The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 19:49:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation/l1tf: Drop the swap storage limit restriction
when l1tf=off
Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever
the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit
is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for
deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled.
We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is
clearly out of the limit.
Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make
much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is
forcefully disabled by the administrator.
[ tglx: Folded the documentation delta change ]
Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin(a)soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Cc: <linux-mm(a)kvack.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 05a252e5178d..835e422572eb 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2095,6 +2095,9 @@
off
Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
emit any warnings.
+ It also drops the swap size and available
+ RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and
+ bare metal.
Default is 'flush'.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
index b85dd80510b0..9af977384168 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
warnings.
+ It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+ on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
============ =============================================================
The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
@@ -576,7 +579,8 @@ Default mitigations
The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
- PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
- unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+ unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+ to ~16TB.
- L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
a guest.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index a68b32cb845a..58689ac64440 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1002,7 +1002,8 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
#endif
half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
+ if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
half_pa);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index ef99f3892e1f..427a955a2cf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void)
pages = generic_max_swapfile_size();
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) && l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF) {
/* Limit the swap file size to MAX_PA/2 for L1TF workaround */
unsigned long long l1tf_limit = l1tf_pfn_limit();
/*
The patch below does not apply to the 4.9-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
>From 5b5e4d623ec8a34689df98e42d038a3b594d2ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 19:49:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/speculation/l1tf: Drop the swap storage limit restriction
when l1tf=off
Swap storage is restricted to max_swapfile_size (~16TB on x86_64) whenever
the system is deemed affected by L1TF vulnerability. Even though the limit
is quite high for most deployments it seems to be too restrictive for
deployments which are willing to live with the mitigation disabled.
We have a customer to deploy 8x 6,4TB PCIe/NVMe SSD swap devices which is
clearly out of the limit.
Drop the swap restriction when l1tf=off is specified. It also doesn't make
much sense to warn about too much memory for the l1tf mitigation when it is
forcefully disabled by the administrator.
[ tglx: Folded the documentation delta change ]
Fixes: 377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin(a)soleen.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina(a)suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de>
Cc: <linux-mm(a)kvack.org>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181113184910.26697-1-mhocko@kernel.org
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 05a252e5178d..835e422572eb 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2095,6 +2095,9 @@
off
Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
emit any warnings.
+ It also drops the swap size and available
+ RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and
+ bare metal.
Default is 'flush'.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
index b85dd80510b0..9af977384168 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
warnings.
+ It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+ on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
============ =============================================================
The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
@@ -576,7 +579,8 @@ Default mitigations
The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
- PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
- unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
+ unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+ to ~16TB.
- L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
a guest.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index a68b32cb845a..58689ac64440 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1002,7 +1002,8 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
#endif
half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
- if (e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
+ if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
half_pa);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index ef99f3892e1f..427a955a2cf2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ unsigned long max_swapfile_size(void)
pages = generic_max_swapfile_size();
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) && l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF) {
/* Limit the swap file size to MAX_PA/2 for L1TF workaround */
unsigned long long l1tf_limit = l1tf_pfn_limit();
/*
Hello!
Please apply commit 102cd9096356 ("qmi_wwan: apply SET_DTR quirk to the
SIMCOM shared device ID") to the v4.9 and v4.14 longterm branches.
Note: There is no point in backporting it to earlier releases, as the
affected devices need the "raw-ip" feature introduced in v4.5.
Thanks,
Bjørn
Build failure log of arm - BeagleBoard-X15 board while make modules
Git branch: linux-4.14.y
Git URL: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Git commit: b8b55f8fd937348f867eb0e4098b6d658959d075
In file included from sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c:33:0:
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c:6381:48: error: 'ALC294_FIXUP_ASUS_SPK'
undeclared here (not in a function); did you mean
'ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC'?
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x10a1, "ASUS UX391UA", ALC294_FIXUP_ASUS_SPK),
^
include/sound/core.h:415:43: note: in definition of macro 'SND_PCI_QUIRK'
{_SND_PCI_QUIRK_ID(vend, dev), .value = (val)}
^~~
CC [M] drivers/cpufreq/highbank-cpufreq.o
scripts/Makefile.build:326: recipe for target
'sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.o' failed
make[5]: *** [sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.o] Error 1
- Naresh