September 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH v5 4/5] tpm: Allocate chip->auth in tpm2_start_auth_session()

by Jarkko Sakkinen

Move allocation of chip->auth to tpm2_start_auth_session() so that the field can be used as flag to tell whether auth session is active or not. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v5: - No changes. v4: - Change to bug. v3: - No changes. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 1aef5b1f9c90..a8d3d5d52178 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -484,7 +484,8 @@ static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, sha256_final(&sctx, out); } -static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) +static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct tpm2_auth *auth) { struct crypto_kpp *kpp; struct kpp_request *req; @@ -543,7 +544,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) sg_set_buf(&s[0], chip->null_ec_key_x, EC_PT_SZ); sg_set_buf(&s[1], chip->null_ec_key_y, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_input(req, s, EC_PT_SZ*2); - sg_init_one(d, chip->auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); + sg_init_one(d, auth->salt, EC_PT_SZ); kpp_request_set_output(req, d, EC_PT_SZ); crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req); kpp_request_free(req); @@ -554,8 +555,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip) * This works because KDFe fully consumes the secret before it * writes the salt */ - tpm2_KDFe(chip->auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, - chip->auth->salt); + tpm2_KDFe(auth->salt, "SECRET", x, chip->null_ec_key_x, auth->salt); out: crypto_free_kpp(kpp); @@ -854,6 +854,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, /* manually close the session if it wasn't consumed */ tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } else { /* reset for next use */ auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; @@ -882,6 +884,8 @@ void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm2_flush_context(chip, auth->handle); memzero_explicit(auth, sizeof(*auth)); + kfree(auth); + chip->auth = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_end_auth_session); @@ -970,25 +974,29 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key) */ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { + struct tpm2_auth *auth; struct tpm_buf buf; - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int rc; u32 null_key; + int rc; - if (!auth) { - dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is not active\n"); + if (chip->auth) { + dev_warn_once(&chip->dev, "auth session is active\n"); return 0; } + auth = kzalloc(sizeof(*auth), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!auth) + return -ENOMEM; + rc = tpm2_load_null(chip, &null_key); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; auth->session = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); if (rc) - goto out; + goto err; /* salt key handle */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, null_key); @@ -1000,7 +1008,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_append(&buf, auth->our_nonce, sizeof(auth->our_nonce)); /* append encrypted salt and squirrel away unencrypted in auth */ - tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip); + tpm_buf_append_salt(&buf, chip, auth); /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_HMAC); @@ -1021,10 +1029,13 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) { + chip->auth = auth; + return 0; + } - out: +err: + kfree(auth); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_start_auth_session); @@ -1371,10 +1382,6 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) if (rc) return rc; - chip->auth = kmalloc(sizeof(*chip->auth), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->auth) - return -ENOMEM; - return rc; } #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ -- 2.46.1

2 months, 4 weeks

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[PATCH] soc: qcom: pd_mapper: fix ADSP PD maps

by Dmitry Baryshkov

On X1E8 devices root ADSP domain should have tms/pdr_enabled registered. Change the PDM domain data that is used for X1E80100 ADSP. Fixes: bd6db1f1486e ("soc: qcom: pd_mapper: Add X1E80100") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov(a)linaro.org> --- drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c b/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c index c940f4da28ed..9d33a8c71778 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c +++ b/drivers/soc/qcom/qcom_pd_mapper.c @@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static const struct qcom_pdm_domain_data *sm8550_domains[] = { static const struct qcom_pdm_domain_data *x1e80100_domains[] = { &adsp_audio_pd, - &adsp_root_pd, + &adsp_root_pd_pdr, &adsp_charger_pd, &adsp_sensor_pd, &cdsp_root_pd, --- base-commit: 32ffa5373540a8d1c06619f52d019c6cdc948bb4 change-id: 20240918-x1e-fix-pdm-pdr-b7c4d978aaf3 Best regards, -- Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov(a)linaro.org>

3 months

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[alternative-merged] padata-honor-the-callers-alignment-in-case-of-chunk_size-0.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: padata: honor the caller's alignment in case of chunk_size 0 has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was padata-honor-the-callers-alignment-in-case-of-chunk_size-0.patch This patch was dropped because an alternative patch was or shall be merged ------------------------------------------------------ From: Kamlesh Gurudasani <kamlesh(a)ti.com> Subject: padata: honor the caller's alignment in case of chunk_size 0 Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 02:32:52 +0530 In the case where we are forcing the ps.chunk_size to be at least 1, we are ignoring the caller's alignment. Move the forcing of ps.chunk_size to be at least 1 before rounding it up to caller's alignment, so that caller's alignment is honored. While at it, use max() to force the ps.chunk_size to be at least 1 to improve readability. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240822-max-v1-1-cb4bc5b1c101@ti.com Fixes: 6d45e1c948a8 ("padata: Fix possible divide-by-0 panic in padata_mt_helper()") Signed-off-by: Kamlesh Gurudasani <kamlesh(a)ti.com> Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan(a)oracle.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- kernel/padata.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/kernel/padata.c~padata-honor-the-callers-alignment-in-case-of-chunk_size-0 +++ a/kernel/padata.c @@ -509,21 +509,17 @@ void __init padata_do_multithreaded(stru /* * Chunk size is the amount of work a helper does per call to the - * thread function. Load balance large jobs between threads by + * thread function. Load balance large jobs between threads by * increasing the number of chunks, guarantee at least the minimum * chunk size from the caller, and honor the caller's alignment. + * Ensure chunk_size is at least 1 to prevent divide-by-0 + * panic in padata_mt_helper(). */ ps.chunk_size = job->size / (ps.nworks * load_balance_factor); ps.chunk_size = max(ps.chunk_size, job->min_chunk); + ps.chunk_size = max(ps.chunk_size, 1ul); ps.chunk_size = roundup(ps.chunk_size, job->align); - /* - * chunk_size can be 0 if the caller sets min_chunk to 0. So force it - * to at least 1 to prevent divide-by-0 panic in padata_mt_helper().` - */ - if (!ps.chunk_size) - ps.chunk_size = 1U; - list_for_each_entry(pw, &works, pw_list) if (job->numa_aware) { int old_node = atomic_read(&last_used_nid); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from kamlesh(a)ti.com are

3 months

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[PATCH v6 3/3] x86/sgx: Resolve EREMOVE page vs EAUG page data race

by Dmitrii Kuvaiskii

Two enclave threads may try to add and remove the same enclave page simultaneously (e.g., if the SGX runtime supports both lazy allocation and MADV_DONTNEED semantics). Consider some enclave page added to the enclave. User space decides to temporarily remove this page (e.g., emulating the MADV_DONTNEED semantics) on CPU1. At the same time, user space performs a memory access on the same page on CPU2, which results in a #PF and ultimately in sgx_vma_fault(). Scenario proceeds as follows: /* * CPU1: User space performs * ioctl(SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES) * on enclave page X */ sgx_encl_remove_pages() { mutex_lock(&encl->lock); entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl); /* * verify that page is * trimmed and accepted */ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); /* * remove PTE entry; cannot * be performed under lock */ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl); /* * Fault on CPU2 on same page X */ sgx_vma_fault() { /* * PTE entry was removed, but the * page is still in enclave's xarray */ xa_load(&encl->page_array) != NULL -> /* * SGX driver thinks that this page * was swapped out and loads it */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); /* * this is effectively a no-op */ entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(); /* * add PTE entry * * *BUG*: a PTE is installed for a * page in process of being removed */ vmf_insert_pfn(...); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE; } /* * continue with page removal */ mutex_lock(&encl->lock); sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page) { /* * remove page via EREMOVE */ /* * free EPC page */ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page); } xa_erase(&encl->page_array); mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); } Here, CPU1 removed the page. However CPU2 installed the PTE entry on the same page. This enclave page becomes perpetually inaccessible (until another SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl). This is because the page is marked accessible in the PTE entry but is not EAUGed, and any subsequent access to this page raises a fault: with the kernel believing there to be a valid VMA, the unlikely error code X86_PF_SGX encountered by code path do_user_addr_fault() -> access_error() causes the SGX driver's sgx_vma_fault() to be skipped and user space receives a SIGSEGV instead. The userspace SIGSEGV handler cannot perform EACCEPT because the page was not EAUGed. Thus, the user space is stuck with the inaccessible page. Fix this race by forcing the fault handler on CPU2 to back off if the page is currently being removed (on CPU1). This is achieved by setting SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY flag right-before the first mutex_unlock() in sgx_encl_remove_pages(). Upon loading the page, CPU2 checks whether this page is busy, and if yes then CPU2 backs off and waits until the page is completely removed. After that, any memory access to this page results in a normal "allocate and EAUG a page on #PF" flow. Additionally fix a similar race: user space converts a normal enclave page to a TCS page (via SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES) on CPU1, and at the same time, user space performs a memory access on the same page on CPU2. This fix is not strictly necessary (this particular race would indicate a bug in a user space application), but it gives a consistent rule: if an enclave page is under certain operation by the kernel with the mapping removed, then other threads trying to access that page are temporarily blocked and should retry. Fixes: 9849bb27152c1 ("x86/sgx: Support complete page removal") Fixes: 45d546b8c109d ("x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Kuvaiskii <dmitrii.kuvaiskii(a)intel.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h index b566b8ad5f33..96b11e8fb770 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h @@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ /* 'desc' bits holding the offset in the VA (version array) page. */ #define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK GENMASK_ULL(11, 3) -/* 'desc' bit indicating that the page is busy (being reclaimed). */ +/* 'desc' bit indicating that the page is busy (being reclaimed, removed or + * converted to a TCS page). */ #define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY BIT(2) /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c index b65ab214bdf5..c6f936440438 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c @@ -969,12 +969,22 @@ static long sgx_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl, /* * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). + * + * Releasing encl->lock leads to a data race: while CPU1 + * performs sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() and removes the PTE + * entry for the enclave page, CPU2 may attempt to load + * this page (because the page is still in enclave's + * xarray). To prevent CPU2 from loading the page, mark + * the page as busy before unlock and unmark after lock + * again. */ + entry->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY; mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr); mutex_lock(&encl->lock); + entry->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY; sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page); } @@ -1141,7 +1151,14 @@ static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, /* * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). + * + * Releasing encl->lock leads to a data race: while CPU1 + * performs sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() and removes the PTE entry + * for the enclave page, CPU2 may attempt to load this page + * (because the page is still in enclave's xarray). To prevent + * CPU2 from loading the page, mark the page as busy. */ + entry->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BUSY; mutex_unlock(&encl->lock); sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr); -- 2.43.0

3 months

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[PATCH 2/8] drm/sched: Always wake up correct scheduler in drm_sched_entity_push_job

by Tvrtko Ursulin

From: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)igalia.com> Since drm_sched_entity_modify_sched() can modify the entities run queue, lets make sure to only dereference the pointer once so both adding and waking up are guaranteed to be consistent. Alternative of moving the spin_unlock to after the wake up would for now be more problematic since the same lock is taken inside drm_sched_rq_update_fifo(). v2: * Improve commit message. (Philipp) * Cache the scheduler pointer directly. (Christian) Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)igalia.com> Fixes: b37aced31eb0 ("drm/scheduler: implement a function to modify sched list") Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Cc: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89(a)gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com> Cc: David Airlie <airlied(a)gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel(a)ffwll.ch> Cc: Philipp Stanner <pstanner(a)redhat.com> Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.7+ Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c index 0e002c17fcb6..a75eede8bf8d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c @@ -599,6 +599,9 @@ void drm_sched_entity_push_job(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job) /* first job wakes up scheduler */ if (first) { + struct drm_gpu_scheduler *sched; + struct drm_sched_rq *rq; + /* Add the entity to the run queue */ spin_lock(&entity->rq_lock); if (entity->stopped) { @@ -608,13 +611,16 @@ void drm_sched_entity_push_job(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job) return; } - drm_sched_rq_add_entity(entity->rq, entity); + rq = entity->rq; + sched = rq->sched; + + drm_sched_rq_add_entity(rq, entity); spin_unlock(&entity->rq_lock); if (drm_sched_policy == DRM_SCHED_POLICY_FIFO) drm_sched_rq_update_fifo(entity, submit_ts); - drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched); + drm_sched_wakeup(sched); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_push_job); -- 2.46.0

3 months

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[PATCH] firmware/sysfb: Disable sysfb for firmware buffers with unknown parent

by Thomas Zimmermann

The sysfb framebuffer handling only operates on graphics devices that provide the system's firmware framebuffer. If that device is not known, assume that any graphics device has been initialized by firmware. Fixes a problem on i915 where sysfb does not release the firmware framebuffer after the native graphics driver loaded. Reported-by: Borah, Chaitanya Kumar <chaitanya.kumar.borah(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/SJ1PR11MB6129EFB8CE63D1EF6D932F94B96F2@SJ… Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/12160 Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Fixes: b49420d6a1ae ("video/aperture: optionally match the device in sysfb_disable()") Cc: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm(a)redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Cc: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam(a)ravnborg.org> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Linux regression tracking (Thorsten Leemhuis) <regressions(a)leemhuis.info> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.11+ --- drivers/firmware/sysfb.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/sysfb.c b/drivers/firmware/sysfb.c index 02a07d3d0d40..a3df782fa687 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/sysfb.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/sysfb.c @@ -67,9 +67,11 @@ static bool sysfb_unregister(void) void sysfb_disable(struct device *dev) { struct screen_info *si = &screen_info; + struct device *parent; mutex_lock(&disable_lock); - if (!dev || dev == sysfb_parent_dev(si)) { + parent = sysfb_parent_dev(si); + if (!dev || !parent || dev == parent) { sysfb_unregister(); disabled = true; } -- 2.46.0

3 months

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[PATCH] drm: Add check for encoder in intel_get_crtc_new_encoder()

by George Rurikov

If the video card driver could not find the connector assigned to the current video controller, or if the hardware status has changed so that a pre-existing connector is no longer active, none of the state connectors will meet the assignment criteria for the current crtc video controller. In the drm_WARN function, encoder->base.dev is called, so '&encoder->base.dev' will be dereferenced since encoder will still be initialized NULL. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: e12d6218fda2 ("drm/i915: Reduce bigjoiner special casing") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: George Rurikov <g.ryurikov(a)securitycode.ru> --- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c index b4ef4d59da1a..1f25b12e5f67 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_display.c @@ -819,9 +819,11 @@ intel_get_crtc_new_encoder(const struct intel_atomic_state *state, num_encoders++; } - drm_WARN(state->base.dev, num_encoders != 1, + if (encoder) { + drm_WARN(state->base.dev, num_encoders != 1, "%d encoders for pipe %c\n", num_encoders, pipe_name(primary_crtc->pipe)); + } return encoder; } -- 2.34.1 Заявление о конфиденциальности Данное электронное письмо и любые приложения к нему являются конфиденциальными и предназначены исключительно для адресата. Если Вы не являетесь адресатом данного письма, пожалуйста, уведомите немедленно отправителя, не раскрывайте содержание другим лицам, не используйте его в каких-либо целях, не храните и не копируйте информацию любым способом.

3 months

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[PATCH 6.1 0/1] f2fs: convert to MAX_SBI_FLAG instead of 32 in stat_show()

by Nikita Zhandarovich

This patch addresses an open issue of buffer overflow in f2fs function stat_show(). On the off chance that si->sbi->s_flag had one of its bits (on the higher end) set to 1, for_each_set_bit() will loop more than s_flag[] can afford, leading in turn to erroneous array access. The issue in question has been fixed in commit 5bb9c111cd98 ("f2fs: convert to MAX_SBI_FLAG instead of 32 in stat_show()") and cherry-picked for 6.1 stable branch. Modified patch can now be cleanly applied to linux-6.1.y. All of the changes made to the patch in order to adapt it are described at the end of commit message in [PATCH 6.1 1/1] f2fs: convert to MAX_SBI_FLAG instead of 32 in stat_show().

3 months

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[PATCH] drm/vc4: Fix atomicity violation in vc4_crtc_send_vblank()

by Qiu-ji Chen

Atomicity violation occurs when the vc4_crtc_send_vblank function is executed simultaneously with modifications to crtc->state or crtc->state->event. Consider a scenario where both crtc->state and crtc->state->event are non-null. They can pass the validity check, but at the same time, crtc->state or crtc->state->event could be set to null. In this case, the validity check in vc4_crtc_send_vblank might act on the old crtc->state and crtc->state->event (before locking), allowing invalid values to pass the validity check, leading to null pointer dereference. To address this issue, it is recommended to include the validity check of crtc->state and crtc->state->event within the locking section of the function. This modification ensures that the values of crtc->state->event and crtc->state do not change during the validation process, maintaining their valid conditions. This possible bug is found by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team. This tool analyzes the locking APIs to extract function pairs that can be concurrently executed, and then analyzes the instructions in the paired functions to identify possible concurrency bugs including data races and atomicity violations. Fixes: 68e4a69aec4d ("drm/vc4: crtc: Create vblank reporting function") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qiu-ji Chen <chenqiuji666(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_crtc.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_crtc.c index 8b5a7e5eb146..98885f519827 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_crtc.c @@ -575,10 +575,12 @@ void vc4_crtc_send_vblank(struct drm_crtc *crtc) struct drm_device *dev = crtc->dev; unsigned long flags; - if (!crtc->state || !crtc->state->event) + spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, flags); + if (!crtc->state || !crtc->state->event) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->event_lock, flags); return; + } - spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, flags); drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(crtc, crtc->state->event); crtc->state->event = NULL; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->event_lock, flags); -- 2.34.1

3 months

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[PATCH] nvme: rdma: Add check for queue in nvmet_rdma_cm_handler()

by George Rurikov

After having been assigned to a NULL value at rdma.c:1758, pointer 'queue' is passed as 1st parameter in call to function 'nvmet_rdma_queue_established' at rdma.c:1773, as 1st parameter in call to function 'nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect' at rdma.c:1787 and as 2nd parameter in call to function 'nvmet_rdma_queue_connect_fail' at rdma.c:1800, where it is dereferenced. I understand, that driver is confident that the RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST event will occur first and perform initialization, but maliciously prepared hardware could send events in violation of the protocol. Nothing guarantees that the sequence of events will start with RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE Fixes: e1a2ee249b19 ("nvmet-rdma: Fix use after free in nvmet_rdma_cm_handler()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: George Rurikov <g.ryurikov(a)securitycode.ru> --- drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c b/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c index 1b6264fa5803..becebc95f349 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c @@ -1770,8 +1770,10 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_cm_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id, ret = nvmet_rdma_queue_connect(cm_id, event); break; case RDMA_CM_EVENT_ESTABLISHED: - nvmet_rdma_queue_established(queue); - break; + if (!queue) { + nvmet_rdma_queue_established(queue); + break; + } case RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_CHANGE: if (!queue) { struct nvmet_rdma_port *port = cm_id->context; @@ -1782,8 +1784,10 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_cm_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id, fallthrough; case RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED: case RDMA_CM_EVENT_TIMEWAIT_EXIT: - nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect(queue); - break; + if (!queue) { + nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect(queue); + break; + } case RDMA_CM_EVENT_DEVICE_REMOVAL: ret = nvmet_rdma_device_removal(cm_id, queue); break; @@ -1793,8 +1797,10 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_cm_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id, fallthrough; case RDMA_CM_EVENT_UNREACHABLE: case RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_ERROR: - nvmet_rdma_queue_connect_fail(cm_id, queue); - break; + if (!queue) { + nvmet_rdma_queue_connect_fail(cm_id, queue); + break; + } default: pr_err("received unrecognized RDMA CM event %d\n", event->event); -- 2.34.1 Заявление о конфиденциальности Данное электронное письмо и любые приложения к нему являются конфиденциальными и предназначены исключительно для адресата. Если Вы не являетесь адресатом данного письма, пожалуйста, уведомите немедленно отправителя, не раскрывайте содержание другим лицам, не используйте его в каких-либо целях, не храните и не копируйте информацию любым способом.

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Linux-stable-mirror September 2024