In vmw_compat_shader_add(), the return value check of vmw_shader_alloc()
is not proper. Modify the check for the return pointer 'res'.
Found by code review and compiled on ubuntu 20.04.
Fixes: 18e4a4669c50 ("drm/vmwgfx: Fix compat shader namespace")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang(a)isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c
index 69dfe69ce0f8..7ed938710342 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_shader.c
@@ -923,8 +923,10 @@ int vmw_compat_shader_add(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
ttm_bo_unreserve(&buf->tbo);
res = vmw_shader_alloc(dev_priv, buf, size, 0, shader_type);
- if (unlikely(ret != 0))
+ if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(res);
goto no_reserve;
+ }
ret = vmw_cmdbuf_res_add(man, vmw_cmdbuf_res_shader,
vmw_shader_key(user_key, shader_type),
--
2.25.1
From: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com>
[ Upstream commit 5ac2c0279053a2c5265d46903432fb26ae2d0da2 ]
Check that the resource which is converted to a surface exists before
trying to use the cursor snooper on it.
vmw_cmd_res_check allows explicit invalid (SVGA3D_INVALID_ID) identifiers
because some svga commands accept SVGA3D_INVALID_ID to mean "no surface",
unfortunately functions that accept the actual surfaces as objects might
(and in case of the cursor snooper, do not) be able to handle null
objects. Make sure that we validate not only the identifier (via the
vmw_cmd_res_check) but also check that the actual resource exists before
trying to do something with it.
Fixes unchecked null-ptr reference in the snooping code.
Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com>
Fixes: c0951b797e7d ("drm/vmwgfx: Refactor resource management")
Reported-by: Kuzey Arda Bulut <kuzeyardabulut(a)gmail.com>
Cc: Broadcom internal kernel review list <bcm-kernel-feedback-list(a)broadcom.com>
Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org
Reviewed-by: Ian Forbes <ian.forbes(a)broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250917153655.1968583-1-zack.rusin@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
[Shivani: Modified to apply on v5.10.y-v6.1.y]
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal(a)broadcom.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
index 0d12d6af6..5d3827b5d 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
@@ -1507,6 +1507,7 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dma(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
SVGA3dCmdHeader *header)
{
struct vmw_buffer_object *vmw_bo = NULL;
+ struct vmw_resource *res;
struct vmw_surface *srf = NULL;
VMW_DECLARE_CMD_VAR(*cmd, SVGA3dCmdSurfaceDMA);
int ret;
@@ -1542,18 +1543,24 @@ static int vmw_cmd_dma(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
dirty = (cmd->body.transfer == SVGA3D_WRITE_HOST_VRAM) ?
VMW_RES_DIRTY_SET : 0;
- ret = vmw_cmd_res_check(dev_priv, sw_context, vmw_res_surface,
- dirty, user_surface_converter,
- &cmd->body.host.sid, NULL);
+ ret = vmw_cmd_res_check(dev_priv, sw_context, vmw_res_surface, dirty,
+ user_surface_converter, &cmd->body.host.sid,
+ NULL);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
if (unlikely(ret != -ERESTARTSYS))
VMW_DEBUG_USER("could not find surface for DMA.\n");
return ret;
}
- srf = vmw_res_to_srf(sw_context->res_cache[vmw_res_surface].res);
+ res = sw_context->res_cache[vmw_res_surface].res;
+ if (!res) {
+ VMW_DEBUG_USER("Invalid DMA surface.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- vmw_kms_cursor_snoop(srf, sw_context->fp->tfile, &vmw_bo->base, header);
+ srf = vmw_res_to_srf(res);
+ vmw_kms_cursor_snoop(srf, sw_context->fp->tfile, &vmw_bo->base,
+ header);
return 0;
}
--
2.40.4
The functions ocfs2_reserve_suballoc_bits(), ocfs2_block_group_alloc(),
ocfs2_block_group_alloc_contig() and ocfs2_find_smallest_chain() trust
the on-disk values related to the allocation chain. However, KASAN bug
was triggered in these functions, and the kernel panicked when accessing
redzoned memory. This occurred due to the corrupted value of `cl_count`
field of `struct ocfs2_chain_list`. Upon analysis, the value of `cl_count`
was observed to be overwhemingly large, due to which the code accessed
redzoned memory.
The fix introduces an if statement which validates value of `cl_count`
(both lower and upper bounds). Lower bound check ensures the value of
`cl_count` is not zero and upper bound check ensures that the value of
`cl_count` is in the range such that it has a value less than the total
size of struct ocfs2_chain_list and maximum number of chains that can be
present, so as to fill one block.
Reported-by: syzbot+af14efe17dfa46173239(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=af14efe17dfa46173239
Tested-by: syzbot+af14efe17dfa46173239(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com>
---
fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
index f7b483f0de2a..7ea63e9cc4f8 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
@@ -671,6 +671,21 @@ static int ocfs2_block_group_alloc(struct ocfs2_super *osb,
BUG_ON(ocfs2_is_cluster_bitmap(alloc_inode));
cl = &fe->id2.i_chain;
+ unsigned int block_size = osb->sb->s_blocksize;
+ unsigned int max_cl_count =
+ (block_size - offsetof(struct ocfs2_chain_list, cl_recs)) /
+ sizeof(struct ocfs2_chain_rec);
+
+ if (!le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count) ||
+ le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count) > max_cl_count) {
+ ocfs2_error(osb->sb,
+ "Invalid chain list: cl_count %u "
+ "exceeds max %u",
+ le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_count), max_cl_count);
+ status = -EIO;
+ goto bail;
+ }
+
status = ocfs2_reserve_clusters_with_limit(osb,
le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_cpg),
max_block, flags, &ac);
base-commit: 36c254515dc6592c44db77b84908358979dd6b50
--
2.34.1
Hi, all
We hit hard-lockups when the Intel IOMMU waits indefinitely for an ATS invalidation
that cannot complete, especially under GDR high-load conditions.
1. Hard-lock when a passthrough PCIe NIC with ATS enabled link-down in Intel IOMMU
non-scalable mode. Two scenarios exist: NIC link-down with an explicit link-down
event and link-down without any event.
a) NIC link-down with an explicit link-dow event.
Call Trace:
qi_submit_sync
qi_flush_dev_iotlb
__context_flush_dev_iotlb.part.0
domain_context_clear_one_cb
pci_for_each_dma_alias
device_block_translation
blocking_domain_attach_dev
iommu_deinit_device
__iommu_group_remove_device
iommu_release_device
iommu_bus_notifier
blocking_notifier_call_chain
bus_notify
device_del
pci_remove_bus_device
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device
pciehp_unconfigure_device
pciehp_disable_slot
pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change
pciehp_ist
b) NIC link-down without an event - hard-lock on VM destroy.
Call Trace:
qi_submit_sync
qi_flush_dev_iotlb
__context_flush_dev_iotlb.part.0
domain_context_clear_one_cb
pci_for_each_dma_alias
device_block_translation
blocking_domain_attach_dev
__iommu_attach_device
__iommu_device_set_domain
__iommu_group_set_domain_internal
iommu_detach_group
vfio_iommu_type1_detach_group
vfio_group_detach_container
vfio_group_fops_release
__fput
2. Hard-lock when a passthrough PCIe NIC with ATS enabled link-down in Intel IOMMU
scalable mode; NIC link-down without an event hard-locks on VM destroy.
Call Trace:
qi_submit_sync
qi_flush_dev_iotlb
intel_pasid_tear_down_entry
device_block_translation
blocking_domain_attach_dev
__iommu_attach_device
__iommu_device_set_domain
__iommu_group_set_domain_internal
iommu_detach_group
vfio_iommu_type1_detach_group
vfio_group_detach_container
vfio_group_fops_release
__fput
Fix both issues with two patches:
1. Skip dev-IOTLB flush for inaccessible devices in __context_flush_dev_iotlb() using
pci_device_is_present().
2. Use pci_device_is_present() instead of pci_dev_is_disconnected() to decide when to
skip ATS invalidation in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid().
Best Regards,
Jinhui
---
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251210171431.1589-1-guojinhui.liam@bytedance.…
Changelog in v1 -> v2 (suggested by Baolu Lu)
- Simplify the pci_device_is_present() check in __context_flush_dev_iotlb().
- Add Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org to both patches.
Jinhui Guo (2):
iommu/vt-d: Skip dev-iotlb flush for inaccessible PCIe device without
scalable mode
iommu/vt-d: Flush dev-IOTLB only when PCIe device is accessible in
scalable mode
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.20.1
Hi,
I would like to request backporting 5326ab737a47 ("virtio_console: fix
order of fields cols and rows") to all LTS kernels.
I'm working on QEMU patches that add virtio console size support.
Without the fix, rows and columns will be swapped.
As far as I know, there are no device implementations that use the
wrong order and would by broken by the fix.
Note: A previous version [1] of the patch contained "Cc: stable" and
"Fixes:" tags, but they seem to have been accidentally left out from
the final version.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250320172654.624657-1-maxbr@linux.ibm.com/
Thanks,
Filip Hejsek