From: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)android.com>
binder_send_failed_reply() is called when a synchronous
transaction fails. It reports an error to the thread that
is waiting for the completion. Given that the transaction
is synchronous, there should never be more than 1 error
response to that thread -- this was being asserted with
a WARN().
However, when exercising the driver with syzbot tests, cases
were observed where multiple "synchronous" requests were
sent without waiting for responses, so it is possible that
multiple errors would be reported to the thread. This testing
was conducted with panic_on_warn set which forced the crash.
This is easily reproduced by sending back-to-back
"synchronous" transactions without checking for any
response (eg, set read_size to 0):
bwr.write_buffer = (uintptr_t)&bc1;
bwr.write_size = sizeof(bc1);
bwr.read_buffer = (uintptr_t)&br;
bwr.read_size = 0;
ioctl(fd, BINDER_WRITE_READ, &bwr);
sleep(1);
bwr2.write_buffer = (uintptr_t)&bc2;
bwr2.write_size = sizeof(bc2);
bwr2.read_buffer = (uintptr_t)&br;
bwr2.read_size = 0;
ioctl(fd, BINDER_WRITE_READ, &bwr2);
sleep(1);
The first transaction is sent to the servicemanager and the reply
fails because no VMA is set up by this client. After
binder_send_failed_reply() is called, the BINDER_WORK_RETURN_ERROR
is sitting on the thread's todo list since the read_size was 0 and
the client is not waiting for a response.
The 2nd transaction is sent and the BINDER_WORK_RETURN_ERROR has not
been consumed, so the thread's reply_error.cmd is still set (normally
cleared when the BINDER_WORK_RETURN_ERROR is handled). Therefore
when the servicemanager attempts to reply to the 2nd failed
transaction, the error is already set and it triggers this warning.
This is a user error since it is not waiting for the synchronous
transaction to complete. If it ever does check, it will see an
error.
Changed the WARN() to a pr_warn().
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)android.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index c88582a..abf05aa 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -1919,8 +1919,14 @@ static void binder_send_failed_reply(struct binder_transaction *t,
&target_thread->todo);
wake_up_interruptible(&target_thread->wait);
} else {
- WARN(1, "Unexpected reply error: %u\n",
- target_thread->reply_error.cmd);
+ /*
+ * Cannot get here for normal operation, but
+ * we can if multiple synchronous transactions
+ * are sent without blocking for responses.
+ * Just ignore the 2nd error in this case.
+ */
+ pr_warn("Unexpected reply error: %u\n",
+ target_thread->reply_error.cmd);
}
binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_thread->proc);
binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread);
--
2.7.4
From: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)android.com>
User-space normally keeps the node alive when creating a transaction
since it has a reference to the target. The local strong ref keeps it
alive if the sending process dies before the target process processes
the transaction. If the source process is malicious or has a reference
counting bug, this can fail.
In this case, when we attempt to decrement the node in the failure
path, the node has already been freed.
This is fixed by taking a tmpref on the node while constructing
the transaction. To avoid re-acquiring the node lock and inner
proc lock to increment the proc's tmpref, a helper is used that
does the ref increments on both the node and proc.
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)google.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 3f9d702..fa23e45 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -2582,6 +2582,48 @@ static bool binder_proc_transaction(struct binder_transaction *t,
return true;
}
+/**
+ * binder_get_node_refs_for_txn() - Get required refs on node for txn
+ * @node: struct binder_node for which to get refs
+ * @proc: returns @node->proc if valid
+ * @error: if no @proc then returns BR_DEAD_REPLY
+ *
+ * User-space normally keeps the node alive when creating a transaction
+ * since it has a reference to the target. The local strong ref keeps it
+ * alive if the sending process dies before the target process processes
+ * the transaction. If the source process is malicious or has a reference
+ * counting bug, relying on the local strong ref can fail.
+ *
+ * Since user-space can cause the local strong ref to go away, we also take
+ * a tmpref on the node to ensure it survives while we are constructing
+ * the transaction. We also need a tmpref on the proc while we are
+ * constructing the transaction, so we take that here as well.
+ *
+ * Return: The target_node with refs taken or NULL if no @node->proc is NULL.
+ * Also sets @proc if valid. If the @node->proc is NULL indicating that the
+ * target proc has died, @error is set to BR_DEAD_REPLY
+ */
+static struct binder_node *binder_get_node_refs_for_txn(
+ struct binder_node *node,
+ struct binder_proc **procp,
+ uint32_t *error)
+{
+ struct binder_node *target_node = NULL;
+
+ binder_node_inner_lock(node);
+ if (node->proc) {
+ target_node = node;
+ binder_inc_node_nilocked(node, 1, 0, NULL);
+ binder_inc_node_tmpref_ilocked(node);
+ node->proc->tmp_ref++;
+ *procp = node->proc;
+ } else
+ *error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
+ binder_node_inner_unlock(node);
+
+ return target_node;
+}
+
static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_thread *thread,
struct binder_transaction_data *tr, int reply,
@@ -2685,43 +2727,35 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
ref = binder_get_ref_olocked(proc, tr->target.handle,
true);
if (ref) {
- binder_inc_node(ref->node, 1, 0, NULL);
- target_node = ref->node;
- }
- binder_proc_unlock(proc);
- if (target_node == NULL) {
+ target_node = binder_get_node_refs_for_txn(
+ ref->node, &target_proc,
+ &return_error);
+ } else {
binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction to invalid handle\n",
- proc->pid, thread->pid);
+ proc->pid, thread->pid);
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
- return_error_param = -EINVAL;
- return_error_line = __LINE__;
- goto err_invalid_target_handle;
}
+ binder_proc_unlock(proc);
} else {
mutex_lock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
target_node = context->binder_context_mgr_node;
- if (target_node == NULL) {
+ if (target_node)
+ target_node = binder_get_node_refs_for_txn(
+ target_node, &target_proc,
+ &return_error);
+ else
return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
- mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
- return_error_line = __LINE__;
- goto err_no_context_mgr_node;
- }
- binder_inc_node(target_node, 1, 0, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
}
- e->to_node = target_node->debug_id;
- binder_node_lock(target_node);
- target_proc = target_node->proc;
- if (target_proc == NULL) {
- binder_node_unlock(target_node);
- return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
+ if (!target_node) {
+ /*
+ * return_error is set above
+ */
+ return_error_param = -EINVAL;
return_error_line = __LINE__;
goto err_dead_binder;
}
- binder_inner_proc_lock(target_proc);
- target_proc->tmp_ref++;
- binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_proc);
- binder_node_unlock(target_node);
+ e->to_node = target_node->debug_id;
if (security_binder_transaction(proc->tsk,
target_proc->tsk) < 0) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
@@ -3071,6 +3105,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_thread)
binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread);
binder_proc_dec_tmpref(target_proc);
+ if (target_node)
+ binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
/*
* write barrier to synchronize with initialization
* of log entry
@@ -3089,6 +3125,8 @@ err_bad_parent:
err_copy_data_failed:
trace_binder_transaction_failed_buffer_release(t->buffer);
binder_transaction_buffer_release(target_proc, t->buffer, offp);
+ if (target_node)
+ binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
target_node = NULL;
t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
binder_alloc_free_buf(&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer);
@@ -3103,13 +3141,14 @@ err_bad_call_stack:
err_empty_call_stack:
err_dead_binder:
err_invalid_target_handle:
-err_no_context_mgr_node:
if (target_thread)
binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread);
if (target_proc)
binder_proc_dec_tmpref(target_proc);
- if (target_node)
+ if (target_node) {
binder_dec_node(target_node, 1, 0);
+ binder_dec_node_tmpref(target_node);
+ }
binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_FAILED_TRANSACTION,
"%d:%d transaction failed %d/%d, size %lld-%lld line %d\n",
--
2.7.4
From: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)android.com>
The binder allocator assumes that the thread that
called binder_open will never die for the lifetime of
that proc. That thread is normally the group_leader,
however it may not be. Use the group_leader instead
of current.
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)google.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index fbe0eb9..a24ad74 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3039,8 +3039,8 @@ static int binder_open(struct inode *nodp, struct file *filp)
proc = kzalloc(sizeof(*proc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (proc == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
- get_task_struct(current);
- proc->tsk = current;
+ get_task_struct(current->group_leader);
+ proc->tsk = current->group_leader;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&proc->todo);
init_waitqueue_head(&proc->wait);
proc->default_priority = task_nice(current);
--
2.7.4
From: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)android.com>
This reverts commit a906d6931f3ccaf7de805643190765ddd7378e27.
The patch introduced a race in the binder driver. An attempt to fix the
race was submitted in "[PATCH v2] android: binder: fix dangling pointer
comparison", however the conclusion in the discussion for that patch
was that the original patch should be reverted.
The reversion is being done as part of the fine-grained locking
patchset since the patch would need to be refactored when
proc->vmm_vm_mm is removed from struct binder_proc and added
in the binder allocator.
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)google.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 15b263a..b51fedc 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3246,10 +3246,6 @@ static long binder_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
/*pr_info("binder_ioctl: %d:%d %x %lx\n",
proc->pid, current->pid, cmd, arg);*/
- if (unlikely(current->mm != proc->vma_vm_mm)) {
- pr_err("current mm mismatch proc mm\n");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
trace_binder_ioctl(cmd, arg);
ret = wait_event_interruptible(binder_user_error_wait, binder_stop_on_user_error < 2);
@@ -3465,7 +3461,6 @@ static int binder_open(struct inode *nodp, struct file *filp)
return -ENOMEM;
get_task_struct(current);
proc->tsk = current;
- proc->vma_vm_mm = current->mm;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&proc->todo);
init_waitqueue_head(&proc->wait);
proc->default_priority = task_nice(current);
--
2.7.4
From: Martijn Coenen <maco(a)android.com>
binder_fd_array_object starts with a 4-byte header,
followed by a few fields that are 8 bytes when
ANDROID_BINDER_IPC_32BIT=N.
This can cause alignment issues in a 64-bit kernel
with a 32-bit userspace, as on x86_32 an 8-byte primitive
may be aligned to a 4-byte address. Pad with a __u32
to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Martijn Coenen <maco(a)android.com>
Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 4.11+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h b/include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h
index 51f891f..7668b57 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/android/binder.h
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ enum {
/* struct binder_fd_array_object - object describing an array of fds in a buffer
* @hdr: common header structure
+ * @pad: padding to ensure correct alignment
* @num_fds: number of file descriptors in the buffer
* @parent: index in offset array to buffer holding the fd array
* @parent_offset: start offset of fd array in the buffer
@@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ enum {
*/
struct binder_fd_array_object {
struct binder_object_header hdr;
+ __u32 pad;
binder_size_t num_fds;
binder_size_t parent;
binder_size_t parent_offset;
--
2.7.4