July 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v2 1/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v2: - Use dev_warn_once() instead of pr_warn_once(). --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 907ac9956a78..2f1d96a5a5a7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -824,8 +824,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response); */ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle); - memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth)); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!auth) + return; + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -907,6 +912,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) int rc; u32 null_key; + if (!auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) goto out; -- 2.45.2

4 days

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[PATCH] tpm: Limit TCG_TPM2_HMAC to known good drivers

by Jarkko Sakkinen

IBM vTPM driver lacks a call to tpm2_sessions_init() and reports: [ 2.987131] tpm tpm0: tpm2_load_context: failed with a TPM error 0x01C4 [ 2.987140] ima: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: -14 HMAC encryption code also has a risk of null derefence, given that when uninitialized, chip->auth is a null pointer. Limit TCG_TPM2_HMAC to known good drivers until these issues have been properly fixed. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation") Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index cf0be8a7939d..c310588a5958 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ if TCG_TPM config TCG_TPM2_HMAC bool "Use HMAC and encrypted transactions on the TPM bus" default X86_64 + depends on TCG_CRB || TCG_TIS_CORE select CRYPTO_ECDH select CRYPTO_LIB_AESCFB select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256 -- 2.45.2

4 days, 1 hour

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[PATCH 3/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_hmac_session*(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_hmac_session*() and remove the fallback implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 181 ++++++++++++++++++------------- include/linux/tpm.h | 67 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 7102a417f3f2..530eb218b9c3 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -268,6 +268,105 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); +/** + * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @attributes: The session attributes + * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) + * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) + * + * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except + * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is + * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, + * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the + * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), + * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be + * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the + * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, + * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). + * + * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling + * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect + * and the TPM will reject the command. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, + int passphrase_len) +{ + u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u32 len; + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!chip->auth) { + /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len; + + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { + /* not the first session so update the existing length */ + len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); + } + /* auth handle */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); + /* nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); + /* attributes */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); + /* passphrase */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len); + tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len); + return; + } + + /* + * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros + * before computing the HMAC + */ + while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') + passphrase_len--; + + auth->attrs = attributes; + auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; + if (passphrase_len) + memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); + + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + /* we're not the first session */ + len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); + if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); + return; + } + + /* add our new session */ + len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); + } else { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + } + + /* random number for our nonce */ + get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); + /* our new nonce */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); + /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); + #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume @@ -449,82 +548,6 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) crypto_free_kpp(kpp); } -/** - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @attributes: The session attributes - * @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none) - * @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none) - * - * This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except - * for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is - * complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes, - * the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the - * session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), - * TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be - * encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the - * response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing, - * but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM). - * - * Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling - * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect - * and the TPM will reject the command. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphrase_len) -{ - u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - u32 len; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - - /* - * The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros - * before computing the HMAC - */ - while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 - && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0') - passphrase_len--; - - auth->attrs = attributes; - auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len; - if (passphrase_len) - memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len); - - if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - /* we're not the first session */ - len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]); - if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { - WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append"); - return; - } - - /* add our new session */ - len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - } - - /* random number for our nonce */ - get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle); - /* our new nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs); - /* and put a placeholder for the hmac */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session); - /** * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -555,6 +578,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_state sctx; + if (!auth) + return; + /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -713,6 +739,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal); int parm_len, len, i, handles; + if (!auth) + return rc; + if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n"); goto out; diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 2844fea4a12a..912fd0d2646d 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -493,22 +493,35 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name); - -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC - -int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); + static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen) { - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, - passphraselen); + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + if (chip->auth) { + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, + passphraselen); + } else { + /* + * If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to + * TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. + */ + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); + } } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); @@ -523,48 +536,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, - int passphraselen) -{ - /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 len = 9 + passphraselen; - - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) { - /* not the first session so update the existing length */ - len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); - } - /* auth handle */ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); - /* nonce */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0); - /* attributes */ - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0); - /* passphrase */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphraselen); - tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphraselen); -} -static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u8 attributes, - u8 *passphrase, - int passphraselen) -{ - int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *) buf->data; - - /* - * if the only sessions are optional, the command tag - * must change to TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS - */ - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset) - head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); -} static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { -- 2.45.2

4 days, 1 hour

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[PATCH 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_append_name(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name() and remove the fallback implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 205 ++++++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/tpm.h | 16 +-- 3 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 4c695b0388f3..9bb142c75243 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ tpm-y += eventlog/common.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o tpm-y += tpm-buf.o +tpm-y += tpm2-sessions.o -tpm-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC) += tpm2-sessions.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += eventlog/of.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index d94b14757452..7102a417f3f2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -163,6 +163,112 @@ static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) return size_map[alg] + 2; } +static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* skip public */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val > tot_len) + return -EINVAL; + offset += val; + /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); + /* forget the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @handle: The handle to be appended + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) + * + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the + * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called + * on the handle to obtain the name. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) +{ + enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + int slot; + + if (!chip->auth) { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ + buf->handles++; + return; + } + + slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; + if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); + return; + } + WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), + "name added in wrong place\n"); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + auth->session += 4; + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + if (!name) + tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + } else { + if (name) + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + } + + auth->name_h[slot] = handle; + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key @@ -567,104 +673,6 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) - return -EINVAL; - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @handle: The handle to be appended - * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) - * - * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the - * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply - * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name - * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV - * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name - * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to - * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these - * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is - * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called - * on the handle to obtain the name. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int slot; - - slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4; - if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; - } - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - auth->session += 4; - - if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || - mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || - mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); - } - - auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name); - /** * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -1311,3 +1319,4 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) return rc; } +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 21a67dc9efe8..2844fea4a12a 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ struct tpm_chip { u8 null_key_name[TPM2_NAME_SIZE]; u8 null_ec_key_x[EC_PT_SZ]; u8 null_ec_key_y[EC_PT_SZ]; - struct tpm2_auth *auth; #endif + struct tpm2_auth *auth; }; #define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10 @@ -490,11 +490,13 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) { } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC -int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -521,14 +523,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ - buf->handles++; -} static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, -- 2.45.2

4 days, 1 hour

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[PATCH 1/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm2_*_auth_session(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.9+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@li… Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 907ac9956a78..d94b14757452 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -824,8 +824,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_check_hmac_response); */ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - tpm2_flush_context(chip, chip->auth->handle); - memzero_explicit(chip->auth, sizeof(*chip->auth)); + struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; + + if (!auth) + return; + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); + memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -907,6 +912,11 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) int rc; u32 null_key; + if (!auth) { + pr_warn_once("%s: encryption is not active\n", __func__); + return 0; + } + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) goto out; -- 2.45.2

4 days, 1 hour

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[PATCH] drm/panfrost: Mark simple_ondemand governor as softdep

by Dragan Simic

Panfrost DRM driver uses devfreq to perform DVFS, while using simple_ondemand devfreq governor by default. This causes driver initialization to fail on boot when simple_ondemand governor isn't built into the kernel statically, as a result of the missing module dependency and, consequently, the required governor module not being included in the initial ramdisk. Thus, let's mark simple_ondemand governor as a softdep for Panfrost, to have its kernel module included in the initial ramdisk. This is a rather longstanding issue that has forced distributions to build devfreq governors statically into their kernels, [1][2] or has forced users to introduce some unnecessary workarounds. [3] For future reference, not having support for the simple_ondemand governor in the initial ramdisk produces errors in the kernel log similar to these below, which were taken from a Pine64 RockPro64: panfrost ff9a0000.gpu: [drm:panfrost_devfreq_init [panfrost]] *ERROR* Couldn't initialize GPU devfreq panfrost ff9a0000.gpu: Fatal error during GPU init panfrost: probe of ff9a0000.gpu failed with error -22 Having simple_ondemand marked as a softdep for Panfrost may not resolve this issue for all Linux distributions. In particular, it will remain unresolved for the distributions whose utilities for the initial ramdisk generation do not handle the available softdep information [4] properly yet. However, some Linux distributions already handle softdeps properly while generating their initial ramdisks, [5] and this is a prerequisite step in the right direction for the distributions that don't handle them properly yet. [1] https://gitlab.manjaro.org/manjaro-arm/packages/core/linux/-/blob/linux61/c… [2] https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/merge_requests/1066 [3] https://forum.pine64.org/showthread.php?tid=15458 [4] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/utils/kernel/kmod/kmod.git/commit/?id=49d8e0… [5] https://github.com/archlinux/mkinitcpio/commit/97ac4d37aae084a050be512f6d8f… Cc: Diederik de Haas <didi.debian(a)cknow.org> Cc: Furkan Kardame <f.kardame(a)manjaro.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: f3ba91228e8e ("drm/panfrost: Add initial panfrost driver") Signed-off-by: Dragan Simic <dsimic(a)manjaro.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c index ef9f6c0716d5..149737d7a07e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c @@ -828,3 +828,4 @@ module_platform_driver(panfrost_driver); MODULE_AUTHOR("Panfrost Project Developers"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Panfrost DRM Driver"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); +MODULE_SOFTDEP("pre: governor_simpleondemand");

4 days, 3 hours

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季度一次性岗位补助通知！

by 财务中心

季度一次性企业职工综合补贴申报表（附件）政策实施期限截至2024年7月15日！

4 days, 4 hours

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patch "iio: light: apds9306: Fix error handing" added to char-misc-linus

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled iio: light: apds9306: Fix error handing to my char-misc git tree which can be found at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git in the char-misc-linus branch. The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.) The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the next -rc kernel release. If you have any questions about this process, please let me know. From 1a5cba43096c9242fab503a40b053ec6b93d313a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mudit Sharma <muditsharma.info(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 22:02:01 +0100 Subject: iio: light: apds9306: Fix error handing The return value of 'iio_gts_find_int_time_by_sel()' is assigned to variable 'intg_old' but value of 'ret' is checked for error. Update to use 'intg_old' for error checking. Fixes: 620d1e6c7a3f ("iio: light: Add support for APDS9306 Light Sensor") Signed-off-by: Mudit Sharma <muditsharma.info(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Subhajit Ghosh <subhajit.ghosh(a)tweaklogic.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240625210203.522179-1-muditsharma.info@gmail.com Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c b/drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c index d6627b3e6000..66a063ea3db4 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/apds9306.c @@ -583,8 +583,8 @@ static int apds9306_intg_time_set(struct apds9306_data *data, int val2) return ret; intg_old = iio_gts_find_int_time_by_sel(&data->gts, intg_time_idx); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; + if (intg_old < 0) + return intg_old; if (intg_old == val2) return 0; -- 2.45.2

4 days, 4 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] serial: 8250_omap: Fix Errata i2310 with RX FIFO level check" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x c128a1b0523b685c8856ddc0ac0e1caef1fdeee5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070339-simile-village-6731@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From c128a1b0523b685c8856ddc0ac0e1caef1fdeee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Udit Kumar <u-kumar1(a)ti.com> Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 21:37:25 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] serial: 8250_omap: Fix Errata i2310 with RX FIFO level check Errata i2310[0] says, Erroneous timeout can be triggered, if this Erroneous interrupt is not cleared then it may leads to storm of interrupts. Commit 9d141c1e6157 ("serial: 8250_omap: Implementation of Errata i2310") which added the workaround but missed ensuring RX FIFO is really empty before applying the errata workaround as recommended in the errata text. Fix this by adding back check for UART_OMAP_RX_LVL to be 0 for workaround to take effect. [0] https://www.ti.com/lit/pdf/sprz536 page 23 Fixes: 9d141c1e6157 ("serial: 8250_omap: Implementation of Errata i2310") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr(a)ti.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e96d0c55-0b12-4cbf-9d23-48963543de49@ti.com/ Signed-off-by: Udit Kumar <u-kumar1(a)ti.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240625160725.2102194-1-u-kumar1@ti.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c index ddac0a13cf84..1af9aed99c65 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_omap.c @@ -672,7 +672,8 @@ static irqreturn_t omap8250_irq(int irq, void *dev_id) * https://www.ti.com/lit/pdf/sprz536 */ if (priv->habit & UART_RX_TIMEOUT_QUIRK && - (iir & UART_IIR_RX_TIMEOUT) == UART_IIR_RX_TIMEOUT) { + (iir & UART_IIR_RX_TIMEOUT) == UART_IIR_RX_TIMEOUT && + serial_port_in(port, UART_OMAP_RX_LVL) == 0) { unsigned char efr2, timeout_h, timeout_l; efr2 = serial_in(up, UART_OMAP_EFR2);

4 days, 4 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] serial: imx: only set receiver level if it is zero" failed to apply to 4.19-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9706fc87b4cff0ac4f5d5d62327be83fe72e3108 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024070352-machinist-blemish-148b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9706fc87b4cff0ac4f5d5d62327be83fe72e3108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefan Eichenberger <stefan.eichenberger(a)toradex.com> Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2024 13:25:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] serial: imx: only set receiver level if it is zero With commit a81dbd0463ec ("serial: imx: set receiver level before starting uart") we set the receiver level to its default value. This caused a regression when using SDMA, where the receiver level is 9 instead of 8 (default). This change will first check if the receiver level is zero and only then set it to the default. This still avoids the interrupt storm when the receiver level is zero. Fixes: a81dbd0463ec ("serial: imx: set receiver level before starting uart") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Eichenberger <stefan.eichenberger(a)toradex.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240703112543.148304-1-eichest@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/imx.c b/drivers/tty/serial/imx.c index f4f40c9373c2..e22be8f45c93 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/imx.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/imx.c @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ #define UCR4_OREN (1<<1) /* Receiver overrun interrupt enable */ #define UCR4_DREN (1<<0) /* Recv data ready interrupt enable */ #define UFCR_RXTL_SHF 0 /* Receiver trigger level shift */ +#define UFCR_RXTL_MASK 0x3F /* Receiver trigger 6 bits wide */ #define UFCR_DCEDTE (1<<6) /* DCE/DTE mode select */ #define UFCR_RFDIV (7<<7) /* Reference freq divider mask */ #define UFCR_RFDIV_REG(x) (((x) < 7 ? 6 - (x) : 6) << 7) @@ -1933,7 +1934,7 @@ static int imx_uart_rs485_config(struct uart_port *port, struct ktermios *termio struct serial_rs485 *rs485conf) { struct imx_port *sport = (struct imx_port *)port; - u32 ucr2; + u32 ucr2, ufcr; if (rs485conf->flags & SER_RS485_ENABLED) { /* Enable receiver if low-active RTS signal is requested */ @@ -1953,7 +1954,10 @@ static int imx_uart_rs485_config(struct uart_port *port, struct ktermios *termio /* Make sure Rx is enabled in case Tx is active with Rx disabled */ if (!(rs485conf->flags & SER_RS485_ENABLED) || rs485conf->flags & SER_RS485_RX_DURING_TX) { - imx_uart_setup_ufcr(sport, TXTL_DEFAULT, RXTL_DEFAULT); + /* If the receiver trigger is 0, set it to a default value */ + ufcr = imx_uart_readl(sport, UFCR); + if ((ufcr & UFCR_RXTL_MASK) == 0) + imx_uart_setup_ufcr(sport, TXTL_DEFAULT, RXTL_DEFAULT); imx_uart_start_rx(port); }

4 days, 4 hours

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