM2_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1 = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 11, + TPM2_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_2 = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 12, + TPM2_PT_INPUT_BUFFER = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 13, + TPM2_PT_HR_TRANSIENT_MIN = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 14, + TPM2_PT_HR_PERSISTENT_MIN = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 15, + TPM2_PT_HR_LOADED_MIN = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 16, + TPM2_PT_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_MAX = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 17, + TPM2_PT_PCR_COUNT = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 18, + TPM2_PT_PCR_SELECT_MIN = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 19, + TPM2_PT_CONTEXT_GAP_MAX = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 20, + TPM2_PT_NV_COUNTERS_MAX = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 22, + TPM2_PT_NV_INDEX_MAX = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 23, + TPM2_PT_MEMORY = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 24, + TPM2_PT_CLOCK_UPDATE = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 25, + TPM2_PT_CONTEXT_HASH = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 26, + TPM2_PT_CONTEXT_SYM = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 27, + TPM2_PT_CONTEXT_SYM_SIZE = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 28, + TPM2_PT_ORDERLY_COUNT = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 29, + TPM2_PT_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 30, + TPM2_PT_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 31, + TPM2_PT_MAX_DIGEST = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 32, + TPM2_PT_MAX_OBJECT_CONTEXT = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 33, + TPM2_PT_MAX_SESSION_CONTEXT = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 34, + TPM2_PT_PS_FAMILY_INDICATOR = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 35, + TPM2_PT_PS_LEVEL = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 36, + TPM2_PT_PS_REVISION = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 37, + TPM2_PT_PS_DAY_OF_YEAR = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 38, + TPM2_PT_PS_YEAR = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 39, + TPM2_PT_SPLIT_MAX = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 40, + TPM2_PT_TOTAL_COMMANDS = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 41, + TPM2_PT_LIBRARY_COMMANDS = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 42, + TPM2_PT_VENDOR_COMMANDS = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 43, + TPM2_PT_NV_BUFFER_MAX = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 44, + TPM2_PT_MODES = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 45, + TPM2_PT_MAX_CAP_BUFFER = TPM2_PT_FIXED + 46, + TPM2_PT_VAR = TPM2_PT_GROUP * 2, + TPM2_PT_PERMANENT = TPM2_PT_VAR + 0, + TPM2_PT_STARTUP_CLEAR = TPM2_PT_VAR + 1, + TPM2_PT_HR_NV_INDEX = TPM2_PT_VAR + 2, + TPM2_PT_HR_LOADED = TPM2_PT_VAR + 3, + TPM2_PT_HR_LOADED_AVAIL = TPM2_PT_VAR + 4, + TPM2_PT_HR_ACTIVE = TPM2_PT_VAR + 5, + TPM2_PT_HR_ACTIVE_AVAIL = TPM2_PT_VAR + 6, + TPM2_PT_HR_TRANSIENT_AVAIL = TPM2_PT_VAR + 7, + TPM2_PT_HR_PERSISTENT = TPM2_PT_VAR + 8, + TPM2_PT_HR_PERSISTENT_AVAIL = TPM2_PT_VAR + 9, + TPM2_PT_NV_COUNTERS = TPM2_PT_VAR + 10, + TPM2_PT_NV_COUNTERS_AVAIL = TPM2_PT_VAR + 11, + TPM2_PT_ALGORITHM_SET = TPM2_PT_VAR + 12, + TPM2_PT_LOADED_CURVES = TPM2_PT_VAR + 13, + TPM2_PT_LOCKOUT_COUNTER = TPM2_PT_VAR + 14, + TPM2_PT_MAX_AUTH_FAIL = TPM2_PT_VAR + 15, + TPM2_PT_LOCKOUT_INTERVAL = TPM2_PT_VAR + 16, + TPM2_PT_LOCKOUT_RECOVERY = TPM2_PT_VAR + 17, + TPM2_PT_NV_WRITE_RECOVERY = TPM2_PT_VAR + 18, + TPM2_PT_AUDIT_COUNTER_0 = TPM2_PT_VAR + 19, + TPM2_PT_AUDIT_COUNTER_1 = TPM2_PT_VAR + 20, +}; /* 128 bytes is an arbitrary cap. This could be as large as TPM_BUFSIZE - 18 * bytes, but 128 is still a relatively large number of random bytes and -- 2.34.1

1 year, 1 month

5
10
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tracing: Free buffers when a used dynamic event is removed" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. Possible dependencies: 4313e5a61304 ("tracing: Free buffers when a used dynamic event is removed") 5448d44c3855 ("tracing: Add unified dynamic event framework") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 4313e5a613049dfc1819a6dfb5f94cf2caff9452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2022 17:14:34 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] tracing: Free buffers when a used dynamic event is removed MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit After 65536 dynamic events have been added and removed, the "type" field of the event then uses the first type number that is available (not currently used by other events). A type number is the identifier of the binary blobs in the tracing ring buffer (known as events) to map them to logic that can parse the binary blob. The issue is that if a dynamic event (like a kprobe event) is traced and is in the ring buffer, and then that event is removed (because it is dynamic, which means it can be created and destroyed), if another dynamic event is created that has the same number that new event's logic on parsing the binary blob will be used. To show how this can be an issue, the following can crash the kernel: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # for i in `seq 65536`; do echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 $arg1:u32' > kprobe_events # done For every iteration of the above, the writing to the kprobe_events will remove the old event and create a new one (with the same format) and increase the type number to the next available on until the type number reaches over 65535 which is the max number for the 16 bit type. After it reaches that number, the logic to allocate a new number simply looks for the next available number. When an dynamic event is removed, that number is then available to be reused by the next dynamic event created. That is, once the above reaches the max number, the number assigned to the event in that loop will remain the same. Now that means deleting one dynamic event and created another will reuse the previous events type number. This is where bad things can happen. After the above loop finishes, the kprobes/foo event which reads the do_sys_openat2 function call's first parameter as an integer. # echo 1 > kprobes/foo/enable # cat /etc/passwd > /dev/null # cat trace cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849603: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196 cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849620: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196 cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849838: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196 cat-2211 [005] .... 2007.849880: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x130) arg1=4294967196 # echo 0 > kprobes/foo/enable Now if we delete the kprobe and create a new one that reads a string: # echo 'p:kprobes/foo do_sys_openat2 +0($arg2):string' > kprobe_events And now we can the trace: # cat trace sendmail-1942 [002] ..... 530.136320: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1= cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.930817: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��" cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.930961: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��" cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.934278: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��" cat-2046 [004] ..... 530.934563: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="��" bash-1515 [007] ..... 534.299093: foo: (do_sys_openat2+0x0/0x240) arg1="kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk��@��4Z��;Y��U And dmesg has: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in string+0xd4/0x1c0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88805fdbbfa0 by task cat/2049 CPU: 0 PID: 2049 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-test+ #641 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x77 print_report+0x17f/0x47b kasan_report+0xad/0x130 string+0xd4/0x1c0 vsnprintf+0x500/0x840 seq_buf_vprintf+0x62/0xc0 trace_seq_printf+0x10e/0x1e0 print_type_string+0x90/0xa0 print_kprobe_event+0x16b/0x290 print_trace_line+0x451/0x8e0 s_show+0x72/0x1f0 seq_read_iter+0x58e/0x750 seq_read+0x115/0x160 vfs_read+0x11d/0x460 ksys_read+0xa9/0x130 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fc2e972ade2 Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d b2 3f 0a 00 e8 05 f0 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffc64e687c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007fc2e972ade2 RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007fc2e980d000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fc2e980d000 R08: 00007fc2e980c010 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020f00 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea00017f6ec0 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x5fdbb flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea00017f6ec8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88805fdbbe80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88805fdbbf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff88805fdbbf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff88805fdbc000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88805fdbc080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== This was found when Zheng Yejian sent a patch to convert the event type number assignment to use IDA, which gives the next available number, and this bug showed up in the fuzz testing by Yujie Liu and the kernel test robot. But after further analysis, I found that this behavior is the same as when the event type numbers go past the 16bit max (and the above shows that). As modules have a similar issue, but is dealt with by setting a "WAS_ENABLED" flag when a module event is enabled, and when the module is freed, if any of its events were enabled, the ring buffer that holds that event is also cleared, to prevent reading stale events. The same can be done for dynamic events. If any dynamic event that is being removed was enabled, then make sure the buffers they were enabled in are now cleared. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221123171434.545706e3@gandalf.local.home Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221110020319.1259291-1-zhengyejian1@huawei.co… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Depends-on: e18eb8783ec49 ("tracing: Add tracing_reset_all_online_cpus_unlocked() function") Depends-on: 5448d44c38557 ("tracing: Add unified dynamic event framework") Depends-on: 6212dd29683ee ("tracing/kprobes: Use dyn_event framework for kprobe events") Depends-on: 065e63f951432 ("tracing: Only have rmmod clear buffers that its events were active in") Depends-on: 575380da8b469 ("tracing: Only clear trace buffer on module unload if event was traced") Fixes: 77b44d1b7c283 ("tracing/kprobes: Rename Kprobe-tracer to kprobe-event") Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Reported-by: Yujie Liu <yujie.liu(a)intel.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <yujie.liu(a)intel.com> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_dynevent.c b/kernel/trace/trace_dynevent.c index 154996684fb5..4376887e0d8a 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_dynevent.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_dynevent.c @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ int dyn_event_release(const char *raw_command, struct dyn_event_operations *type if (ret) break; } + tracing_reset_all_online_cpus(); mutex_unlock(&event_mutex); out: argv_free(argv); @@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ int dyn_events_release_all(struct dyn_event_operations *type) break; } out: + tracing_reset_all_online_cpus(); mutex_unlock(&event_mutex); return ret; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c index 78cd19e31dba..f71ea6e79b3c 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c @@ -2880,7 +2880,10 @@ static int probe_remove_event_call(struct trace_event_call *call) * TRACE_REG_UNREGISTER. */ if (file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_ENABLED) - return -EBUSY; + goto busy; + + if (file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_WAS_ENABLED) + tr->clear_trace = true; /* * The do_for_each_event_file_safe() is * a double loop. After finding the call for this @@ -2893,6 +2896,12 @@ static int probe_remove_event_call(struct trace_event_call *call) __trace_remove_event_call(call); return 0; + busy: + /* No need to clear the trace now */ + list_for_each_entry(tr, &ftrace_trace_arrays, list) { + tr->clear_trace = false; + } + return -EBUSY; } /* Remove an event_call */

1 year, 1 month

4
7
0 0

[PATCH] pwm: core: Zero-initialize the temp state

by Munehisa Kamata

Zero-initialize the on-stack structure to avoid unexpected behaviors. Some drivers may not set or initialize all the values in pwm_state through their .get_state() callback and therefore some random values may remain there and be set into pwm->state eventually. This actually caused regression on ODROID-N2+ as reported in [1]; kernel fails to boot due to random panic or hang-up. [1] https://forum.odroid.com/viewtopic.php?f=177&t=46360 Fixes: c73a3107624d ("pwm: Handle .get_state() failures") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.2 Signed-off-by: Munehisa Kamata <kamatam(a)amazon.com> --- drivers/pwm/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/pwm/core.c b/drivers/pwm/core.c index e01147f66e15..6eac8022a2c2 100644 --- a/drivers/pwm/core.c +++ b/drivers/pwm/core.c @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ static int pwm_device_request(struct pwm_device *pwm, const char *label) if (pwm->chip->ops->get_state) { struct pwm_state state; + memset(&state, 0, sizeof(struct pwm_state)); err = pwm->chip->ops->get_state(pwm->chip, pwm, &state); trace_pwm_get(pwm, &state, err); -- 2.25.1

1 year, 1 month

2
9
0 0

[PATCH] Fix data race in mark_rt_mutex_waiters

by Hernan Ponce de Leon

From: Hernan Ponce de Leon <hernanl.leon(a)huawei.com> Following the defition of data race in tools/memory-model/linux-kernel.cat the dartagnan tool https://github.com/hernanponcedeleon/Dat3M reported a race between mark_rt_mutex_waiters and rt_mutex_cmpxchg_release. Commit 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core") later removed in commit d0aa7a70bf03 ("futex_requeue_pi optimization") and reverted in commit bd197234b0a6 ("Revert "futex_requeue_pi optimization"") The original commit introduced the data race. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v2.6.18.x Fixes: 23f78d4a03c5 ("[PATCH] pi-futex: rt mutex core") Signed-off-by: Hernan Ponce de Leon <hernanl.leon(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c index 010cf4e6d0b8..7ed9472edd48 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static __always_inline void mark_rt_mutex_waiters(struct rt_mutex_base *lock) unsigned long owner, *p = (unsigned long *) &lock->owner; do { - owner = *p; + owner = READ_ONCE(*p); } while (cmpxchg_relaxed(p, owner, owner | RT_MUTEX_HAS_WAITERS) != owner); -- 2.25.1

1 year, 1 month

9
23
0 0

[PATCH v2] crypto: testmgr - fix RNG performance in fuzz tests

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> The performance of the crypto fuzz tests has greatly regressed since v5.18. When booting a kernel on an arm64 dev board with all software crypto algorithms and CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS enabled, the fuzz tests now take about 200 seconds to run, or about 325 seconds with lockdep enabled, compared to about 5 seconds before. The root cause is that the random number generation has become much slower due to commit d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness"). On my same arm64 dev board, at the time the fuzz tests are run, get_random_u8() is about 345x slower than prandom_u32_state(), or about 469x if lockdep is enabled. Lockdep makes a big difference, but much of the rest comes from the get_random_*() functions taking a *very* slow path when the CRNG is not yet initialized. Since the crypto self-tests run early during boot, even having a hardware RNG driver enabled (CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCOM_RNG in my case) doesn't prevent this. x86 systems don't have this issue, but they still see a significant regression if lockdep is enabled. Converting the "Fully random bytes" case in generate_random_bytes() to use get_random_bytes() helps significantly, improving the test time to about 27 seconds. But that's still over 5x slower than before. This is all a bit silly, though, since the fuzz tests don't actually need cryptographically secure random numbers. So let's just make them use a non-cryptographically-secure RNG as they did before. The original prandom_u32() is gone now, so let's use prandom_u32_state() instead, with an explicitly managed state, like various other self-tests in the kernel source tree (rbtree_test.c, test_scanf.c, etc.) already do. This also has the benefit that no locking is required anymore, so performance should be even better than the original version that used prandom_u32(). Fixes: d4150779e60f ("random32: use real rng for non-deterministic randomness") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- v2: made init_rnd_state() use get_random_u64() crypto/testmgr.c | 266 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 169 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index c91e93ece20b..b160eeb12c8e 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -860,12 +860,50 @@ static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS +/* + * The fuzz tests use prandom instead of the normal Linux RNG since they don't + * need cryptographically secure random numbers. This greatly improves the + * performance of these tests, especially if they are run before the Linux RNG + * has been initialized or if they are run on a lockdep-enabled kernel. + */ + +static inline void init_rnd_state(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + prandom_seed_state(rng, get_random_u64()); +} + +static inline u8 prandom_u8(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + return prandom_u32_state(rng); +} + +static inline u32 prandom_u32_below(struct rnd_state *rng, u32 ceil) +{ + /* + * This is slightly biased for non-power-of-2 values of 'ceil', but this + * isn't important here. + */ + return prandom_u32_state(rng) % ceil; +} + +static inline bool prandom_bool(struct rnd_state *rng) +{ + return prandom_u32_below(rng, 2); +} + +static inline u32 prandom_u32_inclusive(struct rnd_state *rng, + u32 floor, u32 ceil) +{ + return floor + prandom_u32_below(rng, ceil - floor + 1); +} + /* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */ -static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) +static unsigned int generate_random_length(struct rnd_state *rng, + unsigned int max_len) { - unsigned int len = get_random_u32_below(max_len + 1); + unsigned int len = prandom_u32_below(rng, max_len + 1); - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: return len % 64; case 1: @@ -878,43 +916,44 @@ static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len) } /* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void flip_random_bit(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void flip_random_bit(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { size_t bitpos; - bitpos = get_random_u32_below(size * 8); + bitpos = prandom_u32_below(rng, size * 8); buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8); } /* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void flip_random_byte(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void flip_random_byte(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { - buf[get_random_u32_below(size)] ^= 0xff; + buf[prandom_u32_below(rng, size)] ^= 0xff; } /* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */ -static void mutate_buffer(u8 *buf, size_t size) +static void mutate_buffer(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size) { size_t num_flips; size_t i; /* Sometimes flip some bits */ - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) { - num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << get_random_u32_below(8), size * 8); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), + size * 8); for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) - flip_random_bit(buf, size); + flip_random_bit(rng, buf, size); } /* Sometimes flip some bytes */ - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) { - num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << get_random_u32_below(8), size); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) { + num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), size); for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++) - flip_random_byte(buf, size); + flip_random_byte(rng, buf, size); } } /* Randomly generate 'count' bytes, but sometimes make them "interesting" */ -static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) +static void generate_random_bytes(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t count) { u8 b; u8 increment; @@ -923,11 +962,11 @@ static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) if (count == 0) return; - switch (get_random_u32_below(8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */ case 0: case 1: /* All the same byte, plus optional mutations */ - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: b = 0x00; break; @@ -935,28 +974,28 @@ static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count) b = 0xff; break; default: - b = get_random_u8(); + b = prandom_u8(rng); break; } memset(buf, b, count); - mutate_buffer(buf, count); + mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count); break; case 2: /* Ascending or descending bytes, plus optional mutations */ - increment = get_random_u8(); - b = get_random_u8(); + increment = prandom_u8(rng); + b = prandom_u8(rng); for (i = 0; i < count; i++, b += increment) buf[i] = b; - mutate_buffer(buf, count); + mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count); break; default: /* Fully random bytes */ - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) - buf[i] = get_random_u8(); + prandom_bytes_state(rng, buf, count); } } -static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, +static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct test_sg_division *divs, size_t max_divs, char *p, char *end, bool gen_flushes, u32 req_flags) { @@ -967,24 +1006,26 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, unsigned int this_len; const char *flushtype_str; - if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_bool(rng)) this_len = remaining; else - this_len = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, remaining); + this_len = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, remaining); div->proportion_of_total = this_len; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - div->offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(PAGE_SIZE - 128, PAGE_SIZE - 1); - else if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) - div->offset = get_random_u32_below(32); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, + PAGE_SIZE - 128, + PAGE_SIZE - 1); + else if (prandom_bool(rng)) + div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, 32); else - div->offset = get_random_u32_below(PAGE_SIZE); - if (get_random_u32_below(8) == 0) + div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, PAGE_SIZE); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8) == 0) div->offset_relative_to_alignmask = true; div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_NONE; if (gen_flushes) { - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT; break; @@ -996,7 +1037,7 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, if (div->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE && !(req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && - get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + prandom_bool(rng)) div->nosimd = true; switch (div->flush_type) { @@ -1031,7 +1072,8 @@ static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs, } /* Generate a random testvec_config for fuzz testing */ -static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, +static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct testvec_config *cfg, char *name, size_t max_namelen) { char *p = name; @@ -1043,7 +1085,7 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "random:"); - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: case 1: cfg->inplace_mode = OUT_OF_PLACE; @@ -1058,12 +1100,12 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, break; } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { cfg->req_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " may_sleep"); } - switch (get_random_u32_below(4)) { + switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) { case 0: cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_final"); @@ -1078,36 +1120,37 @@ static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg, break; } - if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && - get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && prandom_bool(rng)) { cfg->nosimd = true; p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd"); } p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=["); - p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->src_divs, + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->src_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), p, end, (cfg->finalization_type != FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST), cfg->req_flags); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); - if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && prandom_bool(rng)) { p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " dst_divs=["); - p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->dst_divs, + p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->dst_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), p, end, false, cfg->req_flags); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]"); } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { - cfg->iv_offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { + cfg->iv_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset); } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { - cfg->key_offset = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { + cfg->key_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, + MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK); p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset); } @@ -1620,11 +1663,14 @@ static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_hash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); @@ -1642,15 +1688,16 @@ static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num, * Generate a hash test vector from the given implementation. * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. */ -static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, +static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct shash_desc *desc, struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int maxkeysize, unsigned int maxdatasize, char *name, size_t max_namelen) { /* Data */ - vec->psize = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); + vec->psize = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize); /* * Key: length in range [1, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize. @@ -1660,9 +1707,9 @@ static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc, vec->ksize = 0; if (maxkeysize) { vec->ksize = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->ksize = get_random_u32_inclusive(1, maxkeysize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->ksize = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, maxkeysize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize); vec->setkey_error = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize); @@ -1696,6 +1743,7 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; const char *algname = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_name; const char *driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm); + struct rnd_state rng; char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct crypto_shash *generic_tfm = NULL; struct shash_desc *generic_desc = NULL; @@ -1709,6 +1757,8 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, if (noextratests) return 0; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); if (err) @@ -1777,10 +1827,11 @@ static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, } for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_hash_testvec(generic_desc, &vec, + generate_random_hash_testvec(&rng, generic_desc, &vec, maxkeysize, maxdatasize, vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); - generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_hash_vec_cfg(&vec, vec_name, cfg, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate); @@ -2182,11 +2233,14 @@ static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_aead_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, tsgls); @@ -2202,6 +2256,7 @@ static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { + struct rnd_state rng; struct aead_request *req; struct crypto_aead *tfm; const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc; @@ -2220,24 +2275,26 @@ struct aead_extra_tests_ctx { * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag. The * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty. */ -static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, +static void mutate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, unsigned int ivsize) { const unsigned int aad_tail_size = aad_iv ? ivsize : 0; const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0 && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { + if (prandom_bool(rng) && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) { /* Mutate the AAD */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen - aad_tail_size); - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, + vec->alen - aad_tail_size); + if (prandom_bool(rng)) return; } - if (get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (prandom_bool(rng)) { /* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize); } else { /* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */ - flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); } } @@ -2248,7 +2305,8 @@ static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv, */ #define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8 -static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, +static void generate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_request *req, const struct aead_test_suite *suite, struct aead_testvec *vec, bool prefer_inauthentic) @@ -2257,17 +2315,18 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen; const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) && - (prefer_inauthentic || get_random_u32_below(4) == 0); + (prefer_inauthentic || + prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0); /* Generate the AAD. */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen); if (suite->aad_iv && vec->alen >= ivsize) /* Avoid implementation-defined behavior. */ memcpy((u8 *)vec->assoc + vec->alen - ivsize, vec->iv, ivsize); - if (inauthentic && get_random_u32_below(2) == 0) { + if (inauthentic && prandom_bool(rng)) { /* Generate a random ciphertext. */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen); } else { int i = 0; struct scatterlist src[2], dst; @@ -2279,7 +2338,7 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, if (vec->alen) sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen); if (vec->plen) { - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen); sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen); } sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen); @@ -2299,7 +2358,7 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an * inauthentic one. */ - mutate_aead_message(vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); + mutate_aead_message(rng, vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize); } vec->novrfy = 1; if (suite->einval_allowed) @@ -2313,7 +2372,8 @@ static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req, * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often. */ -static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, +static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct aead_request *req, struct aead_testvec *vec, const struct aead_test_suite *suite, unsigned int maxkeysize, @@ -2329,18 +2389,18 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ vec->klen = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->klen = get_random_u32_below(maxkeysize + 1); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); vec->setkey_error = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); /* IV */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); /* Tag length: in [0, maxauthsize], but usually choose maxauthsize */ authsize = maxauthsize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - authsize = get_random_u32_below(maxauthsize + 1); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + authsize = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxauthsize + 1); if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE; if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize)) @@ -2349,11 +2409,11 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize); /* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */ - total_len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) + total_len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) vec->alen = 0; else - vec->alen = generate_random_length(total_len); + vec->alen = generate_random_length(rng, total_len); vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen; vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize; @@ -2364,7 +2424,7 @@ static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req, vec->novrfy = 0; vec->crypt_error = 0; if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0) - generate_aead_message(req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); + generate_aead_message(rng, req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic); snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"", vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy); @@ -2376,7 +2436,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec( int i; for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { - generate_random_aead_testvec(ctx->req, &ctx->vec, + generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, ctx->req, &ctx->vec, &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, ctx->vec_name, @@ -2407,7 +2467,8 @@ static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) */ try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx); if (ctx->vec.novrfy) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->cfgname, sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); err = test_aead_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &ctx->vec, ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg, @@ -2497,12 +2558,13 @@ static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx) * the other implementation against them. */ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_aead_testvec(generic_req, &ctx->vec, + generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, generic_req, &ctx->vec, &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead, ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize, ctx->vec_name, sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false); - generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg, + ctx->cfgname, sizeof(ctx->cfgname)); if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) { err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec, @@ -2541,6 +2603,7 @@ static int test_aead_extra(const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc, ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx) return -ENOMEM; + init_rnd_state(&ctx->rng); ctx->req = req; ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); ctx->test_desc = test_desc; @@ -2930,11 +2993,14 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec, #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS if (!noextratests) { + struct rnd_state rng; struct testvec_config cfg; char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN]; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) { - generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname, + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name, &cfg, req, tsgls); @@ -2952,7 +3018,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec, * Generate a symmetric cipher test vector from the given implementation. * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated. */ -static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, +static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng, + struct skcipher_request *req, struct cipher_testvec *vec, unsigned int maxdatasize, char *name, size_t max_namelen) @@ -2966,17 +3033,17 @@ static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req, /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */ vec->klen = maxkeysize; - if (get_random_u32_below(4) == 0) - vec->klen = get_random_u32_below(maxkeysize + 1); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); + if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) + vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen); vec->setkey_error = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen); /* IV */ - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize); /* Plaintext */ - vec->len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize); - generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); + vec->len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize); + generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len); /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to encrypt. */ if (vec->setkey_error) @@ -3018,6 +3085,7 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN; const char *algname = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name; const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm); + struct rnd_state rng; char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct crypto_skcipher *generic_tfm = NULL; struct skcipher_request *generic_req = NULL; @@ -3035,6 +3103,8 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, if (strncmp(algname, "kw(", 3) == 0) return 0; + init_rnd_state(&rng); + if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver); if (err) @@ -3119,9 +3189,11 @@ static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver, } for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) { - generate_random_cipher_testvec(generic_req, &vec, maxdatasize, + generate_random_cipher_testvec(&rng, generic_req, &vec, + maxdatasize, vec_name, sizeof(vec_name)); - generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname)); + generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname, + sizeof(cfgname)); err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name, cfg, req, tsgls); base-commit: 2fcd07b7ccd5fd10b2120d298363e4e6c53ccf9c -- 2.39.2

1 year, 1 month

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs - fix crash with CFI enabled

by Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> aesbs_ecb_encrypt(), aesbs_ecb_decrypt(), aesbs_xts_encrypt(), and aesbs_xts_decrypt() are called via indirect function calls. Therefore they need to use SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START instead of SYM_FUNC_START to cause their type hashes to be emitted when the kernel is built with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y. Otherwise, the code crashes with a CFI failure if the compiler doesn't happen to optimize out the indirect calls. Fixes: c50d32859e70 ("arm64: Add types to indirect called assembly functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)google.com> --- arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S index 7278a37c2d5c..baf450717b24 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-core.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/cfi_types.h> #include <asm/assembler.h> .text @@ -620,12 +621,12 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_decrypt8) .endm .align 4 -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) __ecb_crypt aesbs_encrypt8, v0, v1, v4, v6, v3, v7, v2, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_ecb_encrypt) .align 4 -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) __ecb_crypt aesbs_decrypt8, v0, v1, v6, v4, v2, v7, v3, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_ecb_decrypt) @@ -799,11 +800,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(__xts_crypt8) ret .endm -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_encrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_encrypt) __xts_crypt aesbs_encrypt8, v0, v1, v4, v6, v3, v7, v2, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_xts_encrypt) -SYM_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_decrypt) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aesbs_xts_decrypt) __xts_crypt aesbs_decrypt8, v0, v1, v6, v4, v2, v7, v3, v5 SYM_FUNC_END(aesbs_xts_decrypt) base-commit: f3a2439f20d918930cc4ae8f76fe1c1afd26958f -- 2.39.2

1 year, 1 month

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] drm/i915: Preserve crtc_state->inherited during state clearing

by Ville Syrjala

From: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> intel_crtc_prepare_cleared_state() is unintentionally losing the "inherited" flag. This will happen if intel_initial_commit() is forced to go through the full modeset calculations for whatever reason. Afterwards the first real commit from userspace will not get forced to the full modeset path, and thus eg. audio state may not get recomputed properly. So if the monitor was already enabled during boot audio will not work until userspace itself does an explicit full modeset. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Lee Shawn C <shawn.c.lee(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c index a1fbdf32bd21..ed95c0acfaae 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c @@ -5078,6 +5078,7 @@ intel_crtc_prepare_cleared_state(struct intel_atomic_state *state, * only fields that are know to not cause problems are preserved. */ saved_state->uapi = crtc_state->uapi; + saved_state->inherited = crtc_state->inherited; saved_state->scaler_state = crtc_state->scaler_state; saved_state->shared_dpll = crtc_state->shared_dpll; saved_state->dpll_hw_state = crtc_state->dpll_hw_state; -- 2.39.2

1 year, 1 month

2
1
0 0

[PATCH] PCI: kirin: Select REGMAP_MMIO for PCIE_KIRIN

by Xi Ruoyao

pcie-kirin.c invokes devm_regmap_init_mmio, so it's necessary to select REGMAP_MMIO or vmlinux fails to link with "undefined reference to `__devm_regmap_init_mmio_clk`. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # at least for 6.1 and 6.2 Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111(a)xry111.site> --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig index 434f6a4f4041..d29551261e80 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/Kconfig @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ config PCIE_KIRIN tristate "HiSilicon Kirin series SoCs PCIe controllers" depends on PCI_MSI select PCIE_DW_HOST + select REGMAP_MMIO help Say Y here if you want PCIe controller support on HiSilicon Kirin series SoCs. -- 2.39.2

1 year, 1 month

2
3
0 0

[PATCH v2] Input: xen-kbdfront - drop keys to shrink modalias

by Jason Andryuk

xen kbdfront registers itself as being able to deliver *any* key since it doesn't know what keys the backend may produce. Unfortunately, the generated modalias gets too large and uevent creation fails with -ENOMEM. This can lead to gdm not using the keyboard since there is no seat associated [1] and the debian installer crashing [2]. Trim the ranges of key capabilities by removing some BTN_* ranges. While doing this, some neighboring undefined ranges are removed to trim it further. An upper limit of KEY_KBD_LCD_MENU5 is still too large. Use an upper limit of KEY_BRIGHTNESS_MENU. This removes: BTN_DPAD_UP(0x220)..BTN_DPAD_RIGHT(0x223) Empty space 0x224..0x229 Empty space 0x28a..0x28f KEY_MACRO1(0x290)..KEY_MACRO30(0x2ad) KEY_MACRO_RECORD_START 0x2b0 KEY_MACRO_RECORD_STOP 0x2b1 KEY_MACRO_PRESET_CYCLE 0x2b2 KEY_MACRO_PRESET1(0x2b3)..KEY_MACRO_PRESET3(0xb5) Empty space 0x2b6..0x2b7 KEY_KBD_LCD_MENU1(0x2b8)..KEY_KBD_LCD_MENU5(0x2bc) Empty space 0x2bd..0x2bf BTN_TRIGGER_HAPPY(0x2c0)..BTN_TRIGGER_HAPPY40(0x2e7) Empty space 0x2e8..0x2ff The modalias shrinks from 2082 to 1550 bytes. A chunk of keys need to be removed to allow the keyboard to be used. This may break some functionality, but the hope is these macro keys are uncommon and don't affect any users. [1] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/22944 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/xen-devel/87o8dw52jc.fsf@vps.thesusis.net/T/ Cc: Phillip Susi <phill(a)thesusis.net> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) v2: Remove more keys: v1 didn't remove enough and modalias was still broken. diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c b/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c index 8d8ebdc2039b..4ecb579df748 100644 --- a/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c +++ b/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c @@ -256,7 +256,14 @@ static int xenkbd_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev, __set_bit(EV_KEY, kbd->evbit); for (i = KEY_ESC; i < KEY_UNKNOWN; i++) __set_bit(i, kbd->keybit); - for (i = KEY_OK; i < KEY_MAX; i++) + /* In theory we want to go KEY_OK..KEY_MAX, but that grows the + * modalias line too long. There is a gap of buttons from + * BTN_DPAD_UP..BTN_DPAD_RIGHT and KEY_ALS_TOGGLE is the next + * defined. Then continue up to KEY_BRIGHTNESS_MENU as an upper + * limit. */ + for (i = KEY_OK; i < BTN_DPAD_UP; i++) + __set_bit(i, kbd->keybit); + for (i = KEY_ALS_TOGGLE; i <= KEY_BRIGHTNESS_MENU; i++) __set_bit(i, kbd->keybit); ret = input_register_device(kbd); -- 2.38.1

1 year, 1 month

2
4
0 0

[PATCH v6 06/20] irqdomain: Fix mapping-creation race

by Johan Hovold

Parallel probing of devices that share interrupts (e.g. when a driver uses asynchronous probing) can currently result in two mappings for the same hardware interrupt to be created due to missing serialisation. Make sure to hold the irq_domain_mutex when creating mappings so that looking for an existing mapping before creating a new one is done atomically. Fixes: 765230b5f084 ("driver-core: add asynchronous probing support for drivers") Fixes: b62b2cf5759b ("irqdomain: Fix handling of type settings for existing mappings") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YuJXMHoT4ijUxnRb@hovoldconsulting.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.8 Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor(a)chromium.org> Cc: Jon Hunter <jonathanh(a)nvidia.com> Tested-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi(a)chromium.org> Tested-by: Mark-PK Tsai <mark-pk.tsai(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> --- kernel/irq/irqdomain.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c b/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c index 7b57949bc79c..bfda4adc05c0 100644 --- a/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c +++ b/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(irq_domain_mutex); static struct irq_domain *irq_default_domain; +static int irq_domain_alloc_irqs_locked(struct irq_domain *domain, int irq_base, + unsigned int nr_irqs, int node, void *arg, + bool realloc, const struct irq_affinity_desc *affinity); static void irq_domain_check_hierarchy(struct irq_domain *domain); struct irqchip_fwid { @@ -682,9 +685,9 @@ unsigned int irq_create_direct_mapping(struct irq_domain *domain) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(irq_create_direct_mapping); #endif -static unsigned int __irq_create_mapping_affinity(struct irq_domain *domain, - irq_hw_number_t hwirq, - const struct irq_affinity_desc *affinity) +static unsigned int irq_create_mapping_affinity_locked(struct irq_domain *domain, + irq_hw_number_t hwirq, + const struct irq_affinity_desc *affinity) { struct device_node *of_node = irq_domain_get_of_node(domain); int virq; @@ -699,7 +702,7 @@ static unsigned int __irq_create_mapping_affinity(struct irq_domain *domain, return 0; } - if (irq_domain_associate(domain, virq, hwirq)) { + if (irq_domain_associate_locked(domain, virq, hwirq)) { irq_free_desc(virq); return 0; } @@ -735,14 +738,20 @@ unsigned int irq_create_mapping_affinity(struct irq_domain *domain, return 0; } + mutex_lock(&irq_domain_mutex); + /* Check if mapping already exists */ virq = irq_find_mapping(domain, hwirq); if (virq) { pr_debug("existing mapping on virq %d\n", virq); - return virq; + goto out; } - return __irq_create_mapping_affinity(domain, hwirq, affinity); + virq = irq_create_mapping_affinity_locked(domain, hwirq, affinity); +out: + mutex_unlock(&irq_domain_mutex); + + return virq; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(irq_create_mapping_affinity); @@ -809,6 +818,8 @@ unsigned int irq_create_fwspec_mapping(struct irq_fwspec *fwspec) if (WARN_ON(type & ~IRQ_TYPE_SENSE_MASK)) type &= IRQ_TYPE_SENSE_MASK; + mutex_lock(&irq_domain_mutex); + /* * If we've already configured this interrupt, * don't do it again, or hell will break loose. @@ -821,7 +832,7 @@ unsigned int irq_create_fwspec_mapping(struct irq_fwspec *fwspec) * interrupt number. */ if (type == IRQ_TYPE_NONE || type == irq_get_trigger_type(virq)) - return virq; + goto out; /* * If the trigger type has not been set yet, then set @@ -829,35 +840,45 @@ unsigned int irq_create_fwspec_mapping(struct irq_fwspec *fwspec) */ if (irq_get_trigger_type(virq) == IRQ_TYPE_NONE) { irq_data = irq_get_irq_data(virq); - if (!irq_data) - return 0; + if (!irq_data) { + virq = 0; + goto out; + } irqd_set_trigger_type(irq_data, type); - return virq; + goto out; } pr_warn("type mismatch, failed to map hwirq-%lu for %s!\n", hwirq, of_node_full_name(to_of_node(fwspec->fwnode))); - return 0; + virq = 0; + goto out; } if (irq_domain_is_hierarchy(domain)) { - virq = irq_domain_alloc_irqs(domain, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, fwspec); - if (virq <= 0) - return 0; + virq = irq_domain_alloc_irqs_locked(domain, -1, 1, NUMA_NO_NODE, + fwspec, false, NULL); + if (virq <= 0) { + virq = 0; + goto out; + } } else { /* Create mapping */ - virq = __irq_create_mapping_affinity(domain, hwirq, NULL); + virq = irq_create_mapping_affinity_locked(domain, hwirq, NULL); if (!virq) - return virq; + goto out; } irq_data = irq_get_irq_data(virq); - if (WARN_ON(!irq_data)) - return 0; + if (WARN_ON(!irq_data)) { + virq = 0; + goto out; + } /* Store trigger type */ irqd_set_trigger_type(irq_data, type); +out: + mutex_unlock(&irq_domain_mutex); return virq; } @@ -1888,6 +1909,13 @@ void irq_domain_set_info(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq, irq_set_handler_data(virq, handler_data); } +static int irq_domain_alloc_irqs_locked(struct irq_domain *domain, int irq_base, + unsigned int nr_irqs, int node, void *arg, + bool realloc, const struct irq_affinity_desc *affinity) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + static void irq_domain_check_hierarchy(struct irq_domain *domain) { } -- 2.39.1

1 year, 1 month

4
3
0 0

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror February 2023