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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:12 +0000 Subject: x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 1e340c60d0dd3ae07b5bedc16a0469c14b9f3410) Add MSR and bit definitions for SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD and ARCH_CAPABILITIES. See Intel's 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ #define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR) /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ +#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ + +#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ +#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ + #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1 #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2 #define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd @@ -50,6 +57,11 @@ #define SNB_C3_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 28) #define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe + +#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a +#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ +#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */ + #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:10 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit fc67dd70adb711a45d2ef34e12d1a8be75edde61) Add three feature bits exposed by new microcode on Intel CPUs for speculation control. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -296,6 +296,9 @@ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (18*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ /* * BUG word(s) Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:09 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 95ca0ee8636059ea2800dfbac9ecac6212d6b38f) This is a pure feature bits leaf. There are two AVX512 feature bits in it already which were handled as scattered bits, and three more from this leaf are going to be added for speculation control features. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)suse.de> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-2-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 2 -- 6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_8000_000A_EDX, CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, + CPUID_7_EDX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -78,8 +79,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -100,8 +102,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 15, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 18 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -197,9 +197,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ -#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ -#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ +#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */ /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */ #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o nokaiser */ @@ -295,6 +293,10 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+3) /* Scalable MCA */ +/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW (18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ + /* * BUG word(s) */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ #define DISABLED_MASK15 0 #define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK15 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK16 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 18) +#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -737,6 +737,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx; c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx; + c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx; } /* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struc const struct cpuid_bit *cb; static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CR_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 }, - { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CR_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CR_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CR_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CR_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 }, Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:11 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit 5d10cbc91d9eb5537998b65608441b592eec65e7) AMD exposes the PRED_CMD/SPEC_CTRL MSRs slightly differently to Intel. See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2b3e25cc-286d-8bd0-aeaf-9ac4aae39de8@amd.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -258,6 +258,9 @@ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (ebx), word 13 */ #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+0) /* CLZERO instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+1) /* Instructions Retired Count */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD (13*32+12) /* Prediction Command MSR (AMD) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL (13*32+14) /* Speculation Control MSR only (AMD) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (AMD) */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (eax), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */ Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 16:14:14 +0000 Subject: x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes From: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> (cherry picked from commit a5b2966364538a0e68c9fa29bc0a3a1651799035) This doesn't refuse to load the affected microcodes; it just refuses to use the Spectre v2 mitigation features if they're detected, by clearing the appropriate feature bits. The AMD CPUID bits are handled here too, because hypervisors *may* have been exposing those bits even on Intel chips, for fine-grained control of what's available. It is non-trivial to use x86_match_cpu() for this table because that doesn't handle steppings. And the approach taken in commit bd9240a18 almost made me lose my lunch. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: gnomes(a)lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: ak(a)linux.intel.com Cc: ashok.raj(a)intel.com Cc: dave.hansen(a)intel.com Cc: karahmed(a)amazon.de Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz(a)infradead.org Cc: bp(a)alien8.de Cc: pbonzini(a)redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh(a)linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 7 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ */ #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH 0x0E + #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM 0x0F #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L 0x16 #define INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN 0x17 @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G 0x1F /* Auburndale / Havendale */ #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP 0x1A #define INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX 0x2E + #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE 0x25 #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP 0x2C #define INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX 0x2F @@ -36,9 +38,9 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E 0x46 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE 0x3D -#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E 0x47 #define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X 0x4F +#define INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D 0x56 #define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE 0x4E #define INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP 0x5E @@ -57,9 +59,10 @@ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 0x4D /* Avaton/Rangely */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT 0x4C /* CherryTrail / Braswell */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD 0x4A /* Tangier */ -#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Annidale */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD 0x5A /* Anniedale */ #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT 0x5C #define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON 0x5F /* Goldmont Microserver */ +#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE 0x7A /* Xeon Phi */ --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -61,6 +61,59 @@ void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x8 } } +/* + * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken. + * Information taken from; + * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/01/microcode-up… + * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345 + * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild + * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release + */ +struct sku_microcode { + u8 model; + u8 stepping; + u32 microcode; +}; +static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = { + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0B, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x0A, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x09, 0x84 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP, 0x03, 0xc2 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, 0x04, 0x28 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x1b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x02, 0x14 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, 0x01, 0x21 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, 0x01, 0x18 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, 0x03, 0x23 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 }, + { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a }, + /* Updated in the 20180108 release; blacklist until we know otherwise */ + { INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE, 0x01, 0x22 }, + /* Observed in the wild */ + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b }, + { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 }, +}; + +static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) { + if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model && + c->x86_mask == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping) + return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode); + } + return false; +} + static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 misc_enable; @@ -87,6 +140,19 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpui rdmsr(MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV, lower_word, c->microcode); } + if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD) || + cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) { + pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling SPEC_CTRL\n"); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SPEC_CTRL); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD); + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP); + } + /* * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41: * Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-introduce-alloc_loaded_vmcs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-eliminate-vmcs02-pool.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt-can-t-fail.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-msr-bitmaps-per-vcpu.patch queue-4.9/kvm-nvmx-mark-vmcs12-pages-dirty-on-l2-exit.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 15:50:28 -0800 Subject: module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module From: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> (cherry picked from commit caf7501a1b4ec964190f31f9c3f163de252273b8) There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the right compiler or the right option. To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source or prebuilt object files are not checked. If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org Cc: jeyu(a)kernel.org Cc: arjan(a)linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125235028.31211-1-andi@firstfloor.org Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- include/linux/module.h | 9 +++++++++ kernel/module.c | 11 +++++++++++ scripts/mod/modpost.c | 9 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -92,6 +93,19 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; +static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; + +#ifdef RETPOLINE +bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline) + return true; + + pr_err("System may be vunerable to spectre v2\n"); + spectre_v2_bad_module = true; + return false; +} +#endif static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { @@ -277,6 +291,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""); } #endif --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -791,6 +791,15 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(c static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {} #endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */ +#ifdef RETPOLINE +extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline); +#else +static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline) +{ + return true; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG static inline bool module_sig_ok(struct module *module) { --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2817,6 +2817,15 @@ static int check_modinfo_livepatch(struc } #endif /* CONFIG_LIVEPATCH */ +static void check_modinfo_retpoline(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info) +{ + if (retpoline_module_ok(get_modinfo(info, "retpoline"))) + return; + + pr_warn("%s: loading module not compiled with retpoline compiler.\n", + mod->name); +} + /* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, struct load_info *info) @@ -2969,6 +2978,8 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module * add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); } + check_modinfo_retpoline(mod, info); + if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) { add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); pr_warn("%s: module is from the staging directory, the quality " --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c @@ -2130,6 +2130,14 @@ static void add_intree_flag(struct buffe buf_printf(b, "\nMODULE_INFO(intree, \"Y\");\n"); } +/* Cannot check for assembler */ +static void add_retpoline(struct buffer *b) +{ + buf_printf(b, "\n#ifdef RETPOLINE\n"); + buf_printf(b, "MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"); + buf_printf(b, "#endif\n"); +} + static void add_staging_flag(struct buffer *b, const char *name) { static const char *staging_dir = "drivers/staging"; @@ -2474,6 +2482,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) add_header(&buf, mod); add_intree_flag(&buf, !external_module); + add_retpoline(&buf); add_staging_flag(&buf, mod->name); err |= add_versions(&buf, mod); add_depends(&buf, mod, modules); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ak(a)linux.intel.com are queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/kvm-svm-allow-direct-access-to-msr_ia32_spec_ctrl.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/module-retpoline-warn-about-missing-retpoline-in-module.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-emulate-msr_ia32_arch_capabilities.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 10:58:13 +0100 Subject: KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> (cherry picked from commit 1a29b5b7f347a1a9230c1e0af5b37e3e571588ab) Replace the indirect calls with CALL_NOSPEC. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: rga(a)amazon.de Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron(a)akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125095843.595615683@infradead.org [dwmw2: Use ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT like upstream, now we have it] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "x86.h" #include "tss.h" @@ -1012,8 +1013,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsign void (*fop)(void) = (void *)em_setcc + 4 * (condition & 0xf); flags = (flags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]" - : "=a"(rc) : [fastop]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC + : "=a"(rc) : [thunk_target]"r"(fop), [flags]"r"(flags)); return rc; } @@ -5306,15 +5307,14 @@ static void fetch_possible_mmx_operand(s static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *)) { - register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP); ulong flags = (ctxt->eflags & EFLAGS_MASK) | X86_EFLAGS_IF; if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp)) fop += __ffs(ctxt->dst.bytes) * FASTOP_SIZE; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" : "+a"(ctxt->dst.val), "+d"(ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D"(flags), - [fastop]"+S"(fop), "+r"(__sp) + [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : "c"(ctxt->src2.val)); ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK) | (flags & EFLAGS_MASK); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kaiser-fix-intel_bts-perf-crashes.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] Patch "KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe" has been added to the 4.9-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe to the 4.9-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=sum… The filename of the patch is: kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch and it can be found in the queue-4.9 subdirectory. If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> know about it. >From foo@baz Wed Feb 7 19:38:23 CST 2018 From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 10:58:14 +0100 Subject: KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> (cherry picked from commit c940a3fb1e2e9b7d03228ab28f375fb5a47ff699) Replace indirect call with CALL_NOSPEC. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj(a)intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima(a)intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2(a)infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: rga(a)amazon.de Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick(a)intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron(a)akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven(a)intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180125095843.645776917@infradead.org Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw(a)amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -8676,14 +8676,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(str #endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif "+r"(__sp) : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) ); Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from peterz(a)infradead.org are queue-4.9/kvm-x86-add-ibpb-support.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-intel-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-cpuid_7_edx-cpuid-leaf.patch queue-4.9/kvm-x86-make-indirect-calls-in-emulator-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeature-blacklist-spec_ctrl-pred_cmd-on-early-spectre-v2-microcodes.patch queue-4.9/x86-asm-fix-inline-asm-call-constraints-for-gcc-4.4.patch queue-4.9/kvm-vmx-make-indirect-call-speculation-safe.patch queue-4.9/x86-cpufeatures-add-amd-feature-bits-for-speculation-control.patch queue-4.9/x86-msr-add-definitions-for-new-speculation-control-msrs.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-make-unpoison-of-pgd-for-trusted-boot-work-for-real.patch queue-4.9/kaiser-fix-intel_bts-perf-crashes.patch queue-4.9/x86-retpoline-remove-the-esp-rsp-thunk.patch queue-4.9/x86-pti-do-not-enable-pti-on-cpus-which-are-not-vulnerable-to-meltdown.patch

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] v3.18.94 build: 0 failures 1 warnings (v3.18.94)

by Build bot for Mark Brown

Tree/Branch: v3.18.94 Git describe: v3.18.94 Commit: cde3537bd1 Linux 3.18.94 Build Time: 50 min 14 sec Passed: 9 / 9 (100.00 %) Failed: 0 / 9 ( 0.00 %) Errors: 0 Warnings: 1 Section Mismatches: 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- defconfigs with issues (other than build errors): 2 warnings 0 mismatches : x86_64-defconfig ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Warnings Summary: 1 2 ../include/linux/ftrace.h:632:36: warning: calling '__builtin_return_address' with a nonzero argument is unsafe [-Wframe-address] =============================================================================== Detailed per-defconfig build reports below: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x86_64-defconfig : PASS, 0 errors, 2 warnings, 0 section mismatches Warnings: ../include/linux/ftrace.h:632:36: warning: calling '__builtin_return_address' with a nonzero argument is unsafe [-Wframe-address] ../include/linux/ftrace.h:632:36: warning: calling '__builtin_return_address' with a nonzero argument is unsafe [-Wframe-address] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Passed with no errors, warnings or mismatches: arm64-allnoconfig arm64-allmodconfig arm-multi_v5_defconfig arm-multi_v7_defconfig arm-allmodconfig arm-allnoconfig x86_64-allnoconfig arm64-defconfig

7 years, 9 months

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[Linux-stable-mirror] A question about commit 6c16fa backported in 3.18.93

by Wang Han

Hello, I am not familiar with Linux mailing, sorry for this. I am writing this mail because I am not sure about commit 6c16fa957e84c8b640dadc4e0264ff0d2dae7aa3 added in 3.18.93. That backport made the arp.h changes in struct __ipv4_neigh_lookup(), but compared with upstream commit, I think that 3 lines should be added in __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(), as I go through the context. Also the latter would be called unconditionally if former is called so it would cover more cases. Could you please check this and let me know? Though it would 90% be my derp. Thanks, Wang

7 years, 9 months

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