The patch below does not apply to the 6.14-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.14.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x a39f3087092716f2bd531d6fdc20403c3dc2a879
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025051210-devourer-antarctic-1ed3@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.14.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From a39f3087092716f2bd531d6fdc20403c3dc2a879 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 2 May 2025 16:02:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] rust: allow Rust 1.87.0's `clippy::ptr_eq` lint
Starting with Rust 1.87.0 (expected 2025-05-15) [1], Clippy may expand
the `ptr_eq` lint, e.g.:
error: use `core::ptr::eq` when comparing raw pointers
--> rust/kernel/list.rs:438:12
|
438 | if self.first == item {
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ help: try: `core::ptr::eq(self.first, item)`
|
= help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#ptr_eq
= note: `-D clippy::ptr-eq` implied by `-D warnings`
= help: to override `-D warnings` add `#[allow(clippy::ptr_eq)]`
It is expected that a PR to relax the lint will be backported [2] by
the time Rust 1.87.0 releases, since the lint was considered too eager
(at least by default) [3].
Thus allow the lint temporarily just in case.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # Needed in 6.12.y and later (Rust is pinned in older LTSs).
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/14339 [1]
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/14526 [2]
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/14525 [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502140237.1659624-3-ojeda@kernel.org
[ Converted to `allow`s since backport was confirmed. - Miguel ]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs b/rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs
index ae9d072741ce..87a71fd40c3c 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
//! Implementation of [`Vec`].
+// May not be needed in Rust 1.87.0 (pending beta backport).
+#![allow(clippy::ptr_eq)]
+
use super::{
allocator::{KVmalloc, Kmalloc, Vmalloc},
layout::ArrayLayout,
diff --git a/rust/kernel/list.rs b/rust/kernel/list.rs
index a335c3b1ff5e..2054682c5724 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/list.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/list.rs
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
//! A linked list implementation.
+// May not be needed in Rust 1.87.0 (pending beta backport).
+#![allow(clippy::ptr_eq)]
+
use crate::sync::ArcBorrow;
use crate::types::Opaque;
use core::iter::{DoubleEndedIterator, FusedIterator};
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 52f671db18823089a02f07efc04efdb2272ddc17 ]
The test Davide added in commit ca22da2fbd69 ("act_mirred: use the backlog
for nested calls to mirred ingress") hangs our testing VMs every 10 or so
runs, with the familiar tcp_v4_rcv -> tcp_v4_rcv deadlock reported by
lockdep.
The problem as previously described by Davide (see Link) is that
if we reverse flow of traffic with the redirect (egress -> ingress)
we may reach the same socket which generated the packet. And we may
still be holding its socket lock. The common solution to such deadlocks
is to put the packet in the Rx backlog, rather than run the Rx path
inline. Do that for all egress -> ingress reversals, not just once
we started to nest mirred calls.
In the past there was a concern that the backlog indirection will
lead to loss of error reporting / less accurate stats. But the current
workaround does not seem to address the issue.
Fixes: 53592b364001 ("net/sched: act_mirred: Implement ingress actions")
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner(a)gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti(a)redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/33dc43f587ec1388ba456b4915c75f02a8aae226.166…
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net>
[Minor conflict resolved due to code context change.]
Signed-off-by: Jianqi Ren <jianqi.ren.cn(a)windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: He Zhe <zhe.he(a)windriver.com>
---
Verified the build test
---
net/sched/act_mirred.c | 14 +++++---------
.../testing/selftests/net/forwarding/tc_actions.sh | 3 ---
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sched/act_mirred.c b/net/sched/act_mirred.c
index bbc34987bd09..896bffd50aa8 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_mirred.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_mirred.c
@@ -205,18 +205,14 @@ static int tcf_mirred_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
return err;
}
-static bool is_mirred_nested(void)
-{
- return unlikely(__this_cpu_read(mirred_nest_level) > 1);
-}
-
-static int tcf_mirred_forward(bool want_ingress, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int
+tcf_mirred_forward(bool at_ingress, bool want_ingress, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
if (!want_ingress)
err = tcf_dev_queue_xmit(skb, dev_queue_xmit);
- else if (is_mirred_nested())
+ else if (!at_ingress)
err = netif_rx(skb);
else
err = netif_receive_skb(skb);
@@ -312,7 +308,7 @@ static int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
/* let's the caller reinsert the packet, if possible */
if (use_reinsert) {
- err = tcf_mirred_forward(want_ingress, skb);
+ err = tcf_mirred_forward(at_ingress, want_ingress, skb);
if (err)
tcf_action_inc_overlimit_qstats(&m->common);
__this_cpu_dec(mirred_nest_level);
@@ -320,7 +316,7 @@ static int tcf_mirred_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
}
}
- err = tcf_mirred_forward(want_ingress, skb2);
+ err = tcf_mirred_forward(at_ingress, want_ingress, skb2);
if (err)
tcf_action_inc_overlimit_qstats(&m->common);
__this_cpu_dec(mirred_nest_level);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/tc_actions.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/tc_actions.sh
index b0f5e55d2d0b..589629636502 100755
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/tc_actions.sh
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/forwarding/tc_actions.sh
@@ -235,9 +235,6 @@ mirred_egress_to_ingress_tcp_test()
check_err $? "didn't mirred redirect ICMP"
tc_check_packets "dev $h1 ingress" 102 10
check_err $? "didn't drop mirred ICMP"
- local overlimits=$(tc_rule_stats_get ${h1} 101 egress .overlimits)
- test ${overlimits} = 10
- check_err $? "wrong overlimits, expected 10 got ${overlimits}"
tc filter del dev $h1 egress protocol ip pref 100 handle 100 flower
tc filter del dev $h1 egress protocol ip pref 101 handle 101 flower
--
2.34.1
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x a39f3087092716f2bd531d6fdc20403c3dc2a879
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025051211-unclothed-common-f6cf@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From a39f3087092716f2bd531d6fdc20403c3dc2a879 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 2 May 2025 16:02:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] rust: allow Rust 1.87.0's `clippy::ptr_eq` lint
Starting with Rust 1.87.0 (expected 2025-05-15) [1], Clippy may expand
the `ptr_eq` lint, e.g.:
error: use `core::ptr::eq` when comparing raw pointers
--> rust/kernel/list.rs:438:12
|
438 | if self.first == item {
| ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ help: try: `core::ptr::eq(self.first, item)`
|
= help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#ptr_eq
= note: `-D clippy::ptr-eq` implied by `-D warnings`
= help: to override `-D warnings` add `#[allow(clippy::ptr_eq)]`
It is expected that a PR to relax the lint will be backported [2] by
the time Rust 1.87.0 releases, since the lint was considered too eager
(at least by default) [3].
Thus allow the lint temporarily just in case.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # Needed in 6.12.y and later (Rust is pinned in older LTSs).
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/14339 [1]
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/14526 [2]
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/14525 [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502140237.1659624-3-ojeda@kernel.org
[ Converted to `allow`s since backport was confirmed. - Miguel ]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
diff --git a/rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs b/rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs
index ae9d072741ce..87a71fd40c3c 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/alloc/kvec.rs
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
//! Implementation of [`Vec`].
+// May not be needed in Rust 1.87.0 (pending beta backport).
+#![allow(clippy::ptr_eq)]
+
use super::{
allocator::{KVmalloc, Kmalloc, Vmalloc},
layout::ArrayLayout,
diff --git a/rust/kernel/list.rs b/rust/kernel/list.rs
index a335c3b1ff5e..2054682c5724 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/list.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/list.rs
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
//! A linked list implementation.
+// May not be needed in Rust 1.87.0 (pending beta backport).
+#![allow(clippy::ptr_eq)]
+
use crate::sync::ArcBorrow;
use crate::types::Opaque;
use core::iter::{DoubleEndedIterator, FusedIterator};
The patch titled
Subject: XArray: fix kmemleak false positive in xas_shrink()
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
xarray-fix-kmemleak-false-positive-in-xas_shrink.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patche…
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code ***
The -mm tree is included into linux-next via the mm-everything
branch at git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
and is updated there every 2-3 working days
------------------------------------------------------
From: Jared Kangas <jkangas(a)redhat.com>
Subject: XArray: fix kmemleak false positive in xas_shrink()
Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 12:17:07 -0700
Kmemleak periodically produces a false positive report that resembles
the following:
unreferenced object 0xffff0000c105ed08 (size 576):
comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294937478
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
d8 e7 0a 8b 00 80 ff ff 20 ed 05 c1 00 00 ff ff ........ .......
backtrace (crc 69e99671):
kmemleak_alloc+0xb4/0xc4
kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x1f0/0x244
xas_alloc+0x2a0/0x3a0
xas_expand.constprop.0+0x144/0x4dc
xas_create+0x2b0/0x484
xas_store+0x60/0xa00
__xa_alloc+0x194/0x280
__xa_alloc_cyclic+0x104/0x2e0
dev_index_reserve+0xd8/0x18c
register_netdevice+0x5e8/0xf90
register_netdev+0x28/0x50
loopback_net_init+0x68/0x114
ops_init+0x90/0x2c0
register_pernet_operations+0x20c/0x554
register_pernet_device+0x3c/0x8c
net_dev_init+0x5cc/0x7d8
This transient leak can be traced to xas_shrink(): when the xarray's
head is reassigned, kmemleak may have already started scanning the
xarray. When this happens, if kmemleak fails to scan the new xa_head
before it moves, kmemleak will see it as a leak until the xarray is
scanned again.
The report can be reproduced by running the xdp_bonding BPF selftest,
although it doesn't appear consistently due to the bug's transience.
In my testing, the following script has reliably triggered the report in
under an hour on a debug kernel with kmemleak enabled, where KSELFTESTS
is set to the install path for the kernel selftests:
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
echo 1 >/sys/module/kmemleak/parameters/verbose
echo scan=1 >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
while :; do
$KSELFTESTS/bpf/test_progs -t xdp_bonding
done
To prevent this false positive report, mark the new xa_head in
xas_shrink() as a transient leak.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250512191707.245153-1-jkangas@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jared Kangas <jkangas(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Jared Kangas <jkangas(a)redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org>
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org>
---
lib/xarray.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/lib/xarray.c~xarray-fix-kmemleak-false-positive-in-xas_shrink
+++ a/lib/xarray.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/bitmap.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xarray.h>
@@ -476,6 +477,7 @@ static void xas_shrink(struct xa_state *
break;
node = xa_to_node(entry);
node->parent = NULL;
+ kmemleak_transient_leak(node);
}
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jkangas(a)redhat.com are
xarray-fix-kmemleak-false-positive-in-xas_shrink.patch
When increasing the array size in memblock_double_array() and the slab
is not yet available, a call to memblock_find_in_range() is used to
reserve/allocate memory. However, the range returned may not have been
accepted, which can result in a crash when booting an SNP guest:
RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0x68/0x130
Code: ...
RSP: 0000:ffffffff9cc03ce8 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: ff11001ff83e5000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: fffffffffffff000
RDX: 0000000000000bc0 RSI: ffffffff9dba8860 RDI: ff11001ff83e5c00
RBP: 0000000000002000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000002000
R10: 000000207fffe000 R11: 0000040000000000 R12: ffffffff9d06ef78
R13: ff11001ff83e5000 R14: ffffffff9dba7c60 R15: 0000000000000c00
memblock_double_array+0xff/0x310
memblock_add_range+0x1fb/0x2f0
memblock_reserve+0x4f/0xa0
memblock_alloc_range_nid+0xac/0x130
memblock_alloc_internal+0x53/0xc0
memblock_alloc_try_nid+0x3d/0xa0
swiotlb_init_remap+0x149/0x2f0
mem_init+0xb/0xb0
mm_core_init+0x8f/0x350
start_kernel+0x17e/0x5d0
x86_64_start_reservations+0x14/0x30
x86_64_start_kernel+0x92/0xa0
secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x194/0x19b
Mitigate this by calling accept_memory() on the memory range returned
before the slab is available.
Prior to v6.12, the accept_memory() interface used a 'start' and 'end'
parameter instead of 'start' and 'size', therefore the accept_memory()
call must be adjusted to specify 'start + size' for 'end' when applying
to kernels prior to v6.12.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # see patch description, needs adjustments for <= 6.11
Fixes: dcdfdd40fa82 ("mm: Add support for unaccepted memory")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com>
---
mm/memblock.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/memblock.c b/mm/memblock.c
index 0a53db4d9f7b..30fa553e9634 100644
--- a/mm/memblock.c
+++ b/mm/memblock.c
@@ -457,7 +457,14 @@ static int __init_memblock memblock_double_array(struct memblock_type *type,
min(new_area_start, memblock.current_limit),
new_alloc_size, PAGE_SIZE);
- new_array = addr ? __va(addr) : NULL;
+ if (addr) {
+ /* The memory may not have been accepted, yet. */
+ accept_memory(addr, new_alloc_size);
+
+ new_array = __va(addr);
+ } else {
+ new_array = NULL;
+ }
}
if (!addr) {
pr_err("memblock: Failed to double %s array from %ld to %ld entries !\n",
base-commit: fc96b232f8e7c0a6c282f47726b2ff6a5fb341d2
--
2.46.2