(struct dirty_throttle_control *)->thresh is an unsigned long, but is
passed as the u32 divisor argument to div_u64(). On architectures where
unsigned long is 64 bytes, the argument will be implicitly truncated.
Use div64_u64() instead of div_u64() so that the value used in the "is
this a safe division" check is the same as the divisor.
Also, remove redundant cast of the numerator to u64, as that should
happen implicitly.
This would be difficult to exploit in memcg domain, given the
ratio-based arithmetic domain_drity_limits() uses, but is much easier in
global writeback domain with a BDI_CAP_STRICTLIMIT-backing device, using
e.g. vm.dirty_bytes=(1<<32)*PAGE_SIZE so that dtc->thresh == (1<<32)
Fixes: f6789593d5ce ("mm/page-writeback.c: fix divide by zero in bdi_dirty_limits()")
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <MPatlasov(a)parallels.com>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Zach O'Keefe <zokeefe(a)google.com>
---
mm/page-writeback.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/page-writeback.c b/mm/page-writeback.c
index cd4e4ae77c40a..02147b61712bc 100644
--- a/mm/page-writeback.c
+++ b/mm/page-writeback.c
@@ -1638,7 +1638,7 @@ static inline void wb_dirty_limits(struct dirty_throttle_control *dtc)
*/
dtc->wb_thresh = __wb_calc_thresh(dtc);
dtc->wb_bg_thresh = dtc->thresh ?
- div_u64((u64)dtc->wb_thresh * dtc->bg_thresh, dtc->thresh) : 0;
+ div64_u64(dtc->wb_thresh * dtc->bg_thresh, dtc->thresh) : 0;
/*
* In order to avoid the stacked BDI deadlock we need
--
2.43.0.429.g432eaa2c6b-goog
Hi Nam,
+CC stable( heads up as this is a regression affecting 5.15.y and
probably others, Greg: this was reproducible upstream so reported
everything w.r.t upstream code but initially found on 5.15.y)
On 19/04/24 20:29, Nam Cao wrote:
> On 2024-04-18 Harshit Mogalapalli wrote:
>> While fuzzing 5.15.y kernel with Syzkaller, we noticed a INFO: task hung
>> bug in fb_deferred_io_work()
>
> I think the problem is because of improper offset address calculation.
> The kernel calculate address offset with:
> offset = vmf->address - vmf->vma->vm_start
>
> Now the problem is that your C program mmap the framebuffer at 2
> different offsets:
> mmap(ptr, 4096, PROT_WRITE, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED, fd, 0xff000);
> mmap(ptr, 4096, PROT_WRITE, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
>
> but the kernel doesn't take these different offsets into account.
> So, 2 different pages are mistakenly recognized as the same page.
>
> Can you try the following patch?
This patch works well against the reproducer, this simplified repro and
the longer repro which syzkaller generated couldn't trigger any hang
with the below patch applied.
Thanks,
Harshit
>
> Best regards,
> Nam
>
> diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb_defio.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb_defio.c
> index dae96c9f61cf..d5d6cd9e8b29 100644
> --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb_defio.c
> +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fb_defio.c
> @@ -196,7 +196,8 @@ static vm_fault_t fb_deferred_io_track_page(struct fb_info *info, unsigned long
> */
> static vm_fault_t fb_deferred_io_page_mkwrite(struct fb_info *info, struct vm_fault *vmf)
> {
> - unsigned long offset = vmf->address - vmf->vma->vm_start;
> + unsigned long offset = vmf->address - vmf->vma->vm_start
> + + (vmf->vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
> struct page *page = vmf->page;
>
> file_update_time(vmf->vma->vm_file);
>
>
commit 3aadf100f93d80815685493d60cd8cab206403df upstream.
This reverts commit ad6bcdad2b6724e113f191a12f859a9e8456b26d. I had
nak'd it, and Greg said on the thread that it links that he wasn't going
to take it either, especially since it's not his code or his tree, but
then, seemingly accidentally, it got pushed up some months later, in
what looks like a mistake, with no further discussion in the linked
thread. So revert it, since it's clearly not intended.
Fixes: ad6bcdad2b67 ("vmgenid: emit uevent when VMGENID updates")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230531095119.11202-2-bchalios@amazon.es
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/virt/vmgenid.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c b/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
index b67a28da4702..a1c467a0e9f7 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ static int vmgenid_add(struct acpi_device *device)
static void vmgenid_notify(struct acpi_device *device, u32 event)
{
struct vmgenid_state *state = acpi_driver_data(device);
- char *envp[] = { "NEW_VMGENID=1", NULL };
u8 old_id[VMGENID_SIZE];
memcpy(old_id, state->this_id, sizeof(old_id));
@@ -76,7 +75,6 @@ static void vmgenid_notify(struct acpi_device *device, u32 event)
if (!memcmp(old_id, state->this_id, sizeof(old_id)))
return;
add_vmfork_randomness(state->this_id, sizeof(state->this_id));
- kobject_uevent_env(&device->dev.kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE, envp);
}
static const struct acpi_device_id vmgenid_ids[] = {
--
2.44.0
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024041901-roundish-flint-1143@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
e871abcda3b6 ("random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context")
bbc7e1bed1f5 ("random: add back async readiness notifier")
9148de3196ed ("random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand")
f62384995e4c ("random: split initialization into early step and later step")
745558f95885 ("random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot")
228dfe98a313 ("Merge tag 'char-misc-6.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 13:38:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context
The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has
initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes,
however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the
last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to
be deferred to a worker.
Previously the code used the execute_in_process_context() helper
function, which accounts for whether or not the caller is
in_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the
caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.
This turned out to be the case with input_handle_event() in
drivers/input/input.c contributing entropy:
[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc
[<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec
[<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144
[<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148
[<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c
[<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90
[<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c
[<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8
[<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c
[<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec
[<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38
[<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28
[<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8
[<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc
[<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270
[<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48
[<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490
[<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98
According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various
drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And in_atomic() isn't reliable.
So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the
static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing
this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not
changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's
not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is
fine.
Reported-by: Guoyong Wang <guoyong.wang(a)mediatek.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 456be28ba67c..2597cb43f438 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
{
- static struct execute_work set_ready;
+ static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready);
unsigned int new, orig, add;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
- if (static_key_initialized)
- execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+ if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq)
+ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &set_ready);
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_notifier, 0, NULL);
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)
/*
* If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels
- * are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where
- * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized.
+ * or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static
+ * branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized.
*/
if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
crng_set_ready(NULL);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024041903-pentagon-deceiver-fe1d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
e871abcda3b6 ("random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context")
bbc7e1bed1f5 ("random: add back async readiness notifier")
9148de3196ed ("random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand")
f62384995e4c ("random: split initialization into early step and later step")
745558f95885 ("random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot")
228dfe98a313 ("Merge tag 'char-misc-6.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 13:38:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context
The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has
initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes,
however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the
last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to
be deferred to a worker.
Previously the code used the execute_in_process_context() helper
function, which accounts for whether or not the caller is
in_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the
caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.
This turned out to be the case with input_handle_event() in
drivers/input/input.c contributing entropy:
[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc
[<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec
[<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144
[<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148
[<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c
[<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90
[<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c
[<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8
[<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c
[<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec
[<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38
[<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28
[<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8
[<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc
[<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270
[<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48
[<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490
[<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98
According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various
drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And in_atomic() isn't reliable.
So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the
static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing
this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not
changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's
not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is
fine.
Reported-by: Guoyong Wang <guoyong.wang(a)mediatek.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 456be28ba67c..2597cb43f438 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
{
- static struct execute_work set_ready;
+ static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready);
unsigned int new, orig, add;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
- if (static_key_initialized)
- execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+ if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq)
+ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &set_ready);
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_notifier, 0, NULL);
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)
/*
* If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels
- * are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where
- * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized.
+ * or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static
+ * branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized.
*/
if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
crng_set_ready(NULL);
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024041905-obvious-blush-10d8@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
e871abcda3b6 ("random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context")
bbc7e1bed1f5 ("random: add back async readiness notifier")
9148de3196ed ("random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand")
f62384995e4c ("random: split initialization into early step and later step")
745558f95885 ("random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot")
228dfe98a313 ("Merge tag 'char-misc-6.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From e871abcda3b67d0820b4182ebe93435624e9c6a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 13:38:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] random: handle creditable entropy from atomic process context
The entropy accounting changes a static key when the RNG has
initialized, since it only ever initializes once. Static key changes,
however, cannot be made from atomic context, so depending on where the
last creditable entropy comes from, the static key change might need to
be deferred to a worker.
Previously the code used the execute_in_process_context() helper
function, which accounts for whether or not the caller is
in_interrupt(). However, that doesn't account for the case where the
caller is actually in process context but is holding a spinlock.
This turned out to be the case with input_handle_event() in
drivers/input/input.c contributing entropy:
[<ffffffd613025ba0>] die+0xa8/0x2fc
[<ffffffd613027428>] bug_handler+0x44/0xec
[<ffffffd613016964>] brk_handler+0x90/0x144
[<ffffffd613041e58>] do_debug_exception+0xa0/0x148
[<ffffffd61400c208>] el1_dbg+0x60/0x7c
[<ffffffd61400c000>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x38/0x90
[<ffffffd613011294>] el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x6c
[<ffffffd613102d88>] __might_resched+0x1fc/0x2e8
[<ffffffd613102b54>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x7c
[<ffffffd6130b6eac>] cpus_read_lock+0x1c/0xec
[<ffffffd6132c2820>] static_key_enable+0x14/0x38
[<ffffffd61400ac08>] crng_set_ready+0x14/0x28
[<ffffffd6130df4dc>] execute_in_process_context+0xb8/0xf8
[<ffffffd61400ab30>] _credit_init_bits+0x118/0x1dc
[<ffffffd6138580c8>] add_timer_randomness+0x264/0x270
[<ffffffd613857e54>] add_input_randomness+0x38/0x48
[<ffffffd613a80f94>] input_handle_event+0x2b8/0x490
[<ffffffd613a81310>] input_event+0x6c/0x98
According to Guoyong, it's not really possible to refactor the various
drivers to never hold a spinlock there. And in_atomic() isn't reliable.
So, rather than trying to be too fancy, just punt the change in the
static key to a workqueue always. There's basically no drawback of doing
this, as the code already needed to account for the static key not
changing immediately, and given that it's just an optimization, there's
not exactly a hurry to change the static key right away, so deferal is
fine.
Reported-by: Guoyong Wang <guoyong.wang(a)mediatek.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 456be28ba67c..2597cb43f438 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
{
- static struct execute_work set_ready;
+ static DECLARE_WORK(set_ready, crng_set_ready);
unsigned int new, orig, add;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -718,8 +718,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
- if (static_key_initialized)
- execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+ if (static_key_initialized && system_unbound_wq)
+ queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &set_ready);
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_notifier, 0, NULL);
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
@@ -890,8 +890,8 @@ void __init random_init(void)
/*
* If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels
- * are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where
- * it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized.
+ * or workqueues are initialized, then we should enable the static
+ * branch here, where it's guaranteed that these have been initialized.
*/
if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
crng_set_ready(NULL);
There is a recent report on UFFDIO_COPY over hugetlb:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000ee06de0616177560@google.com/
350: lockdep_assert_held(&hugetlb_lock);
Should be an issue in hugetlb but triggered in an userfault context, where
it goes into the unlikely path where two threads modifying the resv map
together. Mike has a fix in that path for resv uncharge but it looks like
the locking criteria was overlooked: hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd()
will update the cgroup pointer, so it requires to be called with the lock
held.
Looks like a stable material, so have it copied.
Reported-by: syzbot+4b8077a5fccc61c385a1(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Mina Almasry <almasrymina(a)google.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 79aa925bf239 ("hugetlb_cgroup: fix reservation accounting")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx(a)redhat.com>
---
mm/hugetlb.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c
index 26ab9dfc7d63..3158a55ce567 100644
--- a/mm/hugetlb.c
+++ b/mm/hugetlb.c
@@ -3247,9 +3247,12 @@ struct folio *alloc_hugetlb_folio(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
rsv_adjust = hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, 1);
hugetlb_acct_memory(h, -rsv_adjust);
- if (deferred_reserve)
+ if (deferred_reserve) {
+ spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd(hstate_index(h),
pages_per_huge_page(h), folio);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&hugetlb_lock);
+ }
}
if (!memcg_charge_ret)
--
2.44.0