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[PATCH 6.1.y RESEND v2] KVM: arm64: sys_regs: disable -Wuninitialized-const-pointer warning

by Justin Stitt

A new warning in Clang 22 [1] complains that @clidr passed to get_clidr_el1() is an uninitialized const pointer. get_clidr_el1() doesn't really care since it casts away the const-ness anyways -- it is a false positive. This patch isn't needed for anything past 6.1 as this code section was reworked in Commit 7af0c2534f4c ("KVM: arm64: Normalize cache configuration") which incidentally removed the aforementioned warning. Since there is no upstream equivalent, this patch just needs to be applied to 6.1. Disable this warning for sys_regs.o instead of backporting the patches from 6.2+ that modified this code area. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7c8c5e6a9101e ("arm64: KVM: system register handling") Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/00dacf8c22f065cb52efb14cd091d44… [1] Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com> --- Changes in v2: - disable warning for TU instead of initialising the struct - update commit message - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250724-b4-clidr-unint-const-ptr-v1-1-67c4d620… - Link to v1 resend (sent wrong diff, thanks Nathan): https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251204-b4-clidr-unint-const-ptr-v1-1-95161315… --- arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile index 5e33c2d4645a..5fdb5331bfad 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ kvm-y += arm.o mmu.o mmio.o psci.o hypercalls.o pvtime.o \ kvm-$(CONFIG_HW_PERF_EVENTS) += pmu-emul.o pmu.o +# Work around a false positive Clang 22 -Wuninitialized-const-pointer warning +CFLAGS_sys_regs.o := $(call cc-disable-warning, uninitialized-const-pointer) + always-y := hyp_constants.h hyp-constants.s define rule_gen_hyp_constants --- base-commit: 830b3c68c1fb1e9176028d02ef86f3cf76aa2476 change-id: 20250728-stable-disable-unit-ptr-warn-281fee82539c Best regards, -- Justin Stitt <justinstitt(a)google.com>

1 day, 14 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] gpio: loongson: Switch 2K2000/3000 GPIO to BYTE_CTRL_MODE" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x dae9750105cf93ac1e156ef91f4beeb53bd64777 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122958-statue-subtotal-2f1c@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From dae9750105cf93ac1e156ef91f4beeb53bd64777 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xi Ruoyao <xry111(a)xry111.site> Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 15:50:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] gpio: loongson: Switch 2K2000/3000 GPIO to BYTE_CTRL_MODE The manuals of 2K2000 says both BIT_CTRL_MODE and BYTE_CTRL_MODE are supported but the latter is recommended. Also on 2K3000, per the ACPI DSDT the GPIO controller is compatible with 2K2000, but it fails to operate GPIOs 62 and 63 (and maybe others) using BIT_CTRL_MODE. Using BYTE_CTRL_MODE also makes those 2K3000 GPIOs work. Fixes: 3feb70a61740 ("gpio: loongson: add more gpio chip support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111(a)xry111.site> Reviewed-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251128075033.255821-1-xry111@xry111.site Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-loongson-64bit.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-loongson-64bit.c index d4e291b275f0..77d07e31366f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-loongson-64bit.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-loongson-64bit.c @@ -408,11 +408,11 @@ static const struct loongson_gpio_chip_data loongson_gpio_ls2k2000_data0 = { static const struct loongson_gpio_chip_data loongson_gpio_ls2k2000_data1 = { .label = "ls2k2000_gpio", - .mode = BIT_CTRL_MODE, - .conf_offset = 0x0, - .in_offset = 0x20, - .out_offset = 0x10, - .inten_offset = 0x30, + .mode = BYTE_CTRL_MODE, + .conf_offset = 0x800, + .in_offset = 0xa00, + .out_offset = 0x900, + .inten_offset = 0xb00, }; static const struct loongson_gpio_chip_data loongson_gpio_ls2k2000_data2 = {

1 day, 14 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122959-unawake-devious-8898@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 19:04:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options() strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed: strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Call Trace: <TASK> __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039 strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline] sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline] parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline] __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline] path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63 characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a non-NUL-term string here. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 7de15249e826..d1ba894c0e0a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - char s_mount_opts[65]; + char s_mount_opts[64]; struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL; struct fs_context *fc = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -2484,7 +2484,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) return 0; - strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts); + if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts) < 0) + return -E2BIG; fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc)

1 day, 15 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122936-jaunt-sliding-0a13@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 09:01:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in memory for journal sb Copying the file system while it is mounted as read-only results in a mount failure: [~]# mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sdc [~]# mount /dev/sdc -o ro /mnt/test [~]# dd if=/dev/sdc of=/dev/sda bs=1M [~]# mount /dev/sda /mnt/test1 [ 1094.849826] JBD2: journal checksum error [ 1094.850927] EXT4-fs (sda): Could not load journal inode mount: mount /dev/sda on /mnt/test1 failed: Bad message The process described above is just an abstracted way I came up with to reproduce the issue. In the actual scenario, the file system was mounted read-only and then copied while it was still mounted. It was found that the mount operation failed. The user intended to verify the data or use it as a backup, and this action was performed during a version upgrade. Above issue may happen as follows: ext4_fill_super set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb) if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) incompat = JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_CSUM_V3; if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal, compat, 0, incompat); lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); //The data in the journal sb was modified, but the checksum was not updated, so the data remaining in memory has a mismatch between the data and the checksum. unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); In this case, the journal sb copied over is in a state where the checksum and data are inconsistent, so mounting fails. To solve the above issue, update the checksum in memory after modifying the journal sb. Fixes: 4fd5ea43bc11 ("jbd2: checksum journal superblock") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251103010123.3753631-1-yebin(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c index 2fe1786a8f1b..c973162d5b31 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c @@ -2354,6 +2354,12 @@ int jbd2_journal_set_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb->s_feature_compat |= cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat |= cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); @@ -2383,9 +2389,17 @@ void jbd2_journal_clear_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb = journal->j_superblock; + lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat &= ~cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); + unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_clear_features);

1 day, 15 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122935-turban-sweep-c818@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 09:01:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in memory for journal sb Copying the file system while it is mounted as read-only results in a mount failure: [~]# mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sdc [~]# mount /dev/sdc -o ro /mnt/test [~]# dd if=/dev/sdc of=/dev/sda bs=1M [~]# mount /dev/sda /mnt/test1 [ 1094.849826] JBD2: journal checksum error [ 1094.850927] EXT4-fs (sda): Could not load journal inode mount: mount /dev/sda on /mnt/test1 failed: Bad message The process described above is just an abstracted way I came up with to reproduce the issue. In the actual scenario, the file system was mounted read-only and then copied while it was still mounted. It was found that the mount operation failed. The user intended to verify the data or use it as a backup, and this action was performed during a version upgrade. Above issue may happen as follows: ext4_fill_super set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb) if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) incompat = JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_CSUM_V3; if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal, compat, 0, incompat); lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); //The data in the journal sb was modified, but the checksum was not updated, so the data remaining in memory has a mismatch between the data and the checksum. unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); In this case, the journal sb copied over is in a state where the checksum and data are inconsistent, so mounting fails. To solve the above issue, update the checksum in memory after modifying the journal sb. Fixes: 4fd5ea43bc11 ("jbd2: checksum journal superblock") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251103010123.3753631-1-yebin(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c index 2fe1786a8f1b..c973162d5b31 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c @@ -2354,6 +2354,12 @@ int jbd2_journal_set_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb->s_feature_compat |= cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat |= cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); @@ -2383,9 +2389,17 @@ void jbd2_journal_clear_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb = journal->j_superblock; + lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat &= ~cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); + unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_clear_features);

1 day, 15 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122957-crevice-busily-7e0e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 19:04:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options() strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed: strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Call Trace: <TASK> __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039 strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline] sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline] parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline] __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline] path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63 characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a non-NUL-term string here. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 7de15249e826..d1ba894c0e0a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - char s_mount_opts[65]; + char s_mount_opts[64]; struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL; struct fs_context *fc = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -2484,7 +2484,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) return 0; - strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts); + if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts) < 0) + return -E2BIG; fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc)

1 day, 15 hours

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122956-dropkick-outlast-5a49@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From ee5a977b4e771cc181f39d504426dbd31ed701cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2025 19:04:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] ext4: fix string copying in parse_apply_sb_mount_options() strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bca5 ("string.h: Introduce memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed: strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032 Call Trace: <TASK> __fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039 strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline] sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline] parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline] __ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline] ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline] path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63 characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a non-NUL-term string here. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 8ecb790ea8c3 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 7de15249e826..d1ba894c0e0a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fs_context *m_ctx) { struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb); - char s_mount_opts[65]; + char s_mount_opts[64]; struct ext4_fs_context *s_ctx = NULL; struct fs_context *fc = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; @@ -2484,7 +2484,8 @@ static int parse_apply_sb_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, if (!sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts[0]) return 0; - strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts); + if (strscpy_pad(s_mount_opts, sbi->s_es->s_mount_opts) < 0) + return -E2BIG; fc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fs_context), GFP_KERNEL); if (!fc)

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 6.1-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.1.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122934-exclude-sevenfold-d418@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.1.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 6abfe107894af7e8ce3a2e120c619d81ee764ad5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Date: Mon, 3 Nov 2025 09:01:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] jbd2: fix the inconsistency between checksum and data in memory for journal sb Copying the file system while it is mounted as read-only results in a mount failure: [~]# mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sdc [~]# mount /dev/sdc -o ro /mnt/test [~]# dd if=/dev/sdc of=/dev/sda bs=1M [~]# mount /dev/sda /mnt/test1 [ 1094.849826] JBD2: journal checksum error [ 1094.850927] EXT4-fs (sda): Could not load journal inode mount: mount /dev/sda on /mnt/test1 failed: Bad message The process described above is just an abstracted way I came up with to reproduce the issue. In the actual scenario, the file system was mounted read-only and then copied while it was still mounted. It was found that the mount operation failed. The user intended to verify the data or use it as a backup, and this action was performed during a version upgrade. Above issue may happen as follows: ext4_fill_super set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb) if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) incompat = JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_CSUM_V3; if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal, compat, 0, incompat); lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); //The data in the journal sb was modified, but the checksum was not updated, so the data remaining in memory has a mismatch between the data and the checksum. unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); In this case, the journal sb copied over is in a state where the checksum and data are inconsistent, so mounting fails. To solve the above issue, update the checksum in memory after modifying the journal sb. Fixes: 4fd5ea43bc11 ("jbd2: checksum journal superblock") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Message-ID: <20251103010123.3753631-1-yebin(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c index 2fe1786a8f1b..c973162d5b31 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c @@ -2354,6 +2354,12 @@ int jbd2_journal_set_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb->s_feature_compat |= cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat |= cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); @@ -2383,9 +2389,17 @@ void jbd2_journal_clear_features(journal_t *journal, unsigned long compat, sb = journal->j_superblock; + lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); sb->s_feature_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(compat); sb->s_feature_ro_compat &= ~cpu_to_be32(ro); sb->s_feature_incompat &= ~cpu_to_be32(incompat); + /* + * Update the checksum now so that it is valid even for read-only + * filesystems where jbd2_write_superblock() doesn't get called. + */ + if (jbd2_journal_has_csum_v2or3(journal)) + sb->s_checksum = jbd2_superblock_csum(sb); + unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer); jbd2_journal_init_transaction_limits(journal); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(jbd2_journal_clear_features);

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122900-scorer-malformed-d565@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:58:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming from external I/O cause on only limited harm. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: bcfff8384f6c ("tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array") Tested-by: Lai Yi <yi1.lai(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)opinsys.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 30d00219f9f3..082b910ddf0d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); - kfree(chip->allocated_banks); #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC kfree(chip->auth); #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c index cf64c7385105..b49a790f1bd5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c @@ -799,11 +799,6 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr) */ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(1, sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) - return -ENOMEM; - chip->allocated_banks[0].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1; chip->allocated_banks[0].digest_size = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]; chip->allocated_banks[0].crypto_id = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5532e53a2dd3..dd502322f499 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -550,11 +550,9 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]); - - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(nr_possible_banks, - sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) { + if (nr_possible_banks > TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS) { + pr_err("tpm: out of bank capacity: %u > %u\n", + nr_possible_banks, TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index b15360ff78d7..53de9488c509 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ #include <crypto/aes.h> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ -#define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + +#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE +#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8 struct tpm_chip; struct trusted_key_payload; @@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ enum tpm2_curves { struct tpm_digest { u16 alg_id; - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; struct tpm_bank_info { @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { unsigned int groups_cnt; u32 nr_allocated_banks; - struct tpm_bank_info *allocated_banks; + struct tpm_bank_info allocated_banks[TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS]; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle; char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];

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FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

by gregkh＠linuxfoundation.org

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>. To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e # <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.> git commit -s git send-email --to '<stable(a)vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025122900-hassle-blush-5272@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^.. Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From faf07e611dfa464b201223a7253e9dc5ee0f3c9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2025 15:58:02 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] tpm: Cap the number of PCR banks tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() does not cap any upper limit for the number of banks. Cap the limit to eight banks so that out of bounds values coming from external I/O cause on only limited harm. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: bcfff8384f6c ("tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array") Tested-by: Lai Yi <yi1.lai(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles(a)meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen(a)opinsys.com> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 30d00219f9f3..082b910ddf0d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -246,7 +246,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf); kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf); - kfree(chip->allocated_banks); #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC kfree(chip->auth); #endif diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c index cf64c7385105..b49a790f1bd5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c @@ -799,11 +799,6 @@ int tpm1_pm_suspend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 tpm_suspend_pcr) */ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) { - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(1, sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) - return -ENOMEM; - chip->allocated_banks[0].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1; chip->allocated_banks[0].digest_size = hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO_SHA1]; chip->allocated_banks[0].crypto_id = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5532e53a2dd3..dd502322f499 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -550,11 +550,9 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) nr_possible_banks = be32_to_cpup( (__be32 *)&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 5]); - - chip->allocated_banks = kcalloc(nr_possible_banks, - sizeof(*chip->allocated_banks), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!chip->allocated_banks) { + if (nr_possible_banks > TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS) { + pr_err("tpm: out of bank capacity: %u > %u\n", + nr_possible_banks, TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index b15360ff78d7..53de9488c509 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ #include <crypto/aes.h> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ -#define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + +#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE +#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8 struct tpm_chip; struct trusted_key_payload; @@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ enum tpm2_curves { struct tpm_digest { u16 alg_id; - u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } __packed; struct tpm_bank_info { @@ -189,7 +191,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { unsigned int groups_cnt; u32 nr_allocated_banks; - struct tpm_bank_info *allocated_banks; + struct tpm_bank_info allocated_banks[TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS]; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle; char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1];

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