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[PATCH] Bluetooth: HCI: Fix hci0 not release in usb disconnect process

by zhangchen200426＠163.com

From: zhangchen <zhangchen01(a)kylinos.cn> If hci_resume_dev before hci_unregister_dev, the hci command will timeout and the reference count of hdev will not reset to zero. Then the node "hci0" will not release. The output in question is as follows: [ 3391.553518][ 7] [T247244] Bluetooth: hci0: command 0x0c01 tx timeout [ 3391.553588][ 7] [T264732] Bluetooth: hci0: Opcode 0x0c01 failed: -110 [ 3393.569514][ 3] [T247244] Bluetooth: hci0: command 0x0c01 tx timeout [ 3393.569515][ 3] [T264732] Bluetooth: hci0: Opcode 0x0c1a failed: -110 [ 3393.709645][ 6] [T104579] usb 10-1: new full-speed USB device number 95 using xhci-hcd [ 3393.862194][ 6] [T104579] usb 10-1: New USB device found, idVendor=13d3, idProduct=3570, bcdDevice= 0.00 [ 3393.862205][ 6] [T104579] usb 10-1: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=3 [ 3393.862208][ 6] [T104579] usb 10-1: Product: Bluetooth Radio [ 3393.862210][ 6] [T104579] usb 10-1: Manufacturer: Realtek [ 3393.862212][ 6] [T104579] usb 10-1: SerialNumber: 00e04c000001 [ 3393.867589][ 6] [T247244] Bluetooth: hci1: RTL: examining hci_ver=0b hci_rev=000b lmp_ver=0b lmp_subver=8852 [ 3393.868573][ 6] [T247244] Bluetooth: hci1: RTL: rom_version status=0 version=1 [ 3393.868583][ 6] [T247244] Bluetooth: hci1: RTL: loading rtl_bt/rtl8852bu_fw.bin [ 3393.868672][ 6] [T247244] Bluetooth: hci1: RTL: loading rtl_bt/rtl8852bu_config.bin [ 3393.869699][ 6] [T247244] Bluetooth: hci1: RTL: cfg_sz 6, total sz 65603 The call sequence in question is as follows: usb disconnect: btusb_disconnect hci_unregister_dev hci_dev_set_flag hci_cmd_sync_clear hci_unregister_suspend_notifier hci_dev_do_close device_del device resume: hci_suspend_notifier hci_resume_dev hci_resume_sync hci_set_event_mask_sync __hci_cmd_sync_status __hci_cmd_sync_status_sk __hci_cmd_sync_sk wait_event_interruptible_timeout The output after adding debug information in question is as follows: [ 6378.366215][ 6] [T434033] hci_resume_dev hci name hci0 [ 6378.366218][ 6] [T434033] hci_resume_sync set event mask sync [ 6378.366219][ 6] [T434033] hci_set_event_mask_sync [ 6378.366220][ 6] [T434033] __hci_cmd_sync_sk hci name hci0 Opcode 0x0c01 [ 6378.366227][ 6] [T434033] __hci_cmd_sync_sk wait event interruptible timeout [ 6378.367632][ 6] [T420012] btusb_disconnect intf 0000000024117fc1 [ 6378.367637][ 6] [T420012] btusb_disconnect hci_unregister_dev [ 6378.367638][ 6] [T420012] hci_unregister_dev 0000000064bfd783 name hci0 bus 1 [ 6378.367641][ 6] [T420012] hci_unregister_dev set flag [ 6378.367804][ 6] [T420012] hci_unregister_dev cmd sync clear [ 6378.367807][ 6] [T420012] hci_unregister_dev unregister suspend notifier [ 6380.367544][ 6] [T434033] __hci_cmd_sync_sk cmd timeout [ 6380.367542][ 6] [T197498] Bluetooth: hci0: command 0x0c01 tx timeout [ 6380.367550][ 6] [T434033] __hci_cmd_sync_sk hci0 end: err -110 [ 6380.367552][ 6] [T434033] Bluetooth: hci0: Opcode 0x0c01 failed: -110 [ 6380.367555][ 6] [T434033] hci_resume_sync clear event filter [ 6380.367556][ 6] [T434033] hci_resume_sync resume scan sync [ 6380.367558][ 6] [T434033] __hci_cmd_sync_sk hci name hci0 Opcode 0x0c1a [ 6380.367561][ 6] [T434033] __hci_cmd_sync_sk wait event interruptible timeout [ 6382.383538][ 6] [T197498] Bluetooth: hci0: command 0x0c01 tx timeout [ 6382.383593][ 6] [T434033] __hci_cmd_sync_sk hci0 end: err -110 [ 6382.383597][ 6] [T434033] Bluetooth: hci0: Opcode 0x0c1a failed: -110 The output after adding debug information in normal is as follows: [50.039156][ 6] [ T8360] btusb_disconnect intf 00000000fca35842 [50.039160][ 6] [ T8360] btusb_disconnect hci_unregister_dev [50.039162][ 6] [ T8360] hci_unregister_dev 000000002422b946 name hci0 bus 1 [50.039164][ 6] [ T8360] hci_unregister_dev set flag [50.039224][ 6] [ T8360] hci_unregister_dev cmd sync clear [50.039227][ 5] [ T8360] hci_unregister_dev unregister suspend notifier [50.043542][ 5] [ T8284] hci_resume_dev hci name hci0 This patch add hci_cancel_cmd_sync in hci_unregister_dev to wake up hdev->req_wait_q, and stop __hci_cmd_sync_sk by judging the HCI_UNREGISTER flag. Then stopping hci_resume_dev process based on the returned error code. Fixes: 182ee45da083 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Rework hci_suspend_notifier") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: zhangchen <zhangchen01(a)kylinos.cn> --- net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 6 ++++++ net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index 3418d7b964a1..c977bcba3e76 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ static void hci_rx_work(struct work_struct *work); static void hci_cmd_work(struct work_struct *work); static void hci_tx_work(struct work_struct *work); +static void hci_cancel_cmd_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err); /* HCI device list */ LIST_HEAD(hci_dev_list); @@ -2695,6 +2696,8 @@ void hci_unregister_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev) hci_dev_set_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER); mutex_unlock(&hdev->unregister_lock); + hci_cancel_cmd_sync(hdev, EINTR); + write_lock(&hci_dev_list_lock); list_del(&hdev->list); write_unlock(&hci_dev_list_lock); @@ -2877,6 +2880,9 @@ int hci_resume_dev(struct hci_dev *hdev) ret = hci_resume_sync(hdev); hci_req_sync_unlock(hdev); + if (ret && hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER)) + return 0; + mgmt_resuming(hdev, hdev->wake_reason, &hdev->wake_addr, hdev->wake_addr_type); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index 6e76798ec786..f48d34fbfff2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -174,10 +174,11 @@ struct sk_buff *__hci_cmd_sync_sk(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 opcode, u32 plen, return ERR_PTR(err); err = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(hdev->req_wait_q, - hdev->req_status != HCI_REQ_PEND, + hdev->req_status != HCI_REQ_PEND || + hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER), timeout); - if (err == -ERESTARTSYS) + if (err == -ERESTARTSYS || hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER)) return ERR_PTR(-EINTR); switch (hdev->req_status) { @@ -6296,6 +6297,7 @@ static int hci_resume_scan_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev) */ int hci_resume_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev) { + int err; /* If not marked as suspended there nothing to do */ if (!hdev->suspended) return 0; @@ -6303,10 +6305,14 @@ int hci_resume_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev) hdev->suspended = false; /* Restore event mask */ - hci_set_event_mask_sync(hdev); + err = hci_set_event_mask_sync(hdev); + if (err && hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER)) + return err; /* Clear any event filters and restore scan state */ - hci_clear_event_filter_sync(hdev); + err = hci_clear_event_filter_sync(hdev); + if (err && hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER)) + return err; /* Resume scanning */ hci_resume_scan_sync(hdev); @@ -6315,10 +6321,14 @@ int hci_resume_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev) hci_resume_monitor_sync(hdev); /* Resume other advertisements */ - hci_resume_advertising_sync(hdev); + err = hci_resume_advertising_sync(hdev); + if (err && hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER)) + return err; /* Resume discovery */ - hci_resume_discovery_sync(hdev); + err = hci_resume_discovery_sync(hdev); + if (err && hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNREGISTER)) + return err; return 0; } -- 2.25.1

23 hours, 3 minutes

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[PATCH 6.1.y v1 0/2] mptcp: Fix conflicts between MPTCP and sockmap

by Jiayuan Chen

Overall, we encountered a warning [1] that can be triggered by running the selftest I provided. sockmap works by replacing sk_data_ready, recvmsg, sendmsg operations and implementing fast socket-level forwarding logic: 1. Users can obtain file descriptors through userspace socket()/accept() interfaces, then call BPF syscall to perform these replacements. 2. Users can also use the bpf_sock_hash_update helper (in sockops programs) to replace handlers when TCP connections enter ESTABLISHED state (BPF_SOCK_OPS_PASSIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB/BPF_SOCK_OPS_ACTIVE_ESTABLISHED_CB) However, when combined with MPTCP, an issue arises: MPTCP creates subflow sk's and performs TCP handshakes, so the BPF program obtains subflow sk's and may incorrectly replace their sk_prot. We need to reject such operations. In patch 1, we set psock_update_sk_prot to NULL in the subflow's custom sk_prot. Additionally, if the server's listening socket has MPTCP enabled and the client's TCP also uses MPTCP, we should allow the combination of subflow and sockmap. This is because the latest Golang programs have enabled MPTCP for listening sockets by default [2]. For programs already using sockmap, upgrading Golang should not cause sockmap functionality to fail. Patch 2 prevents the panic from occurring. Despite these patches fixing stream corruption, users of sockmap must set GODEBUG=multipathtcp=0 to disable MPTCP until sockmap fully supports it. [1] truncated warning: ------------[ cut here ]------------ BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000004bb PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 400 Comm: test_progs Not tainted 6.1.0+ #16 RIP: 0010:mptcp_stream_accept (./include/linux/list.h:88 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3719) RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ef3cf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8880089dcc58 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000002c000000b0 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc90000ef3d38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880089dc600 R13: ffff88800b859e00 R14: ffff88800638c680 R15: 0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000004bb CR3: 000000000b8e8006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? apparmor_socket_accept (security/apparmor/lsm.c:966) do_accept (net/socket.c:1856) __sys_accept4 (net/socket.c:1897 net/socket.c:1927) __x64_sys_accept (net/socket.c:1941) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) [2]: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/607715 Jiayuan Chen (2): mptcp: disallow MPTCP subflows from sockmap net,mptcp: fix proto fallback detection with BPF net/mptcp/protocol.c | 5 +++-- net/mptcp/subflow.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

23 hours, 22 minutes

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-6.12] Revert "drm/amd/display: Move setup_stream_attribute"

by Sasha Levin

From: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> [ Upstream commit 3126c9ccb4373d8758733c6699ba5ab93dbe5c9d ] This reverts commit 2681bf4ae8d24df950138b8c9ea9c271cd62e414. This results in a blank screen on the HDMI port on some systems. Revert for now so as not to regress 6.18, can be addressed in 6.19 once the issue is root caused. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/4652 Cc: Sunpeng.Li(a)amd.com Cc: ivan.lipski(a)amd.com Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit d0e9de7a81503cdde37fb2d37f1d102f9e0f38fb) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus: Now I have a complete understanding of the issue. Let me summarize my analysis: ## Comprehensive Analysis ### 1. Commit Message Analysis This is a **revert** of commit `2681bf4ae8d24df950138b8c9ea9c271cd62e414` that moved `setup_stream_attribute()` from `link_set_dpms_on()` to individual `enable_stream()` functions. The commit clearly states: - The change "results in a blank screen on the HDMI port on some systems" - Includes a bug report link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/4652 - Explicitly intended to "not regress 6.18" - Cherry-picked from upstream with maintainer sign-off ### 2. Critical Finding: Buggy Commit Already Backported **The original problematic commit (`7965cb360655`) was already backported to stable trees** (as shown by `[ Upstream commit ... ]` and Sasha Levin's signature). This means **stable users are currently affected by this regression** and need the fix. ### 3. Technical Root Cause The original commit attempted to fix a symclk RCO clock gating issue by moving `setup_stream_attribute()` later in the sequence, after clock ungating in `enable_stream()`. However: - **For DP (DisplayPort)**: This ordering works because DP needs symclk ungated first - **For HDMI/TMDS**: The stream attributes must be set earlier, specifically before VPG power-on and infoframe construction in `link_set_dpms_on()` The code at line 3055 in `dcn20_hwseq.c` shows where the call was moved: ```c link_hwss->setup_stream_attribute(pipe_ctx); ``` This call happens too late for HDMI paths, causing blank screens because the HDMI signal initialization sequence depends on attributes being programmed before the display pipe is fully enabled. ### 4. Code Change Assessment The revert is small and surgical: - **5 files changed** - Removes `link_hwss->setup_stream_attribute()` from 3 hwseq files (dce110, dcn20, dcn401) - Restores the call in `link_dpms.c` at the correct position (after `set_out_mux()`, before VPG power-on) - Removes unused LVDS stub from virtual_stream_encoder.c ### 5. Stable Kernel Rules Compliance | Criteria | Assessment | |----------|------------| | Fixes a real bug affecting users | ✅ Blank HDMI screen - severe user- visible regression | | Obviously correct | ✅ Simple revert to known-working code | | Small and contained | ✅ ~20 lines removed, ~5 lines added | | No new features | ✅ Pure regression fix | | Bug exists in stable | ✅ Original buggy commit was backported | ### 6. Risk Assessment - **Regression risk: LOW** - This reverts to previously known-working behavior that was stable for years - **Trade-off**: The original symclk RCO issue will remain unfixed, but: - RCO issue affects a narrow DP corner case - Blank HDMI affects common consumer hardware - A blank screen is a far worse failure than the clock gating issue - **Testing**: Upstream maintainer sign-off (Alex Deucher) and cherry- picked from mainline ### 7. User Impact - **Severity: CRITICAL** - Complete display failure on HDMI - **Scope: HIGH** - HDMI is ubiquitous; affects multiple hardware generations (dce110, dcn20, dcn401) - **Real users affected**: Bug report confirms actual user impact ### Conclusion This commit is an **ideal stable backport candidate**: 1. The regression-causing commit was already backported to stable trees, so stable users are currently broken 2. It fixes a critical user-visible bug (blank HDMI displays) 3. The fix is a simple, safe revert to known-good code 4. It has proper upstream maintainer approval 5. The risk of the revert causing problems is minimal (returning to proven behavior) The revert is **mandatory** for any stable tree that includes commit `7965cb360655` to restore working HDMI functionality. **YES** drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dce110/dce110_hwseq.c | 1 - drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn20/dcn20_hwseq.c | 2 -- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn401/dcn401_hwseq.c | 2 -- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/link/link_dpms.c | 3 +++ .../drm/amd/display/dc/virtual/virtual_stream_encoder.c | 7 ------- 5 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dce110/dce110_hwseq.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dce110/dce110_hwseq.c index 537f53811460..39de51cbbde9 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dce110/dce110_hwseq.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dce110/dce110_hwseq.c @@ -671,7 +671,6 @@ void dce110_enable_stream(struct pipe_ctx *pipe_ctx) uint32_t early_control = 0; struct timing_generator *tg = pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg; - link_hwss->setup_stream_attribute(pipe_ctx); link_hwss->setup_stream_encoder(pipe_ctx); dc->hwss.update_info_frame(pipe_ctx); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn20/dcn20_hwseq.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn20/dcn20_hwseq.c index f7b72b24b750..921023500bec 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn20/dcn20_hwseq.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn20/dcn20_hwseq.c @@ -3052,8 +3052,6 @@ void dcn20_enable_stream(struct pipe_ctx *pipe_ctx) link_enc->transmitter - TRANSMITTER_UNIPHY_A); } - link_hwss->setup_stream_attribute(pipe_ctx); - if (dc->res_pool->dccg->funcs->set_pixel_rate_div) dc->res_pool->dccg->funcs->set_pixel_rate_div( dc->res_pool->dccg, diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn401/dcn401_hwseq.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn401/dcn401_hwseq.c index 0fe763704945..b95b98cc2553 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn401/dcn401_hwseq.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/hwss/dcn401/dcn401_hwseq.c @@ -968,8 +968,6 @@ void dcn401_enable_stream(struct pipe_ctx *pipe_ctx) } } - link_hwss->setup_stream_attribute(pipe_ctx); - if (dc->res_pool->dccg->funcs->set_pixel_rate_div) { dc->res_pool->dccg->funcs->set_pixel_rate_div( dc->res_pool->dccg, diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/link/link_dpms.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/link/link_dpms.c index cb80b4599936..8c8682f743d6 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/link/link_dpms.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/link/link_dpms.c @@ -2458,6 +2458,7 @@ void link_set_dpms_on( struct link_encoder *link_enc = pipe_ctx->link_res.dio_link_enc; enum otg_out_mux_dest otg_out_dest = OUT_MUX_DIO; struct vpg *vpg = pipe_ctx->stream_res.stream_enc->vpg; + const struct link_hwss *link_hwss = get_link_hwss(link, &pipe_ctx->link_res); bool apply_edp_fast_boot_optimization = pipe_ctx->stream->apply_edp_fast_boot_optimization; @@ -2501,6 +2502,8 @@ void link_set_dpms_on( pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg->funcs->set_out_mux(pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg, otg_out_dest); } + link_hwss->setup_stream_attribute(pipe_ctx); + pipe_ctx->stream->apply_edp_fast_boot_optimization = false; // Enable VPG before building infoframe diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/virtual/virtual_stream_encoder.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/virtual/virtual_stream_encoder.c index 6ffc74fc9dcd..ad088d70e189 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/virtual/virtual_stream_encoder.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/virtual/virtual_stream_encoder.c @@ -44,11 +44,6 @@ static void virtual_stream_encoder_dvi_set_stream_attribute( struct dc_crtc_timing *crtc_timing, bool is_dual_link) {} -static void virtual_stream_encoder_lvds_set_stream_attribute( - struct stream_encoder *enc, - struct dc_crtc_timing *crtc_timing) -{} - static void virtual_stream_encoder_set_throttled_vcp_size( struct stream_encoder *enc, struct fixed31_32 avg_time_slots_per_mtp) @@ -120,8 +115,6 @@ static const struct stream_encoder_funcs virtual_str_enc_funcs = { virtual_stream_encoder_hdmi_set_stream_attribute, .dvi_set_stream_attribute = virtual_stream_encoder_dvi_set_stream_attribute, - .lvds_set_stream_attribute = - virtual_stream_encoder_lvds_set_stream_attribute, .set_throttled_vcp_size = virtual_stream_encoder_set_throttled_vcp_size, .update_hdmi_info_packets = -- 2.51.0

23 hours, 24 minutes

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[PATCH v2] tpm2-sessions: address out-of-range indexing

by Jarkko Sakkinen

'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID. Address the issue by: 1. Rename 'name_size' as 'tpm2_name_size' so that it is bit easier to recognize and make it a fallible function. 2. Check for only known algorithms in 'tpm2_name_size'. Return -EINVAL for unrecognized algorithms. 3. In order to correctly propagate possible errors make also 'tpm2_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible and address their possible errors at the call sites. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- v2: There was spurious extra field added to tpm2_hash by mistake. drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 23 ++++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 108 ++++++++++++++-------- include/linux/tpm.h | 6 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 38 ++++++-- 4 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5b6ccf901623..e63254135a74 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -202,8 +207,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -261,7 +272,11 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) + goto out; + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6d03c224e6b2..82b9d9096fd1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -141,19 +141,28 @@ struct tpm2_auth { }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* - * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) + * Calculate size of the TPMT_HA payload of TPM2B_NAME. */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int tpm2_name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SM3_256: + return SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + } + + return -EINVAL; } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +170,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int name_size_alg; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -172,9 +182,15 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) return -EINVAL; offset += val; /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + name_size_alg = tpm2_name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (name_size_alg < 0) + return name_size_alg; + + if (val != name_size_alg) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -222,46 +238,59 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; + int name_size; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + return -ENOMEM; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + return -EIO; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); + } } else { if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + return -EINVAL; } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + name_size = tpm2_name_size(name); + if (name_size < 0) + return name_size; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size); + } #endif + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -537,7 +566,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -549,9 +578,10 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_ctx sctx; struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx; + int name_size; if (!auth) - return; + return -EINVAL; /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -559,10 +589,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) cc = be32_to_cpu(head->ordinal); i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); - if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; - } + if (i < 0) + return -EINVAL; + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -576,9 +605,8 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + return -EINVAL; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -609,12 +637,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + return -EINVAL; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + return -EINVAL; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -646,8 +674,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + name_size = tpm2_name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (name_size < 0) + return name_size; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], name_size); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -668,6 +699,7 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1); hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac); + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 0e9e043f728c..1a59f0190eb3 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -528,8 +528,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e165b117bbca..33544b6bc105 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -283,7 +283,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + goto out_put; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -331,7 +337,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + goto out; + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -438,7 +449,12 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -450,7 +466,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -497,7 +516,11 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -522,7 +545,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); -- 2.52.0

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[PATCH] tpm2-sessions: address out-of-range indexing

by Jarkko Sakkinen

'name_size' does not have any range checks, and it just directly indexes with TPM_ALG_ID. Address the issue by: 1. Rename 'name_size' as 'tpm2_name_size' so that it is bit easier to recognize and make it a fallible function. 2. Check for only known algorithms in 'tpm2_name_size'. Return -EINVAL for unrecognized algorithms. 3. In order to correctly propagate possible errors make also 'tpm2_buf_append_name' and 'tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session' fallible and address their possible errors at the call sites. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Fixes: 1085b8276bb4 ("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 23 ++++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 108 ++++++++++++++-------- include/linux/tpm.h | 7 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 38 ++++++-- 4 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5b6ccf901623..e63254135a74 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -187,7 +187,12 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, } if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, &buf, pcr_idx); @@ -202,8 +207,14 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, chip->allocated_banks[i].digest_size); } - if (!disable_pcr_integrity) - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting extend a PCR value"); if (!disable_pcr_integrity) rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); @@ -261,7 +272,11 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, num_bytes); - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + + err = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (err) + goto out; + err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out, buffer), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 6d03c224e6b2..82b9d9096fd1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -141,19 +141,28 @@ struct tpm2_auth { }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + /* - * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) + * Calculate size of the TPMT_HA payload of TPM2B_NAME. */ -static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) +static int tpm2_name_size(const u8 *name) { - static u8 size_map[] = { - [TPM_ALG_SHA1] = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA256] = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA384] = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, - [TPM_ALG_SHA512] = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, - }; - u16 alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); - return size_map[alg] + 2; + u16 hash_alg = get_unaligned_be16(name); + + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM_ALG_SHA1: + return SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA256: + return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA384: + return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SHA512: + return SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + case TPM_ALG_SM3_256: + return SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; + } + + return -EINVAL; } static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) @@ -161,6 +170,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + int name_size_alg; u32 val; /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ @@ -172,9 +182,15 @@ static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) return -EINVAL; offset += val; /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + name_size_alg = tpm2_name_size(&buf->data[offset]); + if (name_size_alg < 0) + return name_size_alg; + + if (val != name_size_alg) return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); /* forget the rest */ return 0; @@ -222,46 +238,59 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; + int name_size; int slot; + int ret; #endif if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle); - return; + return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + return -ENOMEM; } auth = chip->auth; - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); + if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); + return -EIO; + } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session += 4; if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (!name) { + ret = tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + if (ret) + return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); + } } else { if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + return -EINVAL; } auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); + if (name) { + name_size = tpm2_name_size(name); + if (name_size < 0) + return name_size; + + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size); + } #endif + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -537,7 +566,7 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip, * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. */ -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) { u32 cc, handles, val; struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; @@ -549,9 +578,10 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; struct sha256_ctx sctx; struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx; + int name_size; if (!auth) - return; + return -EINVAL; /* save the command code in BE format */ auth->ordinal = head->ordinal; @@ -559,10 +589,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) cc = be32_to_cpu(head->ordinal); i = tpm2_find_cc(chip, cc); - if (i < 0) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "Command 0x%x not found in TPM\n", cc); - return; - } + if (i < 0) + return -EINVAL; + attrs = chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); @@ -576,9 +605,8 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); if (auth->name_h[i] != handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: handle %d wrong for name\n", - i); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); + return -EINVAL; } } /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ @@ -609,12 +637,12 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) offset_s += len; } if (offset_s != offset_p) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM session length is incorrect\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "session length is incorrect\n"); + return -EINVAL; } if (!hmac) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM could not find HMAC session\n"); - return; + dev_err(&chip->dev, "could not find HMAC session\n"); + return -EINVAL; } /* encrypt before HMAC */ @@ -646,8 +674,11 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], - name_size(auth->name[i])); + name_size = tpm2_name_size(auth->name[i]); + if (name_size < 0) + return name_size; + + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], name_size); } else { __be32 h = cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); @@ -668,6 +699,7 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, auth->tpm_nonce, sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce)); hmac_sha256_update(&hctx, &auth->attrs, 1); hmac_sha256_final(&hctx, hmac); + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 0e9e043f728c..f168c547abae 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ enum tpm2_session_attributes { struct tpm2_hash { unsigned int crypto_id; unsigned int tpm_id; + unsigned int hash_size; }; int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal); @@ -528,8 +529,8 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip) #endif } -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); +int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -562,7 +563,7 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip, #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); -void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); +int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index e165b117bbca..33544b6bc105 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -283,7 +283,13 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + goto out_put; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -331,7 +337,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + goto out; + } + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (rc) @@ -438,7 +449,12 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); @@ -450,7 +466,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); if (!rc) @@ -497,7 +516,11 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, blob_handle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + if (rc) { + tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); + return rc; + } if (!options->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, @@ -522,7 +545,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, NULL, 0); } - tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); -- 2.52.0

1 day, 3 hours

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[PATCH] clk: keystone: syscon-clk: fix regmap leak on probe failure

by Johan Hovold

The mmio regmap allocated during probe is never freed. Switch to using the device managed allocator so that the regmap is released on probe failures (e.g. probe deferral) and on driver unbind. Fixes: a250cd4c1901 ("clk: keystone: syscon-clk: Do not use syscon helper to build regmap") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.15 Cc: Andrew Davis <afd(a)ti.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c b/drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c index c509929da854..ecf180a7949c 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c +++ b/drivers/clk/keystone/syscon-clk.c @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int ti_syscon_gate_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (IS_ERR(base)) return PTR_ERR(base); - regmap = regmap_init_mmio(dev, base, &ti_syscon_regmap_cfg); + regmap = devm_regmap_init_mmio(dev, base, &ti_syscon_regmap_cfg); if (IS_ERR(regmap)) return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(regmap), "failed to get regmap\n"); -- 2.51.2

1 day, 5 hours

2
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[PATCH] clk: samsung: exynos-clkout: Assign .num before accessing .hws

by Nathan Chancellor

Commit f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") annotated the hws member of 'struct clk_hw_onecell_data' with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS) about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[] is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero. This occurs in exynos_clkout_probe() due to .num being assigned after .hws[] has been accessed: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c:178:18 index 0 is out of range for type 'clk_hw *[*]' Move the .num initialization to before the first access of .hws[], clearing up the warning. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") Reported-by: Jochen Sprickerhof <jochen(a)sprickerhof.de> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/aSIYDN5eyKFKoXKL@eldamar.lan/ Tested-by: Jochen Sprickerhof <jochen(a)sprickerhof.de> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c b/drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c index 5f1a4f5e2e59..5b21025338bd 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c +++ b/drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos-clkout.c @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ static int exynos_clkout_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) clkout->mux.shift = EXYNOS_CLKOUT_MUX_SHIFT; clkout->mux.lock = &clkout->slock; + clkout->data.num = EXYNOS_CLKOUT_NR_CLKS; clkout->data.hws[0] = clk_hw_register_composite(NULL, "clkout", parent_names, parent_count, &clkout->mux.hw, &clk_mux_ops, NULL, NULL, &clkout->gate.hw, @@ -185,7 +186,6 @@ static int exynos_clkout_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto err_unmap; } - clkout->data.num = EXYNOS_CLKOUT_NR_CLKS; ret = of_clk_add_hw_provider(clkout->np, of_clk_hw_onecell_get, &clkout->data); if (ret) goto err_clk_unreg; --- base-commit: b6430552c8cd95e90bb842ce2f421e7a5381859f change-id: 20251124-exynos-clkout-fix-ubsan-bounds-error-93071375ec78 Best regards, -- Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org>

1 day, 5 hours

5
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[PATCH] bcache: call bio_endio() to replace directly calling bio->bi_end_io()

by colyli＠fnnas.com

From: Coly Li <colyli(a)fnnas.com> When a bcache device is not attached to a cache device, current code calls the request's bi_end_io() callback directly. The correct method is to call bio_endio(bio) instead of bio->bi_end_io(bio). This patch fixes the incorrect calling. Fixes: bc082a55d25c ("bcache: fix inaccurate io state for detached bcache devices") Fixes: 40f567bbb3b0 ("md: bcache: check the return value of kzalloc() in detached_dev_do_request()") Reported-by: Shida Zhang <zhangshida(a)kylinos.cn> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20251121081748.1443507-1-zhangshida@kyl… Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)infradead.org> Cc: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org #4.17+ Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli(a)fnnas.com> --- drivers/md/bcache/request.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/request.c b/drivers/md/bcache/request.c index af345dc6fde1..7b815064db54 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/request.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/request.c @@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ static void detached_dev_end_io(struct bio *bio) } kfree(ddip); - bio->bi_end_io(bio); + bio_endio(bio); } static void detached_dev_do_request(struct bcache_device *d, struct bio *bio, @@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ static void detached_dev_do_request(struct bcache_device *d, struct bio *bio, ddip = kzalloc(sizeof(struct detached_dev_io_private), GFP_NOIO); if (!ddip) { bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE; - bio->bi_end_io(bio); + bio_endio(bio); return; } @@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ static void detached_dev_do_request(struct bcache_device *d, struct bio *bio, if ((bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_DISCARD) && !bdev_max_discard_sectors(dc->bdev)) - bio->bi_end_io(bio); + bio_endio(bio); else submit_bio_noacct(bio); } -- 2.47.3

1 day, 9 hours

1
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[PATCH] counter: interrupt-cnt: Drop IRQF_NO_THREAD flag

by A. Sverdlin

From: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> An IRQ handler can either be IRQF_NO_THREAD or acquire spinlock_t, as CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING warns: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.18.0-rc1+git... #1 ----------------------------- some-user-space-process/1251 is trying to lock: (&counter->events_list_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: counter_push_event [counter] other info that might help us debug this: context-{2:2} no locks held by some-user-space-process/.... stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1251 Comm: some-user-space-process 6.18.0-rc1+git... #1 PREEMPT Call trace: show_stack (C) dump_stack_lvl dump_stack __lock_acquire lock_acquire _raw_spin_lock_irqsave counter_push_event [counter] interrupt_cnt_isr [interrupt_cnt] __handle_irq_event_percpu handle_irq_event handle_simple_irq handle_irq_desc generic_handle_domain_irq gpio_irq_handler handle_irq_desc generic_handle_domain_irq gic_handle_irq call_on_irq_stack do_interrupt_handler el0_interrupt __el0_irq_handler_common el0t_64_irq_handler el0t_64_irq ... and Sebastian correctly points out. Remove IRQF_NO_THREAD as an alternative to switching to raw_spinlock_t, because the latter would limit all potential nested locks to raw_spinlock_t only. Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251117151314.xwLAZrWY@linutronix.de/ Fixes: a55ebd47f21f ("counter: add IRQ or GPIO based counter") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin(a)siemens.com> --- drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c b/drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c index 6c0c1d2d7027d..e6100b5fb082e 100644 --- a/drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c +++ b/drivers/counter/interrupt-cnt.c @@ -229,8 +229,7 @@ static int interrupt_cnt_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) irq_set_status_flags(priv->irq, IRQ_NOAUTOEN); ret = devm_request_irq(dev, priv->irq, interrupt_cnt_isr, - IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING | IRQF_NO_THREAD, - dev_name(dev), counter); + IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING, dev_name(dev), counter); if (ret) return ret; -- 2.51.1

1 day, 11 hours

5
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[PATCH] fs: ocfs2: fix kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain

by Prithvi Tambewagh

syzbot reported a kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain() because the `cl_next_free_rec` field of the allocation chain list is 0, triggring the BUG_ON(!cl->cl_next_free_rec) condition and panicking the kernel. To fix this, `cl_next_free_rec` is checked inside the caller of ocfs2_find_victim_chain() i.e. ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits() and if it is equal to 0, ocfs2_error() is called, to log the corruption and force the filesystem into read-only mode, to prevent further damage. Reported-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=96d38c6e1655c1420a72 Tested-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com> --- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c index 6ac4dcd54588..84bb2d11c2aa 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c @@ -1993,6 +1993,13 @@ static int ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(struct ocfs2_alloc_context *ac, cl = (struct ocfs2_chain_list *) &fe->id2.i_chain; + if (le16_to_cpu(cl->cl_next_free_rec) == 0) { + status = ocfs2_error(ac->ac_inode->i_sb, + "Chain allocator dinode %llu has 0 chains\n", + (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(fe->i_blkno)); + goto bail; + } + victim = ocfs2_find_victim_chain(cl); ac->ac_chain = victim; base-commit: 939f15e640f193616691d3bcde0089760e75b0d3 -- 2.34.1

1 day, 14 hours

1
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