February 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Fix broken SNP support with KVM module built-in" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021858-default-pledge-8039@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com> Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 22:54:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Fix broken SNP support with KVM module built-in Fix issues with enabling SNP host support and effectively SNP support which is broken with respect to the KVM module being built-in. SNP host support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() which is invoked as device_initcall(). SNP check on IOMMU is done during IOMMU PCI init (IOMMU_PCI_INIT stage). And for that reason snp_rmptable_init() is currently invoked via device_initcall() and cannot be invoked via subsys_initcall() as core IOMMU subsystem gets initialized via subsys_initcall(). Now, if kvm_amd module is built-in, it gets initialized before SNP host support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() : [ 10.131811] kvm_amd: TSC scaling supported [ 10.136384] kvm_amd: Nested Virtualization enabled [ 10.141734] kvm_amd: Nested Paging enabled [ 10.146304] kvm_amd: LBR virtualization supported [ 10.151557] kvm_amd: SEV enabled (ASIDs 100 - 509) [ 10.156905] kvm_amd: SEV-ES enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99) [ 10.162256] kvm_amd: SEV-SNP enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99) [ 10.171508] kvm_amd: Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported [ 10.177052] kvm_amd: Virtual GIF supported ... ... [ 10.201648] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu And then svm_x86_ops->enable_virtualization_cpu() (svm_enable_virtualization_cpu) programs MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA as following: wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd->save_area_pa); So VM_HSAVE_PA is non-zero before SNP support is enabled on all CPUs. snp_rmptable_init() gets invoked after svm_enable_virtualization_cpu() as following : ... [ 11.256138] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu ... [ 11.264918] SEV-SNP: in snp_rmptable_init This triggers a #GP exception in snp_rmptable_init() when snp_enable() is invoked to set SNP_EN in SYSCFG MSR: [ 11.294289] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010010 (tried to write 0x0000000003fc0000) at rIP: 0xffffffffaf5d5c28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30) ... [ 11.294404] Call Trace: [ 11.294482] <IRQ> [ 11.294513] ? show_stack_regs+0x26/0x30 [ 11.294522] ? ex_handler_msr+0x10f/0x180 [ 11.294529] ? search_extable+0x2b/0x40 [ 11.294538] ? fixup_exception+0x2dd/0x340 [ 11.294542] ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x440 [ 11.294550] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30 [ 11.294557] ? __pfx_snp_enable+0x10/0x10 [ 11.294567] ? native_write_msr+0x8/0x30 [ 11.294570] ? __snp_enable+0x5d/0x70 [ 11.294575] snp_enable+0x19/0x20 [ 11.294578] __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9c/0x3a0 [ 11.294586] generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x17/0x20 [ 11.294589] __sysvec_call_function+0x20/0x90 [ 11.294596] sysvec_call_function+0x80/0xb0 [ 11.294601] </IRQ> [ 11.294603] <TASK> [ 11.294605] asm_sysvec_call_function+0x1f/0x30 ... [ 11.294631] arch_cpu_idle+0xd/0x20 [ 11.294633] default_idle_call+0x34/0xd0 [ 11.294636] do_idle+0x1f1/0x230 [ 11.294643] ? complete+0x71/0x80 [ 11.294649] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40 [ 11.294652] start_secondary+0x12d/0x160 [ 11.294655] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [ 11.294662] </TASK> This #GP exception is getting triggered due to the following errata for AMD family 19h Models 10h-1Fh Processors: Processor may generate spurious #GP(0) Exception on WRMSR instruction: Description: The Processor will generate a spurious #GP(0) Exception on a WRMSR instruction if the following conditions are all met: - the target of the WRMSR is a SYSCFG register. - the write changes the value of SYSCFG.SNPEn from 0 to 1. - One of the threads that share the physical core has a non-zero value in the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR. The document being referred to above: https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/revisi… To summarize, with kvm_amd module being built-in, KVM/SVM initialization happens before host SNP is enabled and this SVM initialization sets VM_HSAVE_PA to non-zero, which then triggers a #GP when SYSCFG.SNPEn is being set and this will subsequently cause SNP_INIT(_EX) to fail with INVALID_CONFIG error as SYSCFG[SnpEn] is not set on all CPUs. Essentially SNP host enabling code should be invoked before KVM initialization, which is currently not the case when KVM is built-in. Add fix to call snp_rmptable_init() early from iommu_snp_enable() directly and not invoked via device_initcall() which enables SNP host support before KVM initialization with kvm_amd module built-in. Add additional handling for `iommu=off` or `amd_iommu=off` options. Note that IOMMUs need to be enabled for SNP initialization, therefore, if host SNP support is enabled but late IOMMU initialization fails then that will cause PSP driver's SNP_INIT to fail as IOMMU SNP sanity checks in SNP firmware will fail with invalid configuration error as below: [ 9.723114] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled [ 9.727602] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled [ 9.732527] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) [ 9.739098] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: no command queues available [ 9.745167] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: psp enabled [ 9.805337] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV-SNP: failed to INIT rc -5, error 0x3 [ 9.866426] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV API:1.53 build:5 Fixes: c3b86e61b756 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature") Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Co-developed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Message-ID: <138b520fb83964782303b43ade4369cd181fdd9c.1739226950.git.ashish.kalra(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 5d9685f92e5c..1581246491b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { } #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void); +int snp_rmptable_init(void); int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level); void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address); int psmash(u64 pfn); @@ -541,6 +542,7 @@ void kdump_sev_callback(void); void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void); #else static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; } +static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; } static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; } static inline void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address) {} static inline int psmash(u64 pfn) { return -ENODEV; } diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c index 1dcc027ec77e..42e74a5a7d78 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c @@ -505,19 +505,19 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void) * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP * firmware ABI spec. */ -static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) +int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) { unsigned int i; u64 val; - if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) - return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))) + return -ENOSYS; - if (!amd_iommu_snp_en) - goto nosnp; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!amd_iommu_snp_en)) + return -ENOSYS; if (!setup_rmptable()) - goto nosnp; + return -ENOSYS; /* * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) /* Zero out the RMP bookkeeping area */ if (!clear_rmptable_bookkeeping()) { free_rmp_segment_table(); - goto nosnp; + return -ENOSYS; } /* Zero out the RMP entries */ @@ -562,17 +562,8 @@ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true; return 0; - -nosnp: - cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); - return -ENOSYS; } -/* - * This must be called after the IOMMU has been initialized. - */ -device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init); - static void set_rmp_segment_info(unsigned int segment_shift) { rmp_segment_shift = segment_shift; diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index c5cd92edada0..2fecfed75e54 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -3194,7 +3194,7 @@ static bool __init detect_ivrs(void) return true; } -static void iommu_snp_enable(void) +static __init void iommu_snp_enable(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) @@ -3219,6 +3219,14 @@ static void iommu_snp_enable(void) goto disable_snp; } + /* + * Enable host SNP support once SNP support is checked on IOMMU. + */ + if (snp_rmptable_init()) { + pr_warn("SNP: RMP initialization failed, SNP cannot be supported.\n"); + goto disable_snp; + } + pr_info("IOMMU SNP support enabled.\n"); return; @@ -3318,6 +3326,19 @@ static int __init iommu_go_to_state(enum iommu_init_state state) ret = state_next(); } + /* + * SNP platform initilazation requires IOMMUs to be fully configured. + * If the SNP support on IOMMUs has NOT been checked, simply mark SNP + * as unsupported. If the SNP support on IOMMUs has been checked and + * host SNP support enabled but RMP enforcement has not been enabled + * in IOMMUs, then the system is in a half-baked state, but can limp + * along as all memory should be Hypervisor-Owned in the RMP. WARN, + * but leave SNP as "supported" to avoid confusing the kernel. + */ + if (ret && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) && + !WARN_ON_ONCE(amd_iommu_snp_en)) + cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); + return ret; } @@ -3426,18 +3447,23 @@ void __init amd_iommu_detect(void) int ret; if (no_iommu || (iommu_detected && !gart_iommu_aperture)) - return; + goto disable_snp; if (!amd_iommu_sme_check()) - return; + goto disable_snp; ret = iommu_go_to_state(IOMMU_IVRS_DETECTED); if (ret) - return; + goto disable_snp; amd_iommu_detected = true; iommu_detected = 1; x86_init.iommu.iommu_init = amd_iommu_init; + return; + +disable_snp: + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); } /****************************************************************************

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Fix broken SNP support with KVM module built-in" failed to apply to 6.13-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.13-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.13.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021856-heave-blade-985e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.13.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 409f45387c937145adeeeebc6d6032c2ec232b35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com> Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 22:54:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Fix broken SNP support with KVM module built-in Fix issues with enabling SNP host support and effectively SNP support which is broken with respect to the KVM module being built-in. SNP host support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() which is invoked as device_initcall(). SNP check on IOMMU is done during IOMMU PCI init (IOMMU_PCI_INIT stage). And for that reason snp_rmptable_init() is currently invoked via device_initcall() and cannot be invoked via subsys_initcall() as core IOMMU subsystem gets initialized via subsys_initcall(). Now, if kvm_amd module is built-in, it gets initialized before SNP host support is enabled in snp_rmptable_init() : [ 10.131811] kvm_amd: TSC scaling supported [ 10.136384] kvm_amd: Nested Virtualization enabled [ 10.141734] kvm_amd: Nested Paging enabled [ 10.146304] kvm_amd: LBR virtualization supported [ 10.151557] kvm_amd: SEV enabled (ASIDs 100 - 509) [ 10.156905] kvm_amd: SEV-ES enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99) [ 10.162256] kvm_amd: SEV-SNP enabled (ASIDs 1 - 99) [ 10.171508] kvm_amd: Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported [ 10.177052] kvm_amd: Virtual GIF supported ... ... [ 10.201648] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu And then svm_x86_ops->enable_virtualization_cpu() (svm_enable_virtualization_cpu) programs MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA as following: wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd->save_area_pa); So VM_HSAVE_PA is non-zero before SNP support is enabled on all CPUs. snp_rmptable_init() gets invoked after svm_enable_virtualization_cpu() as following : ... [ 11.256138] kvm_amd: in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu ... [ 11.264918] SEV-SNP: in snp_rmptable_init This triggers a #GP exception in snp_rmptable_init() when snp_enable() is invoked to set SNP_EN in SYSCFG MSR: [ 11.294289] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0010010 (tried to write 0x0000000003fc0000) at rIP: 0xffffffffaf5d5c28 (native_write_msr+0x8/0x30) ... [ 11.294404] Call Trace: [ 11.294482] <IRQ> [ 11.294513] ? show_stack_regs+0x26/0x30 [ 11.294522] ? ex_handler_msr+0x10f/0x180 [ 11.294529] ? search_extable+0x2b/0x40 [ 11.294538] ? fixup_exception+0x2dd/0x340 [ 11.294542] ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x440 [ 11.294550] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30 [ 11.294557] ? __pfx_snp_enable+0x10/0x10 [ 11.294567] ? native_write_msr+0x8/0x30 [ 11.294570] ? __snp_enable+0x5d/0x70 [ 11.294575] snp_enable+0x19/0x20 [ 11.294578] __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9c/0x3a0 [ 11.294586] generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x17/0x20 [ 11.294589] __sysvec_call_function+0x20/0x90 [ 11.294596] sysvec_call_function+0x80/0xb0 [ 11.294601] </IRQ> [ 11.294603] <TASK> [ 11.294605] asm_sysvec_call_function+0x1f/0x30 ... [ 11.294631] arch_cpu_idle+0xd/0x20 [ 11.294633] default_idle_call+0x34/0xd0 [ 11.294636] do_idle+0x1f1/0x230 [ 11.294643] ? complete+0x71/0x80 [ 11.294649] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40 [ 11.294652] start_secondary+0x12d/0x160 [ 11.294655] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [ 11.294662] </TASK> This #GP exception is getting triggered due to the following errata for AMD family 19h Models 10h-1Fh Processors: Processor may generate spurious #GP(0) Exception on WRMSR instruction: Description: The Processor will generate a spurious #GP(0) Exception on a WRMSR instruction if the following conditions are all met: - the target of the WRMSR is a SYSCFG register. - the write changes the value of SYSCFG.SNPEn from 0 to 1. - One of the threads that share the physical core has a non-zero value in the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR. The document being referred to above: https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/revisi… To summarize, with kvm_amd module being built-in, KVM/SVM initialization happens before host SNP is enabled and this SVM initialization sets VM_HSAVE_PA to non-zero, which then triggers a #GP when SYSCFG.SNPEn is being set and this will subsequently cause SNP_INIT(_EX) to fail with INVALID_CONFIG error as SYSCFG[SnpEn] is not set on all CPUs. Essentially SNP host enabling code should be invoked before KVM initialization, which is currently not the case when KVM is built-in. Add fix to call snp_rmptable_init() early from iommu_snp_enable() directly and not invoked via device_initcall() which enables SNP host support before KVM initialization with kvm_amd module built-in. Add additional handling for `iommu=off` or `amd_iommu=off` options. Note that IOMMUs need to be enabled for SNP initialization, therefore, if host SNP support is enabled but late IOMMU initialization fails then that will cause PSP driver's SNP_INIT to fail as IOMMU SNP sanity checks in SNP firmware will fail with invalid configuration error as below: [ 9.723114] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled [ 9.727602] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled [ 9.732527] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) [ 9.739098] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: no command queues available [ 9.745167] ccp 0000:a2:00.1: psp enabled [ 9.805337] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV-SNP: failed to INIT rc -5, error 0x3 [ 9.866426] ccp 0000:23:00.1: SEV API:1.53 build:5 Fixes: c3b86e61b756 ("x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature") Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Co-developed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Message-ID: <138b520fb83964782303b43ade4369cd181fdd9c.1739226950.git.ashish.kalra(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 5d9685f92e5c..1581246491b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { } #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void); +int snp_rmptable_init(void); int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level); void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address); int psmash(u64 pfn); @@ -541,6 +542,7 @@ void kdump_sev_callback(void); void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void); #else static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; } +static inline int snp_rmptable_init(void) { return -ENOSYS; } static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; } static inline void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address) {} static inline int psmash(u64 pfn) { return -ENODEV; } diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c index 1dcc027ec77e..42e74a5a7d78 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c @@ -505,19 +505,19 @@ static bool __init setup_rmptable(void) * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP * firmware ABI spec. */ -static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) +int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) { unsigned int i; u64 val; - if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) - return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))) + return -ENOSYS; - if (!amd_iommu_snp_en) - goto nosnp; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!amd_iommu_snp_en)) + return -ENOSYS; if (!setup_rmptable()) - goto nosnp; + return -ENOSYS; /* * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) /* Zero out the RMP bookkeeping area */ if (!clear_rmptable_bookkeeping()) { free_rmp_segment_table(); - goto nosnp; + return -ENOSYS; } /* Zero out the RMP entries */ @@ -562,17 +562,8 @@ static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true; return 0; - -nosnp: - cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); - return -ENOSYS; } -/* - * This must be called after the IOMMU has been initialized. - */ -device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init); - static void set_rmp_segment_info(unsigned int segment_shift) { rmp_segment_shift = segment_shift; diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index c5cd92edada0..2fecfed75e54 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -3194,7 +3194,7 @@ static bool __init detect_ivrs(void) return true; } -static void iommu_snp_enable(void) +static __init void iommu_snp_enable(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) @@ -3219,6 +3219,14 @@ static void iommu_snp_enable(void) goto disable_snp; } + /* + * Enable host SNP support once SNP support is checked on IOMMU. + */ + if (snp_rmptable_init()) { + pr_warn("SNP: RMP initialization failed, SNP cannot be supported.\n"); + goto disable_snp; + } + pr_info("IOMMU SNP support enabled.\n"); return; @@ -3318,6 +3326,19 @@ static int __init iommu_go_to_state(enum iommu_init_state state) ret = state_next(); } + /* + * SNP platform initilazation requires IOMMUs to be fully configured. + * If the SNP support on IOMMUs has NOT been checked, simply mark SNP + * as unsupported. If the SNP support on IOMMUs has been checked and + * host SNP support enabled but RMP enforcement has not been enabled + * in IOMMUs, then the system is in a half-baked state, but can limp + * along as all memory should be Hypervisor-Owned in the RMP. WARN, + * but leave SNP as "supported" to avoid confusing the kernel. + */ + if (ret && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) && + !WARN_ON_ONCE(amd_iommu_snp_en)) + cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); + return ret; } @@ -3426,18 +3447,23 @@ void __init amd_iommu_detect(void) int ret; if (no_iommu || (iommu_detected && !gart_iommu_aperture)) - return; + goto disable_snp; if (!amd_iommu_sme_check()) - return; + goto disable_snp; ret = iommu_go_to_state(IOMMU_IVRS_DETECTED); if (ret) - return; + goto disable_snp; amd_iommu_detected = true; iommu_detected = 1; x86_init.iommu.iommu_init = amd_iommu_init; + return; + +disable_snp: + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + cc_platform_clear(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP); } /****************************************************************************

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Enter guest mode before initializing nested NPT" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 46d6c6f3ef0eaff71c2db6d77d4e2ebb7adac34f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021837-volumes-twig-2514@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 46d6c6f3ef0eaff71c2db6d77d4e2ebb7adac34f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 17:08:25 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Enter guest mode before initializing nested NPT MMU When preparing vmcb02 for nested VMRUN (or state restore), "enter" guest mode prior to initializing the MMU for nested NPT so that guest_mode is set in the MMU's role. KVM's model is that all L2 MMUs are tagged with guest_mode, as the behavior of hypervisor MMUs tends to be significantly different than kernel MMUs. Practically speaking, the bug is relatively benign, as KVM only directly queries role.guest_mode in kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots() and kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(), which SVM doesn't use, and in paths that are optimizations (mmu_page_zap_pte() and shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages()). And while the role is incorprated into shadow page usage, because nested NPT requires KVM to be using NPT for L1, reusing shadow pages across L1 and L2 is impossible as L1 MMUs will always have direct=1, while L2 MMUs will have direct=0. Hoist the TLB processing and setting of HF_GUEST_MASK to the beginning of the flow instead of forcing guest_mode in the MMU, as nothing in nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() between the old and new locations touches TLB flush requests or HF_GUEST_MASK, i.e. there's no reason to present inconsistent vCPU state to the MMU. Fixes: 69cb877487de ("KVM: nSVM: move MMU setup to nested_prepare_vmcb_control") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130010825.220346-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 74c20dbb92da..d4ac4a1f8b81 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -5540,7 +5540,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0, union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role; /* NPT requires CR0.PG=1. */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct); + WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct || !cpu_role.base.guest_mode); root_role = cpu_role.base; root_role.level = kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index d77b094d9a4d..04c375bf1ac2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 pause_count12; u32 pause_thresh12; + nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu); + + /* Enter Guest-Mode */ + enter_guest_mode(vcpu); + /* * Filled at exit: exit_code, exit_code_hi, exit_info_1, exit_info_2, * exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes. @@ -762,11 +767,6 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, } } - nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu); - - /* Enter Guest-Mode */ - enter_guest_mode(vcpu); - /* * Merge guest and host intercepts - must be called with vcpu in * guest-mode to take effect.

4 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Enter guest mode before initializing nested NPT" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 46d6c6f3ef0eaff71c2db6d77d4e2ebb7adac34f # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021824-strict-motivator-41ae@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 46d6c6f3ef0eaff71c2db6d77d4e2ebb7adac34f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 17:08:25 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nSVM: Enter guest mode before initializing nested NPT MMU When preparing vmcb02 for nested VMRUN (or state restore), "enter" guest mode prior to initializing the MMU for nested NPT so that guest_mode is set in the MMU's role. KVM's model is that all L2 MMUs are tagged with guest_mode, as the behavior of hypervisor MMUs tends to be significantly different than kernel MMUs. Practically speaking, the bug is relatively benign, as KVM only directly queries role.guest_mode in kvm_mmu_free_guest_mode_roots() and kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(), which SVM doesn't use, and in paths that are optimizations (mmu_page_zap_pte() and shadow_mmu_try_split_huge_pages()). And while the role is incorprated into shadow page usage, because nested NPT requires KVM to be using NPT for L1, reusing shadow pages across L1 and L2 is impossible as L1 MMUs will always have direct=1, while L2 MMUs will have direct=0. Hoist the TLB processing and setting of HF_GUEST_MASK to the beginning of the flow instead of forcing guest_mode in the MMU, as nothing in nested_vmcb02_prepare_control() between the old and new locations touches TLB flush requests or HF_GUEST_MASK, i.e. there's no reason to present inconsistent vCPU state to the MMU. Fixes: 69cb877487de ("KVM: nSVM: move MMU setup to nested_prepare_vmcb_control") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130010825.220346-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 74c20dbb92da..d4ac4a1f8b81 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -5540,7 +5540,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0, union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role; /* NPT requires CR0.PG=1. */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct); + WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct || !cpu_role.base.guest_mode); root_role = cpu_role.base; root_role.level = kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index d77b094d9a4d..04c375bf1ac2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 pause_count12; u32 pause_thresh12; + nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu); + + /* Enter Guest-Mode */ + enter_guest_mode(vcpu); + /* * Filled at exit: exit_code, exit_code_hi, exit_info_1, exit_info_2, * exit_int_info, exit_int_info_err, next_rip, insn_len, insn_bytes. @@ -762,11 +767,6 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm, } } - nested_svm_transition_tlb_flush(vcpu); - - /* Enter Guest-Mode */ - enter_guest_mode(vcpu); - /* * Merge guest and host intercepts - must be called with vcpu in * guest-mode to take effect.

4 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Reject Hyper-V's SEND_IPI hypercalls if local APIC" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a8de7f100bb5989d9c3627d3a223ee1c863f3b69 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021851-nautical-buffoon-d8b1@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a8de7f100bb5989d9c3627d3a223ee1c863f3b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 16:34:51 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Reject Hyper-V's SEND_IPI hypercalls if local APIC isn't in-kernel Advertise support for Hyper-V's SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX hypercalls if and only if the local API is emulated/virtualized by KVM, and explicitly reject said hypercalls if the local APIC is emulated in userspace, i.e. don't rely on userspace to opt-in to KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID. Rejecting SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX fixes a NULL-pointer dereference if Hyper-V enlightenments are exposed to the guest without an in-kernel local APIC: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd __kasan_report.cold+0x34/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 __apic_accept_irq+0x3a/0x5c0 kvm_hv_send_ipi.isra.0+0x34e/0x820 kvm_hv_hypercall+0x8d9/0x9d0 kvm_emulate_hypercall+0x506/0x7e0 __vmx_handle_exit+0x283/0xb60 vmx_handle_exit+0x1d/0xd0 vcpu_enter_guest+0x16b0/0x24c0 vcpu_run+0xc0/0x550 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x170/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscal1_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 Note, checking the sending vCPU is sufficient, as the per-VM irqchip_mode can't be modified after vCPUs are created, i.e. if one vCPU has an in-kernel local APIC, then all vCPUs have an in-kernel local APIC. Reported-by: Dongjie Zou <zoudongjie(a)huawei.com> Fixes: 214ff83d4473 ("KVM: x86: hyperv: implement PV IPI send hypercalls") Fixes: 2bc39970e932 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: Introduce KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250118003454.2619573-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c index 6a6dd5a84f22..6ebeb6cea6c0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c @@ -2226,6 +2226,9 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc) u32 vector; bool all_cpus; + if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) + return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT; + if (hc->code == HVCALL_SEND_IPI) { if (!hc->fast) { if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa, &send_ipi, @@ -2852,7 +2855,8 @@ int kvm_get_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid, ent->eax |= HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED; ent->eax |= HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED; ent->eax |= HV_X64_RELAXED_TIMING_RECOMMENDED; - ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED; + if (!vcpu || lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) + ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED; ent->eax |= HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED; if (evmcs_ver) ent->eax |= HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED;

4 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: x86: Reject Hyper-V's SEND_IPI hypercalls if local APIC" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a8de7f100bb5989d9c3627d3a223ee1c863f3b69 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021850-exes-cabana-e868@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a8de7f100bb5989d9c3627d3a223ee1c863f3b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 16:34:51 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Reject Hyper-V's SEND_IPI hypercalls if local APIC isn't in-kernel Advertise support for Hyper-V's SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX hypercalls if and only if the local API is emulated/virtualized by KVM, and explicitly reject said hypercalls if the local APIC is emulated in userspace, i.e. don't rely on userspace to opt-in to KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID. Rejecting SEND_IPI and SEND_IPI_EX fixes a NULL-pointer dereference if Hyper-V enlightenments are exposed to the guest without an in-kernel local APIC: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd __kasan_report.cold+0x34/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 __apic_accept_irq+0x3a/0x5c0 kvm_hv_send_ipi.isra.0+0x34e/0x820 kvm_hv_hypercall+0x8d9/0x9d0 kvm_emulate_hypercall+0x506/0x7e0 __vmx_handle_exit+0x283/0xb60 vmx_handle_exit+0x1d/0xd0 vcpu_enter_guest+0x16b0/0x24c0 vcpu_run+0xc0/0x550 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x170/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscal1_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 Note, checking the sending vCPU is sufficient, as the per-VM irqchip_mode can't be modified after vCPUs are created, i.e. if one vCPU has an in-kernel local APIC, then all vCPUs have an in-kernel local APIC. Reported-by: Dongjie Zou <zoudongjie(a)huawei.com> Fixes: 214ff83d4473 ("KVM: x86: hyperv: implement PV IPI send hypercalls") Fixes: 2bc39970e932 ("x86/kvm/hyper-v: Introduce KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_HV_CPUID") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250118003454.2619573-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c index 6a6dd5a84f22..6ebeb6cea6c0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c @@ -2226,6 +2226,9 @@ static u64 kvm_hv_send_ipi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_hv_hcall *hc) u32 vector; bool all_cpus; + if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) + return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT; + if (hc->code == HVCALL_SEND_IPI) { if (!hc->fast) { if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest(kvm, hc->ingpa, &send_ipi, @@ -2852,7 +2855,8 @@ int kvm_get_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_cpuid2 *cpuid, ent->eax |= HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED; ent->eax |= HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED; ent->eax |= HV_X64_RELAXED_TIMING_RECOMMENDED; - ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED; + if (!vcpu || lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) + ent->eax |= HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED; ent->eax |= HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED; if (evmcs_ver) ent->eax |= HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED;

4 months

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] drm/xe: Carve out wopcm portion from the stolen memory" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x e977499820782ab1c69f354d9f41b6d9ad1f43d9 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021815-sublease-unneeded-0077@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From e977499820782ab1c69f354d9f41b6d9ad1f43d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 15:36:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] drm/xe: Carve out wopcm portion from the stolen memory The top of stolen memory is WOPCM, which shouldn't be accessed. Remove this portion from the stolen memory region for discrete platforms. This was already done for integrated, but was missing for discrete platforms. This also moves get_wopcm_size() so detect_bar2_dgfx() and detect_bar2_integrated can use the same function. v2: Improve commit message and suitable stable version tag(Lucas) Fixes: d8b52a02cb40 ("drm/xe: Implement stolen memory.") Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld(a)intel.com> Cc: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi(a)intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.11+ Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi(a)intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250210143654.2076747-1-nirm… Signed-off-by: Nirmoy Das <nirmoy.das(a)intel.com> (cherry picked from commit 2c7f45cc7e197a792ce5c693e56ea48f60b312da) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi(a)intel.com> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ttm_stolen_mgr.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ttm_stolen_mgr.c index 423856cc18d4..d414421f8c13 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ttm_stolen_mgr.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_ttm_stolen_mgr.c @@ -57,38 +57,6 @@ bool xe_ttm_stolen_cpu_access_needs_ggtt(struct xe_device *xe) return GRAPHICS_VERx100(xe) < 1270 && !IS_DGFX(xe); } -static s64 detect_bar2_dgfx(struct xe_device *xe, struct xe_ttm_stolen_mgr *mgr) -{ - struct xe_tile *tile = xe_device_get_root_tile(xe); - struct xe_mmio *mmio = xe_root_tile_mmio(xe); - struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(xe->drm.dev); - u64 stolen_size; - u64 tile_offset; - u64 tile_size; - - tile_offset = tile->mem.vram.io_start - xe->mem.vram.io_start; - tile_size = tile->mem.vram.actual_physical_size; - - /* Use DSM base address instead for stolen memory */ - mgr->stolen_base = (xe_mmio_read64_2x32(mmio, DSMBASE) & BDSM_MASK) - tile_offset; - if (drm_WARN_ON(&xe->drm, tile_size < mgr->stolen_base)) - return 0; - - stolen_size = tile_size - mgr->stolen_base; - - /* Verify usage fits in the actual resource available */ - if (mgr->stolen_base + stolen_size <= pci_resource_len(pdev, LMEM_BAR)) - mgr->io_base = tile->mem.vram.io_start + mgr->stolen_base; - - /* - * There may be few KB of platform dependent reserved memory at the end - * of vram which is not part of the DSM. Such reserved memory portion is - * always less then DSM granularity so align down the stolen_size to DSM - * granularity to accommodate such reserve vram portion. - */ - return ALIGN_DOWN(stolen_size, SZ_1M); -} - static u32 get_wopcm_size(struct xe_device *xe) { u32 wopcm_size; @@ -112,6 +80,44 @@ static u32 get_wopcm_size(struct xe_device *xe) return wopcm_size; } +static s64 detect_bar2_dgfx(struct xe_device *xe, struct xe_ttm_stolen_mgr *mgr) +{ + struct xe_tile *tile = xe_device_get_root_tile(xe); + struct xe_mmio *mmio = xe_root_tile_mmio(xe); + struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(xe->drm.dev); + u64 stolen_size, wopcm_size; + u64 tile_offset; + u64 tile_size; + + tile_offset = tile->mem.vram.io_start - xe->mem.vram.io_start; + tile_size = tile->mem.vram.actual_physical_size; + + /* Use DSM base address instead for stolen memory */ + mgr->stolen_base = (xe_mmio_read64_2x32(mmio, DSMBASE) & BDSM_MASK) - tile_offset; + if (drm_WARN_ON(&xe->drm, tile_size < mgr->stolen_base)) + return 0; + + /* Carve out the top of DSM as it contains the reserved WOPCM region */ + wopcm_size = get_wopcm_size(xe); + if (drm_WARN_ON(&xe->drm, !wopcm_size)) + return 0; + + stolen_size = tile_size - mgr->stolen_base; + stolen_size -= wopcm_size; + + /* Verify usage fits in the actual resource available */ + if (mgr->stolen_base + stolen_size <= pci_resource_len(pdev, LMEM_BAR)) + mgr->io_base = tile->mem.vram.io_start + mgr->stolen_base; + + /* + * There may be few KB of platform dependent reserved memory at the end + * of vram which is not part of the DSM. Such reserved memory portion is + * always less then DSM granularity so align down the stolen_size to DSM + * granularity to accommodate such reserve vram portion. + */ + return ALIGN_DOWN(stolen_size, SZ_1M); +} + static u32 detect_bar2_integrated(struct xe_device *xe, struct xe_ttm_stolen_mgr *mgr) { struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(xe->drm.dev);

4 months

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[PATCH v2] ufs: core: bsg: Fix memory crash in case arpmb command failed

by Arthur Simchaev

In case the device doesn't support arpmb, the kernel get memory crash due to copy user data in bsg_transport_sg_io_fn level. So in case ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req returned error, do not set the job's reply_len. Memory crash backtrace: 3,1290,531166405,-;ufshcd 0000:00:12.5: ARPMB OP failed: error code -22 4,1308,531166555,-;Call Trace: 4,1309,531166559,-; <TASK> 4,1310,531166565,-; ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80 4,1311,531166575,-; ? die+0x37/0xa0 4,1312,531166583,-; ? do_trap+0xd4/0xf0 4,1313,531166593,-; ? do_error_trap+0x71/0xb0 4,1314,531166601,-; ? usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 4,1315,531166610,-; ? exc_invalid_op+0x52/0x80 4,1316,531166622,-; ? usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 4,1317,531166630,-; ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 4,1318,531166643,-; ? usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 4,1319,531166652,-; __check_heap_object+0xe3/0x120 4,1320,531166661,-; check_heap_object+0x185/0x1d0 4,1321,531166670,-; __check_object_size.part.0+0x72/0x150 4,1322,531166679,-; __check_object_size+0x23/0x30 4,1323,531166688,-; bsg_transport_sg_io_fn+0x314/0x3b0 Fixes: 6ff265fc5ef6 ("scsi: ufs: core: bsg: Add advanced RPMB support in ufs_bsg") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arthur Simchaev <arthur.simchaev(a)sandisk.com> --- Changes in v2: - Add Fixes tag - Elaborate commit log Signed-off-by: Arthur Simchaev <arthur.simchaev(a)sandisk.com> --- drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c b/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c index 8d4ad0a3f2cf..a8ed9bc6e4f1 100644 --- a/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +++ b/drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c @@ -194,10 +194,12 @@ static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job) ufshcd_rpm_put_sync(hba); kfree(buff); bsg_reply->result = ret; - job->reply_len = !rpmb ? sizeof(struct ufs_bsg_reply) : sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply); /* complete the job here only if no error */ - if (ret == 0) + if (ret == 0) { + job->reply_len = !rpmb ? sizeof(struct ufs_bsg_reply) : + sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply); bsg_job_done(job, ret, bsg_reply->reply_payload_rcv_len); + } return ret; } -- 2.34.1

4 months

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[PATCH v2] gpiolib: protect gpio_chip with SRCU in array_info paths in multi get/set

by Bartosz Golaszewski

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> During the locking rework in GPIOLIB, we omitted one important use-case, namely: setting and getting values for GPIO descriptor arrays with array_info present. This patch does two things: first it makes struct gpio_array store the address of the underlying GPIO device and not chip. Next: it protects the chip with SRCU from removal in gpiod_get_array_value_complex() and gpiod_set_array_value_complex(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> --- Changes in v2: - fix sparse warning about differing address spaces by checking for open-drain/source flags directly in the descriptor drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c index f261f7893f85..fddbcf8a360e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c @@ -3128,6 +3128,8 @@ static int gpiod_get_raw_value_commit(const struct gpio_desc *desc) static int gpio_chip_get_multiple(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned long *mask, unsigned long *bits) { + lockdep_assert_held(&gc->gpiodev->srcu); + if (gc->get_multiple) return gc->get_multiple(gc, mask, bits); if (gc->get) { @@ -3158,6 +3160,7 @@ int gpiod_get_array_value_complex(bool raw, bool can_sleep, struct gpio_array *array_info, unsigned long *value_bitmap) { + struct gpio_chip *gc; int ret, i = 0; /* @@ -3169,10 +3172,15 @@ int gpiod_get_array_value_complex(bool raw, bool can_sleep, array_size <= array_info->size && (void *)array_info == desc_array + array_info->size) { if (!can_sleep) - WARN_ON(array_info->chip->can_sleep); + WARN_ON(array_info->gdev->can_sleep); - ret = gpio_chip_get_multiple(array_info->chip, - array_info->get_mask, + guard(srcu)(&array_info->gdev->srcu); + gc = srcu_dereference(array_info->gdev->chip, + &array_info->gdev->srcu); + if (!gc) + return -ENODEV; + + ret = gpio_chip_get_multiple(gc, array_info->get_mask, value_bitmap); if (ret) return ret; @@ -3453,6 +3461,8 @@ static void gpiod_set_raw_value_commit(struct gpio_desc *desc, bool value) static void gpio_chip_set_multiple(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned long *mask, unsigned long *bits) { + lockdep_assert_held(&gc->gpiodev->srcu); + if (gc->set_multiple) { gc->set_multiple(gc, mask, bits); } else { @@ -3470,6 +3480,7 @@ int gpiod_set_array_value_complex(bool raw, bool can_sleep, struct gpio_array *array_info, unsigned long *value_bitmap) { + struct gpio_chip *gc; int i = 0; /* @@ -3481,14 +3492,19 @@ int gpiod_set_array_value_complex(bool raw, bool can_sleep, array_size <= array_info->size && (void *)array_info == desc_array + array_info->size) { if (!can_sleep) - WARN_ON(array_info->chip->can_sleep); + WARN_ON(array_info->gdev->can_sleep); + + guard(srcu)(&array_info->gdev->srcu); + gc = srcu_dereference(array_info->gdev->chip, + &array_info->gdev->srcu); + if (!gc) + return -ENODEV; if (!raw && !bitmap_empty(array_info->invert_mask, array_size)) bitmap_xor(value_bitmap, value_bitmap, array_info->invert_mask, array_size); - gpio_chip_set_multiple(array_info->chip, array_info->set_mask, - value_bitmap); + gpio_chip_set_multiple(gc, array_info->set_mask, value_bitmap); i = find_first_zero_bit(array_info->set_mask, array_size); if (i == array_size) @@ -4750,9 +4766,10 @@ struct gpio_descs *__must_check gpiod_get_array(struct device *dev, { struct gpio_desc *desc; struct gpio_descs *descs; + struct gpio_device *gdev; struct gpio_array *array_info = NULL; - struct gpio_chip *gc; int count, bitmap_size; + unsigned long dflags; size_t descs_size; count = gpiod_count(dev, con_id); @@ -4773,7 +4790,7 @@ struct gpio_descs *__must_check gpiod_get_array(struct device *dev, descs->desc[descs->ndescs] = desc; - gc = gpiod_to_chip(desc); + gdev = gpiod_to_gpio_device(desc); /* * If pin hardware number of array member 0 is also 0, select * its chip as a candidate for fast bitmap processing path. @@ -4781,8 +4798,8 @@ struct gpio_descs *__must_check gpiod_get_array(struct device *dev, if (descs->ndescs == 0 && gpio_chip_hwgpio(desc) == 0) { struct gpio_descs *array; - bitmap_size = BITS_TO_LONGS(gc->ngpio > count ? - gc->ngpio : count); + bitmap_size = BITS_TO_LONGS(gdev->ngpio > count ? + gdev->ngpio : count); array = krealloc(descs, descs_size + struct_size(array_info, invert_mask, 3 * bitmap_size), @@ -4802,7 +4819,7 @@ struct gpio_descs *__must_check gpiod_get_array(struct device *dev, array_info->desc = descs->desc; array_info->size = count; - array_info->chip = gc; + array_info->gdev = gdev; bitmap_set(array_info->get_mask, descs->ndescs, count - descs->ndescs); bitmap_set(array_info->set_mask, descs->ndescs, @@ -4815,7 +4832,7 @@ struct gpio_descs *__must_check gpiod_get_array(struct device *dev, continue; /* Unmark array members which don't belong to the 'fast' chip */ - if (array_info->chip != gc) { + if (array_info->gdev != gdev) { __clear_bit(descs->ndescs, array_info->get_mask); __clear_bit(descs->ndescs, array_info->set_mask); } @@ -4838,9 +4855,10 @@ struct gpio_descs *__must_check gpiod_get_array(struct device *dev, array_info->set_mask); } } else { + dflags = READ_ONCE(desc->flags); /* Exclude open drain or open source from fast output */ - if (gpiochip_line_is_open_drain(gc, descs->ndescs) || - gpiochip_line_is_open_source(gc, descs->ndescs)) + if (test_bit(FLAG_OPEN_DRAIN, &dflags) || + test_bit(FLAG_OPEN_SOURCE, &dflags)) __clear_bit(descs->ndescs, array_info->set_mask); /* Identify 'fast' pins which require invertion */ @@ -4852,7 +4870,7 @@ struct gpio_descs *__must_check gpiod_get_array(struct device *dev, if (array_info) dev_dbg(dev, "GPIO array info: chip=%s, size=%d, get_mask=%lx, set_mask=%lx, invert_mask=%lx\n", - array_info->chip->label, array_info->size, + array_info->gdev->label, array_info->size, *array_info->get_mask, *array_info->set_mask, *array_info->invert_mask); return descs; diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h index 83690f72f7e5..147156ec502b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib.h @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ extern const char *const gpio_suffixes[]; * * @desc: Array of pointers to the GPIO descriptors * @size: Number of elements in desc - * @chip: Parent GPIO chip + * @gdev: Parent GPIO device * @get_mask: Get mask used in fastpath * @set_mask: Set mask used in fastpath * @invert_mask: Invert mask used in fastpath @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ extern const char *const gpio_suffixes[]; struct gpio_array { struct gpio_desc **desc; unsigned int size; - struct gpio_chip *chip; + struct gpio_device *gdev; unsigned long *get_mask; unsigned long *set_mask; unsigned long invert_mask[]; -- 2.45.2

4 months

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[PATCH net 0/8] net: enetc: fix some known issues

by Wei Fang

There are some issues with the enetc driver, some of which are specific to the LS1028A platform, and some of which were introduced recently when i.MX95 ENETC support was added, so this patch set aims to clean up those issues. Wei Fang (8): net: enetc: fix the off-by-one issue in enetc_map_tx_buffs() net: enetc: correct the tx_swbd statistics net: enetc: correct the xdp_tx statistics net: enetc: VFs do not support HWTSTAMP_TX_ONESTEP_SYNC net: enetc: update UDP checksum when updating originTimestamp field net: enetc: add missing enetc4_link_deinit() net: enetc: remove the mm_lock from the ENETC v4 driver net: enetc: correct the EMDIO base offset for ENETC v4 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c | 53 +++++++++++++++---- .../net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc4_hw.h | 3 ++ .../net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc4_pf.c | 2 +- .../ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_ethtool.c | 7 ++- .../freescale/enetc/enetc_pf_common.c | 10 +++- 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

4 months

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Linux-stable-mirror February 2025