September 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

+ ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Subject: ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 06:47:20 +0000 One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem. The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting, the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption [EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record, but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata block. Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856) FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49) CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000 Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256 User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888 Links: 1 Clusters: 141738 ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024 atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024 mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024 dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969 Refcount Block: 2777346 Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14 Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230 ## Offset Clusters Block# 0 0 2310 2776351 1 2310 2139 2777375 2 4449 1221 2778399 3 5670 731 2779423 4 6401 566 2780447 ....... .... ....... ....... .... ....... The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr. The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space for inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243 to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode already has extents beyond this index (in this case upto 230), thereby causing corruption. The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata at the destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has verified the fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240912064720.898600-1-gautham.ananthakrishna@or… Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink") Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark(a)fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec(a)evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei(a)live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe(a)suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun(a)huawei.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c~ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree +++ a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "namei.h" #include "ocfs2_trace.h" #include "file.h" +#include "symlink.h" #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> @@ -4155,8 +4156,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry int ret; struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry); struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL; + struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode); - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { + if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { ret = -EINVAL; mlog_errno(ret); goto out; @@ -4182,6 +4184,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry goto out_unlock; } + if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) && + (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) { + /* + * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. + * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). + */ + struct ocfs2_inode_info *new_oi = OCFS2_I(new_inode); + + if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && + !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) { + struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = new_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = old_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; + int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size); + + le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / + sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); + } + } + ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); if (ret) { @@ -4189,7 +4211,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry goto inode_unlock; } - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { + if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c~ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree +++ a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -6520,16 +6520,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(st } new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode); - /* - * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. - * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). - */ - if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && - !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) { - struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; - le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / - sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); - } + spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock); new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL; new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com are ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch

3 days, 10 hours

1
0
0 0

[PATCH] crypto: Fix logical operator in _aead_recvmsg()

by George Rurikov

From: MrRurikov <grurikovsherbakov(a)yandex.ru> After having been compared to a NULL value at algif_aead.c:191, pointer 'tsgl_src' is passed as 2nd parameter in call to function 'crypto_aead_copy_sgl' at algif_aead.c:244, where it is dereferenced at algif_aead.c:85. Change logical operator from && to || because pointer 'tsgl_src' is NULL, then 'proccessed' will still be non-null Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code") Signed-off-by: MrRurikov <grurikovsherbakov(a)yandex.ru> --- crypto/algif_aead.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index 7d58cbbce4af..135f09a4b3f8 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, if (tsgl_src) break; } - if (processed && !tsgl_src) { + if (processed || !tsgl_src) { err = -EFAULT; goto free; } -- 2.34.1 Заявление о конфиденциальности Данное электронное письмо и любые приложения к нему являются конфиденциальными и предназначены исключительно для адресата. Если Вы не являетесь адресатом данного письма, пожалуйста, уведомите немедленно отправителя, не раскрывайте содержание другим лицам, не используйте его в каких-либо целях, не храните и не копируйте информацию любым способом.

3 days, 11 hours

4
3
0 0

[PATCH v5.4-v4.19] gpio: prevent potential speculation leaks in gpio_device_get_desc()

by hsimeliere.opensource＠witekio.com

From: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> commit d795848ecce24a75dfd46481aee066ae6fe39775 upstream. Userspace may trigger a speculative read of an address outside the gpio descriptor array. Users can do that by calling gpio_ioctl() with an offset out of range. Offset is copied from user and then used as an array index to get the gpio descriptor without sanitization in gpio_device_get_desc(). This change ensures that the offset is sanitized by using array_index_nospec() to mitigate any possibility of speculative information leaks. This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc. Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523085332.1801-1-hagarhem@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource(a)witekio.com> --- drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c index abdf448b11a3..f83b2214d704 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/irq.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/device.h> @@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ struct gpio_desc *gpiochip_get_desc(struct gpio_chip *chip, if (hwnum >= gdev->ngpio) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - return &gdev->descs[hwnum]; + return &gdev->descs[array_index_nospec(hwnum, gdev->ngpio)]; } /** -- 2.43.0

3 days, 11 hours

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v6.1-v5.10] gpio: prevent potential speculation leaks in gpio_device_get_desc()

by hsimeliere.opensource＠witekio.com

From: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> commit d795848ecce24a75dfd46481aee066ae6fe39775 upstream. Userspace may trigger a speculative read of an address outside the gpio descriptor array. Users can do that by calling gpio_ioctl() with an offset out of range. Offset is copied from user and then used as an array index to get the gpio descriptor without sanitization in gpio_device_get_desc(). This change ensures that the offset is sanitized by using array_index_nospec() to mitigate any possibility of speculative information leaks. This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc. Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240523085332.1801-1-hagarhem@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <hsimeliere.opensource(a)witekio.com> --- drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c index 9d8c78312403..a0c1dabd2939 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/irq.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/device.h> @@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ struct gpio_desc *gpiochip_get_desc(struct gpio_chip *gc, if (hwnum >= gdev->ngpio) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - return &gdev->descs[hwnum]; + return &gdev->descs[array_index_nospec(hwnum, gdev->ngpio)]; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gpiochip_get_desc); -- 2.43.0

3 days, 11 hours

1
0
0 0

Re: [PATCH 6.10 000/121] 6.10.11-rc1 review

by Ronald Warsow

Hi Greg no regressions here on x86_64 (RKL, Intel 11th Gen. CPU) Thanks Tested-by: Ronald Warsow <rwarsow(a)gmx.de>

3 days, 12 hours

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 6.10] LoongArch: KVM: Remove unnecessary definition of KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS

by WangYuli

From: Yuli Wang <wangyuli(a)uniontech.com> [ Upstream commit 296b03ce389b4f7b3d7ea5664e53d432fb17e745 ] 1. "KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS" is renamed as "KVM_INTERNAL_MEM_SLOTS". 2. "KVM_INTERNAL_MEM_SLOTS" defaults to zero, so it is not necessary to define it in LoongArch's asm/kvm_host.h. Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao <maobibo(a)loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao(a)uniontech.com> Signed-off-by: Yuli Wang <wangyuli(a)uniontech.com> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> --- arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_host.h index c87b6ea0ec47..d348005d143e 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ #define KVM_MAX_VCPUS 256 #define KVM_MAX_CPUCFG_REGS 21 -/* memory slots that does not exposed to userspace */ -#define KVM_PRIVATE_MEM_SLOTS 0 #define KVM_HALT_POLL_NS_DEFAULT 500000 -- 2.43.0

3 days, 13 hours

2
1
0 0

[PATCH v2 3/6] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_primary() failure in tpm2_load_null()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

tpm2_load_null() ignores the return value of tpm2_create_primary(). Further, it does not heal from the situation when memcmp() returns zero. Address this by returning on failure and saving the null key if there was no detected interference in the bus. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.11+ Fixes: eb24c9788cd9 ("tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v2: - Refined the commit message. - Reverted tpm2_create_primary() changes. They are not required if tmp_null_key is used as the parameter. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index d63510ad44ab..9c0356d7ce5e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -850,22 +850,32 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth, static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) { - int rc; unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed context */ u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2]; + u32 tmp_null_key; + int rc; rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset, - null_key); - if (rc != -EINVAL) + &tmp_null_key); + if (rc != -EINVAL) { + if (!rc) + *null_key = tmp_null_key; return rc; + } /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */ dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n"); - /* check the null name against what we know */ - tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name); - if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) - /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure */ + + rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key, name); + if (rc) return rc; + + /* Return the null key if the name has not been changed: */ + if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0) { + *null_key = tmp_null_key; + return 0; + } + /* * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so * the TPM must have been illegally reset. All in-kernel TPM @@ -874,6 +884,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it. */ dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due to interference\n"); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, tmp_null_key); chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_DISABLE; return rc; -- 2.46.0

3 days, 14 hours

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v2 2/6] tpm: Return on tpm2_create_null_primary() failure

by Jarkko Sakkinen

tpm2_sessions_init() ignores the return value of tpm2_create_null_primary(). Address this by returning on failure. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.11+ Fixes: d2add27cf2b8 ("tpm: Add NULL primary creation") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v2: - Refined the commit message. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6cc1ea81c57c..d63510ad44ab 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -1288,8 +1288,10 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) int rc; rc = tpm2_create_null_primary(chip); - if (rc) + if (rc) { dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: security failed (NULL seed derivation): %d\n", rc); + return rc; + } chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); if (!chip->auth) -- 2.46.0

3 days, 14 hours

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 6.6] drm/amd/display: Fix subvp+drr logic errors

by Murad Masimov

From: Alvin Lee <alvin.lee2(a)amd.com> commit 8a0f02b7beed7b2b768dbdf3b79960de68f460c5 upstream. [Why] There is some logic error where the wrong variable was used to check for OTG_MASTER and DPP_PIPE. [How] Add booleans to confirm that the expected pipes were found before validating schedulability. Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <rodrigo.siqueira(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Samson Tam <samson.tam(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Dhere <chaitanya.dhere(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alvin Lee <alvin.lee2(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Murad Masimov <m.masimov(a)maxima.ru> --- .../drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c index 3d82cbef1274..7160380d5690 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c @@ -879,6 +879,8 @@ static bool subvp_drr_schedulable(struct dc *dc, struct dc_state *context) int16_t stretched_drr_us = 0; int16_t drr_stretched_vblank_us = 0; int16_t max_vblank_mallregion = 0; + bool subvp_found = false; + bool drr_found = false; // Find SubVP pipe for (i = 0; i < dc->res_pool->pipe_count; i++) { @@ -891,8 +893,10 @@ static bool subvp_drr_schedulable(struct dc *dc, struct dc_state *context) continue; // Find the SubVP pipe - if (pipe->stream->mall_stream_config.type == SUBVP_MAIN) + if (pipe->stream->mall_stream_config.type == SUBVP_MAIN) { + subvp_found = true; break; + } } // Find the DRR pipe @@ -900,15 +904,20 @@ static bool subvp_drr_schedulable(struct dc *dc, struct dc_state *context) drr_pipe = &context->res_ctx.pipe_ctx[i]; // We check for master pipe only - if (!resource_is_pipe_type(pipe, OTG_MASTER) || - !resource_is_pipe_type(pipe, DPP_PIPE)) + if (!resource_is_pipe_type(drr_pipe, OTG_MASTER) || + !resource_is_pipe_type(drr_pipe, DPP_PIPE)) continue; if (drr_pipe->stream->mall_stream_config.type == SUBVP_NONE && drr_pipe->stream->ignore_msa_timing_param && - (drr_pipe->stream->allow_freesync || drr_pipe->stream->vrr_active_variable)) + (drr_pipe->stream->allow_freesync || drr_pipe->stream->vrr_active_variable)) { + drr_found = true; break; + } } + if (!subvp_found || !drr_found) + return false; + main_timing = &pipe->stream->timing; phantom_timing = &pipe->stream->mall_stream_config.paired_stream->timing; drr_timing = &drr_pipe->stream->timing; -- 2.39.2

3 days, 14 hours

1
0
0 0

[PATCH 6.1] drm/amd/display: Fix subvp+drr logic errors

by Murad Masimov

From: Alvin Lee <alvin.lee2(a)amd.com> commit 8a0f02b7beed7b2b768dbdf3b79960de68f460c5 upstream. [Why] There is some logic error where the wrong variable was used to check for OTG_MASTER and DPP_PIPE. [How] Add booleans to confirm that the expected pipes were found before validating schedulability. Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <rodrigo.siqueira(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Samson Tam <samson.tam(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Dhere <chaitanya.dhere(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alvin Lee <alvin.lee2(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> [m.masimov(a)maxima.ru: In order to adapt this patch to branch 6.1 only changes related to finding the SubVP pipe were applied as in 6.1 drr_pipe is passed as a function argument.] Signed-off-by: Murad Masimov <m.masimov(a)maxima.ru> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c index 85e0d1c2a908..4b0719392d28 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.c @@ -862,6 +862,7 @@ static bool subvp_drr_schedulable(struct dc *dc, struct dc_state *context, struc int16_t stretched_drr_us = 0; int16_t drr_stretched_vblank_us = 0; int16_t max_vblank_mallregion = 0; + bool subvp_found = false; // Find SubVP pipe for (i = 0; i < dc->res_pool->pipe_count; i++) { @@ -873,10 +874,15 @@ static bool subvp_drr_schedulable(struct dc *dc, struct dc_state *context, struc continue; // Find the SubVP pipe - if (pipe->stream->mall_stream_config.type == SUBVP_MAIN) + if (pipe->stream->mall_stream_config.type == SUBVP_MAIN) { + subvp_found = true; break; + } } + if (!subvp_found) + return false; + main_timing = &pipe->stream->timing; phantom_timing = &pipe->stream->mall_stream_config.paired_stream->timing; drr_timing = &drr_pipe->stream->timing; -- 2.39.2

3 days, 14 hours

1
0
0 0

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

Linux-stable-mirror September 2024