May 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[for-next][PATCH 01/10] ring-buffer: Move cpus_read_lock() outside of buffer->mutex

by Steven Rostedt

From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: __might_fault+0xa5/0x110 _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80 _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70 perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0 perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0 start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0 _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690 cpu_up+0x117/0x170 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170 smp_init+0x2b/0xf0 kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0 kernel_init+0x1e/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0 ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0 __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120 tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80 tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock); lock(&buffer->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113: #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390 #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70 stack backtrace: CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be check_noncircular+0x146/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210 lock_acquire+0x174/0x310 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0 __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0 ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50 ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110 tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0 __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10 ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10 ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130 do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390 ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10 ? 0xffffffffc0370095 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90 </TASK> The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527105820.0f45d045@gandalf.local.home Fixes: 117c39200d9d7 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> --- kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c index 3f9bf562beea..ca1a8e706004 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c @@ -2849,6 +2849,12 @@ int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size, if (nr_pages < 2) nr_pages = 2; + /* + * Keep CPUs from coming online while resizing to synchronize + * with new per CPU buffers being created. + */ + guard(cpus_read_lock)(); + /* prevent another thread from changing buffer sizes */ mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex); atomic_inc(&buffer->resizing); @@ -2893,7 +2899,6 @@ int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size, cond_resched(); } - cpus_read_lock(); /* * Fire off all the required work handlers * We can't schedule on offline CPUs, but it's not necessary @@ -2933,7 +2938,6 @@ int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size, cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0; } - cpus_read_unlock(); } else { cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu_id]; @@ -2961,8 +2965,6 @@ int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size, goto out_err; } - cpus_read_lock(); - /* Can't run something on an offline CPU. */ if (!cpu_online(cpu_id)) rb_update_pages(cpu_buffer); @@ -2981,7 +2983,6 @@ int ring_buffer_resize(struct trace_buffer *buffer, unsigned long size, } cpu_buffer->nr_pages_to_update = 0; - cpus_read_unlock(); } out: -- 2.47.2

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4] fs/filesystems: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow in fs_name()

by Sasha Levin

From: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> [ Upstream commit 1363c134ade81e425873b410566e957fecebb261 ] fs_name() has @index as unsigned int, so there is underflow risk for operation '@index--'. Fix by breaking the for loop when '@index == 0' which is also more proper than '@index <= 0' for unsigned integer comparison. Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250410-fix_fs-v1-1-7c14ccc8ebaa@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Detailed Analysis:** **The Bug:** The `fs_name()` function at `fs/filesystems.c:156-174` has a critical unsigned integer underflow vulnerability. When the function receives `index=0` as a parameter, the loop `for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--)` decrements `index` from 0 to `UINT_MAX` (4294967295 on 32-bit systems), causing the condition `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` to evaluate incorrectly. **The Fix:** The commit changes the logic from: - Old: `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` - New: `if (index == 0) { if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) res = 0; break; }` This prevents the unsigned integer from wrapping around and provides proper bounds checking. **Impact and Severity:** 1. **User-accessible vulnerability**: The `fs_name()` function is called through the `sysfs` system call (syscall #139) with option 2, making it directly accessible to userspace applications. 2. **Potential for exploitation**: An attacker could call `sysfs(2, 0, buffer)` to trigger the underflow, potentially causing: - Infinite loops in the filesystem list traversal - Unintended module reference acquisition - System instability or denial of service 3. **Core filesystem subsystem**: This affects the fundamental filesystem registration mechanism in the kernel. **Comparison with Similar Commits:** This follows the same pattern as the **accepted backport examples**: - **Similar to Commit #1 (ntfs3)**: Both fix integer overflow/underflow issues that could cause system instability - **Similar to Commit #3 (f2fs)**: Both prevent integer arithmetic issues in filesystem code - **Similar to Commit #5 (f2fs)**: Both add bounds checking to prevent corruption **Stable Tree Criteria:** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Prevents potential system instability and undefined behavior ✅ **Small and contained**: Minimal code change, only affects one function ✅ **Clear side effects**: No architectural changes, just safer bounds checking ✅ **Low regression risk**: The fix makes the function more robust without changing expected behavior ✅ **Critical subsystem**: Filesystem management is fundamental to kernel operation **Conclusion:** This is a textbook example of a commit suitable for stable backporting: it fixes a clear bug with security implications in core kernel infrastructure, uses a minimal and safe approach, and has no risk of introducing regressions. The unsigned integer underflow could lead to system instability when triggered through the accessible `sysfs` syscall. fs/filesystems.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/filesystems.c b/fs/filesystems.c index 5e1a190133738..148073e372acd 100644 --- a/fs/filesystems.c +++ b/fs/filesystems.c @@ -155,15 +155,19 @@ static int fs_index(const char __user * __name) static int fs_name(unsigned int index, char __user * buf) { struct file_system_type * tmp; - int len, res; + int len, res = -EINVAL; read_lock(&file_systems_lock); - for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) - if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) { + if (index == 0) { + if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + res = 0; break; + } + } read_unlock(&file_systems_lock); - if (!tmp) - return -EINVAL; + if (res) + return res; /* OK, we got the reference, so we can safely block */ len = strlen(tmp->name) + 1; -- 2.39.5

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10] fs/filesystems: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow in fs_name()

by Sasha Levin

From: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> [ Upstream commit 1363c134ade81e425873b410566e957fecebb261 ] fs_name() has @index as unsigned int, so there is underflow risk for operation '@index--'. Fix by breaking the for loop when '@index == 0' which is also more proper than '@index <= 0' for unsigned integer comparison. Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250410-fix_fs-v1-1-7c14ccc8ebaa@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Detailed Analysis:** **The Bug:** The `fs_name()` function at `fs/filesystems.c:156-174` has a critical unsigned integer underflow vulnerability. When the function receives `index=0` as a parameter, the loop `for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--)` decrements `index` from 0 to `UINT_MAX` (4294967295 on 32-bit systems), causing the condition `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` to evaluate incorrectly. **The Fix:** The commit changes the logic from: - Old: `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` - New: `if (index == 0) { if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) res = 0; break; }` This prevents the unsigned integer from wrapping around and provides proper bounds checking. **Impact and Severity:** 1. **User-accessible vulnerability**: The `fs_name()` function is called through the `sysfs` system call (syscall #139) with option 2, making it directly accessible to userspace applications. 2. **Potential for exploitation**: An attacker could call `sysfs(2, 0, buffer)` to trigger the underflow, potentially causing: - Infinite loops in the filesystem list traversal - Unintended module reference acquisition - System instability or denial of service 3. **Core filesystem subsystem**: This affects the fundamental filesystem registration mechanism in the kernel. **Comparison with Similar Commits:** This follows the same pattern as the **accepted backport examples**: - **Similar to Commit #1 (ntfs3)**: Both fix integer overflow/underflow issues that could cause system instability - **Similar to Commit #3 (f2fs)**: Both prevent integer arithmetic issues in filesystem code - **Similar to Commit #5 (f2fs)**: Both add bounds checking to prevent corruption **Stable Tree Criteria:** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Prevents potential system instability and undefined behavior ✅ **Small and contained**: Minimal code change, only affects one function ✅ **Clear side effects**: No architectural changes, just safer bounds checking ✅ **Low regression risk**: The fix makes the function more robust without changing expected behavior ✅ **Critical subsystem**: Filesystem management is fundamental to kernel operation **Conclusion:** This is a textbook example of a commit suitable for stable backporting: it fixes a clear bug with security implications in core kernel infrastructure, uses a minimal and safe approach, and has no risk of introducing regressions. The unsigned integer underflow could lead to system instability when triggered through the accessible `sysfs` syscall. fs/filesystems.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/filesystems.c b/fs/filesystems.c index 90b8d879fbaf3..1ab8eb5edf28e 100644 --- a/fs/filesystems.c +++ b/fs/filesystems.c @@ -156,15 +156,19 @@ static int fs_index(const char __user * __name) static int fs_name(unsigned int index, char __user * buf) { struct file_system_type * tmp; - int len, res; + int len, res = -EINVAL; read_lock(&file_systems_lock); - for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) - if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) { + if (index == 0) { + if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + res = 0; break; + } + } read_unlock(&file_systems_lock); - if (!tmp) - return -EINVAL; + if (res) + return res; /* OK, we got the reference, so we can safely block */ len = strlen(tmp->name) + 1; -- 2.39.5

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 1/3] fs/filesystems: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow in fs_name()

by Sasha Levin

From: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> [ Upstream commit 1363c134ade81e425873b410566e957fecebb261 ] fs_name() has @index as unsigned int, so there is underflow risk for operation '@index--'. Fix by breaking the for loop when '@index == 0' which is also more proper than '@index <= 0' for unsigned integer comparison. Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250410-fix_fs-v1-1-7c14ccc8ebaa@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Detailed Analysis:** **The Bug:** The `fs_name()` function at `fs/filesystems.c:156-174` has a critical unsigned integer underflow vulnerability. When the function receives `index=0` as a parameter, the loop `for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--)` decrements `index` from 0 to `UINT_MAX` (4294967295 on 32-bit systems), causing the condition `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` to evaluate incorrectly. **The Fix:** The commit changes the logic from: - Old: `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` - New: `if (index == 0) { if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) res = 0; break; }` This prevents the unsigned integer from wrapping around and provides proper bounds checking. **Impact and Severity:** 1. **User-accessible vulnerability**: The `fs_name()` function is called through the `sysfs` system call (syscall #139) with option 2, making it directly accessible to userspace applications. 2. **Potential for exploitation**: An attacker could call `sysfs(2, 0, buffer)` to trigger the underflow, potentially causing: - Infinite loops in the filesystem list traversal - Unintended module reference acquisition - System instability or denial of service 3. **Core filesystem subsystem**: This affects the fundamental filesystem registration mechanism in the kernel. **Comparison with Similar Commits:** This follows the same pattern as the **accepted backport examples**: - **Similar to Commit #1 (ntfs3)**: Both fix integer overflow/underflow issues that could cause system instability - **Similar to Commit #3 (f2fs)**: Both prevent integer arithmetic issues in filesystem code - **Similar to Commit #5 (f2fs)**: Both add bounds checking to prevent corruption **Stable Tree Criteria:** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Prevents potential system instability and undefined behavior ✅ **Small and contained**: Minimal code change, only affects one function ✅ **Clear side effects**: No architectural changes, just safer bounds checking ✅ **Low regression risk**: The fix makes the function more robust without changing expected behavior ✅ **Critical subsystem**: Filesystem management is fundamental to kernel operation **Conclusion:** This is a textbook example of a commit suitable for stable backporting: it fixes a clear bug with security implications in core kernel infrastructure, uses a minimal and safe approach, and has no risk of introducing regressions. The unsigned integer underflow could lead to system instability when triggered through the accessible `sysfs` syscall. fs/filesystems.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/filesystems.c b/fs/filesystems.c index 58b9067b2391c..95e5256821a53 100644 --- a/fs/filesystems.c +++ b/fs/filesystems.c @@ -156,15 +156,19 @@ static int fs_index(const char __user * __name) static int fs_name(unsigned int index, char __user * buf) { struct file_system_type * tmp; - int len, res; + int len, res = -EINVAL; read_lock(&file_systems_lock); - for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) - if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) { + if (index == 0) { + if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + res = 0; break; + } + } read_unlock(&file_systems_lock); - if (!tmp) - return -EINVAL; + if (res) + return res; /* OK, we got the reference, so we can safely block */ len = strlen(tmp->name) + 1; -- 2.39.5

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.1 1/3] fs/filesystems: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow in fs_name()

by Sasha Levin

From: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> [ Upstream commit 1363c134ade81e425873b410566e957fecebb261 ] fs_name() has @index as unsigned int, so there is underflow risk for operation '@index--'. Fix by breaking the for loop when '@index == 0' which is also more proper than '@index <= 0' for unsigned integer comparison. Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250410-fix_fs-v1-1-7c14ccc8ebaa@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Detailed Analysis:** **The Bug:** The `fs_name()` function at `fs/filesystems.c:156-174` has a critical unsigned integer underflow vulnerability. When the function receives `index=0` as a parameter, the loop `for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--)` decrements `index` from 0 to `UINT_MAX` (4294967295 on 32-bit systems), causing the condition `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` to evaluate incorrectly. **The Fix:** The commit changes the logic from: - Old: `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` - New: `if (index == 0) { if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) res = 0; break; }` This prevents the unsigned integer from wrapping around and provides proper bounds checking. **Impact and Severity:** 1. **User-accessible vulnerability**: The `fs_name()` function is called through the `sysfs` system call (syscall #139) with option 2, making it directly accessible to userspace applications. 2. **Potential for exploitation**: An attacker could call `sysfs(2, 0, buffer)` to trigger the underflow, potentially causing: - Infinite loops in the filesystem list traversal - Unintended module reference acquisition - System instability or denial of service 3. **Core filesystem subsystem**: This affects the fundamental filesystem registration mechanism in the kernel. **Comparison with Similar Commits:** This follows the same pattern as the **accepted backport examples**: - **Similar to Commit #1 (ntfs3)**: Both fix integer overflow/underflow issues that could cause system instability - **Similar to Commit #3 (f2fs)**: Both prevent integer arithmetic issues in filesystem code - **Similar to Commit #5 (f2fs)**: Both add bounds checking to prevent corruption **Stable Tree Criteria:** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Prevents potential system instability and undefined behavior ✅ **Small and contained**: Minimal code change, only affects one function ✅ **Clear side effects**: No architectural changes, just safer bounds checking ✅ **Low regression risk**: The fix makes the function more robust without changing expected behavior ✅ **Critical subsystem**: Filesystem management is fundamental to kernel operation **Conclusion:** This is a textbook example of a commit suitable for stable backporting: it fixes a clear bug with security implications in core kernel infrastructure, uses a minimal and safe approach, and has no risk of introducing regressions. The unsigned integer underflow could lead to system instability when triggered through the accessible `sysfs` syscall. fs/filesystems.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/filesystems.c b/fs/filesystems.c index 58b9067b2391c..95e5256821a53 100644 --- a/fs/filesystems.c +++ b/fs/filesystems.c @@ -156,15 +156,19 @@ static int fs_index(const char __user * __name) static int fs_name(unsigned int index, char __user * buf) { struct file_system_type * tmp; - int len, res; + int len, res = -EINVAL; read_lock(&file_systems_lock); - for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) - if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) { + if (index == 0) { + if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + res = 0; break; + } + } read_unlock(&file_systems_lock); - if (!tmp) - return -EINVAL; + if (res) + return res; /* OK, we got the reference, so we can safely block */ len = strlen(tmp->name) + 1; -- 2.39.5

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 1/3] fs/filesystems: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow in fs_name()

by Sasha Levin

From: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> [ Upstream commit 1363c134ade81e425873b410566e957fecebb261 ] fs_name() has @index as unsigned int, so there is underflow risk for operation '@index--'. Fix by breaking the for loop when '@index == 0' which is also more proper than '@index <= 0' for unsigned integer comparison. Signed-off-by: Zijun Hu <quic_zijuhu(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250410-fix_fs-v1-1-7c14ccc8ebaa@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Detailed Analysis:** **The Bug:** The `fs_name()` function at `fs/filesystems.c:156-174` has a critical unsigned integer underflow vulnerability. When the function receives `index=0` as a parameter, the loop `for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--)` decrements `index` from 0 to `UINT_MAX` (4294967295 on 32-bit systems), causing the condition `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` to evaluate incorrectly. **The Fix:** The commit changes the logic from: - Old: `if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner))` - New: `if (index == 0) { if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) res = 0; break; }` This prevents the unsigned integer from wrapping around and provides proper bounds checking. **Impact and Severity:** 1. **User-accessible vulnerability**: The `fs_name()` function is called through the `sysfs` system call (syscall #139) with option 2, making it directly accessible to userspace applications. 2. **Potential for exploitation**: An attacker could call `sysfs(2, 0, buffer)` to trigger the underflow, potentially causing: - Infinite loops in the filesystem list traversal - Unintended module reference acquisition - System instability or denial of service 3. **Core filesystem subsystem**: This affects the fundamental filesystem registration mechanism in the kernel. **Comparison with Similar Commits:** This follows the same pattern as the **accepted backport examples**: - **Similar to Commit #1 (ntfs3)**: Both fix integer overflow/underflow issues that could cause system instability - **Similar to Commit #3 (f2fs)**: Both prevent integer arithmetic issues in filesystem code - **Similar to Commit #5 (f2fs)**: Both add bounds checking to prevent corruption **Stable Tree Criteria:** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Prevents potential system instability and undefined behavior ✅ **Small and contained**: Minimal code change, only affects one function ✅ **Clear side effects**: No architectural changes, just safer bounds checking ✅ **Low regression risk**: The fix makes the function more robust without changing expected behavior ✅ **Critical subsystem**: Filesystem management is fundamental to kernel operation **Conclusion:** This is a textbook example of a commit suitable for stable backporting: it fixes a clear bug with security implications in core kernel infrastructure, uses a minimal and safe approach, and has no risk of introducing regressions. The unsigned integer underflow could lead to system instability when triggered through the accessible `sysfs` syscall. fs/filesystems.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/filesystems.c b/fs/filesystems.c index 58b9067b2391c..95e5256821a53 100644 --- a/fs/filesystems.c +++ b/fs/filesystems.c @@ -156,15 +156,19 @@ static int fs_index(const char __user * __name) static int fs_name(unsigned int index, char __user * buf) { struct file_system_type * tmp; - int len, res; + int len, res = -EINVAL; read_lock(&file_systems_lock); - for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) - if (index <= 0 && try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + for (tmp = file_systems; tmp; tmp = tmp->next, index--) { + if (index == 0) { + if (try_module_get(tmp->owner)) + res = 0; break; + } + } read_unlock(&file_systems_lock); - if (!tmp) - return -EINVAL; + if (res) + return res; /* OK, we got the reference, so we can safely block */ len = strlen(tmp->name) + 1; -- 2.39.5

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 1/7] btrfs: exit after state insertion failure at btrfs_convert_extent_bit()

by Sasha Levin

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> [ Upstream commit 3bf179e36da917c5d9bec71c714573ed1649b7c1 ] If insert_state() state failed it returns an error pointer and we call extent_io_tree_panic() which will trigger a BUG() call. However if CONFIG_BUG is disabled, which is an uncommon and exotic scenario, then we fallthrough and call cache_state() which will dereference the error pointer, resulting in an invalid memory access. So jump to the 'out' label after calling extent_io_tree_panic(), it also makes the code more clear besides dealing with the exotic scenario where CONFIG_BUG is disabled. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Detailed Analysis:** **1. Bug Description and Impact:** The commit fixes a serious potential memory corruption bug in the btrfs filesystem. When `insert_state()` fails in `btrfs_convert_extent_bit()`, it returns an error pointer (ERR_PTR). The current code calls `extent_io_tree_panic()` which triggers `BUG()`, but if `CONFIG_BUG` is disabled, the code continues executing and calls `cache_state(inserted_state, cached_state)` with the error pointer, causing invalid memory access. **2. Code Changes Analysis:** The fix is minimal and surgical - just adding a single `goto out;` statement after the `extent_io_tree_panic()` call: ```c if (IS_ERR(inserted_state)) { ret = PTR_ERR(inserted_state); extent_io_tree_panic(tree, prealloc, "insert", ret); + goto out; // <-- The fix } ``` This ensures that when `CONFIG_BUG` is disabled, execution jumps to the cleanup code instead of continuing with an invalid pointer. **3. Comparison with Similar Commits:** This commit aligns with the pattern seen in "Similar Commit #2" (Status: YES), which also: - Removes reliance on `BUG_ON()` behavior - Provides graceful error handling - Has minimal risk - Fixes a potential crash/corruption scenario Similar to commit #3 and #5 (both Status: NO), this touches BUG() handling, but unlike those commits which make broader architectural changes to error handling patterns, this fix is much more contained. **4. Stable Tree Criteria Assessment:** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Prevents potential memory corruption/crashes ✅ **Small and contained**: Single line addition ✅ **Minimal risk**: Only affects error path when insert_state() fails AND CONFIG_BUG is disabled ✅ **No new features**: Pure bug fix ✅ **No architectural changes**: Preserves existing error handling, just prevents fallthrough ✅ **Critical subsystem**: btrfs filesystem corruption prevention ✅ **Clear side effects**: No unintended consequences beyond fixing the bug **5. Risk Assessment:** - **Very Low Risk**: The change only affects an error condition that's already problematic - **Exotic scenario**: Only impacts systems with `CONFIG_BUG` disabled (uncommon but not impossible) - **No regression potential**: The change only prevents executing invalid code, doesn't change normal operation - **Well-contained**: Affects only one function in one file **6. Security Implications:** While `CONFIG_BUG` disabled is uncommon, this could potentially be exploited if an attacker can trigger the `insert_state()` failure condition, leading to memory corruption. The fix prevents this attack vector. This is a clear candidate for stable backporting - it fixes a real bug with minimal risk and follows the stable tree rules perfectly. fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c index 6d08c100b01de..bb3aaf610652a 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c @@ -1456,6 +1456,7 @@ int convert_extent_bit(struct extent_io_tree *tree, u64 start, u64 end, if (IS_ERR(inserted_state)) { ret = PTR_ERR(inserted_state); extent_io_tree_panic(tree, prealloc, "insert", ret); + goto out; } cache_state(inserted_state, cached_state); if (inserted_state == prealloc) -- 2.39.5

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.14 1/8] btrfs: exit after state insertion failure at btrfs_convert_extent_bit()

by Sasha Levin

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> [ Upstream commit 3bf179e36da917c5d9bec71c714573ed1649b7c1 ] If insert_state() state failed it returns an error pointer and we call extent_io_tree_panic() which will trigger a BUG() call. However if CONFIG_BUG is disabled, which is an uncommon and exotic scenario, then we fallthrough and call cache_state() which will dereference the error pointer, resulting in an invalid memory access. So jump to the 'out' label after calling extent_io_tree_panic(), it also makes the code more clear besides dealing with the exotic scenario where CONFIG_BUG is disabled. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Detailed Analysis:** **1. Bug Description and Impact:** The commit fixes a serious potential memory corruption bug in the btrfs filesystem. When `insert_state()` fails in `btrfs_convert_extent_bit()`, it returns an error pointer (ERR_PTR). The current code calls `extent_io_tree_panic()` which triggers `BUG()`, but if `CONFIG_BUG` is disabled, the code continues executing and calls `cache_state(inserted_state, cached_state)` with the error pointer, causing invalid memory access. **2. Code Changes Analysis:** The fix is minimal and surgical - just adding a single `goto out;` statement after the `extent_io_tree_panic()` call: ```c if (IS_ERR(inserted_state)) { ret = PTR_ERR(inserted_state); extent_io_tree_panic(tree, prealloc, "insert", ret); + goto out; // <-- The fix } ``` This ensures that when `CONFIG_BUG` is disabled, execution jumps to the cleanup code instead of continuing with an invalid pointer. **3. Comparison with Similar Commits:** This commit aligns with the pattern seen in "Similar Commit #2" (Status: YES), which also: - Removes reliance on `BUG_ON()` behavior - Provides graceful error handling - Has minimal risk - Fixes a potential crash/corruption scenario Similar to commit #3 and #5 (both Status: NO), this touches BUG() handling, but unlike those commits which make broader architectural changes to error handling patterns, this fix is much more contained. **4. Stable Tree Criteria Assessment:** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Prevents potential memory corruption/crashes ✅ **Small and contained**: Single line addition ✅ **Minimal risk**: Only affects error path when insert_state() fails AND CONFIG_BUG is disabled ✅ **No new features**: Pure bug fix ✅ **No architectural changes**: Preserves existing error handling, just prevents fallthrough ✅ **Critical subsystem**: btrfs filesystem corruption prevention ✅ **Clear side effects**: No unintended consequences beyond fixing the bug **5. Risk Assessment:** - **Very Low Risk**: The change only affects an error condition that's already problematic - **Exotic scenario**: Only impacts systems with `CONFIG_BUG` disabled (uncommon but not impossible) - **No regression potential**: The change only prevents executing invalid code, doesn't change normal operation - **Well-contained**: Affects only one function in one file **6. Security Implications:** While `CONFIG_BUG` disabled is uncommon, this could potentially be exploited if an attacker can trigger the `insert_state()` failure condition, leading to memory corruption. The fix prevents this attack vector. This is a clear candidate for stable backporting - it fixes a real bug with minimal risk and follows the stable tree rules perfectly. fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c index 6d08c100b01de..bb3aaf610652a 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c @@ -1456,6 +1456,7 @@ int convert_extent_bit(struct extent_io_tree *tree, u64 start, u64 end, if (IS_ERR(inserted_state)) { ret = PTR_ERR(inserted_state); extent_io_tree_panic(tree, prealloc, "insert", ret); + goto out; } cache_state(inserted_state, cached_state); if (inserted_state == prealloc) -- 2.39.5

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.15 1/9] btrfs: exit after state insertion failure at btrfs_convert_extent_bit()

by Sasha Levin

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> [ Upstream commit 3bf179e36da917c5d9bec71c714573ed1649b7c1 ] If insert_state() state failed it returns an error pointer and we call extent_io_tree_panic() which will trigger a BUG() call. However if CONFIG_BUG is disabled, which is an uncommon and exotic scenario, then we fallthrough and call cache_state() which will dereference the error pointer, resulting in an invalid memory access. So jump to the 'out' label after calling extent_io_tree_panic(), it also makes the code more clear besides dealing with the exotic scenario where CONFIG_BUG is disabled. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. **Detailed Analysis:** **1. Bug Description and Impact:** The commit fixes a serious potential memory corruption bug in the btrfs filesystem. When `insert_state()` fails in `btrfs_convert_extent_bit()`, it returns an error pointer (ERR_PTR). The current code calls `extent_io_tree_panic()` which triggers `BUG()`, but if `CONFIG_BUG` is disabled, the code continues executing and calls `cache_state(inserted_state, cached_state)` with the error pointer, causing invalid memory access. **2. Code Changes Analysis:** The fix is minimal and surgical - just adding a single `goto out;` statement after the `extent_io_tree_panic()` call: ```c if (IS_ERR(inserted_state)) { ret = PTR_ERR(inserted_state); extent_io_tree_panic(tree, prealloc, "insert", ret); + goto out; // <-- The fix } ``` This ensures that when `CONFIG_BUG` is disabled, execution jumps to the cleanup code instead of continuing with an invalid pointer. **3. Comparison with Similar Commits:** This commit aligns with the pattern seen in "Similar Commit #2" (Status: YES), which also: - Removes reliance on `BUG_ON()` behavior - Provides graceful error handling - Has minimal risk - Fixes a potential crash/corruption scenario Similar to commit #3 and #5 (both Status: NO), this touches BUG() handling, but unlike those commits which make broader architectural changes to error handling patterns, this fix is much more contained. **4. Stable Tree Criteria Assessment:** ✅ **Fixes important bug**: Prevents potential memory corruption/crashes ✅ **Small and contained**: Single line addition ✅ **Minimal risk**: Only affects error path when insert_state() fails AND CONFIG_BUG is disabled ✅ **No new features**: Pure bug fix ✅ **No architectural changes**: Preserves existing error handling, just prevents fallthrough ✅ **Critical subsystem**: btrfs filesystem corruption prevention ✅ **Clear side effects**: No unintended consequences beyond fixing the bug **5. Risk Assessment:** - **Very Low Risk**: The change only affects an error condition that's already problematic - **Exotic scenario**: Only impacts systems with `CONFIG_BUG` disabled (uncommon but not impossible) - **No regression potential**: The change only prevents executing invalid code, doesn't change normal operation - **Well-contained**: Affects only one function in one file **6. Security Implications:** While `CONFIG_BUG` disabled is uncommon, this could potentially be exploited if an attacker can trigger the `insert_state()` failure condition, leading to memory corruption. The fix prevents this attack vector. This is a clear candidate for stable backporting - it fixes a real bug with minimal risk and follows the stable tree rules perfectly. fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c index 13de6af279e52..92cfde37b1d33 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c @@ -1456,6 +1456,7 @@ int convert_extent_bit(struct extent_io_tree *tree, u64 start, u64 end, if (IS_ERR(inserted_state)) { ret = PTR_ERR(inserted_state); extent_io_tree_panic(tree, prealloc, "insert", ret); + goto out; } cache_state(inserted_state, cached_state); if (inserted_state == prealloc) -- 2.39.5

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH v3] mm/hugetlb: fix a deadlock with pagecache_folio and hugetlb_fault_mutex_table

by Gavin Guo

There is ABBA dead locking scenario happening between hugetlb_fault() and hugetlb_wp() on the pagecache folio's lock and hugetlb global mutex, which is reproducible with syzkaller [1]. As below stack traces reveal, process-1 tries to take the hugetlb global mutex (A3), but with the pagecache folio's lock hold. Process-2 took the hugetlb global mutex but tries to take the pagecache folio's lock. Process-1 Process-2 ========= ========= hugetlb_fault mutex_lock (A1) filemap_lock_hugetlb_folio (B1) hugetlb_wp alloc_hugetlb_folio #error mutex_unlock (A2) hugetlb_fault mutex_lock (A4) filemap_lock_hugetlb_folio (B4) unmap_ref_private mutex_lock (A3) Fix it by releasing the pagecache folio's lock at (A2) of process-1 so that pagecache folio's lock is available to process-2 at (B4), to avoid the deadlock. In process-1, a new variable is added to track if the pagecache folio's lock has been released by its child function hugetlb_wp() to avoid double releases on the lock in hugetlb_fault(). The similar changes are applied to hugetlb_no_page(). Link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DVRnIW-vSayU5J1re9Ct_br3jJQU6Vpb/view?usp=… [1] Fixes: 40549ba8f8e0 ("hugetlb: use new vma_lock for pmd sharing synchronization") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Cc: Florent Revest <revest(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo(a)igalia.com> --- V1 -> V2 Suggested-by Oscar Salvador: - Use folio_test_locked to replace the unnecessary parameter passing. V2 -> V3 - Dropped the approach suggested by Oscar. - Refine the code and git commit suggested by Gavin Shan. mm/hugetlb.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/hugetlb.c b/mm/hugetlb.c index 6a3cf7935c14..560b9b35262a 100644 --- a/mm/hugetlb.c +++ b/mm/hugetlb.c @@ -6137,7 +6137,8 @@ static void unmap_ref_private(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, * Keep the pte_same checks anyway to make transition from the mutex easier. */ static vm_fault_t hugetlb_wp(struct folio *pagecache_folio, - struct vm_fault *vmf) + struct vm_fault *vmf, + bool *pagecache_folio_locked) { struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma; struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; @@ -6234,6 +6235,18 @@ static vm_fault_t hugetlb_wp(struct folio *pagecache_folio, u32 hash; folio_put(old_folio); + /* + * The pagecache_folio has to be unlocked to avoid + * deadlock and we won't re-lock it in hugetlb_wp(). The + * pagecache_folio could be truncated after being + * unlocked. So its state should not be reliable + * subsequently. + */ + if (pagecache_folio) { + folio_unlock(pagecache_folio); + if (pagecache_folio_locked) + *pagecache_folio_locked = false; + } /* * Drop hugetlb_fault_mutex and vma_lock before * unmapping. unmapping needs to hold vma_lock @@ -6588,7 +6601,7 @@ static vm_fault_t hugetlb_no_page(struct address_space *mapping, hugetlb_count_add(pages_per_huge_page(h), mm); if ((vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) { /* Optimization, do the COW without a second fault */ - ret = hugetlb_wp(folio, vmf); + ret = hugetlb_wp(folio, vmf, NULL); } spin_unlock(vmf->ptl); @@ -6660,6 +6673,7 @@ vm_fault_t hugetlb_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma); struct address_space *mapping; int need_wait_lock = 0; + bool pagecache_folio_locked = true; struct vm_fault vmf = { .vma = vma, .address = address & huge_page_mask(h), @@ -6814,7 +6828,8 @@ vm_fault_t hugetlb_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, if (flags & (FAULT_FLAG_WRITE|FAULT_FLAG_UNSHARE)) { if (!huge_pte_write(vmf.orig_pte)) { - ret = hugetlb_wp(pagecache_folio, &vmf); + ret = hugetlb_wp(pagecache_folio, &vmf, + &pagecache_folio_locked); goto out_put_page; } else if (likely(flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE)) { vmf.orig_pte = huge_pte_mkdirty(vmf.orig_pte); @@ -6832,7 +6847,9 @@ vm_fault_t hugetlb_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, spin_unlock(vmf.ptl); if (pagecache_folio) { - folio_unlock(pagecache_folio); + if (pagecache_folio_locked) + folio_unlock(pagecache_folio); + folio_put(pagecache_folio); } out_mutex: base-commit: 914873bc7df913db988284876c16257e6ab772c6 -- 2.43.0

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 2/8] drm/fdinfo: Switch to idr_for_each() in drm_show_memory_stats()

by Simona Vetter

Unlike idr_for_each_entry(), which terminates on the first NULL entry, idr_for_each passes them through. This fixes potential issues with the idr walk terminating prematurely due to transient NULL entries the exist when creating and destroying a handle. Note that transient NULL pointers in drm_file.object_idr have been a thing since f6cd7daecff5 ("drm: Release driver references to handle before making it available again"), this is a really old issue. Aside from temporarily inconsistent fdinfo statistic there's no other impact of this issue. Fixes: 686b21b5f6ca ("drm: Add fdinfo memory stats") Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> Cc: Emil Velikov <emil.l.velikov(a)gmail.com> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)intel.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.5+ Signed-off-by: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter(a)ffwll.ch> --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c index 246cf845e2c9..428a4eb85e94 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c @@ -892,6 +892,58 @@ void drm_print_memory_stats(struct drm_printer *p, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_print_memory_stats); +struct drm_bo_print_data { + struct drm_memory_stats status; + enum drm_gem_object_status supported_status; +}; + +static int +drm_bo_memory_stats(int id, void *ptr, void *data) +{ + struct drm_bo_print_data *drm_data; + struct drm_gem_object *obj = ptr; + enum drm_gem_object_status s = 0; + size_t add_size; + + if (!obj) + return 0; + + add_size = (obj->funcs && obj->funcs->rss) ? + obj->funcs->rss(obj) : obj->size; + + if (obj->funcs && obj->funcs->status) { + s = obj->funcs->status(obj); + drm_data->supported_status |= s; + } + + if (drm_gem_object_is_shared_for_memory_stats(obj)) + drm_data->status.shared += obj->size; + else + drm_data->status.private += obj->size; + + if (s & DRM_GEM_OBJECT_RESIDENT) { + drm_data->status.resident += add_size; + } else { + /* If already purged or not yet backed by pages, don't + * count it as purgeable: + */ + s &= ~DRM_GEM_OBJECT_PURGEABLE; + } + + if (!dma_resv_test_signaled(obj->resv, dma_resv_usage_rw(true))) { + drm_data->status.active += add_size; + drm_data->supported_status |= DRM_GEM_OBJECT_ACTIVE; + + /* If still active, don't count as purgeable: */ + s &= ~DRM_GEM_OBJECT_PURGEABLE; + } + + if (s & DRM_GEM_OBJECT_PURGEABLE) + drm_data->status.purgeable += add_size; + + return 0; +} + /** * drm_show_memory_stats - Helper to collect and show standard fdinfo memory stats * @p: the printer to print output to @@ -902,50 +954,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_print_memory_stats); */ void drm_show_memory_stats(struct drm_printer *p, struct drm_file *file) { - struct drm_gem_object *obj; - struct drm_memory_stats status = {}; - enum drm_gem_object_status supported_status = 0; - int id; + struct drm_bo_print_data data = {}; spin_lock(&file->table_lock); - idr_for_each_entry (&file->object_idr, obj, id) { - enum drm_gem_object_status s = 0; - size_t add_size = (obj->funcs && obj->funcs->rss) ? - obj->funcs->rss(obj) : obj->size; - - if (obj->funcs && obj->funcs->status) { - s = obj->funcs->status(obj); - supported_status |= s; - } - - if (drm_gem_object_is_shared_for_memory_stats(obj)) - status.shared += obj->size; - else - status.private += obj->size; - - if (s & DRM_GEM_OBJECT_RESIDENT) { - status.resident += add_size; - } else { - /* If already purged or not yet backed by pages, don't - * count it as purgeable: - */ - s &= ~DRM_GEM_OBJECT_PURGEABLE; - } - - if (!dma_resv_test_signaled(obj->resv, dma_resv_usage_rw(true))) { - status.active += add_size; - supported_status |= DRM_GEM_OBJECT_ACTIVE; - - /* If still active, don't count as purgeable: */ - s &= ~DRM_GEM_OBJECT_PURGEABLE; - } - - if (s & DRM_GEM_OBJECT_PURGEABLE) - status.purgeable += add_size; - } + idr_for_each(&file->object_idr, &drm_bo_memory_stats, &data); spin_unlock(&file->table_lock); - drm_print_memory_stats(p, &status, supported_status, "memory"); + drm_print_memory_stats(p, &data.status, data.supported_status, "memory"); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_show_memory_stats); -- 2.49.0

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH v2] can: kvaser_pciefd: refine error prone echo_skb_max handling logic

by Fedor Pchelkin

echo_skb_max should define the supported upper limit of echo_skb[] allocated inside the netdevice's priv. The corresponding size value provided by this driver to alloc_candev() is KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT which is 17. But later echo_skb_max is rounded up to the nearest power of two (for the max case, that would be 32) and the tx/ack indices calculated further during tx/rx may exceed the upper array boundary. Kasan reported this for the ack case inside kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet(), though the xmit function has actually caught the same thing earlier. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet+0x2d7/0x92a drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1528 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888105e4f078 by task swapper/4/0 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.15.0 #12 PREEMPT(voluntary) Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl lib/dump_stack.c:122 print_report mm/kasan/report.c:521 kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:634 kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1528 kvaser_pciefd_read_packet drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1605 kvaser_pciefd_read_buffer drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1656 kvaser_pciefd_receive_irq drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1684 kvaser_pciefd_irq_handler drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1733 __handle_irq_event_percpu kernel/irq/handle.c:158 handle_irq_event kernel/irq/handle.c:210 handle_edge_irq kernel/irq/chip.c:833 __common_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:296 common_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:286 </IRQ> Tx max count definitely matters for kvaser_pciefd_tx_avail(), but for seq numbers' generation that's not the case - we're free to calculate them as would be more convenient, not taking tx max count into account. The only downside is that the size of echo_skb[] should correspond to the max seq number (not tx max count), so in some situations a bit more memory would be consumed than could be. Thus make the size of the underlying echo_skb[] sufficient for the rounded max tx value. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8256e0ca6010 ("can: kvaser_pciefd: Fix echo_skb race") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> --- v2: fix the problem by rounding up the KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT constant when allocating candev (Axel Forsman) drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c b/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c index f6921368cd14..0071a51ce2c1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c @@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_setup_can_ctrls(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie) u32 status, tx_nr_packets_max; netdev = alloc_candev(sizeof(struct kvaser_pciefd_can), - KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT); + roundup_pow_of_two(KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT)); if (!netdev) return -ENOMEM; @@ -995,7 +995,6 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_setup_can_ctrls(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie) can->tx_max_count = min(KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT, tx_nr_packets_max - 1); can->can.clock.freq = pcie->freq; - can->can.echo_skb_max = roundup_pow_of_two(can->tx_max_count); spin_lock_init(&can->lock); can->can.bittiming_const = &kvaser_pciefd_bittiming_const; -- 2.49.0

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] can: kvaser_pciefd: refine error prone echo_skb_max handling logic

by Fedor Pchelkin

echo_skb_max should define the supported upper limit of echo_skb[] allocated inside the netdevice's priv. The corresponding size value provided by this driver to alloc_candev() is KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT which is 17. But later echo_skb_max is rounded up to the nearest power of two (for the max case, that would be 32) and the tx/ack indices calculated further during tx/rx may exceed the upper array boundary. Kasan reported this for the ack case inside kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet(), though the xmit function has actually caught the same thing earlier. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet+0x2d7/0x92a drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1528 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888105e4f078 by task swapper/4/0 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.15.0 #12 PREEMPT(voluntary) Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl lib/dump_stack.c:122 print_report mm/kasan/report.c:521 kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:634 kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1528 kvaser_pciefd_read_packet drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1605 kvaser_pciefd_read_buffer drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1656 kvaser_pciefd_receive_irq drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1684 kvaser_pciefd_irq_handler drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1733 __handle_irq_event_percpu kernel/irq/handle.c:158 handle_irq_event kernel/irq/handle.c:210 handle_edge_irq kernel/irq/chip.c:833 __common_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:296 common_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:286 </IRQ> Remove echo_skb_max rounding as this may increase it to unexpected values. In this sense restore echo_skb_max handling logic prior to commit 8256e0ca6010 ("can: kvaser_pciefd: Fix echo_skb race"). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8256e0ca6010 ("can: kvaser_pciefd: Fix echo_skb race") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> --- Actually the trick with rounding up allows to calculate seq numbers efficiently, avoiding a more consuming 'mod' operation used in the current patch. I see tx max size definitely matters only for kvaser_pciefd_tx_avail(), but for seq numbers' generation that's not the case - we're free to calculate them as would be more convenient, not taking tx max size into account. The only downside is that the size of echo_skb[] should correspond to the max seq number (not tx max number), so in some situations a bit more memory would be consumed than could be. So another approach to fix the problem would be to precompute the rounded up value of echo_skb_max and pass it to alloc_candev() making the size of the underlying echo_skb[] sufficient. If that looks more acceptable, I'll be glad to rework the patch in that direction. drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c b/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c index f6921368cd14..1ec4ab9510b6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c @@ -411,7 +411,6 @@ struct kvaser_pciefd_can { void __iomem *reg_base; struct can_berr_counter bec; u8 cmd_seq; - u8 tx_max_count; u8 tx_idx; u8 ack_idx; int err_rep_cnt; @@ -760,7 +759,7 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_stop(struct net_device *netdev) static unsigned int kvaser_pciefd_tx_avail(const struct kvaser_pciefd_can *can) { - return can->tx_max_count - (READ_ONCE(can->tx_idx) - READ_ONCE(can->ack_idx)); + return can->can.echo_skb_max - (READ_ONCE(can->tx_idx) - READ_ONCE(can->ack_idx)); } static int kvaser_pciefd_prepare_tx_packet(struct kvaser_pciefd_tx_packet *p, @@ -810,7 +809,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t kvaser_pciefd_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, { struct kvaser_pciefd_can *can = netdev_priv(netdev); struct kvaser_pciefd_tx_packet packet; - unsigned int seq = can->tx_idx & (can->can.echo_skb_max - 1); + unsigned int seq = can->tx_idx % can->can.echo_skb_max; unsigned int frame_len; int nr_words; @@ -992,10 +991,9 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_setup_can_ctrls(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie) tx_nr_packets_max = FIELD_GET(KVASER_PCIEFD_KCAN_TX_NR_PACKETS_MAX_MASK, ioread32(can->reg_base + KVASER_PCIEFD_KCAN_TX_NR_PACKETS_REG)); - can->tx_max_count = min(KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT, tx_nr_packets_max - 1); + can->can.echo_skb_max = min(KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT, tx_nr_packets_max - 1); can->can.clock.freq = pcie->freq; - can->can.echo_skb_max = roundup_pow_of_two(can->tx_max_count); spin_lock_init(&can->lock); can->can.bittiming_const = &kvaser_pciefd_bittiming_const; @@ -1523,7 +1521,7 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie, unsigned int len, frame_len = 0; struct sk_buff *skb; - if (echo_idx != (can->ack_idx & (can->can.echo_skb_max - 1))) + if (echo_idx != can->ack_idx % can->can.echo_skb_max) return 0; skb = can->can.echo_skb[echo_idx]; if (!skb) -- 2.49.0

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] accel/ivpu: Fix warning in ivpu_gem_bo_free()

by Jacek Lawrynowicz

Don't WARN if imported buffers are in use in ivpu_gem_bo_free() as they can be indeed used in the original context/driver. Fixes: 647371a6609d ("accel/ivpu: Add GEM buffer object management") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.3 Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c b/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c index 5908268ca45e9..0371a8b4a474f 100644 --- a/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c +++ b/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c @@ -285,7 +285,8 @@ static void ivpu_gem_bo_free(struct drm_gem_object *obj) list_del(&bo->bo_list_node); mutex_unlock(&vdev->bo_list_lock); - drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, !dma_resv_test_signaled(obj->resv, DMA_RESV_USAGE_READ)); + drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, !bo->base.base.import_attach && + !dma_resv_test_signaled(obj->resv, DMA_RESV_USAGE_READ)); drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, ivpu_bo_size(bo) == 0); drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, bo->base.vaddr); -- 2.45.1

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] e1000e: fix heap overflow in e1000_set_eeprom()

by Mikael Wessel

The ETHTOOL_SETEEPROM ioctl copies user data into a kmalloc'ed buffer without validating eeprom->len and eeprom->offset. A CAP_NET_ADMIN user can overflow the heap and crash the kernel or gain code execution. Validate length and offset before kmalloc() to avoid leaking eeprom_buff. Fixes: bc7f75fa9788 ("[E1000E]: New pci-express e1000 driver (currently for ICH9 devices only)") Reported-by: Mikael Wessel <post(a)mikaelkw.online> Signed-off-by: Mikael Wessel <post(a)mikaelkw.online> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ethtool.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ethtool.c index 98e541e39730..d04e59528619 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ethtool.c @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ static int e1000_set_eeprom(struct net_device *netdev, return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (eeprom->magic != - (adapter->pdev->vendor | (adapter->pdev->device << 16))) + (adapter->pdev->vendor | (adapter->pdev->device << 16))) return -EFAULT; if (adapter->flags & FLAG_READ_ONLY_NVM) @@ -569,6 +569,10 @@ static int e1000_set_eeprom(struct net_device *netdev, max_len = hw->nvm.word_size * 2; + /* bounds check: offset + len must not exceed EEPROM size */ + if (eeprom->offset + eeprom->len > max_len) + return -EINVAL; + first_word = eeprom->offset >> 1; last_word = (eeprom->offset + eeprom->len - 1) >> 1; eeprom_buff = kmalloc(max_len, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -596,9 +600,6 @@ static int e1000_set_eeprom(struct net_device *netdev, for (i = 0; i < last_word - first_word + 1; i++) le16_to_cpus(&eeprom_buff[i]); - if (eeprom->len > max_len || - eeprom->offset > max_len - eeprom->len) - return -EINVAL; memcpy(ptr, bytes, eeprom->len); for (i = 0; i < last_word - first_word + 1; i++) -- 2.48.1

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] wifi: ath12k: fix ring-buffer corruption

by Johan Hovold

Users of the Lenovo ThinkPad X13s have reported that Wi-Fi sometimes breaks and the log fills up with errors like: ath11k_pci 0006:01:00.0: HTC Rx: insufficient length, got 1484, expected 1492 ath11k_pci 0006:01:00.0: HTC Rx: insufficient length, got 1460, expected 1484 which based on a quick look at the ath11k driver seemed to indicate some kind of ring-buffer corruption. Miaoqing Pan tracked it down to the host seeing the updated destination ring head pointer before the updated descriptor, and the error handling for that in turn leaves the ring buffer in an inconsistent state. While this has not yet been observed with ath12k, the ring-buffer implementation is very similar to the ath11k one and it suffers from the same bugs. Add the missing memory barrier to make sure that the descriptor is read after the head pointer to address the root cause of the corruption while fixing up the error handling in case there are ever any (ordering) bugs on the device side. Note that the READ_ONCE() are only needed to avoid compiler mischief in case the ring-buffer helpers are ever inlined. Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 WLAN.HMT.1.0.c5-00481-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ-3 Fixes: d889913205cf ("wifi: ath12k: driver for Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.3 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218623 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250310010217.3845141-3-quic_miaoqing@quicinc.com Cc: Miaoqing Pan <quic_miaoqing(a)quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/ce.c | 11 +++++------ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hal.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/ce.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/ce.c index be0d669d31fc..740586fe49d1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/ce.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/ce.c @@ -343,11 +343,10 @@ static int ath12k_ce_completed_recv_next(struct ath12k_ce_pipe *pipe, goto err; } + /* Make sure descriptor is read after the head pointer. */ + dma_rmb(); + *nbytes = ath12k_hal_ce_dst_status_get_length(desc); - if (*nbytes == 0) { - ret = -EIO; - goto err; - } *skb = pipe->dest_ring->skb[sw_index]; pipe->dest_ring->skb[sw_index] = NULL; @@ -380,8 +379,8 @@ static void ath12k_ce_recv_process_cb(struct ath12k_ce_pipe *pipe) dma_unmap_single(ab->dev, ATH12K_SKB_RXCB(skb)->paddr, max_nbytes, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); - if (unlikely(max_nbytes < nbytes)) { - ath12k_warn(ab, "rxed more than expected (nbytes %d, max %d)", + if (unlikely(max_nbytes < nbytes || nbytes == 0)) { + ath12k_warn(ab, "unexpected rx length (nbytes %d, max %d)", nbytes, max_nbytes); dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); continue; diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hal.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hal.c index cd59ff8e6c7b..91d5126ca149 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hal.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/hal.c @@ -1962,7 +1962,7 @@ u32 ath12k_hal_ce_dst_status_get_length(struct hal_ce_srng_dst_status_desc *desc { u32 len; - len = le32_get_bits(desc->flags, HAL_CE_DST_STATUS_DESC_FLAGS_LEN); + len = le32_get_bits(READ_ONCE(desc->flags), HAL_CE_DST_STATUS_DESC_FLAGS_LEN); desc->flags &= ~cpu_to_le32(HAL_CE_DST_STATUS_DESC_FLAGS_LEN); return len; @@ -2132,7 +2132,7 @@ void ath12k_hal_srng_access_begin(struct ath12k_base *ab, struct hal_srng *srng) srng->u.src_ring.cached_tp = *(volatile u32 *)srng->u.src_ring.tp_addr; else - srng->u.dst_ring.cached_hp = *srng->u.dst_ring.hp_addr; + srng->u.dst_ring.cached_hp = READ_ONCE(*srng->u.dst_ring.hp_addr); } /* Update cached ring head/tail pointers to HW. ath12k_hal_srng_access_begin() -- 2.48.1

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] iommu/arm-smmu-qcom: Add SM6115 MDSS compatible

by Alexey Klimov

Add the SM6115 MDSS compatible to clients compatible list, as it also needs that workaround. Without this workaround, for example, QRB4210 RB2 which is based on SM4250/SM6115 generates a lot of smmu unhandled context faults during boot: arm_smmu_context_fault: 116854 callbacks suppressed arm-smmu c600000.iommu: Unhandled context fault: fsr=0x402, iova=0x5c0ec600, fsynr=0x320021, cbfrsynra=0x420, cb=5 arm-smmu c600000.iommu: FSR = 00000402 [Format=2 TF], SID=0x420 arm-smmu c600000.iommu: FSYNR0 = 00320021 [S1CBNDX=50 PNU PLVL=1] arm-smmu c600000.iommu: Unhandled context fault: fsr=0x402, iova=0x5c0d7800, fsynr=0x320021, cbfrsynra=0x420, cb=5 arm-smmu c600000.iommu: FSR = 00000402 [Format=2 TF], SID=0x420 and also leads to failed initialisation of lontium lt9611uxc driver and gpu afterwards: ------------[ cut here ]------------ !aspace WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 324 at drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_vma.c:130 msm_gem_vma_init+0x150/0x18c [msm] Modules linked in: ... (long list of modules) CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 324 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.15.0-03037-gaacc73ceeb8b #4 PREEMPT Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. QRB4210 RB2 (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : msm_gem_vma_init+0x150/0x18c [msm] lr : msm_gem_vma_init+0x150/0x18c [msm] sp : ffff80008144b280 ... Call trace: msm_gem_vma_init+0x150/0x18c [msm] (P) get_vma_locked+0xc0/0x194 [msm] msm_gem_get_and_pin_iova_range+0x4c/0xdc [msm] msm_gem_kernel_new+0x48/0x160 [msm] msm_gpu_init+0x34c/0x53c [msm] adreno_gpu_init+0x1b0/0x2d8 [msm] a6xx_gpu_init+0x1e8/0x9e0 [msm] adreno_bind+0x2b8/0x348 [msm] component_bind_all+0x100/0x230 msm_drm_bind+0x13c/0x3d0 [msm] try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x164/0x1d0 __component_add+0xa4/0x174 component_add+0x14/0x20 dsi_dev_attach+0x20/0x34 [msm] dsi_host_attach+0x58/0x98 [msm] devm_mipi_dsi_attach+0x34/0x90 lt9611uxc_attach_dsi.isra.0+0x94/0x124 [lontium_lt9611uxc] lt9611uxc_probe+0x540/0x5fc [lontium_lt9611uxc] i2c_device_probe+0x148/0x2a8 really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120 driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 __driver_attach+0x90/0x1a0 bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb8 driver_attach+0x24/0x30 bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 driver_register+0x68/0x124 i2c_register_driver+0x48/0xcc lt9611uxc_driver_init+0x20/0x1000 [lontium_lt9611uxc] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1d4 do_init_module+0x54/0x1fc load_module+0x1748/0x1c8c init_module_from_file+0x74/0xa0 __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x130/0x2f8 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x2c/0x80 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- msm_dpu 5e01000.display-controller: [drm:msm_gpu_init [msm]] *ERROR* could not allocate memptrs: -22 msm_dpu 5e01000.display-controller: failed to load adreno gpu platform a400000.remoteproc:glink-edge:apr:service@7:dais: Adding to iommu group 19 msm_dpu 5e01000.display-controller: failed to bind 5900000.gpu (ops a3xx_ops [msm]): -22 msm_dpu 5e01000.display-controller: adev bind failed: -22 lt9611uxc 0-002b: failed to attach dsi to host lt9611uxc 0-002b: probe with driver lt9611uxc failed with error -22 Suggested-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexey Klimov <alexey.klimov(a)linaro.org> --- drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu/arm-smmu-qcom.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu/arm-smmu-qcom.c b/drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu/arm-smmu-qcom.c index 59d02687280e..c919babcea75 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu/arm-smmu-qcom.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/arm/arm-smmu/arm-smmu-qcom.c @@ -365,6 +365,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id qcom_smmu_client_of_match[] __maybe_unused = { { .compatible = "qcom,sdm670-mdss" }, { .compatible = "qcom,sdm845-mdss" }, { .compatible = "qcom,sdm845-mss-pil" }, + { .compatible = "qcom,sm6115-mdss" }, { .compatible = "qcom,sm6350-mdss" }, { .compatible = "qcom,sm6375-mdss" }, { .compatible = "qcom,sm8150-mdss" }, -- 2.47.2

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 2/2] drm/amdgpu: Dirty cleared blocks on allocation

by Natalie Vock

If we hand out cleared blocks to users, they are expected to write at least some non-zero values somewhere. If we keep the CLEAR bit set on the block, amdgpu_fill_buffer will assume there is nothing to do and incorrectly skip clearing the block. Ultimately, the (still dirty) block will be reused as if it were cleared, without any wiping of the memory contents. Most severely, this means that any buffer allocated with AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_CLEARED | AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_WIPE_ON_RELEASE (which is the case for **all userspace buffers**) are neither guaranteed to contain cleared VRAM, nor are they being wiped on release, potentially leaking application memory to arbitrary other applications. Fixes: a68c7eaa7a8ff ("drm/amdgpu: Enable clear page functionality") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3812 Signed-off-by: Natalie Vock <natalie.vock(a)gmx.de> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vram_mgr.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vram_mgr.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vram_mgr.c index 2d7f82e98df9..cecc67d0f0b8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vram_mgr.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vram_mgr.c @@ -591,6 +591,13 @@ static int amdgpu_vram_mgr_new(struct ttm_resource_manager *man, list_for_each_entry(block, &vres->blocks, link) { unsigned long start; + /* + * Allocated blocks may be dirtied as soon as we return. + * Mark all blocks as dirty here, otherwise we might + * incorrectly assume the memory is still zeroed. + */ + drm_buddy_block_set_dirty(block); + start = amdgpu_vram_mgr_block_start(block) + amdgpu_vram_mgr_block_size(block); start >>= PAGE_SHIFT; -- 2.49.0

5 months, 1 week

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] can: kvaser_pciefd: Force IRQ edge in case of nested IRQ" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 9176bd205ee0b2cd35073a9973c2a0936bcb579e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025052430-customary-paramount-b71a@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 9176bd205ee0b2cd35073a9973c2a0936bcb579e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Axel Forsman <axfo(a)kvaser.com> Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 13:43:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] can: kvaser_pciefd: Force IRQ edge in case of nested IRQ Avoid the driver missing IRQs by temporarily masking IRQs in the ISR to enforce an edge even if a different IRQ is signalled before handled IRQs are cleared. Fixes: 48f827d4f48f ("can: kvaser_pciefd: Move reset of DMA RX buffers to the end of the ISR") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Axel Forsman <axfo(a)kvaser.com> Tested-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja(a)kvaser.com> Reviewed-by: Jimmy Assarsson <extja(a)kvaser.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250520114332.8961-2-axfo@kvaser.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> diff --git a/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c b/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c index cf0d51805272..9cc9176c2058 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c @@ -1646,24 +1646,28 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_read_buffer(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie, int dma_buf) return res; } -static u32 kvaser_pciefd_receive_irq(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie) +static void kvaser_pciefd_receive_irq(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie) { + void __iomem *srb_cmd_reg = KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CMD_REG; u32 irq = ioread32(KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_REG); - if (irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DPD0) - kvaser_pciefd_read_buffer(pcie, 0); + iowrite32(irq, KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_REG); - if (irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DPD1) + if (irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DPD0) { + kvaser_pciefd_read_buffer(pcie, 0); + iowrite32(KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CMD_RDB0, srb_cmd_reg); /* Rearm buffer */ + } + + if (irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DPD1) { kvaser_pciefd_read_buffer(pcie, 1); + iowrite32(KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CMD_RDB1, srb_cmd_reg); /* Rearm buffer */ + } if (unlikely(irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DOF0 || irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DOF1 || irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DUF0 || irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DUF1)) dev_err(&pcie->pci->dev, "DMA IRQ error 0x%08X\n", irq); - - iowrite32(irq, KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_REG); - return irq; } static void kvaser_pciefd_transmit_irq(struct kvaser_pciefd_can *can) @@ -1691,29 +1695,22 @@ static irqreturn_t kvaser_pciefd_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev) struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie = (struct kvaser_pciefd *)dev; const struct kvaser_pciefd_irq_mask *irq_mask = pcie->driver_data->irq_mask; u32 pci_irq = ioread32(KVASER_PCIEFD_PCI_IRQ_ADDR(pcie)); - u32 srb_irq = 0; - u32 srb_release = 0; int i; if (!(pci_irq & irq_mask->all)) return IRQ_NONE; + iowrite32(0, KVASER_PCIEFD_PCI_IEN_ADDR(pcie)); + if (pci_irq & irq_mask->kcan_rx0) - srb_irq = kvaser_pciefd_receive_irq(pcie); + kvaser_pciefd_receive_irq(pcie); for (i = 0; i < pcie->nr_channels; i++) { if (pci_irq & irq_mask->kcan_tx[i]) kvaser_pciefd_transmit_irq(pcie->can[i]); } - if (srb_irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DPD0) - srb_release |= KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CMD_RDB0; - - if (srb_irq & KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IRQ_DPD1) - srb_release |= KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CMD_RDB1; - - if (srb_release) - iowrite32(srb_release, KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CMD_REG); + iowrite32(irq_mask->all, KVASER_PCIEFD_PCI_IEN_ADDR(pcie)); return IRQ_HANDLED; } @@ -1733,13 +1730,22 @@ static void kvaser_pciefd_teardown_can_ctrls(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie) } } +static void kvaser_pciefd_disable_irq_srcs(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie) +{ + unsigned int i; + + /* Masking PCI_IRQ is insufficient as running ISR will unmask it */ + iowrite32(0, KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IEN_REG); + for (i = 0; i < pcie->nr_channels; ++i) + iowrite32(0, pcie->can[i]->reg_base + KVASER_PCIEFD_KCAN_IEN_REG); +} + static int kvaser_pciefd_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) { int ret; struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie; const struct kvaser_pciefd_irq_mask *irq_mask; - void __iomem *irq_en_base; pcie = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*pcie), GFP_KERNEL); if (!pcie) @@ -1805,8 +1811,7 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_IEN_REG); /* Enable PCI interrupts */ - irq_en_base = KVASER_PCIEFD_PCI_IEN_ADDR(pcie); - iowrite32(irq_mask->all, irq_en_base); + iowrite32(irq_mask->all, KVASER_PCIEFD_PCI_IEN_ADDR(pcie)); /* Ready the DMA buffers */ iowrite32(KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CMD_RDB0, KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CMD_REG); @@ -1820,8 +1825,7 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, return 0; err_free_irq: - /* Disable PCI interrupts */ - iowrite32(0, irq_en_base); + kvaser_pciefd_disable_irq_srcs(pcie); free_irq(pcie->pci->irq, pcie); err_pci_free_irq_vectors: @@ -1844,35 +1848,26 @@ static int kvaser_pciefd_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, return ret; } -static void kvaser_pciefd_remove_all_ctrls(struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < pcie->nr_channels; i++) { - struct kvaser_pciefd_can *can = pcie->can[i]; - - if (can) { - iowrite32(0, can->reg_base + KVASER_PCIEFD_KCAN_IEN_REG); - unregister_candev(can->can.dev); - timer_delete(&can->bec_poll_timer); - kvaser_pciefd_pwm_stop(can); - free_candev(can->can.dev); - } - } -} - static void kvaser_pciefd_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct kvaser_pciefd *pcie = pci_get_drvdata(pdev); + unsigned int i; - kvaser_pciefd_remove_all_ctrls(pcie); + for (i = 0; i < pcie->nr_channels; ++i) { + struct kvaser_pciefd_can *can = pcie->can[i]; - /* Disable interrupts */ - iowrite32(0, KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_ADDR(pcie) + KVASER_PCIEFD_SRB_CTRL_REG); - iowrite32(0, KVASER_PCIEFD_PCI_IEN_ADDR(pcie)); + unregister_candev(can->can.dev); + timer_delete(&can->bec_poll_timer); + kvaser_pciefd_pwm_stop(can); + } + kvaser_pciefd_disable_irq_srcs(pcie); free_irq(pcie->pci->irq, pcie); pci_free_irq_vectors(pcie->pci); + + for (i = 0; i < pcie->nr_channels; ++i) + free_candev(pcie->can[i]->can.dev); + pci_iounmap(pdev, pcie->reg_base); pci_release_regions(pdev); pci_disable_device(pdev);

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH v4] usb: dwc3: Abort suspend on soft disconnect failure

by Kuen-Han Tsai

When dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect() fails, dwc3_suspend_common() keeps going with the suspend, resulting in a period where the power domain is off, but the gadget driver remains connected. Within this time frame, invoking vbus_event_work() will cause an error as it attempts to access DWC3 registers for endpoint disabling after the power domain has been completely shut down. Abort the suspend sequence when dwc3_gadget_suspend() cannot halt the controller and proceeds with a soft connect. Fixes: 9f8a67b65a49 ("usb: dwc3: gadget: fix gadget suspend/resume") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kuen-Han Tsai <khtsai(a)google.com> --- Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt Workqueue: events vbus_event_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x118 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x7c dump_stack+0x18/0x3c panic+0x16c/0x390 nmi_panic+0xa4/0xa8 arm64_serror_panic+0x6c/0x94 do_serror+0xc4/0xd0 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x48 el1h_64_error+0x68/0x6c readl+0x4c/0x8c __dwc3_gadget_ep_disable+0x48/0x230 dwc3_gadget_ep_disable+0x50/0xc0 usb_ep_disable+0x44/0xe4 ffs_func_eps_disable+0x64/0xc8 ffs_func_set_alt+0x74/0x368 ffs_func_disable+0x18/0x28 composite_disconnect+0x90/0xec configfs_composite_disconnect+0x64/0x88 usb_gadget_disconnect_locked+0xc0/0x168 vbus_event_work+0x3c/0x58 process_one_work+0x1e4/0x43c worker_thread+0x25c/0x430 kthread+0x104/0x1d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 --- Changelog: v4: - correct the mistake where semicolon was forgotten - return -EAGAIN upon dwc3_gadget_suspend() failure v3: - change the Fixes tag v2: - move declarations in separate lines - add the Fixes tag --- drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c | 9 +++++++-- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 22 +++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c index 66a08b527165..f36bc933c55b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c @@ -2388,6 +2388,7 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) { u32 reg; int i; + int ret; if (!pm_runtime_suspended(dwc->dev) && !PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg)) { dwc->susphy_state = (dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0)) & @@ -2406,7 +2407,9 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE: if (pm_runtime_suspended(dwc->dev)) break; - dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + ret = dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + if (ret) + return ret; synchronize_irq(dwc->irq_gadget); dwc3_core_exit(dwc); break; @@ -2441,7 +2444,9 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) break; if (dwc->current_otg_role == DWC3_OTG_ROLE_DEVICE) { - dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + ret = dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + if (ret) + return ret; synchronize_irq(dwc->irq_gadget); } diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index 89a4dc8ebf94..630fd5f0ce97 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -4776,26 +4776,22 @@ int dwc3_gadget_suspend(struct dwc3 *dwc) int ret; ret = dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect(dwc); - if (ret) - goto err; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags); - if (dwc->gadget_driver) - dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); - - return 0; - -err: /* * Attempt to reset the controller's state. Likely no * communication can be established until the host * performs a port reset. */ - if (dwc->softconnect) + if (ret && dwc->softconnect) { dwc3_gadget_soft_connect(dwc); + return -EAGAIN; + } - return ret; + spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags); + if (dwc->gadget_driver) + dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); + + return 0; } int dwc3_gadget_resume(struct dwc3 *dwc) -- 2.49.0.604.gff1f9ca942-goog

5 months, 1 week

3
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[PATCH v5] usb: dwc3: Abort suspend on soft disconnect failure

by Kuen-Han Tsai

When dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect() fails, dwc3_suspend_common() keeps going with the suspend, resulting in a period where the power domain is off, but the gadget driver remains connected. Within this time frame, invoking vbus_event_work() will cause an error as it attempts to access DWC3 registers for endpoint disabling after the power domain has been completely shut down. Abort the suspend sequence when dwc3_gadget_suspend() cannot halt the controller and proceeds with a soft connect. Fixes: 9f8a67b65a49 ("usb: dwc3: gadget: fix gadget suspend/resume") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen(a)synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Kuen-Han Tsai <khtsai(a)google.com> --- Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt Workqueue: events vbus_event_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xf4/0x118 show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x7c dump_stack+0x18/0x3c panic+0x16c/0x390 nmi_panic+0xa4/0xa8 arm64_serror_panic+0x6c/0x94 do_serror+0xc4/0xd0 el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x48 el1h_64_error+0x68/0x6c readl+0x4c/0x8c __dwc3_gadget_ep_disable+0x48/0x230 dwc3_gadget_ep_disable+0x50/0xc0 usb_ep_disable+0x44/0xe4 ffs_func_eps_disable+0x64/0xc8 ffs_func_set_alt+0x74/0x368 ffs_func_disable+0x18/0x28 composite_disconnect+0x90/0xec configfs_composite_disconnect+0x64/0x88 usb_gadget_disconnect_locked+0xc0/0x168 vbus_event_work+0x3c/0x58 process_one_work+0x1e4/0x43c worker_thread+0x25c/0x430 kthread+0x104/0x1d4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 --- Changelog: v5: - add the Acked-by tag v4: - correct the mistake where semicolon was forgotten - return -EAGAIN upon dwc3_gadget_suspend() failure v3: - change the Fixes tag v2: - move declarations in separate lines - add the Fixes tag --- drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c | 9 +++++++-- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 22 +++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c index 66a08b527165..f36bc933c55b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c @@ -2388,6 +2388,7 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) { u32 reg; int i; + int ret; if (!pm_runtime_suspended(dwc->dev) && !PMSG_IS_AUTO(msg)) { dwc->susphy_state = (dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUSB2PHYCFG(0)) & @@ -2406,7 +2407,9 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE: if (pm_runtime_suspended(dwc->dev)) break; - dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + ret = dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + if (ret) + return ret; synchronize_irq(dwc->irq_gadget); dwc3_core_exit(dwc); break; @@ -2441,7 +2444,9 @@ static int dwc3_suspend_common(struct dwc3 *dwc, pm_message_t msg) break; if (dwc->current_otg_role == DWC3_OTG_ROLE_DEVICE) { - dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + ret = dwc3_gadget_suspend(dwc); + if (ret) + return ret; synchronize_irq(dwc->irq_gadget); } diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index 321361288935..b6b63b530148 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -4821,26 +4821,22 @@ int dwc3_gadget_suspend(struct dwc3 *dwc) int ret; ret = dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect(dwc); - if (ret) - goto err; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags); - if (dwc->gadget_driver) - dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); - - return 0; - -err: /* * Attempt to reset the controller's state. Likely no * communication can be established until the host * performs a port reset. */ - if (dwc->softconnect) + if (ret && dwc->softconnect) { dwc3_gadget_soft_connect(dwc); + return -EAGAIN; + } - return ret; + spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags); + if (dwc->gadget_driver) + dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); + + return 0; } int dwc3_gadget_resume(struct dwc3 *dwc) -- 2.49.0.1164.gab81da1b16-goog

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] accel/ivpu: Use firmware names from upstream repo

by Jacek Lawrynowicz

Use FW names from linux-firmware repo instead of deprecated ones. Fixes: c140244f0cfb ("accel/ivpu: Add initial Panther Lake support") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.13+ Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_fw.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_fw.c b/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_fw.c index ccaaf6c100c02..9db741695401e 100644 --- a/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_fw.c +++ b/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_fw.c @@ -55,18 +55,18 @@ static struct { int gen; const char *name; } fw_names[] = { - { IVPU_HW_IP_37XX, "vpu_37xx.bin" }, + { IVPU_HW_IP_37XX, "intel/vpu/vpu_37xx_v1.bin" }, { IVPU_HW_IP_37XX, "intel/vpu/vpu_37xx_v0.0.bin" }, - { IVPU_HW_IP_40XX, "vpu_40xx.bin" }, + { IVPU_HW_IP_40XX, "intel/vpu/vpu_40xx_v1.bin" }, { IVPU_HW_IP_40XX, "intel/vpu/vpu_40xx_v0.0.bin" }, - { IVPU_HW_IP_50XX, "vpu_50xx.bin" }, + { IVPU_HW_IP_50XX, "intel/vpu/vpu_50xx_v1.bin" }, { IVPU_HW_IP_50XX, "intel/vpu/vpu_50xx_v0.0.bin" }, }; /* Production fw_names from the table above */ -MODULE_FIRMWARE("intel/vpu/vpu_37xx_v0.0.bin"); -MODULE_FIRMWARE("intel/vpu/vpu_40xx_v0.0.bin"); -MODULE_FIRMWARE("intel/vpu/vpu_50xx_v0.0.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("intel/vpu/vpu_37xx_v1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("intel/vpu/vpu_40xx_v1.bin"); +MODULE_FIRMWARE("intel/vpu/vpu_50xx_v1.bin"); static int ivpu_fw_request(struct ivpu_device *vdev) { -- 2.45.1

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH] accel/ivpu: Improve buffer object logging

by Jacek Lawrynowicz

- Fix missing alloc log when drm_gem_handle_create() fails in drm_vma_node_allow() and open callback is not called - Add ivpu_bo->ctx_id that enables to log the actual context id instead of using 0 as default - Add couple WARNs and errors so we can catch more memory corruption issues Fixes: 37dee2a2f433 ("accel/ivpu: Improve buffer object debug logs") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+ Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c b/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c index e0d242d9f3e50..a76cbf4761f8c 100644 --- a/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c +++ b/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static inline void ivpu_dbg_bo(struct ivpu_device *vdev, struct ivpu_bo *bo, con { ivpu_dbg(vdev, BO, "%6s: bo %8p vpu_addr %9llx size %8zu ctx %d has_pages %d dma_mapped %d mmu_mapped %d wc %d imported %d\n", - action, bo, bo->vpu_addr, ivpu_bo_size(bo), bo->ctx ? bo->ctx->id : 0, + action, bo, bo->vpu_addr, ivpu_bo_size(bo), bo->ctx_id, (bool)bo->base.pages, (bool)bo->base.sgt, bo->mmu_mapped, bo->base.map_wc, (bool)drm_gem_is_imported(&bo->base.base)); } @@ -94,8 +94,6 @@ ivpu_bo_alloc_vpu_addr(struct ivpu_bo *bo, struct ivpu_mmu_context *ctx, ivpu_err(vdev, "Failed to add BO to context %u: %d\n", ctx->id, ret); } - ivpu_dbg_bo(vdev, bo, "alloc"); - mutex_unlock(&bo->lock); drm_dev_exit(idx); @@ -215,7 +213,7 @@ struct drm_gem_object *ivpu_gem_prime_import(struct drm_device *dev, return ERR_PTR(ret); } -static struct ivpu_bo *ivpu_bo_alloc(struct ivpu_device *vdev, u64 size, u32 flags) +static struct ivpu_bo *ivpu_bo_alloc(struct ivpu_device *vdev, u64 size, u32 flags, u32 ctx_id) { struct drm_gem_shmem_object *shmem; struct ivpu_bo *bo; @@ -233,6 +231,7 @@ static struct ivpu_bo *ivpu_bo_alloc(struct ivpu_device *vdev, u64 size, u32 fla return ERR_CAST(shmem); bo = to_ivpu_bo(&shmem->base); + bo->ctx_id = ctx_id; bo->base.map_wc = flags & DRM_IVPU_BO_WC; bo->flags = flags; @@ -240,6 +239,8 @@ static struct ivpu_bo *ivpu_bo_alloc(struct ivpu_device *vdev, u64 size, u32 fla list_add_tail(&bo->bo_list_node, &vdev->bo_list); mutex_unlock(&vdev->bo_list_lock); + ivpu_dbg_bo(vdev, bo, "alloc"); + return bo; } @@ -278,8 +279,13 @@ static void ivpu_gem_bo_free(struct drm_gem_object *obj) mutex_unlock(&vdev->bo_list_lock); drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, !dma_resv_test_signaled(obj->resv, DMA_RESV_USAGE_READ)); + drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, ivpu_bo_size(bo) == 0); + drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, bo->base.vaddr); ivpu_bo_unbind_locked(bo); + drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, bo->mmu_mapped); + drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, bo->ctx); + mutex_destroy(&bo->lock); drm_WARN_ON(obj->dev, refcount_read(&bo->base.pages_use_count) > 1); @@ -314,7 +320,7 @@ int ivpu_bo_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file *fi if (size == 0) return -EINVAL; - bo = ivpu_bo_alloc(vdev, size, args->flags); + bo = ivpu_bo_alloc(vdev, size, args->flags, file_priv->ctx.id); if (IS_ERR(bo)) { ivpu_err(vdev, "Failed to allocate BO: %pe (ctx %u size %llu flags 0x%x)", bo, file_priv->ctx.id, args->size, args->flags); @@ -322,7 +328,10 @@ int ivpu_bo_create_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file *fi } ret = drm_gem_handle_create(file, &bo->base.base, &args->handle); - if (!ret) + if (ret) + ivpu_err(vdev, "Failed to create handle for BO: %pe (ctx %u size %llu flags 0x%x)", + bo, file_priv->ctx.id, args->size, args->flags); + else args->vpu_addr = bo->vpu_addr; drm_gem_object_put(&bo->base.base); @@ -345,7 +354,7 @@ ivpu_bo_create(struct ivpu_device *vdev, struct ivpu_mmu_context *ctx, drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, !PAGE_ALIGNED(range->end)); drm_WARN_ON(&vdev->drm, !PAGE_ALIGNED(size)); - bo = ivpu_bo_alloc(vdev, size, flags); + bo = ivpu_bo_alloc(vdev, size, flags, IVPU_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_MMU_SSID); if (IS_ERR(bo)) { ivpu_err(vdev, "Failed to allocate BO: %pe (vpu_addr 0x%llx size %llu flags 0x%x)", bo, range->start, size, flags); @@ -452,7 +461,7 @@ static void ivpu_bo_print_info(struct ivpu_bo *bo, struct drm_printer *p) mutex_lock(&bo->lock); drm_printf(p, "%-9p %-3u 0x%-12llx %-10lu 0x%-8x %-4u", - bo, bo->ctx ? bo->ctx->id : 0, bo->vpu_addr, bo->base.base.size, + bo, bo->ctx_id, bo->vpu_addr, bo->base.base.size, bo->flags, kref_read(&bo->base.base.refcount)); if (bo->base.pages) diff --git a/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.h b/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.h index a222a9ec9d611..0c93118c85bd3 100644 --- a/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.h +++ b/drivers/accel/ivpu/ivpu_gem.h @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct ivpu_bo { u64 vpu_addr; u32 flags; u32 job_status; /* Valid only for command buffer */ + u32 ctx_id; bool mmu_mapped; }; -- 2.45.1

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 2/5] mm/filemap: use filemap_end_dropbehind() for read invalidation

by Jens Axboe

Use the filemap_end_dropbehind() helper rather than calling folio_unmap_invalidate() directly, as we need to check if the folio has been redirtied or marked for writeback once the folio lock has been re-acquired. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy(a)hammerspace.com> Fixes: 8026e49bff9b ("mm/filemap: add read support for RWF_DONTCACHE") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/ba8a9805331ce258a622feaca266b163db681… Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> --- mm/filemap.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c index 008a55290f34..6af6d8f2929c 100644 --- a/mm/filemap.c +++ b/mm/filemap.c @@ -2644,8 +2644,7 @@ static inline bool pos_same_folio(loff_t pos1, loff_t pos2, struct folio *folio) return (pos1 >> shift == pos2 >> shift); } -static void filemap_end_dropbehind_read(struct address_space *mapping, - struct folio *folio) +static void filemap_end_dropbehind_read(struct folio *folio) { if (!folio_test_dropbehind(folio)) return; @@ -2653,7 +2652,7 @@ static void filemap_end_dropbehind_read(struct address_space *mapping, return; if (folio_trylock(folio)) { if (folio_test_clear_dropbehind(folio)) - folio_unmap_invalidate(mapping, folio, 0); + filemap_end_dropbehind(folio); folio_unlock(folio); } } @@ -2774,7 +2773,7 @@ ssize_t filemap_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter, for (i = 0; i < folio_batch_count(&fbatch); i++) { struct folio *folio = fbatch.folios[i]; - filemap_end_dropbehind_read(mapping, folio); + filemap_end_dropbehind_read(folio); folio_put(folio); } folio_batch_init(&fbatch); -- 2.49.0

5 months, 1 week

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[PATCH 1/5] mm/filemap: gate dropbehind invalidate on folio !dirty && !writeback

by Jens Axboe

It's possible for the folio to either get marked for writeback or redirtied. Add a helper, filemap_end_dropbehind(), which guards the folio_unmap_invalidate() call behind check for the folio being both non-dirty and not under writeback AFTER the folio lock has been acquired. Use this helper folio_end_dropbehind_write(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: fb7d3bc41493 ("mm/filemap: drop streaming/uncached pages when writeback completes") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20250525083209.GS2023217@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> --- mm/filemap.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c index 7b90cbeb4a1a..008a55290f34 100644 --- a/mm/filemap.c +++ b/mm/filemap.c @@ -1589,6 +1589,16 @@ int folio_wait_private_2_killable(struct folio *folio) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(folio_wait_private_2_killable); +static void filemap_end_dropbehind(struct folio *folio) +{ + struct address_space *mapping = folio->mapping; + + VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_locked(folio), folio); + + if (mapping && !folio_test_writeback(folio) && !folio_test_dirty(folio)) + folio_unmap_invalidate(mapping, folio, 0); +} + /* * If folio was marked as dropbehind, then pages should be dropped when writeback * completes. Do that now. If we fail, it's likely because of a big folio - @@ -1604,8 +1614,7 @@ static void folio_end_dropbehind_write(struct folio *folio) * invalidation in that case. */ if (in_task() && folio_trylock(folio)) { - if (folio->mapping) - folio_unmap_invalidate(folio->mapping, folio, 0); + filemap_end_dropbehind(folio); folio_unlock(folio); } } -- 2.49.0

5 months, 1 week

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