June 2025 - Linux-stable-mirror

[PATCH] asm-generic/io.h: Skip trace helpers if rwmmio events are disabled

by Varad Gautam

With `CONFIG_TRACE_MMIO_ACCESS=y`, the `{read,write}{b,w,l,q}{_relaxed}()` mmio accessors unconditionally call `log_{post_}{read,write}_mmio()` helpers, which in turn call the ftrace ops for `rwmmio` trace events This adds a performance penalty per mmio accessor call, even when `rwmmio` events are disabled at runtime (~80% overhead on local measurement). Guard these with `tracepoint_enabled()`. Signed-off-by: Varad Gautam <varadgautam(a)google.com> Fixes: 210031971cdd ("asm-generic/io: Add logging support for MMIO accessors") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> --- include/asm-generic/io.h | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/asm-generic/io.h b/include/asm-generic/io.h index 3c61c29ff6ab..a9b5da547523 100644 --- a/include/asm-generic/io.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/io.h @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRACE_MMIO_ACCESS) && !(defined(__DISABLE_TRACE_MMIO__)) #include <linux/tracepoint-defs.h> +#define rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(tracepoint) tracepoint_enabled(tracepoint) DECLARE_TRACEPOINT(rwmmio_write); DECLARE_TRACEPOINT(rwmmio_post_write); DECLARE_TRACEPOINT(rwmmio_read); @@ -91,6 +92,7 @@ void log_post_read_mmio(u64 val, u8 width, const volatile void __iomem *addr, #else +#define rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(tracepoint) false static inline void log_write_mmio(u64 val, u8 width, volatile void __iomem *addr, unsigned long caller_addr, unsigned long caller_addr0) {} static inline void log_post_write_mmio(u64 val, u8 width, volatile void __iomem *addr, @@ -189,11 +191,13 @@ static inline u8 readb(const volatile void __iomem *addr) { u8 val; - log_read_mmio(8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_read)) + log_read_mmio(8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __io_br(); val = __raw_readb(addr); __io_ar(val); - log_post_read_mmio(val, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_read)) + log_post_read_mmio(val, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); return val; } #endif @@ -204,11 +208,13 @@ static inline u16 readw(const volatile void __iomem *addr) { u16 val; - log_read_mmio(16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_read)) + log_read_mmio(16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __io_br(); val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(addr)); __io_ar(val); - log_post_read_mmio(val, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_read)) + log_post_read_mmio(val, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); return val; } #endif @@ -219,11 +225,13 @@ static inline u32 readl(const volatile void __iomem *addr) { u32 val; - log_read_mmio(32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_read)) + log_read_mmio(32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __io_br(); val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(addr)); __io_ar(val); - log_post_read_mmio(val, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_read)) + log_post_read_mmio(val, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); return val; } #endif @@ -235,11 +243,13 @@ static inline u64 readq(const volatile void __iomem *addr) { u64 val; - log_read_mmio(64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_read)) + log_read_mmio(64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __io_br(); val = __le64_to_cpu((__le64 __force)__raw_readq(addr)); __io_ar(val); - log_post_read_mmio(val, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_read)) + log_post_read_mmio(val, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); return val; } #endif @@ -249,11 +259,13 @@ static inline u64 readq(const volatile void __iomem *addr) #define writeb writeb static inline void writeb(u8 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) { - log_write_mmio(value, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_write)) + log_write_mmio(value, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __io_bw(); __raw_writeb(value, addr); __io_aw(); - log_post_write_mmio(value, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_write)) + log_post_write_mmio(value, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); } #endif @@ -261,11 +273,13 @@ static inline void writeb(u8 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) #define writew writew static inline void writew(u16 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) { - log_write_mmio(value, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_write)) + log_write_mmio(value, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __io_bw(); __raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), addr); __io_aw(); - log_post_write_mmio(value, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_write)) + log_post_write_mmio(value, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); } #endif @@ -273,11 +287,13 @@ static inline void writew(u16 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) #define writel writel static inline void writel(u32 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) { - log_write_mmio(value, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_write)) + log_write_mmio(value, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __io_bw(); __raw_writel((u32 __force)__cpu_to_le32(value), addr); __io_aw(); - log_post_write_mmio(value, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_write)) + log_post_write_mmio(value, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); } #endif @@ -286,11 +302,13 @@ static inline void writel(u32 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) #define writeq writeq static inline void writeq(u64 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) { - log_write_mmio(value, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_write)) + log_write_mmio(value, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __io_bw(); __raw_writeq((u64 __force)__cpu_to_le64(value), addr); __io_aw(); - log_post_write_mmio(value, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_write)) + log_post_write_mmio(value, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); } #endif #endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */ @@ -306,9 +324,11 @@ static inline u8 readb_relaxed(const volatile void __iomem *addr) { u8 val; - log_read_mmio(8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_read)) + log_read_mmio(8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); val = __raw_readb(addr); - log_post_read_mmio(val, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_read)) + log_post_read_mmio(val, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); return val; } #endif @@ -319,9 +339,11 @@ static inline u16 readw_relaxed(const volatile void __iomem *addr) { u16 val; - log_read_mmio(16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_read)) + log_read_mmio(16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); val = __le16_to_cpu((__le16 __force)__raw_readw(addr)); - log_post_read_mmio(val, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_read)) + log_post_read_mmio(val, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); return val; } #endif @@ -332,9 +354,11 @@ static inline u32 readl_relaxed(const volatile void __iomem *addr) { u32 val; - log_read_mmio(32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_read)) + log_read_mmio(32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); val = __le32_to_cpu((__le32 __force)__raw_readl(addr)); - log_post_read_mmio(val, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_read)) + log_post_read_mmio(val, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); return val; } #endif @@ -345,9 +369,11 @@ static inline u64 readq_relaxed(const volatile void __iomem *addr) { u64 val; - log_read_mmio(64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_read)) + log_read_mmio(64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); val = __le64_to_cpu((__le64 __force)__raw_readq(addr)); - log_post_read_mmio(val, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_read)) + log_post_read_mmio(val, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); return val; } #endif @@ -356,9 +382,11 @@ static inline u64 readq_relaxed(const volatile void __iomem *addr) #define writeb_relaxed writeb_relaxed static inline void writeb_relaxed(u8 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) { - log_write_mmio(value, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_write)) + log_write_mmio(value, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __raw_writeb(value, addr); - log_post_write_mmio(value, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_write)) + log_post_write_mmio(value, 8, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); } #endif @@ -366,9 +394,11 @@ static inline void writeb_relaxed(u8 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) #define writew_relaxed writew_relaxed static inline void writew_relaxed(u16 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) { - log_write_mmio(value, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_write)) + log_write_mmio(value, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __raw_writew((u16 __force)cpu_to_le16(value), addr); - log_post_write_mmio(value, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_write)) + log_post_write_mmio(value, 16, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); } #endif @@ -376,9 +406,11 @@ static inline void writew_relaxed(u16 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) #define writel_relaxed writel_relaxed static inline void writel_relaxed(u32 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) { - log_write_mmio(value, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_write)) + log_write_mmio(value, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __raw_writel((u32 __force)__cpu_to_le32(value), addr); - log_post_write_mmio(value, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_write)) + log_post_write_mmio(value, 32, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); } #endif @@ -386,9 +418,11 @@ static inline void writel_relaxed(u32 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) #define writeq_relaxed writeq_relaxed static inline void writeq_relaxed(u64 value, volatile void __iomem *addr) { - log_write_mmio(value, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_write)) + log_write_mmio(value, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); __raw_writeq((u64 __force)__cpu_to_le64(value), addr); - log_post_write_mmio(value, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); + if (rwmmio_tracepoint_enabled(rwmmio_post_write)) + log_post_write_mmio(value, 64, addr, _THIS_IP_, _RET_IP_); } #endif -- 2.49.0.472.ge94155a9ec-goog

11 hours, 34 minutes

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: fix use-after-free in __smb2_lease_break_noti()" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 21a4e47578d44c6b37c4fc4aba8ed7cc8dbb13de # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025042109-embroider-consoling-20d9@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 21a4e47578d44c6b37c4fc4aba8ed7cc8dbb13de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2025 15:19:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: fix use-after-free in __smb2_lease_break_noti() Move tcp_transport free to ksmbd_conn_free. If ksmbd connection is referenced when ksmbd server thread terminates, It will not be freed, but conn->tcp_transport is freed. __smb2_lease_break_noti can be performed asynchronously when the connection is disconnected. __smb2_lease_break_noti calls ksmbd_conn_write, which can cause use-after-free when conn->ksmbd_transport is already freed. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert(a)doyensec.com> Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert(a)doyensec.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> diff --git a/fs/smb/server/connection.c b/fs/smb/server/connection.c index c1f22c129111..83764c230e9d 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/connection.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/connection.c @@ -39,8 +39,10 @@ void ksmbd_conn_free(struct ksmbd_conn *conn) xa_destroy(&conn->sessions); kvfree(conn->request_buf); kfree(conn->preauth_info); - if (atomic_dec_and_test(&conn->refcnt)) + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&conn->refcnt)) { + ksmbd_free_transport(conn->transport); kfree(conn); + } } /** diff --git a/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c b/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c index 7f38a3c3f5bd..abedf510899a 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c @@ -93,15 +93,19 @@ static struct tcp_transport *alloc_transport(struct socket *client_sk) return t; } +void ksmbd_free_transport(struct ksmbd_transport *kt) +{ + struct tcp_transport *t = TCP_TRANS(kt); + + sock_release(t->sock); + kfree(t->iov); + kfree(t); +} + static void free_transport(struct tcp_transport *t) { kernel_sock_shutdown(t->sock, SHUT_RDWR); - sock_release(t->sock); - t->sock = NULL; - ksmbd_conn_free(KSMBD_TRANS(t)->conn); - kfree(t->iov); - kfree(t); } /** diff --git a/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.h b/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.h index 8c9aa624cfe3..1e51675ee1b2 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.h +++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ int ksmbd_tcp_set_interfaces(char *ifc_list, int ifc_list_sz); struct interface *ksmbd_find_netdev_name_iface_list(char *netdev_name); +void ksmbd_free_transport(struct ksmbd_transport *kt); int ksmbd_tcp_init(void); void ksmbd_tcp_destroy(void);

12 hours, 4 minutes

2
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0 0

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] crypto: qat - add shutdown handler to qat_dh895xcc" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 2c4e8b228733bfbcaf49408fdf94d220f6eb78fc # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062004-setting-ruined-8212@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 2c4e8b228733bfbcaf49408fdf94d220f6eb78fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu(a)intel.com> Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2025 15:59:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] crypto: qat - add shutdown handler to qat_dh895xcc During a warm reset via kexec, the system bypasses the driver removal sequence, meaning that the remove() callback is not invoked. If a QAT device is not shutdown properly, the device driver will fail to load in a newly rebooted kernel. This might result in output like the following after the kexec reboot: QAT: AE0 is inactive!! QAT: failed to get device out of reset dh895xcc 0000:3f:00.0: qat_hal_clr_reset error dh895xcc 0000:3f:00.0: Failed to init the AEs dh895xcc 0000:3f:00.0: Failed to initialise Acceleration Engine dh895xcc 0000:3f:00.0: Resetting device qat_dev0 dh895xcc 0000:3f:00.0: probe with driver dh895xcc failed with error -14 Implement the shutdown() handler that hooks into the reboot notifier list. This brings down the QAT device and ensures it is shut down properly. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 7afa232e76ce ("crypto: qat - Intel(R) QAT DH895xcc accelerator") Reviewed-by: Ahsan Atta <ahsan.atta(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c index 730147404ceb..b59e0cc49e52 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c @@ -209,6 +209,13 @@ static void adf_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) kfree(accel_dev); } +static void adf_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev = adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(pdev); + + adf_dev_down(accel_dev); +} + static const struct pci_device_id adf_pci_tbl[] = { { PCI_VDEVICE(INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_QAT_DH895XCC) }, { } @@ -220,6 +227,7 @@ static struct pci_driver adf_driver = { .name = ADF_DH895XCC_DEVICE_NAME, .probe = adf_probe, .remove = adf_remove, + .shutdown = adf_shutdown, .sriov_configure = adf_sriov_configure, .err_handler = &adf_err_handler, };

1 day, 1 hour

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] btrfs: fix qgroup reservation leak on failure to allocate" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 1f2889f5594a2bc4c6a52634c4a51b93e785def5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062054-unhappily-kebab-e7e5@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 1f2889f5594a2bc4c6a52634c4a51b93e785def5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Date: Wed, 7 May 2025 13:05:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] btrfs: fix qgroup reservation leak on failure to allocate ordered extent If we fail to allocate an ordered extent for a COW write we end up leaking a qgroup data reservation since we called btrfs_qgroup_release_data() but we didn't call btrfs_qgroup_free_refroot() (which would happen when running the respective data delayed ref created by ordered extent completion or when finishing the ordered extent in case an error happened). So make sure we call btrfs_qgroup_free_refroot() if we fail to allocate an ordered extent for a COW write. Fixes: 7dbeaad0af7d ("btrfs: change timing for qgroup reserved space for ordered extents to fix reserved space leak") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris(a)bur.io> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c b/fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c index ae49f87b27e8..e44d3dd17caf 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c @@ -153,9 +153,10 @@ static struct btrfs_ordered_extent *alloc_ordered_extent( struct btrfs_ordered_extent *entry; int ret; u64 qgroup_rsv = 0; + const bool is_nocow = (flags & + ((1U << BTRFS_ORDERED_NOCOW) | (1U << BTRFS_ORDERED_PREALLOC))); - if (flags & - ((1U << BTRFS_ORDERED_NOCOW) | (1U << BTRFS_ORDERED_PREALLOC))) { + if (is_nocow) { /* For nocow write, we can release the qgroup rsv right now */ ret = btrfs_qgroup_free_data(inode, NULL, file_offset, num_bytes, &qgroup_rsv); if (ret < 0) @@ -170,8 +171,13 @@ static struct btrfs_ordered_extent *alloc_ordered_extent( return ERR_PTR(ret); } entry = kmem_cache_zalloc(btrfs_ordered_extent_cache, GFP_NOFS); - if (!entry) + if (!entry) { + if (!is_nocow) + btrfs_qgroup_free_refroot(inode->root->fs_info, + btrfs_root_id(inode->root), + qgroup_rsv, BTRFS_QGROUP_RSV_DATA); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + } entry->file_offset = file_offset; entry->num_bytes = num_bytes;

1 day, 1 hour

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: VMX: Flush shadow VMCS on emergency reboot" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a0ee1d5faff135e28810f29e0f06328c66f89852 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062039-anger-volumes-9d75@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a0ee1d5faff135e28810f29e0f06328c66f89852 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Gao <chao.gao(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 22:08:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Flush shadow VMCS on emergency reboot Ensure the shadow VMCS cache is evicted during an emergency reboot to prevent potential memory corruption if the cache is evicted after reboot. This issue was identified through code inspection, as __loaded_vmcs_clear() flushes both the normal VMCS and the shadow VMCS. Avoid checking the "launched" state during an emergency reboot, unlike the behavior in __loaded_vmcs_clear(). This is important because reboot NMIs can interfere with operations like copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(), where shadow VMCSes are loaded directly using VMPTRLD. In such cases, if NMIs occur right after the VMCS load, the shadow VMCSes will be active but the "launched" state may not be set. Fixes: 16f5b9034b69 ("KVM: nVMX: Copy processor-specific shadow-vmcs to VMCS12") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang(a)intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250324140849.2099723-1-chao.gao@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index ef2d7208dd20..848c4963bdb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -770,8 +770,11 @@ void vmx_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu(void) return; list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu), - loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) + loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) { vmcs_clear(v->vmcs); + if (v->shadow_vmcs) + vmcs_clear(v->shadow_vmcs); + } kvm_cpu_vmxoff(); }

2 days, 9 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.4.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062047-modular-police-cff2@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.4.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 13:33:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below: INFO: task syz-executor140:5308 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-syzkaller-00069-g81e4f8d68c66 #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:syz-executor140 state:D stack:24016 pid:5308 tgid:5308 ppid:5306 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00000006 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5378 [inline] __schedule+0x190e/0x4c90 kernel/sched/core.c:6765 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6842 [inline] schedule+0x14b/0x320 kernel/sched/core.c:6857 io_schedule+0x8d/0x110 kernel/sched/core.c:7690 folio_wait_bit_common+0x839/0xee0 mm/filemap.c:1317 __folio_lock mm/filemap.c:1664 [inline] folio_lock include/linux/pagemap.h:1163 [inline] __filemap_get_folio+0x147/0xb40 mm/filemap.c:1917 pagecache_get_page+0x2c/0x130 mm/folio-compat.c:87 find_get_page_flags include/linux/pagemap.h:842 [inline] f2fs_grab_cache_page+0x2b/0x320 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2776 __get_node_page+0x131/0x11b0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1463 read_xattr_block+0xfb/0x190 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:306 lookup_all_xattrs fs/f2fs/xattr.c:355 [inline] f2fs_getxattr+0x676/0xf70 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:533 __f2fs_get_acl+0x52/0x870 fs/f2fs/acl.c:179 f2fs_acl_create fs/f2fs/acl.c:375 [inline] f2fs_init_acl+0xd7/0x9b0 fs/f2fs/acl.c:418 f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0xa0f/0x1050 fs/f2fs/dir.c:539 f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x448/0x860 fs/f2fs/inline.c:666 f2fs_add_dentry+0xba/0x1e0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:765 f2fs_do_add_link+0x28c/0x3a0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:808 f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3616 [inline] f2fs_mknod+0x2e8/0x5b0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:766 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4191 unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1286 [inline] unix_bind+0x563/0xe30 net/unix/af_unix.c:1379 __sys_bind_socket net/socket.c:1817 [inline] __sys_bind+0x1e4/0x290 net/socket.c:1848 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1853 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1851 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1851 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Let's dump and check metadata of corrupted inode, it shows its xattr_nid is the same to its i_ino. dump.f2fs -i 3 chaseyu.img.raw i_xattr_nid [0x 3 : 3] So that, during mknod in the corrupted directory, it tries to get and lock inode page twice, result in deadlock. - f2fs_mknod - f2fs_add_inline_entry - f2fs_get_inode_page --- lock dir's inode page - f2fs_init_acl - f2fs_acl_create(dir,..) - __f2fs_get_acl - f2fs_getxattr - lookup_all_xattrs - __get_node_page --- try to lock dir's inode page In order to fix this, let's add sanity check on ino and xnid. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+cc448dcdc7ae0b4e4ffa(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/67e06150.050a0220.21942d.0005.GAE@… Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index fa5097da7c88..f5991e8751b9 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page) return false; } + if (ino_of_node(node_page) == fi->i_xattr_nid) { + f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: corrupted inode i_ino=%lx, xnid=%x, run fsck to fix.", + __func__, inode->i_ino, fi->i_xattr_nid); + return false; + } + if (f2fs_has_extra_attr(inode)) { if (!f2fs_sb_has_extra_attr(sbi)) { f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx) is with extra_attr, but extra_attr feature is off",

2 days, 10 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062023-frequent-thousand-f5c6@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 13:33:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below: INFO: task syz-executor140:5308 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-syzkaller-00069-g81e4f8d68c66 #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:syz-executor140 state:D stack:24016 pid:5308 tgid:5308 ppid:5306 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00000006 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5378 [inline] __schedule+0x190e/0x4c90 kernel/sched/core.c:6765 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6842 [inline] schedule+0x14b/0x320 kernel/sched/core.c:6857 io_schedule+0x8d/0x110 kernel/sched/core.c:7690 folio_wait_bit_common+0x839/0xee0 mm/filemap.c:1317 __folio_lock mm/filemap.c:1664 [inline] folio_lock include/linux/pagemap.h:1163 [inline] __filemap_get_folio+0x147/0xb40 mm/filemap.c:1917 pagecache_get_page+0x2c/0x130 mm/folio-compat.c:87 find_get_page_flags include/linux/pagemap.h:842 [inline] f2fs_grab_cache_page+0x2b/0x320 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2776 __get_node_page+0x131/0x11b0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1463 read_xattr_block+0xfb/0x190 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:306 lookup_all_xattrs fs/f2fs/xattr.c:355 [inline] f2fs_getxattr+0x676/0xf70 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:533 __f2fs_get_acl+0x52/0x870 fs/f2fs/acl.c:179 f2fs_acl_create fs/f2fs/acl.c:375 [inline] f2fs_init_acl+0xd7/0x9b0 fs/f2fs/acl.c:418 f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0xa0f/0x1050 fs/f2fs/dir.c:539 f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x448/0x860 fs/f2fs/inline.c:666 f2fs_add_dentry+0xba/0x1e0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:765 f2fs_do_add_link+0x28c/0x3a0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:808 f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3616 [inline] f2fs_mknod+0x2e8/0x5b0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:766 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4191 unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1286 [inline] unix_bind+0x563/0xe30 net/unix/af_unix.c:1379 __sys_bind_socket net/socket.c:1817 [inline] __sys_bind+0x1e4/0x290 net/socket.c:1848 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1853 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1851 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1851 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Let's dump and check metadata of corrupted inode, it shows its xattr_nid is the same to its i_ino. dump.f2fs -i 3 chaseyu.img.raw i_xattr_nid [0x 3 : 3] So that, during mknod in the corrupted directory, it tries to get and lock inode page twice, result in deadlock. - f2fs_mknod - f2fs_add_inline_entry - f2fs_get_inode_page --- lock dir's inode page - f2fs_init_acl - f2fs_acl_create(dir,..) - __f2fs_get_acl - f2fs_getxattr - lookup_all_xattrs - __get_node_page --- try to lock dir's inode page In order to fix this, let's add sanity check on ino and xnid. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+cc448dcdc7ae0b4e4ffa(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/67e06150.050a0220.21942d.0005.GAE@… Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index fa5097da7c88..f5991e8751b9 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page) return false; } + if (ino_of_node(node_page) == fi->i_xattr_nid) { + f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: corrupted inode i_ino=%lx, xnid=%x, run fsck to fix.", + __func__, inode->i_ino, fi->i_xattr_nid); + return false; + } + if (f2fs_has_extra_attr(inode)) { if (!f2fs_sb_has_extra_attr(sbi)) { f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx) is with extra_attr, but extra_attr feature is off",

2 days, 10 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062013-uncertain-flyable-d3b8@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 13:33:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below: INFO: task syz-executor140:5308 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-syzkaller-00069-g81e4f8d68c66 #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:syz-executor140 state:D stack:24016 pid:5308 tgid:5308 ppid:5306 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00000006 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5378 [inline] __schedule+0x190e/0x4c90 kernel/sched/core.c:6765 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6842 [inline] schedule+0x14b/0x320 kernel/sched/core.c:6857 io_schedule+0x8d/0x110 kernel/sched/core.c:7690 folio_wait_bit_common+0x839/0xee0 mm/filemap.c:1317 __folio_lock mm/filemap.c:1664 [inline] folio_lock include/linux/pagemap.h:1163 [inline] __filemap_get_folio+0x147/0xb40 mm/filemap.c:1917 pagecache_get_page+0x2c/0x130 mm/folio-compat.c:87 find_get_page_flags include/linux/pagemap.h:842 [inline] f2fs_grab_cache_page+0x2b/0x320 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2776 __get_node_page+0x131/0x11b0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1463 read_xattr_block+0xfb/0x190 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:306 lookup_all_xattrs fs/f2fs/xattr.c:355 [inline] f2fs_getxattr+0x676/0xf70 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:533 __f2fs_get_acl+0x52/0x870 fs/f2fs/acl.c:179 f2fs_acl_create fs/f2fs/acl.c:375 [inline] f2fs_init_acl+0xd7/0x9b0 fs/f2fs/acl.c:418 f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0xa0f/0x1050 fs/f2fs/dir.c:539 f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x448/0x860 fs/f2fs/inline.c:666 f2fs_add_dentry+0xba/0x1e0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:765 f2fs_do_add_link+0x28c/0x3a0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:808 f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3616 [inline] f2fs_mknod+0x2e8/0x5b0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:766 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4191 unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1286 [inline] unix_bind+0x563/0xe30 net/unix/af_unix.c:1379 __sys_bind_socket net/socket.c:1817 [inline] __sys_bind+0x1e4/0x290 net/socket.c:1848 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1853 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1851 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1851 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Let's dump and check metadata of corrupted inode, it shows its xattr_nid is the same to its i_ino. dump.f2fs -i 3 chaseyu.img.raw i_xattr_nid [0x 3 : 3] So that, during mknod in the corrupted directory, it tries to get and lock inode page twice, result in deadlock. - f2fs_mknod - f2fs_add_inline_entry - f2fs_get_inode_page --- lock dir's inode page - f2fs_init_acl - f2fs_acl_create(dir,..) - __f2fs_get_acl - f2fs_getxattr - lookup_all_xattrs - __get_node_page --- try to lock dir's inode page In order to fix this, let's add sanity check on ino and xnid. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+cc448dcdc7ae0b4e4ffa(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/67e06150.050a0220.21942d.0005.GAE@… Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index fa5097da7c88..f5991e8751b9 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page) return false; } + if (ino_of_node(node_page) == fi->i_xattr_nid) { + f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: corrupted inode i_ino=%lx, xnid=%x, run fsck to fix.", + __func__, inode->i_ino, fi->i_xattr_nid); + return false; + } + if (f2fs_has_extra_attr(inode)) { if (!f2fs_sb_has_extra_attr(sbi)) { f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx) is with extra_attr, but extra_attr feature is off",

2 days, 10 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062012-stride-reliance-60ad@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 061cf3a84bde038708eb0f1d065b31b7c2456533 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 13:33:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on ino and xnid syzbot reported a f2fs bug as below: INFO: task syz-executor140:5308 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7-syzkaller-00069-g81e4f8d68c66 #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:syz-executor140 state:D stack:24016 pid:5308 tgid:5308 ppid:5306 task_flags:0x400140 flags:0x00000006 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5378 [inline] __schedule+0x190e/0x4c90 kernel/sched/core.c:6765 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6842 [inline] schedule+0x14b/0x320 kernel/sched/core.c:6857 io_schedule+0x8d/0x110 kernel/sched/core.c:7690 folio_wait_bit_common+0x839/0xee0 mm/filemap.c:1317 __folio_lock mm/filemap.c:1664 [inline] folio_lock include/linux/pagemap.h:1163 [inline] __filemap_get_folio+0x147/0xb40 mm/filemap.c:1917 pagecache_get_page+0x2c/0x130 mm/folio-compat.c:87 find_get_page_flags include/linux/pagemap.h:842 [inline] f2fs_grab_cache_page+0x2b/0x320 fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2776 __get_node_page+0x131/0x11b0 fs/f2fs/node.c:1463 read_xattr_block+0xfb/0x190 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:306 lookup_all_xattrs fs/f2fs/xattr.c:355 [inline] f2fs_getxattr+0x676/0xf70 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:533 __f2fs_get_acl+0x52/0x870 fs/f2fs/acl.c:179 f2fs_acl_create fs/f2fs/acl.c:375 [inline] f2fs_init_acl+0xd7/0x9b0 fs/f2fs/acl.c:418 f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0xa0f/0x1050 fs/f2fs/dir.c:539 f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x448/0x860 fs/f2fs/inline.c:666 f2fs_add_dentry+0xba/0x1e0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:765 f2fs_do_add_link+0x28c/0x3a0 fs/f2fs/dir.c:808 f2fs_add_link fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3616 [inline] f2fs_mknod+0x2e8/0x5b0 fs/f2fs/namei.c:766 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4191 unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1286 [inline] unix_bind+0x563/0xe30 net/unix/af_unix.c:1379 __sys_bind_socket net/socket.c:1817 [inline] __sys_bind+0x1e4/0x290 net/socket.c:1848 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1853 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1851 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x7a/0x90 net/socket.c:1851 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Let's dump and check metadata of corrupted inode, it shows its xattr_nid is the same to its i_ino. dump.f2fs -i 3 chaseyu.img.raw i_xattr_nid [0x 3 : 3] So that, during mknod in the corrupted directory, it tries to get and lock inode page twice, result in deadlock. - f2fs_mknod - f2fs_add_inline_entry - f2fs_get_inode_page --- lock dir's inode page - f2fs_init_acl - f2fs_acl_create(dir,..) - __f2fs_get_acl - f2fs_getxattr - lookup_all_xattrs - __get_node_page --- try to lock dir's inode page In order to fix this, let's add sanity check on ino and xnid. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+cc448dcdc7ae0b4e4ffa(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/67e06150.050a0220.21942d.0005.GAE@… Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index fa5097da7c88..f5991e8751b9 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -288,6 +288,12 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *node_page) return false; } + if (ino_of_node(node_page) == fi->i_xattr_nid) { + f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: corrupted inode i_ino=%lx, xnid=%x, run fsck to fix.", + __func__, inode->i_ino, fi->i_xattr_nid); + return false; + } + if (f2fs_has_extra_attr(inode)) { if (!f2fs_sb_has_extra_attr(sbi)) { f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx) is with extra_attr, but extra_attr feature is off",

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: VMX: Flush shadow VMCS on emergency reboot" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a0ee1d5faff135e28810f29e0f06328c66f89852 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025062034-chastise-wrecking-9a12@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a0ee1d5faff135e28810f29e0f06328c66f89852 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Gao <chao.gao(a)intel.com> Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2025 22:08:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] KVM: VMX: Flush shadow VMCS on emergency reboot Ensure the shadow VMCS cache is evicted during an emergency reboot to prevent potential memory corruption if the cache is evicted after reboot. This issue was identified through code inspection, as __loaded_vmcs_clear() flushes both the normal VMCS and the shadow VMCS. Avoid checking the "launched" state during an emergency reboot, unlike the behavior in __loaded_vmcs_clear(). This is important because reboot NMIs can interfere with operations like copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(), where shadow VMCSes are loaded directly using VMPTRLD. In such cases, if NMIs occur right after the VMCS load, the shadow VMCSes will be active but the "launched" state may not be set. Fixes: 16f5b9034b69 ("KVM: nVMX: Copy processor-specific shadow-vmcs to VMCS12") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang(a)intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250324140849.2099723-1-chao.gao@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index ef2d7208dd20..848c4963bdb8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -770,8 +770,11 @@ void vmx_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu(void) return; list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu), - loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) + loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link) { vmcs_clear(v->vmcs); + if (v->shadow_vmcs) + vmcs_clear(v->shadow_vmcs); + } kvm_cpu_vmxoff(); }

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