January 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 01/24] f2fs: fix to check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block()

by Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit 956fa1ddc132e028f3b7d4cf17e6bfc8cb36c7fd ] Let's check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() in do_recover_data() rather than letting it fails silently. Also refactoring check condition on return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() as below: - trigger f2fs_bug_on() only for ENOSPC case; - use do-while statement to avoid redundant codes; Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c index da123c6d3ce0..7e30326b296c 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c @@ -611,7 +611,16 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode, */ if (dest == NEW_ADDR) { f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range(&dn, 1); - f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); + do { + err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); + if (err == -ENOSPC) { + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); + break; + } + } while (err && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)); + if (err) + goto err; continue; } @@ -619,12 +628,14 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode, if (f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) { if (src == NULL_ADDR) { - err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); - while (err && - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)) + do { err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); - /* We should not get -ENOSPC */ - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, err); + if (err == -ENOSPC) { + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); + break; + } + } while (err && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)); if (err) goto err; } -- 2.43.0

1 year, 1 month

1
23
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 01/28] f2fs: fix to check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block()

by Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit 956fa1ddc132e028f3b7d4cf17e6bfc8cb36c7fd ] Let's check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() in do_recover_data() rather than letting it fails silently. Also refactoring check condition on return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() as below: - trigger f2fs_bug_on() only for ENOSPC case; - use do-while statement to avoid redundant codes; Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c index c3c527afdd07..2700e0fdd3e0 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c @@ -641,7 +641,16 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode, */ if (dest == NEW_ADDR) { f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range(&dn, 1); - f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); + do { + err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); + if (err == -ENOSPC) { + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); + break; + } + } while (err && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)); + if (err) + goto err; continue; } @@ -649,12 +658,14 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode, if (f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) { if (src == NULL_ADDR) { - err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); - while (err && - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)) + do { err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); - /* We should not get -ENOSPC */ - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, err); + if (err == -ENOSPC) { + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); + break; + } + } while (err && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)); if (err) goto err; } -- 2.43.0

1 year, 1 month

1
27
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 01/35] f2fs: fix to check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block()

by Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit 956fa1ddc132e028f3b7d4cf17e6bfc8cb36c7fd ] Let's check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() in do_recover_data() rather than letting it fails silently. Also refactoring check condition on return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() as below: - trigger f2fs_bug_on() only for ENOSPC case; - use do-while statement to avoid redundant codes; Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c index ba7eeb3c2738..da0801aa4118 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c @@ -657,7 +657,16 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode, */ if (dest == NEW_ADDR) { f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range(&dn, 1); - f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); + do { + err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); + if (err == -ENOSPC) { + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); + break; + } + } while (err && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)); + if (err) + goto err; continue; } @@ -665,12 +674,14 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode, if (f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) { if (src == NULL_ADDR) { - err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); - while (err && - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)) + do { err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); - /* We should not get -ENOSPC */ - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, err); + if (err == -ENOSPC) { + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); + break; + } + } while (err && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)); if (err) goto err; } -- 2.43.0

1 year, 1 month

1
34
0 0

Re: [PATCH v2 04/28] binder: fix async space check for 0-sized buffers

by Carlos Llamas

On Fri, Dec 01, 2023 at 05:21:33PM +0000, Carlos Llamas wrote: > Move the padding of 0-sized buffers to an earlier stage to account for > this round up during the alloc->free_async_space check. > > Fixes: 74310e06be4d ("android: binder: Move buffer out of area shared with user space") > Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com> > Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> > --- Sorry, I forgot to Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org. -- Carlos Llamas

1 year, 1 month

2
3
0 0

Re: [PATCH] keys, dns: Fix size check of V1 server-list header

by Sedat Dilek

On Wed, Jan 10, 2024 at 10:12 PM David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> wrote: > > > Fix the size check added to dns_resolver_preparse() for the V1 server-list > header so that it doesn't give EINVAL if the size supplied is the same as > the size of the header struct (which should be valid). > > This can be tested with: > > echo -n -e '\0\0\01\xff\0\0' | keyctl padd dns_resolver desc @p > > which will give "add_key: Invalid argument" without this fix. > > Fixes: 1997b3cb4217 ("keys, dns: Fix missing size check of V1 server-list header") [ CC stable(a)vger.kernel.org ] Your (follow-up) patch is now upstream. https://git.kernel.org/linus/acc657692aed438e9931438f8c923b2b107aebf9 This misses CC: Stable Tag as suggested by Linus. Looks like linux-6.1.y and linux-6.6.y needs it, too. https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… BG, -Sedat- > Reported-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu(a)intel.com> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZZ4fyY4r3rqgZL+4@xpf.sh.intel.com/ > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> > cc: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis(a)qq.com> > cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> > cc: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> > Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> > Cc: Jeffrey E Altman <jaltman(a)auristor.com> > Cc: Wang Lei <wang840925(a)gmail.com> > Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)redhat.com> > Cc: Steve French <sfrench(a)us.ibm.com> > Cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne(a)auristor.com> > Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem(a)davemloft.net> > Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> > Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> > Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> > --- > net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c > index f18ca02aa95a..c42ddd85ff1f 100644 > --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c > +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c > @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) > const struct dns_server_list_v1_header *v1; > > /* It may be a server list. */ > - if (datalen <= sizeof(*v1)) > + if (datalen < sizeof(*v1)) > return -EINVAL; > > v1 = (const struct dns_server_list_v1_header *)data; > >

1 year, 1 month

2
3
0 0

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 01/73] f2fs: fix to check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block()

by Sasha Levin

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> [ Upstream commit 956fa1ddc132e028f3b7d4cf17e6bfc8cb36c7fd ] Let's check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() in do_recover_data() rather than letting it fails silently. Also refactoring check condition on return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() as below: - trigger f2fs_bug_on() only for ENOSPC case; - use do-while statement to avoid redundant codes; Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c index 7be60df277a5..f0de36ef73c2 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/recovery.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/recovery.c @@ -712,7 +712,16 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode, */ if (dest == NEW_ADDR) { f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range(&dn, 1); - f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); + do { + err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); + if (err == -ENOSPC) { + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); + break; + } + } while (err && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)); + if (err) + goto err; continue; } @@ -720,12 +729,14 @@ static int do_recover_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct inode *inode, if (f2fs_is_valid_blkaddr(sbi, dest, META_POR)) { if (src == NULL_ADDR) { - err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); - while (err && - IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)) + do { err = f2fs_reserve_new_block(&dn); - /* We should not get -ENOSPC */ - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, err); + if (err == -ENOSPC) { + f2fs_bug_on(sbi, 1); + break; + } + } while (err && + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION)); if (err) goto err; } -- 2.43.0

1 year, 1 month

1
72
0 0

[PATCH] firmware: arm_scmi: Check Mailbox/SMT channel for consistency

by Cristian Marussi

On reception of a completion interrupt the SMT memory area is accessed to retrieve the message header at first and then, if the message sequence number identifies a transaction which is still pending, the related payload is fetched too. When an SCMI command times out the channel ownership remains with the platform until eventually a late reply is received and, as a consequence, any further transmission attempt remains pending, waiting for the channel to be relinquished by the platform. Once that late reply is received the channel ownership is given back to the agent and any pending request is then allowed to proceed and overwrite the SMT area of the just delivered late reply; then the wait for the reply to the new request starts. It has been observed that the spurious IRQ related to the late reply can be wrongly associated with the freshly enqueued request: when that happens the SCMI stack in-flight lookup procedure is fooled by the fact that the message header now present in the SMT area is related to the new pending transaction, even though the real reply has still to arrive. This race-condition on the A2P channel can be detected by looking at the channel status bits: a genuine reply from the platform will have set the channel free bit before triggering the completion IRQ. Add a consistency check to validate such condition in the A2P ISR. Reported-by: Xinglong Yang <xinglong.yang(a)cixtech.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/PUZPR06MB54981E6FA00D82BFDBB864FBF08DA@PUZPR06M… Fixes: 5c8a47a5a91d ("firmware: arm_scmi: Make scmi core independent of the transport type") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> --- drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h | 1 + drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h index 3b7c68a11fd0..0956c2443840 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/common.h @@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ void shmem_fetch_notification(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem, void shmem_clear_channel(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem); bool shmem_poll_done(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem, struct scmi_xfer *xfer); +bool shmem_channel_free(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem); /* declarations for message passing transports */ struct scmi_msg_payld; diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c index 19246ed1f01f..b8d470417e8f 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/mailbox.c @@ -45,6 +45,20 @@ static void rx_callback(struct mbox_client *cl, void *m) { struct scmi_mailbox *smbox = client_to_scmi_mailbox(cl); + /* + * An A2P IRQ is NOT valid when received while the platform still has + * the ownership of the channel, because the platform at first releases + * the SMT channel and then sends the completion interrupt. + * + * This addresses a possible race condition in which a spurious IRQ from + * a previous timed-out reply which arrived late could be wrongly + * associated with the next pending transaction. + */ + if (cl->knows_txdone && !shmem_channel_free(smbox->shmem)) { + dev_warn(smbox->cinfo->dev, "Ignoring spurious A2P IRQ !\n"); + return; + } + scmi_rx_callback(smbox->cinfo, shmem_read_header(smbox->shmem), NULL); } diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c index 87b4f4d35f06..517d52fb3bcb 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/shmem.c @@ -122,3 +122,9 @@ bool shmem_poll_done(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem, (SCMI_SHMEM_CHAN_STAT_CHANNEL_ERROR | SCMI_SHMEM_CHAN_STAT_CHANNEL_FREE); } + +bool shmem_channel_free(struct scmi_shared_mem __iomem *shmem) +{ + return (ioread32(&shmem->channel_status) & + SCMI_SHMEM_CHAN_STAT_CHANNEL_FREE); +} -- 2.34.1

1 year, 1 month

3
5
0 0

Updated Database - HIMSS 2024

by Theresa Walden

Greetings Are you interested in purchasing HIMSS 2024 Attendees Email Database? People You Meet: CIO'VP of it/is, CEO, chairman, pre, EXECDIR, ADM/Group practice mgr., CTO, chief executive director, digital health innovation,CMIO,CNIO,CCIO,COO,GM,CMO,CSO,CISO,Director of info security, site security, chief innovation officer, information management system,c-suit,general&finance management ,clinical management'consulant'govermant employee,academic,other, hospital, multihospital system, integrated delivery system, healthcare consulting firm, market supplier,enterpeneur,startup,disuptor,academic medical center,academic medical institution,pharma,lifescience,public health, Ancillary clinical service provider, other Record in the list contains: Contact Name, Job Title, Company/Business Name, Complete Mailing Address, email, Telephone/Fax Number, Website/URL, Revenue, Employee Size, SIC Code, Industry. If you are interested, I am happy to "Send Counts and Pricing". Thanks, Theresa- Executive Director

1 year, 1 month

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v1] selftests/mm: ksm_tests should only MADV_HUGEPAGE valid memory

by Ryan Roberts

ksm_tests was previously mmapping a region of memory, aligning the returned pointer to a PMD boundary, then setting MADV_HUGEPAGE, but was setting it past the end of the mmapped area due to not taking the pointer alignment into consideration. Fix this behaviour. Up until commit efa7df3e3bb5 ("mm: align larger anonymous mappings on THP boundaries"), this buggy behavior was (usually) masked because the alignment difference was always less than PMD-size. But since the mentioned commit, `ksm_tests -H -s 100` started failing. Fixes: 325254899684 ("selftests: vm: add KSM huge pages merging time test") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts(a)arm.com> --- Applies on top of mm-unstable. Thanks, Ryan tools/testing/selftests/mm/ksm_tests.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/ksm_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/ksm_tests.c index 380b691d3eb9..b748c48908d9 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/ksm_tests.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/ksm_tests.c @@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static int ksm_merge_hugepages_time(int merge_type, int mapping, int prot, if (map_ptr_orig == MAP_FAILED) err(2, "initial mmap"); - if (madvise(map_ptr, len + HPAGE_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE)) + if (madvise(map_ptr, len, MADV_HUGEPAGE)) err(2, "MADV_HUGEPAGE"); pagemap_fd = open("/proc/self/pagemap", O_RDONLY); -- 2.25.1

1 year, 1 month

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v2] ovl: require xwhiteout feature flag on layer roots

by Miklos Szeredi

Add a check on each lower layer for the xwhiteout feature. This prevents unnecessary checking the overlay.whiteouts xattr when reading a directory if this feature is not enabled, i.e. most of the time. Share the same xattr for the per-directory and the per-layer flag, which has the effect that if this is enabled for a layer, then the optimization to bypass checking of individual entries does not work on the root of the layer. This was deemed better, than having a separate xattr for the layer and the directory. Fixes: bc8df7a3dc03 ("ovl: Add an alternative type of whiteout") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.7 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> --- v2: - use overlay.whiteouts instead of overlay.feature_xwhiteout - move initialization to ovl_get_layers() - xwhiteouts can only be enabled on lower layer fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 10 +++++++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 7 +++++-- fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 2 ++ fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 11 ++++++++--- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 13 +++++++++++++ fs/overlayfs/util.c | 7 ++++++- 6 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c index 03bc8d5dfa31..583cf56df66e 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c @@ -863,7 +863,8 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup_index(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upper, * Returns next layer in stack starting from top. * Returns -1 if this is the last layer. */ -int ovl_path_next(int idx, struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +int ovl_path_next(int idx, struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + const struct ovl_layer **layer) { struct ovl_entry *oe = OVL_E(dentry); struct ovl_path *lowerstack = ovl_lowerstack(oe); @@ -871,13 +872,16 @@ int ovl_path_next(int idx, struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) BUG_ON(idx < 0); if (idx == 0) { ovl_path_upper(dentry, path); - if (path->dentry) + if (path->dentry) { + *layer = &OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb)->layers[0]; return ovl_numlower(oe) ? 1 : -1; + } idx++; } BUG_ON(idx > ovl_numlower(oe)); path->dentry = lowerstack[idx - 1].dentry; - path->mnt = lowerstack[idx - 1].layer->mnt; + *layer = lowerstack[idx - 1].layer; + path->mnt = (*layer)->mnt; return (idx < ovl_numlower(oe)) ? idx + 1 : -1; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h index 05c3dd597fa8..6359cf5c66ff 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h @@ -492,7 +492,9 @@ bool ovl_path_check_dir_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const struct path *path, enum ovl_xattr ox); bool ovl_path_check_origin_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const struct path *path); bool ovl_path_check_xwhiteout_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const struct path *path); -bool ovl_path_check_xwhiteouts_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const struct path *path); +bool ovl_path_check_xwhiteouts_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, + const struct ovl_layer *layer, + const struct path *path); bool ovl_init_uuid_xattr(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs, const struct path *upperpath); @@ -674,7 +676,8 @@ int ovl_get_index_name(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin, struct dentry *ovl_get_index_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh); struct dentry *ovl_lookup_index(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *upper, struct dentry *origin, bool verify); -int ovl_path_next(int idx, struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path); +int ovl_path_next(int idx, struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + const struct ovl_layer **layer); int ovl_verify_lowerdata(struct dentry *dentry); struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h index d82d2a043da2..33fcd3d3af30 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct ovl_layer { int idx; /* One fsid per unique underlying sb (upper fsid == 0) */ int fsid; + /* xwhiteouts are enabled on this layer*/ + bool xwhiteouts; }; struct ovl_path { diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c index a490fc47c3e7..c2597075e3f8 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c @@ -305,8 +305,6 @@ static inline int ovl_dir_read(const struct path *realpath, if (IS_ERR(realfile)) return PTR_ERR(realfile); - rdd->in_xwhiteouts_dir = rdd->dentry && - ovl_path_check_xwhiteouts_xattr(OVL_FS(rdd->dentry->d_sb), realpath); rdd->first_maybe_whiteout = NULL; rdd->ctx.pos = 0; do { @@ -359,10 +357,14 @@ static int ovl_dir_read_merged(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list, .is_lowest = false, }; int idx, next; + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); + const struct ovl_layer *layer; for (idx = 0; idx != -1; idx = next) { - next = ovl_path_next(idx, dentry, &realpath); + next = ovl_path_next(idx, dentry, &realpath, &layer); rdd.is_upper = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry) == realpath.dentry; + if (ovl_path_check_xwhiteouts_xattr(ofs, layer, &realpath)) + rdd.in_xwhiteouts_dir = true; if (next != -1) { err = ovl_dir_read(&realpath, &rdd); @@ -568,6 +570,7 @@ static int ovl_dir_read_impure(const struct path *path, struct list_head *list, int err; struct path realpath; struct ovl_cache_entry *p, *n; + struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(path->dentry->d_sb); struct ovl_readdir_data rdd = { .ctx.actor = ovl_fill_plain, .list = list, @@ -577,6 +580,8 @@ static int ovl_dir_read_impure(const struct path *path, struct list_head *list, INIT_LIST_HEAD(list); *root = RB_ROOT; ovl_path_upper(path->dentry, &realpath); + if (ovl_path_check_xwhiteouts_xattr(ofs, &ofs->layers[0], &realpath)) + rdd.in_xwhiteouts_dir = true; err = ovl_dir_read(&realpath, &rdd); if (err) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index a0967bb25003..04588721eb2a 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -1027,6 +1027,7 @@ static int ovl_get_layers(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fs_context_layer *l = &ctx->lower[i]; struct vfsmount *mnt; struct inode *trap; + struct path root; int fsid; if (i < nr_merged_lower) @@ -1069,6 +1070,16 @@ static int ovl_get_layers(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs, */ mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY | MNT_NOATIME; + /* + * Check if xwhiteout (xattr whiteout) support is enabled on + * this layer. + */ + root.mnt = mnt; + root.dentry = mnt->mnt_root; + err = ovl_path_getxattr(ofs, &root, OVL_XATTR_XWHITEOUTS, NULL, 0); + if (err >= 0) + layers[ofs->numlayer].xwhiteouts = true; + layers[ofs->numlayer].trap = trap; layers[ofs->numlayer].mnt = mnt; layers[ofs->numlayer].idx = ofs->numlayer; @@ -1079,6 +1090,8 @@ static int ovl_get_layers(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs, l->name = NULL; ofs->numlayer++; ofs->fs[fsid].is_lower = true; + + } /* diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c index c3f020ca13a8..6c6e6f5893ea 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c @@ -739,11 +739,16 @@ bool ovl_path_check_xwhiteout_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const struct path *path) return res >= 0; } -bool ovl_path_check_xwhiteouts_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, const struct path *path) +bool ovl_path_check_xwhiteouts_xattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, + const struct ovl_layer *layer, + const struct path *path) { struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; int res; + if (!layer->xwhiteouts) + return false; + /* xattr.whiteouts must be a directory */ if (!d_is_dir(dentry)) return false; -- 2.43.0

1 year, 1 month

4
13
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror January 2024