FEAT_PMUv3p9 registers such as PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1
access from EL1 requires appropriate EL2 fine grained trap configuration
via FEAT_FGT2 based trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2.
Otherwise such register accesses will result in traps into EL2.
Add a new helper __init_el2_fgt2() which initializes FEAT_FGT2 based fine
grained trap control registers HDFGRTR2_EL2 and HDFGWTR2_EL2 (setting the
bits nPMICNTR_EL0, nPMICFILTR_EL0 and nPMUACR_EL1) to enable access into
PMICNTR_EL0, PMICFILTR_EL0, and PMUACR_EL1 registers.
Also update booting.rst with SCR_EL3.FGTEn2 requirement for all FEAT_FGT2
based registers to be accessible in EL2.
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz(a)kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton(a)linux.dev>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel(a)lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-doc(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvmarm(a)lists.linux.dev
Fixes: 0bbff9ed8165 ("perf/arm_pmuv3: Add PMUv3.9 per counter EL0 access control")
Fixes: d8226d8cfbaf ("perf: arm_pmuv3: Add support for Armv9.4 PMU instruction counter")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh(a)kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual(a)arm.com>
---
Changes in V3:
- Added 'MDCR_EL3.EnPM2 = 0b1' as a booting requirement per Mark
- Added 'Fixes:' and 'CC: stable' tags per Mark
Changes in V2:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250203050828.1049370-8-anshuman.khandual@arm.…
Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst b/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst
index cad6fdc96b98..dee7b6de864f 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst
@@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ Before jumping into the kernel, the following conditions must be met:
- SCR_EL3.FGTEn (bit 27) must be initialised to 0b1.
+ For CPUs with the Fine Grained Traps 2 (FEAT_FGT2) extension present:
+
+ - If EL3 is present and the kernel is entered at EL2:
+
+ - SCR_EL3.FGTEn2 (bit 59) must be initialised to 0b1.
+
For CPUs with support for HCRX_EL2 (FEAT_HCX) present:
- If EL3 is present and the kernel is entered at EL2:
@@ -382,6 +388,22 @@ Before jumping into the kernel, the following conditions must be met:
- SMCR_EL2.EZT0 (bit 30) must be initialised to 0b1.
+ For CPUs with the Performance Monitors Extension (FEAT_PMUv3p9):
+
+ - If EL3 is present:
+
+ - MDCR_EL3.EnPM2 (bit 7) must be initialised to 0b1.
+
+ - If the kernel is entered at EL1 and EL2 is present:
+
+ - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMICNTR_EL0 (bit 2) must be initialised to 0b1.
+ - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMICFILTR_EL0 (bit 3) must be initialised to 0b1.
+ - HDFGRTR2_EL2.nPMUACR_EL1 (bit 4) must be initialised to 0b1.
+
+ - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMICNTR_EL0 (bit 2) must be initialised to 0b1.
+ - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMICFILTR_EL0 (bit 3) must be initialised to 0b1.
+ - HDFGWTR2_EL2.nPMUACR_EL1 (bit 4) must be initialised to 0b1.
+
For CPUs with Memory Copy and Memory Set instructions (FEAT_MOPS):
- If the kernel is entered at EL1 and EL2 is present:
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h
index 25e162651750..1a0071faf57e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h
@@ -233,6 +233,30 @@
.Lskip_fgt_\@:
.endm
+.macro __init_el2_fgt2
+ mrs x1, id_aa64mmfr0_el1
+ ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_FGT_SHIFT, #4
+ cmp x1, #ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1_FGT_FGT2
+ b.lt .Lskip_fgt2_\@
+
+ mov x0, xzr
+ mrs x1, id_aa64dfr0_el1
+ ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_SHIFT, #4
+ cmp x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_V3P9
+ b.lt .Lskip_pmuv3p9_\@
+
+ orr x0, x0, #HDFGRTR2_EL2_nPMICNTR_EL0
+ orr x0, x0, #HDFGRTR2_EL2_nPMICFILTR_EL0
+ orr x0, x0, #HDFGRTR2_EL2_nPMUACR_EL1
+.Lskip_pmuv3p9_\@:
+ msr_s SYS_HDFGRTR2_EL2, x0
+ msr_s SYS_HDFGWTR2_EL2, x0
+ msr_s SYS_HFGRTR2_EL2, xzr
+ msr_s SYS_HFGWTR2_EL2, xzr
+ msr_s SYS_HFGITR2_EL2, xzr
+.Lskip_fgt2_\@:
+.endm
+
.macro __init_el2_gcs
mrs_s x1, SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1
ubfx x1, x1, #ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_GCS_SHIFT, #4
@@ -283,6 +307,7 @@
__init_el2_nvhe_idregs
__init_el2_cptr
__init_el2_fgt
+ __init_el2_fgt2
__init_el2_gcs
.endm
--
2.25.1
If bio_add_folio() fails (because it is full),
erofs_fileio_scan_folio() needs to submit the I/O request via
erofs_fileio_rq_submit() and allocate a new I/O request with an empty
`struct bio`. Then it retries the bio_add_folio() call.
However, at this point, erofs_onlinefolio_split() has already been
called which increments `folio->private`; the retry will call
erofs_onlinefolio_split() again, but there will never be a matching
erofs_onlinefolio_end() call. This leaves the folio locked forever
and all waiters will be stuck in folio_wait_bit_common().
This bug has been added by commit ce63cb62d794 ("erofs: support
unencoded inodes for fileio"), but was practically unreachable because
there was room for 256 folios in the `struct bio` - until commit
9f74ae8c9ac9 ("erofs: shorten bvecs[] for file-backed mounts") which
reduced the array capacity to 16 folios.
It was now trivial to trigger the bug by manually invoking readahead
from userspace, e.g.:
posix_fadvise(fd, 0, st.st_size, POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED);
This should be fixed by invoking erofs_onlinefolio_split() only after
bio_add_folio() has succeeded. This is safe: asynchronous completions
invoking erofs_onlinefolio_end() will not unlock the folio because
erofs_fileio_scan_folio() is still holding a reference to be released
by erofs_onlinefolio_end() at the end.
Fixes: ce63cb62d794 ("erofs: support unencoded inodes for fileio")
Fixes: 9f74ae8c9ac9 ("erofs: shorten bvecs[] for file-backed mounts")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com>
---
fs/erofs/fileio.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/erofs/fileio.c b/fs/erofs/fileio.c
index 4fa0a0121288..60c7cc4c105c 100644
--- a/fs/erofs/fileio.c
+++ b/fs/erofs/fileio.c
@@ -150,10 +150,10 @@ static int erofs_fileio_scan_folio(struct erofs_fileio *io, struct folio *folio)
io->rq->bio.bi_iter.bi_sector = io->dev.m_pa >> 9;
attached = 0;
}
- if (!attached++)
- erofs_onlinefolio_split(folio);
if (!bio_add_folio(&io->rq->bio, folio, len, cur))
goto io_retry;
+ if (!attached++)
+ erofs_onlinefolio_split(folio);
io->dev.m_pa += len;
}
cur += len;
--
2.47.2
Unlike sysfs, the lifetime of configfs objects is controlled by
userspace. There is no mechanism for the kernel to find and delete all
created config-items. Instead, the configfs-tsm-report mechanism has an
expectation that tsm_unregister() can happen at any time and cause
established config-item access to start failing.
That expectation is not fully satisfied. While tsm_report_read(),
tsm_report_{is,is_bin}_visible(), and tsm_report_make_item() safely fail
if tsm_ops have been unregistered, tsm_report_privlevel_store()
tsm_report_provider_show() fail to check for ops registration. Add the
missing checks for tsm_ops having been removed.
Now, in supporting the ability for tsm_unregister() to always succeed,
it leaves the problem of what to do with lingering config-items. The
expectation is that the admin that arranges for the ->remove() (unbind)
of the ${tsm_arch}-guest driver is also responsible for deletion of all
open config-items. Until that deletion happens, ->probe() (reload /
bind) of the ${tsm_arch}-guest driver fails.
This allows for emergency shutdown / revocation of attestation
interfaces, and requires coordinated restart.
Fixes: 70e6f7e2b985 ("configfs-tsm: Introduce a shared ABI for attestation reports")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose(a)arm.com>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price(a)arm.com>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar(a)arm.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com>
Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy(a)linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Cedric Xing <cedric.xing(a)intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com>
---
drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
index 9432d4e303f1..096f4f7c0c11 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/tsm.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
static struct tsm_provider {
const struct tsm_ops *ops;
void *data;
+ atomic_t count;
} provider;
static DECLARE_RWSEM(tsm_rwsem);
@@ -92,6 +93,10 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_privlevel_store(struct config_item *cfg,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
+ if (!provider.ops)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
/*
* The valid privilege levels that a TSM might accept, if it accepts a
* privilege level setting at all, are a max of TSM_PRIVLEVEL_MAX (see
@@ -101,7 +106,6 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_privlevel_store(struct config_item *cfg,
if (provider.ops->privlevel_floor > val || val > TSM_PRIVLEVEL_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
- guard(rwsem_write)(&tsm_rwsem);
rc = try_advance_write_generation(report);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -115,6 +119,10 @@ static ssize_t tsm_report_privlevel_floor_show(struct config_item *cfg,
char *buf)
{
guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+
+ if (!provider.ops)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%u\n", provider.ops->privlevel_floor);
}
CONFIGFS_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, privlevel_floor);
@@ -217,6 +225,9 @@ CONFIGFS_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, generation);
static ssize_t tsm_report_provider_show(struct config_item *cfg, char *buf)
{
guard(rwsem_read)(&tsm_rwsem);
+ if (!provider.ops)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", provider.ops->name);
}
CONFIGFS_ATTR_RO(tsm_report_, provider);
@@ -421,12 +432,20 @@ static struct config_item *tsm_report_make_item(struct config_group *group,
if (!state)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ atomic_inc(&provider.count);
config_item_init_type_name(&state->cfg, name, &tsm_report_type);
return &state->cfg;
}
+static void tsm_report_drop_item(struct config_group *group, struct config_item *item)
+{
+ config_item_put(item);
+ atomic_dec(&provider.count);
+}
+
static struct configfs_group_operations tsm_report_group_ops = {
.make_item = tsm_report_make_item,
+ .drop_item = tsm_report_drop_item,
};
static const struct config_item_type tsm_reports_type = {
@@ -459,6 +478,11 @@ int tsm_register(const struct tsm_ops *ops, void *priv)
return -EBUSY;
}
+ if (atomic_read(&provider.count)) {
+ pr_err("configfs/tsm not empty\n");
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
provider.ops = ops;
provider.data = priv;
return 0;
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