September 2024 - Linux-stable-mirror

[git:media_tree/master] media: qcom: camss: Fix ordering of pm_runtime_enable

by Hans Verkuil

This is an automatic generated email to let you know that the following patch were queued: Subject: media: qcom: camss: Fix ordering of pm_runtime_enable Author: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue(a)linaro.org> Date: Mon Jul 29 13:42:03 2024 +0100 pm_runtime_enable() should happen prior to vfe_get() since vfe_get() calls pm_runtime_resume_and_get(). This is a basic race condition that doesn't show up for most users so is not widely reported. If you blacklist qcom-camss in modules.d and then subsequently modprobe the module post-boot it is possible to reliably show this error up. The kernel log for this error looks like this: qcom-camss ac5a000.camss: Failed to power up pipeline: -13 Fixes: 02afa816dbbf ("media: camss: Add basic runtime PM support") Reported-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZoVNHOTI0PKMNt4_@hovoldconsulting.com/ Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Dybcio <konradybcio(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl> drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss.c b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss.c index 51b1d3550421..d64985ca6e88 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss.c @@ -2283,6 +2283,8 @@ static int camss_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) v4l2_async_nf_init(&camss->notifier, &camss->v4l2_dev); + pm_runtime_enable(dev); + num_subdevs = camss_of_parse_ports(camss); if (num_subdevs < 0) { ret = num_subdevs; @@ -2323,8 +2325,6 @@ static int camss_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } } - pm_runtime_enable(dev); - return 0; err_register_subdevs: @@ -2332,6 +2332,7 @@ err_register_subdevs: err_v4l2_device_unregister: v4l2_device_unregister(&camss->v4l2_dev); v4l2_async_nf_cleanup(&camss->notifier); + pm_runtime_disable(dev); err_genpd_cleanup: camss_genpd_cleanup(camss);

2 weeks

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[git:media_tree/master] media: qcom: camss: Remove use_count guard in stop_streaming

by Hans Verkuil

This is an automatic generated email to let you know that the following patch were queued: Subject: media: qcom: camss: Remove use_count guard in stop_streaming Author: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue(a)linaro.org> Date: Mon Jul 29 13:42:02 2024 +0100 The use_count check was introduced so that multiple concurrent Raw Data Interfaces RDIs could be driven by different virtual channels VCs on the CSIPHY input driving the video pipeline. This is an invalid use of use_count though as use_count pertains to the number of times a video entity has been opened by user-space not the number of active streams. If use_count and stream-on count don't agree then stop_streaming() will break as is currently the case and has become apparent when using CAMSS with libcamera's released softisp 0.3. The use of use_count like this is a bit hacky and right now breaks regular usage of CAMSS for a single stream case. Stopping qcam results in the splat below, and then it cannot be started again and any attempts to do so fails with -EBUSY. [ 1265.509831] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 919 at drivers/media/common/videobuf2/videobuf2-core.c:2183 __vb2_queue_cancel+0x230/0x2c8 [videobuf2_common] ... [ 1265.510630] Call trace: [ 1265.510636] __vb2_queue_cancel+0x230/0x2c8 [videobuf2_common] [ 1265.510648] vb2_core_streamoff+0x24/0xcc [videobuf2_common] [ 1265.510660] vb2_ioctl_streamoff+0x5c/0xa8 [videobuf2_v4l2] [ 1265.510673] v4l_streamoff+0x24/0x30 [videodev] [ 1265.510707] __video_do_ioctl+0x190/0x3f4 [videodev] [ 1265.510732] video_usercopy+0x304/0x8c4 [videodev] [ 1265.510757] video_ioctl2+0x18/0x34 [videodev] [ 1265.510782] v4l2_ioctl+0x40/0x60 [videodev] ... [ 1265.510944] videobuf2_common: driver bug: stop_streaming operation is leaving buffer 0 in active state [ 1265.511175] videobuf2_common: driver bug: stop_streaming operation is leaving buffer 1 in active state [ 1265.511398] videobuf2_common: driver bug: stop_streaming operation is leaving buffer 2 in active st One CAMSS specific way to handle multiple VCs on the same RDI might be: - Reference count each pipeline enable for CSIPHY, CSID, VFE and RDIx. - The video buffers are already associated with msm_vfeN_rdiX so release video buffers when told to do so by stop_streaming. - Only release the power-domains for the CSIPHY, CSID and VFE when their internal refcounts drop. Either way refusing to release video buffers based on use_count is erroneous and should be reverted. The silicon enabling code for selecting VCs is perfectly fine. Its a "known missing feature" that concurrent VCs won't work with CAMSS right now. Initial testing with this code didn't show an error but, SoftISP and "real" usage with Google Hangouts breaks the upstream code pretty quickly, we need to do a partial revert and take another pass at VCs. This commit partially reverts commit 89013969e232 ("media: camss: sm8250: Pipeline starting and stopping for multiple virtual channels") Fixes: 89013969e232 ("media: camss: sm8250: Pipeline starting and stopping for multiple virtual channels") Reported-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZoVNHOTI0PKMNt4_@hovoldconsulting.com/ Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl> drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss-video.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) --- diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss-video.c b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss-video.c index cd72feca618c..3b8fc31d957c 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss-video.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/camss/camss-video.c @@ -297,12 +297,6 @@ static void video_stop_streaming(struct vb2_queue *q) ret = v4l2_subdev_call(subdev, video, s_stream, 0); - if (entity->use_count > 1) { - /* Don't stop if other instances of the pipeline are still running */ - dev_dbg(video->camss->dev, "Video pipeline still used, don't stop streaming.\n"); - return; - } - if (ret) { dev_err(video->camss->dev, "Video pipeline stop failed: %d\n", ret); return;

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[PATCH] net: drop bad gso csum_start and offset in virtio_net_hdr

by mathieu.tortuyaux＠gmail.com

From: Mathieu Tortuyaux <mtortuyaux(a)microsoft.com> [ Upstream commit 89add40066f9ed9abe5f7f886fe5789ff7e0c50e ] Tighten csum_start and csum_offset checks in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb for GSO packets. The function already checks that a checksum requested with VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM is in skb linear. But for GSO packets this might not hold for segs after segmentation. Syzkaller demonstrated to reach this warning in skb_checksum_help offset = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb); ret = -EINVAL; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(offset >= skb_headlen(skb))) By injecting a TSO packet: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3539 at net/core/dev.c:3284 skb_checksum_help+0x3d0/0x5b0 ip_do_fragment+0x209/0x1b20 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:774 ip_finish_output_gso net/ipv4/ip_output.c:279 [inline] __ip_finish_output+0x2bd/0x4b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:301 iptunnel_xmit+0x50c/0x930 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82 ip_tunnel_xmit+0x2296/0x2c70 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:813 __gre_xmit net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:469 [inline] ipgre_xmit+0x759/0xa60 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:661 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4850 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4864 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3595 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x261/0x8c0 net/core/dev.c:3611 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1b97/0x3c90 net/core/dev.c:4261 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3073 [inline] The geometry of the bad input packet at tcp_gso_segment: [ 52.003050][ T8403] skb len=12202 headroom=244 headlen=12093 tailroom=0 [ 52.003050][ T8403] mac=(168,24) mac_len=24 net=(192,52) trans=244 [ 52.003050][ T8403] shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=1552 type=3 segs=0)) [ 52.003050][ T8403] csum(0x60000c7 start=199 offset=1536 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0) Mitigate with stricter input validation. csum_offset: for GSO packets, deduce the correct value from gso_type. This is already done for USO. Extend it to TSO. Let UFO be: udp[46]_ufo_fragment ignores these fields and always computes the checksum in software. csum_start: finding the real offset requires parsing to the transport header. Do not add a parser, use existing segmentation parsing. Thanks to SKB_GSO_DODGY, that also catches bad packets that are hw offloaded. Again test both TSO and USO. Do not test UFO for the above reason, and do not test UDP tunnel offload. GSO packet are almost always CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. USO packets may be CHECKSUM_NONE since commit 10154db ("udp: Allow GSO transmit from devices with no checksum offload"), but then still these fields are initialized correctly in udp4_hwcsum/udp6_hwcsum_outgoing. So no need to test for ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL first. This revises an existing fix mentioned in the Fixes tag, which broke small packets with GSO offload, as detected by kselftests. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e1db31216c789f552871 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240723223109.2196886-1-kuba@kernel.org Fixes: e269d79 ("net: missing check virtio") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240729201108.1615114-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gma… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mathieu Tortuyaux <mtortuyaux(a)microsoft.com> --- Hi, This patch fixes network failures on OpenStack VMs running with Kernel 5.15.165. In 5.15.165, the commit "net: missing check virtio" is breaking networks on VMs that uses virtio in some conditions. I slightly adapted the patch to have it fitting this branch (5.15.y). Once patched and compiled it has been successfully tested on Flatcar CI with Kernel 5.15.165. NOTE: This patch has already been backported on other stable branches (like 6.6.y) Thanks, Mathieu - @tormath1 include/linux/virtio_net.h | 17 ++++++----------- net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c | 3 +++ net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index 29b19d0a324c..d9410d97158d 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int thlen = 0; unsigned int p_off = 0; unsigned int ip_proto; - u64 ret, remainder, gso_size; if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { switch (hdr->gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) { @@ -88,16 +87,6 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->csum_offset); u32 needed = start + max_t(u32, thlen, off + sizeof(__sum16)); - if (hdr->gso_size) { - gso_size = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->gso_size); - ret = div64_u64_rem(skb->len, gso_size, &remainder); - if (!(ret && (hdr->gso_size > needed) && - ((remainder > needed) || (remainder == 0)))) { - return -EINVAL; - } - skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; - } - if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, needed)) return -EINVAL; @@ -163,6 +152,12 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, if (gso_size == GSO_BY_FRAGS) return -EINVAL; + if ((gso_size & SKB_GSO_TCPV4) || + (gso_size & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)) { + if (skb->csum_offset != offsetof(struct tcphdr, check)) + return -EINVAL; + } + /* Too small packets are not really GSO ones. */ if (skb->len - nh_off > gso_size) { shinfo->gso_size = gso_size; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c index fc61cd3fea65..76684cbd63a4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_offload.c @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, if (thlen < sizeof(*th)) goto out; + if (unlikely(skb_checksum_start(skb) != skb_transport_header(skb))) + goto out; + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, thlen)) goto out; diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c index c61268849948..61773a26fb34 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -279,6 +279,10 @@ struct sk_buff *__udp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *gso_skb, if (gso_skb->len <= sizeof(*uh) + mss) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + if (unlikely(skb_checksum_start(gso_skb) != + skb_transport_header(gso_skb))) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + skb_pull(gso_skb, sizeof(*uh)); /* clear destructor to avoid skb_segment assigning it to tail */ -- 2.44.2

2 weeks

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[PATCH] mt76: mt7615: check devm_kasprintf() returned value

by Ma Ke

devm_kasprintf() can return a NULL pointer on failure but this returned value is not checked. Fix this lack and check the returned value. Found by code review. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0bb4e9187ea4 ("mt76: mt7615: fix hwmon temp sensor mem use-after-free") Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/init.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/init.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/init.c index f7722f67db57..0b9ebdcda221 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/init.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7615/init.c @@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ int mt7615_thermal_init(struct mt7615_dev *dev) name = devm_kasprintf(&wiphy->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "mt7615_%s", wiphy_name(wiphy)); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + hwmon = devm_hwmon_device_register_with_groups(&wiphy->dev, name, dev, mt7615_hwmon_groups); return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(hwmon); -- 2.25.1

2 weeks

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[PATCH v4.19-v5.10] virtio_net: Fix napi_skb_cache_put warning

by Shivani Agarwal

From: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> [ Upstream commit f8321fa75102246d7415a6af441872f6637c93ab ] After the commit bdacf3e34945 ("net: Use nested-BH locking for napi_alloc_cache.") was merged, the following warning began to appear: WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1 at net/core/skbuff.c:1451 napi_skb_cache_put+0x82/0x4b0 __warn+0x12f/0x340 napi_skb_cache_put+0x82/0x4b0 napi_skb_cache_put+0x82/0x4b0 report_bug+0x165/0x370 handle_bug+0x3d/0x80 exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50 asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 __free_old_xmit+0x1c8/0x510 napi_skb_cache_put+0x82/0x4b0 __free_old_xmit+0x1c8/0x510 __free_old_xmit+0x1c8/0x510 __pfx___free_old_xmit+0x10/0x10 The issue arises because virtio is assuming it's running in NAPI context even when it's not, such as in the netpoll case. To resolve this, modify virtnet_poll_tx() to only set NAPI when budget is available. Same for virtnet_poll_cleantx(), which always assumed that it was in a NAPI context. Fixes: df133f3f9625 ("virtio_net: bulk free tx skbs") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Heng Qi <hengqi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240712115325.54175-1-leitao@debian.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> [Shivani: Modified to apply on v4.19.y-v5.10.y] Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal(a)broadcom.com> --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index f7ed99561..99dea89b2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ static bool is_xdp_raw_buffer_queue(struct virtnet_info *vi, int q) return false; } -static void virtnet_poll_cleantx(struct receive_queue *rq) +static void virtnet_poll_cleantx(struct receive_queue *rq, int budget) { struct virtnet_info *vi = rq->vq->vdev->priv; unsigned int index = vq2rxq(rq->vq); @@ -1508,7 +1508,7 @@ static void virtnet_poll_cleantx(struct receive_queue *rq) return; if (__netif_tx_trylock(txq)) { - free_old_xmit_skbs(sq, true); + free_old_xmit_skbs(sq, !!budget); __netif_tx_unlock(txq); } @@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ static int virtnet_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) unsigned int received; unsigned int xdp_xmit = 0; - virtnet_poll_cleantx(rq); + virtnet_poll_cleantx(rq, budget); received = virtnet_receive(rq, budget, &xdp_xmit); @@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ static int virtnet_poll_tx(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(vi->dev, index); __netif_tx_lock(txq, raw_smp_processor_id()); virtqueue_disable_cb(sq->vq); - free_old_xmit_skbs(sq, true); + free_old_xmit_skbs(sq, !!budget); opaque = virtqueue_enable_cb_prepare(sq->vq); -- 2.39.4

2 weeks

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[PATCH v3] usb: xhci: fix loss of data on Cadence xHC

by Pawel Laszczak

Streams should flush their TRB cache, re-read TRBs, and start executing TRBs from the beginning of the new dequeue pointer after a 'Set TR Dequeue Pointer' command. Cadence controllers may fail to start from the beginning of the dequeue TRB as it doesn't clear the Opaque 'RsvdO' field of the stream context during 'Set TR Dequeue' command. This stream context area is where xHC stores information about the last partially executed TD when a stream is stopped. xHC uses this information to resume the transfer where it left mid TD, when the stream is restarted. Patch fixes this by clearing out all RsvdO fields before initializing new Stream transfer using a 'Set TR Dequeue Pointer' command. Fixes: 3d82904559f4 ("usb: cdnsp: cdns3 Add main part of Cadence USBSSP DRD Driver") cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pawel Laszczak <pawell(a)cadence.com> --- Changelog: v3: - changed patch to patch Cadence specific v2: - removed restoring of EDTLA field drivers/usb/cdns3/host.c | 4 +++- drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 7 +++++++ drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/usb/host/xhci.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/cdns3/host.c b/drivers/usb/cdns3/host.c index ceca4d839dfd..7ba760ee62e3 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/cdns3/host.c +++ b/drivers/usb/cdns3/host.c @@ -62,7 +62,9 @@ static const struct xhci_plat_priv xhci_plat_cdns3_xhci = { .resume_quirk = xhci_cdns3_resume_quirk, }; -static const struct xhci_plat_priv xhci_plat_cdnsp_xhci; +static const struct xhci_plat_priv xhci_plat_cdnsp_xhci = { + .quirks = XHCI_CDNS_SCTX_QUIRK, +}; static int __cdns_host_init(struct cdns *cdns) { diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c index b9ae5c2a2527..9199dbfcea07 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c @@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI 0x2142 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_3242_XHCI 0x3242 +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_CADENCE 0x17CD +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_CADENCE_SSP 0x0200 + static const char hcd_name[] = "xhci_hcd"; static struct hc_driver __read_mostly xhci_pci_hc_driver; @@ -532,6 +535,10 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct device *dev, struct xhci_hcd *xhci) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_ZHAOXIN_TRB_FETCH; } + if (pdev->vendor == PCI_DEVICE_ID_CADENCE && + pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_CADENCE_SSP) + xhci->quirks |= XHCI_CDNS_SCTX_QUIRK; + /* xHC spec requires PCI devices to support D3hot and D3cold */ if (xhci->hci_version >= 0x120) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_DEFAULT_PM_RUNTIME_ALLOW; diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c index 1dde53f6eb31..a1ad2658c0c7 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c @@ -1386,6 +1386,20 @@ static void xhci_handle_cmd_set_deq(struct xhci_hcd *xhci, int slot_id, struct xhci_stream_ctx *ctx = &ep->stream_info->stream_ctx_array[stream_id]; deq = le64_to_cpu(ctx->stream_ring) & SCTX_DEQ_MASK; + + /* + * Cadence xHCI controllers store some endpoint state + * information within Rsvd0 fields of Stream Endpoint + * context. This field is not cleared during Set TR + * Dequeue Pointer command which causes XDMA to skip + * over transfer ring and leads to data loss on stream + * pipe. + * To fix this issue driver must clear Rsvd0 field. + */ + if (xhci->quirks & XHCI_CDNS_SCTX_QUIRK) { + ctx->reserved[0] = 0; + ctx->reserved[1] = 0; + } } else { deq = le64_to_cpu(ep_ctx->deq) & ~EP_CTX_CYCLE_MASK; } diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h index 101e74c9060f..4cbd58eed214 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.h @@ -1907,6 +1907,7 @@ struct xhci_hcd { #define XHCI_ZHAOXIN_TRB_FETCH BIT_ULL(45) #define XHCI_ZHAOXIN_HOST BIT_ULL(46) #define XHCI_WRITE_64_HI_LO BIT_ULL(47) +#define XHCI_CDNS_SCTX_QUIRK BIT_ULL(48) unsigned int num_active_eps; unsigned int limit_active_eps; -- 2.43.0

2 weeks

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[PATCH v2] drm/panthor: flush FW AS caches in slow reset path

by Adrián Larumbe

In the off-chance that waiting for the firmware to signal its booted status timed out in the fast reset path, one must flush the cache lines for the entire FW VM address space before reloading the regions, otherwise stale values eventually lead to a scheduler job timeout. Fixes: 647810ec2476 ("drm/panthor: Add the MMU/VM logical block") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Adrián Larumbe <adrian.larumbe(a)collabora.com> Acked-by: Liviu Dudau <liviu.dudau(a)arm.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_fw.c | 8 +++++++- drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_fw.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_fw.c index 857f3f11258a..ef232c0c2049 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_fw.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_fw.c @@ -1089,6 +1089,12 @@ int panthor_fw_post_reset(struct panthor_device *ptdev) panthor_fw_stop(ptdev); ptdev->fw->fast_reset = false; drm_err(&ptdev->base, "FW fast reset failed, trying a slow reset"); + + ret = panthor_vm_flush_all(ptdev->fw->vm); + if (ret) { + drm_err(&ptdev->base, "FW slow reset failed (couldn't flush FW's AS l2cache)"); + return ret; + } } /* Reload all sections, including RO ones. We're not supposed @@ -1099,7 +1105,7 @@ int panthor_fw_post_reset(struct panthor_device *ptdev) ret = panthor_fw_start(ptdev); if (ret) { - drm_err(&ptdev->base, "FW slow reset failed"); + drm_err(&ptdev->base, "FW slow reset failed (couldn't start the FW )"); return ret; } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.c index d47972806d50..bbc12728437f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.c @@ -576,6 +576,12 @@ static int mmu_hw_do_operation_locked(struct panthor_device *ptdev, int as_nr, if (as_nr < 0) return 0; + /* + * If the AS number is greater than zero, then we can be sure + * the device is up and running, so we don't need to explicitly + * power it up + */ + if (op != AS_COMMAND_UNLOCK) lock_region(ptdev, as_nr, iova, size); @@ -874,14 +880,23 @@ static int panthor_vm_flush_range(struct panthor_vm *vm, u64 iova, u64 size) if (!drm_dev_enter(&ptdev->base, &cookie)) return 0; - /* Flush the PTs only if we're already awake */ - if (pm_runtime_active(ptdev->base.dev)) - ret = mmu_hw_do_operation(vm, iova, size, AS_COMMAND_FLUSH_PT); + ret = mmu_hw_do_operation(vm, iova, size, AS_COMMAND_FLUSH_PT); drm_dev_exit(cookie); return ret; } +/** + * panthor_vm_flush_all() - Flush L2 caches for the entirety of a VM's AS + * @vm: VM whose cache to flush + * + * Return: 0 on success, a negative error code if flush failed. + */ +int panthor_vm_flush_all(struct panthor_vm *vm) +{ + return panthor_vm_flush_range(vm, vm->base.mm_start, vm->base.mm_range); +} + static int panthor_vm_unmap_pages(struct panthor_vm *vm, u64 iova, u64 size) { struct panthor_device *ptdev = vm->ptdev; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.h index f3c1ed19f973..6788771071e3 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/panthor/panthor_mmu.h @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ panthor_vm_get_bo_for_va(struct panthor_vm *vm, u64 va, u64 *bo_offset); int panthor_vm_active(struct panthor_vm *vm); void panthor_vm_idle(struct panthor_vm *vm); int panthor_vm_as(struct panthor_vm *vm); +int panthor_vm_flush_all(struct panthor_vm *vm); struct panthor_heap_pool * panthor_vm_get_heap_pool(struct panthor_vm *vm, bool create); -- 2.46.0

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Re: CVE-2024-41041: udp: Set SOCK_RCU_FREE earlier in udp_lib_get_port().

by Siddh Raman Pant

On Mon, 29 Jul 2024 16:32:36 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: > > udp: Set SOCK_RCU_FREE earlier in udp_lib_get_port(). > > [...] > > We had the same bug in TCP and fixed it in commit 871019b22d1b ("net: > set SOCK_RCU_FREE before inserting socket into hashtable"). > > Let's apply the same fix for UDP. > > [...] > > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2024-41041 to this issue. > > > Affected and fixed versions > =========================== > > Issue introduced in 4.20 with commit 6acc9b432e67 and fixed in 5.4.280 with commit 7a67c4e47626 > Issue introduced in 4.20 with commit 6acc9b432e67 and fixed in 5.10.222 with commit 9f965684c57c These versions don't have the TCP fix backported. Please do so. Thanks, Siddh

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[PATCH 1/2] bpf, cgroups: Fix cgroup v2 fallback on v1/v2 mixed mode

by Connor O'Brien

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> commit 8520e224f547cd070c7c8f97b1fc6d58cff7ccaa upstream. Fix cgroup v1 interference when non-root cgroup v2 BPF programs are used. Back in the days, commit bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") embedded per-socket cgroup information into sock->sk_cgrp_data and in order to save 8 bytes in struct sock made both mutually exclusive, that is, when cgroup v1 socket tagging (e.g. net_cls/net_prio) is used, then cgroup v2 falls back to the root cgroup in sock_cgroup_ptr() (&cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp). The assumption made was "there is no reason to mix the two and this is in line with how legacy and v2 compatibility is handled" as stated in bd1060a1d671. However, with Kubernetes more widely supporting cgroups v2 as well nowadays, this assumption no longer holds, and the possibility of the v1/v2 mixed mode with the v2 root fallback being hit becomes a real security issue. Many of the cgroup v2 BPF programs are also used for policy enforcement, just to pick _one_ example, that is, to programmatically deny socket related system calls like connect(2) or bind(2). A v2 root fallback would implicitly cause a policy bypass for the affected Pods. In production environments, we have recently seen this case due to various circumstances: i) a different 3rd party agent and/or ii) a container runtime such as [0] in the user's environment configuring legacy cgroup v1 net_cls tags, which triggered implicitly mentioned root fallback. Another case is Kubernetes projects like kind [1] which create Kubernetes nodes in a container and also add cgroup namespaces to the mix, meaning programs which are attached to the cgroup v2 root of the cgroup namespace get attached to a non-root cgroup v2 path from init namespace point of view. And the latter's root is out of reach for agents on a kind Kubernetes node to configure. Meaning, any entity on the node setting cgroup v1 net_cls tag will trigger the bypass despite cgroup v2 BPF programs attached to the namespace root. Generally, this mutual exclusiveness does not hold anymore in today's user environments and makes cgroup v2 usage from BPF side fragile and unreliable. This fix adds proper struct cgroup pointer for the cgroup v2 case to struct sock_cgroup_data in order to address these issues; this implicitly also fixes the tradeoffs being made back then with regards to races and refcount leaks as stated in bd1060a1d671, and removes the fallback, so that cgroup v2 BPF programs always operate as expected. [0] https://github.com/nestybox/sysbox/ [1] https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/ Fixes: bd1060a1d671 ("sock, cgroup: add sock->sk_cgroup") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)google.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210913230759.2313-1-daniel@iogearbox.net [resolve trivial conflicts] Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connor.obrien(a)crowdstrike.com> --- Hello, Requesting that these patches be applied to 5.10-stable. Tested to confirm that the cgroup_v1v2 bpf selftest for this issue passes on 5.10 with the first patch applied and fails without it. The syzkaller crash referenced in the second patch reproduces on 5.10 after applying just the first patch, but not with both patches applied. Conflicts were due to unrelated changes to the surrounding context; the actual code change remains the same as in the upstream patch. Thanks, Connor O'Brien include/linux/cgroup-defs.h | 107 +++++++++-------------------------- include/linux/cgroup.h | 22 +------ kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 50 ++++------------ net/core/netclassid_cgroup.c | 7 +-- net/core/netprio_cgroup.c | 10 +--- 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h index c9fafca1c30c..6c6323a01d43 100644 --- a/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h +++ b/include/linux/cgroup-defs.h @@ -764,107 +764,54 @@ static inline void cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(struct task_struct *tsk) {} * sock_cgroup_data is embedded at sock->sk_cgrp_data and contains * per-socket cgroup information except for memcg association. * - * On legacy hierarchies, net_prio and net_cls controllers directly set - * attributes on each sock which can then be tested by the network layer. - * On the default hierarchy, each sock is associated with the cgroup it was - * created in and the networking layer can match the cgroup directly. - * - * To avoid carrying all three cgroup related fields separately in sock, - * sock_cgroup_data overloads (prioidx, classid) and the cgroup pointer. - * On boot, sock_cgroup_data records the cgroup that the sock was created - * in so that cgroup2 matches can be made; however, once either net_prio or - * net_cls starts being used, the area is overriden to carry prioidx and/or - * classid. The two modes are distinguished by whether the lowest bit is - * set. Clear bit indicates cgroup pointer while set bit prioidx and - * classid. - * - * While userland may start using net_prio or net_cls at any time, once - * either is used, cgroup2 matching no longer works. There is no reason to - * mix the two and this is in line with how legacy and v2 compatibility is - * handled. On mode switch, cgroup references which are already being - * pointed to by socks may be leaked. While this can be remedied by adding - * synchronization around sock_cgroup_data, given that the number of leaked - * cgroups is bound and highly unlikely to be high, this seems to be the - * better trade-off. + * On legacy hierarchies, net_prio and net_cls controllers directly + * set attributes on each sock which can then be tested by the network + * layer. On the default hierarchy, each sock is associated with the + * cgroup it was created in and the networking layer can match the + * cgroup directly. */ struct sock_cgroup_data { - union { -#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN - struct { - u8 is_data : 1; - u8 no_refcnt : 1; - u8 unused : 6; - u8 padding; - u16 prioidx; - u32 classid; - } __packed; -#else - struct { - u32 classid; - u16 prioidx; - u8 padding; - u8 unused : 6; - u8 no_refcnt : 1; - u8 is_data : 1; - } __packed; + struct cgroup *cgroup; /* v2 */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID + u32 classid; /* v1 */ +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO + u16 prioidx; /* v1 */ #endif - u64 val; - }; }; -/* - * There's a theoretical window where the following accessors race with - * updaters and return part of the previous pointer as the prioidx or - * classid. Such races are short-lived and the result isn't critical. - */ static inline u16 sock_cgroup_prioidx(const struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) { - /* fallback to 1 which is always the ID of the root cgroup */ - return (skcd->is_data & 1) ? skcd->prioidx : 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO + return READ_ONCE(skcd->prioidx); +#else + return 1; +#endif } static inline u32 sock_cgroup_classid(const struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) { - /* fallback to 0 which is the unconfigured default classid */ - return (skcd->is_data & 1) ? skcd->classid : 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID + return READ_ONCE(skcd->classid); +#else + return 0; +#endif } -/* - * If invoked concurrently, the updaters may clobber each other. The - * caller is responsible for synchronization. - */ static inline void sock_cgroup_set_prioidx(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd, u16 prioidx) { - struct sock_cgroup_data skcd_buf = {{ .val = READ_ONCE(skcd->val) }}; - - if (sock_cgroup_prioidx(&skcd_buf) == prioidx) - return; - - if (!(skcd_buf.is_data & 1)) { - skcd_buf.val = 0; - skcd_buf.is_data = 1; - } - - skcd_buf.prioidx = prioidx; - WRITE_ONCE(skcd->val, skcd_buf.val); /* see sock_cgroup_ptr() */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO + WRITE_ONCE(skcd->prioidx, prioidx); +#endif } static inline void sock_cgroup_set_classid(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd, u32 classid) { - struct sock_cgroup_data skcd_buf = {{ .val = READ_ONCE(skcd->val) }}; - - if (sock_cgroup_classid(&skcd_buf) == classid) - return; - - if (!(skcd_buf.is_data & 1)) { - skcd_buf.val = 0; - skcd_buf.is_data = 1; - } - - skcd_buf.classid = classid; - WRITE_ONCE(skcd->val, skcd_buf.val); /* see sock_cgroup_ptr() */ +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID + WRITE_ONCE(skcd->classid, classid); +#endif } #else /* CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA */ diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h index c9c430712d47..15c27a2c98e2 100644 --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h @@ -816,33 +816,13 @@ static inline void cgroup_account_cputime_field(struct task_struct *task, */ #ifdef CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA -#if defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID) -extern spinlock_t cgroup_sk_update_lock; -#endif - -void cgroup_sk_alloc_disable(void); void cgroup_sk_alloc(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd); void cgroup_sk_clone(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd); void cgroup_sk_free(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd); static inline struct cgroup *sock_cgroup_ptr(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) { -#if defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID) - unsigned long v; - - /* - * @skcd->val is 64bit but the following is safe on 32bit too as we - * just need the lower ulong to be written and read atomically. - */ - v = READ_ONCE(skcd->val); - - if (v & 3) - return &cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp; - - return (struct cgroup *)(unsigned long)v ?: &cgrp_dfl_root.cgrp; -#else - return (struct cgroup *)(unsigned long)skcd->val; -#endif + return skcd->cgroup; } #else /* CONFIG_CGROUP_DATA */ diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c index 11400eba6124..3ec531ef50d8 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -6557,74 +6557,44 @@ int cgroup_parse_float(const char *input, unsigned dec_shift, s64 *v) */ #ifdef CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA -#if defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO) || defined(CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID) - -DEFINE_SPINLOCK(cgroup_sk_update_lock); -static bool cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled __read_mostly; - -void cgroup_sk_alloc_disable(void) -{ - if (cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled) - return; - pr_info("cgroup: disabling cgroup2 socket matching due to net_prio or net_cls activation\n"); - cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled = true; -} - -#else - -#define cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled false - -#endif - void cgroup_sk_alloc(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) { - if (cgroup_sk_alloc_disabled) { - skcd->no_refcnt = 1; - return; - } - /* Don't associate the sock with unrelated interrupted task's cgroup. */ if (in_interrupt()) return; rcu_read_lock(); - while (true) { struct css_set *cset; cset = task_css_set(current); if (likely(cgroup_tryget(cset->dfl_cgrp))) { - skcd->val = (unsigned long)cset->dfl_cgrp; + skcd->cgroup = cset->dfl_cgrp; cgroup_bpf_get(cset->dfl_cgrp); break; } cpu_relax(); } - rcu_read_unlock(); } void cgroup_sk_clone(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) { - if (skcd->val) { - if (skcd->no_refcnt) - return; - /* - * We might be cloning a socket which is left in an empty - * cgroup and the cgroup might have already been rmdir'd. - * Don't use cgroup_get_live(). - */ - cgroup_get(sock_cgroup_ptr(skcd)); - cgroup_bpf_get(sock_cgroup_ptr(skcd)); - } + struct cgroup *cgrp = sock_cgroup_ptr(skcd); + + /* + * We might be cloning a socket which is left in an empty + * cgroup and the cgroup might have already been rmdir'd. + * Don't use cgroup_get_live(). + */ + cgroup_get(cgrp); + cgroup_bpf_get(cgrp); } void cgroup_sk_free(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd) { struct cgroup *cgrp = sock_cgroup_ptr(skcd); - if (skcd->no_refcnt) - return; cgroup_bpf_put(cgrp); cgroup_put(cgrp); } diff --git a/net/core/netclassid_cgroup.c b/net/core/netclassid_cgroup.c index 41b24cd31562..b6de5ee22391 100644 --- a/net/core/netclassid_cgroup.c +++ b/net/core/netclassid_cgroup.c @@ -72,11 +72,8 @@ static int update_classid_sock(const void *v, struct file *file, unsigned n) struct update_classid_context *ctx = (void *)v; struct socket *sock = sock_from_file(file, &err); - if (sock) { - spin_lock(&cgroup_sk_update_lock); + if (sock) sock_cgroup_set_classid(&sock->sk->sk_cgrp_data, ctx->classid); - spin_unlock(&cgroup_sk_update_lock); - } if (--ctx->batch == 0) { ctx->batch = UPDATE_CLASSID_BATCH; return n + 1; @@ -122,8 +119,6 @@ static int write_classid(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, struct cftype *cft, struct css_task_iter it; struct task_struct *p; - cgroup_sk_alloc_disable(); - cs->classid = (u32)value; css_task_iter_start(css, 0, &it); diff --git a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c index 9bd4cab7d510..d4c71e382a13 100644 --- a/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c +++ b/net/core/netprio_cgroup.c @@ -207,8 +207,6 @@ static ssize_t write_priomap(struct kernfs_open_file *of, if (!dev) return -ENODEV; - cgroup_sk_alloc_disable(); - rtnl_lock(); ret = netprio_set_prio(of_css(of), dev, prio); @@ -222,12 +220,10 @@ static int update_netprio(const void *v, struct file *file, unsigned n) { int err; struct socket *sock = sock_from_file(file, &err); - if (sock) { - spin_lock(&cgroup_sk_update_lock); + + if (sock) sock_cgroup_set_prioidx(&sock->sk->sk_cgrp_data, (unsigned long)v); - spin_unlock(&cgroup_sk_update_lock); - } return 0; } @@ -236,8 +232,6 @@ static void net_prio_attach(struct cgroup_taskset *tset) struct task_struct *p; struct cgroup_subsys_state *css; - cgroup_sk_alloc_disable(); - cgroup_taskset_for_each(p, css, tset) { void *v = (void *)(unsigned long)css->id; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH v4.19-v5.10] block: initialize integrity buffer to zero before writing it to media

by Shivani Agarwal

From: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> [ Upstream commit 899ee2c3829c5ac14bfc7d3c4a5846c0b709b78f ] Metadata added by bio_integrity_prep is using plain kmalloc, which leads to random kernel memory being written media. For PI metadata this is limited to the app tag that isn't used by kernel generated metadata, but for non-PI metadata the entire buffer leaks kernel memory. Fix this by adding the __GFP_ZERO flag to allocations for writes. Fixes: 7ba1ba12eeef ("block: Block layer data integrity support") Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240613084839.1044015-2-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal(a)broadcom.com> --- block/bio-integrity.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/block/bio-integrity.c b/block/bio-integrity.c index a4cfc9727..499697330 100644 --- a/block/bio-integrity.c +++ b/block/bio-integrity.c @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ bool bio_integrity_prep(struct bio *bio) unsigned int bytes, offset, i; unsigned int intervals; blk_status_t status; + gfp_t gfp = GFP_NOIO; if (!bi) return true; @@ -238,12 +239,20 @@ bool bio_integrity_prep(struct bio *bio) if (!bi->profile->generate_fn || !(bi->flags & BLK_INTEGRITY_GENERATE)) return true; + + /* + * Zero the memory allocated to not leak uninitialized kernel + * memory to disk. For PI this only affects the app tag, but + * for non-integrity metadata it affects the entire metadata + * buffer. + */ + gfp |= __GFP_ZERO; } intervals = bio_integrity_intervals(bi, bio_sectors(bio)); /* Allocate kernel buffer for protection data */ len = intervals * bi->tuple_size; - buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOIO | q->bounce_gfp); + buf = kmalloc(len, gfp | q->bounce_gfp); status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; if (unlikely(buf == NULL)) { printk(KERN_ERR "could not allocate integrity buffer\n"); -- 2.39.4

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Linux-stable-mirror September 2024