May 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH 2/5] tracefs: Still use mount point as default permissions for instances

by Steven Rostedt

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> If the instances directory's permissions were never change, then have it and its children use the mount point permissions as the default. Currently, the permissions of instance directories are determined by the instance directory's permissions itself. But if the tracefs file system is remounted and changes the permissions, the instance directory and its children should use the new permission. But because both the instance directory and its children use the instance directory's inode for permissions, it misses the update. To demonstrate this: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/ # mkdir instances/foo # ls -ld instances/foo drwxr-x--- 5 root root 0 May 1 19:07 instances/foo # ls -ld instances drwxr-x--- 3 root root 0 May 1 18:57 instances # ls -ld current_tracer -rw-r----- 1 root root 0 May 1 18:57 current_tracer # mount -o remount,gid=1002 . # ls -ld instances drwxr-x--- 3 root root 0 May 1 18:57 instances # ls -ld instances/foo/ drwxr-x--- 5 root root 0 May 1 19:07 instances/foo/ # ls -ld current_tracer -rw-r----- 1 root lkp 0 May 1 18:57 current_tracer Notice that changing the group id to that of "lkp" did not affect the instances directory nor its children. It should have been: # ls -ld current_tracer -rw-r----- 1 root root 0 May 1 19:19 current_tracer # ls -ld instances/foo/ drwxr-x--- 5 root root 0 May 1 19:25 instances/foo/ # ls -ld instances drwxr-x--- 3 root root 0 May 1 19:19 instances # mount -o remount,gid=1002 . # ls -ld current_tracer -rw-r----- 1 root lkp 0 May 1 19:19 current_tracer # ls -ld instances drwxr-x--- 3 root lkp 0 May 1 19:19 instances # ls -ld instances/foo/ drwxr-x--- 5 root lkp 0 May 1 19:25 instances/foo/ Where all files were updated by the remount gid update. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8186fff7ab649 ("tracefs/eventfs: Use root and instance inodes as default ownership") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/inode.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c index 2a1dc2b442d1..1130c0fe2426 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c @@ -170,16 +170,39 @@ static void set_tracefs_inode_owner(struct inode *inode) { struct tracefs_inode *ti = get_tracefs(inode); struct inode *root_inode = ti->private; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; + + uid = root_inode->i_uid; + gid = root_inode->i_gid; + + /* + * If the root is not the mount point, then check the root's + * permissions. If it was never set, then default to the + * mount point. + */ + if (root_inode != d_inode(root_inode->i_sb->s_root)) { + struct tracefs_inode *rti; + + rti = get_tracefs(root_inode); + root_inode = d_inode(root_inode->i_sb->s_root); + + if (!(rti->flags & TRACEFS_UID_PERM_SET)) + uid = root_inode->i_uid; + + if (!(rti->flags & TRACEFS_GID_PERM_SET)) + gid = root_inode->i_gid; + } /* * If this inode has never been referenced, then update * the permissions to the superblock. */ if (!(ti->flags & TRACEFS_UID_PERM_SET)) - inode->i_uid = root_inode->i_uid; + inode->i_uid = uid; if (!(ti->flags & TRACEFS_GID_PERM_SET)) - inode->i_gid = root_inode->i_gid; + inode->i_gid = gid; } static int tracefs_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, -- 2.43.0

5 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 1/5] tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options

by Steven Rostedt

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> There's an inconsistency with the way permissions are handled in tracefs. Because the permissions are generated when accessed, they default to the root inode's permission if they were never set by the user. If the user sets the permissions, then a flag is set and the permissions are saved via the inode (for tracefs files) or an internal attribute field (for eventfs). But if a remount happens that specify the permissions, all the files that were not changed by the user gets updated, but the ones that were are not. If the user were to remount the file system with a given permission, then all files and directories within that file system should be updated. This can cause security issues if a file's permission was updated but the admin forgot about it. They could incorrectly think that remounting with permissions set would update all files, but miss some. For example: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # chgrp 1002 current_tracer # ls -l [..] -rw-r----- 1 root root 0 May 1 21:25 buffer_size_kb -rw-r----- 1 root root 0 May 1 21:25 buffer_subbuf_size_kb -r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 1 21:25 buffer_total_size_kb -rw-r----- 1 root lkp 0 May 1 21:25 current_tracer -rw-r----- 1 root root 0 May 1 21:25 dynamic_events -r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 1 21:25 dyn_ftrace_total_info -r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 1 21:25 enabled_functions Where current_tracer now has group "lkp". # mount -o remount,gid=1001 . # ls -l -rw-r----- 1 root tracing 0 May 1 21:25 buffer_size_kb -rw-r----- 1 root tracing 0 May 1 21:25 buffer_subbuf_size_kb -r--r----- 1 root tracing 0 May 1 21:25 buffer_total_size_kb -rw-r----- 1 root lkp 0 May 1 21:25 current_tracer -rw-r----- 1 root tracing 0 May 1 21:25 dynamic_events -r--r----- 1 root tracing 0 May 1 21:25 dyn_ftrace_total_info -r--r----- 1 root tracing 0 May 1 21:25 enabled_functions Everything changed but the "current_tracer". Add a new link list that keeps track of all the tracefs_inodes which has the permission flags that tell if the file/dir should use the root inode's permission or not. Then on remount, clear all the flags so that the default behavior of using the root inode's permission is done for all files and directories. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 8186fff7ab649 ("tracefs/eventfs: Use root and instance inodes as default ownership") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- fs/tracefs/event_inode.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/tracefs/inode.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- fs/tracefs/internal.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c index dc97c19f9e0a..db71fed7057d 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c @@ -289,6 +289,35 @@ static const struct file_operations eventfs_file_operations = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +/* + * On a remount of tracefs, if UID or GID options are set, then + * the mount point inode permissions should be used. + * Reset the saved permission flags appropriately. + */ +void eventfs_remount(struct tracefs_inode *ti, bool update_uid, bool update_gid) +{ + struct eventfs_inode *ei = ti->private; + + if (!ei) + return; + + if (update_uid) + ei->attr.mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_UID; + + if (update_gid) + ei->attr.mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_GID; + + if (!ei->entry_attrs) + return; + + for (int i = 0; i < ei->nr_entries; i++) { + if (update_uid) + ei->entry_attrs[i].mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_UID; + if (update_gid) + ei->entry_attrs[i].mode &= ~EVENTFS_SAVE_GID; + } +} + /* Return the evenfs_inode of the "events" directory */ static struct eventfs_inode *eventfs_find_events(struct dentry *dentry) { diff --git a/fs/tracefs/inode.c b/fs/tracefs/inode.c index 5545e6bf7d26..2a1dc2b442d1 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/inode.c +++ b/fs/tracefs/inode.c @@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ static struct vfsmount *tracefs_mount; static int tracefs_mount_count; static bool tracefs_registered; +/* + * Keep track of all tracefs_inodes in order to update their + * flags if necessary on a remount. + */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(tracefs_inode_mutex); +static LIST_HEAD(tracefs_inodes); + static struct inode *tracefs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) { struct tracefs_inode *ti; @@ -38,12 +45,22 @@ static struct inode *tracefs_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) if (!ti) return NULL; + mutex_lock(&tracefs_inode_mutex); + list_add(&ti->list, &tracefs_inodes); + mutex_unlock(&tracefs_inode_mutex); + return &ti->vfs_inode; } static void tracefs_free_inode(struct inode *inode) { - kmem_cache_free(tracefs_inode_cachep, get_tracefs(inode)); + struct tracefs_inode *ti = get_tracefs(inode); + + mutex_lock(&tracefs_inode_mutex); + list_del(&ti->list); + mutex_unlock(&tracefs_inode_mutex); + + kmem_cache_free(tracefs_inode_cachep, ti); } static ssize_t default_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *buf, @@ -313,6 +330,8 @@ static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb, bool remount) struct tracefs_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info; struct inode *inode = d_inode(sb->s_root); struct tracefs_mount_opts *opts = &fsi->mount_opts; + struct tracefs_inode *ti; + bool update_uid, update_gid; umode_t tmp_mode; /* @@ -332,6 +351,25 @@ static int tracefs_apply_options(struct super_block *sb, bool remount) if (!remount || opts->opts & BIT(Opt_gid)) inode->i_gid = opts->gid; + if (remount && (opts->opts & BIT(Opt_uid) || opts->opts & BIT(Opt_gid))) { + mutex_lock(&tracefs_inode_mutex); + + update_uid = opts->opts & BIT(Opt_uid); + update_gid = opts->opts & BIT(Opt_gid); + + list_for_each_entry(ti, &tracefs_inodes, list) { + if (update_uid) + ti->flags &= ~TRACEFS_UID_PERM_SET; + + if (update_gid) + ti->flags &= ~TRACEFS_GID_PERM_SET; + + if (ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE) + eventfs_remount(ti, update_uid, update_gid); + } + mutex_unlock(&tracefs_inode_mutex); + } + return 0; } diff --git a/fs/tracefs/internal.h b/fs/tracefs/internal.h index 15c26f9aaad4..661ac13e2984 100644 --- a/fs/tracefs/internal.h +++ b/fs/tracefs/internal.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ enum { struct tracefs_inode { struct inode vfs_inode; /* The below gets initialized with memset_after(ti, 0, vfs_inode) */ + struct list_head list; unsigned long flags; void *private; }; @@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ struct dentry *tracefs_end_creating(struct dentry *dentry); struct dentry *tracefs_failed_creating(struct dentry *dentry); struct inode *tracefs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb); +void eventfs_remount(struct tracefs_inode *ti, bool update_uid, bool update_gid); void eventfs_d_release(struct dentry *dentry); #endif /* _TRACEFS_INTERNAL_H */ -- 2.43.0

5 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH net] tipc: fix UAF in error path

by Paolo Abeni

Sam Page (sam4k) working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative reported a UAF in the tipc_buf_append() error path: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88804d2a7c80 by task poc/8034 CPU: 1 PID: 8034 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.8.2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack linux/lib/dump_stack.c:88 dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 linux/lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description linux/mm/kasan/report.c:377 print_report+0xc4/0x620 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 linux/mm/kasan/report.c:601 kfree_skb_list_reason+0x47e/0x4c0 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1183 skb_release_data+0x5af/0x880 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1026 skb_release_all linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1094 __kfree_skb linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1108 kfree_skb_reason+0x12d/0x210 linux/net/core/skbuff.c:1144 kfree_skb linux/./include/linux/skbuff.h:1244 tipc_buf_append+0x425/0xb50 linux/net/tipc/msg.c:186 tipc_link_input+0x224/0x7c0 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1324 tipc_link_rcv+0x76e/0x2d70 linux/net/tipc/link.c:1824 tipc_rcv+0x45f/0x10f0 linux/net/tipc/node.c:2159 tipc_udp_recv+0x73b/0x8f0 linux/net/tipc/udp_media.c:390 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xad2/0x1850 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2108 udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x131/0xb00 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2186 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x165/0x3b0 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2346 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x2594/0x3400 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:2422 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x30c/0x4e0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e4/0x520 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_local_deliver+0x18e/0x1f0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254 dst_input linux/./include/net/dst.h:461 ip_rcv_finish linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:449 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:308 ip_rcv+0x2c5/0x5d0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_input.c:569 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x199/0x1e0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5534 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5648 process_backlog+0x101/0x6b0 linux/net/core/dev.c:5976 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 linux/net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll linux/net/core/dev.c:6645 net_rx_action+0x95a/0xe90 linux/net/core/dev.c:6781 __do_softirq+0x21f/0x8e7 linux/kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq linux/kernel/softirq.c:454 do_softirq+0xb2/0xf0 linux/kernel/softirq.c:441 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x100/0x120 linux/kernel/softirq.c:381 local_bh_enable linux/./include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 rcu_read_unlock_bh linux/./include/linux/rcupdate.h:851 __dev_queue_xmit+0x871/0x3ee0 linux/net/core/dev.c:4378 dev_queue_xmit linux/./include/linux/netdevice.h:3169 neigh_hh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:526 neigh_output linux/./include/net/neighbour.h:540 ip_finish_output2+0x169f/0x2550 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 __ip_finish_output linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:313 __ip_finish_output+0x49e/0x950 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND linux/./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output linux/./include/net/dst.h:451 ip_local_out linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 ip_send_skb+0x3e5/0x560 linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 udp_send_skb+0x73f/0x1530 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1a36/0x2b40 linux/net/ipv4/udp.c:1250 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x140 linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c:850 sock_sendmsg_nosec linux/net/socket.c:730 __sock_sendmsg linux/net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x42c/0x4e0 linux/net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2203 __se_sys_sendto linux/net/socket.c:2199 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 linux/net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x270 linux/arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120 RIP: 0033:0x7f3434974f29 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 37 8f 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff9154f2b8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3434974f29 RDX: 00000000000032c8 RSI: 00007fff9154f300 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff915532e0 R08: 00007fff91553360 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 000055ed86d261d0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> In the critical scenario, either the relevant skb is freed or its ownership is transferred into a frag_lists. In both cases, the cleanup code must not free it again: we need to clear the skb reference earlier. Fixes: 1149557d64c9 ("tipc: eliminate unnecessary linearization of incoming buffers") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23852 Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> --- net/tipc/msg.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/msg.c b/net/tipc/msg.c index 5c9fd4791c4b..9a6e9bcbf694 100644 --- a/net/tipc/msg.c +++ b/net/tipc/msg.c @@ -156,6 +156,11 @@ int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf) if (!head) goto err; + /* Either the input skb ownership is transferred to headskb + * or the input skb is freed, clear the reference to avoid + * bad access on error path. + */ + *buf = NULL; if (skb_try_coalesce(head, frag, &headstolen, &delta)) { kfree_skb_partial(frag, headstolen); } else { @@ -179,7 +184,6 @@ int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf) *headbuf = NULL; return 1; } - *buf = NULL; return 0; err: kfree_skb(*buf); -- 2.43.2

5 months, 2 weeks

3
2
0 0

[PATCH] arm64: dts: qcom: qcs404: fix bluetooth device address

by Johan Hovold

The 'local-bd-address' property is used to pass a unique Bluetooth device address from the boot firmware to the kernel and should otherwise be left unset so that the OS can prevent the controller from being used until a valid address has been provided through some other means (e.g. using btmgmt). Fixes: 60f77ae7d1c1 ("arm64: dts: qcom: qcs404-evb: Enable uart3 and add Bluetooth") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.10 Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/qcs404-evb.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/qcs404-evb.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/qcs404-evb.dtsi index 10655401528e..a22b4501ce1e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/qcs404-evb.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/qcs404-evb.dtsi @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ bluetooth { vddrf-supply = <&vreg_l1_1p3>; vddch0-supply = <&vdd_ch0_3p3>; - local-bd-address = [ 02 00 00 00 5a ad ]; + local-bd-address = [ 00 00 00 00 00 00 ]; max-speed = <3200000>; }; -- 2.43.2

5 months, 2 weeks

3
2
0 0

Request to backport "bpf: Add missing BPF_LINK_TYPE invocations" to 6.6 kernel

by Ignat Korchagin

Hello, We recently saw a KASAN report on a 6.6.27 kernel similar to [1] and noticed that commit 117211aa739a ("bpf: Add missing BPF_LINK_TYPE invocations") was never backported to the 6.6 stable tree. Is there a reason? Can it be backported? [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZXptoKRSLspnk2ie@xpf.sh.intel.com/ Ignat

5 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 7044dcff8301b29269016ebd17df27c4736140d2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024042939-ended-heavily-2e5c@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 7044dcff8301 ("rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro") 1b6170ff7a20 ("rust: module: place generated init_module() function in .init.text") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7044dcff8301b29269016ebd17df27c4736140d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 18:52:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The `module!` macro creates glue code that are called by C to initialize the Rust modules using the `Module::init` function. Part of this glue code are the local functions `__init` and `__exit` that are used to initialize/destroy the Rust module. These functions are safe and also visible to the Rust mod in which the `module!` macro is invoked. This means that they can be called by other safe Rust code. But since they contain `unsafe` blocks that rely on only being called at the right time, this is a soundness issue. Wrap these generated functions inside of two private modules, this guarantees that the public functions cannot be called from the outside. Make the safe functions `unsafe` and add SAFETY comments. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh(a)protonmail.com> Closes: https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux/issues/629 Fixes: 1fbde52bde73 ("rust: add `macros` crate") Signed-off-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me> Reviewed-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida(a)microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401185222.12015-1-benno.lossin@proton.me [ Moved `THIS_MODULE` out of the private-in-private modules since it should remain public, as Dirk Behme noticed [1]. Capitalized comments, avoided newline in non-list SAFETY comments and reworded to add Reported-by and newline. ] Link: https://rust-for-linux.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/291565-Help/topic/x/nea… [1] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/rust/macros/module.rs b/rust/macros/module.rs index 27979e582e4b..acd0393b5095 100644 --- a/rust/macros/module.rs +++ b/rust/macros/module.rs @@ -199,17 +199,6 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream { /// Used by the printing macros, e.g. [`info!`]. const __LOG_PREFIX: &[u8] = b\"{name}\\0\"; - /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark. - // - // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo - // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple. - #[cfg(MODULE)] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[used] - static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = (); - - static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None; - // SAFETY: `__this_module` is constructed by the kernel at load time and will not be // freed until the module is unloaded. #[cfg(MODULE)] @@ -221,81 +210,132 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream { kernel::ThisModule::from_ptr(core::ptr::null_mut()) }}; - // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers. - /// # Safety - /// - /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be - /// freed after that completes. - #[cfg(MODULE)] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[no_mangle] - #[link_section = \".init.text\"] - pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ - __init() - }} + // Double nested modules, since then nobody can access the public items inside. + mod __module_init {{ + mod __module_init {{ + use super::super::{type_}; - #[cfg(MODULE)] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[no_mangle] - pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{ - __exit() - }} + /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark. + // + // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo + // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple. + #[cfg(MODULE)] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[used] + static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = (); - // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer - // and the identifiers need to be unique. - #[cfg(not(MODULE))] - #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"] - #[used] - pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init; + static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None; - #[cfg(not(MODULE))] - #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)] - core::arch::global_asm!( - r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\" - __{name}_initcall: - .long __{name}_init - . - .previous - \"# - ); + // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers. + /// # Safety + /// + /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be + /// freed after that completes. + #[cfg(MODULE)] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[no_mangle] + #[link_section = \".init.text\"] + pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ + // SAFETY: This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double + // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its + // unique name. + unsafe {{ __init() }} + }} - #[cfg(not(MODULE))] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[no_mangle] - pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ - __init() - }} + #[cfg(MODULE)] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[no_mangle] + pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{ + // SAFETY: + // - This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double + // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its + // unique name, + // - furthermore it is only called after `init_module` has returned `0` + // (which delegates to `__init`). + unsafe {{ __exit() }} + }} - #[cfg(not(MODULE))] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[no_mangle] - pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{ - __exit() - }} + // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer + // and the identifiers need to be unique. + #[cfg(not(MODULE))] + #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"] + #[used] + pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init; - fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ - match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&THIS_MODULE) {{ - Ok(m) => {{ - unsafe {{ - __MOD = Some(m); + #[cfg(not(MODULE))] + #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)] + core::arch::global_asm!( + r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\" + __{name}_initcall: + .long __{name}_init - . + .previous + \"# + ); + + #[cfg(not(MODULE))] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[no_mangle] + pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ + // SAFETY: This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double + // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its + // placement above in the initcall section. + unsafe {{ __init() }} + }} + + #[cfg(not(MODULE))] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[no_mangle] + pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{ + // SAFETY: + // - This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double + // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its + // unique name, + // - furthermore it is only called after `__{name}_init` has returned `0` + // (which delegates to `__init`). + unsafe {{ __exit() }} + }} + + /// # Safety + /// + /// This function must only be called once. + unsafe fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ + match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&super::super::THIS_MODULE) {{ + Ok(m) => {{ + // SAFETY: No data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this + // module and there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These + // functions are only called once and `__exit` cannot be called + // before or during `__init`. + unsafe {{ + __MOD = Some(m); + }} + return 0; + }} + Err(e) => {{ + return e.to_errno(); + }} }} - return 0; }} - Err(e) => {{ - return e.to_errno(); + + /// # Safety + /// + /// This function must + /// - only be called once, + /// - be called after `__init` has been called and returned `0`. + unsafe fn __exit() {{ + // SAFETY: No data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this module + // and there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These functions are only + // called once and `__init` was already called. + unsafe {{ + // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup. + __MOD = None; + }} }} + + {modinfo} }} }} - - fn __exit() {{ - unsafe {{ - // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup. - __MOD = None; - }} - }} - - {modinfo} ", type_ = info.type_, name = info.name,

5 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro" failed to apply to 6.8-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.8-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.8.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 7044dcff8301b29269016ebd17df27c4736140d2 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024042938-computing-synthetic-f9fe@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.8.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 7044dcff8301 ("rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro") 1b6170ff7a20 ("rust: module: place generated init_module() function in .init.text") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 7044dcff8301b29269016ebd17df27c4736140d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me> Date: Mon, 1 Apr 2024 18:52:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] rust: macros: fix soundness issue in `module!` macro MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The `module!` macro creates glue code that are called by C to initialize the Rust modules using the `Module::init` function. Part of this glue code are the local functions `__init` and `__exit` that are used to initialize/destroy the Rust module. These functions are safe and also visible to the Rust mod in which the `module!` macro is invoked. This means that they can be called by other safe Rust code. But since they contain `unsafe` blocks that rely on only being called at the right time, this is a soundness issue. Wrap these generated functions inside of two private modules, this guarantees that the public functions cannot be called from the outside. Make the safe functions `unsafe` and add SAFETY comments. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh(a)protonmail.com> Closes: https://github.com/Rust-for-Linux/linux/issues/629 Fixes: 1fbde52bde73 ("rust: add `macros` crate") Signed-off-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin(a)proton.me> Reviewed-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida(a)microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401185222.12015-1-benno.lossin@proton.me [ Moved `THIS_MODULE` out of the private-in-private modules since it should remain public, as Dirk Behme noticed [1]. Capitalized comments, avoided newline in non-list SAFETY comments and reworded to add Reported-by and newline. ] Link: https://rust-for-linux.zulipchat.com/#narrow/stream/291565-Help/topic/x/nea… [1] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/rust/macros/module.rs b/rust/macros/module.rs index 27979e582e4b..acd0393b5095 100644 --- a/rust/macros/module.rs +++ b/rust/macros/module.rs @@ -199,17 +199,6 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream { /// Used by the printing macros, e.g. [`info!`]. const __LOG_PREFIX: &[u8] = b\"{name}\\0\"; - /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark. - // - // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo - // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple. - #[cfg(MODULE)] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[used] - static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = (); - - static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None; - // SAFETY: `__this_module` is constructed by the kernel at load time and will not be // freed until the module is unloaded. #[cfg(MODULE)] @@ -221,81 +210,132 @@ pub(crate) fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream { kernel::ThisModule::from_ptr(core::ptr::null_mut()) }}; - // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers. - /// # Safety - /// - /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be - /// freed after that completes. - #[cfg(MODULE)] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[no_mangle] - #[link_section = \".init.text\"] - pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ - __init() - }} + // Double nested modules, since then nobody can access the public items inside. + mod __module_init {{ + mod __module_init {{ + use super::super::{type_}; - #[cfg(MODULE)] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[no_mangle] - pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{ - __exit() - }} + /// The \"Rust loadable module\" mark. + // + // This may be best done another way later on, e.g. as a new modinfo + // key or a new section. For the moment, keep it simple. + #[cfg(MODULE)] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[used] + static __IS_RUST_MODULE: () = (); - // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer - // and the identifiers need to be unique. - #[cfg(not(MODULE))] - #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"] - #[used] - pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init; + static mut __MOD: Option<{type_}> = None; - #[cfg(not(MODULE))] - #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)] - core::arch::global_asm!( - r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\" - __{name}_initcall: - .long __{name}_init - . - .previous - \"# - ); + // Loadable modules need to export the `{{init,cleanup}}_module` identifiers. + /// # Safety + /// + /// This function must not be called after module initialization, because it may be + /// freed after that completes. + #[cfg(MODULE)] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[no_mangle] + #[link_section = \".init.text\"] + pub unsafe extern \"C\" fn init_module() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ + // SAFETY: This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double + // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its + // unique name. + unsafe {{ __init() }} + }} - #[cfg(not(MODULE))] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[no_mangle] - pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ - __init() - }} + #[cfg(MODULE)] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[no_mangle] + pub extern \"C\" fn cleanup_module() {{ + // SAFETY: + // - This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double + // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its + // unique name, + // - furthermore it is only called after `init_module` has returned `0` + // (which delegates to `__init`). + unsafe {{ __exit() }} + }} - #[cfg(not(MODULE))] - #[doc(hidden)] - #[no_mangle] - pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{ - __exit() - }} + // Built-in modules are initialized through an initcall pointer + // and the identifiers need to be unique. + #[cfg(not(MODULE))] + #[cfg(not(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS))] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[link_section = \"{initcall_section}\"] + #[used] + pub static __{name}_initcall: extern \"C\" fn() -> core::ffi::c_int = __{name}_init; - fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ - match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&THIS_MODULE) {{ - Ok(m) => {{ - unsafe {{ - __MOD = Some(m); + #[cfg(not(MODULE))] + #[cfg(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS)] + core::arch::global_asm!( + r#\".section \"{initcall_section}\", \"a\" + __{name}_initcall: + .long __{name}_init - . + .previous + \"# + ); + + #[cfg(not(MODULE))] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[no_mangle] + pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ + // SAFETY: This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double + // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its + // placement above in the initcall section. + unsafe {{ __init() }} + }} + + #[cfg(not(MODULE))] + #[doc(hidden)] + #[no_mangle] + pub extern \"C\" fn __{name}_exit() {{ + // SAFETY: + // - This function is inaccessible to the outside due to the double + // module wrapping it. It is called exactly once by the C side via its + // unique name, + // - furthermore it is only called after `__{name}_init` has returned `0` + // (which delegates to `__init`). + unsafe {{ __exit() }} + }} + + /// # Safety + /// + /// This function must only be called once. + unsafe fn __init() -> core::ffi::c_int {{ + match <{type_} as kernel::Module>::init(&super::super::THIS_MODULE) {{ + Ok(m) => {{ + // SAFETY: No data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this + // module and there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These + // functions are only called once and `__exit` cannot be called + // before or during `__init`. + unsafe {{ + __MOD = Some(m); + }} + return 0; + }} + Err(e) => {{ + return e.to_errno(); + }} }} - return 0; }} - Err(e) => {{ - return e.to_errno(); + + /// # Safety + /// + /// This function must + /// - only be called once, + /// - be called after `__init` has been called and returned `0`. + unsafe fn __exit() {{ + // SAFETY: No data race, since `__MOD` can only be accessed by this module + // and there only `__init` and `__exit` access it. These functions are only + // called once and `__init` was already called. + unsafe {{ + // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup. + __MOD = None; + }} }} + + {modinfo} }} }} - - fn __exit() {{ - unsafe {{ - // Invokes `drop()` on `__MOD`, which should be used for cleanup. - __MOD = None; - }} - }} - - {modinfo} ", type_ = info.type_, name = info.name,

5 months, 2 weeks

2
1
0 0

[PATCH 2/5] Bluetooth: qca: fix info leak when fetching board id

by Johan Hovold

Add the missing sanity check when fetching the board id to avoid leaking slab data when later requesting the firmware. Fixes: a7f8dedb4be2 ("Bluetooth: qca: add support for QCA2066") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.7 Cc: Tim Jiang <quic_tjiang(a)quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c index a508d79d9aaa..638074992c82 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c @@ -252,6 +252,11 @@ static int qca_read_fw_board_id(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 *bid) goto out; } + if (skb->len < 3) { + err = -EILSEQ; + goto out; + } + *bid = (edl->data[1] << 8) + edl->data[2]; bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "%s: bid = %x", __func__, *bid); -- 2.43.2

5 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 1/5] Bluetooth: qca: fix info leak when fetching fw build id

by Johan Hovold

Add the missing sanity checks and move the 255-byte build-id buffer off the stack to avoid leaking stack data through debugfs in case the build-info reply is malformed. Fixes: c0187b0bd3e9 ("Bluetooth: btqca: Add support to read FW build version for WCN3991 BTSoC") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.12 Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/bluetooth/btqca.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c index 38a770278103..a508d79d9aaa 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.c @@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ static int qca_read_fw_build_info(struct hci_dev *hdev) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct edl_event_hdr *edl; - char cmd, build_label[QCA_FW_BUILD_VER_LEN]; + char *build_label; + char cmd; int build_lbl_len, err = 0; bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "QCA read fw build info"); @@ -114,6 +115,11 @@ static int qca_read_fw_build_info(struct hci_dev *hdev) return err; } + if (skb->len < sizeof(*edl)) { + err = -EILSEQ; + goto out; + } + edl = (struct edl_event_hdr *)(skb->data); if (!edl) { bt_dev_err(hdev, "QCA read fw build info with no header"); @@ -129,14 +135,25 @@ static int qca_read_fw_build_info(struct hci_dev *hdev) goto out; } + if (skb->len < sizeof(*edl) + 1) { + err = -EILSEQ; + goto out; + } + build_lbl_len = edl->data[0]; - if (build_lbl_len <= QCA_FW_BUILD_VER_LEN - 1) { - memcpy(build_label, edl->data + 1, build_lbl_len); - *(build_label + build_lbl_len) = '\0'; + + if (skb->len < sizeof(*edl) + 1 + build_lbl_len) { + err = -EILSEQ; + goto out; } + build_label = kstrndup(&edl->data[1], build_lbl_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!build_label) + goto out; + hci_set_fw_info(hdev, "%s", build_label); + kfree(build_label); out: kfree_skb(skb); return err; diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.h b/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.h index 49ad668d0d0b..215433fd76a1 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.h +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btqca.h @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ #define get_soc_ver(soc_id, rom_ver) \ ((le32_to_cpu(soc_id) << 16) | (le16_to_cpu(rom_ver))) -#define QCA_FW_BUILD_VER_LEN 255 #define QCA_HSP_GF_SOC_ID 0x1200 #define QCA_HSP_GF_SOC_MASK 0x0000ff00 -- 2.43.2

5 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 28/45] drm/amd/display: Fix idle optimization checks for multi-display and dual eDP

by Tom Chung

From: Nicholas Kazlauskas <nicholas.kazlauskas(a)amd.com> [Why] Idle optimizations are blocked if there's more than one eDP connector on the board - blocking S0i3 and IPS2 for static screen. [How] Fix the checks to correctly detect number of active eDP. Also restrict the eDP support to panels that have correct feature support. Cc: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello(a)amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Charlene Liu <charlene.liu(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <nicholas.kazlauskas(a)amd.com> --- .../amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn35/dcn35_hwseq.c | 33 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn35/dcn35_hwseq.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn35/dcn35_hwseq.c index 1c71a5d4ac5d..bddcd23a2727 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn35/dcn35_hwseq.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn35/dcn35_hwseq.c @@ -660,22 +660,43 @@ void dcn35_power_down_on_boot(struct dc *dc) bool dcn35_apply_idle_power_optimizations(struct dc *dc, bool enable) { - struct dc_link *edp_links[MAX_NUM_EDP]; - int i, edp_num; if (dc->debug.dmcub_emulation) return true; if (enable) { - dc_get_edp_links(dc, edp_links, &edp_num); - if (edp_num == 0 || edp_num > 1) - return false; + uint32_t num_active_edp = 0; + int i; for (i = 0; i < dc->current_state->stream_count; ++i) { struct dc_stream_state *stream = dc->current_state->streams[i]; + struct dc_link *link = stream->link; + bool is_psr = link && !link->panel_config.psr.disable_psr && + (link->psr_settings.psr_version == DC_PSR_VERSION_1 || + link->psr_settings.psr_version == DC_PSR_VERSION_SU_1); + bool is_replay = link && link->replay_settings.replay_feature_enabled; + + /* Ignore streams that disabled. */ + if (stream->dpms_off) + continue; + + /* Active external displays block idle optimizations. */ + if (!dc_is_embedded_signal(stream->signal)) + return false; + + /* If not PWRSEQ0 can't enter idle optimizations */ + if (link && link->link_index != 0) + return false; - if (!stream->dpms_off && !dc_is_embedded_signal(stream->signal)) + /* Check for panel power features required for idle optimizations. */ + if (!is_psr && !is_replay) return false; + + num_active_edp += 1; } + + /* If more than one active eDP then disallow. */ + if (num_active_edp > 1) + return false; } // TODO: review other cases when idle optimization is allowed -- 2.34.1

5 months, 2 weeks

1
0
0 0

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror May 2024