October 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v2 09/13] media: cx24116: prevent overflows on SNR calculus

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

as reported by Coverity, if reading SNR registers fail, a negative number will be returned, causing an underflow when reading SNR registers. Prevent that. Fixes: 8953db793d5b ("V4L/DVB (9178): cx24116: Add module parameter to return SNR as ESNO.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c index 8b978a9f74a4..f5dd3a81725a 100644 --- a/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c +++ b/drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c @@ -741,6 +741,7 @@ static int cx24116_read_snr_pct(struct dvb_frontend *fe, u16 *snr) { struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv; u8 snr_reading; + int ret; static const u32 snr_tab[] = { /* 10 x Table (rounded up) */ 0x00000, 0x0199A, 0x03333, 0x04ccD, 0x06667, 0x08000, 0x0999A, 0x0b333, 0x0cccD, 0x0e667, @@ -749,7 +750,11 @@ static int cx24116_read_snr_pct(struct dvb_frontend *fe, u16 *snr) dprintk("%s()\n", __func__); - snr_reading = cx24116_readreg(state, CX24116_REG_QUALITY0); + ret = cx24116_readreg(state, CX24116_REG_QUALITY0); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + snr_reading = ret; if (snr_reading >= 0xa0 /* 100% */) *snr = 0xffff; -- 2.47.0

1 year

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[PATCH v2 07/13] media: s5p-jpeg: prevent buffer overflows

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

The current logic allows word to be less than 2. If this happens, there will be buffer overflows, as reported by smatch. Add extra checks to prevent it. While here, remove an unused word = 0 assignment. Fixes: 6c96dbbc2aa9 ("[media] s5p-jpeg: add support for 5433") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski(a)gmail.com> --- .../media/platform/samsung/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/samsung/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c b/drivers/media/platform/samsung/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c index d2c4a0178b3c..1db4609b3557 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/samsung/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/samsung/s5p-jpeg/jpeg-core.c @@ -775,11 +775,14 @@ static void exynos4_jpeg_parse_decode_h_tbl(struct s5p_jpeg_ctx *ctx) (unsigned long)vb2_plane_vaddr(&vb->vb2_buf, 0) + ctx->out_q.sos + 2; jpeg_buffer.curr = 0; - word = 0; - if (get_word_be(&jpeg_buffer, &word)) return; - jpeg_buffer.size = (long)word - 2; + + if (word < 2) + jpeg_buffer.size = 0; + else + jpeg_buffer.size = (long)word - 2; + jpeg_buffer.data += 2; jpeg_buffer.curr = 0; @@ -1058,6 +1061,7 @@ static int get_word_be(struct s5p_jpeg_buffer *buf, unsigned int *word) if (byte == -1) return -1; *word = (unsigned int)byte | temp; + return 0; } @@ -1145,7 +1149,7 @@ static bool s5p_jpeg_parse_hdr(struct s5p_jpeg_q_data *result, if (get_word_be(&jpeg_buffer, &word)) break; length = (long)word - 2; - if (!length) + if (length <= 0) return false; sof = jpeg_buffer.curr; /* after 0xffc0 */ sof_len = length; @@ -1176,7 +1180,7 @@ static bool s5p_jpeg_parse_hdr(struct s5p_jpeg_q_data *result, if (get_word_be(&jpeg_buffer, &word)) break; length = (long)word - 2; - if (!length) + if (length <= 0) return false; if (n_dqt >= S5P_JPEG_MAX_MARKER) return false; @@ -1189,7 +1193,7 @@ static bool s5p_jpeg_parse_hdr(struct s5p_jpeg_q_data *result, if (get_word_be(&jpeg_buffer, &word)) break; length = (long)word - 2; - if (!length) + if (length <= 0) return false; if (n_dht >= S5P_JPEG_MAX_MARKER) return false; @@ -1214,6 +1218,7 @@ static bool s5p_jpeg_parse_hdr(struct s5p_jpeg_q_data *result, if (get_word_be(&jpeg_buffer, &word)) break; length = (long)word - 2; + /* No need to check underflows as skip() does it */ skip(&jpeg_buffer, length); break; } -- 2.47.0

1 year

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[PATCH v2 06/13] media: av7110: fix a spectre vulnerability

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

As warned by smatch: drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110_ca.c:270 dvb_ca_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'av7110->ci_slot' [w] (local cap) There is a spectre-related vulnerability at the code. Fix it. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110.h | 4 +++- drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110_ca.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110.h b/drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110.h index ec461fd187af..b584754f4be0 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110.h +++ b/drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110.h @@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ struct infrared { u32 ir_config; }; +#define MAX_CI_SLOTS 2 + /* place to store all the necessary device information */ struct av7110 { /* devices */ @@ -163,7 +165,7 @@ struct av7110 { /* CA */ - struct ca_slot_info ci_slot[2]; + struct ca_slot_info ci_slot[MAX_CI_SLOTS]; enum av7110_video_mode vidmode; struct dmxdev dmxdev; diff --git a/drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110_ca.c b/drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110_ca.c index 6ce212c64e5d..fce4023c9dea 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110_ca.c +++ b/drivers/staging/media/av7110/av7110_ca.c @@ -26,23 +26,28 @@ void CI_handle(struct av7110 *av7110, u8 *data, u16 len) { + unsigned slot_num; + dprintk(8, "av7110:%p\n", av7110); if (len < 3) return; switch (data[0]) { case CI_MSG_CI_INFO: - if (data[2] != 1 && data[2] != 2) + if (data[2] != 1 && data[2] != MAX_CI_SLOTS) break; + + slot_num = array_index_nospec(data[2] - 1, MAX_CI_SLOTS); + switch (data[1]) { case 0: - av7110->ci_slot[data[2] - 1].flags = 0; + av7110->ci_slot[slot_num].flags = 0; break; case 1: - av7110->ci_slot[data[2] - 1].flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_PRESENT; + av7110->ci_slot[slot_num].flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_PRESENT; break; case 2: - av7110->ci_slot[data[2] - 1].flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_READY; + av7110->ci_slot[slot_num].flags |= CA_CI_MODULE_READY; break; } break; @@ -262,15 +267,19 @@ static int dvb_ca_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, void *parg) case CA_GET_SLOT_INFO: { struct ca_slot_info *info = (struct ca_slot_info *)parg; + unsigned int slot_num; if (info->num < 0 || info->num > 1) { mutex_unlock(&av7110->ioctl_mutex); return -EINVAL; } - av7110->ci_slot[info->num].num = info->num; - av7110->ci_slot[info->num].type = FW_CI_LL_SUPPORT(av7110->arm_app) ? - CA_CI_LINK : CA_CI; - memcpy(info, &av7110->ci_slot[info->num], sizeof(struct ca_slot_info)); + slot_num = array_index_nospec(info->num, MAX_CI_SLOTS); + + av7110->ci_slot[slot_num].num = info->num; + av7110->ci_slot[slot_num].type = FW_CI_LL_SUPPORT(av7110->arm_app) ? + CA_CI_LINK : CA_CI; + memcpy(info, &av7110->ci_slot[slot_num], + sizeof(struct ca_slot_info)); break; } -- 2.47.0

1 year

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[PATCH v2 05/13] media: mgb4: protect driver against spectre

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

Frequency range is set from sysfs via frequency_range_store(), being vulnerable to spectre, as reported by smatch: drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c:231 mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range() warn: potential spectre issue 'cmt_vals_in' [r] drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c:238 mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range() warn: possible spectre second half. 'reg_set' Fix it. Fixes: 0ab13674a9bd ("media: pci: mgb4: Added Digiteq Automotive MGB4 driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Martin Tůma <martin.tuma(a)digiteqautomotive.com> --- drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c b/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c index 70dc78ef193c..a25b68403bc6 100644 --- a/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c +++ b/drivers/media/pci/mgb4/mgb4_cmt.c @@ -227,6 +227,8 @@ void mgb4_cmt_set_vin_freq_range(struct mgb4_vin_dev *vindev, u32 config; size_t i; + freq_range = array_index_nospec(freq_range, ARRAY_SIZE(cmt_vals_in)); + addr = cmt_addrs_in[vindev->config->id]; reg_set = cmt_vals_in[freq_range]; -- 2.47.0

1 year

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[PATCH v2 02/13] media: v4l2-tpg: prevent the risk of a division by zero

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

As reported by Coverity, the logic at tpg_precalculate_line() blindly rescales the buffer even when scaled_witdh is equal to zero. If this ever happens, this will cause a division by zero. Instead, add a WARN_ON_ONCE() to trigger such cases and return without doing any precalculation. Fixes: 63881df94d3e ("[media] vivid: add the Test Pattern Generator") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c b/drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c index c86343a4d0bf..940bfbf275ce 100644 --- a/drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c +++ b/drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-core.c @@ -1795,6 +1795,9 @@ static void tpg_precalculate_line(struct tpg_data *tpg) unsigned p; unsigned x; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tpg->src_width || !tpg->scaled_width)) + return; + switch (tpg->pattern) { case TPG_PAT_GREEN: contrast = TPG_COLOR_100_RED; -- 2.47.0

1 year

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[PATCH 10/13] media: adv7604 prevent underflow condition when reporting colorspace

by Mauro Carvalho Chehab

Currently, adv76xx_log_status() reads some date using io_read() which may return negative values. The current logi doesn't check such errors, causing colorspace to be reported on a wrong way at adv76xx_log_status(). If I/O error happens there, print a different message, instead of reporting bogus messages to userspace. Fixes: 54450f591c99 ("[media] adv7604: driver for the Analog Devices ADV7604 video decoder") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/media/i2c/adv7604.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/i2c/adv7604.c b/drivers/media/i2c/adv7604.c index 48230d5109f0..272945a878b3 100644 --- a/drivers/media/i2c/adv7604.c +++ b/drivers/media/i2c/adv7604.c @@ -2519,10 +2519,10 @@ static int adv76xx_log_status(struct v4l2_subdev *sd) const struct adv76xx_chip_info *info = state->info; struct v4l2_dv_timings timings; struct stdi_readback stdi; - u8 reg_io_0x02 = io_read(sd, 0x02); + int ret; + u8 reg_io_0x02; u8 edid_enabled; u8 cable_det; - static const char * const csc_coeff_sel_rb[16] = { "bypassed", "YPbPr601 -> RGB", "reserved", "YPbPr709 -> RGB", "reserved", "RGB -> YPbPr601", "reserved", "RGB -> YPbPr709", @@ -2621,13 +2621,21 @@ static int adv76xx_log_status(struct v4l2_subdev *sd) v4l2_info(sd, "-----Color space-----\n"); v4l2_info(sd, "RGB quantization range ctrl: %s\n", rgb_quantization_range_txt[state->rgb_quantization_range]); - v4l2_info(sd, "Input color space: %s\n", - input_color_space_txt[reg_io_0x02 >> 4]); - v4l2_info(sd, "Output color space: %s %s, alt-gamma %s\n", - (reg_io_0x02 & 0x02) ? "RGB" : "YCbCr", - (((reg_io_0x02 >> 2) & 0x01) ^ (reg_io_0x02 & 0x01)) ? - "(16-235)" : "(0-255)", - (reg_io_0x02 & 0x08) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + + ret = io_read(sd, 0x02); + if (ret < 0) { + v4l2_info(sd, "Can't read Input/Output color space\n"); + } else { + reg_io_0x02 = ret; + + v4l2_info(sd, "Input color space: %s\n", + input_color_space_txt[reg_io_0x02 >> 4]); + v4l2_info(sd, "Output color space: %s %s, alt-gamma %s\n", + (reg_io_0x02 & 0x02) ? "RGB" : "YCbCr", + (((reg_io_0x02 >> 2) & 0x01) ^ (reg_io_0x02 & 0x01)) ? + "(16-235)" : "(0-255)", + (reg_io_0x02 & 0x08) ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + } v4l2_info(sd, "Color space conversion: %s\n", csc_coeff_sel_rb[cp_read(sd, info->cp_csc) >> 4]); -- 2.47.0

1 year

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[PATCH] LoongArch: Make KASAN usable for variable cpu_vabits

by Huacai Chen

Currently, KASAN on LoongArch assume the CPU VA bits is 48, which is true for Loongson-3 series, but not for Loongson-2 series (only 40 or lower), this patch fix that issue and make KASAN usable for variable cpu_vabits. 1. Define XRANGE_SHADOW_SHIFT which means valid address length from VA_BITS to min(cpu_vabits, VA_BITS). 2. In kasan_mem_to_shadow() let DMW addresses which exceed XRANGE_SIZE to return kasan_early_shadow_page. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kanglong Wang <wangkanglong(a)loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> --- arch/loongarch/include/asm/kasan.h | 2 +- arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kasan.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kasan.h index cd6084f4e153..c6bce5fbff57 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kasan.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kasan.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #define XRANGE_SHIFT (48) /* Valid address length */ -#define XRANGE_SHADOW_SHIFT (PGDIR_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT - 3) +#define XRANGE_SHADOW_SHIFT min(cpu_vabits, VA_BITS) /* Used for taking out the valid address */ #define XRANGE_SHADOW_MASK GENMASK_ULL(XRANGE_SHADOW_SHIFT - 1, 0) /* One segment whole address space size */ diff --git a/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c b/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c index 427d6b1aec09..e5ecc8c12034 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/mm/kasan_init.c @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr) return (void *)(kasan_early_shadow_page); maddr &= XRANGE_SHADOW_MASK; + + if (maddr >= XRANGE_SIZE) + return (void *)(kasan_early_shadow_page); + switch (xrange) { case XKPRANGE_CC_SEG: offset = XKPRANGE_CC_SHADOW_OFFSET; -- 2.43.5

1 year

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[PATCH] LoongArch: Enable IRQ if do_ale() triggered in irq-enabled context

by Huacai Chen

Unaligned access exception can be triggered in irq-enabled context such as user mode, in this case do_ale() may call get_user() which may cause sleep. Then we will get: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/loongarch/kernel/access-helper.h:7 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 129, name: modprobe preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 129 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc1+ #1723 Tainted: [W]=WARN Stack : 9000000105e0bd48 0000000000000000 9000000003803944 9000000105e08000 9000000105e0bc70 9000000105e0bc78 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000105e0bc78 0000000000000001 9000000185e0ba07 9000000105e0b890 ffffffffffffffff 9000000105e0bc78 73924b81763be05b 9000000100194500 000000000000020c 000000000000000a 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 00000000000023f0 00000000000e1401 00000000072f8000 0000007ffbb0e260 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000005437650 90000000055d5000 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 0000007ffbb0e1f0 0000000000000000 0000005567b00490 0000000000000000 9000000003803964 0000007ffbb0dfec 00000000000000b0 0000000000000007 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d ... Call Trace: [<9000000003803964>] show_stack+0x64/0x1a0 [<9000000004c57464>] dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0xb0 [<9000000003861ab4>] __might_resched+0x154/0x1a0 [<900000000380c96c>] emulate_load_store_insn+0x6c/0xf60 [<9000000004c58118>] do_ale+0x78/0x180 [<9000000003801bc8>] handle_ale+0x128/0x1e0 So enable IRQ if unaligned access exception is triggered in irq-enabled context to fix it. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Binbin Zhou <zhoubinbin(a)loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> --- arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c index f9f4eb00c92e..c57b4134f3e8 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c @@ -555,6 +555,9 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr do_ale(struct pt_regs *regs) #else unsigned int *pc; + if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE) + local_irq_enable(); + perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, regs, regs->csr_badvaddr); /* @@ -579,6 +582,8 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr do_ale(struct pt_regs *regs) die_if_kernel("Kernel ale access", regs); force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)regs->csr_badvaddr); out: + if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE) + local_irq_disable(); #endif irqentry_exit(regs, state); } -- 2.43.5

1 year

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[PATCH] LoongArch: Get correct cores_per_package for SMT systems

by Huacai Chen

In loongson_sysconf, The "core" of cores_per_node and cores_per_package stands for a logical core, which means in a SMT system it stands for a thread indeed. This information is gotten from SMBIOS Type4 Structure, so in order to get a correct cores_per_package for both SMT and non-SMT systems in parse_cpu_table() we should use SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET instead of SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chao Li <lichao(a)loongson.cn> Tested-by: Chao Li <lichao(a)loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> --- arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c index 00e307203ddb..cbd3c09a93c1 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ #define SMBIOS_FREQHIGH_OFFSET 0x17 #define SMBIOS_FREQLOW_MASK 0xFF #define SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET 0x23 +#define SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET 0x25 #define LOONGSON_EFI_ENABLE (1 << 3) unsigned long fw_arg0, fw_arg1, fw_arg2; @@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ static void __init parse_cpu_table(const struct dmi_header *dm) cpu_clock_freq = freq_temp * 1000000; loongson_sysconf.cpuname = (void *)dmi_string_parse(dm, dmi_data[16]); - loongson_sysconf.cores_per_package = *(dmi_data + SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET); + loongson_sysconf.cores_per_package = *(dmi_data + SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET); pr_info("CpuClock = %llu\n", cpu_clock_freq); } -- 2.43.5 diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h index 6d5846dd075c..7657e016233f 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ struct loongson_board_info { #define NR_WORDS DIV_ROUND_UP(NR_CPUS, BITS_PER_LONG) +/* + * The "core" of cores_per_node and cores_per_package stands for a + * logical core, which means in a SMT system it stands for a thread. + */ struct loongson_system_configuration { int nr_cpus; int nr_nodes;

1 year

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回复: 回复: [PATCH v1] riscv: dts: starfive: disable unused csi/camss nodes

by Changhuang Liang

Hi, Conor > On Thu, Oct 17, 2024 at 05:49:56AM +0000, Changhuang Liang wrote: > > Hi, Conor, > > > > > Hi, Conor > > > > > > Thanks for your patch. > > > > > > > From: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley(a)microchip.com> > > > > > > > > Aurelien reported probe failures due to the csi node being enabled > > > > without having a camera attached to it. A camera was in the > > > > initial submissions, but was removed from the dts, as it had not > > > > actually been present on the board, but was from an addon board > > > > used by the developer > > > of the relevant drivers. > > > > The non-camera pipeline nodes were not disabled when this happened > > > > and the probe failures are problematic for Debian. Disable them. > > > > > > > > CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org > > > > Fixes: 28ecaaa5af192 ("riscv: dts: starfive: jh7110: Add camera > > > > subsystem > > > > nodes") > > > > > > Here you write it in 13 characters, should be "Fixes: 28ecaaa5af19 ..." > > > > > > > After fixing this: > > Reviewed-by: Changhuang Liang <changhuang.liang(a)starfivetech.com> > > Ye, I know it was 13 not 12. I don't think that's a problem though. Okay, that's fine. Best Regards, Changhuang

1 year

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