September 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH] RDMA/irdma: fix error message in irdma_modify_qp_roce()

by Vitaliy Shevtsov

Use a correct field max_dest_rd_atomic instead of max_rd_atomic for the error output. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace. Fixes: b48c24c2d710 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device supported verb APIs") Signed-off-by: Vitaliy Shevtsov <v.shevtsov(a)maxima.ru> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c index 76c5f461faca..baa3dff6faab 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c @@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ int irdma_modify_qp_roce(struct ib_qp *ibqp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, if (attr->max_dest_rd_atomic > dev->hw_attrs.max_hw_ird) { ibdev_err(&iwdev->ibdev, "rd_atomic = %d, above max_hw_ird=%d\n", - attr->max_rd_atomic, + attr->max_dest_rd_atomic, dev->hw_attrs.max_hw_ird); return -EINVAL; } -- 2.46.1

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 1/3] serial: qcom-geni: fix premature receiver enable

by Johan Hovold

The receiver should no be enabled until the port is opened so drop the bogus call to start tx from the setup code which is shared with the console implementation. This was added for some confused implementation of hibernation support, but the receiver must not be started unconditionally as the port may not have been open when hibernating the system. Fixes: 35781d8356a2 ("tty: serial: qcom-geni-serial: Add support for Hibernation feature") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.2 Cc: Aniket Randive <quic_arandive(a)quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c b/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c index 6f0db310cf69..9ea6bd09e665 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/qcom_geni_serial.c @@ -1152,7 +1152,6 @@ static int qcom_geni_serial_port_setup(struct uart_port *uport) false, true, true); geni_se_init(&port->se, UART_RX_WM, port->rx_fifo_depth - 2); geni_se_select_mode(&port->se, port->dev_data->mode); - qcom_geni_serial_start_rx(uport); port->setup = true; return 0; -- 2.44.2

3 months, 1 week

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[failures] ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch removed from -mm tree

by Andrew Morton

The quilt patch titled Subject: ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch This patch was dropped because it had testing failures ------------------------------------------------------ From: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Subject: ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 06:47:20 +0000 One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem. The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting, the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption [EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record, but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata block. Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856) FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49) CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000 Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256 User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888 Links: 1 Clusters: 141738 ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024 atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024 mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024 dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969 Refcount Block: 2777346 Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14 Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230 ## Offset Clusters Block# 0 0 2310 2776351 1 2310 2139 2777375 2 4449 1221 2778399 3 5670 731 2779423 4 6401 566 2780447 ....... .... ....... ....... .... ....... The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr. The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space for inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243 to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode already has extents beyond this index (in this case upto 230), thereby causing corruption. The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata at the destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has verified the fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240912064720.898600-1-gautham.ananthakrishna@or… Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink") Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark(a)fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec(a)evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei(a)live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe(a)suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun(a)huawei.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c~ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree +++ a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "namei.h" #include "ocfs2_trace.h" #include "file.h" +#include "symlink.h" #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> @@ -4155,8 +4156,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry int ret; struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry); struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL; + struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode); - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { + if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { ret = -EINVAL; mlog_errno(ret); goto out; @@ -4182,6 +4184,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry goto out_unlock; } + if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) && + (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) { + /* + * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. + * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). + */ + struct ocfs2_inode_info *new_oi = OCFS2_I(new_inode); + + if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && + !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) { + struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = new_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = old_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; + int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size); + + le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / + sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); + } + } + ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); if (ret) { @@ -4189,7 +4211,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry goto inode_unlock; } - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { + if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c~ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree +++ a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -6520,16 +6520,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(st } new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode); - /* - * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. - * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). - */ - if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && - !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) { - struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; - le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / - sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); - } + spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock); new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL; new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com are

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH RFC V4 1/1] ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree

by Gautham Ananthakrishna

One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem. The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting, the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption [EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record, but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata block. Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856) FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49) CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000 Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256 User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888 Links: 1 Clusters: 141738 ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024 atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024 mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024 dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969 Refcount Block: 2777346 Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14 Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230 ## Offset Clusters Block# 0 0 2310 2776351 1 2310 2139 2777375 2 4449 1221 2778399 3 5670 731 2779423 4 6401 566 2780447 ....... .... ....... ....... .... ....... The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr. The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space for inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243 to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode already has extents beyond this index (in this case upto 230), thereby causing corruption. The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata at the destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has verified the fix. Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> --- fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c index 3f80a56d0d60..05105d271fc8 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "namei.h" #include "ocfs2_trace.h" #include "file.h" +#include "symlink.h" #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> @@ -4155,8 +4156,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry, int ret; struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry); struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL; + struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode); - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { + if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { ret = -EINVAL; mlog_errno(ret); goto out; @@ -4182,6 +4184,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry, goto out_unlock; } + if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) && + (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) { + /* + * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. + * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). + */ + struct ocfs2_inode_info *new_oi = OCFS2_I(new_inode); + + if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && + !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) { + struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = new_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = old_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; + int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size); + + le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / + sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); + } + } + ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); if (ret) { @@ -4189,7 +4211,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry *old_dentry, goto inode_unlock; } - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { + if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c index 3b81213ed7b8..a9f716ec89e2 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -6511,16 +6511,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(struct ocfs2_xattr_reflink *args) } new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode); - /* - * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. - * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). - */ - if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && - !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) { - struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; - le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / - sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); - } + spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock); new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL; new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features); -- 2.39.3

3 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] selftests: mptcp: join: restrict fullmesh endp on 1st sf" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 49ac6f05ace5bb0070c68a0193aa05d3c25d4c83 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024091343-excusably-laborer-3bef@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: 49ac6f05ace5 ("selftests: mptcp: join: restrict fullmesh endp on 1st sf") 4878f9f8421f ("selftests: mptcp: join: validate fullmesh endp on 1st sf") e571fb09c893 ("selftests: mptcp: add speed env var") 4aadde088a58 ("selftests: mptcp: add fullmesh env var") 080b7f5733fd ("selftests: mptcp: add fastclose env var") 662aa22d7dcd ("selftests: mptcp: set all env vars as local ones") 9e9d176df8e9 ("selftests: mptcp: add pm_nl_set_endpoint helper") 1534f87ee0dc ("selftests: mptcp: drop sflags parameter") 595ef566a2ef ("selftests: mptcp: drop addr_nr_ns1/2 parameters") 0c93af1f8907 ("selftests: mptcp: drop test_linkfail parameter") be7e9786c915 ("selftests: mptcp: set FAILING_LINKS in run_tests") 4369c198e599 ("selftests: mptcp: test userspace pm out of transfer") ae947bb2c253 ("selftests: mptcp: join: skip Fastclose tests if not supported") d4c81bbb8600 ("selftests: mptcp: join: support local endpoint being tracked or not") 4a0b866a3f7d ("selftests: mptcp: join: skip test if iptables/tc cmds fail") 0c4cd3f86a40 ("selftests: mptcp: join: use 'iptables-legacy' if available") 6c160b636c91 ("selftests: mptcp: update userspace pm subflow tests") 48d73f609dcc ("selftests: mptcp: update userspace pm addr tests") 8697a258ae24 ("Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net") thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 49ac6f05ace5bb0070c68a0193aa05d3c25d4c83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthieu Baerts (NGI0)" <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 21:06:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] selftests: mptcp: join: restrict fullmesh endp on 1st sf A new endpoint using the IP of the initial subflow has been recently added to increase the code coverage. But it breaks the test when using old kernels not having commit 86e39e04482b ("mptcp: keep track of local endpoint still available for each msk"), e.g. on v5.15. Similar to commit d4c81bbb8600 ("selftests: mptcp: join: support local endpoint being tracked or not"), it is possible to add the new endpoint conditionally, by checking if "mptcp_pm_subflow_check_next" is present in kallsyms: this is not directly linked to the commit introducing this symbol but for the parent one which is linked anyway. So we can know in advance what will be the expected behaviour, and add the new endpoint only when it makes sense to do so. Fixes: 4878f9f8421f ("selftests: mptcp: join: validate fullmesh endp on 1st sf") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240910-net-selftests-mptcp-fix-install-v1-1-8f12… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh index a4762c49a878..cde041c93906 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh @@ -3064,7 +3064,9 @@ fullmesh_tests() pm_nl_set_limits $ns1 1 3 pm_nl_set_limits $ns2 1 3 pm_nl_add_endpoint $ns1 10.0.2.1 flags signal - pm_nl_add_endpoint $ns2 10.0.1.2 flags subflow,fullmesh + if mptcp_lib_kallsyms_has "mptcp_pm_subflow_check_next$"; then + pm_nl_add_endpoint $ns2 10.0.1.2 flags subflow,fullmesh + fi fullmesh=1 speed=slow \ run_tests $ns1 $ns2 10.0.1.1 chk_join_nr 3 3 3

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] rust: sync: fix incorrect Sync bounds for LockedBy

by Alice Ryhl

The `impl Sync for LockedBy` implementation has insufficient trait bounds, as it only requires `T: Send`. However, `T: Sync` is also required for soundness because the `LockedBy::access` method could be used to provide shared access to the inner value from several threads in parallel. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7b1f55e3a984 ("rust: sync: introduce `LockedBy`") Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com> --- rust/kernel/sync/locked_by.rs | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/rust/kernel/sync/locked_by.rs b/rust/kernel/sync/locked_by.rs index babc731bd5f6..153ba4edcb03 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/sync/locked_by.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/sync/locked_by.rs @@ -83,9 +83,10 @@ pub struct LockedBy<T: ?Sized, U: ?Sized> { // SAFETY: `LockedBy` can be transferred across thread boundaries iff the data it protects can. unsafe impl<T: ?Sized + Send, U: ?Sized> Send for LockedBy<T, U> {} -// SAFETY: `LockedBy` serialises the interior mutability it provides, so it is `Sync` as long as the -// data it protects is `Send`. -unsafe impl<T: ?Sized + Send, U: ?Sized> Sync for LockedBy<T, U> {} +// SAFETY: Shared access to the `LockedBy` can provide both `&mut T` references in a synchronized +// manner, or `&T` access in an unsynchronized manner. The `Send` trait is sufficient for the first +// case, and `Sync` is sufficient for the second case. +unsafe impl<T: ?Sized + Send + Sync, U: ?Sized> Sync for LockedBy<T, U> {} impl<T, U> LockedBy<T, U> { /// Constructs a new instance of [`LockedBy`]. @@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ pub fn access<'a>(&'a self, owner: &'a U) -> &'a T { panic!("mismatched owners"); } - // SAFETY: `owner` is evidence that the owner is locked. + // SAFETY: `owner` is evidence that there are only shared references to the owner. unsafe { &*self.data.get() } } --- base-commit: 93dc3be19450447a3a7090bd1dfb9f3daac3e8d2 change-id: 20240912-locked-by-sync-fix-07193df52f98 Best regards, -- Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com>

3 months, 1 week

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+ zram-free-secondary-algorithms-names.patch added to mm-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: zram: free secondary algorithms names has been added to the -mm mm-unstable branch. Its filename is zram-free-secondary-algorithms-names.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky(a)chromium.org> Subject: zram: free secondary algorithms names Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2024 11:54:56 +0900 We need to kfree() secondary algorithms names when reset zram device that had multi-streams, otherwise we leak memory. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240911025600.3681789-1-senozhatsky@chromium.org Fixes: 001d92735701 ("zram: add recompression algorithm sysfs knob") Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky(a)chromium.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c~zram-free-secondary-algorithms-names +++ a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c @@ -2112,6 +2112,13 @@ static void zram_destroy_comps(struct zr zram->num_active_comps--; } + for (prio = ZRAM_SECONDARY_COMP; prio < ZRAM_MAX_COMPS; prio++) { + if (!zram->comp_algs[prio]) + continue; + kfree(zram->comp_algs[prio]); + zram->comp_algs[prio] = NULL; + } + zram_comp_params_reset(zram); } _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from senozhatsky(a)chromium.org are zsmalloc-use-unique-zsmalloc-caches-names.patch zram-free-secondary-algorithms-names.patch

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH v3] dt-bindings: serial: rs485: Fix rs485-rts-delay property

by Michal Simek

Code expects array only with 2 items which should be checked. But also item checking is not working as it should likely because of incorrect items description. Fixes: d50f974c4f7f ("dt-bindings: serial: Convert rs485 bindings to json-schema") Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek(a)amd.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- Changes in v3: - Remove incorrectly assigned value for the first item 50/100 because of my testing Changes in v2: - Remove maxItems properties which are not needed - Add stable ML to CC .../devicetree/bindings/serial/rs485.yaml | 19 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/rs485.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/rs485.yaml index 9418fd66a8e9..b93254ad2a28 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/rs485.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/rs485.yaml @@ -18,16 +18,15 @@ properties: description: prop-encoded-array <a b> $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/uint32-array items: - items: - - description: Delay between rts signal and beginning of data sent in - milliseconds. It corresponds to the delay before sending data. - default: 0 - maximum: 100 - - description: Delay between end of data sent and rts signal in milliseconds. - It corresponds to the delay after sending data and actual release - of the line. - default: 0 - maximum: 100 + - description: Delay between rts signal and beginning of data sent in + milliseconds. It corresponds to the delay before sending data. + default: 0 + maximum: 100 + - description: Delay between end of data sent and rts signal in milliseconds. + It corresponds to the delay after sending data and actual release + of the line. + default: 0 + maximum: 100 rs485-rts-active-high: description: drive RTS high when sending (this is the default). -- 2.43.0

3 months, 1 week

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+ ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch

by Andrew Morton

The patch titled Subject: ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch This patch will shortly appear at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche… This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm and is updated there every 2-3 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Subject: ocfs2: reserve space for inline xattr before attaching reflink tree Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 06:47:20 +0000 One of our customers reported a crash and a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem. The crash was due to the detection of corruption. Upon troubleshooting, the fsck -fn output showed the below corruption [EXTENT_LIST_FREE] Extent list in owner 33080590 claims 230 as the next free chain record, but fsck believes the largest valid value is 227. Clamp the next record value? n The stat output from the debugfs.ocfs2 showed the following corruption where the "Next Free Rec:" had overshot the "Count:" in the root metadata block. Inode: 33080590 Mode: 0640 Generation: 2619713622 (0x9c25a856) FS Generation: 904309833 (0x35e6ac49) CRC32: 00000000 ECC: 0000 Type: Regular Attr: 0x0 Flags: Valid Dynamic Features: (0x16) HasXattr InlineXattr Refcounted Extended Attributes Block: 0 Extended Attributes Inline Size: 256 User: 0 (root) Group: 0 (root) Size: 281320357888 Links: 1 Clusters: 141738 ctime: 0x66911b56 0x316edcb8 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.829349048 2024 atime: 0x66911d6b 0x7f7a28d -- Fri Jul 12 06:11:23.133669517 2024 mtime: 0x66911b56 0x12ed75d7 -- Fri Jul 12 06:02:30.317552087 2024 dtime: 0x0 -- Wed Dec 31 17:00:00 1969 Refcount Block: 2777346 Last Extblk: 2886943 Orphan Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Slot: 0 Sub Alloc Bit: 14 Tree Depth: 1 Count: 227 Next Free Rec: 230 ## Offset Clusters Block# 0 0 2310 2776351 1 2310 2139 2777375 2 4449 1221 2778399 3 5670 731 2779423 4 6401 566 2780447 ....... .... ....... ....... .... ....... The issue was in the reflink workfow while reserving space for inline xattr. The problematic function is ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(). By the time this function is called the reflink tree is already recreated at the destination inode from the source inode. At this point, this function reserves space for inline xattrs at the destination inode without even checking if there is space at the root metadata block. It simply reduces the l_count from 243 to 227 thereby making space of 256 bytes for inline xattr whereas the inode already has extents beyond this index (in this case upto 230), thereby causing corruption. The fix for this is to reserve space for inline metadata at the destination inode before the reflink tree gets recreated. The customer has verified the fix. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240912064720.898600-1-gautham.ananthakrishna@or… Fixes: ef962df057aa ("ocfs2: xattr: fix inlined xattr reflink") Signed-off-by: Gautham Ananthakrishna <gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark(a)fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec(a)evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei(a)live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe(a)suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun(a)huawei.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> --- fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c~ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree +++ a/fs/ocfs2/refcounttree.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include "namei.h" #include "ocfs2_trace.h" #include "file.h" +#include "symlink.h" #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> @@ -4155,8 +4156,9 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry int ret; struct inode *inode = d_inode(old_dentry); struct buffer_head *new_bh = NULL; + struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode); - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { + if (oi->ip_flags & OCFS2_INODE_SYSTEM_FILE) { ret = -EINVAL; mlog_errno(ret); goto out; @@ -4182,6 +4184,26 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry goto out_unlock; } + if ((oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) && + (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL)) { + /* + * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. + * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). + */ + struct ocfs2_inode_info *new_oi = OCFS2_I(new_inode); + + if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && + !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(new_inode))) { + struct ocfs2_dinode *new_di = new_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_dinode *old_di = old_bh->b_data; + struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; + int inline_size = le16_to_cpu(old_di->i_xattr_inline_size); + + le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / + sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); + } + } + ret = ocfs2_create_reflink_node(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); if (ret) { @@ -4189,7 +4211,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_reflink(struct dentry goto inode_unlock; } - if (OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { + if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL) { ret = ocfs2_reflink_xattrs(inode, old_bh, new_inode, new_bh, preserve); --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c~ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree +++ a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c @@ -6520,16 +6520,7 @@ static int ocfs2_reflink_xattr_inline(st } new_oi = OCFS2_I(args->new_inode); - /* - * Adjust extent record count to reserve space for extended attribute. - * Inline data count had been adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(). - */ - if (!(new_oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && - !(ocfs2_inode_is_fast_symlink(args->new_inode))) { - struct ocfs2_extent_list *el = &new_di->id2.i_list; - le16_add_cpu(&el->l_count, -(inline_size / - sizeof(struct ocfs2_extent_rec))); - } + spin_lock(&new_oi->ip_lock); new_oi->ip_dyn_features |= OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL | OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL; new_di->i_dyn_features = cpu_to_le16(new_oi->ip_dyn_features); _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from gautham.ananthakrishna(a)oracle.com are ocfs2-reserve-space-for-inline-xattr-before-attaching-reflink-tree.patch

3 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] crypto: Fix logical operator in _aead_recvmsg()

by George Rurikov

From: MrRurikov <grurikovsherbakov(a)yandex.ru> After having been compared to a NULL value at algif_aead.c:191, pointer 'tsgl_src' is passed as 2nd parameter in call to function 'crypto_aead_copy_sgl' at algif_aead.c:244, where it is dereferenced at algif_aead.c:85. Change logical operator from && to || because pointer 'tsgl_src' is NULL, then 'proccessed' will still be non-null Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of duplicate code") Signed-off-by: MrRurikov <grurikovsherbakov(a)yandex.ru> --- crypto/algif_aead.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index 7d58cbbce4af..135f09a4b3f8 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, if (tsgl_src) break; } - if (processed && !tsgl_src) { + if (processed || !tsgl_src) { err = -EFAULT; goto free; } -- 2.34.1 Заявление о конфиденциальности Данное электронное письмо и любые приложения к нему являются конфиденциальными и предназначены исключительно для адресата. Если Вы не являетесь адресатом данного письма, пожалуйста, уведомите немедленно отправителя, не раскрывайте содержание другим лицам, не используйте его в каких-либо целях, не храните и не копируйте информацию любым способом.

3 months, 1 week

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