From: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)igalia.com>
Since drm_sched_entity_modify_sched() can modify the entities run queue
lets make sure to only derefernce the pointer once so both adding and
waking up are guaranteed to be consistent.
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)igalia.com>
Fixes: b37aced31eb0 ("drm/scheduler: implement a function to modify sched list")
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com>
Cc: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel(a)ffwll.ch>
Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v5.7+
---
drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
index ae8be30472cd..62b07ef7630a 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c
@@ -599,6 +599,8 @@ void drm_sched_entity_push_job(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job)
/* first job wakes up scheduler */
if (first) {
+ struct drm_sched_rq *rq;
+
/* Add the entity to the run queue */
spin_lock(&entity->rq_lock);
if (entity->stopped) {
@@ -608,13 +610,15 @@ void drm_sched_entity_push_job(struct drm_sched_job *sched_job)
return;
}
- drm_sched_rq_add_entity(entity->rq, entity);
+ rq = entity->rq;
+
+ drm_sched_rq_add_entity(rq, entity);
spin_unlock(&entity->rq_lock);
if (drm_sched_policy == DRM_SCHED_POLICY_FIFO)
drm_sched_rq_update_fifo(entity, submit_ts);
- drm_sched_wakeup(entity->rq->sched, entity);
+ drm_sched_wakeup(rq->sched, entity);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_push_job);
--
2.46.0
Memory access #VEs are hard for Linux to handle in contexts like the
entry code or NMIs. But other OSes need them for functionality.
There's a static (pre-guest-boot) way for a VMM to choose one or the
other. But VMMs don't always know which OS they are booting, so they
choose to deliver those #VEs so the "other" OSes will work. That,
unfortunately has left us in the lurch and exposed to these
hard-to-handle #VEs.
The TDX module has introduced a new feature. Even if the static
configuration is set to "send nasty #VEs", the kernel can dynamically
request that they be disabled. Once they are disabled, access to private
memory that is not in the Mapped state in the Secure-EPT (SEPT) will
result in an exit to the VMM rather than injecting a #VE.
Check if the feature is available and disable SEPT #VE if possible.
If the TD is allowed to disable/enable SEPT #VEs, the ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE
attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the
control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader)
changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to
determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 373e715e31bf ("x86/tdx: Panic on bad configs that #VE on "private" memory access")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang(a)intel.com>
---
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 10 +++-
2 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index 08ce488b54d0..f969f4f5ebf8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static inline void tdcall(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args)
}
/* Read TD-scoped metadata */
-static inline u64 __maybe_unused tdg_vm_rd(u64 field, u64 *value)
+static inline u64 tdg_vm_rd(u64 field, u64 *value)
{
struct tdx_module_args args = {
.rdx = field,
@@ -193,6 +193,62 @@ static void __noreturn tdx_panic(const char *msg)
__tdx_hypercall(&args);
}
+/*
+ * The kernel cannot handle #VEs when accessing normal kernel memory. Ensure
+ * that no #VE will be delivered for accesses to TD-private memory.
+ *
+ * TDX 1.0 does not allow the guest to disable SEPT #VE on its own. The VMM
+ * controls if the guest will receive such #VE with TD attribute
+ * ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE.
+ *
+ * Newer TDX modules allow the guest to control if it wants to receive SEPT
+ * violation #VEs.
+ *
+ * Check if the feature is available and disable SEPT #VE if possible.
+ *
+ * If the TD is allowed to disable/enable SEPT #VEs, the ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE
+ * attribute is no longer reliable. It reflects the initial state of the
+ * control for the TD, but it will not be updated if someone (e.g. bootloader)
+ * changes it before the kernel starts. Kernel must check TDCS_TD_CTLS bit to
+ * determine if SEPT #VEs are enabled or disabled.
+ */
+static void disable_sept_ve(u64 td_attr)
+{
+ const char *msg = "TD misconfiguration: SEPT #VE has to be disabled";
+ bool debug = td_attr & ATTR_DEBUG;
+ u64 config, controls;
+
+ /* Is this TD allowed to disable SEPT #VE */
+ tdg_vm_rd(TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS, &config);
+ if (!(config & TDCS_CONFIG_FLEXIBLE_PENDING_VE)) {
+ /* No SEPT #VE controls for the guest: check the attribute */
+ if (td_attr & ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE)
+ return;
+
+ /* Relax SEPT_VE_DISABLE check for debug TD for backtraces */
+ if (debug)
+ pr_warn("%s\n", msg);
+ else
+ tdx_panic(msg);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if SEPT #VE has been disabled before us */
+ tdg_vm_rd(TDCS_TD_CTLS, &controls);
+ if (controls & TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE)
+ return;
+
+ /* Keep #VEs enabled for splats in debugging environments */
+ if (debug)
+ return;
+
+ /* Disable SEPT #VEs */
+ tdg_vm_wr(TDCS_TD_CTLS, TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE,
+ TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE);
+
+ return;
+}
+
static void tdx_setup(u64 *cc_mask)
{
struct tdx_module_args args = {};
@@ -218,24 +274,12 @@ static void tdx_setup(u64 *cc_mask)
gpa_width = args.rcx & GENMASK(5, 0);
*cc_mask = BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
+ td_attr = args.rdx;
+
/* Kernel does not use NOTIFY_ENABLES and does not need random #VEs */
tdg_vm_wr(TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES, 0, -1ULL);
- /*
- * The kernel can not handle #VE's when accessing normal kernel
- * memory. Ensure that no #VE will be delivered for accesses to
- * TD-private memory. Only VMM-shared memory (MMIO) will #VE.
- */
- td_attr = args.rdx;
- if (!(td_attr & ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE)) {
- const char *msg = "TD misconfiguration: SEPT_VE_DISABLE attribute must be set.";
-
- /* Relax SEPT_VE_DISABLE check for debug TD. */
- if (td_attr & ATTR_DEBUG)
- pr_warn("%s\n", msg);
- else
- tdx_panic(msg);
- }
+ disable_sept_ve(td_attr);
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h
index 7e12cfa28bec..fecb2a6e864b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h
@@ -19,9 +19,17 @@
#define TDG_VM_RD 7
#define TDG_VM_WR 8
-/* TDCS fields. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD module calls */
+/* TDX TD-Scope Metadata. To be used by TDG.VM.WR and TDG.VM.RD */
+#define TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS 0x1110000300000016
+#define TDCS_TD_CTLS 0x1110000300000017
#define TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES 0x9100000000000010
+/* TDCS_CONFIG_FLAGS bits */
+#define TDCS_CONFIG_FLEXIBLE_PENDING_VE BIT_ULL(1)
+
+/* TDCS_TD_CTLS bits */
+#define TD_CTLS_PENDING_VE_DISABLE BIT_ULL(0)
+
/* TDX hypercall Leaf IDs */
#define TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001
#define TDVMCALL_GET_QUOTE 0x10002
--
2.45.2
Rename tdx_parse_tdinfo() to tdx_setup() and move setting NOTIFY_ENABLES
there.
The function will be extended to adjust TD configuration.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy(a)linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang(a)intel.com>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index 64717a96a936..08ce488b54d0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static void __noreturn tdx_panic(const char *msg)
__tdx_hypercall(&args);
}
-static void tdx_parse_tdinfo(u64 *cc_mask)
+static void tdx_setup(u64 *cc_mask)
{
struct tdx_module_args args = {};
unsigned int gpa_width;
@@ -218,6 +218,9 @@ static void tdx_parse_tdinfo(u64 *cc_mask)
gpa_width = args.rcx & GENMASK(5, 0);
*cc_mask = BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
+ /* Kernel does not use NOTIFY_ENABLES and does not need random #VEs */
+ tdg_vm_wr(TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES, 0, -1ULL);
+
/*
* The kernel can not handle #VE's when accessing normal kernel
* memory. Ensure that no #VE will be delivered for accesses to
@@ -964,11 +967,11 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_INTEL;
- tdx_parse_tdinfo(&cc_mask);
- cc_set_mask(cc_mask);
- /* Kernel does not use NOTIFY_ENABLES and does not need random #VEs */
- tdg_vm_wr(TDCS_NOTIFY_ENABLES, 0, -1ULL);
+ /* Configure the TD */
+ tdx_setup(&cc_mask);
+
+ cc_set_mask(cc_mask);
/*
* All bits above GPA width are reserved and kernel treats shared bit
--
2.45.2
From: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk(a)amd.com>
Hi Arthur,
Can you give the patch below a try? If it works, please respond with a
Tested-by. I'll then submit it with your Reported-by and Tested-by.
Thanks,
Jason
[PATCH] fbdev/xen-fbfront: Assign fb_info->device
Probing xen-fbfront faults in video_is_primary_device(). The passed-in
struct device is NULL since xen-fbfront doesn't assign it and the
memory is kzalloc()-ed. Assign fb_info->device to avoid this.
This was exposed by the conversion of fb_is_primary_device() to
video_is_primary_device() which dropped a NULL check for struct device.
Fixes: f178e96de7f0 ("arch: Remove struct fb_info from video helpers")
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk(a)amd.com>
---
The other option would be to re-instate the NULL check in
video_is_primary_device()
---
drivers/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c
index 66d4628a96ae..c90f48ebb15e 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/xen-fbfront.c
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ static int xenfb_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
/* complete the abuse: */
fb_info->pseudo_palette = fb_info->par;
fb_info->par = info;
+ fb_info->device = &dev->dev;
fb_info->screen_buffer = info->fb;
--
2.43.0
The patch below does not apply to the 4.19-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-4.19.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2ab9d830262c132ab5db2f571003d80850d56b2a
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024090922-directed-majorette-f8ad@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 4.19.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
2ab9d830262c ("perf/aux: Fix AUX buffer serialization")
c1e8d7c6a7a6 ("mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem comments")
d8ed45c5dcd4 ("mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites")
5a36f0f3f518 ("Merge tag 'vfio-v5.8-rc1' of git://github.com/awilliam/linux-vfio")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2ab9d830262c132ab5db2f571003d80850d56b2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2024 10:14:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] perf/aux: Fix AUX buffer serialization
Ole reported that event->mmap_mutex is strictly insufficient to
serialize the AUX buffer, add a per RB mutex to fully serialize it.
Note that in the lock order comment the perf_event::mmap_mutex order
was already wrong, that is, it nesting under mmap_lock is not new with
this patch.
Fixes: 45bfb2e50471 ("perf: Add AUX area to ring buffer for raw data streams")
Reported-by: Ole <ole(a)binarygecko.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index c973e3c11e03..8a6c6bbcd658 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -1255,8 +1255,9 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
* perf_event_context::mutex
* perf_event::child_mutex;
* perf_event_context::lock
- * perf_event::mmap_mutex
* mmap_lock
+ * perf_event::mmap_mutex
+ * perf_buffer::aux_mutex
* perf_addr_filters_head::lock
*
* cpu_hotplug_lock
@@ -6373,12 +6374,11 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
event->pmu->event_unmapped(event, vma->vm_mm);
/*
- * rb->aux_mmap_count will always drop before rb->mmap_count and
- * event->mmap_count, so it is ok to use event->mmap_mutex to
- * serialize with perf_mmap here.
+ * The AUX buffer is strictly a sub-buffer, serialize using aux_mutex
+ * to avoid complications.
*/
if (rb_has_aux(rb) && vma->vm_pgoff == rb->aux_pgoff &&
- atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&rb->aux_mmap_count, &event->mmap_mutex)) {
+ atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&rb->aux_mmap_count, &rb->aux_mutex)) {
/*
* Stop all AUX events that are writing to this buffer,
* so that we can free its AUX pages and corresponding PMU
@@ -6395,7 +6395,7 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
rb_free_aux(rb);
WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&rb->aux_refcount));
- mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&rb->aux_mutex);
}
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&rb->mmap_count))
@@ -6483,6 +6483,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
unsigned long user_locked, user_lock_limit;
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
+ struct mutex *aux_mutex = NULL;
struct perf_buffer *rb = NULL;
unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
unsigned long vma_size;
@@ -6531,6 +6532,9 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
if (!rb)
goto aux_unlock;
+ aux_mutex = &rb->aux_mutex;
+ mutex_lock(aux_mutex);
+
aux_offset = READ_ONCE(rb->user_page->aux_offset);
aux_size = READ_ONCE(rb->user_page->aux_size);
@@ -6681,6 +6685,8 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
atomic_dec(&rb->mmap_count);
}
aux_unlock:
+ if (aux_mutex)
+ mutex_unlock(aux_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
/*
diff --git a/kernel/events/internal.h b/kernel/events/internal.h
index 451514442a1b..e072d995d670 100644
--- a/kernel/events/internal.h
+++ b/kernel/events/internal.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct perf_buffer {
struct user_struct *mmap_user;
/* AUX area */
+ struct mutex aux_mutex;
long aux_head;
unsigned int aux_nest;
long aux_wakeup; /* last aux_watermark boundary crossed by aux_head */
diff --git a/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
index 8cadf97bc290..4f46f688d0d4 100644
--- a/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
@@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ ring_buffer_init(struct perf_buffer *rb, long watermark, int flags)
*/
if (!rb->nr_pages)
rb->paused = 1;
+
+ mutex_init(&rb->aux_mutex);
}
void perf_aux_output_flag(struct perf_output_handle *handle, u64 flags)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 2ab9d830262c132ab5db2f571003d80850d56b2a
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2024090922-footbath-barrack-c29b@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
2ab9d830262c ("perf/aux: Fix AUX buffer serialization")
c1e8d7c6a7a6 ("mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem comments")
d8ed45c5dcd4 ("mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites")
5a36f0f3f518 ("Merge tag 'vfio-v5.8-rc1' of git://github.com/awilliam/linux-vfio")
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 2ab9d830262c132ab5db2f571003d80850d56b2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2024 10:14:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] perf/aux: Fix AUX buffer serialization
Ole reported that event->mmap_mutex is strictly insufficient to
serialize the AUX buffer, add a per RB mutex to fully serialize it.
Note that in the lock order comment the perf_event::mmap_mutex order
was already wrong, that is, it nesting under mmap_lock is not new with
this patch.
Fixes: 45bfb2e50471 ("perf: Add AUX area to ring buffer for raw data streams")
Reported-by: Ole <ole(a)binarygecko.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index c973e3c11e03..8a6c6bbcd658 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -1255,8 +1255,9 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
* perf_event_context::mutex
* perf_event::child_mutex;
* perf_event_context::lock
- * perf_event::mmap_mutex
* mmap_lock
+ * perf_event::mmap_mutex
+ * perf_buffer::aux_mutex
* perf_addr_filters_head::lock
*
* cpu_hotplug_lock
@@ -6373,12 +6374,11 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
event->pmu->event_unmapped(event, vma->vm_mm);
/*
- * rb->aux_mmap_count will always drop before rb->mmap_count and
- * event->mmap_count, so it is ok to use event->mmap_mutex to
- * serialize with perf_mmap here.
+ * The AUX buffer is strictly a sub-buffer, serialize using aux_mutex
+ * to avoid complications.
*/
if (rb_has_aux(rb) && vma->vm_pgoff == rb->aux_pgoff &&
- atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&rb->aux_mmap_count, &event->mmap_mutex)) {
+ atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&rb->aux_mmap_count, &rb->aux_mutex)) {
/*
* Stop all AUX events that are writing to this buffer,
* so that we can free its AUX pages and corresponding PMU
@@ -6395,7 +6395,7 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
rb_free_aux(rb);
WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&rb->aux_refcount));
- mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&rb->aux_mutex);
}
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&rb->mmap_count))
@@ -6483,6 +6483,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
unsigned long user_locked, user_lock_limit;
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
+ struct mutex *aux_mutex = NULL;
struct perf_buffer *rb = NULL;
unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
unsigned long vma_size;
@@ -6531,6 +6532,9 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
if (!rb)
goto aux_unlock;
+ aux_mutex = &rb->aux_mutex;
+ mutex_lock(aux_mutex);
+
aux_offset = READ_ONCE(rb->user_page->aux_offset);
aux_size = READ_ONCE(rb->user_page->aux_size);
@@ -6681,6 +6685,8 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
atomic_dec(&rb->mmap_count);
}
aux_unlock:
+ if (aux_mutex)
+ mutex_unlock(aux_mutex);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
/*
diff --git a/kernel/events/internal.h b/kernel/events/internal.h
index 451514442a1b..e072d995d670 100644
--- a/kernel/events/internal.h
+++ b/kernel/events/internal.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct perf_buffer {
struct user_struct *mmap_user;
/* AUX area */
+ struct mutex aux_mutex;
long aux_head;
unsigned int aux_nest;
long aux_wakeup; /* last aux_watermark boundary crossed by aux_head */
diff --git a/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
index 8cadf97bc290..4f46f688d0d4 100644
--- a/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/events/ring_buffer.c
@@ -337,6 +337,8 @@ ring_buffer_init(struct perf_buffer *rb, long watermark, int flags)
*/
if (!rb->nr_pages)
rb->paused = 1;
+
+ mutex_init(&rb->aux_mutex);
}
void perf_aux_output_flag(struct perf_output_handle *handle, u64 flags)